

relativity (81–87), but makes some scientific gaffs. Hadrons and bosons are not particles but classes of particles; and protons, far from having an existence “brief in the extreme” (92), are quite stable hadrons. Neither are they mutually exclusive classes (mesons are both hadrons and bosons). Similarly the claim that “chemical reactions contribute to the explosion of stars” confuses chemical with nuclear processes (309). Also G’s insistence that angels have mass/energy would have them subject to gravity—angels could then be sucked into black holes—and their existence open to scientific verification.

Overall this work adopts a number of difficult and controversial positions, only some of which I mentioned above. Given the standing of the author, the book will likely generate significant discussion. The advantage of G.’s approach is that the clarity of its exposition makes it easy to identify where one disagrees and why. His position is relatively coherent, and he follows through even where his conclusions differ from more commonly received positions.

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Max Weber’s Theory of Personality. By Sara R. Farris. Studies in Critical Social Sciences 56. Leiden: Brill. 2013. Pp. xii + 229. \$40.79.

By setting out Weber’s theory of the Puritan personality with its counterparts, Farris’s promising work mirrors one of Weber’s investigative methods: he demonstrated what a mystic is by contrasting the mystic with the ascetic, and he clarified charisma by contrasting it with traditional and bureaucratic authority. The topic of Weber’s concept of personality has been relatively neglected in secondary literature, but the few scholars who have investigated it have underscored its importance in Weber’s thinking. These scholars focus on Weber’s writings on Protestantism because they recognize that his concept of personality is based on the thought of American Puritans. These scholars also acknowledge that Weber was convinced that the Puritan emphasis on the individual helped break the power of authority. F. agrees but argues that it is insufficient to focus exclusively on the Protestant writings, and that, by examining the other cultures in Weber’s sociology of religion, we can arrive at a much fuller picture of his theory of personality. Unfortunately, the book’s promise is diminished because of significant omissions and flaws.

Chapter 1 provides the philosophical context for Weber’s notion of the “historical individual.” Chapter 2 charts his movement from the philosophical notion of the historical individual to the sociological concept of personality, which F. locates within the German concept of *Bildung*,” noting that *Bildung* is more than an education and aimed at the formation of the entire individual. Chapter 3 focuses on Weber’s notion of personality as found generally in Protestant circles, particularly in its most sharpened formulation in American Puritanism. This focus depicts the active individual who is driven by his or her faith, but whose personality develops partially as a response to community

members. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are devoted to Weber's delineation of personality's opposite: the "non-personality" treated in his studies on ancient Judaism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Chapter 7 links Weber's sociological notion of personality with his concept of the political leader. F. believes that for Weber charisma is the most important part of leadership, but she finds fault with his "Orientalist" and "Western-centric" outlook. The chapters devoted to the ethics of the world religions are clear and quite accurate; the problems are found mostly in the introductory chapters and the conclusion.

The problems involve some serious omissions, including very important contributions to various aspects of Weber's sociology of religion by such scholars as Edith Hanke, Hans Kippenberg, Volker Krech, Hubert Treiber, and Martin Riesebrodt. Also, no mention is made of the crucial collection *Max Webers "Religionssystematik"* edited by Kippenburg and Riesebrodt (2001). Nor does F. explain why she bypasses the standard and definitive volumes of Weber's collected writings (*Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* [1984]). Not only are these volumes critical editions, but they contain important and lengthy introductions, numerous clarifying footnotes, and exemplary editorial additions.

Some flaws may have resulted from F.'s omissions. Her treatment of Weber's notion of causality is oversimplified in general and wrong at certain points. She would have likely benefited from the writings by some of the best scholars on Weber's concept of causality, including H. H. Bruun, Stephen Turner, Heinz Zipprian, Gerhard Wagner, and, more recently, Ole Algevall.

Other flaws are simply errors of commission. F. misinterprets the conflict over historical methods and misunderstands the Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism. Specifically, she is wrong about Heinrich Rickert's philosophy and about Emil Lask's philosophy of history. Another big problem is F.'s lack of understanding of prophecy: Weber's notions of "vessel" and "instrument" are found not in his discussions on prophecy but in his distinction between the ascetic and the mystic. Weber maintained that the radical Protestant ascetic was convinced that he is God's "instrument," and therefore must do God's work in this world. In contrast, the traditional Catholic mystic believed himself to be like a "vessel" in which to receive God, and he was convinced that this world had no value and looked forward to heaven. While F. has a basic understanding of charisma, she does not fully comprehend Weber's notion of the political leader. Some of these flaws can be traced to her emphasis on Marx and the blurring of Weber's distinction between politics and scholarship. Further, it is highly unlikely that Weber would have regarded sociology as a bridge between scholarly theory and "political praxis."

While F.'s work offers a significant contribution to an important and neglected topic on Max Weber, her errors are significant and detract from the book's value. Her thesis regarding Weber's theory of personality may not be completely convincing, but it is certainly provocative—and that makes her book well worth reading.

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