

## CURRENT THEOLOGY

### RELIGION

PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION. Much concerning this topic can be gathered from a review written by Ed. Dhanis, S.J. in the *Nouv. Rev. Théol.* [63 (1936) 196] on the lengthy work of G. van der Leeuw, entitled "Phänomenologie der Religion," (Tübingen, 1934, Mohr, xii-670). Phenomenology is not history of religion; it is not concerned with the origin and evolution of religion; it supposes its facts from this science. Neither is it a psychology of religion, for it does not *limit* its study to psychic processes, cognitional or affective. Nor is it a philosophy of religion, since it prescind from any discussion of the value (intrinsic or extrinsic) of religious forms, and even from the objective realities which are claimed in various faiths, and finally from the metaphysical entities at the basis of religious thought. Phenomenology seeks to describe accurately *the structure, both subjective and objective, of religious phenomena, to discover the network of intelligible reasons which unify them, and thus, to classify them.* Max Scheler presents an essential religious phenomenology; it deals with universal phenomena. Leeuw writes upon concrete phenomenology. After an analysis, commended by the reviewer (though not unreservedly) for its penetration, finesse, and erudition, Leeuw proposes the structure of the great world religions. Mazdism is the religion of combat; the Greek, of impetuous desire and 'figuration'; Brahminism and Hinduism, of the infinite and ascetic; Buddhism, of Nirvana and of compassion; Israelitic, of Divine will and submission; Islamic, of Divine majesty and humility; Christian, of the plenitude of love. In passing from this concrete discussion of the religions, the peoples who professed them, their founders, apostles, reformers and defenders, Leeuw follows the essential or abstract phenomenology of Scheler and Otto, and finds that, in basis and universally, all religion is "Erlösungsreligion," a religion of redemption and salvation. The author is not a rationalist; he has the viewpoint of the conservative Protestant.

Phenomenology claims to deal with the religious fact and seek its structure. It is allied when it comes to practical application to what is being called Phenomenalism. An analysis of this will be found in Bernhard Jansen's article, "Intellectualismus—Irrationalismus auf dem Gebiet der Moral und Religion," in *Stimmen der Zeit* [135 (1938) 2,135]. Though principally concerned with Critica and Ontology, the theory has its effect on religion and morals. For it holds that there is no ontologic basis of good, religion, ethics; it denies the validity of basic judgments such as, Good is to be done. It denies a relation between being and value, and excludes the intellectual from religion. The value it does admit is found in the field of the voluntary and of the emotional.

**THE RECENT EXISTENTIALPHILOSOPHIE.** The political and religious creed of many of the youth of Germany has been influenced by the writings of Martin Heidegger, called the metaphysician of Nazism. His first volume provoked a thorough analysis and critique by A. Delp, S. J., the title of whose work sums up the philosophy of Heidegger, "Tragische Existenz. Zur Philosophie Martin Heidegger (Frib. 1935, Herder, 128). In the *Nouv. Rev. Théol.* [63 (June, 1936) 561-580] H. Thielemans, S. J., writes on the same topic, "Existence Tragique. La Métaphysique du Nazisme," and agrees substantially with Delp's analysis, differs in some details and reflections.

Heidegger with all philosophers seeks the solution of the riddle of life. This is not found in the study of our essence, but of our existence, for there we find what we ought to do and how we ought to exist. Individual existence is the proper source to investigate. Now existence is bound by the bournes of *this* world; its ultimate end is in this world. Heidegger's fundamental concept is that Man, or Existence, is a *Concrete Time*. This 'Time' is finite, intrinsically and absolutely, and death is not external to life; it is a viewpoint from which life is studied; it does not differ from life; for that which dies is more non-being than being. This 'Time' again, is conscious of itself, that is, conscious of what it is in itself, that is, non-being. It knows it has been projected into existence, but not from where; it knows it holds existence in its hands, but also that it does not control it; it knows that it is isolated and alone and forgotten; it does not know whither it goes. Hence all existence fundamentally is anxiety, fear, anguish, perturbation. Man, therefore, in his existence is a Concrete Time, a Nothing, conscious and in anguish. Heidegger is not using a rhetorical figure when he calls man a lapse of time; he is solemnly philosophizing.

Anguish plays a prominent role in this philosophy of life. For alone it makes life comprehensible, alone it links the experience of the past and the fear of the future, and this gives life unity. Anguish is present in every act of becoming, every passing from potency to act, in which it is aided by the world about it. The world, which is only relatively existent to lonely man, is real (In T's view, Heidegger is not an idealist).

What ought man do in and with this world? Being nothing, from nothing, and destined for nothingness, he is to devote himself to those things which the world offers; thereby he lives 'becoming' and reaches the term of his potencies. But the world is too large for anyone to use all its means; hence this devotion is to be paid to the world *about us*, to *our* section of existence. In practice, this is to consecrate existence to the building of a terrestrial civilization and culture in *our* surroundings. For oneself one does nothing, since one is nothing and is to go nowhere. But for the world, the Umwelt, existence must have the courage of the anguish of death in its work amid the things of the world. Thus the ideal of life, its only *raison d'être* is its

destined immersion in a community of existences in order to build with them a new terrestrial culture.

Now this 'finitisme titaneseque,' as it has been called, has strangely enthused men. Thielemans quotes from H. Naumann, "*Germanischer Schicksal-glaube*." "We go out from Heidegger's philosophy,—regenerated, . . . not with sorrow for or a feeling of sin, not with self-contentment or a resolve to improve, but with a consciousness of our abandoned and dejected existence which is governed by fate. Knowing that our end is a final nothingness, nonetheless we consecrate our talents to the imposed task, . . . that gives us the feeling of true grandeur, . . . and the attitude in which man perishes, but perishes as a hero."

An equally devastating exposé of the Existentialphilosophie is to be found in a more recent article of August Brenner, S. J., entitled, "Die Entwertung des Seins in der Existentialphilosophie," [*Scholastik*, 12 (1937), 2,233]. Though most philosophies agree that being is good, while they may differ on the reason, Schopenhauer and Hartmann were pessimists; yet they hoped for escape in another life. Nietzsche, too, was a pessimist, but without this escape; he invented, or rather, refurbished another escape, the transmigration of souls. But Heidegger plumps for extinction. Again, his forerunners found the anguish of life in external causes; Heidegger finds it at the very basis and essence of existence. In Levinas, through whom this philosophy has appeared in the *Rech. Philosoph.* [4 (1935) 373] existence is called "nausea," and nature is described as in flight from itself with no refuge; existence is thus an "evasion," a quest between two nothings.

## APOLOGETICS

THE SANCTITY OF CHRIST. A page out of Mohammedan Apologetics will prove that it is still important to solve very ordinary difficulties against the Sanctity of Christ. In "*The Islamic Review*," [27 (1939) 306-312], Chishtie writes on "Jesus and Morality." The bulk of the article is devoted to a discussion of the pericope concerning the adulteress. Here, it is claimed, there is a low form of morality in the act of mercy, and also a low norm of morality in judging, for the guilt or innocence of the accusers is not in question in arriving at a just sentence. Hence, even Christians have rejected the norm of conduct, here exemplified; no Christian state has written a law of such a kind. Christian writers, too, have rejected the story, among others, one of the most influential, Augustine. The second part of the article attacks our Lord for his conduct in supplying wine at Cana. The Islamic mind is evident in the spirit of the article, the hatred of wine, and the severity upon leniency towards any misconduct of women.

THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST. The *Congregational Quarterly* [17 (Oct.

1939) 4, 494] reports upon "The 13th Congregational Theological Conference, 1939," which was held by the English body of Congregationalists. The topic of the Conference was "The Person of Christ." In the summarized report of the proceedings, there is but one paper which presents the orthodox Christian view, upon the Person of Christ; there are several papers which hold to various forms of the liberal view.

## SACRED SCRIPTURE

**VULGATE'S IMPORTANCE.** The Wuerttemberg Bible Society (Protestant) has published the 7th, enlarged edition of Dr. Alfred Schmoller's Concordance to the Greek New Testament. With this issue the author has introduced a new feature. Beside each Greek word he has added the corresponding Latin Vulgate translation. A reviewer in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* [1939, 133], H. G. Opitz, remarks that this feature alone would make the book indispensable for students.

**OLD LATIN VERSION OF NEW TESTAMENT** published. Adolf Juelicher did not live to see the publication of his book "*Itala. Das Neue Testament.*" The loss of his sight caused the work to be finished by Walter Matzkow. Juelicher recognized that besides the version current in Italy there was an ancient African translation not influenced by the translation then current in Italy. In the printed book the *Itala* text as restored by the author is first given and under it the text of the *African* (or *Afra*). The publisher announces that Mark and Luke will appear soon [*Theol Lit* (1939) 132].

**TRENT NOT AGAINST HEBREW TEXT.** A writer in *Beihelft zur Z N W*, 66., Stummer, emphasizes the importance of the Vulgate for textual criticism. All will be glad to hear, says a writer in *Th L Zeitung* (1930) 120, that the opinion that Council of Trent in 1546 forbade Catholics to use the Hebrew Bible, is a fable.

**LAGRANGE'S LA CRITIQUE RATIONELLE PRAISED.** H. Seesemann [*Theol. Lit. Zeitung* (1939) 133-4] says the book is the most complete that has appeared in this field for many years. He judges it an immensely useful reference book (ein ungeheuer brauchbares Arbeitsbuch).

H. G. Opitz [editor of *Theol. Lit. Zeit.*] calls A. Nock's St. Paul the best NT book of 1938 [*ibid.* (1939) 136]. Nock's thesis is that Paul is explained merely as a Pharisee and as influenced by the synagogue and Pharisaic piety. Christianity really started not with Paul but with the Jerusalem community, when they brought the death of Jesus into agreement with the OT.

**THE ZWEIFUELLE THEORY.** The "Q" Hypothesis receives an accurate and devastating criticism in the article, "St. Luke's Debt to St. Matthew," by Christopher Butler, of Downside Abbey [*Harvard Theol. Rev.* 32 (1939) 237-308]. The author states that his argument "is based, substan-

tially, not on theories of Christian development to which it has been sought to bring the literary data into conformity, but on a direct application to those data of general principles of comparative documentary criticism" (237). After setting down the principles, the author discusses the dependence of the Third Gospel, first on the Second, and then on the First. He shows that in fact as well as in principle, "unless external considerations urge, it is unscientific to conjecture hypothetical documents to explain correspondences for which a theory of direct interdependence is sufficient." The author applies his canon to five important passages in the Synoptic Gospels.

GOSPEL CHRONOLOGY: THE LENGTH OF OUR LORD'S MINISTRY. Dom Bernard Orchard in his article, "The Two-Year Public Ministry Viewed and Reviewed" [*Downside Review*, 57 (Ju. 1939) 308-339], combines a valuable review of recent chronological discussion with a new approach of his own in solution of the vexed question of the length of Christ's public ministry. The article is a searching critique of the book of E. Sutcliffe, S. J. "A Two-Year Public Ministry." Fr. Sutcliffe, using the recent material supplied in E. Power's article in *Biblica* (1928), U. Holzmeister's "*Chronologia Vitae Christi*" (1933), and T. Corbishley's article in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (1935), made the principal supports of his contention the following points: i) the Crucifixion occurred on April 7, 30; ii) the "yet a four month and the harvest cometh" (Jo. 4, 36) is not a proverb, but a literal chronological notice; iii) the Galilean ministry which followed the first public ministry in Judea began about December and was short; iv) the 5th and 6th chapters of Saint John are to be reversed in order to present the chronological sequence; v) the feast of John, 6, 4, was certainly a Pasch (the parallel place in Mark speaks of 'green grass'), and the feast of John 5, 1, is *the same Pasch*.

Dom Orchard agrees with the general thesis of a two-year ministry; he accepts the fact that the Galilean ministry which followed the event in Samaria was short. He refuses to accept the reversal in Saint John's chapters, pointing out other places in the Fourth Gospel where the occidental mind might argue for a logical reversal which an oriental would not bother about. Concerning the two feasts, he argues that Jo. 6, 4, is a second Pasch, and that the feast of Jo. 5, 1, is not the same nor another Pasch nor a feast following the Pasch of Jo. 6, 4. It is a feast before the Pasch of Jo. 6, 4, and it may be Purim. He stresses the view of Sutcliffe that the Galilean ministry was short, and points out the emphatic place in the argument to be given to the fact that the year 29 was a leap-year, and that a month, Ve-adar, was intercalated. Hence there is plenty of time (since the Pasch was later) for the Galilean ministry up as far as the feeding of the five thousand, the event found in all four Gospels.

## THE ONE GOD

**THE DIVINE SANCTITY.** An excellent and thorough article concerning Holiness appears in *Divus Thomas* [17 (Sept. 1939) 258-288] entitled "Formale und objective Heiligkeit." The first article (others will follow) deals with the Divine Sanctity. The author is Rev. Dr. Alexander Horvath, O. P. After noting that the Divine activity is directed inwardly and ad extra, that it is both free and natural, the author develops the two aspects of the Divine Holiness, the negative aspect (to be found in the faultlessness and spotlessness of God) and the positive (the moral dignity of the Divine majesty).<sup>1</sup> At the end of the article is an excellent analytical conspectus of the Divine Holiness in God, in the processions of the Word and of the Holy Ghost. The table is in Latin and runs three pages (285-288).

**GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURIBLES.** The author of a long article in the *Collectanea Franciscana* [9 (Ju. 1939) 3, 321-361] purposes to examine the writings of Saint Bonaventure on God's foreknowledge of free acts, and to reverse the admission, long made among Franciscan theologians, that the Seraphic Doctor so phrased his doctrine as to favor a Molinistic interpretation. The article is entitled, "La prescience divine selon saint Bonaventure," by P. Marie Bernard d'Ypres, O. M. Cap. He premises that Bonaventure never discussed the question explicitly or systematically; yet his principles are clear. He notes that B's opinion on whether God knows the contingent free futures in His eternity is disputed among Franciscans, and whether He knows them in His ideas is also a point of discussion, while almost all Franciscan writers say that Bonaventure favors the direction taken by the supporters of the *Scientia Media*. The writer then examines the parts of Bonaventure's theology which touch upon the question. He finds that the fundamental reason why the futuribles are knowable to God is the Divine Truth itself, which is, in Bonaventure, recurringly, *Lux summe expressiva*. This Light in no wise *depends* on the future free act, though it involves *ordinationem et connotationem*. The future act is objective, its objectivity being in the exemplary idea of God, which represents things under their every aspect, and hence under their future aspect. The principal text which is cited as amenable to a Molinistic interpretation is discussed by Mastrius in his 40th Dist. on the *First Book of the Sentences* (art. 2. qu. 1, ad 1, 2, 3). Mastrius, though holding his own doctrine of condetermination, admits that Bonaventure favors the *Scientia Media*; d'Ypres admits that the text is interpretable in the Molinistic sense, but ought not so to be interpreted in view of Bonaventure's general doctrine on the ideas and knowledge of God.

<sup>1</sup>The definition of Fr. Horvath is: Die formale Heiligkeit als eine naturhafte Eigenschaft Gottes wäre demnach die der Würde Gottes entsprechende Betätigung seiner Macht, sofern jeder innere oder äussere Vorgang vollkommen jenen Gesetzen entspricht die ihn regeln, und daher selber fehler- und makellos ist."

The Scientia Media interposes a Divine decree between the futuribles and the futures; Bonaventure has no decree; hence the two systems diverge on an essential point. At the conclusion the author recognizes that the opinion of Saint Bonaventure is not a fully complete explanation; it does not explain certain elements, but yet, according to the writer, neither do the supporters of the Scientia Media explain "d'où vient à Dieu cette connaissance de toutes les hypothèses possibles, mais assurent que c'est là un mode de connaître propre à Dieu, ope scientiae mediae."

## THE VIRTUES

LOVE, LOVE AND A KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. The topic of love and charity has been the object of much discussion in non-Catholic religious writings in German in recent years, and since it will probably appear more prominently in similar writings in America because of a marked sociological trend, the reader is referred to a brief but compact essay in *Stimmen der Zeit* [136 (Sept. 1939) 12, 398-403] by H. U. von Balthasar, S. J., entitled, "Eros und Agape." The author discusses the recent writing upon the cleavage between the two sorts of love, the spiritual and the lower form. In his first paragraphs he gives a panoramic sketch of the way in which the distinction has been made in various periods of thought. There is the Platonic Eros and the Christian Agape, which in Augustine appear as Cupiditas and Caritas, in Aquinas, as Amor Concupiscentiae and Amor Benevolentiae, in the Renaissance, as the earthly and celestial loves, in Protestantism as the sinful and egocentric love and the redemptive love.

There can be no doubt that this modern movement to base religion on love is nothing but an attempt to escape from the position in which the Kantian philosophy has placed modern thought. In principle Kant's Critique sought to invalidate and destroy the ontological basis of realism which in the Scholastic philosophy was essential in the proof of the existence of God; to have a God at all, Kant was driven to seek proof in the volitional part of man. That many modern writers, accepting the materialistic denial of a spiritual will, have been forced to seek God in the lower emotional part of man is not surprising; neither is it matter for wonderment that others have sheered away from materialism, and, with Scheler and Otto, tried to find a basis for religion, goodness and God in the higher love. In these less gross systems of religious thought, the intelligence is allowed to play a subordinate part, not in arriving at the first concept of God, which is a postulate of the instinctive spiritual love of man, but in the subsequent elaboration of the religious system. In the forming of the concept of God, the will plays the dominant role. Furthermore, with a cavalier disregard of a genealogy which leads back through Schopenhauer, Kant, and Illuminism, to Luther, the modern champions are claiming that fundamentally they are taking the standpoint of Augustine.

There have been and there are difficulties in presenting the way in which Augustine conceived that man knows God. The article on Saint Augustine in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie* presented the difficulties briefly some years ago (cf. col. 2334 and following). Within recent years several essays have emphasized important points. Thus Bernhard Jansens, S.J., in his "Der Kampf um Augustinus im dreizehnten Jahrhundert" [*Stimmen der Zeit*, 111 (1926) 91 ff.], showed that the problem of the 13th century does not differ substantially from that of today: Does knowledge in Augustine begin from the senses, and by abstraction arrive at a knowledge of spiritual things, of the absolute, of God; or does the mind, independently of sensible knowledge, know eternal truths through a higher God-given light. Johannes Olivi (1298) contended for an ontologistic interpretation; Saint Thomas harmonized Saint Augustine and Aristotelianism, by interpreting the "lumen internum" as a condition in Augustine's scheme of using the capacity to know sensible things. Jansens makes the point that Augustine did not have a thoroughly thought-out epistemology, a point to be emphasized, and to be kept in relation to the fact that Augustine derived his first theories of cognition from the views of Neo-Platonists and Plotinus.

The solution of Saint Thomas and of the Scholastics is elaborated in the article of Charles Boyer, S.J., "La philosophie augustinienne ignore-t-elle l'abstraction?" [*Nouv. Rev. Théol.* 57 (1930) 817]. According to Augustine, at the moment of the contact of the sense with the corporeal, the soul receives a "lumen," by which it knows the nature of the corporeal. Boyer holds that this doctrine of the "lumen" has the very essentials of Aristotelian abstraction, since Augustine can in no true sense be interpreted as an Ontologist, nor as a supporter of innate ideas. True, the Saint did not elaborate his thought on the "lumen," but, since it is the intermediary between sense and intelligence, it performs the same function as the *intellectus agens* of the Scholastics.

It is apparent that in the three studies of Augustine so far mentioned, there is not a word of "love" as a condition, cause, or ingredient, in man's knowledge of God. Yet it is clear on the other hand that the sources from which Augustine drew his thoughts upon cognition emphasized the necessity of the *katharsis* of the sensible and of the sensual in the pursuit of truth. Again, apart from the "lumen" which is required for any sort of cognition, the epistemological problem becomes more obscure when the topic is restricted to a cognition of God. Certainly, for mystical contemplation, Augustine demanded the *katharsis*; this is made clear in the article of J. Mareschal, S.J., "La vision de Dieu au sommet de la contemplation d'après saint augustin" [*Nouv. Rev. Théol.* 57 (1930) 89 ff. and 191 ff.]. Furthermore, the point is made recently that in speaking of the knowledge of God, Augustine's theory of cognition ought to be considered rather a theory of religious knowl-



edge than a pure epistemology. Not being interested directly in the mechanics of cognition, enraptured rather to bring men to the knowledge of the highest truth, Augustine is anxious to have men clear away the gross effects of sin.

The bearing of these considerations on the problem has been discussed in the article of Endre von Ivanka, "*Die unmittelbare Gotteserkenntnis als Grundlage des Natürlichen Erkennens und als Ziel des übernatürlichen Strebens bei Augustin*," [*Scholastik*, 13 (1938) 4, 521-543]. This essay discusses at some length the manner in which Augustine christianized the Neo-Platonism of his youth. In the philosophy which he accepted, the soul was held to know God by an inward inclination; the operation and effectual success of the soul's powers depended on detachment from the senses, both epistemologically and morally. The soul, once withdrawn from the sensible and the material, was enabled to contemplate itself, and since it was a part of the deity, it thus arrived at a knowledge of God; self-knowledge, purified, became knowledge of God. Augustine and other Christian Fathers cleared out the error in this pantheistic explanation.<sup>1</sup> The soul was not "*pars Dei*," but "*imago Dei*." Hence, it is able to see God in itself, and its seeing is dependent on its will-act of love, *not of God, but of the good*. According to Ivanka, the will-act is a *medium quo* or *quod*; but this is not sustained, it seems, by the fact that Augustine called such a will-act a source. Ivanka cites passages in Augustine where the above view is modified, especially the places where Augustine shows that Faith is the force which clears the image blurred by sin, though Faith does not create the image; the image is in the soul naturally.

In conclusion, it would seem that when the most emphatic passages of Saint Augustine on the function of the will in arriving at a knowledge of God are put forth, there is no support for the contention that he is a forefather of the philosophy which removes the intellectual entirely from the field of contact with God or subordinates its rôle. Kant was the most influential force in putting apparently solid and systematic supports under the contention that man reaches to a knowledge of God through the will rather than the intelligence. Kant, as Paulsen repeatedly stated, was the philosopher of Protestantism; but more immediately, he was the spokesman of the century of Illuminism, of the *Aufklärungszeit*, which ran its course to Kant and to the French Revolution. On "*Kant der Religionsphilosoph der Aufklärung*," one may consult the interesting chapter in the book of

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<sup>1</sup>The same writer shows an earlier stage in the patristic conversion of the Platonic epistemology into an acceptable Christian system in his "*Von Platonismus zur Theorie der Mystik. Zur Erkenntnislehre Gregors von Nyssa*" [*Scholastik*, 11 (1936) 2, 163-195]. Gregory, too, held a knowledge of God through the soul, the *imago*, and the clearer perception of God through purgation of the gross. He held this more as a matter of fact than as an epistemological theory.

Bernhard Jansens, "Wege der Weltweisheit" (Herder, 1924), and for a clear analysis of Kant's knowledge of God, an article by the same author, entitled, "Die ideale Ort Gottes im System des Kritizismus" [*Stimmen der Zeit*, 114 (1927) 14]. If one asks Kant: Does God exist? The answer is affirmative. If one asks: Do we know that God exists? The answer is negative. If one asks: What guarantees this existence of God? The answer is, "the will." But the modern schools which derive their fundamental viewpoint on the rôle of intelligence in religion from Kant are far less likely to speak of the will or assert positively that there is any *knowledge* of God; they are groping for primary religious concepts in the sensible or subconscious.

## MARIOLOGY

THE PERPETUAL VIRGINITY. An article in the "*Bibliotheca Sacra*," [96 (1939) no. 383, 335] is welcome, both for the fact that a Protestant writer contends for the Virginity of Our Lady 'post partum,' and also for the emphasis given to an approach to difficulties made out of the 'brethren texts' in the Gospels. The article is entitled, "Who Was James, the Lord's Brother?" by Kenneth Mackenzie, D.D. He announces his thesis as follows: "While we may shrink from the Roman doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, also a compulsory article of the Roman faith, we may hold reverently that the womb which bare the Son of God Incarnate, should not be contaminated by the flesh of any other than 'that Holy Thing which shall be born of Thee'." Since the reason why the Protestants, claiming to argue from the Bible only, reject the virginity after delivery is found in the texts which speak of the brothers of the Lord, the writer, arguing from the same exclusive source, argues that the conduct of the brothers of the Lord is such that He cannot be named their elder, or first-born. The author emphasizes the point that "they did not give the customary respect of the first-born to Jesus," that their conduct is quite un-Jewish and inexplicable on the hypothesis that He was the eldest son. The author proposes the alternative solution that the brothers were the sons of Saint Joseph by a former marriage. After a discussion of Mt. 8, 20; 12, 46; Jo. 2, 24; 7, 5; 19, 26, where, especially, the giving of Our Lady to the care of St. John is a sign that there were not younger brothers, the author concludes that, had the "brethren" been blood-brothers, "his (Christ's) every word would be law to all his juniors. Obedience, respect, and consideration would be offered him, with willing and gracious admission of His legal position. But the history of the Gospels discounts that recognition."

THE PROXIMATE BASIS OF MARY'S PRIVILEGE. P. I. B. Carol, O.F.M., presents his views "De Fundamento Proximo Co-redemptionis Marianae," in *Marianum*, [1 (Apr. 1939) 2, 173-188]. Noting that Bittremieux and

Di Fonso, O.M.Conv., find the basis of Mary's privilege as Co-redemptrix "in illo B.V. merito quod pro suo objecto ea omnia habuit quae nobis Redemptor noster de condigno meruit," Carol contends that this merit is rather a constituent part or an integral element than a basis. He proposes as the immediate basis (*fundamentum proximum*) of the privilege a twofold principle which he calls "Retroversio-Consortium." Billot embodies this in his statement that Mary holds the place in restoration which Eve held in the loss. In general Carol defines the principle: *Retroversio significat quosdam subsequentes eventus esse oppositos in natura et cursu quibusdam praevis eventibus, et praedictos subsequentes eventus adjuncta invertere efficiendo ut ea quae hucusque a praevis eventibus causata fuerant, in posterum dissoluta remaneant.* Such a process in the case of our Lady becomes a principle through the Divine decree which associates Mary with Christ; her association with Him is implicitly decreed in the decision to reverse the order of loss; hence, there are not two laws, but one.

Carol takes up a fundamental objection against his thesis. Such a law or principle is the decree of Redemption itself! To answer this, the author defines what he means by "*fundamentum*" more closely. He admits that if "*fundamentum*" is taken in the sense of the "*ratio adequata*" why Mary is called Co-redemptrix, then, certainly, the merits and satisfactions offered to God by our Lady are the *fundamentum*. But if the word is taken to mean the basic ordination of God, or the principle or law which immediately causes the positing of her merits and satisfactions, then we must look to the Law of Association in the Restoration through the Reversal of the Loss.

Carol then proceeds to a Patristic argument for his contention. The principal texts adduced are *Justin* (cum Tryph. 100; PG 6, 110), *Irenaeus* [Adv. Haer. 3, 22, 4; 5, 19; 5, 21; PG 7, 958, 1175, 1182; with a reference to D'Alès, La doctrine de la récapitulation en S. Irenée, *Rech. de Sc. Rel.* 6 (1916) 189], *Tertullian* (De carne Christi, 17; PL 2, 182), *Ephraem* (Serm. de div. 3; Assemani-Mobarek, 3, 607); *Cyril Hiersol.* (Catech. xii, 15; PG 33, 742), *Epiphanius* (Adv. Haer. 78, 18; PG 42, 727), *Chrysostom* (Hom. in Pasch. 2; PG 52, 767-768), *Augustine* (Adv. Jul. 1, 3; PL 44, 644; cf. *Friedrich*, Die Mariologie des Hl. Augustinus, Köln, 1907, 238-260), *Theodorus* ("de eodem retroversionis-consortii principio eloquentissime," Hom. 5, 8-9; PG 77, 1418), *Chrysologus* (Serm. 142 de Annunt. PL 52, 579), *Basilius* (Orat. 3, 4; PG 85, 61), *Maximus* (Serm. 15; PL 57, 254). Carol also cites from the liturgy, the Preface of Passiontide (ut unde mors oriebatur) and the *Pange lingua* (hoc opus salutis nostrae ordo depoposcerat etc.) His conclusion that his thesis is "aperte stabilita necnon solide commonstrata" is not so clear, since the texts are not concerned with the very fine theological point of distinguishing between two subtle contentions. He claims, however, to have cited the texts which deal with the co-redeeming

activity or our Lady as due to the law of inversion, and not with the hundred others which merely name Mary the second Eve.

**THE FORMAL AND EXPLICIT INTERCESSION OF OUR LADY.** In a brief article August Deneffe, S.J., summarizes the arguments favoring a formal and explicit intercession on the part of our Lady; the essay, "Die zweifache Fürbitte in der allgemeinen Gnadenvermittlung Mariens," appeared in *Scholastik* [13 (1938) 4, 559-564]. After commending the chapter on this topic in Bittremieux' "De universale mediatione Mariae," the author notes that the "intercessio interpretativa" is clearly enough established, and that even in the case of all the saints, an argument can be drawn (from the Canon of the Mass and from some of the prayers, e.g. of St. Aloysius, of individual saints) for formal intercession; hence, a fortiori, formal intercession is an activity of our Lady in heaven. The following reasons assure us of it, i) in the mind of the Church and of the faithful Mary is thought of as *expressly* asking favors; ii) it is the common opinion of theologians now that the intercession of Christ is formal; on the principle of association, that of Mary is to be admitted; and there seems to be no reason why only some graces are the object of such intercession; iii) since the saints in glory are in a state of more perfect charity, they pray the more; this is immeasurably more true of Mary both in respect of state and of prayer; iv) on the principle of accumulation and distribution; since Mary cooperated through formal activity in accumulating merits, so too formally she is active in distributing the graces of the redemption; v) in direct assertion the word "intercession" in ancient and modern citations is to be taken of formal rather than of interpretative intercession; vi) the Mass, "Mariae Mediatrix," favors formal intercession; vii) authors of merit stand for the thesis, Scheeben, Pesch, Diekamp (ut probabilis), Van Noort, Bittremieux.

**HYPERDULIA.** In the first three fascicules for 1939, the *Marianum* of the Servite Fathers is carrying articles by P. Giuseppe M. Albarelli, O.S.M., entitled "Il Bisogno di una 'Madre Celeste' nell'Umanità Decaduta." The first article treats of the various goddesses or consort-goddesses of polytheistic religions. The writer finds that the characteristic note of the female goddesses are the qualities of sweetness and goodness, though these ideas are frequently perverted both in concept and practice. In this section, which is a rapid sketch of the facts about female deities, the reader feels that there are questions for which there was not space for thorough treatment. Did the multiplication of goddesses mean that men sought a celestial mother, or did it mean that, having conceived gods on the models of themselves, the peoples of these perverted religions invented consorts for the social needs of gods, or did it mean that the notion of fertility and abundance, connected with the woman on earth, was transferred to the pantheon? Several factors undoubtedly contributed. The author emphasizes an excellent point when

he comes to deal (in the second section, *Marianum*, 1 (Apr. 1939) 2, 188-200) with the views of recent writers in the field of comparative religions. He points out the usual complaint which Catholic writers, and also some of the more scientific among non-Catholics, make concerning the unscientific use of the argument from analogy. Certainly no field of study has been so spoiled by the fallacious use of this form of argument than that of comparative religion, and especially on the part of those who are sold to the evolutionary thesis of continuity between religions of the past and Christianity. After pointing out that the analogies between the cult of goddesses and the devotion paid to our Lady are markedly superficial, and that any proof of causal connection between the two is singularly lacking, P. Albarelli emphasizes the fact that the Church has never failed to insist on the *humanity* of our Lady. There was never a heresy concerning the point of our Lady's nature, and this at a time when the faithful who were paying devotion to her had recently come from polytheistic peoples and were often living in the midst of them. The last part of the series shows that the devotion arose out of genuine Christian sources of Scripture and Tradition.

## THE SACRAMENTS

**THE BLESSED EUCHARIST.** The difficulties pointed out in the Excursus of J. P. Haran, S.J., in the earlier pages of this issue, are already being felt. The Fall numbers of *The Living Churchman* are carrying letters concerning the Concordat between the Episcopal and Presbyterian Churches. The editor states (in the issue of Nov 15th) that every effort is being made to publish the divergent views of correspondents. ". . . we believe the proportion of pros and cons published is approximately in ratio to the pros and cons received." In England the attempt at a compromise in belief in the Blessed Sacrament is being made. O. C. Quick in his "Doctrine Report and the Sacraments," [*Theology*, 34 (1939) 344] seeks to find an escape from the "quasi-material or physical identity between the consecrated elements of the Body which was crucified," and thus come to a statement of Eucharistic doctrine which will be acceptable to the Evangelicals. The author writes some rather cloudy theology in stating that since no Anglican theologian holds that Christ's Body is spatially in Heaven, one of the main objections to the doctrine of Real Presence is removed.

In America it is gratifying to hear a voice raised for a better view. Mr. Felix L. Cirlot has published a book, "The Early Eucharist" (S.P.C.K. 12/6), which contradicts the tenets of prevalent non-Catholic writers concerning early belief in the Eucharist. The book is a revision of a thesis submitted to the General Theology Seminary of New York, written under the direction of Dr. Burton Scott Easton. A reviewer in the *Expository Times*, Edinburgh

(50, May 1939, 355), notes the following points; though dubious about what he calls a "novel method."

"In his chapter on the Eucharistic Sacrifice in the First Two centuries the author works backward and not forward in history. He believes that by coming from the developed doctrine and practice to the inchoate we may be enabled to read back into the original texts something which could be missed by the Biblical exegete. For example "he is of opinion that the realistic interpretation of the 'flesh and blood' passage in Jn 6 is reenforced through doctrinal studies." The author holds that "the high sacramentalism of St. Paul's Eucharistic doctrine, including his belief that the body and blood of Christ are really present and received in the Eucharist, was already the common faith of Palestinian Jewish Christianity well before the Gentiles began to flock into the Church, and was really received by St. Paul from that source."

(26/V/39)

PENANCE. P. Marie-Clement Chartier, O.F.M., has a long and thoroughly done discussion of penitential discipline as portrayed in the writings of Saint Cyprian. It appears in the first two numbers of the *Antonianum* for 1939, entitled, "La discipline pénitentielle d'après les écrits de saint Cyprien." In the first part of the first article an important discussion of the difficult problem of Penance in the writings of Tertullian appears [14 (Jan. 1939) 1, 18-42]. In 1914 the work of d'Alès (*L'edit de Calliste*) gained many to his explanation of Tertullian's testimony in the sense that in the *De Paenitentia* Tertullian held that no sins were irremissible and implicitly admitted that no sin was pardoned without recourse to the absolution of the Church. Most writers, especially Galtier, accepted and forwarded this view; but Amann (art. Pénitence, *Dict. de Théol.*) confessed his dissatisfaction. The real difficulty of the texts was yet unsolved, and it was put most clearly by Vacandard: In the *De Paen.* Tertullian says that all sins are remissible, but he does not say that they are all to be remitted at an ecclesiastical tribunal; in the *De Pudicitia*, he says again that all are remissible, but he goes on to say that three of them are not remissible at an ecclesiastical tribunal.

P. Chartier claims that the difficulty and confusion have arisen because an essential historical distinction has been neglected, namely, between partial and total excommunication. In that time a total excommunication meant that the sinner was excluded from canonical penance; obviously he would be urged to do penance privately; a partial excommunication included as one of its features the doing of canonical penance. Hence, he says, in the *De Pud.*, the three kinds of sin which are said to be irremissible are excluded from canonical penance, and therefore from the ecclesiastical termination of such penance; the fact that they are excluded is not an argument that the Church had a canonical penance not leading up to absolution. Together, the two essays of Tertullian prove that the Church either partially or totally excluded the sinner; if she partially excommunicated him, she assigned a canonical penance; if she totally excommunicated him, she did not impose any canonical penance. P. Chartier refers to a former article of his own in *Antonianum* (10 (1935) 501-508) for a fuller discussion of the point; the present articles on penance in Saint Cyprian's texts (Cyprian was in Africa only thirty years

after the time of which Tertullian speaks) confirm and prove the same solution.

**THE MATTER AND FORM OF HOLY ORDERS.** Theologians will necessarily take account of the historical data which are contained in an article, "Die Einigung der armenischen Kirche mit der katholische Kirche auf dem Konzil von Florenz," by G. Hofmann, S.J., in the *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, (5 (1939) 151-185). It is an interesting and thoroughly documented account of the dealings with the Armenian leaders before the Council, of the events at the Council itself, and of the subsequent developments. It is clear that the Dominican and Franciscan missionaries of the East laid the foundation of the steps which, principally through them, the Church took to bring the Armenians to the Council; furthermore, the theology of the Armenians and their liturgical practice were thoroughly known, again through the religious, in the West. The point is made that even before reunion with Rome, the Armenians, in imitation of the custom already found in the West, had introduced into their ordination ceremony the "traditio instrumentorum," along with their ancient practice of imposition. The writer claims that the section on the Sacraments in the Decree for the Armenians is an Instruction, and in respect of Holy Orders, it legitimized for an Eastern Rite a practice which the Easterners had taken from the West. Further, the Instruction is not to be looked upon as a *Definition* that the Handing Over of the Instruments is to be regarded as part of the Matter and Form of the Sacrament. Moving on to the question whether the Council as a whole can be called a *Definition in the strict sense*, the author holds to the negative. But if the Decree is regarded 'en bloc', it can be so called in a wider sense, for in chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, Florence repeated dogmatic decrees of former Councils, and even here, chapters 1 and 4 have disciplinary segments; chapter 6 is the *Quicumque*; chapter 8 is purely disciplinary (concerning feasts); chapter 7 is the Instruction on the Sacraments. Concerning the views of two Popes, Hofmann cites letters not yet brought to the attention of theologians. They are, first, a letter of Pope Eugene IV, within a month after the promulgation of the Decree, to the Archbishop of Lemberg (Lwow), in which the Pope speaks of the "decretum hujusmodi et hac sancta synodo et sede apostolica divinitus diffinitum"; secondly, a letter of Nicholas V to the Archbishop of Nikosia, which speaks of action to be taken against those who oppose the Decree, and names them, "pertinaciter contententes, haereticos."