

## THE EASTERN SCHISM AND THE DIVISION OF EUROPE

JOSEPH LEDIT, S.J.

*La Maison Bellarmin, Montréal*

Now that Europe has been cut in two, and its two fragments have become minor parts of the large systems that fill the world, Eurasia on one side, and the Atlantic community on the other, it becomes the object of increasing study. The most thought-provoking book that we have read recently on the subject is Oskar Halecki's *The Limits and Divisions of European History*,<sup>1</sup> which sums up what the learned Fordham professor has written on the subject since 1923.

He emphasizes, perhaps more strongly than anyone else, how Christianity entered into the very being of Europe: "Throughout the whole course of European history in its proper sense, Europe was practically identical with Christendom."<sup>2</sup> Christianity, of course, is destined for all nations, but the two traditions, the Greco-Roman and the Christian, united to form "a specifically European mind."<sup>3</sup> Christianity was the chief source of that "European solidarity," which was not strong enough to overcome the divisions that finally brought about Europe's downfall, but which gave Europe "real greatness."<sup>4</sup> The following paragraph sums up Halecki's views on the subject:

Christianity was so typical of, and so intimately associated with, European civilization, that in the earlier part of the European Ages, the so-called Middle Ages, Church and culture had been inseparable. In the thirteenth century—which from this point of view can be considered the greatest of all,—the *philosophia perennis* seemed to have established a lasting harmony, not only between faith and reason, but also between the two fundamental constituents of the European minds, the Christian and humanist traditions. But one of the successive revivals of the latter, the one to which the name of Renaissance has remained specifically attached, opposed these two elements to each other. The attempts to create a culture which would be European without being Christian were initiated by the neo-pagan wing of the humanists and resumed under the slogan of "Enlightenment." And their apparent triumph in the secularization of nineteenth century culture is now recognized as the main cause of the present crisis of European civilization.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Oskar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1950).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

The lasting harmony between Church and state, faith and reason, the Christian and the humanist traditions, was not, therefore, the effect of ironclad compulsion, for no cultured society lives and grows forever on violence. It could only have been the cohesion of a living and growing social organism. In spite of the abuses that eventually brought about its collapse, this harmony was the fundamental characteristic of the Middle Ages. In like manner, the disunity introduced by what Halecki calls the neo-pagan wing of the humanists, and erected into a system by the Enlightenment, brought about the disintegration and decay of European society that we witness today, in spite of the constructive emphasis which was necessarily laid on freedom and tolerance, after the shattering blow dealt to Christian unity in the sixteenth century. An obvious deduction from Halecki's premises is that the evolution from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, passing through the Protestant Reformation and culminating with the end of the European Age, did not mark progress but an advance towards catastrophe and death. This is the terrible lesson taught by the historical vicissitudes of the European Age.

Yet it is more important to observe that Halecki's analysis, in this particular respect, does not apply to Christian Europe as a whole, but to the Europe which sought its spiritual inspiration in Rome. This was called by some "Western Europe," leaving the name "Eastern Europe" to that part of the European continent which adopted Christianity in the Eastern rite, although Halecki uses the distinction of East and West in a different context. The upheaval of the Renaissance reached the non-Latin Christians indirectly. In fact, the beginning of Russia's growth on the Eastern marches of Europe coincides with the beginning of the end of the European Age. We observe the slow progress of that growth through the reigns of Ivan the Terrible, Alexis Michaelovich, Peter the Great, and Catherine II, through the nineteenth century and our own epoch. Eurasia, as well as the Atlantic community, rose from a spiritually shattered Europe.

The division between Eurasia and the Atlantic community runs through the middle of Europe and of the world; it is now called the Iron Curtain. It is important to realize the nature of this division. How far back does it go in European history? Is it a consequence of age-long developments, or the result of contemporary accident, or both? Many

factors entered into its development, but the old religious controversy between East and West was perhaps the most important of all. This latter has strongly impressed scholars like Bidlo, Toynbee, and de Reynold who observe a basic dualism in European history from the very beginning of the European Age. Eastern Europe, according to them, is that which the Greek Orthodox Church controlled. Western Europe—for them the true Europe—is the rest. Halecki, though giving great importance to religious factors, rejects this interpretation, which threatens the very idea of European unity and risks the exclusion of the Western Slavs from Western Europe. Bidlo, for example, stressed the unity of Slavic history almost as strongly as he insisted on European dualism.

Apart from this disagreement, there are other reasons which encourage us to take up anew the question of the religious division of Europe. Beginning with E. Amann's article on Pope John VIII in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*,<sup>6</sup> in 1924, many studies of the Patriarch Photius and his schism have appeared. Dvornik's *The Photian Schism: History and Legend*<sup>7</sup> is the most recent and by far the most extensive study on the question (though we do not think that it says the last word). The codification of the Oriental Church law by a Vatican commission has prompted many studies on the differences between East and West. The recent edition by the Oriental Congregation of the Slavic liturgical books with its much-discussed additions to the Eastern Catholic calendar, the liturgical reform of the Byzantine-Slavonic-Ukrainian rite, the new interest in Church unity, the many papers recently written by churchmen and political writers on the interrelationship of Church and state, all these factors invite us to look once more into the religious division that tore asunder the unity of Europe in the ninth and the eleventh centuries.

The division between East and West began to appear as soon as the Church, emerging from the underground after the Edict of Milan (313), appeared in public. The heresies came into the open and the civil power was invited by one of the conflicting parties (generally the heterodox;

<sup>6</sup> E. Amann, "Jean VIII," *DTC*, VIII, 601-13.

<sup>7</sup> Francis Dvornik, *The Photian Schism: History and Legend* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948).

the Roman popes were more reserved towards civil authority) to take part in the quarrels. When one compares the Roman synods, convoked and presided over by the popes, with the Eastern councils, brought together by the emperors with the agreement of the popes and directed at least partially by the secular representatives of the civil power, one is struck by the startling differences between the two. Those who follow the Roman leadership settle dogmatically their doctrinal quarrels: *Roma locuta est, causa finita est*. It is not quite so in the East, where the principal preoccupation is not so much the search for truth and its definition as the re-establishment of religious peace through orderly discussion and agreement, the order being ensured by the secular presidents. This is why the Council of Nicea (325), convoked by Constantine to pacify the Church torn asunder by the Arian quarrel, settled things only dogmatically. In spite of the definition of *homoousios*, the strife between Arians and orthodox nearly filled the century, the Arians being generally more ingenious in presenting their case to civil authority than their orthodox colleagues.

This trend developed yet more during the following century, on the occasion of the great Christological heresies. The Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon met for different purposes according to pope and emperor. In the papal view, they were to confirm the dogmatic decisions established in previous Roman synods; in the emperor's they were to re-establish concord through discussion and vote. Today, Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestant fundamentalists are still faithful to the dogmatic decisions of Chalcedon and Ephesus, but the ecclesiastical quarrels only rose to a much higher pitch during the years following the Councils. In fact, the empire rocked under the blows of controversy, and the emperors could not resist the temptation of seeking to re-establish peace through their own personal decrees, through the permanent synod established at Constantinople of which the patriarch was the president, or through the convocation of new councils. Synodal government meant imperial government. When, some twelve centuries later, Peter the Great suppressed the Moscow patriarchate in order to establish synodal rule over the Russian church, it was claimed by some that he did so in accordance with the Protestant pattern proposed to him by his adviser, Theophan Procopovič. It might have been truer to observe that Peter gave a modern twist to the synodal conception as

it had developed in the old Eastern empire in opposition to the Roman principle. He said in his *Règlement ecclésiastique* that it was easier for the tsar to avoid church sedition if he dealt with a synod rather than with a patriarch. Byzantium had discovered that long before, but here we have recognition from a very authoritarian emperor that the synodal principle does not make for freedom as it should, but for subservience to temporal power.

It is amazing, then, that the new discoverers of the *sobornost'*, or synodal principle, should split hairs and make new definitions in a fantastic attempt to prove the opposite. Stalin has returned to the ancient principle of patriarchal and synodal government, both of them being, of course, properly subordinated to civil power. It could even be claimed that he is ready to use his power more discreetly than many a Byzantine emperor. In fact, there is truth in the contention that the Moscovite church of the present day is more canonical in its observance of Eastern tradition than the Russian churches of the emigration which are attached to nothing. If it is argued that the Bolshevik government is godless and anti-Christian, it may be also said that in the days of Basiliscus, Zeno, even Justinian at times, and certainly Leo the Isaurian and Copronymus, the patriarchs had to show far greater suppleness in adapting their orthodoxy to the changeable whims of temporal power than they do today, for Stalin does not seem to bother about rites and dogma, provided obedience is complete.

It was unavoidable, under the circumstances described, that conflict should arise between East and West, between religious opportunism and dogmatic intransigence. The paradox is that religious opportunism gradually led the way to political control of consciences, whereas dogmatic intransigence meant the liberation of religion from state domination. Not so long after Chalcedon, a first schism opposed Rome to Constantinople for thirty-five years, during which the emperors tried to retain the loyalty of their Syrian and Egyptian subjects, strongly affected by Monophysitism, by means of religious compromises that satisfied no one. The breach was scarcely healed when it broke open once more under Justinian, and religious unity was maintained only by the unconditional surrender of Pope Vigilius who thereby seriously compromised the authority of the Roman see. At the beginning of the following century, the political efforts to re-establish union with the

Monophysites brought about the new heresy of Monothelism, which caused untold confusion for twenty-eight years (610–38) before it brought about a new schism between Rome and Constantinople (638–81). By then, the religious unity of the two great sees of Christendom had, on the imperial side, become largely a matter of political expediency. After a short resurgence of Monothelism (711–13), Constantinople was shaken by the crisis of iconoclasm (726–87 and 814–43). Between the two periods of iconoclasm, another quarrel broke out over the matrimonial adventures of Emperor Constantine VI. By then, dissension was rife not only between heretic and orthodox, Roman and Greek, but also between those whom Dvornik calls the extremists and the moderates, the extremists fighting for principle, and the moderates for compromise. It is a paradox worth pondering that Patriarch Photius, leader of the moderates and one of the most astute ecclesiastical politicians of all times, should have become the standard bearer of the great schism, whereas Theodore the Studite, leader of the extremists during the period immediately preceding, should be the symbol of unity, for he is revered by Catholic and Orthodox alike. It is not that we blame Photius for having initiated the break. Before him, during the two hundred and thirty-three years from 610 to 843, the Byzantine Church spent one hundred and fifty-one (almost two-thirds) in separation from the Roman. Political power could enforce successive variations of orthodoxy among its subjects, but at the expense of unity with those beyond its political influence.

Another factor which led to the growth of the isolating principle of autocephaly was the controversy over the rank of the various episcopal sees. From the very beginning, those of Alexandria, Antioch, and Rome were distinguished above the rest. The reason for such ranking was twofold. One was administrative, insofar as the bishop who was at the head of an important metropolis exercised greater influence than the one who ruled over a lonely city, and obtained thereby greater authority. The other reason was spiritual: Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria were established by the apostle Peter (Alexandria by his disciple Mark). The Roman claims rise from the very depths of Christian antiquity. Quoting as authority Scripture and a number of Church Fathers and Doctors from East and West, the popes claimed and, when the occasion arose, actually exercised supreme ecclesiastical

jurisdiction in all parts of the known world, judging, in final instance, of doctrines and of men. When Constantinople became the imperial city and the center of ecclesiastical intrigue at the court, it also claimed special hierarchical prerogatives. The motive alleged was that Constantinople was the "New Rome." When the Council of Chalcedon met (451), settled the Christological controversies, and at the same time marked the downfall of Alexandria and Antioch, it also claimed for Constantinople privileges identical with those of Rome, but the motive was now secular. The New Rome, "honored with a senate and the seat of empire, and having equal privileges with the ancient queen city of Rome, should be extolled and magnified in ecclesiastical matters as well." This reasoning subordinated ecclesiastical primacy to political circumstance, and was, of course, never recognized by Rome.

As the prestige of the West declined owing to the rise of the barbarians, and that of the Eastern empire became more resplendent, the claims of Constantinople became more and more insistent. The Emperor Justinian decided that "the Church of Constantinople is the head of all others"; at the end of the sixth century, the patriarch of Constantinople assumed the title of "ecumenical patriarch" and exercised jurisdiction over Antioch and Alexandria as well. This, needless to say, did not smooth relations between Rome and Constantinople. Considering his Roman colleague as little more than his equal and strongly impressed by the political strength of Constantinople and the decadence of the West, the patriarch of Constantinople could afford, now and then, to be gracious to Rome. When Pope Leo III gave an emperor's crown to Charlemagne (800) who, in spite of the prestige before which even Haroun-al-Raschid bowed, was nevertheless considered by the East as a barbarian, Constantinople hardened against the West. There were now two empires, each with its emperor and its patriarch. To a secular-minded clergy, who made ecclesiastical authority depend on political prestige, the break became emotionally unavoidable. The first incident was bound to make manifest the division which had developed during the centuries, and was no longer bridged by a real will for spiritual unity. Constantinople was ready enough to maintain the solemn commemoration of the popes at the altar, but only as a friendly gesture towards a friend and as long as friendship lasted. Having gained independence from his ecclesiastical superior, the patriarch stood now

alone before civil authority. Freedom from the pope had been acquired, but the Church was almost helpless before the temporal ruler. There was little to restrain civil authority from binding the very souls of its subjects. Autocephaly may mean freedom with regard to a foreign spiritual authority, if one wishes to call it "foreign," as Hobbes and Voltaire will later explain, but it also means the end of a spiritual authority different from the secular power. In that light, we consider as minor the quarrels over the *Filioque*, the addition or non-addition to the symbol, and so forth. Those differences had existed for quite some time; Constantinople had been aware of them and had raised no objection.

Nor do we intend to discuss the legitimacy of the grievances then expressed and repeated through the centuries by the apologists of both sides. It happens, in quarrels, that both parties may be to blame, and it is not difficult for the cleverer man to jockey his antagonist into an undefensible position. Dvornik's recent book on Photius constitutes as bold an historical justification of the famed patriarch as anything that was ever attempted; it received considerable praise from the president of the Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies. What we are trying to identify are the basic differences in religious outlook between the Eastern and Western Church, in order to analyse at a later moment some aspects of the present-day Russian Weltanschauung.

When East and West separated, Photius reproached the West with having abandoned ancient tradition; that was the slant he gave to his rebuke. His principal complaint was that Catholics had changed the symbol by adding the *Filioque*, stating that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son. He could not have considered this quarrel major, since it was eventually patched up, and he mounted once more on his throne with the blessing of Pope John VIII and died, it seems, in unity with Rome. But he had blazed the way for the great polemicists of the future: they were to mark the external obvious differences between the East and the West, and to accuse the West of having deserted ancient orthodoxy. This was extremely effective, especially with popular audiences, for it pointed to the fidelity of the East to its national and religious inheritance: the seven ecumenical councils; the ancient liturgy, clothed in beauty by the great lights of Eastern Chris-



tendom; the thousand little pious practises handed down from generation to generation. All that remained after the schism. It was a patrimony of unequalled beauty. Western liturgy, which had received its final touches during the dark period of the barbarians, did not have that imperial simplicity. Pointing to the differences in Western practices, obvious to the most uncultured eye, religious polemicists could accuse their adversaries of horrible things. The use of unleavened bread for the Eucharist proved that the Romans had fallen into Judaism. The celibacy of the clergy, practiced in the West, could be interpreted as rampant concubinage—and there were occasions when the accusation was objective enough. Shaving of the beard became a shocking sign of homosexuality. The presence of organs in churches could be considered as proof that they were used for theatrical music and dances, which led to orgies. The lace that decorated the priest's alb could be interpreted as masquerading in woman's garb.

Now this type of polemics can be understood by the people, especially in times of national emergency when war propaganda appeals to religious sentiment and tends to prove the satanic malice of the enemy. The lists of Latin errors, after Michael Cerularius who drew up the first of them, became interminable. The pope best known in ancient Russia was Piotr Gugnivy, Peter the Stammerer, who never existed but none the less had authorized the priests to have each seven wives and to play the organ in church (for some reason or other, both of these things went together). To obtain an idea of the lengths to which this anti-Latinism went, it would be useful to read the profession of faith of the Moscow synod of 1620, together with the forty-four maledictions that the candidate for Orthodox rebaptism had to pronounce. The West, for that matter, could misconstrue Eastern differences just as unfairly, though the temptation to do so was less strong, since the Western emphasis on ritual and externals was not so great and the Western Church was not so bound up with nationalism. Among the nine heresies that Cardinal Humbert of the White Forest found in Michael Cerularius, some were fairly unprintable. But in the East, where religion closely followed national lines, felt strongly the influence of secular rule, and was attached by the infinitely numerous threads of home and church ritual to a hallowed past, the temptation to can-

onize one's compatriots and to damn the foreigner acquired tremendous strength. Yet the evolution was not quite the same in the different Eastern countries.

At Constantinople, unto the day when the city fell to the Turks (May 29, 1453), there was always a party that favored religious union with the West. Some were attracted by religious motives, but they were a small minority. Others hoped to enlist the aid of the West against the Turks. There were at least twenty-five attempts at reunion between 1054 and the year of the city's fall. The adversaries of the union, especially after the Fourth Crusade and the sacking of Constantinople (1204), had the ear of the people. The final reunion, discussed and concluded at the Council of Florence (1439) under the menace of the Turks, was rejected by the people who preferred the Turks to the Latins. After the fall of Constantinople, though individual patriarchs signed professions of faith acceptable to Rome (generally with the purpose of obtaining financial aid from the popes), there was never a movement towards reunion among the Greek-speaking hierarchy. We shall be told by a synod of Constantinople in 1848 that, even if the prelates wavered, the custodian of ancient orthodoxy was the Christian people as a whole, which alone was infallible. This doctrine was to have, particularly in the Slavophile school, a startling development.

It has been observed that Russia produced little that was completely original. It had, instead, the gift of infusing extraordinary vitality into what came from abroad. This certainly happened to Marxism; it was also true of autocephaly. When Russia was baptized, in the days of Olga and Vladimir, the ties between Rome and Constantinople were loose enough, but they held; hence, ambassadors from papal and imperial courts were welcome in Kiev, which received its liturgy from Byzantium and its legislation, the *Pravda Ruska*, from the West. There was something of the freshness of spring in the way good things came to Kiev from every direction. Kiev was the metropolis of the world. Yaroslav the Great was born in paganism at a time when his father owned an impressive harem; he eventually married a Swedish princess, and his children married into almost every royal family of Europe: Vladimir married Olga of Stade, Izyaslav brought to Kiev Princess Gertrude of Poland, Anastasia became Queen of

Hungary about 1046, Sviatoslav of Tchernigov married the daughter of Count Etheler of Dithmarschen, Vsevolod married a princess of Byzantium to become the father of the famed Vladimir Monomakh (who, in turn, married an English girl, Guida, daughter of Harold II), Elizabeth became the wife of King Harald of Norway and, after his death, of King Sven of Denmark, and finally, daughter Ann by her marriage to Henry I became Queen of France. Free winds swept over Kievan Russia, which was the joyful link of Christendom. It is impressive that in all genuinely native pre-Mongolian literature there is not a word of polemics against the Latin West; the Greek prelates who came over from Byzantium produced unfortunately an abundant supply. At the middle of the twelfth century, almost a hundred years before the Mongol invasion, the religious break between Russia and the West must be considered as consummated. At the beginning of the thirteenth, Pope Innocent III sent Cardinal Gregory of San Vitale as legate to Volhynia in a fruitless attempt to restore unity. In 1237-40, the Mongol invasion cut Russia off from the West. The material iron curtain was added to the spiritual one which had been slowly forming for a hundred years.

The invasion cut Russia in two. The Ukraine and White Russia, which had been the primitive Kievan Russia, came under Polish influence and thereby kept contact with the West. This is the chief reason why Halecki considers this "Russia" as part of Europe, while he denies the privilege to North Russia or Muscovy. Europe at that time was being re-educated. The thirteenth century saw medieval universities at their best. Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Salamanca, and later Cracow, Heidelberg, Cologne, Prague, and a great many others covered Europe, taught theology, philosophy, science, and law, and drilled dialectics into Europe's blood. Europe learned the value of logic and reason. From Riga to Seville, Gothic architecture and sculpture lavished culture not on the chosen few but on Europe's masses, while Dante, citizen and bard of Christendom, lifted poetry to heights it has not reached since. It is impressive to read through the *Regesta Vaticana* of that epoch. Letters from England, Ireland, France, Scandinavia, Italy, the Baltic countries, from the Holy Roman Empire, Poland, Hungary, Spain, Dalmatia, and the Latin empire of the East give proof of a universal spiritual harmony.

It is pathetic to realize that North Russia was as completely cut off, not only from the centre of European Christendom but from the intellectual crucible in which modern Europe was formed, as if it had been located on another planet. Even Georgia in the Caucasus or the Armenian kings of Cilicia were closer to Europe than Russia was. Culture, which, when Russia was European, had risen to splendid heights with Nestor the Chronicler, Hilarion, Cyril of Turov, Daniel Затворник, and the anonymous author of the Lay of Igor, vanished in the blackest night of oppression and collaboration with the invader. The intellectual production of Russia was stopped for at least two hundred years and then lagged behind until the nineteenth century. Instead, every princeling, prince, and metropolitan bishop pilgrimaged to the Golden Horde to obtain permission to exist. Outside of the monasteries, which were Russia's great refuge during this long night, only the crafty and cruel flourished. Russia pardoned everything to its Moscow princes, who ruthlessly collaborated with the invaders, ran to the Horde to trip other princes in the race for hegemony, violated their oaths to win a Tartar favor. It was a grim story, but collaboration with the invader is never nice. During those two centuries Moscow learned how to bide its time, to dissimulate, to exploit the smallest concession to the limit, to be hard and relentless. The Church backed the Moscow princes against their Russian competitors. Everything was pardoned in the dazzling light of the final victory over the Tartars. To understand Russia's patriotism, one must remember that liberation was bought at a great price but also that it wiped away the humiliations and crimes voluntarily accepted. While the West was engaged in intellectual pursuits, Russia subordinated everything—intelligence, moral law, Christianity itself—to an elementary will to live and to conquer. The Tartars were beaten, because of their divisions and because the Moscow prince centralized everything. Russia learned then to be monolithic and continued to grow in that direction long after the Tartars were subdued by Russia in their turn.

On the lowest rung of the ladder, there was the infinite mass of serfs without an intelligence and without a will of their own. As Tchaadaiev remarked:

Everywhere else, slavery had the same origin: conquest. Not so with us. One day, one part of the nation discovered it had become the slave of the other part

by the very nature of things, by the effect of an imperious necessity of the country, of the inevitable march of society, without abuse on one side, without complaint on the other.<sup>8</sup>

On top, the medieval grand duke (later the tsar) ruled in awful loneliness because most of his relatives had been strangled or starved in jail. In time, the nobles were properly subdued. They did not even own their land except by grace of their sovereign and when they appeared before him it was with formulas like: "Thy slave Jackie prostrates himself in the dust before Thee." They could be whipped, beheaded, sent to Siberia, or tonsured and made to pronounce monastic vows at will. The tsar was responsible only to himself and to God, and this was just as it should be in Holy Russia. Ancient Muscovy had none of the characteristics of a rational country. It may have been still savage, half-Asiatic, but it was of heroic dimensions and possessed an almost limitless vitality. Why is it that Russians, even the most liberal of them, speak with such feeling of the most ruthless of their rulers? Belinsky, who was the pioneer of socialism in the dangerous days of Nicolas I, and who really loved the downtrodden, spoke of Ivan the Terrible with a longing that was almost tender. Vladimir Soloviev, the mildest and most angelic Russian who ever appeared in literature, brushed away the cruelty of Peter the Great to speak only of his glorious accomplishments. The glow of Holy Russia, like charity, covers everything, and Russian elementary recklessness cannot be shackled by cold intellect. There is something deeply Russian about Berdiaiev's theory of thinking with one's entire being; but it takes a Russian to reason it out.

During those endless Middle Ages, when everything was black and hopeless, and the Tartar yoke seemed destined to last forever, when Russians betrayed and murdered one another and sorrowed for their crimes in dramatic repentance, when complicities between prince, bishop, and Tartars were whispered about, or silently chronicled in the monasteries with gory details of what Pushkin called "their sins and dark deeds," and when the only escape from such apocalyptic disgrace could be found in the loneliness of forests, or distant islands, or frozen Northern wastes, or wherever people went in search of God and

<sup>8</sup> Lettre au Comte de Circourt, in *Works and Letters of Tchaadaiev*, edited by M. Herschenson, I, 273.

peace, Russia was bathed in unnatural light. It alone had the true faith and was alone entrusted with God's mission to mankind. That ancient Rome had fallen into "Apollinarian heresy," they knew from all they had heard about Peter the Stammerer and from the awful stories that went with the legend. Constantinople was crumbling too. Even during the Tartar period, Muscovy was already Constantinople's principal source of revenue and Moscow could afford to look down on her; after the Council of Florence and the union with Rome, God's punishment overcame the imperial city (in the Russian conception), and Constantinople was conquered by the Turks. The church bells ceased to be rung (and can a Russian conceive of a church without its bells?) and the crescent was raised above the Hagia Sophia. Orthodoxy remained in Moscow alone. Russia contained all grace, all holiness, all truth, which had disappeared from the rest of the world. Moscow was the Third Rome. This idea was not formulated during the Tartar period, but immediately after, yet it grew out of Russia's loneliness during the period of enslavement. It was not merely a question of administrative autocephaly; all was bathed in a mystic glow. God and Holy Russia were bound together in a clear, unmistakable way. At first, the bearer of the divine mission was the anointed of God, the prince, especially after the marriage of Ivan III with the daughter of the Paleologues, and after Ivan IV took the title of tsar in 1547; at that time, there was perhaps more of emotion than doctrine, but Russia was thrilled. Immediately after his coronation Ivan ordered the canonization of some thirty-seven Russian saints, and Russia was glorified in heaven as it was on earth.

Much later this emotion became the doctrine of Holy Russia. In its classical redaction, it affirmed three principles: autocracy, nationality, and orthodoxy, so intimately interrelated that they formed but one reality: Holy Russia. Autocracy meant that the people was one with the tsar, and the tsar one with the people. A striking text to illustrate this conception is in the famous lecture of Vladimir Soloviev (March 13, 1881) wherein he laid upon Alexander III the obligation to pardon the murderers of his father.

The people have no doubt about it. The tsar is not the representative of external law. The people see in him the bearer and the expression of its entire life, the personal center of its entire being. The tsar is not the employer of violent physical

force for the observance of external law. But if the tsar really is the expression of the entire popular being and, above all, of its spiritual life, then he must stand on the principles of the national life.

Then he went on to say that the Russian people was Christian and bound by the precept: Thou shalt not kill. Therefore, the tsar had to pardon his enemies. Soloviev's doctrine was not official, and it was not followed, but the inner nature of the bond that linked tsar with people was no mere tenet of the Slavophile school; in some way or other, it was held by all except the revolutionaries who, in turn, exalted the national feeling, the *narodnost'*, into a messianic mission for the world.

Autocracy and nationalism were inextricably bound up with the mysterious thing called "orthodoxy," which was so identical with Russian nationalism that Baltic Lutherans, who reached the highest positions in government, army, and anywhere else in officialdom, were never considered quite as Russians. The Poles, drafted into the army and sent to die for the tsar, may have been Russian citizens, but they were certainly not Russians. Something deep, intimate, that belonged to the very soul of Russia, was missing. Until 1905, if a Russian Orthodox turned Catholic, he was considered a traitor not so much to his religion as to his country. Tchaadaiev never left Orthodoxy, but he considered it sterile and admired Catholicism. This was enough to have him declared insane by Tsar Nicholas I. When Prince Myshkin, in Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot*, explains that Catholicism is worse than atheism, he shows he believed in what Dostoyevsky called the "Russian Christ." This was not the madness of pride that we shall see in Hitler's doctrine of the identity of God and nation. There was infinite meekness in Dostoyevsky's Christ, and he imposed tremendous responsibilities on his countrymen. Yet the identification, in irresistible sentiment, of national and religious emotion, of Russian patriotism and Russian Orthodoxy, was by then complete.

It was no mere fear of the foreigner that kept Russians aloof from visitors who came to Muscovy. Herberstein, Olearius, and Paul of Aleppo, Catholic, Protestant, and even Orthodox visitors who left travelogues of ancient Muscovy, insist on the fact that their contacts with the local population were severely controlled. The Third Rome did not unfold its inner life before the irreverent foreigner; it reduced contamination to the minimum. It kept its treasure intact. Though

the foreigner may have been clever and cultured, and though his services may have been considered indispensable for the time being, he was suspected. Many Greek beggars who streamed to Muscovy during the seventeenth century were not even allowed in. They were handed something at Putivl and sent home. It was almost impossible for a foreigner to become a resident in Muscovy, unless he accepted Orthodox rebaptism like Lermontov's Scotch ancestor George Learmont. A few Protestants were allowed to settle in Moscow's German suburb, especially during the reign of Boris Godunov and thereafter, but they were segregated and did not mingle with the population; Catholics would be tolerated in Muscovy for the first time after the conquests of the seventeenth century when Catholic territories would be embodied in the empire. Though the ecclesiastical differences between Catholicism and Orthodoxy may be comparatively slight, as Halecki pointed out,<sup>8a</sup> it remains that the religious mistrust between Moscow and the West, and especially between Moscow and Rome, is abysmal. Nor do we think that it is on account of a Roman lack of good will, for the five volumes of Father Pierling and the two of Adrien Boudou are a witness to Rome's efforts towards rapprochement. It may be that the concept of orthodoxy needs clarification.

In his famous book, *Russia and the Universal Church*,<sup>9</sup> Vladimir Soloviev first qualified what he calls "true orthodoxy." He says that to be orthodox is

... to be baptized Christian, to wear on one's breast a cross or a little ikon, to adore Christ, to pray to the most immaculate Virgin and the other saints represented on ikons or relics, to keep the feast days and fasts according to traditional order, to venerate the sacred function of bishops and priests, to participate in the sacraments and divine service. This is the true orthodoxy of the Russian people and ours too.

This is all, of course, accepted by Rome. He was convinced that Russia meant nothing else by its Orthodoxy, and affirmed with incomparable eloquence that it was, therefore, part of the universal Church, separated only by a misunderstanding that could easily be explained away. For

<sup>8a</sup> Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

<sup>9</sup> Vladimir Soloviev, *Russia and the Universal Church*, trans. Herbert Rees (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948).



years he attempted to explain this misunderstanding, and failed dismally.

"Pseudo-orthodoxy," as he labeled it, rests on three negations, namely, (1) the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, (2) the Virgin Mary was not immaculate from the first moment of her existence, and (3) the pope of Rome did not have primacy of jurisdiction nor the dogmatic authority of a universal pastor and doctor.

He opposed very strongly the administrative setup of the Russian Church and quoted Aksakov to the effect that it appeared as "a kind of colossal bureau of administration, which applied to the task of feeding Christ's flock all the methods of German bureaucracy, with all the official falsehood inherent in it." He rejected absolutely the Holy Synod and the intrusion of civil government in Church administration. It is characteristic that he should have considered this as something foreign to Russia, introduced with the Holy Synod under foreign German influence.

There is yet a fourth element in the conception of orthodoxy, and it contains an ambiguity that must be cleared away before we can reach an understanding with even the most disinterested of Russians. The identification of religion with the nation's spirit became so intimate during the centuries, that we are not sure that even Soloviev, who had a mind as all-embracing as the world, totally escaped it. His concept of theocracy which he developed especially after 1882 entailed not only one pope, vicar of Christ upon earth, but one tsar, who also was to be the representative of Christ's kingship. This was not the claim of a cheap nationalist, for Soloviev was the very antithesis of such smallness! In this theocracy, he hoped, politics would become Christian; there would be freedom for all the oppressed, protection for all the feeble, social justice and the good Christian peace for all. Such was to be the magnificent responsibility of this tsar, but he would have to be Russian. In his famous letter to Bishop Strossmayer, of September 21, 1886, he said that religious unity meant that

... Russia would be free to accomplish her great universal mission of gathering about her all the Slav nations, and to found a new civilization really Christian, that is to say, uniting the characters of the truth which is one, with freedom which is multiform, in the supreme principle of charity, embracing all in unity, and distributing to all the fulness of the only good.

This is a new type of Pan-Slavism, far more spiritual than that of his friend Aksakov, but I doubt if all Slavs, the Poles for instance, are ready to accept it. Make Russian leadership as spiritual and as disinterested as you wish, and as humble as a Russian starets; there will always be some one who will say that no nation has a divine mission to rule over others.

This notion of "orthodoxy" explains the ruthless hostility of "orthodox" ruling circles towards Catholics of the Eastern rite. Latin Catholics were despised and suspected as foreigners, and every means was taken by the tsars to obtain bishops who would cooperate in liberating the new subjects from what hindered them from being properly assimilated. Even after 1905, the Russian government would not tolerate Catholicism of the Eastern rite, except for a short period in 1917. To a Catholic, the question of rite is subordinate to that of faith. Christ founded one Church which is neither Greek, nor Jewish, nor barbarian, nor Roman, nor Eastern, nor Western. No political conditions are imposed on one who enters the Church. As the centuries passed, the externals of Christianity—architecture of temples, decoration and painting, formulas of prayers, etc.—followed different lines of development according to the various countries and their fixed canons. The Syriac Churches of the Near East still sing the poems of St. Ephrem. Those who came under the influence of Constantinople have kept the liturgies of St. John Chrysostom and St. Basil, and sing the canons of St. John Damascene and others. In the West, the liturgies of St. Gregory and St. Ambrose are still recited in our day.

The question of liturgical language is unimportant as well. In the West, it is true, all Catholics use Latin, though there have been recent efforts to introduce, at least partially, the vernacular. Not so in the East, where there is a variety of languages, generally archaic, but closer to the present-day spoken tongue than Latin would be to Spanish or Italian. According to the Catholic Church, these ritual differences are absolutely to be respected and protected by the supreme authority of the Church, as being the legitimate patrimony of the respective groups and a proof of the Church's lack of interest in the cultural conquests of warring nations. Whenever group reunions took place—the Greeks at Florence (1439), the Ruthenians at Brest Litovsk (1596), the Rumanians at Alba Julia (1697), etc.—the groups kept their languages

and their rites. This legislation must be considered as definitive and there has been no wavering during the centuries on the part of the Holy See, though some of the Catholic Eastern churches partially latinized their rites by introducing Western devotions and practices against the will of Rome.

To a Russian Orthodox this Catholicism of some of the Eastern rites is the most despicable type of hypocrisy and deceit. Accustomed to think in political or nationalist terms, they interpret it as an attempt on the part of the pope to penetrate into their national soul and corrupt its integrity. This threatens the spiritual unity of the people, since it gives spiritual allegiance to a foreign pope and divorces the most intimate part of man's conscience from its allegiance to the temporal ruler. Spiritual allegiance, in the Orthodox mind, is inseparable from political loyalty to the same person, or nation, or ideal. Both have been melted together in the crucible of the centuries. Any spiritual allegiance outside of the nation is a threat, all the more dangerous when it is made by authentic nationals and not by conquered subjects. To tolerate Catholicism of the Eastern rite would mean that the state had renounced its hold on the souls of its citizens. Hence, the state, which is unwilling to relinquish this hold, destroys Catholicism of this type with all the ruthlessness in its power. The roving Cossacks of the seventeenth century, the agnostic and religiously indifferent Peter the Great, the liberal and "tolerant" (in the Voltairian sense) Catherine II, the autocratic Nicholas I, the mild-mannered Alexander II, and finally Stalin and his ecclesiastical henchmen, all destroyed Eastern Catholicism with total violence.

Now, all these persecutors claimed to be liberators, which is nonsense to us when we realize how laborious and slow the process of building up those churches had been, and how bitterly they tried to remain faithful when driven underground. One of the most startling examples was that of the diocese of Chelm in 1875. It was "liberated" from unity with Rome, to which it had been "compelled," according to the version of the liberators, in former years. Yet, when real freedom came thirty years later, after one of the most relentless persecutions of modern times (before Bolshevism, which has broken all the records of history), the population in its entirety, some three hundred thousand people, expressed its will to remain Catholic. This was the most dreadful denial

ever uttered in the face of Orthodoxy's liberating pretences. Yet the prelates who hover about Stalin preached this "liberation" once more, in the case of the Ukrainians in 1945, of the Rumanians in 1948, of the Carpatho-Russians in 1950, and got the MVD to back their propaganda. A sordid story if ever there was one, but was all this "liberation" misery a simple hypocrisy of the Machiavellian type? Perhaps, but we believe it goes far deeper. There may have been genuine sincerity in these police-churchmen, for whom the reunion with *their* orthodoxy and *their* conception of truth was such a great good that violence was justified by its results.

Now Vladimir Soloviev condemned himself to the underground in order to assume that particular form of Catholicism which was above all else despised, threatened, and persecuted. He did not leave Russia but fought his battle where he was. He knew that Russia would not follow him, and this is why his last works announce Russia's doom. His poem on Pan-Mongolism shows the Third Rome crumbling in the dust; there shall not be a Fourth, and this was the end of the dream of Philothee of Pskov. Yet, this was a joy to him, for it announced the coming of God's judgment. He was the most spiritual and disinterested of all Russian writers.

We mentioned the link between autocracy, nationalism, and orthodoxy in the Slavophile conception of Russia. Nineteenth-century radicalism may have fought autocracy and orthodoxy, or at least the bureaucratic conception of both. It remained faithful in a strange way to Russian nationalism. In his famous page, where he compares Russia to a troika speeding away, Gogol noted the dread of other nations and states, hurrying to give way to Russia as it passed by like "a miracle of God." Pushkin was freedom's poet, but when French liberals protested against the repression of Poland in 1831, he told them to mind their own business, that this was a Slav quarrel, and that if they wanted to interfere, Russia would be their grave. Every one remembers Lermontov's famous epigram on "unwashed Russia, land of masters, land of slaves," and his prophecy of Russia's rivers overflowing with blood. Bloody Russia had entered so deeply into his soul that the Red army published an anthology of his, during the last war, to bolster the morale of its troops. Belinsky was one of the very first to preach socialism in Russia. To every purpose, he was a Westerner who entertained

the deepest contempt and hatred for what was then autocracy and orthodoxy. We know of no one who felt more vividly the national spirit, the *narodnost'*, of the Russian people, which he made the basis of his poetic esthetic. Whatever his politics may have been, Belinsky's literary message was that the Russian genius entered into its own and surpassed everything that literature had hitherto produced in any country, when it dropped foreign patterns to express the Russian spirit.

The Russian spirit, "the smell of Russia" (quoting Pushkin's famous line in the preface of *Ruslan and Lyudmila*), is it not the same thing as that "Russian sense" of which Dostoyevsky wrote in *My Paradox*, and which made the most reactionary Slavophiles agree on matters of foreign policy? All Russian radicals believed at least in a Slav federation under Russian hegemony. Pestel, Herzen, Bakunin were Pan-Slavists; the two latter were world-revolutionists as well, even as our present-day revolutionaries dream of a world-state under Slav leadership, dominated by the Soviet Union, which is in turn to be led by Russia. Under these circumstances it may be well to meditate on the following lines of Dostoyevsky's *My Paradox*:

It follows from this that a Russian, having become a real European, cannot fail to become simultaneously a natural enemy of Russia. Thus we obtained two types of civilized Russians: the European Belinsky, with his negative attitude towards Europe, became a Russian in the highest degree, in spite of all the errors proclaimed by him about Russia, while the native descendant of an ancient family, the Russian prince Gagarin, having turned European considered it his duty not only to adopt Catholicism, but even to become a Jesuit. Tell me now which one of them is more likely a friend of Russia?

Does not my second example from the extreme right confirm my initial paradox that Russian socialists and communards, above all, are not Europeans, and that they will in the end become true and excellent Russians, when the misunderstandings vanish and when they come to know Russia?<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the very demons so dramatically portrayed in Dostoyevsky's famous novel were less foreign to Russia than those fellow-citizens who, while keeping faithfully their political loyalty to the land of their birth, gave their spiritual allegiance to the pope. It was impossible to draw more strongly the line of separation between East and West. Thus, in spite of Belinsky's terrible letter to Gogol, Russian "ortho-

<sup>10</sup> Translated by Jan Kucharzewski, *The Origins of Modern Russia* (New York: The Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences in America, 1948), p. 115.

doxy" is not incompatible with the famous critic's blasphemy. Yet Belinsky had served as model for Ivan Karamazov. The three Karamazovs were brothers; all three were definitely Russian, but any one who became Catholic cut himself away from Russia's soul according to Dostoyevsky. Even the demons who had brought to Russia the poison from the West remained Russians. But the Russians who became Catholics ceased to be Russians and belonged to the doomed West. The Slavophile could understand the soul of the Russian revolutionary; that of the Russian Catholic remained a closed book and this is why Dostoyevsky completely misunderstood the West in his legend of the Grand Inquisitor.

The modern Russian revolutionary, likewise, is incapable of understanding anyone who does not bow to the Russian claim to domination. Quite possibly, he may think that his rule is something like Soloviev's dream of theocracy: "freedom for all the oppressed, protection for all the people, social justice and the good [Christian] peace for all"—and who but a scoundrel could ever oppose such benevolence? When Soloviev began writing about theocracy in 1882, the Siberian prisons were fairly filled. He himself was threatened with being sent to the Kolyma the year before, in 1881. These prison camps are overflowing with millions of prisoners today, but the revolutionary does not think of that. He merely contemplates the goodness of his own soul. This blind optimism springs from sources far deeper than dialectic materialism, and in scope goes infinitely beyond political interests. Kucharzewski, in his *The Origins of Modern Russia*, a work which went far too unnoticed, described the "revolutionary messianism" of the nineteenth-century Russian radicals. Thus also, Blok's last poem, *The Scythians*, must not be interpreted as an invitation to Europe, as he worded it and as he perhaps deluded himself into thinking it was. It was rather the challenge of the Scythian, embittered to savagery, who embraced in fantastic synthesis "the heat of cold numbers, and the gift of divine visions . . . and the sharp French wit, and the dark German genius," who understood all, remembered all, thought he loved all, and hated terribly, and felt behind him the limitless, destructive strength of Asia. Now, this may perhaps be, as seen by the intuition of a great poet, the innermost soul of the new Russia, except that the "gift of divine vision" is spent on the contemplation of

a smouldering world, "liberated" from its "filth and corruption" by the new men who cannot conceive the building of their problematic new world except in terms of the destruction of the old.

Lenin, born Russian, was essentially an *émigré* surrounded by cosmopolitans. Therefore the contention of old-regime Russians that Marxism is essentially foreign to Russia is substantially sound. It was dramatically set forth in Fulton J. Sheen's book, *Communism and the Conscience of the West*.<sup>11</sup> Since then, the situation has evolved, as George Kennan's recent article in *Foreign Affairs*<sup>12</sup> has shown. Marxism, or at least a form of it, has settled in Russia. Stalin is not a Russian, even as Napoleon was not a Frenchman, but he has attempted the synthesis of doctrinal Marxism with the ancient Russian inheritance, and there is the tremendous vitality of youth in the attempt. This is not in disagreement with the laws of Marxian dialectics, as expounded by the priesthood of the sect. Marxism claims to be the consummation of human development. Therefore, all history is an avenue to the new Communist world. This was realized in dynamic fashion about 1935, at the time of the seventh congress of the Komintern, but the preparations began earlier. At that time, following the new Moscow party line, the French leader Maurice Thorez spoke movingly of medieval cathedrals; the handful of British Communists staged a superb pageant in which all English history, from the Magna Charta onwards, illustrated Britain's majestic march towards freedom. Canadian Communists claimed Mackenzie and Papineau as their ancestors, and the United States comrades were determined to carry out Lincoln's work unto the end. This was the new line! If in the Western world it was accepted by the public as mere propaganda, it was not quite so in the U.S.S.R. Old Russian history had been rediscovered. National heroes lived on the national screen through the magic of Eisenstein and Pudovkin. Dmitri Donskoy, Ivan Susanin, Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great were acclaimed by Soviet Russia long before the war of 1941. Much has been made of the welcome accorded to the invading German armies as proof of Bolshevik unpopularity. This happened mostly in separatist Ukraine. And

<sup>11</sup> Fulton J. Sheen, *Communism and the Conscience of the West* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948).

<sup>12</sup> George F. Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIX (April, 1951), 351-71.

yet, Soviet Russia pulled itself together to drive out the aggressor. Even in the Ukraine, it was the people of Soviet Russia who won the war. As Blok had said, the new Russia "understands everything, remembers everything." It claims to raise all that was positive in human achievement to a higher level, and it is amazing to see huge editions of Shakespeare, of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, become the spiritual food of Soviet youth. But it is not Russian youth that enters into Western culture. Instead, the masterpieces of Western culture, we fear, are being "refined" in the Soviet crucible.

At the beginning of the Soviet revolution, during what may be called the period of antithesis, the battle against the Russian Church, the Orthodox Church, was only an aspect of the general war against old Russia. It was waged in two manners: by the efforts of Yaroslavski's "Union of the Militant Godless," and by the disintegrating action of the various Red churches, set up in opposition to Patriarch Tykhon. Today, in accordance with Marxian dialectics, the reassumption of Orthodoxy in public life is but an aspect, an important one, of the integration of Russia's past into the new Russia. It is a synthesis, the lifting of what had been denied onto a higher plane. Now Stalin assumed into his system not a transient little sect that had been encouraged in the early years of the revolution; he chose the most ancient and conservative representative of historical Orthodoxy: the patriarchal Church. He favored synodal and other relations with the Eastern patriarchates, such as had not existed since the Moscow Council of 1666-67. He established friendship with the dissident Eastern Churches, the Armenian Gregorians, the Syrian Jacobites, the Coptic Monophysites, such as never existed since the great upheavals of early Christendom. He reconciled the Bulgarian Church with the patriarchate of Constantinople after a schism that had lasted for three-quarters of a century. He received in custody the Russian Orthodox establishments of the Holy Land. He respects, at least externally, the autocephaly of the Rumanian, the Bulgarian, the Georgian, the Serbian, the Albanian, and other lesser Churches. He claims he does not interfere in liturgical and dogmatic matters, provided the Church renders to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and gives him unconditional obedience wherever politics are concerned. If it is said that the Russian Church is not free, it may be also affirmed by authentic Russians that it was not



free when Belinsky said it was the apologist of the knout, preached the scaffold, and was responsible for Russia's obscurantism. After all, in 1839, the lay authority of Count Protasov intervened to oblige the Metropolitan of Moscow, Philaret, to change the doctrine of his catechism, which became one of Russia's symbolic books (as far as the Orthodox Church can have such books).

Such things do not happen today, and Stalin might argue that he does not interfere in religious matters, except to urge unification. He may even point, in this respect, to greater successes than Constantine or Justinian; for the Orthodox Church, properly aided by state police, acquired a greater number of faithful in the new territories of Ukraine and Rumania, more efficiently and more rapidly than at any other time in history. Moreover, if the obvious plan of disciplining the Roman Catholics of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, etc., into some form of *Gleichschaltung* with Orthodoxy succeeds—and the present regime has means of physical constraint and psychological persuasion unknown before—, then Stalin might claim to have brought mankind into a closer unity than the one welded by Roman legions, Roman law, and Roman slave-drivers for the Mediterranean world only.

Now it is our contention that this unification is indescribably awful, that it is the most relentless and degrading assault ever organized against individual consciences and organized groups in all history, that it is the lowest degree of degradation of man by man the world has ever known; but the all-important question is: is it possible to make Soviet churchmen, and Soviet statesmen, and Soviet educators, and whoever is responsible for Soviet ideology see this point? Will they not rather feel approved by the many people on our side of the barrier who agree with *them*? Will they not say, like Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor, that even if the endeavor was grim, it was justified by success? The attitude of Soviet propaganda in general, and the resolutions of the Moscow Council of 1948 with regard to the pope, the ecumenical movement, and the Anglican Church in particular, seem to demonstrate that the mind of Soviet Russia excludes the Western mind, except insofar as the Western mind will allow itself to be assimilated into the Soviet way. Is this phenomenon a prolongation of the ancient exclusiveness of the Third Rome, of the anathemas of the Moscow Coun-

cil of 1620, of the anti-Western Pan-Slavism of the nineteenth-century revolutionaries? Is it something entirely new? It seems to this writer that it is a synthesis of new and old, and this may explain its dynamism. It is a huge stream reaching the cataracts.

Following the religious evolution in the East, we may point to the following developments: (1) intervention of the state to establish religious peace between contending parties, whose strife endangers public harmony; (2) supremacy acknowledged to an episcopal see because of the political importance of the city where it is located; (3) conflict with whoever denies the new politico-religious claim; (4) autocephaly through separation and political influence; (5) justification of separation and autocephaly through arguments which appeal to the people, and organic union of religion with patriotism; (6) mission of the stronger autocephaly to other churches and eventually to the world (Third Rome); (7) integration of (traditional) religion in a cultural, ideological, all-integrating, all-world Weltanschauung; (8) development of this philosophy by a highly centralized party which infuses it into the masses, spreads it to other nations, creates the organs of physical and psychological compulsion to enforce its quasi-messianic claims of a new redemption for mankind.

Such would be, very briefly (and probably unfairly) outlined, the politico-religious evolution of the East with respect to the relationship of Church and state. It points to an intellectual abyss which separates East from West. Before endeavoring to seek how some approach might be made towards bridging over the chasm, it may be well to take stock of the politico-religious evolution of the West in the same respect. This evolution entails not only the relationship of Church and state, but the interaction of the individual and the collectivity, of freedom and compulsion as well.