

## CURRENT THEOLOGY

### APOLOGETICS

MIRACLES. Some two years ago W. Norman Pettinger wrote in the *American Church Monthly* (Nov. 1937, 204 ff.) an article entitled, "John Donne as Religious Philosopher and Theologian." In it the author makes this statement, "Donne affirms with Saint Augustine that there is no miracle in the strict sense, for as, if we understood all created nature, nothing would be *mirum*, so, if we knew God's purpose, nothing would be *miraculum*." Apologetes can readily see here the attempt to confuse the definition of miracle by laying emphasis on its entity (created as are non-miraculous things) or on the Divine purpose (which includes the effecting both of natural and miraculous entities and is one without thereby causing the two to be identical in nature and definition). But, in any case, a thorough treatment of Saint Augustine's views on the nature of miracles is welcome, and is recently supplied in the *Rech. de Théol. anc. et méd.* [11 (July, 1939) 197-222] by D. P. DeVooght in the article, "La théologie du miracle selon saint Augustin." An advantage is here met in the author's complete citation of many texts. The writer traces the beginnings of Saint Augustine's thought to an antinomy: God rested on the seventh day, and yet God now works miracles. The *rationes seminales* account for the ordinary processes of nature, but miracles are *insolita*, and this is the fundamental notion of Augustine. As a consequence of his initial position the question occurred: should miracles be considered inside or outside creation. Creation itself is a great miracle; Saint Augustine was led to this concept through his idea of miracle as an extraordinary work of Divine omnipotence, and here the notion of the extraordinary keys in with his basic thought of the strangeness, the rarity, and the uncustomary nature of the miraculous. But it seems that the concept underlying these texts was not univocal. Nevertheless, the fact of the miraculous is admitted and claimed; Saint Augustine even admitted the reality of miracles worked among infidels; the norm whereby they are distinguished from the Christian miracles is the purpose they serve. The Saint took into account that there are clear cases of miracles and doubtful ones; it is probably the right instinct for truth and logical thought as well as a certain vagueness which attaches to his notion of the *insolitum* which makes him cautious about admitting miracles in cases where we are ignorant of natural processes.

H. J. Maidment, M.A., has written "In Defence of Hume on Miracles," in *Philosophy* [14 (Oct. 1939) 56, 422-433]. The article summarizes the views of Hume and agrees with his insistence that the law of causality is an empirical and not a necessary law, and therefore its failure is not a

miracle; he also subscribes to Hume's strictures on the lack of evidential value in human testimony, and repeats, apparently without a thought of the fallacy, the argument that past records of miracles are less trustworthy than present evidence of uniformity. The writer does not add much to Hume, save in his emphasis on a philosophical principle which he would be hard put to defend. The uniformity of nature, he claims, is our criterion of the possible; hence miracles are impossible.

## THE CHURCH

**THE CHAIR OF PETER.** Mention is made of a long article of J. Haller in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, [160 (1939) 2, 229-286] entitled, "Der Weg nach Canossa," less for the purpose of calling the article to attention than for taking note of the author. In this article Haller's conclusion is that a conspiracy of German princes was able to triumph over Henry because the Pope had become their ally, and had controlled their policy through his legates. These legates were able to break down the loyalty of Henry's following; to achieve this, they used the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, the forgeries of which were multiplied for the event and employed officially in this case for the first time.

We may leave it to the church historians to deal with Haller's prejudiced history. But of Haller himself it ought to be noticed that he is one of the most active and bitter of writers against any claims or conduct of the See of Peter. He is the author of "Das Papsttum" (Stuttgart, Vol. i, 1935, Cotta, xiv-512) in which every argument against the Primacy of Peter is gathered and put forth in the name of scientific history. A review of this book by E. de Moreau, S. J. [*Nouv. Rev. Théol.* 63 (1936) 525] recounts Haller's theory of the rise of Papal power out of the Germanic influence; the vivid German imagination is supposed to have been caught and enthused by the picture of Peter with the Keys of Heaven and of Earth. Another volume of the series, from the same publishing house, is called "Idee und Wirklichkeit," that is, of the Papacy (Vol. 2, 1; x-485). Reviewing this work in *Scholastik* [12 (1937) 569] E. Böminghaus names Haller the continuer of the Magdeburg Centuriators, using the historical tools of the 20th century and his own great talents as an historian.

The attack on Papal authority is recently renewed in an English publication of Henry Edward Symonds, "The Church Universal and the See of Rome," (S. P. C. K., 1939, London, x, 296). The aim of the author is to find a basis of reunion for Christian Churches in the First Seven Councils. He claims to show historically that the primary organ of authority, up to the Great Schism, was the body of the Episcopate, which was the heir of the authority of the Apostles. Later, the authority of different bishops clashed; hence, there was a turn to a conciliar form of authority, first locally, and then

ecumenically. The ecumenical idea was *probably* conceived by Constantine! Ecumenical authority rests ultimately on the "sensus fidelium," "which alone can claim to have the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit promised by our Lord to His Church" (261). The "sensus fidelium" is molded by the human instruments of the Holy Spirit, the Apostolic Sees, and later especially, by the Roman Apostolic See. The concentration of authority in this See, a current developing in the West while the East rather clung to the conciliar idea, was not unquestioned, but eventually it was acceded to. In Leo, the defender of Chalcedon, the two currents touched, but the East developed its idea of Councils. The author sees the possibility of uniting Christendom by a return to the situation of the Church in the time when it was united on the doctrines of the Councils before the Schism.

How attack is continuing on the Continent may be seen in the review by Koters, S. J., [*Scholastik*, 12 (1937) 597-598] of K. Heussi, "War Petrus in Rom?" and of the four essays in a memorial to Erich Caspar in "Geistige Grundlagen Römischer Kirchenpolitik," by E. Herman, S. J., in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* [5 (1939) 259].

An interesting article on Saint Peter's death in Rome appears in the *Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift* [29 (1939) 2, 85-94]. It is entitled "Das Todesjahr des Petrus," by Hans Katzenmayer. After referring to a former article (*ibid.* 28, 129) in which the author claimed to prove that Peter died *before* Paul, and before Nero's persecution (64), he praises U. Holzmeister's analyses of the arguments (*Vita S. Petri*) for the years 68, 67, 65, 64. Against these Katzenmayer seeks to fix the date of Peter's death in 55. His arguments run thus: i) From First Clement (cc. 5-6) he argues that Peter was dead before Nero's persecution; ii) he was alive in 49, the best date for Acts 15; iii) Paul mentions Peter at Corinth; hence, Peter was alive in 51-52; iv) Mark, according to Coloss. 4, 19, was in Rome during Paul's captivity (61-64).<sup>1</sup> Why? Best answer is that Peter was dead, for Peter and Paul would not be in Rome together; v) the best hypothesis is that Peter was dead before 59 at least; else, why is *Acts* silent about him, when Paul comes to Rome; vi) furthermore, *Romans* is silent on Peter, a fact most easily understood, if Peter was dead before its writing (56). Hence the best date is 55. This agrees with the tradition in the Papal Catalog of Feliciani which puts Linus 56-67; it does not clash with the tradition mentioned by Augustine that Peter and Paul died on the same day, but not in the same year; Peter died before Paul.

<sup>1</sup>Anent the Roman captivity, it is recalled that since Deissmann (1897), several critics have contended that Paul composed *Colossians*, *Philemon* and *Ephesians* in a captivity in Ephesus. B. Brinkman, S.J., in an article "Num S. Paulus Ephesi Fuerit Captivus?" [*Verb. Dom.* 19 (Nov. 1939), 321-332], discusses the evidence of an Ephesine captivity, and finds some, though this conclusion does not in the least touch the place of the composition of the letters. Gaechter, S.J., is referred to as having the same probable view in his "*Summa Introductionis in NT.*" (Innsbruck, 1938).

GALLICANISM. A note on the origins of the Gallican theory is to be found in Jean Leclercq's "La renonciation de Celestin V et l'opinion théologique en France du vivant de Boniface VIII," *Rev. d'Hist. de l'Eglise de France* [25 (Apr. 1939) 183-192]. On July 5, 1294, after a vacancy of more than two years Peter Morrone became Celestine V; in little more than five months he resigned and Boniface VIII (Gaetani) was elected. The abdication and the subsequent election caused no stir theoretically among the theologians of the time. But political forces were active and soon broke into the theological field. The two Cardinals Colonna joined with Philip the Fair and began theological opposition to the legitimacy of Boniface on the ground that Celestine could not legitimately or validly resign. The twelve arguments of the Colonna faction may be found in Moehler's *Die Kardinal Jakob und Petrus Colonna*. Against these arguments John of Paris defended the legitimacy of resigning; but in the same document he developed some ideas about deposing a bad or unwilling Pope. Leclercq calls attention to the dangerous nature of these ideas, and shows that they were caught up by Philip the Fair; they were the seeds of the later Gallicanism insofar as they favored a power in the Church over the Pope.

In the Heythroppe Bellarmine Series the famous statement of Saint Cyprian, "et primatus Petro datur ut una ecclesia et una cathedra monstretur," is discussed in Maurice Bénévoit's "Saint Cyprian's De Unitate, Ch. 4, in the Light of the Manuscripts." This strong testimony has often been repudiated by Anglican writers as a forged interpolation. Harnack and Chapman, O.S.B., contended for its genuinity, claiming that it is a later correction of Cyprian himself of a form which did not so favor the primacy of Rome. Bénévoit reverses the opinion of Harnack and Chapman; the study of manuscript evidence leads him to the conclusion that the text is genuinely Cyprian's, but that the form above is the earlier statement and that the form that is mute on the primacy is the one eventually and definitely chosen by Cyprian.

THE PETER-PAUL ALTERCATION. Light on historical questions which touch on the Primacy of Peter may be found in two articles recently appearing. The Reverend Paul Auvray of the Oratory has taken up for discussion "Saint Jérôme et saint Augustin: La controverse au sujet de l'incident d'Antioche," *Rech. de Sc. Relig.* [29 (Dec. 39) 5, 594-609]. The documents bearing on the case are analyzed chronologically and a good bibliography is attached. Some misunderstandings exist concerning the Jerome-Augustine controversy over the Antioch incident in which Paul resisted Peter to his face. The stages of the controversy were: 1) Jerome's explanation of the event in his commentary on Galatians, 389 A.D.; 2) Augustine writes Jerome two letters objecting to his position, 395 and 397; 3) Jerome replies, 403; 4) Augustine answers, 405.

Jerome's position. He explained the Antioch disagreement as *simulatio* on the part of Peter and of Paul. Both agreed on the principle that the Gentiles had no obligation to live as Jews. Both in practice adapted themselves on occasion to Jewish circumstances. Paul had Timothy circumcised, fulfilled vows at Cenchris and at Jerusalem in the Old Testament manner. Peter practiced *simulatio* at Antioch because the Scripture says "*simulationi eius consensuerunt*," Gal. 2, 13. He observed the Law outwardly. His action was "*simulatio, dispensatio honesta, hypocrisis*." These words could mean policy, diplomacy, or simply attitude. Auvray translates the doctrine into the terms of moral theology: the observance of the Law could be justified for a proportionately grave reason. Paul, when he saw the danger of the situation, adopted a policy or attitude of intransigence, correcting St. Peter in order to safeguard the freedom of the Gentiles. There was no doctrinal disagreement.

Although many writers give that impression, Jerome does not suggest the two apostles had arranged the scene previously. Neither does Augustine anywhere indicate he understood Jerome to mean Peter and Paul were merely acting parts rehearsed beforehand.

Augustine's position. For him the disagreement was a real one. He argues principally from the infallibility of Scripture which says Peter did not walk according to the truth of the gospel. Many wrongly are of the opinion that Augustine was here concerned with the general problems of the liceity of lying. He carefully states that the question whether one may tell a lie does not concern him in these letters. He bases his position solely upon the inerrancy of Scripture.

Jerome's reply. In his reply Jerome bases his opinion upon authority, hardly treats the objection from the infallibility of Scripture and devotes most of his time to the general question of lying. At first sight, the whole discussion might seem to be going along two entirely different lines. But Fr. Auvray thinks that Jerome has touched the subject which was in the back of Augustine's mind. Unwittingly Augustine seems to have combined two matters which he tries to keep separate; the exegetical question of the infallibility of Scripture and the moral question on the liceity of lying. About this time Augustine was much concerned with the problem of lying, whether in word or in action, and his treatise *De Mendacio* dates from the same period as his first letter of the controversy. Probably he was haunted by the thought that the apostles could not have given to the world a lesson of hypocrisy.

The outcome. The letters cease with Augustine's answer to Jerome in 405. Probably Jerome did not write again. In his commentary on *Isaias* written in 410 he maintains his former thesis. A remark in his dialog against the Pelagians five years later Augustine interpreted as a retraction.

But in a work of 402, Jerome used similar language (PL. 23, 458), and one may suspect that Augustine did not fully grasp the nuances of Jerome's position and that the two Fathers did not differ so profoundly as they themselves believed. Auvray has an ingenious suggestion. He thinks that Augustine read Jerome's commentary on the Galatians, was shocked at the explanation of the Antioch incident, and then resolved to settle two questions, the exegetical question of the meaning of the passage in Galatians, which Augustine sought by his letter to Jerome, and the second question of the morality of lying which Augustine treated in his *De Mendacio*. The preparation of this treatise may have given rise to the rumor that Augustine was writing a book (*liber*) against Jerome.

Recent apologetic writings in the field of history on the part of Catholics have been increased by the publication in one place of the essays of Mons. Pierre Batiffol. The volume is entitled "Cathedra Petri," and appears among the "Etudes d'histoire ancienne, Unam Sanctam," t. iv. [Editions du Cerf, Paris]. In the first two parts Batiffol's writings on the Primacy are reprinted; in the third those on the relations of the East to the Holy See.

Connected with the question of authority is the topic of the living tradition of the Church. On account of the discourses and writings of Pastor Boergner, a spokesman of French Protestantism, Pinard de la Boullaye, S.J., discussed the rule of faith in conferences; the discussion appears in article form, "L'écriture sainte, est-elle la règle unique de la foi?" [*Nouv. Rev. Théol.* 64 (1936) 839-867].

## SACRED SCRIPTURE

THE ANTICHRIST. Recent events in Spain have undoubtedly prompted the article of J. M. Bover, S.J., "El principio de autoridad obstaculo a la aparicion del Anticristo," in *Razon y Fe* [118 (Sept. 1939) 94-104]. The interpretation of the difficult section in 2 Thessalonians, 2, 3-8, is discussed, with special attention paid to the words, "And now you know what withholdeth, that he may be revealed in his time" (2, 7). Certain features of the prophecy of Saint Paul are clear. There are two opposing forces in the world. The force of iniquity will work mysteriously on until eventually it will result in an apostasy more or less universal. Against this force of iniquity a real obstacle is opposed, "that which withholdeth," the disappearance of which will usher in the time of general apostasy before the end. Catholic interpreters have commonly agreed upon the nature of the obstacle; it is the public legitimate state authority. The Fathers called it the series of the Roman Emperors; the Scholastics saw this dignity transferred to the Holy Roman Emperors, and modern exegetes have seen it in the state's power and authority as represented in the modern governments. Saint Paul's passage on civil authority (Rom. 13, 1-6), written

at the time when Nero was Emperor, is taken to confirm the interpretation. P. Bover calls attention to the importance of this passage now, as a motive for teaching the lesson of the power of legitimate authority. He cites briefly from history in confirmation of the exegesis. Then he turns to determine the force of iniquity in our times. It is the subtle and hidden influence whose operations are seen through all the societies, state, or international, or associational, which set themselves against the Kingdom of Christ. In Spanish history he cites Philip II and Franco as having defended the Gospel against the terrible forces of iniquity of their times.

THE REDACTOR OF "HEBREWS." Origen first wrote down, though probably he was not the first to notice, that the style of thirteen Pauline epistles differs very considerably from that of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The opinion of Catholic exegetes has been at one in holding the Pauline authorship of the letter, though various redactors or secretaries, whose style is found in the letter, have been conjectured. Clement of Rome and Barnabas have been prominently mentioned. In his article, "Rédacteur et destinataires de l'épître aux Hébreux," *Revue Bibl.* [48 (Oct. 1939) 506-529] A. M. Dubarle, O.P., presents strong support from internal evidence (the only evidence available) for his theory that Saint Jude, the author of the Catholic Epistle, is the redactor of notes left by Saint Paul. The article includes in argument a detailed comparison of *Hebrews* and *Jude* under the headings of vocabulary, syntax, style, and mental and cultural outlook and background. Further, the words "I have written to you in a few words" (Heb. 13, 22) cannot refer to the foregonig letter, for *Hebrews* with its nearly 5,000 words is exceeded in length only by *Romans* and *First Corinthians*; the text is more fittingly referred to the 25 verses of the *Epistle of Jude*.

In attempting to determine the addressees of the letter P. Dubarle again turns to internal criticism. The crisis of *Hebrews* is compared with that on which *Jude* and *First* and *Second Peter* touch. It is claimed that all four letters deal with the same situation; it was a crisis in the churches of Asia Minor when many were tempted to apostatize and embrace Judaism. To meet this danger Peter wrote his first letter; Paul had his notes in rough draft, but died before using them. Jude, the brother of James, wrote out in full the Pauline notes and sent them with a brief note of his own, the Catholic Epistle. Peter wrote again (*Second Peter*) and he noted in passing (2 Pet. 3, 15) the difficulty of certain passages in the Pauline letter. When Paul's letters were made into one collection, the attached note of Jude to the last one was separated. It may be remarked that more evidence has been gathered for this hypothesis and has been consistently dealt with than for other theories on the redactor.

JEWISH APOCALYPSES. N. H. Parker, in an article, "Jewish Apocalypse

in the Time of Christ," *Crozer Quarterly* [17 (Jan. 1940) 1, 33-46], has a brief and pointed summary of the content and spirit of the Jewish Apocalypses which will be of value to those interested in the historical background of Jewry at the time of Christ. The Apocalypses as a whole 1) witness to the indomitable faith of Israel in God's promises of the ultimate triumph of the Kingdom; 2) give evidence of a genuine yearning for peace and righteousness in the Kingdom; 3) exercised a wholesome moral influence both on group-action and on individual moral conduct, furthering the idea of individual responsibility and liability; 4) fortified the national spirit against the infiltration of pagan immorality; 5) emphasized the thought of the after-life and resurrection, and brought to attention the nature, origin and transmission of sin. In having these effects they were an aid in the preparation of the Jews for the coming of Christ. On the other hand this same literature had certain grave and essentially wrong views. They were 1) politico-religious rather than spiritual; 2) too hostile to non-Jews; 3) influential in accenting legalistic Pharisaism; 4) marred by doctrinal extravagances and contained fantastic prophecies. It is clear that because of these defects the Apocalypses distorted the idea of the Kingdom and of the King as it was portrayed in the genuine Scriptures of the nation, and thus they did their part in influencing the Jews to reject a spiritual Messiah.

### GOD THE CREATOR

TEXTS ON CREATION. The text of *Wisdom*, 10, 1-2, deserves more attention in our manuals of theology than it has hitherto had. There is a long and most thorough exegetical and philosophical study of this couplet now available in the article of A. Dupont-Sommer, "Adam, "Père du Monde" dans la Sagesse de Salomon," in *Rev. d'Hist. des Relig.* [119 (Mar. & June, 1939) 2-3, 183-203]. The author's translation is the result of his study. "C'est elle (la Sagesse) qui preserva le Protoplaste, le père du monde (qui fut) créé seul, et qui le délivra de la faute sans pareille, et qui lui donna la force pour dominer l'univers." The contrasts are noted: the Adam of *Genesis* is the father of the race; here he is the father of the world; the Adam of *Genesis* is fallen; here he is the just man through wisdom; the Adam of *Genesis* is the lord of creation; here he dominates the world through wisdom. Dupont-Sommer notes that thus the hero of *Wisdom* is raised above the Adam of *Genesis*, and further remarks that thus he has gained in stature as have all the heroes of *Wisdom*, chap. 10, though this is not set down as a violation of truth. Again, the author notes that the Adam of *Wisdom* is the same as the Adam of *Genesis*, and that there is no question of finding here the two Adams of Philo, the one, inferior, terrestrial and mortal, the other, celestial and immortal. The author does not point



out the promise of the redemption which is contained in the text, nor the force of the 'alone' in the matter of the single, first parent.

In an essay which is more ingenious than convincing Carl Martin Edsmann has proposed a new meaning for the text of James, 1, 18, "Voluntarie genuit nos verbo veritatis, ut simus initium aliquod creaturae ejus." The essay appears under the title, "Schöpferwille und Geburt, Jac. 1. Eine Studie zur altchristlichen Kosmologie," in *Zeitschr. f. NT. Wissensch* [38 (1938) 11-44]. Edsmann notes that the "peperit" of the Itala is a better turn for the Greek than "genuit." This word is used with a masculine subject only once in ancient literature outside this text; further, in all metaphorical uses the technical meaning is always preserved; finally, the author is convinced that it came into usage because of former belief in a male-female Urgott, though James had no share in such a belief. Though exegetes have commonly interpreted this verse as having to do with the regeneration wrought by the Word of God, Edsmann contends that the passage is concerned with creation. For in the concept of creation of the time, there was mention of the free-will (from *Genesis*), the notion of "bringing forth in birth" in the Gnostic background concerning the man-woman god, and the notion of a delivery through creation by an act of the mediator, the Word, in the Hermetic literature. Granting all that, the point is not made that there is any place for the new interpretation in Saint James; after all, exegesis intends to arrive at the sense of a text, and very little from Gnostic or Hermetic notions will shed light on New Testament texts.

## GOD THE AUTHOR OF THE SUPERNATURAL

ORIGINAL SIN. In *Biblica* [20 (1939) 4, 387-396], J. Miklik, C. SS. R., takes up for refutation in his article, "Der Fall des Menschen," the views of P. Petrus Mayrhofer, O.S.B., which appeared in *Theologie und Glaube* [28 (1936) 133-162]. The fundamental points of Mayrhofer (in Miklik's refutation) are 1) the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in the narration of *Genesis* are metaphors for man's procreative power; the 'knowledge' in question is a knowledge of woman; 2) the two trees are one and the same; 3) the command not to eat was a prohibition precluding the exercise of the power of procreating; 4) the order of events in *Genesis* is not necessarily the historical order. The supports for this theory are 1) exegetical, and the argument here rests solely on the fact that sometimes the word 'know' is used of carnal relations; 2) the author's concept of the natural and supernatural destinies of man and of the relation of his procreative power to those destinies. Procreation takes on some thing of the aspect of a Sacrament and its use in the newly constituted supernatural order was conditioned. The forbidden fruit is the use of the

power only under conditions set down by God. Through pride Adam destroyed the sacramental character of the act, and hence it does not exist for any subsequent man; 3) theological supports, or, at least, absence of opposition,—the uncertainty and obscurity of the theory introduced by the theologians to explain original sin through the concept of a moral headship of Adam, and the difficulty of accepting the exegesis that the mere eating of fruit can be conceived as a sin which would weigh so heavily on all men.

P. Miklik's refutation of this theory is clear and decisive. Mayrhofer seems completely to have forgotten the "Increase and multiply" of Gen. 1, 26, which is a positive command, and in the supernatural order, to use the procreative faculty. Again, the text shows that Adam ate alone after Eve had eaten alone. Thirdly, the trees are not metaphorical, nor are they one; they are not one even consistently in Mayrhofer's article, for he makes them two after the fall. The introduction of the metaphorical exegesis is against the decree of the Biblical Commission.

For a recent rationalistic view of the story of the fall one may turn to the article of Paul Humbert "La faute d'Adam," in the *Rev. de théol. et philos.* [N. S. 27 (1939) 4, 225-240]. For Humbert the question is reduced to what the Jahvist, the author of Gen. 2, 4b—3, 24, was trying to tell us of the fall. After mentioning the views that the eating of the fruit awakens conscience (Budde), or awakens the sexual instinct (H. Schmidt), or awakens reason (Lods), Humbert urges his own view that in the whole story there is no hint of any moral phenomenon, even in the reference to good and evil. It is any kind of knowing which Jahweh wishes to forestall in the case of man, and according to the author, before the fall man had no knowledge or experience of knowing at all. Hence the act of Adam was supreme *hybris*, though it was done unwittingly. The author arrives at this one-sided view of the narration by emphasizing all the texts which can be made to prove a lack of knowledge and discounting the force of all the parts of the story which have to do with anything opposed to his theory.

**THE DESIRE OF THE VISION.** Few subjects have prompted so many theological articles in recent years as the question concerning the desire in nature of a supernatural end, and the further question of the opinion of the great theologians on the subject, especially Saint Thomas'. Possibly the article of P. Leo Veuthy, O.F.M. Conv., "De naturali desiderio beatitudinis supernaturalis," in the *Miscellanea Franciscana* [39 (Apr. 1939) 2,207-224], will be accused of over-simplifying the issue, but at least there is an excellent presentation of the problem and a solution of it which merits attention. The article presents the antinomy: 1) Habetur in homine ut de facto est, desiderium naturale finis ultimi supernaturalis. 2) Finis ultimus hominis attingi nequit nisi per gratiam seu beneficium omnino gratuitum.

These propositions are admitted by all, "atque a ratione, experientia, et fide demonstrata." Yet they are contradictory, at least apparently. The solution of the writer rests on a distinction between nature in the abstract and in the concrete. Man as we know him in history and experience has this desire, but man as he is thus known is man actually in a supernatural order. Certainly there would be a contradiction, could it be said that man, considered in the abstract and non-existent order of pure nature, has such a desire. But there is no contradiction in his having it in the order in which he exists concretely. But can such a desire, then, be called natural? "Desiderium jure vocatur naturale ex eo quod oriatur a natura hominis." It may also without contradiction be called supernatural, since it is naturally sprung from a creature "jam ordinata ad finem supernaturalem." On the fundamental point at issue here, the author added to his remarks in a note in the following number of the *Miscellanea* [39 (July 1939) 3,529-533], where he states that this concrete existence of present man in the supernatural order does not imply that he is in a state of grace. It is to the fact that he is in this order that the desire exists.

### THE INCARNATE WORD

THE SCOTIST OPINION. The text in Colossians, 1, 15, "the first-born of every creature," has long been used to support the Scotist opinion that, even had Adam not sinned, the Son of God would have assumed human nature. There is a new light thrown on this text in an article which is technically scriptural by Bover, S. J., "El Uso del Adjectivo Singular πᾶς en San Pablo," [*Biblica*, 19 (1938) 4, 411-434]. The writer is directly interested in the "all" or "every" of the text; but incidentally he repeats an interpretation of the whole verse which he first proposed in the *Revista Ecclesiastica* of Valladolid in 1916. The commentators take "first-born" in the etymological and chronological meaning of the word, and thus, obviously, it found favor in the Scotist contention; or they give the word a purely juridical sense, whereby it becomes an equivalent of "lord." Bover proposes a middle meaning, "Filius Heres." His interpretation of the text of *Colossians* then reads, "Filius heres totius creati." Thus Saint Paul uses the expression here which is found in Heb. 1, 2, ". . . by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things."

It is to be noted, however, that even with the chronological implication of the word much diminished, the heirship of Christ to all creation has been used as an argument for the Scotist thesis. This may be seen in the 5th Disputation of Suarez (Sect. 2, 15; Vives Ed. 17, 222) who argues from the chronological implications of Col. 1, 15, but introduces the notion of final causality into his treatment of Heb. 1, 2, and notes that the words which follow ("by whom also he made the world") seem to be attributed to Christ as Man.

**PERSONALITY.** It is possible that a dogmatic notice in the *Clergy Review* of Australia (Nov. 1939, p. 436) escape the notice of professors of theology. Therein a doctorate thesis of Dr. Van de Dries of St. Joseph's College, Mill Hill, England, on "The Formula of Saint Cyril of Alexandria" is mentioned; a limited number of copies is available. The thesis makes the following point: *physis* does not mean person; it is used by Cyril to emphasize the tremendously intimate union of the Divine and human natures against the Nestorian theory of two persons morally one; rather it means the one Divine substance impersonally conceived; the reference to the Word indicates which of the Divine Persons became man, and the adjective 'one' denotes that the Logos before and after the Incarnation is one, identical and unchanged. In the notice attention is called to the wealth of documentation of the monograph.

Nestorianism is still living in a lurking sort of way, or at least views of the definition of 'person' which lead to the ancient heresy. In "Personalism and Catholic Theology," by Jared S. Moore in *The Personalist* [21 (1939) 42-47], the author asks the question: what is personal being? "Fundamentally, I should reply, a Subject-Object, a being capable of making himself the object of his own contemplation and of his own activity." This definition is a repetition of the opinions of Descartes, Locke, Ribot and others who held that personality consists in self-consciousness, while the jurists, with Maine de Biran found the essentials of personality in freedom. Since Christ in His human nature was both conscious and free, these definitions, which depend on a psychological rather than an ontological view of 'person,' lead directly to Nestorianism.

Though not directly connected with the treatise on the Word, it may be advantageous to call to mind two recent Catholic discussions of the concept, person. In the doctoral thesis of James H. Hoban, S.T.L., M.A., "The Thomistic Concept of Person and Some of its Social Implications" (*Cath. Univ. of Am. Philos. Stud.* Vol. 43), the first part is a discussion of Saint Thomas' principle of individuation (*materia quantitate signata*) and of his comments on the classical definition of Boethius. There is only a brief reference to the concepts of Scotus and Suarez, and only a passing notice of the dispute within the Dominican School. Clear information on this point and on other philosophical questions concerning "person" will be found in the article of P. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "De Vera Notione Personalitatis," in the fifth volume of the new series of the *Acta Pontificiae Academiae S. Thomae Aquinatis*, which was published in 1939 by Marietti. P. Garrigou-Lagrange devotes only little space to modern definitions; he then excludes the definitions of Scotus and Suarez by invoking the real distinction between essence and existence. Those who admit that distinction fall into three schools in their view of person; the largest is that of Cajetan

and his followers to whom "persona est id quo natura singularis fit immediate capax existentiae." Capreolus holds that it is "natura singularis ut est sub suo esse." And finally, Billot reduces personality "ad esse actuans naturam singularem." After his discussion, the author formulates his own definition; "Personalitas est quid positivum, substantiale, determinans singularem naturam substantiae ut sit immediate capax existendi per se separatim." The author marks it down as essential to the concept and definition of person that a real distinction be admitted between essence and existence. In the corollaries, the author shows how the definition excludes communicability, how it is applied in the treatise on the Incarnate Word, and how personality differs from individuation.

### MARIOLOGY

MARY AS MEDIATRIX. For many years J. Bittremieux published in the *Standaard van Maria* his yearly review of writings and events having to do with Mariology. This year those who cannot read Dutch may take the advantage of his article, "Il Movimento mariologico dell'anno 1938-1939," in the *Marianum* [2 (Jan. 1940) 1, 5-38]. The article contains a complete review of the literature and the very valuable comments of the author. He emphasizes the fact that the "controversial" stage of the development of the doctrine of the Mediatrix has arrived. "Tutti concedono che Maria ha partecipato alla nostra Redenzione. Alcuni però vogliono limitare questa partecipazione alla sola redenzione *sogettiva*, mentre altri difendono la partecipazione anche alla Redenzione *oggettiva*." P. Lennerz, S.J., is signaled as the principal defender of the former thesis; he has many opponents. But this discussion and dispute is rightly pointed out by Bittremieux as advantageous and necessary. The basic difficulty against a participation of Our Lady in the objective phase of the Redemption is, of course, her own preservation from all sin. Here the solution which is offered needs to distinguish in some way two moments (*signa rationis*) in the objective effects of Christ's death; the first effect of this is the Redemption of Mary; this is preservative and at the same time it is preparative, that is, it has the effect of granting to her a privilege of cooperation in the subsequent effect, the Redemption of all other men. There is no great difficulty in the intelligibility of this solution; the point of those who do not admit it is its absence in the theological sources. Certainly it is not explicitly contained there. But it seems to be latent in the very ancient tradition which has placed Mary in a realm of grace above other men. Again, such cooperation on the part of Our Lady is undoubtedly a great privilege, and the whole tendency of tradition is to discover as verifiable in Mary any privilege which does not infringe upon the unique privileges of Christ. Opinion is still divided whether or not such participation would thus infringe, and the defenders

of the broader view assert that the rôle of Mary is definitely subordinate to that of Christ.

A very thorough consideration of the difficulties will be found in the article, "Redempta et Corredemptrix," of P. Joseph M. Bover, S.J., in the *Marianum* [2 (Jan. 1940) 1, 39-58]. The objection outlined above is met by distinguishing the *signa rationis*. P. Bover has reiterated here valuable comments concerning procedure. He emphasizes the fact that the primary theological consideration with which we are confronted is the bearing of the assertions in tradition that Mary is both redeemed and co-redemptrix. If both of these statements are proved in the sources of revelation, then the task of the theologian is to solve any apparent contradictions as well as he can. His first duty is not to cling to some metaphysical viewpoint. And even if, after effort, his solution is only probable, he is not to be deterred, knowing that certain solutions are not always at the moment attainable.

In the second part of his article P. Bover puts the same difficulty involved in the notion that Mary is both redeemed and yet co-redemptrix in another form. Redemption was wrought through the offering to God of a condign satisfaction, and this involved a paying of the price which was the Blood of Christ. Since Mary could not pay that price, nor participate in its paying, it would seem that she can have had no part in redeeming. To this objection the author offers four solutions which are not mutually exclusive.

The first solution. Redemption is a more general and less definite concept than satisfaction. Let us suppose then that the theological sources speak of Mary's part in redeeming, but are silent on her part in satisfying. It is wrong theological procedure to conclude that, because she has not part in the very specific and concrete function of satisfying, she has, therefore, no part in redeeming. Redemption is an older concept than satisfaction, of which the theory was first proposed by Saint Anselm in the 12th century.

The second solution. The objection rests on two principles: First, that the two concepts, Redemption and satisfaction, are to be taken to have the same extension and comprehension, and that they are both fully equivalent to the paying of a price; second, that Mary can have had nothing to do with the paying of the price. The first principle is incorrect; the two terms are not synonymous. Satisfaction is but one phase of Redemption. Redemption is salvation, liberation; it is won through merits, through sacrifice. In the *Summa* (3, qu. 48, aa. i, 2, 3, 4, 6) Saint Thomas set down five ways in which the sufferings of Christ wrought our salvation. All the considerations go to show that even if Mary had no part in satisfaction, it does not follow that she is excluded from participating in the act of Redemption.

The third solution. This solution is sought in the words of Saint Thomas (3, qu. 48, 5, c): "Ad hoc quod aliquis redimat, duo requiruntur, scil., actus solutionis et pretium solutum. Si enim aliquis solvat pro redemptione

alicujus rei pretium quod non est suum, sed alterius, ipse non dicitur redimere principaliter, sed magis ille cuius est pretium. Pretium autem redemptionis nostrae est sanguis Christi." Granting for the moment that the price itself was in no way Mary's, she can have a part in the paying and thus become, not the principal redeemer, but a secondary consort. The author illustrates this through three examples. Mary's part is the influence she had in effecting the paying of the price.

The fourth solution. The author now asks if the price paid was so exclusively Christ's that Mary had no part in it. Can Mary have participated in some way in satisfying? The author claims that she had a part; she too satisfied, not *de condigno*, but *de congruo*. The price paid was hers in two ways. First, it was Christ's, and Christ was hers in a way in which no other son is related to a mother, for she bore Him virginally. The sufferings of this Son were in some way the Mother's, and Bover cites an excellent comment from the story of the Syro-Phoenissa (Mt. 15, 22): "Non dicit: Miserere filiae, sed, Miserere mei; quia dolor filiae est matris." (Anselmus Laudunensis, PL. 162, 1389) Secondly, Mary added her personal satisfaction to that which her Son offered.

## CANON LAW

CANON 214. Domkapitular V. Fuchs discusses the obligation of celibacy arising from enforced entrance (through fear) to Major Orders in his article, "Erpresster Zutritt zu den höheren Weihen von zölibätsverpflichtenden Klerikers," [*Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht*, 119 (1939) 3-30]. The author shows that the first clear presentation of the question was written by Suarez in his *De Virtutibus et Statu Religioso* [Lib. 9, cap. xvii, dub. 4 (Vives Ed. 1859, xv, 797)]. The problem had its beginnings in the Middle Ages when parents vowed their sons to the priesthood and then brought pressure on them to fulfill the vow. By the 13th century opinion distinguished between physical violence and moral pressure; even grave fear was not held to invalidate the Orders. At the same time one thus ordained was not held to the obligation of celibacy by the canonists. If he had a wife before the ordination. If he were unmarried, many canonists, among them Saint Raymond of Penaforte, held that the obligation of celibacy obtained. By 1575 the opinion which favored liberty became more and more universal and a decision of the Rota in that year stated in a particular case of a subdeacon that he was not obliged to celibacy. Suarez wrote his treatise nearly fifty years after this decision, and doubtless contributed to the strengthening of the prevailing view. Yet, even in 1721, when Prosper Lambertini (not yet elevated as Benedict XIV) was Secretary of the Congregation of the Council and when the Secretary himself could write that the vow of continence annexed to the Orders was not obligatory

in such cases according to the decisions of the Rota, it was considered more prudent to appeal to the Pope for a dispensation from the obligation of celibacy *ad cautelam* in a case where grave fear was proved with certainty. But in his "De Synodo Diocesano," xii, 4, 2, Benedict xiv omitted all mention of the need or prudence of seeking the dispensation *ad cautelam*, which he urged in his earlier "Quaestiones Canonicae," I, qu. 213. Towards the end of his article Fuchs discusses the relation of Canon 214 and 103,2 and sums up the moral and pastoral reasons which lie behind the canonical procedure.

### MORAL THEOLOGY

NATURAL AND CIVIL LAW. *The Modern Schoolman* devotes nearly the entire November issue of 1939 to a "Symposium on the Philosophy of Civil Law," [17 (1939-40) 1, 1-16]. The *Introduction* is written by Wilfrid Parsons; *Law, An Affair of Reason*, by Gerard Smith; *Modern Legal Theory and Scholasticism*, by Moorehouse F. X. Millar; *Law: Eternal, Natural, Civil*, by T. Lincoln Bouscaren; and *Legal Philosophy in the United States*, by Linus A. Lilley.

An extended historical analysis of modern juridical concepts, including a brief but good exposé of their origins, is to be found in recent numbers of the Argentinian *Estudios* [29 (Aug., 1939) no. 338, 141-164; (Sept., 1939) no. 339, 207-239], in the article, "Perspectivas Actuales del Derecho Natural," by Manuel Rio. In the author's view the Scholastic juridical concept is ultimately based on the realistic ontological view of God, man and other creatures, and is developed by exploring the relations of man to others, *otherness* being fundamental in the concept, and *personality* permeating it; the writer touches on the relation of the natural and revealed juridical concepts and their particular applications. The development here offers nothing new; the more valuable part of the essay is found in the analysis of non-Catholic concepts, which, in general, belong to phenomenism. One series of views stems from a rationalistic or intellectualistic phenomenism, which the writer traces to the critical view of Spinoza's Ethics: "Per attributum intelligo quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejus essentiam constituens." The basic attribute of Right is a sort of aprioristic position, from which, almost mechanically, the whole system is derived. In Grotius (not uninfluenced by Nominalism) this basic attribute is the "appetitus socialis." In general, the *attributum juridicum* was not sufficiently determined as in the system of Scholastic Realism, and it was not modified by considerations of an efficient or a final cause of the whole juridical order. Hence it was open to arbitrary development, which depended on the initial view of the juridic. Thus, in Hobbes, the



fundamental attribute in the field of rights was the fear of one man for another; in Puffendorf, the 'imbecillitas' of man, his need to depend on others; in Christian Wolff, it was the state of pure nature; in the period of French Illuminism, it was man's well-being and happiness with the accent on this world's comfort; in Rousseau, it was nature liberated from any external bond, which consequently led to a contract; in Kant, it was liberty from any coercion; in Stammler (1855) it was the idea of attaining to the pure social entity, though without aspiration on the part of those who are associated; hence it eventually became a mere appetite, blindly driving on to a goal, and as far as mind and theory are concerned, it is at the whim of the thinker. The arbitrary views of several modern writers (whose systems are described by Rio) stem from this unfixed and arbitrary opinion on Right.

Along with the opinions on Right which may be termed rationalistic, since they are theoretical, there is also the current of materialistic juridicism. It is seen in the Communistic views of Marx, Engels and of modern writers; also, in those who suppose the whole system of evolutionary ethics; and finally, in the increasing number of those who subscribe to the view that man is only a bundle of instincts and that all his thoughts, opinions, theories, and practice are ultimately explicable in the light of a study of his conscious or sub-conscious impulses.

An article in a recent number of the *Georgetown Law Journal* [28 (Oct., 1939) 1, 1-23] calls to attention the fundamental juridical concepts of the late Mr. Justice Holmes. In "The Conflict of Laws Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes," the writer, G. Kenneth Reiblich, recalls Holmes' remark that "To have doubted one's first principles is the mark of a civilized man." Holmes was far from doing so in the case of his own primary juridical principle, which was, "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical force." The writer further analyzes Holmes as a conceptualist, much in the sense outlined in the articles of Rio, referred to above. He was an apriorist, and deduced applications from his first principles. Whether or not Holmes denied any reality in the *moral* entities involved in a juridical system is not clear from the article.

This very denial is clear in an article by Ferdinand Lundberg in the *April Harper's*, "The Priesthood of the Law," [No. 1067 (Apr., 1939) 515-526]. The writer cites with approval the view of Dr. Felix S. Cohen, who finds, in every division of law, "the profession and the courts evade positive fact whenever possible by taking refuge in metaphysical concepts not susceptible of empirical verification." Among these concepts are mentioned property rights, title, contract, proximate cause, possession. It would seem that empiricism is beginning to have impatient spokesmen in a field not yet won to it.

An expression of the belief that the State is the creator of law will be found in the article, "Power and Law: A Study of the Concept of Law," by Edgar Bodenheimer in *Ethics* [50 (Jan. 1940) 2, 127-143]. The writer states that legal positivism is the prevailing theory at present; according to it law is primarily an exercise of political power, or better a limit upon the exercise of state authority. In its ideal form, law is that limitation upon power by which the possibility of an abuse of power is reduced to a minimum. The author's unwillingness to consider the law of nature is due to his opinion that those who defended this law really never found a law of nature, though they did contribute much on the nature of law. The article regards favorably Kelsen's "Reine Rechtslehre," of 1934, but in essentials the author's views and those of Kelsen are Hegelian.

NATURALISM IN EDUCATION. A direct plea for the education both of children and parents along the lines of evolution and naturalism is to be found in the article of Lawrence K. Frank, entitled, "The Reorientation of Education to the Promotion of Mental Hygiene," [*Mental Hygiene*, 23 (Oct., 1939) 529-543]. "As we assimilate the idea of man as a product of mammalian evolution, with an incredibly long past during which he has developed new capacities and powers, notably intelligence, without having lost any of the most primitive functions and needs, we can begin to reshape our education, in the home and in the schools, towards mental health" (531). In the author's opinion, modern science has outmoded the views which gave western culture its basic cultural directions.

The blame for either evolution or naturalism cannot, of course, be put on the shoulders of Professor Dewey; yet his influence on recent American education is foremost in promoting naturalism. For a thorough study of the recent naturalistic philosophy of Dewey, Kilpatrick, Rugg, and Thorndike, one may consult "Naturalism in American Education," a doctoral thesis of Geoffrey O'Connell, (Benziger, 1939, 299).

### HERESY

A short article in *Fides* (39 (Mar. 1939) 3, 114-119) entitled "Le Deformazioni Sociali dell' Eresie," by Adolfo Tomassi emphasizes a point, not commonly made, concerning the anti-social effects of various early heresies. There are a few Patristic quotations from the Anti-Nicene sources illustrating the effects of Judaistic and Gnostic aberrations on the morals of family and civil life. The same point is made in an article in a subsequent issue (Ju. 1939, 293-296) in a discussion of "L'Inquisizione," signed, Il Biographo. The anti-social features of some of the medieval heresies provoked the intervention of the secular arm, and this more easily at a time when the Church and the state were closely united.