

CURRENT THEOLOGY

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

Life, they tell us, was simpler fifty years ago. We can at least hope this was true of the task of keeping abreast of developments in dogmatic theology. Today the most assiduous student is in danger of engulfment in the torrent of theological works that threatens to flood us all. While we must thank God for this extraordinary dynamism, we are none the less faced with a problem. How to cope with this growth? How indeed to discover the published material? Language itself throws up one barrier. Theological literature, Catholic and otherwise, appears today in every tongue, including the Scandinavian.¹ Catholic writers, largely deserting Latin, are thereby abandoning a ready-made international communications medium. And however valuable may be the rapports with the contemporary mind thus facilitated, only another Mezzofanti would find it easy to keep up with the published work of Catholic theologians. The "traditional reluctance of European publishers to sell their books after they have gone to the trouble of printing them," to which E. O'Brien, S.J., recently referred (*THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 17 [1956] 39), does nothing to ease the burden of the English-speaking scholar. Slim budgets, small printings, and a deep-rooted failure to understand that "it pays to advertise" explain in part this vexing phenomenon. But these we shall probably always have with us. Even as formidable a research student as Dr. Johannes Quasten has tasted of the frustration so discouraging to less hardy souls.² Time and space permitting,

¹ And the Flemish and the Irish. I do not mean it unkindly when I submit that theology in these languages is theology hid under a bushel. Perhaps this is the point at which to note the recent appearance of the third edition of A. Bacci's uniquely useful *Lexicon vocabulorum quae difficiliter Latine redduntur* (Rome: Studium, 1955, pp. xi + 709), which lists the Latin equivalents for some 3,000 words widely used in modern languages. The book would be even more helpful if in future editions we were given a list of the English, French, German, and even Spanish translations of a fairly large number of Italian words not readily identifiable to the non-Italian. Complementary to the *Lexicon* is a collection of Latin documents, by the same author (*Inscriptiones, orationes, epistolae* [3rd ed.; Rome: Studium, 1955, pp. 350]), which has been called a *demonstratio ad visum* of the sometimes unsuspected potentialities of the Latin language.

² In *Estudios eclesiásticos* 30 (1956) 107, I. Iparraguirre, S.J., in his review of *Patrology* 2 (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1953, pp. xi + 450), submits five important bibliographical references from Spanish sources not found in Quasten's book. On the other hand, the author himself, in the French version of Volume 1 (*Initiations aux Pères de l'Eglise* [Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1955, pp. xviii + 410]), has added some eight hundred bibliographical items to those given in the original English volume. Incidentally, the third volume of this magnificent work is promised for the near future; this will surely increase the great debt

I shall later on suggest a possible way out of this impasse, even at the risk of proposing yet another publication. For the moment, however, even a rather haphazard glance over some recent work in Catholic dogmatic theology should not be unwelcome.

I

Primacy of honor in any such survey goes by right to the official pronouncements of the Church. Even here all is not smooth sailing; the days have passed, if they ever existed, when the *Acta apostolicae sedis* was the sole repository of the doctrinal statements of the Holy See. The *Catholic Mind*, the *American Ecclesiastical Review*, and other such publications do much to make readily available the more important official documents; in addition, many will be helped by the growing number of collections of papal documents on one or other special topic, such as those on Marriage and the Family³ and on Youth.⁴ The Jesuits of the Theological Faculty of St. Louis University have come to the help of those to whom the original Latin or Greek bars access to documents that enshrine the teaching of the Church over the centuries. In *The Church Teaches*⁵ many of the most sought-after of such documents have been put into English⁶ and arranged under such

English-speaking theologians owe to Dr. Quasten. Something of a contrast is furnished by the latest edition of the second volume of F. Cayré's *Patrologie et histoire de la théologie* (Edition refondue; Paris-Tournai: Desclée, 1955, pp. 932; the first volume of this new edition was published in 1953), covering the period from the end of the reign of Leo the Great to the times of St. John of the Cross and St. Francis de Sales. The word "refondue" in this case is not to be taken too literally; there has been some re-arrangement and enlargement of material, but in all essentials, including the bibliographies, the book has not been brought completely up to date: the many references to de Ghellinck's *Mouvement théologique au XII^e siècle* ignore the entirely rewritten edition of this magnificent work of scholarship which appeared in 1946; the bibliography on St. John of the Cross has no entry later than thirty years ago; and the bibliography on Augustine, in the first volume, calls for thorough revision. This French edition, then, does not greatly improve on the English version published some twenty years ago (*Manual of Patrology and History of Theology* [Paris-Tournai: Desclée; Vol. 1, 1936; Vol. 2, 1940]), which still remains, of course, a convenient and serviceable vademecum.

³ Alvin Werth and Clement S. Mihanovich, *Papal Pronouncements on Marriage and the Family, from Leo XIII to Pius XII (1878-1954)* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955, pp. x + 189).

⁴ Raymond B. Fullam, S.J., *The Popes on Youth* (New York: America Press, 1955, pp. 448).

⁵ Jesuit Fathers of St. Mary's College, *The Church Teaches: Documents of the Church in English Translation* (St. Louis: Herder, 1955, pp. xiv + 400).

⁶ The harrowing problems of the translator are multiplied when he tackles official documents of any kind, most of all perhaps when they are dogmatic pronouncements of the Church. My first consultation of this book took me to n. 505, an excerpt from the Lateran Council of 649. Where the Latin (as found in Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*) reads:

headings as The Triune God, Grace, The Last Things. Where necessary, a short introduction gives the historical background and points out the theological significance of the texts cited.⁷ Basically similar in purpose, but conceived on a broader scale, the first volume of *Sources of Christian Theology*⁸ makes available in English, in many cases for the first time, not only papal and conciliar pronouncements but also basic passages from the Fathers and theologians, certain liturgical documents, and citations from non-Catholic sources as well. Further volumes in this series will offer similar documentation in all the major fields of Catholic doctrine.

Some works of general reference call for brief comment. What is the maximum useful life of an encyclopedia? Twenty-five years? If this be so, the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* is at least close to obsolescence.⁹ Yet for most of the years of its existence this monumental work remained in many ways a closed book: there was no index. This need is being met more than satisfactorily by the publication, in the form of separate fascicles issued approximately once a year, of *Tables générales*, the fourth of these being dated 1955.¹⁰ This brings the alphabetical listings from *Aaron* to the beginning of the section *Dissimulation*. Treasures are where you find them. In this case, besides an exhaustive index splendidly cross-referenced, there is much added bibliographical information, no less than nine columns, for example, surveying theology in Germany since 1900 (s.v. *Allemagne*, cols. 91-99) and some five columns of new listings on St. Augustine (cols. 306-10). Furthermore, brief supplementary articles are inserted at appropriate places when the need is recognized. Some examples: two concise studies by A. Gelin, one on biblical angelology (s.v. *Ange*, cols. 154-55), the other on the OT revelation of God (s.v. *Dieu*, cols. 977-79).¹¹ F. Cayré supplies much-

"[Maria] incorruptibiliter eam [eum?] genuisse," the English says: "gave him birth without detriment to her virginity." This is an interpretative version; the interpretation has been questioned; in any case we are not given the original.

⁷ The introductory note to *The Last Things* tells us: "These are the last things: death and judgment, purgatory, heaven and hell." Well, these are *some* of the last things. As a matter of fact, the second coming of Christ and the resurrection of the body are mentioned in some of the documents quoted under this heading.

⁸ Paul F. Palmer, S.J. (ed.), *The Sources of Christian Theology 1: Sacraments and Worship*. Liturgy and Doctrinal Development of Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1955, pp. xxii + 227). Fr. Palmer had previously edited on the same principles *Mary in the Documents of the Church* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1952, pp. xxii + 129).

⁹ The first volume is dated 1903; the fifteenth and last, 1951.

¹⁰ Bernard Loth and A. Michel, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique: Tables générales*. Fascicles 1-4, *Aaron-Dissimulation* (à suivre). Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1951-55.

¹¹ A work of this author, well known in the original French under the title *Les idées*

needed clarification on the difference between Augustinianism and Augustinism (cols. 318–23), and, largely relying on de Ghellinck's *Patristique et moyen âge*, A. Michel (s.v. *Apôtres, symbole des*, cols. 224–28) condenses the past fifty years' research on the origin of the Apostles' Creed.¹²

Our own *Catholic Encyclopedia* carried in its original volumes theological articles whose value in many instances has endured. While a supplementary volume appeared in 1922,¹³ much more was needed to bring the whole up to date, if indeed that can be done short of a completely new edition. At any rate, a second supplementary section is now in process of publication¹⁴ in loose-leaf form for insertion into special binders. Though not written for specialists, there are some articles of theological interest: analyses of *Mystici corporis* and *Humani generis* (G. Weigel, S.J.), and a study of *Divino afflante Spiritu* (H. Gallizia). I wonder if a quarterly or even a yearly publication devoted entirely to the type of masterly article we look for in an encyclopedia would not embody in more usable form all the acknowledged values of these expensive and all too soon obsolescent monuments to learning?¹⁵ Certainly it is not only in the field of the natural

mattresses de l'Ancien Testament, has recently appeared in English as *Key Concepts of the Old Testament* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. xiv + 94). This can serve as a handy sample of biblical theology for those who still wonder what that kind of theology is. The book will help the reader to relive OT times as a "history of continual forward movements: a novitiate, a growing spiritualization . . . a history which, though it may be 'ascending and finalized' towards Christ, is nevertheless subject to periods of lassitude and even aberration."

¹² Let me note here *Rufinus: A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed*, translated and annotated by J. N. D. Kelly (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1955, pp. 166). The version of this creed used by Rufinus is of historical importance; it almost certainly stems from the creed submitted by Marcellus of Ancyra to Julius I, which was apparently accepted by the Pope as substantially identical with the Greek form of the creed used in Rome. Incidentally, a number of points of value for the history of theology are illuminated in the translator's notes: the beginnings of the parallel between the revealed data on the inner life of the Blessed Trinity and the psychology of the human intellect (p. 107); the distinct personality of the Holy Spirit (p. 114). On the matter of the canon of Sacred Scripture, Rufinus, listing the books received at Aquileia in the fourth century (p. 72), includes as canonical the whole NT as we know it and twenty-seven protocanonical books of the OT (Lamentations is not mentioned); the deuterocanonical books (except Baruch), while not called canonical, are recommended as profitable reading for Christians.

¹³ *The Catholic Encyclopedia: Supplement 1*, Volume 27 (New York: Universal Knowledge Foundation).

¹⁴ *The Catholic Encyclopedia: Supplement 2*, Volume 28; ed. Vincent C. Hopkins, S.J. (New York: Gilmary Society, from 1950).

¹⁵ The problem of early obsolescence has been to some extent solved by the publishers of general encyclopedias through the issuance of an annual "year-book" updating and supplementing the original articles.

sciences that human knowledge is increasing in leaps and bounds, and new insights are constantly emerging to confound the quiescent. Perhaps even the loose-leaf form would keep the price within the reach of God's poor who abound among the scholarly.

Or perhaps Daniel-Rops has hit upon a practical formula with the new series of publications which began to appear in the spring of 1956.¹⁶ Planned as a collection of monographs in individual small volumes (each something over a hundred pages in length and resembling the *Readers' Digest* in overall dimensions) costing about a dollar each, the series will total one hundred and fifty books, each the work of an expert in his field. Two volumes appear each month, the whole to be available to the public within seven years. Aimed at all who are "interested in religious problems and desirous of keeping abreast of the latest developments on all pertinent questions," the few volumes thus far at hand are prime examples of the admirable French art of *haute vulgarisation*: but the expert will be well advised not to overlook them. The titles listed include studies of theology as a science, tradition, dogma as the basis of faith, revelation, miracles as signs of revelation, Christian philosophy, international morality, as well as twelve volumes on biblical subjects.

And finally, to have done with encyclopedias, we remind our readers of *Catholicisme*,¹⁷ a reference work more in the tradition of the English-language *Catholic Encyclopedia*. Four of seven volumes have been published, modeled closely in size, typography, and general format on the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* of the same publishers. The work is under the general editorship of G. Jacquement, who has also contributed a number of articles. A few may be mentioned. G. Rabeau studies the history and nature of Christian apologetics and its relation to theology (1, 711-18); two articles on the soul (1, 422-34) synopsise the pertinent philosophical and theological data; M.-J. Le Guillou, O.P., is the author of *Dons de Saint Esprit* (3, 1026-31) and *Eglise* (3, 1408-30). And if you are curious to know, for instance, who Daniel-Rops really is (he is Henry Petiot, founder and editor of the French review *Ecclesia*, who writes under that pen name), you will be grateful for the many biographical sketches of the great and near great, living and dead, scattered throughout the pages of *Catholicisme*.

Since a large number of the better-known Jesuit theologians of the first half of this century were contributors to the *Gregorianum*, many half-buried

¹⁶ Daniel-Rops (ed.), *Je sais, Je crois: Encyclopédie du catholicisme au XX^e siècle* (Paris: Arthème Fayard, from 1956).

¹⁷ G. Jacquement (ed.), *Catholicisme hier, aujourd'hui, demain* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, from 1948).

riches are made accessible by the publication of an index to the first thirty volumes of this Roman quarterly.¹⁸ Edited by G. Delannoye, S.J., this is a model in content and form of what this sort of aid to research can be. Following a list of principal articles arranged alphabetically under authors' names, and a second alphabetical list of all publications reviewed, discussed, or even mentioned in these volumes, there is an unusually complete analytical index covering not only subjects featured in main articles, but all matters discussed at any length in notes, book reviews, and briefer comments. Also from the Gregorian University comes a collection of papers as the printed record of the theological part of the University's fourth-century celebration in 1953.¹⁹ This volume was noticed previously (*THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 17 [1956] 140). Here I would call attention to two studies on the nature of theology: M. Browne, O.P. (pp. 1-16), persuasively argues the need to join to the historical and scientific approach a constant stress on theology as wisdom; the primacy of God in theology is the theme of a strong article by R. Gagnebert, O.P. (pp. 41-55).²⁰ There are, in addition, valuable insights into the function and limitations of the sometimes neglected *argumentum ex convenientia* in a short study by M. Flick, S.J. (pp. 57-62); and a thought-provoking study of the miracle as exception to physical law, by E. Dhanis, S.J. (pp. 63-86), throws needed light on the proper role of the religious context of the miracle as a probative factor in Christian apologetics.²¹

¹⁸ *Gregorianum: Indices generales, 1920-1950, Volumina I-XXXI* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1953, pp. viii + 453).

¹⁹ *Problemi scelti de teologia contemporanea*. *Analecta Gregoriana* 68 (Rome: Gregorian University, 1954, pp. viii + 468).

²⁰ The primacy of God in scientific theology is also the subject of Alex. M. Horvath's *Studien zum Gottesbegriff* (Freiburg [Switzerland]: Paulus Verlag, 1954, pp. xii + 316), an enlarged and revised version of the author's 1941 publication, *Der thomistische Gottesbegriff*. God is the *subiectum scientiae* of theology; this means not only that God is the subject about whom are made all the statements of scientific theology, but above all that He is the only ultimate basis for theological truth and the sole possible center of unity and significance for this science.

²¹ We have here a healthy antidote to what may in the end prove to be an overhasty abandonment of a fundamentally sound position. Must we concede that a miracle cannot be called an exception to the laws of nature because, for one thing, of the conviction widely held by scientists that all physical laws are no more than statistical compilations of observed data always open to revision in the light of further observation and experiment? This has led some theologians to redefine miracle as a religious omen and sign addressed by God to men through some special intervention in the affairs of the universe. Among other things, Père Dhanis recalls that not *all* physical laws are merely statistical; and statistical laws themselves, when the result of many centuries of experience, as a matter of fact exclude all real *danger*, and admit of only an infinitesimally remote *possibility*

My first thought, I must confess, was to question the value of an English translation of the simple and lucid Latin of Van Noort's well-known textbooks in dogmatic theology; but the growing number of layfolk, and of religious men and women, who are interested in the scientific study of Catholic theology and yet have little or no Latin may well justify the venture. The first of ten projected volumes,²² after an introductory study of theology as a science, discusses the necessity of religion in general, and of revealed and the Christian religion in particular. More than a translation, the work evidences a conscientious effort to bring the original up to the minute with new bibliographies, including many references to modern periodical literature, and to take proper account of the sometimes disconcerting advances in Catholic scriptural studies. We have here a very definite improvement on the now outmoded Pohle-Preuss series. A horse of a somewhat different color is the translation of Ludwig Ott's *Grundriss der katholischen Dogmatik*, the first German edition of which appeared in 1952 as successor to Bartmann's popular course in basic dogma.²³ The editor of the English edition remarks that this is "quite the most remarkable work of compression of its kind that I have encountered," and this is true enough. Despite some favorable notices,²⁴ it does not seem unreasonable to ask if the art of compression has not squeezed out too much of great value, leaving the result of doubtful aid even for rapid review by those with

that certain extraordinary phenomena should occur (as, for example, the instantaneous cure of organic lesions, the very rapid multiplication of loaves of bread, or of fish). And is not this to say that such laws lead to the practical certainty that these phenomena, when verified, are exceptions to the normal course of events? And there are conditions under which this practical certainty becomes absolute. The religious context in which the miracle occurs surely cannot of itself validate an otherwise deficient argument. It can, however, set the event apart from the category of phenomena that justify recasting the law in question. Consequently, once its factual nature has been established, the religious miracle makes it impossible to revise the antecedently made judgment excluding the possibility of explaining the occurrence as the result of the operation of hidden but purely natural factors. The religious circumstances surrounding the miracle offer an intelligible explanation of its exceptional character; the miracle does not simply happen; it is willed by God operating in a sphere that transcends statistical analysis and computation, and for a purpose that is made understandable by the religious context. See also the well-balanced study by F. Taymans, S.J., "Le miracle, signe du surnaturel," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 77 (1955) 225-45.

²² G. Van Noort, *The True Religion*, tr. and rev. John J. Castellet, S.S., and William R. Murphy, S.S. (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1955, pp. 324).

²³ Ludwig Ott, *Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma*, ed. James Canon Bastible, tr. Patrick Lynch (St. Louis: Herder, 1955, pp. xvi + 519).

²⁴ See, for example, *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* 85 (1956) 380; *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 17 (1956) 253-54.

previous theological training. The passion for predigested theology can lead to no good. What the "educated laymen," to whom the book is also recommended, will make out of it, I should be happy to know. The following is by no means atypical: "In St. Cyril's eight Anathemas the Council of Ephesus (431) rejected the Nestorian 'co-veneration' (*symproskynēsis*) of the Man Jesus Christ with the Word (*Logos*), and laid down as the Catholic teaching that the Incarnate Word (by virtue of His unity of Person) is to be adored with one single adoration (*miā proskynēsei*). D. 120."²⁵ It is a bit of a mystery why our busy translators have not turned their efforts to the extraordinarily successful work of Michael Schmaus, now in its fourth German edition.²⁶ Written with an eye to the modern Catholic mind, so often unacquainted with Scholastic terminology and frameworks of thought, these volumes combine solidity of doctrine with all the basic values of the kerygmatic approach to theology favored by so many in recent years. Theology is presented not as a science only, but as a "science for living," and in a manner intelligible to "the Christian who lives in the *hic et nunc*." Several of the volumes have been reviewed in previous issues of THEOLOGICAL STUDIES by Cyril Vollert, S.J.²⁷

Another whose theological writings call for a courageous translator is Karl Rahner, S.J., of the Innsbruck Theological Faculty. Always stimulating, to some profoundly disturbing, these writings have now been collected and, with the addition of some new matter, published in two volumes.²⁸ A very individualistic style combines with original and penetratingly critical ideas to make for no easy reading. But we meet the very personal reactions of a zealous and gifted mind to the intellectual ferment of our day, which so often involves problems of perennial import in Catholic theology. These reactions include a deeply felt sense of the need to revitalize that theology. Perhaps the most interesting of these studies is the opening essay of the first volume, in which, following a rather trenchant critique of the course of theology as commonly presented in Catholic seminaries, a radically revised presentation is proposed. The objective sought is a revived exposé

²⁵ Whatever be the vagaries of the English language in its adaptations of foreign names, there do exist certain accepted forms; among these we surely do not find such specimens as "Isaianic" (p. 136), "Antiochic" (p. 141), or "Hippolyt" (p. 190). And it is always dangerous to translate into English from a German translation of Latin or Greek when the original is easily consulted.

²⁶ M. J. Schmaus, *Katholische Dogmatik*, 5 vols. (3rd and 4th ed.; Munich: Max Hüber 1948-53).

²⁷ THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 14 (1953) 318; 15 (1954) 482; 16 (1955) 291.

²⁸ *Schriften zur Theologie*, 2 vols. (Einsiedeln-Zürich-Cologne: Benziger, 1954-55, pp. 414, 399). These volumes were reviewed in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 17 (1956) 251-53.

of Catholic truth aimed at inculcating a vitally apprehended Christianity that is capable of reaching to the heart of human living and transforming it into the divine. Accordingly, the course would begin with a "fundamental" theology laying strong emphasis on the accessibility of God to man through the Church of Christ. Then would follow "special dogma," comprising the classical theology of God in Himself and in His relations with the created universe, of grace and the supernatural order, of Christ and His Mother, but also including much of speculative moral theology in a way calculated to bring the essential principles of Christian morality into more obvious relationship with their ultimate bases in dogmatic truths. The theology of the sacraments would be covered not in a special treatise but at strategic points in the general development. The scheme seems to envision two successive treatments of this material, the first prescinding from sin, the second to be presented in the light of the fall of man and his subsequent redemption. The viewpoint throughout, while dogmatic in essence, puts new stress on the historical and humanistic. (If you feel that theology is God-centered in more than a merely etymological sense, you may prefer to call the viewpoint anthropocentric rather than humanistic.) Clearly this is a plan based on no complacency with things as they are. But it is an acute re-examination of methods that somehow seem to carry within themselves the seeds of a deadening formalism. Whether or not one finds it acceptable in its entirety or even in its presuppositions, it is stimulating reading and should prove highly suggestive to those concerned with the theological formation of future priests.

Other chapters in this first volume are no less challenging. Two deal directly with the dynamic influence which considerations based on biblical theology should have on the traditional Scholastic theology. One on "God in the New Testament" starts from the premise that *theos* in almost every instance of its use designates the Father precisely in what characterizes Him as distinct from the Son (and the Holy Spirit), and suggests that we have here the revealed springboard for a more profound study of the divine Sonship of Christ. The second, devoted to present-day problems in Christology, makes, among others, the point that the picture of our Lord that emerges from the Scholastic formulations of revealed truth, unleavened by further elements from biblical theology, does not do full justice to the treasures entrusted to the Church, and so fails to exercise its potentialities for transfusing the life of faith and of the spirit. Following chapters on monogenism, and on our Lady's privileges of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption, two essays center on grace and the supernatural. The first discusses the persisting problem of a "natural" desire for the intuitive

vision of God. The suggestion is made that man will be better understood in his relations to the supernatural if one grants that, besides the supernatural ordination of the soul to God through sanctifying grace, an antecedent supernatural orientation towards God may be present in the soul from the moment of its creation, and be as a matter of fact inalienable, and so inhere forever even in the soul irretrievably lost. Here, of course, one treads on difficult and dangerous ground. There is no suggestion that such an orientation towards the vision of God implies any exigency springing from human nature itself; it is said to be a supernatural gift, though contemporaneous with creation, and so would not seem to be in conflict with the prescriptions of *Humani generis*.²⁹ Some of the reasoning behind this hypothesis would seem logically to lead to a kind of *regressus in infinitum*, demanding previous dispositions behind other previous dispositions.³⁰ A second article on the supernatural raises this question: can we find within the Scholastic tradition a way to reconcile its emphasis on the prominent place of created grace in the supernatural life, with the primacy of position which both Scripture and patristic writings seem to attribute to the uncreated gift of the Spirit dwelling within the justified soul? A tentative offer is made of a key to unlock the puzzle; it is St. Thomas' conception of the unique relationship between the *dispositio ultima* in the supernatural order, in this case created grace, and the form towards which it is a disposition, which is here the indwelling Spirit. The idea will be recognized as not entirely new. But one may wonder if the problem itself is not somewhat exaggerated; the contradiction may well be more apparent than real, the scriptural and patristic emphasis being on the concrete personal level, the Scholastic analysis deriving from the urge to categorize every possible created entity.

The last chapter of this volume faces up to a problem too often slighted in text-book treatises on original sin: what is concupiscence in its theological meaning? Is it nothing more than the indeliberate reaction of the sense appetite to its proportionate object? Or, as not a few seem to understand it, does it mean only such spontaneous activity when aroused by something

²⁹ Though the Pope's language is wide enough: "Others destroy the gratuitous character of the supernatural order, by suggesting that it would be impossible for God to create rational beings without equipping them for the Beatific Vision and calling them to it"; *AAS* 42 (1950) 570. The translation is Msgr. Ronald Knox's from the *Tablet* (London), September 2, 1950, p. 187. As far as I can understand him, Fr. Rahner writes of what God may have in reality done, not of what He necessarily would have to do.

³⁰ On the other hand, some of the reasons militating in favor of this kind of interior orientation of man towards the vision of God, based on Rahner's reasoning, are set forth by J. P. Kenny, S.J., "Reflections on Human Nature and the Supernatural," *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 14 (1953) 280-87.

morally evil? If this is concupiscence, it is not easy to see how it is natural to man; man would seem to be by nature in a state of radical contradiction. On the other hand, if concupiscence be understood to include the indeliberate acts of the will which are the necessary prelude to the exercise of man's free will, would not this imply that the gift of integrity, in so far as it is "immunity from concupiscence," necessarily excludes these spontaneous desires from the will? How then would Adam before the fall have been capable of any free choice? The answer put forth in this chapter does not lend itself to brief condensation; if the reader cares to pursue the matter, he will find the theory set forth at some length in two illuminating articles by J. P. Kenny, S.J.³¹

The second volume of the collection offers a variety of articles, all very much alive to contemporary problems. There is a study of *Mystici corporis* examining the doctrine on membership in the Church and the problem thence arising of the possible links to Christ of those who are not members of His Body. In the field of sacramental theology, regarding penance, the ecclesiastical aspects of sin are discussed together with the role of the penitent himself through his personal confession, contrition, and satisfaction, while the comparative functions of sacramental and personal piety in the sanctification of souls are studied in the light of the part played by personal faith. Other discussions touch on man's personal dignity and freedom vis-a-vis both Church and state, the place of the parish in the Church universal, and the nature of the apostolate of the laity.³²

If an excuse be needed for dwelling thus long on Rahner's *Schriften*, it will probably be found in the feeling of holy disquiet (or is it discontent?) one senses lying beyond the written words. Muted as it may be by the clarion call to a new dynamism in Catholic theology, there still sounds an extraordinarily sympathetic understanding of the men of our time, of their need and their unexpressed yearning for what are in fact the Christian remedies for the gnawing diseases of their souls. True, the *Zeitgeist* to which the European Catholic is attuned is not the same in which the American, of the northern or the southern hemisphere, lives and breathes. But it has enough in common with our own experience to exert a pressure on us also.³³ And if our conclusion be that "something must be done," this need

³¹ "The Problem of Concupiscence: A Recent Theory of Professor Karl Rahner," *Australasian Catholic Record* 29 (1952) 290-304; 30 (1953) 23-32.

³² This essay is discussed at some length by Malachi Donnelly, S.J., in a review of these volumes in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 17 (1956) 251-53.

³³ Catholic theology has not, of course, completely missed the needs and hungers of our generation. Evidence of this is at hand in Roger Aubert, *La théologie catholique au milieu du xx^e siècle* (Tournai-Paris: Casterman, 1954, pp. 101). Two tendencies are singled

not mean that we at once agree that the medicines prescribed are those best suited to the illnesses diagnosed. Is it indeed possible, or desirable, to transform Catholic theology into an instrument for revivification of Catholic life, if in the process it loses the very values for which it is cherished by the Church? The contemplation of Christian truth for its own sake, or for the sake of an ever deeper fathoming of its significance, remains a thing good in itself. Too much preoccupation with "practical" results is often called an American weakness; yet here is one American who sees no little danger in an attempt to make of dogmatic theology a tool for the swift renewal of a Christian spirit in our world, especially were the effort to develop in a pre-vaillingly anthropocentric atmosphere. No doubt all too many only skim the surface of our theology; no doubt familiar formulas obscure nearly as often as they reveal the meaning of Catholic truth; no doubt we are all in fact imperfect in our theologizing, as in all things else. Yet is not Catholic theology rather the ultimate foundation than the immediate inspiration and the everyday tool for the renewal of Christian life? Other, and more immediately effective, factors are at work here, whether or not their depth and wide extension be always perceived.³⁴ a newly vital appreciation of the Catholic liturgy, an increasingly intelligent contact with the Bible, a deeper understanding of the nature of devotion to the Mother of God—these are only a few of the dynamic forces at work. The Spirit of God is at hand in many ways we know not.³⁵ All this, however, should not be taken as adversely critical of the gauntlet thrown down by Karl Rahner; the two volumes of his writings are a splendid tribute to the value of that constant

out as dominating the interests of theologians during the past fifty years: closer contact with theological sources, as seen especially in revived enthusiasm for biblical, patristic, and liturgical studies, and a fruitful series of contacts with non-Catholic thought leading to the rediscovery of many half-forgotten elements in the Catholic tradition itself.

³⁴ May it not be suggested, for example, that too many of the Catholic clergy were taken unawares by the laity's enthusiastic reception of the new *Ordo hebdomadae sanctae*?

³⁵ One of these is through that oft-forgotten instrument, the teacher. I do not mean the formal lecturer, who too often has been the bane of European seminaries and universities. Someone will some day sing the long-delayed song of praise due to the self-effacing effectiveness of sheer good teaching, which has contributed so much spiritually and intellectually to alert students for the Catholic priesthood in the United States. In the meanwhile I recommend to all who come across it the recently published *De modo addiscendi* of the thirteenth-century Franciscan, Gilbert de Tournai: Gilberto de Tournai, *De modo addiscendi*, ed. E. Bonifacio (Turin: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1953, pp. 319). This is a truly wonderful synthesis of all sorts of ideas on teaching methods and objectives garnered from sources as disparate as Cicero, Augustine, and the early Schoolmen, underlining the function of the Christian virtues in opening the door to knowledge and wisdom: scholarly pursuits are the first step on the road to contemplation; their goal is the "attainment of interior peace in the beatific vision of the Supreme Truth."

return to the ultimate sources of all theology, the fruit of which is apparent on almost every page of these essays.³⁶

By way of contrast I mention another work in German. I find it hard to divine what the admirer of Matthias Scheeben's theology will think of the most recent work of a zealous propagator of Scheeben's viewpoints and methods. Julius Tyciak, in a short volume which is a drastic revision of a 1940 publication,³⁷ enlarges on Scheeben's sacramental theology in the light of many years' developments in this field. In a style that often waxes strongly rhetorical, not without detriment both to clarity and accuracy, the author studies the seven sacraments as efficacious channels of supernatural sanctification deriving from Christ as the "primordial sacrament." But on the credit side it is a good deal to have brought out in strong relief the central role in the sanctification of souls played by the redemptive activity of Christ, in Himself and in His prolongation in the Mystical Body.

II

Twice in its decree on original sin the Council of Trent quotes Rom 5:12: "Through one man sin came into the world and through sin death, and thus death passed into all men in whom all sinned," in each case indicating that St. Paul is here speaking of an original sin that affects all of Adam's descendants by reason of his revolt. The man who denies that Adam passed on to all mankind sin, which is the soul's death, "contradicts the Apostle's words"³⁸; the Catholic may not hold that newly born infants inherit nothing of original sin, so that in their case baptism unto the remission of sins is not verified, "for no otherwise are we to understand what the Apostle says [in Rom 5:12] than as the Catholic Church throughout the world has always understood it".³⁹ It seems a very legitimate question, then, to ask just how

³⁶ This is as good a place as any to note the publication of an English translation of Canon Jean Mouroux's highly original study of religious experience, the first of its kind from a Catholic viewpoint: *The Christian Experience* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1954, pp. xi + 370). The original French volume was reviewed by Dietrich von Hildebrand in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 15 (1954) 334-37. We may add that this extremely valuable study is a first-class antidote for a kind of inbred fear which Catholics have nurtured since Reformation times against the very term "religious experience." Men *do* have religious experience, and we should know something about it. As a matter of fact, we do know something, but there are three especially illuminating chapters in this book showing what religious experience meant to Matthew, Paul, and John, as demonstrated in their thoughts on such matters as homage to God, and union with Christ and His mystical Body.

³⁷ *Der siebenfüßige Strom aus der Gnadenwelt der Sakramente* (Freiburg: Herder, 1954, pp. x + 160).

³⁸ *Decretum super peccato originali* (DB 789).

³⁹ *Ibid.* 791.

the Catholic Church throughout the world has understood this passage of St. Paul. A somewhat surprising answer is proposed by Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., of the Biblical Institute in Rome.⁴⁰ The exegesis most in favor among Catholics today (the one almost invariably proposed in our manuals of dogmatic theology at least) differs considerably from the interpretation which Lyonnet suggests as the only one that can even pretend to have been most widely held in the Church throughout the world. Where the current explanation sees in the "death" of the passage a reference solely to physical death, the separation of soul from body as the "wages of sin," the all but universal tradition in East and West favors a considerably broader sense: death, besides the dissolution of the human composite, means the death of the soul (which is sin), and above all it means "eschatological death," which is the definitive and eternal separation of man from God. And where the phrase "all sinned" is taken to mean that all men inherit the guilt of Adam's sin, the Greeks (and some of the Latins as well) understood these words to refer to the personal sins of Adam's descendants. In paraphrase, then, St. Paul is saying that by Adam's fall the power of sin entered into the world bringing "death" in its train, and by this fact all men were set apart from God; the separation was of itself definitive, eternal (apart from redemption) but this eternal "death" was to reach the individual through his own personal sins; and, St. Paul adds, this condition of personal sin was in fact fulfilled and so (again apart from redemption) "death passed into all men in view of the fact (or perhaps more accurately 'since the condition was fulfilled') that *all* adults *sinned* personally," thus ratifying Adam's rebellion and making it their own. It is clear that this exegesis is strongly at variance with the one most familiar to us; the latter labors under its own difficulties, and Lyonnet is probably at his best in pointing these out. The sheerly exegetical reasons offered in support of the "new" interpretation can best be judged by exegetes; I am inclined to think, however, that the position must ultimately stand or fall on the strength of the patristic evidence offered in its support. Much of this is given, and it is more than persuasive; more can certainly be garnered, but this will take time.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Stanislaus Lyonnet, S.J., *Quaestiones in epistolam ad Romanos*, Prima series (Rome: Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 1955, pp. 246). And, more recently, "Le péché originel et l'exégèse de Rom. 5,12-21," *Recherches de science religieuse* 44 (1956) 63-84. See also the same author's "Le sens de *eph' ô* en Rom. 5,12 et l'exégèse des Pères grecs," *Biblica* 36 (1955) 436-56. For a different, though not necessarily contradictory, view cf. Thomas Barrosse, C.S.C., "Death and Sin in the Epistle to the Romans," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 15 (1953-54) 438-59.

⁴¹ Further study of Cyril of Alexandria, to name one source, will be richly rewarding in this connection. Some passages which at first reading seem to deny the very existence

We have at any rate, with regard to St. Paul, the assurance of Trent that he did speak of original sin. Is it true of the Gospel narratives that they are as silent on this matter as the exegetes seem generally to believe?⁴² That their silence is not absolute is suggested in a recent article⁴³ in view of the significance latent in several of our Lord's allusions to the Old Testament. One of these (the argument here is a little too subtle for easy summary) emerges from a comparison of Christ's words to Nicodemus, "Unless a man be born of water and spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the spirit is spirit" (Jn 3:5,6), with Ezechiel's "I will pour upon you clean water and you shall be cleansed; from all your stains and abominations I shall purify you. And I will give you a new heart and I will put a new spirit within you, I shall take out of your flesh the stony heart and will give you a heart of flesh. I will put my spirit in the midst of you" (Ez 36:25-27). Another was occasioned by the Pharisees' question about the legitimacy of divorce (Mt 19:1-12; Mk 10:2-12). In His answer, rising above mere legalities, Christ recalls that it was God who made man male and female (Gn 1:27) and intended them to join in a permanent union superseding all others: "For this reason a man shall leave father and mother and cling to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh" (Gn 2:24). It is not for man to block the fulfilment of God's will by setting apart what He has joined together. The divorce sanctioned by the Law was a concession made to hardness of heart; in the beginning it was not so. These words point to an original state of affairs conforming to God's ideal of marriage, and a later legal concession made in the face of a hardness of heart that was not in man as he came from God's hands, but was the result of sin. The Lord's answer, then, offers at least a discernible hint of an original innocence later lost; and there is also an implicit promise of a restoration; for henceforth it will be forbidden to send one's wife away, and indeed to do so is to be guilty of adultery. If an act hitherto tolerated by the Law is from now on to

of original sin, e.g., *Adversus anthropomorphitas* 8 (PG 76, 1092; on the authenticity of this work see H. du Manoir, S.J., *Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie* [Paris, 1944] p. 57), and especially *In Rom.* 5: 12 (PG 74, 784), will be seen as a matter of fact to be corroborative of the interpretation we are discussing. See on this subject *The Image of God in Man according to St. Cyril of Alexandria*, by Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., soon to appear as Volume 14 in the series *Studies in Christian Antiquity*, ed. Johannes Quasten (Catholic University of America Press).

⁴² So, for instance, A. Gaudel, "Péché originel," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 12,305; A. Feuillet, "Le plan salvifique de Dieu d'après l'épître aux Romains," *Revue biblique* 57 (1950) 361. A. Gelin, in *L'Ami du clergé* 63 (1953) 372, is not quite so apodictic.

⁴³ A. M. Dubarle, O.P., "Le péché originel dans les suggestions de l'évangile," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 39 (1955) 603-14.

involve guilt equal to that of adultery, it is because the situation has changed, as it had once before changed (in an opposite sense) between the day of creation and the coming of the Law. The salvation brought by Jesus is the re-establishment of an original innocence lost through sin. This is the prelude to the Pauline doctrine of the two Adams, and in fact its probable source.⁴⁴

This much about the revealed truth of original sin. What of the theology that seeks to understand it?⁴⁵ Our manuals summarize conveniently the theories currently most favored by Catholics.⁴⁶ The very diversity of opinion demonstrates the difficulty inherent in the diagnosis of the nature of original sin in Adam's offspring. Each is *spoliatus in gratuitis et vulneratus in naturalibus*, said Peter Lombard,⁴⁷ and his successors echoed the words. Current teachings account for the "spoliation": man is deprived of the supernatural gifts of original justice. But a voice is raised to ask if theologians today ponder sufficiently the "wounding" of human nature.⁴⁸ Is human nature truly "fallen" if it is in all essentials identical with "pure nature"? A return to an older explanation, highlighting the *vulneratio naturae*, but probing its meaning more deeply might, it is said, prove enlightening. As briefly as possible, then, if Adam's children are born into the world without the

⁴⁴ If it seems strange to find such references as we have given above to scriptural sources in a survey of dogmatic theology, the reasons will be clearer from a reading of Paul Vogt, O.S.B., *Les sources de la doctrine chrétienne* (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954, pp. 495), a fascinating study of the inspired writings as the primary (and to many the sole) fountainhead of Christian doctrine throughout the great centuries of Scholasticism. At least the close familiarity of all the great theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries with almost every page of the Bible furnishes a goal no man can ignore.

⁴⁵ Both aspects of original sin form the subject matter of a book not hitherto noticed in these pages: M.-M. Labourdette, O.P., *Le péché originel et les origines de l'homme* (Paris: Alsatia, 1953, pp. xx + 210). In three sections the book examines successively the dogma in its scriptural sources and dogmatic formulations, St. Thomas' theology of the fall of man and its consequences, and finally some of the problems that arise today from this Christian belief, principally from the different theories of evolution and polygenism. A concluding chapter offers an analysis of the place of the dogma of man's fall in the economy of salvation. A very interesting appendix summarizes the principles which the author thinks must guide our interpretation of the canons of Trent relating to original sin; some of these are quite illuminating, others should be the subject of further discussion.

⁴⁶ For example, L. Lercher, S.J. *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae* 2 (4th ed.; Barcelona, 1945), especially nn. 654, 658, and 661 f.

⁴⁷ *Sent.* 2, d. 25, c. 8.

⁴⁸ R. P. de Broglie, S.J., *Notes sur la doctrine du péché originel*. Notes prises au cours par les élèves, Faculté de théologie, Institut Catholique de Paris, pp. 16 (no date). Anyone who has seen the reports of his remarks in the public press, or the notes taken of his lectures, will know what discretion to apply before attributing the ideas contained in these notes to anyone other than the *élèves* named in the title.

gifts of original justice, this cannot be merely because God thus punishes Adam in his descendants; for we should then be the heirs not of a sin but of its consequences only. No, if the newborn child is "punished" in any sense, this can only be because of an antecedent unworthiness intrinsic to the child of Adam, disfiguring in him the natural image of God that would have been his birthright even in a state of pure nature.⁴⁹ True, too narrow a conception of the reality signified by "nature" inhibits any theory of a *vulneratio naturae*; if nature is synonymous with abstract essence, a *vulneratio* is patent nonsense; a universal idea is not "wounded." But nature can also mean the collective type which the generative act tends to reproduce in any given race.⁵⁰ Human generation tends in the different races of man to reproduce light- or dark-skinned offspring; even in a particular family generation perpetuates various blemishes and deficiencies. Can we not, then, conceive of original sin as a kind of racial stain which involves for Adam's children the loss not only of supernatural gifts but also of the inner harmony and equilibrium, the spiritual (and bodily) health, that would have characterized man in the state of pure nature?

Analogies come to mind. Men, as a matter of experience, inherit blemishes, some sheerly physical, others reaching into the moral sphere, tendencies, more or less ineluctable, to dishonesty, to intemperance. Congenital predispositions these, from which stem inordinate attractions to certain types of actions and which, under stress of temptation, throw a veil of obscurity over the innate attractiveness of virtuous ideals. Conceived in some such terms, the stain of original sin would be more universal in character and would affect the individual much more profoundly. It would imply an inherited drive to minimize moral and spiritual values as such, to enthrone the temporal, the material, the sensual above the spiritual and the supernatural. Not that fallen man could never perceive the attractiveness of this or that good action, of this or that particular kind of virtuous conduct; but nature ungraced could not know a universal, constant love of moral rectitude even on a purely natural plane.

The heart of the mystery of original sin, then, lies here: how could Adam's fall engender in all his descendants this *vulneratio naturae*? Consider first Adam himself. He could not but have wounded himself physically as well as morally by his desertion of God. Crown a statue; remove the crown; the

⁴⁹ It is not without some significance that St. Thomas speaks of original sin as an *accidens innaturale* (*De malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 9m), as *contrarium prohibens* (*ibid.*, a. 1, ad 11m) and a *habitus corruptus* (*Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1m).

⁵⁰ See Vitus de Broglie, S.J., *De fine ultimo humanae vitae*, Pars prior (Paris: Beauchesne, 1948) pp. 126-29.

statue is unchanged. But crown a man king and then dethrone him; he will be forever changed. In mind and heart he will never be the simple citizen who was always a stranger to power and position. So with Adam; and the basic outlines of the inner disequilibrium that resulted from his fall are clear enough. It affected his relations with God, with himself, and with his fellow men. The first sin broke the bonds of an intimate supernatural familiarity with the Creator. Only through his natural reason could man thereafter reach out towards Him whom he had known and loved on a far higher plane. How easy then to disdain this lowlier contact with divinity, and how much less unreasonable could atheism seem; or how necessary could it appear to bolster this new weakness with superstitious practices or even idolatry. And within his own soul, for how long could fallen man ignore the searing contrast between the happiness he remembered and the misery that now engulfed him? How strong now the urge to drown this nostalgia in a sea of earthly pleasures, not counting the moral costs. Add the perils of a newly hostile world to muffle the voice within that warned of greater spiritual dangers. And where brotherly love was an effortless thing before the sin, brother now turned to competitor and rival with the fall from grace. In the very nature of things the mentality of fallen man imaged the soul embittered by the poverty and disgrace of a brilliant career destroyed and a lifetime's labor lost.

So much for Adam himself. But why would not this initial disequilibrium gradually have diminished and ultimately disappeared from the race of men? Why should it have been perpetuated and have increased from generation to generation? Such questions suppose that human generation tends naturally to perpetuate and perfect a "specific type" (in the narrowest possible Aristotelian sense), whereas all available evidence shows that in truth it propagates the racial type incarnate in our historical ancestors, with all its defects, specific and individual. Examined historically, generation never tended to realize even an ideal "pure" nature, in which, we recall, St. Thomas held that Adam had never lived. Before the fall the generative function in Adam, together with the whole man, was supernaturally transformed and so would have produced only men in the state of original justice; after the fall and the loss of this supernatural elevation human generation surely would not tend to "reproduce" a naturally perfect type of humanity which had never existed on land or sea. The only reproduction possible for fallen man would be the propagation of a human type in a condition of internal disharmony, physical and spiritual, uprooted from the soil in which it had been originally implanted. Man's fallen state implied a racial perversion from which there was no natural door of escape.

These considerations may affect our reading of St. Thomas. When he speaks, for example, of concupiscence as being the material element in original sin, and the deprivation of original justice as the formal element,⁵¹ it is clear that concupiscence is to him no abstraction but a concrete propensity within man to seek his own satisfactions outside the control or approval of reason. He calls it an "inordinate disposition arising from the dissolution of the harmony that was original justice," comparable to a bodily illness.⁵² And the loss of original justice involves more than the loss of supernatural grace; for original justice was the end result of a nature wholly sound in itself, transformed, elevated and made perfect by grace.⁵³ The first sin was thus a catastrophe that destroyed in man something more than sanctifying grace; it disrupted an interior rectitude that was built upon a nature complete and whole in its own sphere.⁵⁴ Original sin, therefore, is a deprivation of an internal equilibrium which, however much it owed to grace, reached down to the very root-fibres of man's nature. No wonder, then, that the Scholastics talk of fallen man as *vulneratus in naturalibus*.⁵⁵ The theory we have thus described, whether or not one is prepared to accept it in its entirety, at least proffers insights that somehow have a ring of reality to them.

Did St. Thomas in fact believe sanctifying grace a part of original justice, or did he rather see it as something really distinct from a rectitude brought about in human nature by other divine gifts? How did he conceive the relationship between grace and original justice? These questions are discussed

⁵¹ As, for instance, *In 2 Sent.*, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3; *De malo*, q. 4, a. 2; *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 82, a. 3.

⁵² *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 82, a. 1.

⁵³ This explains why the grace given to men as the fruit of Christ's redemption does not imply the restoration of the whole of original justice; in our case grace does not find a sound and healthy nature to elevate and transform; we still await the healing of the whole man.

⁵⁴ This is more easily grasped if we recall that for St. Thomas, if it was absurd to hold that man can sin against supernatural morality while remaining perfectly faithful to natural moral dictates, it was equally so to think a man can be habitually ill-oriented towards his final supernatural end without thereby finding himself disorientated in the realm of natural morality and finality. For St. Thomas, sin against the supernatural violates also the laws of right reason. See, for instance, *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1m.

⁵⁵ It must be kept in mind, of course, that the state of moral disequilibrium in which man is born is essentially connected with the moral guilt of Adam's sin; otherwise man would not come into this world in a state of *sin*. This is the teaching of the Church in its condemnation of the position of Michel de Bay: "Original sin is truly sin," he had held, "without any relation or respect to the will from which it took its origin" (*DB* 1047). It is as essential to the state of original sin that it find its source in Adam's guilt, as it is to the state of personal sinfulness that it derive from a past culpable decision of the sinner.

in a recent publication that differs greatly in tone and style from the one we have been describing. Van Roo's book,⁵⁶ originally a doctorate dissertation, hews very closely to Scholastic methods and terminology. Over thirty years ago some well-known theologians⁵⁷ revived a position apparently favored by some of the earliest commentators of St. Thomas (Cajetan, for one): original justice was a gift, quite distinct from grace, which conferred on nature an internal harmony of all its natural powers and thus disposed it for grace; grace itself was a personal endowment, entirely supernatural, and the efficient cause of original justice, of which however it was no part. The position was challenged both in its objective validity and as an interpretation of St. Thomas.⁵⁸ By and large today theologians seem to hold that, in spite of some obscurities, St. Thomas looked on grace as a gift to human nature itself as well as a personal adornment of Adam's soul, and a constituent element, indeed the formal cause, of original justice. This, at any rate, is the position defended by Van Roo. Original justice meant a three-fold inner harmony whereby man's body was ruled by his soul, his lower faculties by reason, and reason was subject to God. The subjection of reason to God was primary, and grace was its cause. And since the primary subjection brought about the other two, grace in the final analysis was the prime element and an essential part of the whole. A second section re-examines the texts in which St. Thomas sets up a distinction between grace as a personal thing and original justice as a gift to human nature. It seems demonstrated that in each instance the distinction is in fact between sanctifying grace as given *after the fall* to individual men, when it was without doubt a personal gift, and original justice *in Adam*, where it was an accidental modification of nature itself transmissible through human generation. This is an essential point that seems to have escaped the defenders of a different interpretation of St. Thomas.

What, then, was the causality exercised by grace as the cause *par ex-*

⁵⁶ William A. Van Roo, S.J., *Grace and Original Justice according to St. Thomas* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1955, pp. 211). The contents of this book were summarized in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 16 (1955) 661.

⁵⁷ Notably J.-B. Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel d'après s. Thomas* (Kain, 1922; Paris, 1930), and J. Bittremieux, "La distinction entre la justice originelle et la grâce sanctifiante d'après s. Thomas. Doctrina Caietani," *Ephemerides theologiae Lovanienses* 6 (1929) 633 ff.

⁵⁸ Is the present writer alone in his occasional annoyance with many of our intramural discussions about "the mind of St. Thomas" on this or that subject? So often these are inconclusive because St. Thomas quite clearly never made up his mind at all on the particular point, and sometimes for the further reason that his interpreters lose sight of the only possible ultimate objective of such discussions: what is the truth of the matter, whatever St. Thomas may or may not have thought about it.

cellence of original justice, of which clearly it was an essential part? Was it formal or efficient cause? After a detailed analysis of St. Thomas' doctrine of the nature and functions of grace and the infused virtues, the following conclusions are reached, in the words of the author's own summary:

It was both formal and efficient cause with the distinctions and limitations we have noted. Saying, then, that grace was formal in original justice, we must limit its strict formal causality to the essence of the soul. Grace did not produce the whole of original justice by formal causality, for the diffusion of its perfection through the powers was the effect rather of efficient causality. It was not the efficient cause of the whole of original justice, but only of the rectitude of the powers of the soul. Saying that it was an efficient cause in this manner, we do not mean that grace was completely distinct from original justice as efficient cause from effect. We are concerned with the unity of order, in which all the ordered elements are related as cause and effect. The efficient causality of grace, then, does not impede its being part of that justice. If it did, the same would be true of the efficient causality of the will perfected by charity. We should have to say that since cause and effect are completely distinct, original justice was either exclusively in the will, or exclusively in the lower powers moved by the will, and in either case we should have to burn half the texts.⁵⁹

III

"Before Abraham came to be, I am" (Jn 8:58). What was in the human mind of Christ when He used such words as these? Was He humanly aware of his divine personality? Could He say to Himself, not only because of His divine knowledge, but also by reason of a self-consciousness in His human intellect: I am the eternal Son of God? Christ is one divine Person who subsists in two complete but distinct natures, the human and the divine, each of which enjoys its own proper attributes and powers. With His human mind, therefore, as well as with the divine intelligence He must somehow know Himself and His own substantial unity. He must know Himself to be one both really and psychologically. But since He has two intellects, and two "consciousnesses" (in some real meaning of this word), how are we to understand the psychological unity of the God-man? That He is ontologically one we know from the dogma of the Incarnation; but how and in what sense is He psychologically one?

That this is no simple question has been proved in recent years by the

⁵⁹ Van Roo, p. 202. This is not quite the theological gobbledygook it may seem at first glance; it puts succinctly the results of a painstaking analysis of Aquinas' doctrine on the causality proper to sanctifying grace as a supernatural reality, and to the infused virtues which normally accompany this grace, points that had not been given their proper weight in this discussion.

sheer number of words that have been written in the attempt to answer it. The problem is not precisely whether or not Jesus Christ knows with His human mind that He is the second Person of the Holy Trinity incarnate. Clearly He knows this; He was able to formulate this truth in human language during His years on earth. The question is, how does He know it? And, more precisely, does He know His divine personality, the real core and center of His ontological unity, as we know our own personalities? Does He have in His created intellect an act of psychological self-consciousness by which He is humanly aware of His interior life and its activities as being in all truth the human life and activities of the Word of God? And this by a process of introspection, of reflection on His own inner human dynamics?

That the question should be proposed in just such terms is the result of modern psychological findings and the attempt to integrate them with the data of revelation and Catholic theology. The attempt has given rise to a sometimes very subtle controversy among theologians that has not been without an occasional lapse into *odium theologicum*. When in the nineteenth century John Baptist Cardinal Franzelin put a similar question to himself, the answer seemed to him simple enough. "If with our contemporaries," he wrote, "we say a person is the subject of the predication 'I' . . . [then] in God there are three who say 'I,' but they say it by one simple act of intellect. The one God says: I the Father, I the Son, I the Holy Spirit. . . . On the other hand, Christ as God is one 'I' who says 'I' to Himself by two distinct and different acts, the one divine, the other human."⁶⁰

Nor did the answer seem much more difficult when Paul Galtier, S.J., first published his treatise on our Lord.⁶¹ Christ, he said, with His human intellect knew that He was God; the very way in which He spoke of His divinity showed either that He was a man speaking what was in His [human] mind, or that God was making use of His humanity as a mere mechanical instrument to simulate a human teacher. This latter would imply that Christ was not truly acting as man, contrary to all evidence and Christian belief. So the question arises: How can the Word Incarnate humanly know Himself to be God? No process of mere deduction could lead Him to human certainty of the personal union of His humanity with the divine Person of the Word; the hypostatic union simply exceeds the capabilities of any created intellect. In the end Galtier concluded that only in and through the supernatural knowledge of the beatific vision could Christ's human mind have found assurance that the Word of God was hypostatically united to His humanity, that His humanity was not a human person, but was super-

⁶⁰ *Tractatus de Verbo incarnato* (3rd ed.; Rome, 1881), Thesis 28, p. 250 f.

⁶¹ *De incarnatione ac redemptione* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1926).

naturally conjoined to the divine Person of the Word (p. 282). But is this really an answer to the question of our Lord's human psychological consciousness of His divine personality? To know God and God's relation to the human nature of Christ is one thing—the beatific vision would seem to imply this much—but is this the same thing as being humanly self-conscious of the divine personality that overshadows and completely embraces this particular humanity? The beatific vision would not seem to be an act of psychological reflection on one's own activities, on one's own person. Galtier, of course, knew this; his position was simply that to the extent "consciousness," by a permissible extension of its meaning, designates the awareness a person has of himself and his activity, then, primarily because of the beatific vision, the Word made flesh is *humanly* conscious of Himself, as from all eternity He is divinely conscious of Himself.⁶² And here is the root explanation of the inner, psychological unity of Jesus Christ, true God and true man. His two "consciousnesses" attest to the hypostatic union, each in its own proper way (p. 283).

This in brief was the thesis which was elaborated twelve years after in a book remarkable for its pioneer effort to integrate the modern data of empirical psychology with traditional Catholic theology,⁶³ and again set forth in summary fashion in a second edition of *De incarnatione ac redemptione*.⁶⁴ However simple this explanation may have seemed, both its simplicity and its validity were soon challenged. It must be recalled that Galtier, in his theology of the hypostatic union, has consistently championed

⁶² To say that our Lord is "humanly conscious of Himself" is perhaps not the simple, clear statement it seems to be. As H. Diepen, O.S.B., said some years ago ("La psychologie humaine du Christ selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue thomiste* 50 [1950] 515–62), Christ without doubt has a human consciousness, but this cannot be an interior awareness of a human ego for the very simple reason that He cannot perceive what does not exist. Were He to perceive His human activities as attributable to a human subject, whether as the psychological or as the metaphysical ego, He would be perceiving what is not true. It would then be the function of the beatific vision not to perfect but to *correct* an erroneous perception. What occurs is rather this. The Son of God is humanly conscious of His human acts; He is aware of these acts as the acts of someone, though that someone cannot be His human nature as subsisting in itself, since it does not so subsist. In other words, Christ perceives His human activity as being not autonomous on the human plane, but as dependent on a "someone"; who that someone is He knows supernaturally through the beatific vision. The vision, therefore, supervenes not to correct a false perception, but to complete and perfect the data, in themselves correct, though incomplete, of Christ's human self-awareness; it assures the Savior's human mind that the Word of God is that Person on whom alone all His human acts depend.

⁶³ Paul Galtier, S.J., *L'Unité du Christ: Être, personne, conscience* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1938, pp. xx + 378).

⁶⁴ Paris: Beauchesne, 1947, pp. vii + 506.

the position of Tiphanius, which explains the absence of a human person from the humanity hypostatically united to the Word of God by the mere fact that this humanity has been taken as His own by a divine Person.⁶⁵ To other schools of Catholic thought, especially perhaps to those who hold as uniquely defensible Capreolus' theory as so skilfully developed by Billot,⁶⁶ this explanation of the ontological unity of Christ is the evil root from which grows a wholly untenable conception of our Lord's psychological unity. The most formidable adversary from this camp has been Msgr. Pietro Parente,⁶⁷ now Archbishop of Perugia, but until recently Dean of the Theological Faculty of the Propaganda in Rome.

What, then, is the objection raised against Galtier's thesis? Put quite simply, the difficulty arises from his contention that in Christ, as in any man, we may discover a created, substantial "I" which is the concrete acting human subject—in the case of Christ, of course, this is His individual human nature which is not a human person—and that this substantial "I" is known by the subject's mind, since it forms a necessary part of the complex object of the individual's self-awareness. Though not a human person, this particular human nature is the only active agent on the created plane in Christ. And so we may legitimately speak of a *human* "I" in the Incarnate Word; and it is this human "I" that, through the beatific vision of God, is empowered to say: I am the eternal Son of God.

Now of all this Msgr. Parente will have no part. In the first place, for him the theory of Tiphanius, in effect, destroys the reality of the hypostatic union. It presents the two natures of Christ standing as it were side by side, with no real bond to link them; as to the psychological unity of Christ, it is fatal to attempt to center it in any sheerly human activity. Unless it is somehow ultimately grounded in the divine Person, there simply is no psychological unity. Only in terms of Thomistic metaphysics (in actual fact, only in that special metaphysics which is Billot's expansion of Capreolus) is there a viable solution of the problem. For here the ontological unity of the God-man is seen to be real and physical in that the human nature of Christ is actuated by the divine existence as this is personally possessed by the Word. And the psychological unity is seen to be equally real in that the Person of the Word is, in Christ, not merely the ultimate subject of attribution, but also the sole *agens* par excellence, the ultimate efficient guiding principle exercising a true hegemony over the whole complex activity of our

⁶⁵ *De incarnatione ac redemptione* (2nd ed.) nn. 213-72.

⁶⁶ Ludovicus Card. Billot, S.J., *De Verbo incarnato* (7th ed.; Rome: Gregorian University, 1927, pp. 638). See especially Thesis 7, pp. 123-60.

⁶⁷ Pietro Parente, *L'Io di Cristo* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1951, pp. 288).

Lord's human nature. And it is precisely in virtue of this hegemony of the divine Person that the Word of God is the subject to whom we must attribute all that is human as well as the divine in our Savior. Not that there is an activity proper to the Person and another proper to the humanity; the activity of a subject is one, though it proceeds from the nature and from the person together through both efficient and formal causality.

If it be protested that all divine action *ad extra* is action common to the three divine Persons, and so the Word as a distinct Person cannot be said to exert an influence on His human nature that is exclusively His, the answer is offered in terms of Billot's theology of the hypostatic union. This is the theory according to which, as will be recalled, the Word subsists in the humanity of Christ by communicating to it the divine existence, common to Father, Son, and Spirit, but only as that existence is conceived as "personalized" by the relation of filiation and so bearing as it were the imprint of the second Person of the Trinity. Granted this, says Parente, we can go one step further and maintain that there is an analogous divine *operative* influence deriving efficiently from the whole Trinity but exercised in a personal way by the Word, who thus becomes the *active* term of attribution for the human activity of Jesus.

Within this framework of thought both the ontological and the psychological unity of the Word Incarnate are safeguarded. As God He is divinely aware of Himself (viewed as "absolute," this awareness is, of course, common to Father, Son, and Spirit, but viewed "relatively" it is somehow personal to the Son), while as man Christ has a human consciousness of Himself. The problem here is not with the divine but with the human "autoconsciousness." And in solving it the Catholic, as such, perforce parts company with those for whom consciousness of self is constitutive of personality; two consciousnesses in Christ would, in this supposition, equal two persons, and this is Nestorianism. If, however, consciousness merely *reveals* the personality objectively existing, then our Lord's twofold awareness necessarily reveals the single existing Person of the Word. If we then accept the guidance of St. Thomas and with him recall that the human mind in its awareness of its own activity is at least implicitly aware of its own existence (*De ver.*, q. 10, a. 8), then where is the contradiction in saying that the human mind of Christ enjoys just such implicit consciousness of its single existence, the divine existence of the Son, which alone actuates it? This was the thesis first propounded in *L'Io di Cristo*, and more recently set forth in greater detail in an enlarged second edition,⁶⁸ with some

⁶⁸ *L'Io di Cristo* (2nd ed.; Brescia: Morcelliana, 1955, pp. 394), reviewed in this issue of THEOLOGICAL STUDIES.

changes already foreshadowed by an article of the author's which appeared in 1953.⁶⁹ One concession to Galtier's position is included among the revisions in this new edition, an admission that the beatific vision plays its part in the clarification and explicitation of the Lord's human perception of the divine ego, the sole fountainhead of all unity, real and psychological, in the God-man.

In an effort to extricate the basic truth from the metaphysical and psychological subtleties in which he felt it had become involved, a professor of theology at the Carmelite scholasticate in Rome set out to review the question from the beginning and to formulate a solution in the simplest possible terms.⁷⁰ Rejecting both Galtier and Parente (the latter principally because of his theory that the Word guides the activities of Christ's human life through a kind of causality that is difficult to envisage⁷¹), he proposes a profound and all-embracing influence of the Word over the Lord's created activities, an ultimate supernatural actuation of the humanity which is its complete sublimation. Under this uniquely supernaturalizing influence, the Word through His human intellect perceives not only the human nature in which it functions, but also the Word Himself as personally united to the created nature. This perception is an experiential awareness of the effects

⁶⁹ "Psicologia di Gesù Cristo," *Enciclopedia cattolica* 10, 255-57 (Vatican City: Ente per l'Enciclopedia cattolica e per il Libro cattolico, 1948-1954). Despite the title, this article is little more than a condensed version of Parente's basic thesis on the "I" of Christ.

⁷⁰ Bartolomé M. Xiberta, O.Carm., *El Yo de Jesucristo: Un conflicto entre dos Cristologías* (Barcelona: Herder, 1954, pp. 172). The review of this work in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 16 (1955) 463-65 rightly notes a tendency, not entirely absent from Msgr. Parente's writings also, to couple Père Galtier's name with the extreme position of Déodat de Basly, O.F.M., "L'Assumptus Homo," *La France franciscaine* 11 (1928) 265-314, particularly as this was developed by Leon Seiller, O.F.M., *La psychologie humaine du Christ* (Paris: Vrin, 1949, pp. 68). Since this booklet was put on the Roman Index, and since Galtier's position is irreproachably orthodox, this juxtaposition of names is something more than disingenuous. In an extended survey of this controversy Kevin McNamara, "The Psychological Unity of Christ," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 23 (1956) 60-69, also notes Xiberta's remark that "Galtier's view of the Word as a mere subject of attribution in relation to the free acts of Christ's manhood is . . . a distortion of the Church's doctrine" springing from the Scotist assumption that personality is in itself a mere negation.

⁷¹ This point has not been accepted by many convinced Thomists, as for instance, C. V. Heris, *The Mystery of Christ* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950, pp. 214). When Christ acts, His action "may come from the divine or the human nature. In the latter case, there is no reason to look for a special intervention of the Word as God by which He would take hold of the activity of Christ's human nature to direct it according to His good pleasure. God has only to accord to this activity the usual co-operation He gives to every action on the part of a creature."

of the hypostatic union achieved through acquired and infused knowledge and consummated in the beatific vision.⁷²

In spite of confident assertions by supporters of the several explanations we have been discussing, the problem of Christ's psychological unity, and indeed the broader problem of His human psychological activity, still await a definitive solution. And no wonder. The controversy has touched upon a whole range of grave theological questions from the determination of the primary constituent factor of personality, through the relationship of the human to the divine in Jesus and the precise knowledge-content of the beatific vision, to the full significance of the principle that all divine activity *ad extra* is common to the three persons of the Trinity.⁷³ Reviewing *El Yo de Jesucristo*, Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., noting the basic truths that only a subject is "conscious" of self, and that in Christ there is only one subject, the divine Word, writes:

Unfortunately it is left to the reader to divine how Fr. Xiberta would have answered his proper question, namely how is the Word conscious of the Word through His human nature, how does a human consciousness without any commingling of the divine consciousness constitute the Word as conscious of the Word. At least, I think he would have seen that the Council of Chalcedon demands not only a single subject but also a divine consciousness and a human consciousness without one merging into the other. There would follow, I suggest, a more nuanced diagnosis of contemporary discussion. Instead of seeing simply a conflict between an orthodox and a heterodox Christology, he would have adverted to a twofold dogmatic requirement demanding both a single divine subject and, at the same time, the natural unity of that subject's human consciousness; in consequence, he would not have tended to regard theologians that insist on the natural unity of Christ's human consciousness as victims of a lamentable aberration when, in fact, they are safeguarding a truth of faith to which his view can hardly be said to do full justice. . . . In the present instance the necessary subtlety seems to be a distinction between the unity of the subject and the unity of the human nature. . . . Christ's human consciousness is a unity in a plurality of potencies, habits and acts; it is a unity in virtue of Christ's human nature and not exclusively in virtue of the divine subject; but also it is a unity that is easily overlooked when one scorns the labor of analyzing consciousness. . . .⁷⁴

One who has not scorned this labor is A. Perego, S.J. In an article which summarizes admirably this whole discussion,⁷⁵ he submits the following. The

⁷² See also Bartolomé M. Xiberta, *Tractatus de Verbo incarnato*, (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1954, pp. 766), especially pp. 283-90.

⁷³ Kevin McNamara, *art. cit.* supra n. 70, p. 67 f.

⁷⁴ *Gregorianum* 36 (1955) 705 f.

⁷⁵ "Il 'lumen gloriae' e l'unità psicologica di Cristo," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 58 (1955) 90-110, 296-310.

proper object of psychological consciousness is the ontological ego as existing; this is always the person (physical, moral, even imagined or fictitious). Only when the thinking subject, through reflective consciousness, becomes aware of himself as a person actually existing do we have a psychological ego; for this is nothing other than the expression in the psychological order of the *principium quod* really present. In the case of the God-man, there is in His created intellect a true reflective perception, and hence a true psychological consciousness, of the divine Person as the unique ego existing in the Incarnate Word. The human mind of Christ pronounces in human terms its proper "I," which differs in no way from the "I" pronounced by the divine intelligence; for this "I" is always objectively the Person of the Word of God; only the minds that perceive it differ. And how is the created mind of Christ capable of this act of psychological consciousness? The answer is to be found in the beatific vision, understood, however, in function of the empowerment conferred by the *lumen gloriae*. This is the supernatural actuation of the created intellect; its role is to elevate the mind to new possibilities of achievement in its properly intellectual functions. And among these functions is that reflective activity on its own operations in which psychological consciousness of self properly consists. And herein, suggests the author, we may find the answer to a difficulty recognized by Galtier himself as intrinsic to his theory:⁷⁶ how to find in the beatific vision of God the *raison d'être* of a true psychological autoconsciousness, that is, a perception of the Word as the ultimate acting subject in Christ? For is it not true that in this vision the created mind knows God as an objective reality, as a thing known, but not as the ego perceived as acting subject? Such knowledge is not that act of reflective awareness which is the psychological consciousness of self. This difficulty is solved, argues Perego, once we see that the *lumen gloriae* must of its very nature transform and elevate the human mind of our Lord in *all* its operations; that, while it enables it to elicit an act of knowledge by which God is attained as a reality objectively known, it also perfects this created intellect in its reflective capacity, in its ability introspectively to perceive the Word as the sole ultimate acting subject. Christ, then, as "comprehensor" not only perceives Himself as beatified in His humanity, but also as one beatified in whom the unique conscious and reflecting subject is the Word of God acting through His human as well as through the divine intellect. With His human mind, therefore, the God-man knows God as an object of intellectual contemplation and also as the one and only subject contemplating, and so as the one and only "I" really present in the Incarnate Word.

If I may at this juncture add a personal reflection, it seems to me, at

⁷⁶ *L'Unité du Christ*, p. 360, note 1.

least at the present writing, that Perego has thrown a strong light of clarification on the real issues of this discussion. His underlining of the fact that consciousness of self, in the psychological sense, is a reflective perception of itself by the thinking subject is of prime importance; and his solution in terms of the supernatural transformation, by the *lumen gloriae*, of this reflective activity of Christ's created intellect is more accurately to the point than any other theorizing I am familiar with.

By the same token, and for much the same reasons, I incline to agree with Perego's critique of the highly ingenious, delicately nuanced theory proposed by Joseph Ternus S.J.⁷⁷ Irenic in tone and in purpose, this article is an effort to combine the best features of the two contrasting positions of Galtier and Parente. From Galtier it borrows the idea of a created psychological ego in Christ,⁷⁸ together with a special function of the beatific vision in the matter of His psychological unity, while from Parente it accepts the concept of an actuation of our Lord's humanity by a quasi-formal causality that is peculiarly the divine Word's, the second Person of the Trinity alone being a principle actuating, without "informing" or inhering in, the created nature. This actuating function, since it affects the whole of our Lord's human nature, extends to all its elements, in particular to the soul and all its faculties and activities, including (what is most important in this question) that awareness of self which is psychological consciousness. By itself, even though supernaturally actuated, this human consciousness perceives directly, not the Person of the Word, but only the created phenomenological ego in Christ; but through the beatific vision this psychological "I" is recognized as being ultimately personalized by the Son of God, and not by any human person.

However acutely reasoned, this hypothesis falls somewhat short of what is needed to establish the existence in Jesus' human mind of a created psychological awareness of self which is in fact a direct perception of the Person of the Word as *the* "I" of the God-made-man. What in this theory seems really to be perceived directly is the "phenomenological ego" of the human nature; this is a created ego, and while the beatific vision may, as has been said before, bring the human mind of Christ into contact with the Word, it does this, in Ternus' theory, by an act of knowledge, not by an act

⁷⁷ "Das Seelen- und Bewusstseinsleben Jesu," in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, 3 vols. (ed. A. Grillmeier, S.J., and H. Bacht, S.J.; Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951-54, pp. xvi + 768, xiv + 867, vii + 981); cf. 3, 81-237.

⁷⁸ In fact, the author believes it to be a logical requisite of the doctrine defined at Chalcedon that we admit a relatively independent created autoconsciousness in Christ, with its own created ego; *ibid.*, p. 237.

that is truly a psychological awareness of self. And without this, the problem remains unsolved.⁷⁹ It seems to me, then, as I have said, that only in the light of a supernatural transformation of the specifically psychological activity of self-reflection in our Lord's mind, through the vision of God, enabling it to reach by immediate perception the Person of the divine Word as the ultimate thinking subject, does it seem possible to set up a true psychological unity in Christ that is the accurate and perfect expression of His ontological oneness.⁸⁰

In this centenary year, marking the extension to the Church universal of the feast of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, we can hardly pass in silence over some at least of the many books and articles that have recently commented on this devotion.

When the devotion to the Sacred Heart had spread to some extent, the faithful soon came to speak of "the Sacred Heart" simply. At first this title was nothing but an abbreviation of the phrase "the Sacred Heart of Jesus." Everybody understood it that way. . . . Both titles, however, are not identical: the phrase "the Sacred Heart of Jesus" signifies directly the Heart and indirectly the Person of Jesus, whereas the phrase "the Sacred Heart" designates directly the Person and indirectly His Heart. What we want to express by the last-named title is that we consider the Person of Jesus in the light in which He is viewed as the object of the devotion, namely, in His interior life and more in particular in His love for men. "*The Sacred Heart*" is Jesus, contemplated and considered, through His Heart, in His interior life, in His love.⁸¹

Few, I suppose, will quarrel seriously with this analysis of changing Catholic usage.⁸² "The Sacred Heart," then, and "the Sacred Heart of Jesus" do not mean quite the same thing. Can we go so far, however, as to

⁷⁹ There is, one must recognize, a real danger of distortion in such an extremely condensed version of a very complex theory; one can only apologize in advance for unintended false impressions.

⁸⁰ No attempt has been made to give a complete bibliography of this whole controversy; some few additional references may, however, be noted: A. Michel, *L'Ami du clergé* 61 (1951) 327 ff., and 62 (1952) 513 f.; E. Hocedez, S.J., "L'Unité de conscience dans le Christ," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 68 (1946) 391-401; E. Masure, "La psychologie du Christ et la métaphysique de l'Incarnation," *L'Année théologique* 9 (1948) 5-28, 128-45, 311-23; Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "L'Unique personnalité du Christ," *Angelicum* 29 (1952) 60-75.

⁸¹ Louis Verheylozon, S.J., *Devotion to the Sacred Heart* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1955) pp. 31-32. There was a brief notice of this book in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 17 (1956) 139.

⁸² As Galtier says, *Le Sacré-Coeur: Textes pontificaux traduits et commentés* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1936): "It is quite profitable for the faithful to speak so of the Sacred Heart; the phrase sets straight before their eyes what it has pleased God to set in the forefront of the Christian religion: the redemptive love [of Christ]."

say that the meanings are so different as to designate two "essentially distinct" devotions? Yet this is surely what is meant by the following:

Since the devotion to the Sacred Heart honors the Person of Jesus in His love, Pius XI understandably calls it the "sum-total of all religion." The whole of Christianity is found within the redemptive love of Christ, and the whole of our religion consists in our response to this love. If on the other hand the devotion had as its direct object the heart of flesh, it could not be the compendium of our religion; the heart has only a secondary place in the Person of Jesus, and plays an even more subsidiary role in the drama of redemption. Devotion to the fleshly heart is of course perfectly legitimate. Pius VI made this clear in condemning on this point the criticisms of the Synod of Pistoia.⁸³ The heart of flesh is deserving of adoration because, with the whole of the Savior's body, it is indissolubly united to the divine Word. But this devotion has a much more limited object. . . . It is comparable to the devotion to the Five Wounds, or to the Precious Blood. It can accompany devotion to the Sacred Heart as a subsidiary devotion, though it is essentially distinct from it.⁸⁴

What considerations lie behind this suggestion, or behind others considerably less startling?⁸⁵ Familiar to all who have interested themselves in the doctrinal foundations of devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus is the normally proffered explanation that the physical heart of our Lord is at least in part the object of this devotion. What else did our Lord mean when He said to St. Margaret Mary: "Behold this heart which has so loved men"?⁸⁶ The heart of flesh is the material object of devotion, but only so far as it is the symbol of Christ's love, which is the formal object.⁸⁷ But, says Msgr. Parente,⁸⁸

⁸³ DB 1561-63.

⁸⁴ J. Galot, S.J., "Quel est l'objet de la dévotion au Sacré-Coeur?" *Nouvelle revue théologique* 77 (1955) 936-37.

⁸⁵ For instance, Thomas V. Fleming, S.J., "Simplified Devotion to the Sacred Heart," *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 16 (1955) 270-74.

⁸⁶ A. Hamon, *Sainte Marguerite-Marie: Sa vie intime* (Paris, 1920) p. 158. In reference to the revelations made to St. Margaret Mary, P. Nouens, M.S.C., "Le Sacré-Coeur et le Jansenisme. Quelques considérations sur les révélations de Paray-le-Monial," *Nuove ricerche storiche sul Giansenismo* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1954, pp. 310), says that, after a painstaking study of the Saint's writings, he can find no basis in them for the idea that our Lord Himself suggested that one of the purposes for which He wanted devotion to His heart to be propagated was to provide a "providential answer" to the rigidities of Jansenism.

⁸⁷ "Huius porro cultus, prout ab Ecclesia fuit approbatus, obiectum materiale proximum complectitur et cor physicum et amorem cordis symbolo expressum," is the thesis developed by Paul Galtier, S.J., *De incarnatione ac redemptione* (2nd ed.; Paris: Beauchesne, 1947) pp. 296-300. See also *Le Sacré-Coeur* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1936) pp. 118-29. Or, as G. Van Noort puts it in *Tractatus de Deo redemptore* (Hilversum, 1925) n. 97: "The

Theologians have not always been of one mind in determining the proper object of the cult of the Sacred Heart, material and formal, proximate and remote. Growth in understanding the physiology of man accounts in part for disagreements and uncertainties. In earlier years the heart was most often looked on concretely as the physiological *organ*, the source and origin of man's love. This was the case in the petition of the Polish hierarchy and in the writings of some of the advocates of the devotion, such as P. Gallifet, S.J., in the early eighteenth century.⁸⁹ P. Lambertini as *Promotor fidei* (he was later to become Benedict XIV) expressed doubts about the physiological basis of the conception of the human heart as the organ of love; the Sacred Congregation of Rites thereupon refused approval to the devotion in 1729. Theologians then gradually developed the theory of the heart as *symbol*; in 1869 J. Jungmann spoke of the symbolic or *metaphorical* heart; Lempl, in 1909, of the heart in an *amplified* or wider sense. Thenceforth theologians under the guidance of the magisterium dropped all consideration of the heart as organ of love. The matter is set forth clearly by N. Nilles, S.J.,⁹⁰ who proposed the heart of flesh as the material object, and Christ's love as the formal object; in our invocations we address the heart *in recto*, the Person of Christ *in obliquo*. Nilles' position was adopted and elaborated by J. Bainvel.⁹¹

Without doubt, then, there has been growth, development, and change in the theology of this devotion. In our own day not a few theologians have thought that there was further need of re-appraisal. Their reasons seem to be principally these: too many of the faithful, of youth in particular, far from being attracted to the Person of Christ and to His redeeming love by the symbolism of the Sacred Heart, are in fact repelled by it;⁹² in addition, is there not, they ask, real danger of an excessively materialistic approach to Christ inherent in a devotion that presents our Lord's physical heart with such emphasis?⁹³ Galot asks: "Can we condemn the youth who says: 'I find no inspiration in the heart of flesh; when I turn to the Sacred Heart

[proximate] object of this devotion is the physical heart of Christ, living, animate, which even now beats in the glorious body of Christ, not simply as a noble part of His body, but especially as it symbolizes the infinite love of Christ. The object of cultus, then, is not the physical heart alone, nor the love of Christ alone, but both together: the physical heart, symbol of love."

⁸⁸ P. Parente, *De Verbo incarnato* (Rome: Institutum Graphicum Tiberinum, 1939) pp. 387-88.

⁸⁹ J. de Gallifet, S.J., *De cultu SS. Cordis Dei et D. N. Jesu Christi* (Rome, 1726), *Novae observationes pro concessione officii et missae SS. Cordis Jesu* (1728), and *L'Excellence de la dévotion au Coeur admirable de J. Christ* (Lyons, 1733).

⁹⁰ N. Nilles, S.J., *De rationibus festorum SS. Cordis Jesu et purissimi cordis Mariae* (1885).

⁹¹ J. Bainvel, S.J., "Coeur Sacré de Jésus (Dévotion au)," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 3, 271-351.

⁹² J. Galot, S.J., *art. cit.* supra n. 84, pp. 924, 937 f.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 938.

it is of the Person of Jesus, of His love for men I am thinking; I have no desire to concretize or symbolize this love in His physical Heart.⁹⁴ Is not this quintessential devotion to the Sacred Heart, devotion, that is, to the loving Person of Christ?⁹⁵

The suggested re-appraisals have taken several forms. In the latest edition of "Lercher"⁹⁶ this conception of the nature of devotion to the Sacred Heart was proposed as best conforming to the Church's requirements: the proximate object is the bodily heart of Christ, but not that alone, since "we invoke the Heart of Jesus pierced by the lance, and also the Heart of Jesus filled with opprobrium." What else, then, is included within the ambit of the proximate and special object of the devotion? It is not enough to say that this object embraces "the physical heart of Christ united to the Word, in so far as it is a symbol of Christ's charity." The true proximate object includes, in addition to the physical heart, the "ethical" heart of Christ, the heart, that is to say, as it is understood to be the "fountainhead, the source, and the subject of man's inner, moral life," with particular emphasis on the close connection between the heart of Christ so understood and the whole of the Savior's redemptive love and activity.⁹⁷

This is also in essence the thesis of Jesús Solano, S.J. "In a wider, though proper, sense the word 'heart' designates the integral subject of man's interior life, with his thoughts and affections; primarily, therefore, the soul with its twofold appetitive faculty and its intelligence. . . . The phrase 'Heart of Jesus' seems to be accepted by the Church in this wider, proper meaning, but with special emphasis on Christ's *love* among the affections of His interior life."⁹⁸ Pointing out that the explanation of this devotion

⁹⁴ This is quoted from an article by A. Dérumaux, "Crise ou évolution dans la dévotion des jeunes pour le Sacré-Coeur," in *Etudes carmélitaines: Le Coeur* (1950) p. 300.

⁹⁵ Galot speaks of a "crisis" in devotion to the Sacred Heart "at least in certain Western European countries." The only comparable experience the present writer has had of anything of this nature in the United States was the case of a recently baptized convert, and the initial repugnance to the idea of devotion to the "heart" of Jesus was easily dissipated. Perhaps the recent convert is more open to enlightenment than the "born" Catholic? Or is the European crisis the kind that arises when we try to enter through the other man's door and find, when we get in, that we have slammed the door behind us? Youth, let us face it, is not *always* right in its likes and dislikes; certainly there are enough American youths who do not find it necessary to push aside the Lord's heart in order to reach His love.

⁹⁶ *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae*, 4 vols. (4th ed.; Barcelona: Herder, 1945). These volumes, in their present form, are the cooperative work of the professors of the Innsbruck theological faculty.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 3, nn. 246-49.

⁹⁸ Jesús Solano, S.J., *De Verbo incarnato*, in *Sacrae theologiae summa* 3 (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1953) nn. 54-66.

through a double object, with the physical heart as the material, and the love or the whole inner life of Christ as the formal object, labors under the difficulty of introducing complexity without compensatory clarity, the author concludes that both Scripture and the Church seem to justify our acceptance of the "Heart of Jesus" as meaning quite simply the Incarnate Word in His interior life, with love as the virtue dominating all His affections and activities.⁹⁹

"The physical Heart of Jesus, a symbol of His love and of His whole inner life, is in the first place the object of this devotion." These are the words of L. Verheylezoon, S.J.,¹⁰⁰ who then asks: "But does It constitute its entire object? I do not think so. I hold that the object also comprises what is meant by the word 'Heart' in a certain figurative sense, namely, that which is the principle and seat of Jesus' love and of His whole inner life, the appetitive faculty of His soul, or that which we shall call His spiritual Heart . . ." (p. 25). Admitting that the Church "in the way in which she presents the devotion, and spiritual writers in the definition which they give of it, mention solely the physical Heart of Jesus, the symbol of His love, and secondarily, of His whole inner life," he nevertheless adds that "in practice they consider as also forming part of the object that which is the principle and seat of His love . . . what we call His spiritual Heart" (p. 28). If this theory seems to postulate a double object of devotion, the author will not have it so. "The two Hearts form only one object." They are to be regarded as "forming a whole, a unity," so that the word heart means "the whole which is formed by both of them, and which may be called His total Heart." The object of this devotion, then, is not alone the physical heart but the "total Heart of Christ at once the symbol, principle and seat of His love and of His whole inner life" (p. 28). I would note two things: first, despite the author's disclaimer, it is not easy to see how he does not in fact set up two objects of devotion, and, secondly, how far are we justified in invoking current practice in the Church as against official doctrinal pronouncements?

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, n. 566. It is possible to interpret the author as meaning to exclude the physical heart of Christ from the object of this devotion, but this is not his intent. He says, of the lack of uniformity among theologians on this subject, "non tam dici debet reale, ac si aliquod elementum inveniretur in alia definitione huius obiecti quod abesset in alia, quam potius dicendum est discrimen in modo concipiendi, seu proponendi eandem rem." And he adds that the concept of the heart in the wider, but proper, sense in which he understands it is the idea of Lercher, and of Diekamp, *Theologiae dogmaticae manuale* 2 (Paris, Tournai, Rome: Desclée, 1944) 292-94. Both of these sources explicitly include the physical heart within the scope of the proper object of the devotion.

¹⁰⁰ *Devotion to the Sacred Heart*, p. 25.

Uniquely personal, as usual, in his approach, Karl Rahner¹⁰¹ submits this consideration: the heart is a "primitive concept" that stands basically for the intimate core of human personality in its concrete reality and in its relations with others. To ask, then, whether the heart means a bodily organ or in some symbolic way a spiritual reality is either to miss the essential point or to become involved in an artificial and confusing dialectic. The heart implies a conception of reality that in its way transcends all distinction between flesh and spirit, since it is an expression of the inner unity of a person compounded of body and soul. The object of devotion to the Sacred Heart, for this reason, is neither the heart of flesh as symbol of Christ's love, nor the abstract, metaphorical "inner spiritual life" of the Savior; the true object can only be the "heart of Christ" understood as what it really is, the sum-total of the Person of the Incarnate Word. And that sum-total is the redeeming love, both human and divine, which ruled all of Christ's activities and rules them still, and offers to men salvation and divine life. Here is a theory that centers the whole devotion in the Person of our Lord, that obviates the need of embarrassing distinctions between the heart and Person of Christ, since it makes one identical with the other. Let us add, however, that to many the solution appears less real than apparent. While verbally there seems to be room for the physical heart of Jesus, in objective fact the true object of the devotion seems to be a spiritual reality alone; the center of personality is surely a spiritual thing, and the divine and human love that unifies the personality of Jesus Christ is itself a purely spiritual thing. This again is to discard the bodily heart from the devotion, at least as a primary element in the proper object which distinguishes this from any other form of cultus offered to Christ.

None of those whose theologizing we have been discussing has, of course, ignored the official teachings of the Church regarding the object of the devotion to the Sacred Heart.¹⁰² It was left, however, to a Spanish Jesuit to take up this point afresh¹⁰³ with results that helped to clear the air of some confusion. Confining himself to papal pronouncements, made by the popes

¹⁰¹ Karl Rahner, S.J., "Einige Thesen zur Theologie der Herz-Jesu-Verehrung," in J. Stierli (ed.), *Cor Salvatoris* (Freiburg, 1954) pp. 166-99.

¹⁰² It is probably sententious to remark on the multiple dangers involved in fostering any form of piety among Catholics that is not strongly rooted in dogmatic truth; such dangers, however, are not absent even in so solidly established a cult as that of the Sacred Heart. This point is highlighted by V. Carbone, *Teologia del S. Cuore de Gesù* (Rome: Editrice Studium, 1953, pp. 139). "Piety," the author says, "not sustained by an understanding of dogma exercises no serious influence on the conduct of life."

¹⁰³ Jesús Solano, S.J., "La expresión 'Corazón de Jesús' en los documentos pontificios," *Manresa* 27 (1955) 291-310.

personally or through the medium of the different Roman Congregations, the author ran some risk of commingling documents of very different doctrinal value, but each is accurately assessed on this score, and the end result is clear and satisfying. The conclusions reached seem beyond cavil. (1) From the beginning the physical heart of Christ has entered into the special object of this devotion; where this element is omitted, then we do not have the devotion to the Sacred Heart approved by the Church.¹⁰⁴ (2) Equally clear is the inclusion of the love of Jesus as symbolized by His physical heart, the love, that is to say, which is the center and motivating force of the whole interior life of Jesus and which has gone unrequited by so many. (3) Finally, a further element cannot be ignored: to consecrate oneself to the Christ who desires to rule all men through love, is to consecrate oneself to a Person; and papal thinking, especially since Leo XIII, appears to be more and more dominated by consideration of the Person of the King to whom the faithful are urged to dedicate themselves in order to effectuate His rule of love over themselves and over human society. And to the popes there clearly is neither confusion nor contradiction in these three aspects of the proper object of this devotion; where the emphasis is, as it has frequently been, on the Person of Jesus, the relation to the bodily heart and to the "ethical" heart is never completely ignored. The object of the authentic devotion, then, as officially approved may be said to be Jesus Christ in Himself as He manifests His loving and too often disregarded heart.

What we have so far written may serve as background material for a better understanding of the latest, and by far the most complete, pronouncement of the Holy See on this devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. Any formal commentary on the Encyclical *Haurietis aquas*¹⁰⁵ will have to await the complete official text of this document, issued to mark the centenary of the institution of the liturgical feast of the Sacred Heart in the Church universal. The following excerpt, however, will serve to point up the discussions of theologians we have been summarizing. After noting that Holy Scripture and the Fathers of the Church "clearly attest that there were in Jesus Christ movements of the senses and affections and that He assumed

¹⁰⁴ An interesting sidelight on the antiquity of devotion to the physical heart of Christ is found in a new (the fourth) edition of a collection of documents illustrating the practice of this veneration as it was known to the Carthusian monks of the Middle Ages, *Ancient Devotions to the Sacred Heart by the Carthusian Monks of the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries* (London: Burns Oates, 1955, pp. 232). The frontispiece of the book reproduces part of an arch of the Grande Chartreuse cloister; dating from the late fifteenth century, it depicts the instruments of the passion surrounding a heart which is pierced by a lance. Is there, I wonder, any older known representation of the Sacred Heart?

¹⁰⁵ Dated May 15, 1956.

human nature to accomplish our eternal salvation," the Holy Father continues:

Wherefore the heart of the Incarnate Word is rightly considered the chief index and symbol of the threefold love with which the divine Redeemer continuously loves the eternal Father and the whole human race. It is the symbol of that divine love which He shares with the Father and the Holy Ghost, but which in Him alone, in the Word namely that was made flesh, is manifested to us through His mortal human body, since "in Him dwells the fullness of the Godhead bodily" (Col 2:9).

It is moreover the symbol of that most ardent love which, infused into His soul, sanctifies the human will of Christ and whose action is enlightened and directed by a twofold most perfect knowledge, namely the beatific and infused (cf. *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 9, a. 1-3).

Finally, in a more direct and natural manner, it is a symbol also of sensible love, since the body of Jesus Christ, formed through the operation of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary, has a most perfect capacity for feeling and perception, much more than the bodies of other men (cf. *Sum. theol.* 3, q. 33, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 46, a. 6).

Since the Scripture and the teachings of the Catholic Church affirm that there is the highest possible harmony and agreement in the Most Holy Soul of Jesus Christ, and that He clearly directed His threefold love to accomplish our redemption, it is therefore obvious that we can most correctly consider and venerate the Heart of the divine Redeemer as signifying the image of His love, the proof of our redemption and the mystical ladder by which we climb to the embrace of "God our Savior" (Tit 3:4).

Wherefore His words, actions, teachings, miracles, and in particular those deeds which more clearly testify this love for us—the institution of the Holy Eucharist, His most bitter passion and death, His Most Holy Mother whom He lovingly gave to us, the founding of the Church and the sending of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles and upon us—all these we must regard as proofs of His threefold love.

In like manner we must lovingly meditate on the pulsations of His Most Sacred Heart by which, so to say, He Himself kept on measuring the time of His sojourn on earth up to the last moment when, as the evangelists testify, "crying out with a loud voice 'It is consummated', and bowing His head, He gave up His spirit" (Mt 27:50; Jn 19:30). Then the beating of His heart stopped, and His sensible love was interrupted until He arose from the tomb in triumph over death.

But after His glorified body was again united to the soul of the divine Redeemer, the Conqueror of death, His Most Sacred Heart never ceased, and never will cease, to beat with imperturbable and calm pulsation. It will likewise never cease to signify His threefold love by which the Son of God is bound to His heavenly

Father, and the whole human race, of which He is by perfect right the mystical Head. (NCWC translation)

IV

Though our concern in this survey is with Catholic theology, the recent English translation of a book critical of Catholic Marian theology, by a professor of the Protestant Waldensian Theological Faculty in Rome,¹⁰⁶ requires some comment. For one reason, this is a serious effort to examine Catholic Mariology in the light of historical and theological criteria, which succeeds in maintaining a reasonably objective viewpoint on a subject that is, understandably enough, an irritant to the author. The Gospel references to Mary are examined first, and following chapters study her "eternal" virginity, the divine Motherhood, the Assumption and Immaculate Conception, and Mary as Queen, Mother of men, and Co-redemptrix. In essence the book sounds a tocsin over the possible, indeed the imminent, transformation of Christianity among Catholics through the excesses of Marian developments. "They will continue to say that one ascends from Mary to Christ. But the real diffusive and persuasive force, the real religious fascination, the real function of effectively focusing the faith and love and devotion of the masses will be exercised entirely by the Virgin Mary. On that day it will be said that within Catholicism Christianity has given up the field to a different religion." On theological grounds the principal objections urged include a rejection of the idea of *meritum de congruo* as applied to Mary (on the by now familiar grounds that this would invalidate the unique efficacy of our Lord's redemption), and an apparently sincere persuasion that the title, Mother of God, is dangerously open to "undesirable" implications, as if, one presumes, Christians might easily take it to mean that Mary was the source of Christ's divinity.

Basically at issue, as one might expect, is the soundly Protestant conviction that Christ instituted no organ of doctrinal authority to assure that growth in understanding of revealed truth, Marian or other, should always remain within the realm of a homogeneous development of the faith once given. Granted this premise, the wildest dreams of doctrinal aberration are not only possible, but their fulfilment is very much to be expected. But surely the firmly guiding hand of the Holy See has long been in evidence, in the field of Mariology particularly. As Pius XII said not long ago, "The laborious study of Mariology will be all the safer and more fruitful the more

¹⁰⁶ Giovanni Miegge, *The Virgin Mary: The Roman Catholic Doctrine*, tr. Waldo Smith (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1955, pp. 196).

we keep before our eyes the sacred teaching authority of the Church. This is the theologian's proximate norm for all truth in matters of faith and morals." Marian theology must stem only from Christ's revelation; our growth in understanding her must be always in consonance with Scripture and the Christian tradition.

When these norms are faithfully followed Mariology will make true and lasting progress by constantly deepening penetration into the Blessed Virgin's dignity and functions. And so this discipline will be enabled to progress along the straight road of moderation that by-passes all falsification and exaggeration of truth, that shuns as well the path trod by those who are troubled by a groundless fear of attributing too much to the Blessed Virgin, or by an equally vain fear that, as they occasionally phrase it, to honor and invoke His Mother is somehow to derogate from the honor and loyalty due the divine Redeemer.¹⁰⁷

That Catholic Marian doctrine has remained within the confines of the original Christian revelation stands as proof of the perennial efficacy of the norms urged by the Holy See.¹⁰⁸

Not all Catholics will be overcritical of some other points made by the author we are discussing. On sheerly exegetical grounds it can be argued that the Gospel story does not tell us a great deal about Mary's supernatural prerogatives; and it is no easy task to interpret objectively the historical data on which must rest the story of the expansion of Catholic Mariology. If Prof. Miegge's interpretations are open to further discussion, as, for example, in the case of St. Irenaeus' classic Eve-Mary parallel, it may readily be granted that Catholic scholars have reached no common understanding on such points.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Address broadcast to the International Mariological Convention, Rome, October 24, 1954, *AAS* 46 (1954) 677 ff. Apropos of this apparently indomitable non-Catholic fear of derogating from the honor due to Christ, a short book in German can be recommended: Otto Semmelroth, S.J., *Maria oder Christus? Christus als Ziel der Marienverehrung* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1954, pp. 160), in which these points are made: the various aspects of our Lady's privileges highlight analogous aspects of the mystery of Christ Himself, as the divine Motherhood illuminates the reality of our Lord's human nature; every Christian should mirror Christ, Mary has in advance made real to the world this conformity to her Son in all its plenitude.

¹⁰⁸ This is not to deny that there have been exaggerations, even doctrinally, regarding our Lady. But that these are no part of Christian tradition is luminously clear from such a masterly study as Josef Huhn's *Das Geheimnis der Jungfrau-Mutter Maria nach dem Kirchenvater Ambrosius* (Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1954, pp. 290), a book that is the fruit of painstaking research. It will probably come as a surprise to see how close Ambrose came to a Mariology essentially as we know it, especially in the interweaving of Marian concepts with the fabric of Christology and soteriology.

¹⁰⁹ An interesting contrast may be made between Prof. Miegge's judgment that

In the field of Catholic writings on our Lady one hardly knows where to begin. Two books, in reality more than the text-books they seem to be, should not be missed by anyone who would be better informed on the giant strides our theology of Mary has made in comparatively recent years. The first, in English, we owe to the inexhaustible zeal of the founder, who is still the moving spirit, of the Mariological Society of America.¹¹⁰ Since this volume is reviewed elsewhere in this issue of THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, we merely say here that, whatever may be the apparently good reasons, our seminary courses can hardly continue to skim lightly over the study of God's Mother. There are few priests or religious who will not profit greatly from a study of Fr. Carol's book; it brings one very much up to date in its subject, and the references to current theological literature alone are probably worth the price of the book. Even briefer in its treatment (less than a hundred pages of text), but constructed on an entirely different plan, a recent French production will have a special appeal for the historically minded.¹¹¹ The first of the two parts into which the book falls is a study of the development of the theology of our Lady from New Testament times to the present—the history, as the author calls it, of the Church's progressive discovery of Mary. The second part relates the "development of Mary's own destiny," from the foreshadowings of the prophets to the second coming of Christ. Rich in suggestions, striking in many of its insights, this "short treatise" adds spiritual inspiration to compendious information. There is an excellent selective bibliographical section, and a further feature that will be welcomed by students of the patristic sources of our Mariology takes the form of two tables (occupying over fifty pages) listing all the unauthentic or dubious documents concerning Mary in the two Patrologies of Migne.

Irenaeus' comparison of Eve and Mary "creates the impression of an ingenious literary construction more than a considered and intentional theological doctrine," and the very different conclusion of Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., "Mary in Western Patristic Thought," in Juniper B. Carol, O.F.M. (ed.), *Mariology* 1 (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955) 111, that Irenaeus "took hold of the [Eve-Mary] analogy and integrated it with his theology. . . . In Irenaeus' eyes, Mary as the Second Eve has a distinctive function in God's design for man's redemption. The co-operation of the first Eve with Satan in effecting man's spiritual death is matched and outstripped by Mary's co-operation with God in effecting man's return to life."

¹¹⁰ Juniper B. Carol, O.F.M., *Fundamentals of Mariology* (New York: Benziger, 1956, pp. xi + 203).

¹¹¹ René Laurentin, *Court traité de théologie mariale* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1953, pp. 187). One is reminded, in connection with the history of Marian theology, of the remarkably succinct presentation of the essential data, originally published as a preface to the 1950 edition of J. B. Terrien, S.J., *La Mère de Dieu et la Mère des hommes* (Paris: Lethielleux), and later made available as a pamphlet: Henri Rondet, S.J., *Introduction à l'étude de la théologie mariale* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1950, pp. 76).

The task of applying scholarly methods to the investigation of the scriptural and historical origins of Marian theology is far from finished. With the appearance of the second volume of his study of the history of the interpretation of the Protoevangelium¹¹² Fr. T. Gallus has brought to completion the work he took up some years ago¹¹³ of supplementing (and correcting) the study of this subject by Drewniak,¹¹⁴ now more than twenty years old. The present volume, covering almost two hundred years, comprises three sections: from 1661 to the era of the Encyclopedists in 1752; from the year following to the beginning of the nineteenth century; and from 1820 to the publication of *Ineffabilis Deus*. These sections are followed by an analysis of the Papal Bull in which "the traditional Mariological interpretation [of Gn 3:15] won official approbation." In all, some four hundred post-Tridentine writers are examined in this volume, making the total treated in the whole work 574, by far the majority being Catholics. Of the total of Catholic authors, the statistically minded will be glad to know that 425, or 85 per cent, propose a Mariological interpretation of this much discussed verse. In almost every case the interpretation is ultimately based, not on the false reading of *ipsa* for *ipsum*, but on the fact that the enmities set up between the woman of Genesis and the serpent are understood to refer to Mary and the devil. It is difficult to see how the essential thesis of the book can be denied: the Mariological meaning is the traditional Catholic understanding of the passage,¹¹⁵ which therefore has every right to be called the Protoevangelium. This poses a problem for the Catholic exegete; it is not easy to understand how an acceptable exegesis can ignore the tradition.

Only occasionally does a book make its appearance which deserves to be called extraordinarily valuable. The epithet is richly merited by a work whose title only hints at the treasures of theological enrichment it offers. This

¹¹² Tibertius Gallus, S.J., *Interpretatio mariologica Protoevangelii posttridentina usque ad definitionem dogmaticam Immaculatae Conceptionis, Pars posterior: Ab anno 1661 usque ad definitionem dogmaticam Immaculatae Conceptionis, 1854* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia et Letteratura, pp. xl + 383). The first part of this study, which appeared from the same publishers in 1953, was reviewed in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 15 (1954) 117 f.

¹¹³ T. Gallus, S.J., *Interpretatio mariologica Protoevangelii tempore postpatristico usque ad Concilium Tridentinum* (Rome: Libreria Orbis Catholicus, 1949, pp. xvi + 215).

¹¹⁴ F. Drewniak, *Die mariologische Deutung von Gen 3:15 in der Väterzeit* (Breslau, 1934).

¹¹⁵ It seems hardly necessary to say that the interpretation that finds Mary intended in some true scriptural sense in this verse of the third chapter of Genesis has been even more widely accepted among Catholics since *Ineffabilis Deus*. See on this point V. G. Bertelli in *Marianum* 13 (1951) 257 ff. and 369 ff.

study of the Byzantine tradition in regard of our Lady's bodily Assumption¹¹⁶ unearths an enormous amount of material that sheds new light on the history of the Assumption belief and of other Marian privileges, notably her spiritual maternity, in the West as well as in the East. We mention here only two points, each of them, however, of capital importance. The source of the many apocryphal narratives of the Assumption, the so-called *transitus* legends, has been a mystery only partly fathomed by scholars. These writings seemed to have sprung almost from nowhere, and yet they were spread throughout the Catholic world beginning with the sixth century. Whence they came, and how one version was related to another, remained questions crying for an answer. This was in particular true of the narratives related to John of Thessalonica, important because their detailed descriptions of Mary's death and burial seemed to demand by the logic of their context a further story of her resurrection that in fact was only vaguely suggested, or even totally ignored. Thanks to the researches detailed in this book we have a hitherto unpublished manuscript of a Greek apocryphal narrative, found in the Vatican (Greek 1982), and dating from the sixth century, in which the resurrection and the bodily Assumption of Mary are clearly affirmed;¹¹⁷ this document, furthermore, was almost certainly John of Thessalonica's source, though in the retelling, for reasons we can only conjecture, he omitted the Assumption story.

More important still for the history of belief in this privilege is another hitherto unknown document, here first given to the world, this time a homily on Mary's Assumption (it is even called exactly that: the *analepsis*) by Theotoknes, bishop of Livias in Palestine, this too dating from the sixth century. And this is a sermon which, though not entirely free from apocryphal elements (used, however, as rhetorical devices rather than as proofs), bases belief in our Lady's bodily Assumption on strictly theological grounds, on reasoning indeed that is not unlike John Damascene's or even Pius XII's in *Munificentissimus Deus*. Markedly Christocentric, the homily derives the Assumption fundamentally from the fact that Mary is the Mother of God; her sanctity and purity of soul are spoken of in terms so universal as to imply the Immaculate Conception, and there is in addition clear indication of belief in her cooperation in the redemption; her heavenly

¹¹⁶ A. Wenger, A.A., *L'Assomption de la très sainte Vierge dans la tradition byzantine du VI^e au X^e siècle. Etudes et documents* (Paris: Institut français d'études byzantines, 1955, pp. 428).

¹¹⁷ See on this point René Laurentin, "Du nouveau sur l'Assomption," *Vie spirituelle* 93 (1955) 181-85.

intercession for the faithful is closely linked with this fact, as well as with the Assumption itself.¹¹⁸

The extraordinary proliferation of theological studies, in our day, on the many facets of Mariology as a special branch of dogmatic theology, has focused new attention on the basic principles (and the actual facts) that play, or should play, their part in the development of Christian dogma and the nature and growth of theology itself.¹¹⁹ There are, as a consequence, few theological works concerned with Mary which do not in one way or another illuminate some aspects of these questions. Here again we mention two books. Msgr. Journet, whose introduction to theology, in its English garb at least, will be familiar to many,¹²⁰ has outlined certain basic principles concerning doctrinal development, with special reference to the Immaculate Conception and to the recent discussions on Mary's relationship to the Church.¹²¹ The first part of this book is devoted to the nature of the Christian revelation, its transmission through inspired writings and tradition, and the process of its constantly growing explication in the Church of Christ.¹²² In the two sections that follow, these general principles are shown in action in the development, from the comparatively few explicitly revealed truths about Mary, of the present-day teaching of the Church and the scientific elaboration that is our modern Mariology. There are insights throughout to be prized, notably, I would say, those relating to the traditionally Catholic use of Holy Scripture, and to that fascinating new understanding of Mary

¹¹⁸ A detailed account of the doctrinal content of this sermon is given by J. Galot, S.J., "Aux origines de la foi en l'Assomption," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 77 (1955) 631-36.

¹¹⁹ For the general background of Catholic opinion on the growth and evolution of dogma, see John J. Galvin, "A Critical Survey of Modern Conceptions of Doctrinal Development," *Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting, June, 1950*, pp. 45-63.

¹²⁰ Charles Journet, *The Wisdom of Faith: An Introduction to Theology* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1952, pp. xvi + 225).

¹²¹ *Esquisse du développement du dogme mariale* (Paris, Alsatia, 1954, pp. 165). The reference to the question of Mary and the Church calls to mind the recent appearance of a French version of Karl Rahner, S.J., *Marie et l'église* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1955, pp. 126). For those, not a few I am sure, who find this author's German more than a little difficult, this small volume of "meditations on the spiritual life" will be a worthwhile introduction to a growingly influential theologian.

¹²² Not everyone will be prepared to accept without demur the author's statement that this explication occurs "in conformity with an intrinsic, inevitable and rigorous logic," especially in view of the historical development of a number of Mariological doctrines as described in the latter two-thirds of this book. At least the kind of "rigorous logic" here involved is subject to further study.

as, in a true sense and in accord with the divine economy of salvation, the ideal and the personification of the Church of Christ.¹²³

Since our purpose throughout has been the modest one of calling attention to developments, rather than of reviewing in detail the books or articles in which they are to be found, we shall have to rest content with a final, and all too brief, comment on one more book of truly major importance.¹²⁴ The importance lies primarily, not in its specific contributions to Mariology (considerable though these are), but rather in its profound and original consideration of the problematics relative to dogmatic "evolution," and to the nature of "tradition" in its special Catholic meaning. If you (*quod Deus avertat*) picture "oral tradition" as a whispering of Christian arcana from lip to ear, or even the proclaiming of dogmas from the rooftops, this book will hardly interest you. Even if, with Billot¹²⁵ and many others, you think of it as for all practical purposes identical with the teachings of the magisterium, past and present, it is likely that you have lost sight of a factor of no minor importance. The magisterium alone, as the proximate norm of faith, is for the Catholic the official interpreter of revelation. But while this is the principal, it is not the only, element in tradition; for it is in truth the *whole* Church, believing as well as teaching, that preserves the deposit of faith, and plays its part in its progressive unfolding. Theology is the worse off where this is forgotten. And it is probably the prime merit of Dillenschneider's work, the fruit of deep analysis, and years of thought and research, to have thrown a very new light on this aspect of the dynamic, vital processes of faith and understanding which the Spirit of God inspires and directs in the minds and hearts and practices of the devoted faithful, as well as in the guiding bishops, of the Church of Christ.¹²⁶

¹²³ On this general theme of Mary and the Church I know no better source of immediately available enlightenment than Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., "Theotokos: The Mother of God," in *The Mystery of the Woman*, ed. Edward D. O'Connor, C.S.C. (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University, 1956, pp. x + 150), reviewed in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 17 (1956) 254-56.

¹²⁴ Clément Dillenschneider, C.S.S.R., *Le sens de la foi et le progrès dogmatique du mystère mariale* (Rome: Academia Mariana Internationalis, 1954, pp. xi + 402).

¹²⁵ Ludovicus Card. Billot, S.J., *De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam haeresim evolutionismi* (4th ed.; Rome, 1929), especially pp. 11-45. See also Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., "The Catholic Concept of Tradition in the Light of Modern Theological Thought," *Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Convention, June, 1951*, pp. 42-75.

¹²⁶ Very much to the point here is the remarkable fact that both Pius IX in his considerations preliminary to the definition of the Immaculate Conception, and Pius XII in the document in which he defined Mary's bodily Assumption into heaven, explicitly

The reader may recall that I threatened earlier to propose a means of keeping the Catholic theologian *au courant* of the flood of theological literature that pours from our printing presses today. What I had in mind was something similar to the tools that have been available for many years to students of the natural sciences, and more recently to historians. If you have ever seen a copy of *Physical, Chemical, or Biological Abstracts* you will know what I am thinking about. At the moment I have at hand the latest issue of *Historical Abstracts*, edited from Vienna and published in the United States.¹²⁷ Let me describe it. In less than a hundred pages we find, among other things, over sixty pages of abstracts of "articles appearing currently in periodicals the world over," a short section of strictly bibliographical news, and more than fifteen pages giving a partial listing of historical periodicals with all necessary information about title, place and times of publication, prices and contents. The whole is a cooperative effort of historical scholars throughout the world; there is an appeal in this current issue for volunteer abstracters, with the required qualifications clearly stated. The "abstracts" of periodical articles are presumably the most valuable part of the contents; I venture to give a sample:

109. George, Katherine and Charles H. (Univ. of Rochester), ROMAN CATHOLIC SAINTHOOD AND SOCIAL STATUS: A STATISTICAL AND ANALYTICAL STUDY. *Journal of Religion* 1955 35 (2): 85-98. Out of 2,494 saints from the first to the twentieth century 78 per cent were born into the upper class, 17 per cent into the middle class, and 5 per cent into the lower class, with a larger percentage of middle class status after the twelfth century. These percentages and the closeness with which changes followed shifts in class relations lead to the conclusion that selection to sainthood was largely reserved to the social elites of European cul-

coupled the beliefs of the faithful with the teachings of the bishops of the universal Church in a phrase whose significance may easily be missed: "singularis Catholicorum antistitum et fidelium conspiratio." Pius IX, *Ineffabilis Deus*, *Acta Pii IX*, 1, 615; Pius XII, *Munificentissimus Deus*, *AAS* 42 (1950) 756-57.

¹²⁷ *Historical Abstracts*, A Quarterly Covering the World's Periodical Literature, 1775-1945, Eric H. Boehm, Editor. Vol. 2, No. 1, Abstracts 1-656, March, 1956. Editorial Address: c/o Historisches Seminar, Universität Wien, Vienna I, Austria. Published in the U. S. A.: 640 West 153rd Street, New York 31, New York. In addition to the *Abstracts* itself there is available the *H. A. Bulletin*, a companion to *Historical Abstracts*. This bulletin is published "primarily to satisfy a need of professors, students of history, seminars, research institutes and departmental libraries. Subscriptions to bibliographical publications like *Historical Abstracts* are normally not taken by individuals. Yet there appears to be a need for an inexpensive reference quarterly within easy reach. The *H. A. Bulletin* is designed to fill this need." The yearly subscription for the four issues is five dollars for institutions, three dollars for individuals, and two dollars for students; available from the publishers of *Historical Abstracts*.

ture. Based on Herbert Thurston et al. (eds.), Butler's *Lives of the Saints* (rev. ed., 12 vols.; New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1926-38) and other lives of saints. N. Kurland

Some technical details about the publication: the issue I speak of runs to less than a hundred double-columned pages, varityped and reproduced by the offset process on standard typewriting-size pages (8½ by 11 inches), sewed and paper-covered. The terms of subscription are similar to those of the different scientific *Abstracts*; in this case, for the four yearly issues, fifteen dollars for individual subscriptions or for those entered by institutions with an annual book (purchase) fund of less than \$10,000; for other institutional subscriptions (universities, libraries, research agencies, etc.) with an annual book (purchase) fund of more than \$10,000, the yearly charge is twenty-five dollars.

Considerably closer to home is the experimental publication of the Jesuit faculty and students of theology of Weston College, Massachusetts,¹²⁸ for all interested in New Testament studies. The first issue in January of this year was multilithed, while the most recent copy (May 1956) is in the form of a seventy-two-page printed booklet. The body of this latest issue is made up of abstracts of periodical articles and book reviews, with a four-page "feature abstract," in this instance Philip J. Donnelly's condensation of "Le sens de *eph ho* en Rom 5:12 et l'exégèse des Pères grecs."¹²⁹ The editors say of this experiment that "we have not covered all of the periodicals, both because our staff is limited (efforts are being made to obtain more collaborators) and because we thought it better to find out how our project would be received before we attempted more complete coverage."

How practical is it to think of a publication offering complete coverage of the whole field of Catholic theology? The problems of cooperative effort, on an international scale especially, are great; the work would have to be sponsored by some established organization. Each of us can probably think of one or more possibilities here. The need, I am sure all will agree, is great enough; occasional surveys (such as this) have their utility, as do the often excellent bibliographical supplements offered by some of our theological periodicals. What is wanting is *complete* information, and this is not at hand.

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¹²⁸ *New Testament Abstracts*, ed. J. J. Collins, S.J. (Weston 93, Mass.: Weston College of the Holy Spirit). Experimental Issue, May 1956.

¹²⁹ See n. 40 *supra*.