

CURRENT THEOLOGY

APOLOGETICS

CHRIST LEGATE TO MANKIND. CHRIST AND ETHICS. The gist of the modernistic view of the ethics taught by Christ may be summed up in the words of a book of 1940: The liberal social Christianity "makes a deliberate adaptation of a gospel originally cast in an apocalyptic framework in order to render more authentically for a changed historical situation its message of human redemption. For liberal Christianity can see no necessary connection whatever between the absolute ethic of Jesus and the particular apocalyptic framework in which it was presented. The timeless truth must be lifted out of a setting that definitely dated it and made relevant to a world to which apocalyptic thinking is alien." (F. Ernest Johnson, in *The Social Gospel Re-examined*, p. 110.) Further notice of this work may be found among the *Book Reviews*.

It is well known that the so-called *Interimsethik* of Christ became popular shortly after 1900 because of the writings, especially of Johann Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, concerning the alleged eschatological views of Christ concerning His Kingdom. It was a corollary that the ethics of Christ were for the *interim*—brief—between His preaching and the end of the world. Hence arose a self-made "problem" for doctrinaires concerning the applicability of Christ's program to our *different* setting. Whatever the twists and turns which ethics have taken in the European followers of the eschatological school, they have not fared so badly as they have with the experimentalist philosophy in America. To the faulty exegesis and history which were invoked for the European opinions, writers in America have added false philosophical theories. It is not often that the underlying philosophy of such views is clearly stated by those who forward them; for this reason the plain and bald statement of a recent article is valuable in making clear to us exactly the positions which are opposed to our own.

In the article "An Experimental Christian Ethics," [*Journal of Religion*, 20 (Oct. 1940) 4, 325-339] Robert E. Fitch asks the question: Can Experimentalism and Christian Ethics be combined? His answer is that "broadly speaking an experimental ethics seeks to steer a course between traditionalism and radicalism." On what grounds it seeks to do this—the author assumes that it ought to be done—may be seen in the views of the writer on the fundamental norm of morality.

Experimentalism strives to appropriate the best of the old and allows for the unique aspect of the new; it "recognizes the fluid and complex character of the moral process;" it supplies methods of analysis, formation of hypo-

theses, trials of them in practice; it holds that the criterion of the value of the ethical act is not determined by any pronouncement of an antecedent authority; rather, the value of it—and its value is its ethical goodness—is determined by the consequences of it; finally, experimentalism “repudiates any notion of finality in the process of moral discovery and points to growth as both the present immanent meaning and the future consummation of the moral life.”

Somewhat optimistically, one would say, the author follows this description of experimentalism with the “thesis of this paper that a reconciliation (between experimentalism and Christian ethics) can and should be made.” It is not necessary to pursue in detail how the author proceeds to this reconciliation; obviously the method is an old one—the use of an excised Gospel record interpreted in as near a fashion as is possible to make Gospel ethics similar to the experimentalist views; what is left in the way of contrast is taken care of by the alleged spirit of Christian ethics: “it is essentially a growing thing.”

The sincere search and the failing path to the goal are to be seen also in the recent article of E. B. Storr, “The Final Authority in Conduct,” [*The Congregational Quarterly*, 18 (July 1940) 3, 283-289]. Herein the author, omitting to treat the natural law, finds no hope of final authority in the laws of men. Biblical criticism has destroyed the ultimate authority of Protestantism, and many who have surrendered the idea of the infallible book “have fallen back on the idea of an infallible Person. Jesus, they claim, is the final and absolute moral authority.” But “which Jesus? For there are two distinct figures in the Gospels—that of the Synoptics and that of John. . . . Again, much of His teaching is in parabolic form, and we have not always the key to unlock its meaning. Further, what measure of importance is to be attached to the apocalyptic element in His teaching, and how much truth is there in the idea of an *Interimsethik*—an ethic meant only for special conditions and not applicable to our ordinary life?” Then, there is the repeated refusal of Christ “to be a lawgiver,” and “there is no reference in the Gospels to many difficult ethical questions . . . the drink problem . . . war . . . slavery . . . certain sex problems. . . .”

“We conclude, then, that neither State nor Church, neither Book nor Man, gives what we are in search of—a final and absolute moral authority.” Man is, therefore, left only with conscience, and the *guide* of this is the past, the community, and the expert; of the three “Jesus represents the authority of *The Expert*,” while the Church represents the authority of the community.

These notices prove how important is the publication of such a book as *Nature and Functions of Authority*, by Doctor Yves Simon, (Marquette University Press, 1940, pp. 78). It would be well if the world outside the

Church delved into such exposés of theses and thoughts which are familiar enough to Catholic scholars, but which are of another world for those who have had no systematic training in philosophy before engaging upon the history and content of Christian origins. In Simon's Aquinas Lecture for 1940 there are not new viewpoints for us, but there is an excellent presentation of two points, the question of the relations between authority and individual liberty and the treatment of the liberalistic view that authority is not something natural and instinctive in man, but a substitutional device excogitated by man for the protection of the incapable.

With acceptable philosophical bases the adverse critics would be in a far better position to understand the positive revealed Law of Christ and of His Kingdom, the Church. It is heartening to note that occasionally some outside the Church have weighed the theory of an *Interimsethik* and found it wanting in some respects. The article of David R. Cochran, "The Relation between Ethics and Eschatology in the Ante-Nicene Fathers," [*Anglican Theological Review*, 22 (Oct. 1940) 4, 309-325] notes a number of points which are valuable. The author points out that the theory of the *Interimsethik* is still prevalent, and especially "explains away" very frequently the renunciatory parts of Christ's ethics. Now the opinion that the end would come soon was an opinion which was still persisting in certain writers into the fourth century (when it may be quoted in Eusebius); this opinion was not found in the Alexandrian writers, because in their tradition the coming of Christ was understood as an individual affair in the life of each man as well as an end-phenomenon; the emphasis on this second Advent of Christ tended to exclude an emphasis on the third or final Advent.

Historical investigation according to Cochran fails singularly to discover that the ethical views of the early Christian writers were influenced by the expectation which they had. The author examines two principal points in which the ethical viewpoint might be expected to be influenced, first, the whole question of marriage, celibacy, and purity. In dealing with these topics the motives and arguments which are put forth for renunciation are not that the world is not to last; the motives are sacrificial, along with an insistence that the state of marriage is only for the procreation of children. Tertullian and Eusebius may be cited as the only ones who urge as a motive the eschatological expectation. Secondly, the Christian attitude toward the State and worldly institutions "moved on quite a different plane from eschatological hope."

The author concludes that with this absence of the eschatological motive it ought to be admitted historically that the other-worldly view of early Christianity, first, is not necessarily connected with the Advent, and secondly,

that it has its obvious roots for its renunciations in the Christian dualism of the flesh and the spirit; the flesh is to be conquered by renunciation of the desires of the body and of the goods of the world. In conclusion, the author discusses an objection that the publicized motives (all that we have in the historical documents) may be rationalized arguments put forth for public consumption for the pagans; that, therefore, the real motives (eschatological) were silenced. There is not proof of such rationalizations; the tenor of the arguments is discoverable in documents which were for Christian reading as well as in those which were offered to the pagan public.

The above article assumes rightly that the views of the early Christians concerning the flesh are those which are ordinarily associated with Christianity. It is on this very point that issue has been taken recently in the essay, "The Anthropology of Saint Paul," by Robert M. Grant [*Anglican Theological Review*, 22 (July, 1940) 3, 199-203]. Students of Saint Paul will be surprised at the amazing (and erroneous) conclusions reached here concerning the Apostle's hyper-Puritanical ethos, his emphasis on woman as inferior, on marriage as contemptible, his *tabu* of women's hair, his fantastic picture in *Romans* I of the Greco-Roman world. The writer finds all this in sharp contrast to the healthful spirit of Jesus. But apparently the Apostle has scored against the Master! For, his attitude toward flesh has had "unfortunate effects on the church, especially in continental Protestantism, down to the present day."

A juster view of Saint Paul will be found in the article, which is in contrast to that of Grant, in "The Fifth Gospel: The Gospel according to Saint Paul," by Otto W. Heick, [*Lutheran Church Quarterly*, 13 (July 1940) 3, 233-244]. The value of the article is in the immense array of Pauline passages (some cited for the orthodox Lutheran positions) which show that the doctrine of the Apostle is that of the Master. These lead, in the author's citation at the end, to the thought so finely phrased by Feine that were men without the Gospels, and had the Pauline letters, the faith of the Christian Church would have been the same.

Interestingly enough the saying of Christ that "the disciple is not above the master," has been strikingly illustrated also in respect of views upon eschatological ethics in the article of Ray C. Petry, "Medieval Eschatology and Saint Francis of Assisi," [*Church History*, 9, March 1940) 1,54-69]. The author describes the historical scene in Saint Francis' century as one of expectation of the end; here Petry's presentation impresses one as colored by the thesis of the writer. Likewise, while Francis was admittedly stirred by the "moving panorama of sinful humanity and the trial and persecution of Christ's faithful," it seems exaggeration to state that he was "fascinated by the approaching end and by the tyrannical power of the Evil

One," or that his spirit of renunciation drew principally from the thought of the Last Day.

But this notice of Petry's article is less concerned with the historical assertions about Saint Francis (for whose story there are better authorities than those cited in the notes—I refer especially to Coulton) than with the conclusion of the essay where the Poverello suffers the same fate as Christ. "Francis was a medieval man. His patterns of thought were those of his time. The prevailing note of his age was necessary preparation for the inevitable Great Day. His contribution must be appreciated, if at all, in relation to his part in that eschatological program. His poverty idealism itself cannot be viewed and evaluated as an attempt at a modern type of social reconstruction. His renunciation must be interpreted as a means to a unique heraldy of God's Kingdom and to the redemptive service of men in the Last Days."

THE CHURCH

PERPETUITY OF THE CHURCH. Since man is instinctively religious, religion will not die, though particular forms of religious expression and confession will die. This is the contention of James Bissett Pratt in *Why Religions Die*. (Univ. Cal. Press, 1940), who applies the three aspects of all instincts (with McDougall) to the religious instinct, namely, the perceptual, the emotional and the volitional, and finds that man's emotional reaction to religion will always obtain. Following an historical analysis why certain ancient forms of religion (Babylonian, Egyptian, etc.) died, the author offers to a Christianity which is threatened with extinction the antidote of modernism. "But, one may ask, can the essential part of the Christian tradition be preserved and, at the same time, thought be left free and faith be kept elastic? I think it can . . . through a constantly fresh and ever spiritual reinterpretation of the essential Christian symbols." Prof. Pratt does not advert in the essay to the fact that Christianity is founded on revelation and that it has in its pure form a promise of perpetuity.

PROPAGATION OF THE FAITH. Under the title *Tous les fidèles pour tous les infidèles* Adolphe Roy has written an interesting booklet on the Association for the Propagation of the Faith (Montreal, 1940, 133 pp.). There is a history of the movement since its origins in 1822, an account of the sums collected and distributed, and the official documents and rules which govern the Association.

GOD THE CREATOR OF NATURE

A THEOLOGY OF WOMAN. In *The Thomist* [2 (Oct. 1940), 4,459-518] Father B. M. Lavaud, O.P., writes fifty valuable pages on the topic "Toward

a Theology of Woman." The best preparation for the reading of this article is a prior essay of the same author, "L'idée divine du mariage," which appeared in the *Etudes Carmélitaines* [23 (Apr. 1938) 1, 165-203], in which after a summary and discussion of the scriptural texts which have to do with marriage, the author discussed the ends of the sacrament as put forth in the early Fathers. Here was found a tendency to consider the acts of marriage in too close connection with ascetical views and with relations to sin, both original and actual. In the modern views concerning the purposes of marriage there is a distinct tendency to accentuate, and this need not be done unduly, the purposes of the common life and their effect on the development of the personality of both partners. This new emphasis increases the consideration of woman as a partner of the contract, and thus one feature of a more adequate "theology of woman" is brought to our attention.

The article in the October (1940) *Thomist* again calls attention to the fact that "certain age-old defects in the presentation of the doctrine of marriage explain the imperfections and omissions, and even the lack of a *theology of woman*." There is "neither Jew nor Greek," said Saint Paul, (Gal. 3, 28) and this phrase has been well emphasized, of old and lately, in our writings on the Mystical Body. But no such emphasis has been given to the phrase which is also written in the same verse, "neither male nor female." In the patristic age the influence of the Greco-Latin philosophy and literature, the Roman law and also the laws of uncivilized peoples, the heritage of what had come from the defective rabbinical exegesis, but above all the ascetical outlook of the Church concerning celibacy and purity—all these unduly affected the theologians of the early centuries, and biased their minds with prejudices against woman. The patristic thought in this respect became the heritage of the medieval schoolmen.

To all this current in theology Father Lavaud opposes the scriptural texts which have to do with woman. In the texts concerning the creation of Adam and Eve there is nothing to support the view of Saints Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Ambrose that sex was not decreed by God until after the prevision of the fall; neither can it be sustained that procreation would have been different in the state of innocence. Saint Augustine, though more temperate, fails to draw out the implications of the idea that woman is the help mate and partner of man, and Aquinas and the schoolmen follow Augustine. In the creation of Eve from the side of Adam both Augustine and Aquinas note the symbol of the *conjunctio socialis*, but woman becomes, in the phrase of Bossuet, a "sort of diminutive." It is exaggerated, however, to claim that the Fathers or the schoolmen ever denied that woman has a spiritual and immortal soul.

In the story of the temptation and fall the fact that woman is the first to be tempted led the schoolmen to expatiate on the natural weakness of woman, on her intellectual and moral inferiority, and even on her lesser possession of supernatural grace. Saint Hugo, Lombard, Saint Thomas may be cited for these views which in their fullest expression may be found in Saint Bonaventure on the 21st Distinction of the Second Book of the Sentences. The development originated in the order of the temptation in the story of Genesis, and not much attention was paid, at least for determining a theology of woman, to the fact that the order of temptation is to be reversed in the order of Redemption through the *Fiat* of the Virgin and the cross of Christ.

In the matter of guilt Saint Bonaventure and Aquinas followed Peter Lombard, who follows Saint Augustine, in finding the greater guilt on the part of Eve out of Saint Paul's text, "For Adam was first formed, and then Eve; and Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced, was in the transgression." (I Tim, 2, 14). The only voices raised in favor of woman as having the lesser sin are those of Saints Ambrose and Bellarmine; Bellarmine analyzes seven acts in the first sin and finds Adam more guilty.

When Father Lavaud entitles his essay, "Toward a Theology of Woman," he means to point out a road (of recantation) along which theology may rightly go and a road of progress to take. But he does more than this; he is off down the road himself for the guidance of others and for the precisizing of questions which need treatment.

RACISM. As "neither Jew nor Greek" has led to theses and corollaries in the treatise on the Church, so too the phrase may properly introduce a corollary into the treatise on God the Creator, in view of modern theories of racism in Europe and of applications of them both in Europe and in our land. The abundant material for these will be found directly in the Encyclical of Pius XII *Summi Pontificatus*, or in the excellent analysis and discussion of it by John LaFarge, S.J., in his article "The Philosophy of Human Unity," [*Modern Schoolman*, 17 (Jan. 1940) 2, 24-26]. "Particularly memorable, for they are capable of a great wealth of illustration and doctrinal expansion are the following points concerning the natural unity of mankind. (Paragraphs 36-42 of the Encyclical) . . . common origin from a first couple . . . common nature (there are no supermen nor "submen" by nature) . . . common dwelling place, the earth of whose resources all men can by natural right avail themselves . . . the unity of the supernatural end, God, to whom all should tend, as well as the unity of means to secure that end." With this basis of unity, its nature is put forth as something different from the regimented international uniformity of the Socialists and the Com-

munists or the "atomized" unity into which industrial Capitalism has driven the modern proletariat. It is *organic* unity. In touching on the necessary authority which must be in the state, the Pope "places an unerring finger on the basic weakness of a so-called authoritarian State which defeats the very purpose of authority by renouncing, through a denial of the spiritual nature of man, the only basis of authority, a free and intelligent recognition and consent." The principles laid down are applied in the Encyclical to private enterprise, the family, education, and international relations.

GOD THE AUTHOR OF SUPERNATURE

ORIGINAL SIN. IS WORLD MISERY A PROOF? As in other scenes and times the miseries of the human situation and world history have led thinking men to conjecture some cataclysmic experience at the very origins of the race, so too in these appalling days through which the world is living. There are three well-known passages on this topic in Catholic writings, and that of Newman comes most easily to mind. Shortly after the opening of the 5th chapter of the *Apologia pro vita sua*, the peerless paragraph occurs, which, since it says better what is noted in the modern authors whom we are to quote, is here repeated.

NEWMAN. "To consider the world in its length and breadth, its various history, the many races of man, their starts, their fortunes, their mutual alienation, their conflicts; and then their ways, habits, governments, forms of worship; their enterprises, their aimless courses, their random achievements and acquirements, the impotent conclusion of long-standing facts, the tokens so faint and broken of a superintending design, the blind evolution of what turn out to be great powers of truths, the progress of things, as if from unreasoning elements, not toward final causes, the greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his short duration, the curtain hung over his futurity, the disappointments of life, the defeat of good, the success of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevalence and intensity of sin, the pervading idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion, that condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apostle's words, "having no hope and without God in the world,"—all this is a vision to dizzy and appal; and inflicts upon the mind the sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond human solution.

"What shall be said to this heart-piercing, reason-bewildering fact? I can only answer, that either there is no Creator, or this living society of men is in a true sense discarded from His presence. . . . And so I argue about the world: *if* there is a God, *since* there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; and

thus the doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God."

SAINTE AUGUSTINE. The argument of Newman is not dissimilar to the disjunction which was offered by Saint Augustine. In the *Against Julian* (Book 4, ch. 16, no. 83, ML 44, 782) Augustine reviews the miseries of the world and man, and asks, "What is left to say save that the cause of these evils is either the malice or impotence of God or the penalty of some ancient first sin? But since God is neither unjust nor evil, it follows that one is forced, even though reluctantly, to conclude that this weighty yoke would not have lain upon Adam's sons, unless the demerit of an original crime had preceded it."

SAINTE THOMAS. Neither Saint Augustine nor Newman treats the question with the care of Saint Thomas who takes up the same point in the Fourth Book of the *Contra Gentiles* (chap. 52) in answer to difficulties against the fact of original sin. "In the way of solution it ought to be premised the certain signs of original sin probably appear." Then very carefully Aquinas considers an essential point in the matter. In the purely hypothetical order of nature there is no reason to say that certain of the miseries of man in his present existence would not have been his lot. Yet this consideration does not absolutely exclude a probable proof of original sin from facts of the present order, since in the order of natural innocence a greater domination of reason over the lower parts might have been expected.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that "hujusmodi defectus quamvis naturales homini videantur absolute, considerando humanam naturam ex parte ejus quod est in ea inferius, tamen, considerando divinam providentiam et dignitatem superioris partis humanae naturae, satis probabiliter probari potest hujusmodi defectus esse poenales; et sic colligi potest humanum genus peccato aliquo originaliter esse infectum."

ORIGINAL SIN IN 1925. But however much Newman, with his synthetic and reflected considerations of the history of man, could see in the way of an indication of the aboriginal calamity, his liberalistic Victorian contemporaries were subscribing to heresies which led to an era of humanistic optimism. Two factors especially led to the scoffing of the late nineteenth century at the orthodox views of the fall of man. The biblical rationalists claimed to have exploded the story of the beginnings both of man and sin in *Genesis* into myth, and the new philosophy of human evolution was encouraging a new and more heretical Pelagianism and a foolishly optimistic humanism.

Even after the First World War, when Barthianism began its march to popularity with its neo-Calvinism and *depraved*, not *deprived*, human nature, the superficial cocksureness of the Victorian heritage continued. The Bampton Lectures for 1924, delivered by the Reverend Norman P. Williams, urged

that neither Christ nor Saint Paul had a notion of the doctrine of original sin, a conclusion, together with many other statements, which was severely criticised for ignorance of the implicit and explicit content of revelation and for a superficial exposé of the sources cited in the lectures, by Father Francis Connell, C.S.S.R., in his "A Recent View of the Fall and Original Sin," [*Ecclesiastical Review*, 78, (1928) pp. 337 ff.]

In 1925 Ernest B. Harper stated, after a lengthy discussion of the psychology of criminality and social statistics, "As to *original sin* it no more exists than original criminality. Neither one can be inherited as such. The term however might still be useful if employed only in the two following uses, (1) to refer to man's original unsocialized nature, or (2) to certain degraded types of homes which are of such a nature as to make sinning, in the case of a child born into such a home, almost inevitable . . . not only can sin not be inherited physically, but neither is it due primarily to biological causes." [*Journal of Religion*, 5 (1925) p. 411.]

In the same year the article of Frederick R. Tennant, "Recent Reconstruction of the Conception of Sin," [*Journal of Religion*, 5 (1925) p. 25 ff.] dealt first with actual sin (which is resolved into something different from the Christian concept of it), and next with original sin. Derived from dubious Biblical sources and contravening the postulates of evolution, the doctrine was felt to need *restatement*. "The old dogma can be restated in relation to the requirements of scientific knowledge and to psychological distinctions not forthcoming when it was formulated in its traditional forms." The author's restatement is that "Sin began when certain practices, as yet non-moral . . . were persisted in . . . after that, they were authoritatively pronounced and individually recognized to be contrary to law or inconsistent with ideals. So much for the origin of sin in the race." This evolutionary theory of original sin is said not to "affect any of the essential contents of the Christian faith" (p. 162)—a statement which is of course amazing.

ORIGINAL SIN IN 1941. In 1941 it cannot be said that orthodox views on original sin have come to be accepted, but recent writings may be quoted which are sharply in contrast to the optimism of the humanitarian first quarter of the present century. In an article "Theology in the Modern World," [*The Congregational Quarterly*, 18 (July 1940) 3, 251-262] Doctor W. B. Selbie writes, "It is claimed for Christianity that it sets forth an ideal moral code and an absolute moral standard. This is so high as to be practically unattainable save by the grace of God and the power of His Holy Spirit. But the flesh wars against the Spirit. There is in man a kind of *damnosa hereditas*, a proneness to evil and wrongdoing which must be overcome before he can produce those fruits of the spirit which are the sign

of his Christian standing." Yet the author is not willing to accede to either one of two forms of concept of original sin. "What is needed today is not a return to Thomism or to Calvinism, but rather to the mind of Christ."

The "new deflationary religious mood" is taken up for discussion in the Rauschenbusch Lectures of 1939 by F. Ernest Johnson and reprinted in the book *The Social Gospel Re-examined* (Harper, 1940, pp. 261, \$2.00). In Chapter III, "How 'Fallen' is Human Nature?" the author puts the question "whether or not the nature of man is so weighted with evil—oriented away from God—that only a succession of miraculous happenings, called accessions of grace, can regenerate him." Struck by the "elemental fact of human experience" that man seeks God, and thinking that the tendency to refer this religious experience to a source outside man is due to a need for "symbols," the author is able to retain some of the optimism which is in the "assurance that indefinite perfectibility is not excluded as we address ourselves to the modification of human nature."

The author admits that "the net result of consulting biology and the forms of psychology that are in high degree biologically oriented is that man has a permanent inheritance that makes him capable of the most bestial conduct. There is no known way to eradicate that sinister aspect of human nature from man's animal inheritance. The potentiality of evil remains. The orthodox theologians score." But one may turn from this view to the hope held out by the cultural anthropologists; it is found that there are "culture patterns that select among native capacities those that shall be given the right of way. The facts about human imperfection must lead to insistence on the idea of the Kingdom;" in them "liberal social Christianity finds a compulsion toward what it calls 'Kingdom building.'" Man is, in contrast to the lower orders, self-transcending, and society by its very nature, affords the means of implementing the highest insights of its more sensitive souls.

Theologians will not find expected orthodoxy in all the views of Edwin Lewis' *A Philosophy of the Christian Revelation* (Harper, 1940, xii, 356, \$3.00) when he deals with original sin in the eighth chapter, entitled, "Creation without Redemption." But there are very cogent presentations of supports of several correct views; the subject is used to show the incompleteness of the notion of creation without the concept of redemption. "It has been the habit in many quarters in recent years to make merry over 'the hoary dogma' of original sin. Readily enough one admits that many extravagances have been associated with the expression, interpretation, and application of the dogma, even to the point of graphic descriptions of hell as 'paved' with the souls of unbaptized infants. . . . One sometimes wishes that the impatient critics of the doctrine of 'natural depravity' would take the trouble to acquaint themselves with what the doctrines really mean.

Perhaps the same observation should be made of those who profess to accept the doctrine" (p. 108). Professor Lewis' book has many other interesting features, some of which are discussed in a review of this somewhat exceptional work, to appear in the next issue.

The Catholic theologian may rightly rejoice that the doctrine of original sin is being considered again without the exuberant and scornful rejections which were the fruit of the heyday of optimistic evolution. But it is to be noticed that this "empirical" manner of reconsidering the fault of the first man has a definite tendency to make man's proneness to evil the essence of the sin. Actual sin is admitted to be prevalent, a tendency to it is discoverable even in the best men; hence the moderns are inclined to admit what they call original sin; but this is not the original sin which is derived through considerations of a re-admitted *Genesis* and through an acceptance of the implications of an inspired passage in *Romans*. Obviously, sources outside revelation can at most confirm what is in them, and the modern world has discredited revelation; modern writers, therefore, will give little real help to their readers either in respect of a plenary faith or of practical guidance of life.

Our theological manuals have contained for many years adequate answers to the difficulties of the last century and this against the doctrine of original sin. These solutions in the text-books are sometimes necessarily summary and in Latin; for an excellent treatment of the two main difficulties (the voluntariness of the sin is thought individual and injustice is charged to God) one will go far before finding a better essay than that written fifteen years ago by Doctor Joseph Becker, "Zur Theodicee der Erbsünde," in the 1926 *Linzer Quartalschrift*.

Possibly the only theological point which has been proposed anew in recent years is that of A. Van Hove, who in his *De erfzonde* (Antwerp, 1936) offered the distinction (of Banez and others) which is best put in the words of the reviewer of the treatise. E. Druwé, S.J., wrote in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* [64 (July 1937) 6, 667-668] as follows: "L'auteur fait sienne la théorie qui voit dans le péché originel la privation de la justice originelle comme don préternaturel adéquatement distinct de la grace sanctifiante, mais entraînant pour l'individu la privation de celle-ci. Ainsi apparait mieux comment le péché originel est appelé par saint Thomas un "peccatum naturae" et s'explique mieux aussi la volontariereté de ce péché en Adam." In the latest treatise appearing, that of Father Boyer, *De Deo Creante et Elevante*, it is stated that "sentiantia jam a tempore Sancti Thomae communior et hodie communissima est quod gratia sanctificans Adami, illi ab initio communicata, non distinguebatur adaequate a justitia originali, sed erat pars integrans, et quidem praecipua et formalis illius justitiae" (p. 324).

GRACE AND THE VIRTUES

SANCTIFYING GRACE AND THE VIRTUES. An excellent summary of certain and disputed points concerning the relations of Sanctifying Grace and the virtues appeared in the Reverend John McCarthy's article, "Grace and the Supernatural Virtues," [*Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 54 (Aug. 1939) 2, 113-120]. Both Aquinas and Suarez hold that Grace affects the very essence of the soul and that the supernatural virtues are operative habits of the soul; to Saint Thomas it seems that the virtues flow physically from Grace; to Suarez the connection is moral, for Grace posits an exigency for the virtues in the soul. Since Grace is prior to the virtues, it would seem to follow that the virtues are not present before the first justification; yet Suarez and Cajetan both conjecture that Faith and Hope may be infused on the occasion of the first act of Faith; their argument is based on the fact that these virtues are separable from Grace and Charity, as is clear from the fact that they remain in the soul after mortal sins except those against these virtues. The writer points out that the argument is not conclusive, for what was present may be conceived to remain more easily than what is absent may be conceived to be infused without that which is its normal origin.

With respect to the relation of Grace and Charity the common view holds that in the justification of the adult there is, first, the actual Grace of Charity, then, Sanctifying Grace, then the virtue of Charity. There is an apparently insuperable obstacle in the process as conceived by the Salmantan group, who conjecture that in this case the act of Charity may proceed from the virtue; if the virtue of Charity is present, how is justification formally attributable to Sanctifying Grace? Others hold that the act of Charity in this case may continue and become the virtue. But there is a difficulty in conceiving that an act becomes a habit. Finally, there is some distinction between Grace and the virtues, and the real distinction of Saint Thomas seems to be more in harmony with the data available.

Several problems face the theologians in considering the case of one in Sanctifying Grace who sins mortally. Mortal sin destroys Grace in every case; it also destroys Charity and the several infused moral virtues. It does not exclude from the soul the virtue of Faith, unless the mortal sin is directly against Faith. In his *De Gratia* (Lib. XI, c. 5) Suarez has the most impressive array of theological testimonies on the singular effects of the sin of infidelity in removing even Faith. The virtue of Hope disappears through the three mortal sins, infidelity (because thus Faith, the base of Hope, is removed), presumption and despair; other kinds of mortal sin do not destroy it. But the evidence concerning the remaining of Hope is less impressive than that in the case of Faith; one of the strongest testi-

monies is the condemnation of the Fifty-seventh Proposition of Quesnelles: *Totum deest peccatori, quando ei deest spes; et non est spes in Deo ubi non est amor.*

The denial that Faith and Hope remain in the cases cited is temerarious. Yet some theologians have argued that, since the virtues flow from Grace physically or morally, it is possible to conceive that only the natural capacity to assent and to trust remains after mortal sin, and that this, activated by actual Grace, is the agent in the process of justification. Moreover, they think that there is a special difficulty in the case of Hope, since, according to many, Hope is a concupiscential love of God.

The argument is not conclusive; it may be answered by pointing out that, although the virtues flow from Grace, there is no essential and necessary connection between the two, at least, between Grace and Faith and Hope. A better answer seems to lie in appealing to the extraordinary power of God, who sustains these virtues, as, similarly, the accidents of bread and wine are sustained after the consecration.

THE VIRTUES AND THE HUMAN FACULTIES. Father McCarthy's article is concerned with theological considerations. For penetrating reflections upon the infused virtues and the faculties of the soul one may turn to a less recent article of Father Emile Mersch, S.J., "La grâce et les vertus théologiques," [*Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 64 (Sept. 1937) 8,802-817]. The writer considers the function rather than the relations of Grace and the virtues. The effect of Sanctifying Grace and the virtues on the soul is to set up a new principle of supernatural vital activity; together with the soul they constitute a divinized operative living unit. Faith and the intellect become one divinized faculty of knowing; Love and the will become one divinized faculty of willing. With what faculty, therefore, is Hope joined to become a similar single divinized faculty? The will has two kinds of acts of love, the perfect and the imperfect or concupiscential; hence, one may see two potencies. Charity is joined with the potency of perfect love; the virtue of Hope is joined with the potency of concupiscential love and constitutes a single divinized faculty. Yet such a solution leads to difficulties in thus distinguishing two potencies in the will; is there not another view?

Since Faith and Charity are united to the two potencies of the soul, Mersch turns to a consideration of the soul itself as a permanent living entity. Certainly the vital activity of the first instance is due to Sanctifying Grace itself; but with the permanence of vital activity there is a faculty which is intimately concerned, the memory. By the memory we preserve the supernatural promises which have been given us; by it, the persistence of our psychological life is maintained; through it we are aware of the continuity of our person and the totality of ourselves; by it we are enabled perpetually

to enrich our souls out of the past; even more, through memory we are able to disjoin ourselves from the present and the ephemeral and thus in a sense to live above time; and, finally, by memory we are able to possess in some measure the future. All these features which follow considerations of the functions and effects of memory and have to do in some way or another with self-construction and totality fit in with the functions and nature of the supernatural virtue of Hope. Hence, Hope belongs to the will, but under the aspect of concupiscential love in a way which has to do with our whole selves and beings as permanent, capable, and destined units. Faith, therefore, and the mind as a single faculty reach truth, God Triune; Charity and the will as a single faculty reach good, God Triune; Hope and the will as one faculty reach out to our total life of eternity, God Triune.

THE CERTAINTY OF HOPE. The problem of the certainty of hope is considered in an excellent analysis offered by Father L. B. Gillon, O.P., in his article, "Certitude de notre espérance," [*Revue Thomiste*, 45 (1939) 2, 232-248]. Since Hope pertains to the will and certainty to the mind, the question arises concerning the security which Hope gives. The solutions of the problem before Saint Thomas were three: the certainty of Hope was considered the same as that of Faith; or the certainty of Hope was thought conditional (*if I persevere*); or, the certainty of Hope was thought partly mental and partly affective. Saint Thomas emphasized the univocal use of the word, *certainty*, for the firm adherence of the mind; hence analogical use obtains when one speaks of certainty in the case of Hope. But this analogical use is based upon reality.

For the analogy is based on the fact that mind is directive of action, and that an objective order of finality postulates a directive mind. In general, Hope, as other virtues, has a certainty of tendency towards its object; specifically, it has this out of the Divine ordination. Hence, one may say that the certainty of Hope is derived from that of Faith insofar as the motion of the appetite is directed by the cognitional faculty; yet the certainty of Faith is not a part of the certainty of Hope, thus derived. For the basis of Hope rests on the Divine ordination which comprises the mercy, power and salvific will of God. More precisely the fundament of Hope is the *liberalitas divina ordinans nos in finem*. This is revealed and it is accepted as certain revelation by Faith; but for the single person to have Hope it is necessary to know that this Divine liberality is extended to him. Hence, the certainty of Hope is individual and particular; that of Faith, general. The certainty of Hope is not a certain knowledge of one's predestination to glory; it is truly present as a supernatural virtue in the non-predestined, and it is not vain in their case, since the Divine liberality is prompt to aid all.

THE VIRTUES IN THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE. All readers, including even scientific theologians, will be interested in *A Companion to the Summa*, Vol. III, by Father Walter Farrell, O.P. (Sheed & Ward, 1904, viii, 530). The writer has taken the text out of theological language, and in so successful a fashion as to convince all that he has read and digested the *Summa* over long and studious years. This volume, together with the others of the series, is an excellent book to put in the hands of seminarians; it will be an excellent introduction to the *Summa* for them. Again, it is a valuable book for the priest and will be found to have innumerable suggestions which will help sermon-composition and also countless bits of practical wisdom for the guidance of souls. Father Farrell promises that during this year he will complete his volume on the first part of the *Summa*, and, after a decent interval, the volume on the third part. The author, too modestly, calls this four-volume work "a layman's *Summa*;" it is that, but priests, pastors and professors, and seminarians will do well to familiarize themselves with Father Farrell's book. In a work of the kind, theological discussion of disputed points of Aquinas' text is not to be expected; the writer follows the thought of the Dominican school without retarding his pages by calling attention to the divergent interpretations which theologians of other schools have offered.

THE VIRTUES AND PRACTICE. Practical ascetical considerations on Grace and the Virtues are to be found in a book by the Reverend James F. Carroll, C.S.Sp., *God, the Holy Ghost*, (Kenedy, 1940, vi, 316). The merit of this book is an emphasis on the activity of the Holy Ghost in the Gifts, the Beatitudes and the Fruits. The writer does not offer new theological considerations but he is able to urge very effectively the practical applications which originate in meditation upon the theology of Grace and the Virtues.

Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen has published an inspiring little book on the Virtues. *The Seven Virtues* (Kenedy, 1940, 110 pp.) is very practical, and in a novel and pleasing way seeks to motivate action through a consideration of the Seven Last Words. In order, the seven virtues are treated in connection with the Words, Fortitude, Hope, Prudence, Faith, Temperance, Justice, Charity.

MARIOLOGY

GREEK PATRISTIC MARIOLOGY. A summary presentation, with documentation, of the development of the theology of Our Lady is offered in the article of Father I. Ortiz de Urbina, S.J., "Lo svilippo della Mariologia nella Patrologia Orientale," [*Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 6 (Jan.-June, 1940) 1-2, 40-82]. In the first two centuries the doctrines of the maternity and of the virginity (*ante et in partu*) appear. Saint Justin may be cited

for the Eve-Mary contrast, which is so important theologically today. In the period from Origen to the Council of Ephesus there is a slight development in the use of the contrast, while the heresies concerning the Incarnate Word lead to the insistence on *theotokos* as the sign of orthodox thought concerning the Mother of God. To Origen is due the insistence on the perpetual virginity (*et post partum*), though less creditably for the Adamantine Doctor the *sword of Simeon* is interpreted as a doubt in Mary's Faith at the crucifixion. The question of the extent of Mary's sinlessness is not explicitly mooted; Ephraem can be cited where the context indicates his opinion on Mary's immunity even from original sin. In the third period which runs up to the time of Saint John Damascene the emphasis in Mariology is on the sanctity and dignity of the Mother of God; the notion of her mediacy of grace appears, and the doctrine of the Assumption comes more clearly to the fore; the feast spreads throughout the East and the West.

GREEK ORTHODOX MARIOLOGY. An interesting notice of the doctrinal situation in the Greek Orthodox Church is to be found in the essay of Father S. Salaville, A.A., "La doctrine d'Elie Miniatis, évêque et prédicateur grec (ob. 1714) sur l'Immaculée Conception," [*Marianum*, 2 (Apr. 1940) 2, 114-144]. Elias Miniatis was the author of *Petra Scandali*, a book which has long been the store-house of modern Greek (and of some Protestant) writers against the primacy of the Roman See. His fame among his own followers is accounted for by this book; he is reprobated among them for the "Latinism" of his profession of the Immaculate Conception, a doctrine which he spread in his writings and sermons. To such an extent has this rejection of Elias gone that editions of his works have appeared with the passages on the Immaculate Conception omitted; thereupon the notion has been spread that this leader of thought was not infected by the novel doctrine of the West. The genuine text leaves no doubt that he did receive the doctrine, but was not successful in bringing his fellow-churchmen to accept it. Elias perceived clearly how the doctrine suited the very beautiful Marian liturgy of the Greeks; yet bias against 'Latinisms' was too strong against his program.

THE WOMAN OF GENESIS, 3, 15. Traditional theology has long accepted the Eve-Mary contrast; yet in the very first text which is concerned with Our Lady several exegetes make Eve the type and Mary the antitype, and thus assume a common ground of comparison. "To the present writer the problem of finding a common ground of comparison between Eve and Mary has long seemed impossible of solution." With these words Father Francis X. Pierce, S.J., begins an interesting and inspiring essay, "Mary Alone is *The Woman of Genesis, 3, 15*," [*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 2 (July 1940) 3,245-252]. The writer first rejects the exegesis of

N. Palmieri, according to which Eve is the woman in the strict literal sense, and Mary the woman in the extended literal sense, because, as between Eve and the material serpent there is an opposition and hostility, so between Mary and the devil . . . Father Pierce refutes this, a) by denying a reference to the material serpent in the verse; b) even were there hostility, a mutual hostility would be required (since that is verified between Mary and the devil) and such hostility is not manifested by serpents towards men and not necessarily by men towards serpents; c) hostility or enmity is indicated in the text by a Hebrew word which is only used of rational beings.

The author proceeds further to say that there is no need of seeing a reference to Eve at all. The use of the article *The Woman* does not compel one to refer to Eve, for the article, as the article with *dove* in Genesis, 8, 7, does not necessarily refer back, but may mean *a certain*. Again, since the text is Messianic it may be lifted entirely from the context for interpretation, in which case the articles or other grammatical parts need not refer to the previous context. This is illustrated from the prophecy in Isaias, 7, 14. Thirdly, Eve is not suitably fitted into the demands of the verse. If any person, except Christ and Mary, is to be mentioned, why is it not Adam, from whom came the heritage of original sin? And why must persons besides Christ and Mary be considered since nothing of the restored supernatural order comes save through them? Moreover, no special opposition is detectible between Eve and either a material serpent or the devil.

Mary alone, then, is *The Woman* of Genesis 3, 15. To the arguments which confirm the exclusion of Eve, the author adds positive indications of the unique reference to Mary. There are four Messianic texts where a *Woman* appears, Genesis, 3,15, Isaias, 7, 14, Jeremias, 31, 22, and Micheas, 5, 3. There is but one woman in the other three. Again, it is only between Mary and the devil that hostility is absolute and mutual. Thirdly, the *semen* of the devil is not sinning men or sinning angels, but *sin*, and there is no opposition to this *semen* which can be verified in the case of Eve; it is verified because of the opposition to the devil verified in Christ, and through Christ, in Mary alone. Father Pierce sums up his interpretation in the words: "I will raise an impenetrable barrier of Grace between you and in a New Woman, between your sin and Her Offspring, the New Man. He will defeat you completely, while you inflict upon Him a minor, physical hurt."

MARY'S VOW OF VIRGINITY. Since the early part of the fourth century the testimonies of Saints Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory of Nyssa and others have prevailed in making the opinion common that Our Lady made a vow of perpetual virginity. The patristic argument was based on the exegesis of the narrative of the Annunciation, and especially on the words, "How shall this be done, because I know not man?" (Lk. 1, 34) In the eighth and

ninth centuries the Greek Church celebrated the feast of the Presentation. According to the apocryphal accounts the parents of Our Lady presented her in the Temple at the age of three, and it was at this age that she pronounced her vow of virginity. The Latins took over the feast, and until the time of Sixtus V, the prayer of the Mass made specific mention of the age of three. It is commonly held now that the particular time of the pronouncing of the vow cannot be determined; most exegetes note that the Gospel narration shows that it was before the marriage of Mary and Joseph. The second argument for the fact of a vow is *ex convenientia*, and is found briefly and clearly in the *Summa* (3, qu. 28, a. 4). A vow adds the note of perfection to a work; Mary must be the *Virgo virginum*; hence "conveniens fuit ut virginitas ejus ex voto esset Deo consecrata."

Possibly it is because there are a few modern exegetes who have doubted the exegetical argument that Paul Jouon, S.J., has written a penetrating analysis of the narrative of the Annunciation in his article, "L'Annonciation. Luc 1, 26-38," [*Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 66 (Aug. 1939) 7, 793-798]. He finds three parts in the conversation of Mary and Gabriel, and between them two pauses. The first part is the *Ave* and the perturbation of the Virgin at the greeting (26-29). After this break the angel seeks to allay the trepidity of Mary: "thou hast found grace with God . . . thou shalt conceive . . . a son . . . thou shalt call his name, Jesus . . . he shall be great . . . son of the most high . . . have the throne of David. . . ." Here Father Jouon points out that the explanation of the name of Jesus is not given and that there is no notification in the phrases describing the son which is not understandable about a Messiah sent to Israel. In a word, in this part of the conversation, the Davidic origin of the child is clear, His Messianic office with respect to Israel is likewise evident, but that He will be Divine is not clear.

A pause, then, follows this part of the story (verse 33). It is natural; Mary supposes that the child will be born normally of herself and Joseph. So far nothing has been said of a miraculous intervention. In this thought there is no positive error. But the process of the conception and the birth of this child as Mary now conceives it leads to her question (verse 34) concerning her virginity. Her fear is fully allayed in the third part of the story where the Divine character of the child is made clear and the process of birth is shown to be miraculous. It is clear that this analysis of the narration brings out into very clear light the reason why Mary put her question; it can only be that she had made a proposal to remain a virgin.

HYPERDOULIA. An instance of the persistent misunderstanding of the devotion paid by Catholics to Our Lady and the saints appeared recently—and in a context where there was no call for an allusion to the Virgin Mother. In an essay entitled, "Evolution of Mormon Doctrine," [*Church History*, 9

(June 1940), 2, 157-169] George B. Arbaugh shows how the Mormons deserted a belief in the Blessed Trinity for tritheism; from tritheism they fell into polytheism, and, finally, they had in their pantheon both male and female gods. Commenting on the Mormon belief in goddesses the author writes: "Nevertheless Mormon goddesses are products of logic rather than objects of devotion. This stands in sharp contrast to what might be termed the practical polytheism of Roman Catholicism, where the Blessed Virgin and the saints, similar to the pagan functional deities, serve real devotional needs even though not being regarded as divine. The great Mormon deities are all male and the goddesses are of little significance apart from their procreational function." (p. 163) The author apparently finds confirmation of this sort of erroneous opinion in the prayers which he cites in a footnote to his paragraph: "Jesus, Mary and Joseph, I give you my heart and my soul! Jesus, Mary and Joseph, assist me in my last agony."

ANSELM'S AXIOM OF MARIOLOGY. An historical notice concerning the Venerable Antonius Pagani a Venetiis gives occasion to quote the manner in which this Franciscan (and Tridentine) theologian quotes the axiom of Anselm in proof of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. In the essay "Ven. Antonius Pagani a Venetiis, O.F.M., (ob. 1589) ejusque *Corollarium* de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis," [*Antonianum*, 15 (Oct. 1940) 4, 323-348] P. Candidus Romeri, O.F.M., gives an interesting account of the life, learning and sanctity of the Venerable Anthony, and prints in full the unedited *Corollarium*. In a writing of 1579, the *Specchio de' fedeli* the Venerable had furthered the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and, conscious of the opposition which theologians of the past had offered to it, called attention to the fact that as yet the medieval saints and doctors had not yet been fully illumined by the Holy Spirit. As for his time (about 1580) men may rest with that assurance which they have in the fact that the Church has officially approved the feast.

Upon the publication of the *Specchio* a certain (unnamed) *theologalis disciplinae magister* took up the Venerable Anthony. The *Corollarium* is the answer to the strictures of this opponent. It is a fine example of gentleness in controversy and competency of theological argument. The Mariological principle is dealt with as follows; after quoting Saint Anselm's text, Pagani continues: "Neque enim Matri Dei denegandum est quicquid nitorem et gratiam et honorem illi potest afferre. Nec contra ipsius puritatis prerogativas adducendae sunt communes leges omnibus cominatae; quippe quae locum non habent ubi de specialibus gratiis et privelegiis agatur, prout in Principum sive Imperatorum privilegiis observatur."

Anselm's principle in the words of Father Olier, the founder of Saint Sulpice, may be found in a short book on the Virgin Mary to which attention

may be called here. Speaking of the Immaculate Conception, Olier writes: "In this moment God united and bestowed on her all the perfections He had given to all the just souls of the ancient law, so that she alone had more of the spirit of Christ than all the priests, patriarchs, judges, prophets, kings, all the saints of the Old Testament, and all the just of the Gentile nations ever possessed." And again, "From the very moment of Mary's conception, the Holy Spirit poured out on her more graces than all the most perfect and most eminent souls together ever possessed or will ever possess."

These passages are cited with approval in *Mary in Our Soul-Life* by Raoul Plus, S.J. (Translated by Sister Mary Bertille and Mary Saint Thomas, S.N.D., Pustet, 1940, pp. 150, \$1.75). The book is one of devotion but there are three points which deserve dogmatic notice. One is the contrast between Mary's motherhood of Christ, which was without pain and travail, and her motherhood of men with pain and travail; the virginity *in partu* is a contrast to the title *co-redemptrix*. Secondly, the sword of Simeon made Mary the mother of the Future Crucified One, and this idea is emphasized in the work—not without the contrast of Mary's joy, but perhaps without sufficient emphasis on the point that as she is mother of the Future Crucified, she is also mother of the Future Risen. Thirdly, the author does well to remark (from Cardinal Bérulle) upon the contrast in the Incarnation, where in the assumption by the Word human *nature* was sublimated, and in the *Fiat* of Our Lady human *personality* was raised to its most sublime heights.

A friendly critic, the Reverend Peter Resch, S.M., writes a valuable note on the article, "A Fundamental Principle in Mariology," which is completed in the present issue of THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. Father Resch says: "The footnote of the first page of the article urges me to name the work of E. Neubert, S.M., *Marie dans le dogme* (Editions Spes, Paris). It has an appendix, "Règles pour juger des privilèges de Marie," of some twenty pages, in which the basic principle is discussed."

THE SACRAMENTS

BAPTISM. THE SIGN *PSI* IN THE CONSECRATION OF BAPTISMAL WATER. An interesting account of the history of the sign *Psi* which is breathed over the baptismal water in the ceremonies of Holy Saturday is to be found in the article "Ein unverstandenes und missverdeutetes Zeichen im Ritus der Taufwasserweihe," by Joseph Braun, S.J. [*Stimmen der Zeit* 137 (April 1940) 7, 217-224]. The rite is first heard of about 800 in the French Churches; it is not noticed in the early Roman sources (Gelasian, Gregorian); by the tenth and eleventh centuries its use was widespread. The significance is not exorcistic, as is the breathing over the child in the ceremony of baptism; there is rather a reference to the breathing of Christ on the Apostles

(John 20, 22), as the words show: "Descendat in hanc plenitudinem fontis virtus Spiritus Sancti."

The early rituals say nothing of the form of the sign, but after the tenth century a figure begins to appear for the direction of the celebrant; the early figures are in the form of the Greek *Psi*; nothing is said of the significance of this letter for some two or three centuries; it is in the late middle ages that the interpretation *psyche* first appears. Attempts to link the sign with Germanic runic signs are not scholarly; neither is the sign an attempt to portray a trunk and three branches of the Tree of Life in Paradise. The best interpretation refers the sign to the Blessed Trinity under whose invocation baptism is administered. Originally the sign was made but once, the long stroke symbolizing the Divine nature and the cross-stroke making the three stems for the Persons. Now the sign is made three times.

THE BLESSED EUCHARIST. THE SACRAMENT. The third of the articles of Dom Romanos Rios on "The Liturgy and Reunion" has appeared in the *Eastern Churches Quarterly* [4 (July 1940) 3, 97-104] under the title "The Words of Consecration in the Tradition of the Eastern Churches." Liturgical history has set out two points indubitably, first, that the culminating point of the ceremonies at Holy Mass leads up to the recitation of the words of institution pronounced by Our Lord; secondly, that the use and place of the *Epiklesis* (Invocation) vary, that the Person of the Blessed Trinity who is invoked varies, and that the precise petition made varies—for the application of the fruits, and in more recent forms of the *Epiklesis*, for the change of the elements into the Body and Blood of Christ. In a word, the recital of the Dominical words is fixed; the *Epiklesis* is not.

In the Eastern Churches not in union with Rome there has been a tendency to emphasize the necessity of the *Epiklesis*, to make it, as the Russian catechism does, an essential part of the ceremony along with the words of consecration. But the oriental patristic sources emphasize the fact that the time of the transubstantiation is the moment of completion of the words of institution; further, in its early usage the *Epiklesis* precedes the Dominical words as the *Quam oblationem* of the Latin Mass.

THE BLESSED EUCHARIST. THE SACRIFICE. Notice should be taken of the valuable contribution to the popularization of the theology of Holy Mass made by Sheed & Ward in publishing the English translation of the *Mysterium Fidei* of Father de la Taille, S. J. (*The Mystery of Faith*, 1940, xviii, 255, \$3.50). The translation covers the first part of the Latin treatise which deals with the Sacrifice of Our Lord. It must have been difficult at times to render the Latin well; the translator (anonymous) is to be congratulated in offering a work which will spread knowledge of and stimulate devotion to the Holy Sacrifice in a large measure.

THE LAMB OF GOD. The words of Saint John the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God" (John 1, 29) have been interpreted by Father Lagrange, O.P. (*The Gospel of Jesus Christ*, I, 87) and by Father Prat, S.J., (*Jesus Christ, sa vie, sa doctrine, son oeuvre*, I, 174-175) as meaning *Ecce innocens Dei*. To this view Father Jouon, S.J., has opposed his interpretation, *Ecce victima Dei* in his article "L'Agneau de Dieu," in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* [67 (March 1940) 3, 318-321]. The arguments are drawn from the fact that these words are carried in the Gospel of John, and John had written the *Apocalypse* (with its references to the sacrificial lamb of God) before the composition of the Gospel; again, from the knowledge which the Baptist could have had concerning the Messiah and the references to Him in *Isaias* 53. But it may be questioned if these considerations touch the realm of reality as accurately as the historical argument as it is set forth in Prat, who remarks that *we* know very well now that the Blood of the Lamb has washed away the sins of the world, "mais il n'est pas nécessaire de prêter au Précurseur une théorie de la mort rédemptrice, à laquelle ses auditeurs n'auraient certainement rien compris."

In 1935 J. Jeremias, well known for attempts to explain Christian origins in the light of eastern religions, suggested that the "Lamb of God" in the original Aramaic expression of Saint John the Baptist was *talja delaba*. [Cf. *Zeit. Neut. Wiss.*, 34 (1935) 115]. Now *talja delaba* means both *Son* and *Lamb* of God. The Christian community many years afterwards gave the meaning *Lamb* in order to make the expression hint at the later doctrine of the redemptive sacrifice. This suggested opinion leaves the real question untouched. It is Saint John who is reporting what he heard from Saint John the Baptist, whose follower the Evangelist was; if the Evangelist wrote *Lamb*, *Lamb* it is, and the further question of the meaning of *Lamb*, *Innocent* or *Victim*, is left open.

The Eucharistic sacrament and sacrifice are dealt with in an essay which, though it does not offer the Catholic view, is a definite return to saner viewpoints and has points of interest and value for the Catholic theologian and for the apologist. In the article, "L'originalité de la pensée johannique," [*Revue de théologie et de philosophie* N.S. 28 (Sept. 1940) 116, 233-261] Philippe H. Menoud passes over the question of the Johannine authorship to discuss if the writer of the Fourth Gospel is the last witness of primitive Christianity or the first theologian of the hellenized Christianity. Directly the thesis of Albert Schweitzer is opposed in which it was stated that Saint Ignatius of Antioch introduced the element of hellenistic mysticism which is not to be found in Saint Paul, but had influence on the Johannine Gospel; this theory was put forth in the 13th chapter of *Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus* (1930), under the caption "Die Hellenisierung der Mystik Pauli

durch Ignatius und die Johannaesische Theologie." Menoud contends that Ignatius did not influence the Fourth Gospel, but that to its author may be attributed a legitimate hellenization of the genuine Christian mysticism which is found in Saint Paul. Especially in the matter of the sacrament and the sacrifice of the Eucharist the Gospel is found to be in opposition to the syncretistic spirit which pervaded hellenistic thought. The author of it insisted on the One God who was the Creator both of spirit and matter, on a Redeemer who was to save the *whole* person of man (matter and spirit), and this through a sacrifice which occurred in objective historical setting. John's hellenism is seen in his introduction of the idea of the Logos; his difference from the Synoptics is discovered (and one does not follow the writer here) in his contrast between the eschatological salvation of the Synoptics and the insistence of the present salvation of man through the "remaining" of Christ; his sharp contrast to the pagan thought in the matter of purificatory rites is seen in the absence of the magical and the merely symbolical in the treatment of the sacrament.

FORM-CRITICISM AND JOHANNINE THEOLOGY. It may be noted in passing that the destructive criticism which has done fatal harm to theology outside the Church in removing the Fourth Gospel promises to be more destructive as Form-Criticism is applied. The latest treatment from the standpoint of the *Formgeschichtliche* school to come to notice is Karl Kundsins' *Charakter und Ursprung der Johannaesischen Reden* (*Acta Univ. Latviensis* I, 4, 185-301, 1940). Here the parallels between the I-sayings (there are many in Chapter VI on the sacrament and in the Last Discourse with its several references to the sacrifice) and similar usages in Babylonian, Egyptian and Indian literature are discussed; Kundsins denies that foreign models account for the Johannine form. The best solution of the "problem" is found through an approach beginning in the *Apocalypse*. The author has felt the primitive Christian experience in which the living Christ is speaking directly to the person, and this person now speaks in the first person to the community. The discourses of the Gospel are not, therefore, those of Christ, but they are the messages of the exalted Christ as He speaks through the recipients of His revelation. This application of Form-Criticism simply offers another support for views already held, but the new prop seems to be another zero.

THE SACRIFICE OF THE CROSS. SATISFACTION. In the essay, "The Atonement, God's Act," [*The Congregational Quarterly*, 18 (April 1940), 146-155] William E. Wilson takes notice of various attempts in recent years to re-establish a doctrine of reparation. He sees in the theology of Barth and Brunner a penal substitution theory almost similar to that of the 16th and 17th centuries, in the writings of Sparrow Simpson an emphasis on the God-

ward reference of the cross, in the writings of V. Taylor an emphasis on Christ's perfect submission to God's judgment on sin. Four points are emphasized: man's terribly serious sin, his inability to save himself, Christ's mediation and God's justice. The writer admits that these four aspects are indeed to be found, not in any God-ward aspect in connection with the cross, but as a revelation of Divine love. On the cross God's atoning love is revealed and not satisfaction for sin; "we have in our Lord's death on the Cross, not an enigma which must be explained by some theory of Divine appeasement, satisfaction, or 'God-ward aspect,' but a revelation of Divine reconciling love."

The author's theory of atonement includes the emphasis of Abelard on love and the idea of recapitulation of Saint Irenaeus. In his own words: "To sum up: the Atonement, seen in the whole work of Christ from Jordan to Calvary, is a revelation that God is love, and thereby a moral appeal to men to turn to Him, and live as His children. Abelard is right. It is the entry into human life of the Son of God in order that men may become partakers of the divine nature. The main theme of recapitulation as Irenaeus taught it is right. It is redemption from the power of evil, whether that be thought of as our own sin, the general sin of mankind, or the influence of spirits of evil. Again in essentials Irenaeus is right. Its method was love to the uttermost, demonstrated by the most searching of all tests, a lonely death of ignominy and torture endured in complete faith in God and love to men. It is atonement by non-resistance." To the writer all other theories of atonement . . . "are supported by precarious inferences from passages, all of which possibly, most probably and many certainly, were never intended by their writers to have any such meaning."

Those who consult the two articles of Bishop Headlam, the Anglican Bishop of Gloucester, signed A. C. Gloucester: under the title "The Atonement—The Work of Christ," [*The Church Quarterly Review*, 130 (April-June, 1940) 1-27, and (July-September, 1940) 193-213] will find a more conservative and thorough treatment of the New Testament sources of teaching on the sacrifice of Christ. But there remains for us work to be done in putting before the modern world the scriptural proofs which lie behind the definitions of the Council of Trent. For in dealing with the effectiveness of the atonement the writer definitely sheers away from what he calls a moral or mechanical act on the part of Christ and from theories which involve any forensic or transactional explanation of the death of Christ or the sacrifice of the cross. "The death of Christ . . . was an ethical sacrifice, a voluntary offering of Himself, and therefore it made an appeal to our consciences. In this way Jesus transformed the meaning of sacrifice. Sacrifice became through him self-sacrifice, and that it means to us now" (p. 203). Again,

"I can find no support in the New Testament for any forensic or transactional explanation of the death of Christ or the sacrifice of the cross; still less an explanation of the victory over evil. These explanations arose in Christian history from the adaptation of Christian theology to the needs of the times, and an imperfect exegesis, in particular a misconception of the meaning of sacrifice. The death of Christ was not necessary to appease the wrath of an angry Father, nor to secure by some strange device a victory over Satan, nor to pay a ransom for mankind. The purpose of the death of Christ was to cleanse mankind from sin" (p. 213). Thus, while appearing to proceed cautiously Bishop Headlam in effect discounts the force of the Scriptural texts which prove that Christ satisfied for sin through a voluntary sacrifice.

MATRIMONY. HISTORY. The obscure field of the history of marriage in the patristic age is investigated in one detail in the article, "Matrimonio romano e matrimonio cristiano," by Aemilius Herman, S.J., in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, [6 (Jan.-June, 1940) 1-2, 222-229]. Historians of jurisprudence have been divided on the question of the influence of the views of the Church on the matrimonial laws of the Empire. Some have found extended Church influence; others have denied any. With respect to the codification of the Emperor Justinian, which belongs to the middle years of the sixth century, Monsignor D'Ercole has claimed recently (*Il consenso degli sposi e la perpetuità del matrimonio nel diritto romano e nei Padri della Chiesa, Rome, 1939*) that in his *Novelle* the Emperor abandoned the old concept of matrimony of the Roman law and took over the view of the Church. In the Roman law marriage was a social connection entered into and recognized by the civil power. It was not understood to be a bond, which had to originate in a free consent, and which was permanent and would perdure apart from the will of the parties.

In the view of the Roman law the two elements of marriage were the *affectio maritalis* and the *vita communis*; with the vanishing of the *affectio maritalis*, divorce became easy. The doctrine of the Church was opposed to this view and its consequences.

Father Herman does not agree that historically Justinian substituted the Christian for the Roman concept of marriage in the codification of the sixth century. But he does agree that the Emperor's tightening up of marriage laws is to be admitted, though on a very substantial point there is an ominous silence: there is not found in the *Novelle* a single word which declares that an illicit divorce is to be declared null and void; the law still provided for remarriage. It may be that the Emperor simply found it impossible to enforce the stricter demands of the Gospel in which personally he thoroughly believed; the difficulties of the times in this respect are amply proved in the writings of the Fathers.

It may not be amiss to point out that this history may throw some light on a question which is being mooted today. The recent emphasis in dealing with the ends of the sacrament upon the co-primary purpose of developing through the *vita communis* the personality of the partners is in contrast to the omission to develop this point in the early writers. May it not be that the emphasis of the Roman law on the *affectio maritalis* and *vita communis* and the possibility of divorce if the first became extinct, created a situation for the leaders of the time which accounts for their abstention from emphasizing these personal elements of the marriage state?

