

Theological Studies



ST. THOMAS' THOUGHT ON *GRATIA OPERANS*

I. INTRODUCTION

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THE differences that have been observed between St. Thomas's earlier and later expositions of *gratia operans* can hardly be understood without some prior account of the thought of his predecessors. Accordingly the present article, after an introductory note on St. Augustine's *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, turns to the work of compiling and focussing some of the results of recent research. In addition to the monographs of Dr. Schupp on the *Gnadenlehre* of Peter Lombard and of Dr. Doms on that of St. Albert the Great, there are two important series of articles: with great thoroughness Dr. Landgraf has investigated several aspects of the general movement of speculation on grace prior to Aquinas, and Dom Lottin, O.S.B., has furnished what from our point of view is a complementary study of contemporary theories of liberty. Together these labours constitute clearly enough an introduction to St. Thomas's thought on *gratia operans*, and our task will be so to exploit this wealth of information that the state of

the question when St. Thomas began to write may become apparent.¹

It may not be amiss to make plain that we are engaged not in the history of dogma but in the history of theological speculation. *Non affirmando sed coniectando* is a fairly frequent phrase in the old writers: it is a signal that they are not enunciating their faith but trying to elaborate its speculative coherence. At any time such work is difficult enough, but it was particularly so in its initial phases when essential theorems were still in process of finding formulation. Thus there is a real difference between the continuity of the history of dogma and the succession of theses and antitheses which characterize the human effort of *fides quaerens intellectum*; and precisely because there is this real difference, speculative failure is not the same as heresy: indeed, such failure was inevitable through the whole period in which theological speculation was groping through trial and error towards the discovery of its proper method and technique.

1. ST. AUGUSTINE'S DE GRATIA ET LIBERO ARBITRIO. The division of grace into operative and coöperative arose not from a detached love of systematization but to meet the exigencies of a controversy. Like more recent strategists, the Pelagians did not defend a rigidly coherent line but rather an elastic set of positions arranged in depth. They agreed with the Stoics that man asked the gods not for virtue but only for fortune: that was their citadel; their battle-front was anywhere. If grace existed, then it was not necessary. If necessary, then it was the law, or knowledge of the law, or nature, or free will, or the remission of sins. If none of these would do, then it was given man according to his merits. If forced to admit that the merit of good deeds presupposes the gift of grace, there were

¹Fr. Norbert del Prado in his three volume work, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, laid great stress on St. Thomas's idea of *gratia operans*. Fr. Lange in his treatise, *De Gratia*, objected that more probably St. Thomas attached little importance to the idea; *gratia operans* was an old term on which something had to be said; it is treated three times (2 d. 26 q. 1 a 5; *De Ver* q. 27 a. 5 ad 1m; 1a 2ae q. 111 a. 2) yet never twice in the same fashion. These variations we believe to be of the greatest interest in the history of speculation on grace.

those who would reply that the grace that causes good deeds is meted out according to the previous merit of good will.²

The last of these Pelagian evasions, based on the familiar distinction between good will and good performance, St. Augustine countered with a parallel distinction between divine operation and divine coöperation. It was a complete and perfect answer. God coöperates with good will to give it good performance; but alone he operates on bad will to make it good; so that good will itself no less than good performance is to be attributed to the divine gift of grace. To pluck out our heart of stone and substitute a heart of flesh is, indeed, a divine operation; and since our heart of stone neither desires nor deserves such a transformation, *Deus sine nobis operatur*. But when once we have willed to be good, we are not straightway saints and martyrs; we are not like St. Peter when on an inverted cross he showed that his good will had grown great and strong; we are like him when at the Last Supper he boasted his fidelity and then in the court-yard thrice denied his Lord. We have our weak and imperfect good will only to pray for strength and spiritual growth; and when in answer to our prayers God enables us to will so firmly that we do perform, *nobiscum cooperatur*. Thus God operates to initiate us in the spiritual life, and he coöperates to bring us to perfection; alone he works to give us good desires, and together with our good desires he labours to give us good performance.³

It is to be observed that this operation and coöperation is a division neither of habitual grace nor of actual grace: it is a division simply of grace. Only in the course of the thirteenth century was the idea of habitual grace firmly established,⁴ while the correlative concept of actual grace seems a corollary to

²*Etsi non datur (gratia) secundum merita bonorum operum, quia per ipsam bene operamur; tamen secundum merita bonae voluntatis datur, quia bona voluntas, inquit, praecedit orantis, quam praecessit credentis, ut secundum haec merita gratia sequatur exaudientis Dei. De Grat et Lib Arb §27 ML 44 897.* The Semi-pelagians added to the above list of alternatives the view that the *initium fidei* sometimes was due to grace and sometimes to free will.

³*loc. cit.* §§27—33 col 897—901.

⁴Contrast Clement V (DB 483) with Innocent III (DB 410).

the development of the idea of the habit.⁵ But, in any case, St. Augustine in the work we are examining does not pay the slightest attention to this future development. Grace is any gratuitous gift of God: it is a vocation to the life of the celibate⁶ or the most efficacious vocation of St. Paul;⁷ it is forgiveness, regeneration, justification,⁸ but also it is the power to avoid sins in future;⁹ it is being a child of God and, as well, it is being moved by the Spirit of God;¹⁰ it is creation in Christ Jesus in whom all things are made new¹¹ and no less is it his aid without which we can do nothing;¹² it is faith operating through charity¹³ but above all it is charity itself.¹⁴ Habitual and actual graces are not distinguished.

This fact eliminates not a little of the surprise that we experience in finding the ideas of justification and of liberation from sin in the foreground when St. Augustine attempts to reconcile divine operation and human liberty. For he has no doubt that the will is free, not only when God coöperates with its good desires, but even when he operates good will itself, when he removes the heart of stone and inserts a heart of flesh. The prophet Ezechiel recounts, indeed, the divine promise to pluck out Israel's heart of stone, but no less does he deliver the divine command that Israel harden not its heart. How, Augustine asks, can God say both *dabo vobis* and *facite vobis*? Why does he give, if man is to be the maker? Or why does he command, if he himself is to be the giver? To this the answer is the celebrated paradox. The will of man is always free but not always good: either it is free from justice, and then it is evil; or it is liberated from sin, and then it is good.¹⁵

In a sense this disjunction is a major Augustinian problem, but in a more fundamental sense it is not a problem at all.

⁵Dr. Langraf affirms that the term, *gratia actualis*, does not occur in the whole of early scholasticism and that a host of terms such as *gratia operans*, *praeveniens*, etc., uniformly refer to justification. *Die Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade in der Frühscholastik*, *Zschr kath Theol* 55 (1931) 171 ff. See below, notes 89, 90, 57.

⁶Aug. *De Grat et Lib Arb* §7 col 886.

⁷*Ibid.* §12, col. 889.

⁸*Ibid.* §§12, 13, 14, 24, col. 889, 890, 895

⁹*Ibid.* §26, col. 896, 897.

¹⁰*Ibid.* §23, col. 895.

¹¹*Ibid.* §19, col. 892.

¹²*Ibid.* §§10, 13, col. 888, 890.

¹³*Ibid.* §18, col. 892.

¹⁴*Ibid.* §§34-40, col. 902-905.

¹⁵*Ibid.* §§29-31, col. 898, 899. Ezech 11, 19, 20; 18, 31, 32; 36, 22-27.

For a problem exists only if there is an intelligibility to be discovered, and to assert a problem of interpretation here, involves the assumption that the *mens Augustini* was a speculative system on the nature of grace and liberty. Now certainly this view has no support in the work with which we are dealing, for the *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* was concerned not with speculation but with dogma. It was written because the prototypes of exaggerated Augustinianism, certain monks at Hadrumetum, so extolled the grace of God as to deny human liberty.¹⁶ It was addressed not to their understanding but to their faith; and if they failed to understand what they were to believe, they were not to dispute but to pray for light.¹⁷ The concepts employed were not the specialized products of abstract reflection but common notions to be found in Scripture and, indeed, familiar to all. There are no definitions, nor are any distinctions drawn except implicitly by the mere juxtaposition of complementary passages of Holy Writ.¹⁸ There is argument, indeed, but not philosophic argument nor any scientific ordering of thought, just triumphant rhetoric marshalling such an array of texts that the claim is obviously true, Not I, but Scripture itself has argued with you.¹⁹ The existence of human liberty is proved from revelation;²⁰ Pelagian ideas on grace are refuted in the same manner;²¹ and when the ultimate problem of reconciliation is faced, St. Augustine is fully content to exclaim *O altitudo* with St. Paul.²²

Still, despite the essentially dogmatic character of the work before us, it cannot be denied that the disjunction of freedom from justice and liberation from sin is speculative in nature and intention. However abrupt, brief and paradoxical, it does aim at explaining; and similarly, throughout Augustine's many writings on grace, there is not only positive theology but also

¹⁶Epist. 214, §1, ML 44, 875.

¹⁷*Ibid.* §7, col. 878; De Grat et Lib. Arb. §§1, 46, col. 881, 912.

¹⁸E.g. *Ibid.* §§29-31, col. 898, 899.

¹⁹. . . sic disputasse ut non magis ego quam divina ipsa Scriptura vobiscum locuta sit. . . . *Ibid.* §41, col. 905, 906.

²⁰Revelavit autem nobis per Scripturas suas sanctas esse in homine liberum voluntatis arbitrium. *Ibid.* §2, col. 882.

²¹*Ibid.* §§6-40, col. 886-905.

²²*Ibid.* §§44-45, col. 909-911.

such a penetration of thought and understanding that one must affirm the development of speculative theology already to have begun. But, while we think this to be true, we also are inclined to assert that the most legitimate commentary on this initial speculation, the commentary most free from the endless vices of anachronism, is simply the history of subsequent speculation.

2. ST. ANSELM. "Once there were proud men who placed the whole efficacy of the virtues in freedom alone; in our times there are many who utterly despair of the existence of freedom."²³ Thus St. Anselm expresses the contrast between his own day and that of St. Augustine. He was faced not with the Pelagian denial of grace, nor yet with the denial of freedom made by the simple-minded monks of Hadrumetum, but with the deeper problem of reconciliation. He felt no need to prove from Scripture either the necessity of grace or the existence of freedom, for both were taken for granted by the age of faith. But he was driven by the imperious impulse of *fides quaerens intellectum* to try and construct a mode of conception that would lend coherence to the mystery. The brilliance of his work is a monument to his genius; its almost complete unsatisfactoriness is an illuminating instance of the difficulty there was in evolving the method and technique of theological speculation.

In the synthetic sweep²⁴ of his thought the fundamental concept is rectitude. Truth is the rectitude that mind alone perceives.²⁵ Justice is rectitude of will maintained for its own sake.²⁶ Freedom is the capacity of maintaining rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude.²⁷ Grace, finally, is the cause of rectitude of will: prevenient grace is the sole cause of its emergence, and the same grace as subsequent is the main cause of its

²³*Tractatus de Concordia Praescientiae*. . . . Cap. 11, ML 158, 522.

²⁴. . . *Opus est ut tu ea quae dicam non sis contentus singula intelligere, sed omnia simul memoria quasi sub uno intuitu colligere*. *De Casu Diaboli* cap. 12, ML 158, 341.

²⁵*Rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis*. *De Veritate* cap. 11, ML 158, 480.

²⁶*Rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata*. *Ibid.* cap. 12, col. 480 ff. Cp. *De Conceptu Virginali*, cap. 4, col. 436 ss.

²⁷*Potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem*. *Dialogus de Libero Arbitrio*, cap. 3, col. 494.

preservation.²⁸ Thus, grace and freedom are the causes of justice,²⁹ and justice is the ground of salvation.³⁰

The necessity of grace is, first, a dogma to be believed but second, almost a theorem to be demonstrated. For the will can obtain rightness neither from itself nor from any other creature. Not from itself, for right acts of will are not a cause but an effect of rightness of will. Not from any other creature, for as no creature can confer salvation, so no creature can confer the ground of salvation.³¹

On the other hand, the idea of freedom is obtained not by philosophic inquiry but rather as a theological conclusion. The *Dialogus de Libero Arbitrio* begins by showing that freedom cannot be the capacity to sin or not sin, for then neither God nor the blessed would be free. It adds that the capacity to sin cannot be even a part of freedom, for sin is servitude and freedom cannot be constituted by the possibility of its opposite.³² This, as is plain, immediately creates a problem of freedom in sinful acts. With regard to the sin of the Angels and of Adam, it is maintained that they sinned not of necessity but of their own accord for they did so by a choice that was free; still it was not by the freedom of their choice that they sinned but rather by their capacity of servitude.³³ With regard to those already in the state of sin, there is no question of their doing what is right for they have lost their rectitude of will; the solution of the difficulty was to affirm that none the less they are truly free, truly able to maintain a rectitude of will they do not possess, just as a man bound and blindfold in a dungeon is truly able to see.³⁴

In this it is easy to discern a dialectical unfolding of St. Augustine's disjunction: either the will is free from justice and then it is evil, or it is liberated from sin and then it is good. Indeed, to escape this dilemma it was necessary to insert an ideal middle term between the two extremes, to place *natura pura* between *natura lapsa* and *natura elevata*, and so, with

²⁸*Concordia*, cap. 14, col. 524 ff.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Ibid.* cap. 12, col. 522, ff and *passim*.

³¹*Ibid.* See the argument in *De Casu Diaboli*, cap. 1, 12, col. 325, 341.

³²*De Lib Arb*, cap. 1, col. 489. ³³*Ibid.* cap. 2, col. 492. ³⁴*Ibid.* cap. 3, 4, col. 493 ff.

speculation released by this metaphysical perspective, study the data of psychology on freedom and the data of revelation on grace. But it is not hard to be wise after the event and, in fact, St. Anselm was prevented from adopting such a course both by the exigencies of his age and by the unsolved problem of theological method.

There were the exigencies of the age. One has only to read over the titles of Anselm's treatises and dialogues to see that his interest lay in all the profoundest problems of theology. The Trinity, the end of the Incarnation, the fall of the angels, original sin, divine foreknowledge and predestination, grace and liberty—only what is difficult seems to his taste. Yet this is not a merely personal matter, for the objective logic of development should seem to play the more fundamental role. Not only are the questions St. Anselm treated the most difficult; they also are the most obviously problems, the most apt to excite wonder and to impose the necessity of speculative thought in the medieval recreation of culture and civilization. Thus, perhaps, the real issue that he faced and settled was the most general one of all: Is speculation possible and is it worthwhile? The strong words he used to describe his contemporaries—*penitus desperant*—show that this issue was real. The exuberance of speculation in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries may be the measure of the prestige of his example and the success of his effort.

From this view-point the problem of method falls into second place, for *primum est esse*. Still, this problem is simultaneous with existence, and it must be acknowledged that St. Anselm in no way solved it. Naturally enough his canon of procedure is the Augustinian *crede ut intelligas*, a canon which, if it insists on faith, fails to point out that there are two standards for the understanding: natural truths can be reduced eventually to perfect coherence, but the truths of faith have the apex of their intelligibility hidden in the transcendence of God. Without this basic rule, defined by the Vatican Council, speculation risks perpetually a twofold error: it may reduce mystery to the level of natural truth, as did Peter Abaelard

and Gilbert de la Porrée; but it may also make the mistake of elevating natural problems to the order of mystery, and this seems to have been St. Anselm's tendency. He makes such a mystery of human liberty that, by the logic of his position, he can afford to conceive grace as the cause of a state of will and to identify this state with the justice of justification. Thus, because baptism is accompanied by no act of will in an infant, he distinguishes between justice and the remission of sins; the infant is not justified but its sins are remitted, and this, together with the justice of Christ and of the Church opens to it the gates of heaven.³⁵ The effects of this strange, explicitly speculative, position on subsequent thought have been studied by the indefatigable Dr. Landgraf.³⁶ Its cause would seem to lie in the then unformulated problem of speculative method.

3. PETER LOMBARD. Between the bold genius of St. Anselm and the timid positivism of the *Glossa ordinaria*,³⁷ the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard struck a golden mean. They cover the whole field of theology, as it then was known, not by any premature attempt at unattainable synthesis but, in the spirit of Aristotelian dialectic, by collecting, arranging and discussing scriptural texts, patristic affirmations and the more notable of contemporary opinions. Quite naturally this work, very solid and not very brilliant, became the basis of lectures in theology and, for centuries, the starting-point of speculative commentaries. It was as though the Lombard had assembled the basic data and then left it to posterity to work out their coherence.³⁸

Perhaps the best way to present the position of the *Sentences* on *gratia operans* will be to give a crude outline and then indicate the forces at work towards a transposition of the whole problem. Basically and essentially, thought is still in the An-

³⁵*De Conc. Virg.*, cap. 29, col. 462-464.

³⁶Der Gerechtigkeitsbegriff des hl. Anselm von Canterbury und seine Bedeutung für die Theologie der Frühcholastik, *Div. Thom.* Freib. 5 (1927) 155-177.

³⁷ML 113, 114. On authorship see Smalley, *Gilbertus Universalis*, Bishop of London (1128-1134), and the Problem of the "Glossa Ordinaria," *Rech. theol. anc. med.* 7 (1935) 235-262; 8 (1936) 24-60.

³⁸See Pelster, "Die Bedeutung der Sentenzenvorlesung für die theologische Spekulation des Mittelalters," *Scholastik* 2 (1927) 250-255.

selmian phase, grace and liberty are correlatives, with freedom an effect of grace and grace what makes freedom free. But while St. Anselm tried to make this coherent by force of subtlety, the Lombard innocently lays bare the incoherence and, as well, unconsciously suggests the lines along which deliverance was to be found.

Fundamental in an outline are the four states of human liberty: the earthly paradise, fallen man, man redeemed, and heaven. In the first there is no difficulty in doing good and no impulsion to evil. In the second we find the startling alternative of *posse peccare et non posse non peccare etiam damnabiliter*. In the third man can avoid mortal sin but also commit it. In the fourth confirmation in grace gives impeccability.³⁹

Grace, operative and coöperative, is defined with reference to this scheme of the states of liberty: it is what makes the difference between the second and the third, between *non posse non peccare* and *posse non peccare*, between the liberty of nature which St. Paul describes with *velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem non invenio* and, on the other hand, the liberty of grace which is efficacious and brings forth fruit in good deeds.⁴⁰

Grace is operative inasmuch as it causes this efficacious good will, making what already was a will into a good and right will.⁴¹ It is coöperative inasmuch as it aids good will to execute good intentions.⁴² But, probably enough, operative and coöperative grace are not two things but one, for grace is not inert but grows and increases.⁴³

This grace which cures and liberates man's free choice would seem to be a virtue. But whether a virtue is an internal act of the soul, as opposed to external, corporeal acts, or else some quality or form that combines with the will after the fashion that rain combines with earth and seed, is a disputed point. The testimonies of the saints can be cited for both sides.⁴⁴

³⁹d. 25 c. 5, 6 (Quaracchi 1916) p. 431. This scheme had its origin in Augustine (*De Correctione et Gratia* §§33-35, ML 44, 936 ff; *De Civitate Dei* 22, cap. 30, CSEL 40² 666f) and reached its final form in Peter Lombard (Landgraf, *Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade*, *Zschr. kath. Theol.* 55 (1931) 425.

⁴⁰d. 25, c. 9, p. 436; cp. 2 d. 26, c. 1, p. 436f.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²*Ibid.* ⁴³d. 27, c. 1, p. 444.

⁴⁴d. 27, c. 6, 12, p. 447, 451s.

Operative grace, which prevents and prepares good will, is faith with charity, justifying faith, faith in Christ.⁴⁵ Does this cause surprise? It could not surprise the Lombard's contemporaries, for they all held approximately the same view.⁴⁶ And it throws not a little light on the fact that St. Thomas always included habitual grace among operative graces.

So much for the crude outline. It now is necessary to point out other features that lead to an entirely new conception of the issue. For in the *Sentences* there is a real, though often incoherent, tendency to think of grace in terms of merit and to think of liberty in terms of nature. In other words, there is a direction of thought that only has to be pushed to its logical conclusion and the theorems regarding the supernatural will be elaborated inevitably.

Thus in the 24th distinction one finds what was termed the "theological" definition of liberty: free will is what does what is right with the aid of grace and, without grace, does evil. Of itself, the will is efficacious in evil but in good slight and inconsiderable.⁴⁷ This view fits with the distinction between *libertas naturae* and *libertas gratiae* where the former is illustrated by St. Paul's *velle adiacet mihi*.⁴⁸ It squares with the definition of operative grace as the liberation of free choice.⁴⁹ It squares with the cruel lot of fallen man, *posse peccare et non posse non peccare etiam damnabiliter*, as this is mitigated by the assertion that some good acts are possible without grace⁵⁰ and by the contradictory, though very useful, affirmation *hominem semper et peccare et non peccare posse*.⁵¹

But the Lombard also was interested in the philosophers' definition of liberty, and he makes a distinct effort to work it into his theory of grace. He accepts *liberum de voluntate iudicium*, provided this does not involve indifference to good and evil,⁵² but simply means that the will, without coercion or necessity, desires and elects what reason decides.⁵³ Again,

⁴⁵ d. 26, c. 3, p. 439.

⁴⁶ Landgraf, *Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade*, *Zschr kath. Theol.* 55 (1931) 179-181.

⁴⁷ d. 24, c. 3, p. 421. On origin of this definition, Lottin, "Les définitions du libre arbitre au XIIIe siècle," *Rev. Thom* 10 (1927) 116 ff.

⁴⁸ d. 25 c. 9, p. 435f.

⁴⁹ d. 26 c. 1, p. 436f.

⁵⁰ d. 26 c. 7, p. 443.

⁵¹ d. 29 c. 4, p. 456.

⁵² d. 25 c. 1-3, p. 428 ff.

⁵³ d. 25 c. 4, p. 431.

besides the fourfold chronological scheme of the states of liberty, he also gives the threefold analytic scheme: *libertas a necessitate* which always exists; *libertas a peccato* which in our present state presupposes grace; and *libertas a miseria* which is the harmony of the earthly paradise and still more of heaven.⁵⁴ Finally, there is an attempt to distinguish between *naturalia* and *gratuita*.⁵⁵ Still one must not leap to conclusions, for all this represents no more than an effort, a direction. Ultimately, a very real antinomy remains.

Yet even this antinomy is not without its promise of solution. If in the fundamental passages grace is what frees free will, at least twice in meeting difficulties the Lombard has recourse to another function of grace, namely, as the ground of merit with respect to eternal life. Thus, against the position that prevenient grace is justifying faith, he objects that *bona cogitatio praecedit fidem* and consequently that good will precedes prevenient grace. His answer is that such a *bona cogitatio* does indeed precede but does not suffice for salvation since it does not spring from the virtue *qua recte vivitur*.⁵⁶ Later he affirms that there are many good acts prior to prevenient or operative grace, and that these acts are due either to grace and free choice or even to free choice alone; but by them man merits neither justification nor eternal life.⁵⁷ However, one must not suppose that the Lombard generalizes the significance of merit, for with regard to Adam's position his thought is most anomalous. In virtue of creation Adam had *posse stare* but needed grace for *posse proficere*; he could resist temptation without grace but he could not merit eternal life.⁵⁸ This is perfectly sound, but to the objection that resistance to temptation is meritorious, the Lombard answers not in terms of the gratuitous character of merit but that the merit of resistance is proportionate to the difficulty; in Eden there was no difficulty.⁵⁹

⁵⁴d. 25 c. 8, p. 432 ff.

⁵⁵d. 25 c. 7, p. 432.

⁵⁶d. 26 c. 4-5, p. 441f.

⁵⁷d. 26 c. 7, p. 443.

⁵⁸For contemporary opinions, Landgraf, "Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade," Zschr. kath. Theol. 55 (1931) 403-422.

⁵⁹d. 24 c. 1, p. 419f.

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that though the Anselmian position had not been transcended, still there were forces at work making for a vast development.

4. THE TRANSITION. Between Peter Lombard and St. Albert the Great there emerged the idea of the supernatural habit.⁶⁰ It is necessary to illustrate the precise nature of this *emergence*.

Everyone is familiar with the common notion of *going faster*. Few understand what you mean when you explain that an acceleration is the second derivative of a continuous function of distance and time. To apprehend *going faster* one has only to drop from a sufficient height. To apprehend *acceleration* one has to master the somewhat difficult notions underlying the differential calculus. Both *going faster* and *acceleration* apprehend the same fact, but the former merely apprehends, while the latter adds to apprehension acts of analysis and generalization, of deduction and systematic correlation. For *acceleration* is *going faster*, but analysed as d^2s/dt^2 , generalized to include *going slower*, enriched with all the implications of the second derivative of a function, and given a significant place in systematic thought on quantitative motion.

Now in the writings of St. Albert or St. Thomas, the *supernatural* is a scientific theorem: it has an exact philosophic definition; its implications are worked out and faced; and this set of abstract correlations gives the mere apprehension a significant, indeed a fundamental, position in an explanatory account of the nature of grace. But just as one can apprehend *going faster* without understanding the calculus, so also the theologians of the twelfth century and earlier could apprehend globally the supernatural character of grace without suspecting the theorem that regards the relations of grace and nature. Thus, from the writings of Peter Lombard Dr. Schupp has been able to list nineteen different expressions referring to the

⁶⁰St. Albert conceived *gratia operans* as the *forma gratiae* in the will, *gratia cooperans* as the *forma meriti* in the free act. In 2 d. 26 a. 6. Not only is this line of thought quite unknown to the Lombard, but also the Lombard's seems to have been extremely mystifying to St. Albert; see, for instance, his discussion of the Lombard's view that merit presupposes difficulty, in 2 d. 24 a. 4.

supernatural,⁶¹ while the masterly articles of Dr. Landgraf, *Studien zur Erkenntnis des Uebernatürlichen in der Frühscholastik*, bear witness to the fact that the idea seems in many writers to be just around the corner.⁶²

Accordingly, the development with which we are concerned was not dogmatic but speculative, and our immediate point will be to illustrate the magnitude of the release which formulation of the theorem effected. In the first place, then, without the idea of the supernatural there can be no satisfactory definition of grace. The dogmatic issue is indeed secure, and all repeated that grace was God's free gift beyond all desert of man. But the difficulty was to explain why everything was not grace; after all, what is there that is not a free gift of God? This question more than puzzled Cardinal Laborans who, defining grace in the strict sense, *veri nominis*, affirmed it to include everything man either has at birth or receives after birth. Feeling that this definition did not square with common notions, he next attempted to indicate two narrower senses of the term; yet even in this he was scarcely more fortunate, for he took grace to mean more specifically everything that the elect have at birth or receive afterwards, and, still more specifically, the virtues of the elect.⁶³

This difficulty with the idea of grace naturally involves an even greater difficulty with the distinction between *naturalia* and *gratuita*. The distinction was a commonplace, but what could it mean? An extreme position was taken by Radulphus Ardens when he affirmed that before the fall all the virtues were natural but now, because of the fall, they are gratuitous.⁶⁴ A more common tendency was to depress nature: Peter Abaelard asserted the disjunction between charity and cupidity and St. Bernard of Clairvaux added that nature in itself was crooked;⁶⁵ even as late as the beginning of the thirteenth century a writer can be found to maintain that without divine charity there can be no virtues at all.⁶⁶

⁶¹Schupp, *Die Gnadenehre des Petrus Lombardus* (Freiburg i Br. 1932) p. 20f.

⁶²*Scholastik* 4 (1929) 1—37, 189-220, 352-389.

⁶³*Ibid.* p. 20f. ⁶⁴*Ibid.* p. 212. ⁶⁵*Ibid.* p. 195, 374; see whole section 353-389.

⁶⁶*Ibid.* p. 191.

Again, the doctrine of merit tended to hang in mid air. It followed that the need of grace in the angels and in our first parents was accompanied with endless difficulties.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the need of grace in fallen man was regarded, in the main, as a need of liberating liberty: sin darkened the understanding and weakened the will; grace illuminated the understanding and strengthened the will.⁶⁸ This psychological conception resulted in difficulties, already observed in Peter Lombard, both with regard to habitual grace and with regard to liberty, and it is not too surprising to find Petrus Pictaviensis, a pupil of the Lombard, explicitly distinguishing the theologians' and the philosophers' definitions of liberty.⁶⁹

But, with the thirteenth century, the dawn. Stephen Langton noted the connection between *gratuitum* and *meritum* to give significance to *gratum faciens*.⁷⁰ Praepositinus placed the distinction between *gratuita* and *naturalia* on a solid basis by pointing out that reason is the highest thing in nature, yet faith is above reason.⁷¹ The final steps were taken by Philip, Chancellor of the University of Paris from 1218 to 1230. Against St. Bernard and Hugh of St. Victor,⁷² he reaffirmed William of Auxerre's affirmation of a natural *amor amicitiae erga Deum* quite distinct from charity, the meritorious love of God. He then presented the theory of two orders, entitatively disproportionate: not only was there the familiar series of grace, faith, charity and merit, but also nature, reason and the natural love of God.⁷³

We have already suggested that the best commentary on Augustine's speculation lies in the subsequent speculative movement. Now the twelfth century theologians were steeped in Augustine, yet their unceasing efforts with a material, which must have seemed hopelessly refractory, terminated in the idea of the supernatural. The anachronistic thinkers of a much later age attempted to reverse that decision, but it is difficult to es-

⁶⁷"Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade," *Zschr. kath. Theol.* 55 (1931) 58.

⁶⁸"Die Erkenntnis der heiligmachende Gnade in der Frühscholastik," *Scholastik* 3 (1928) 27-38.

⁶⁹Lottin, "Les définitions du libre arbitre," *Rev. Thom.* 10 (1927) 224 n. 4.

⁷⁰Landgraf, *Erkenntnis des Uebernatürlichen*, *loc. cit.* p. 219.

⁷¹*Ibid.* p. 214.

⁷²*Ibid.* p. 374, 377.

⁷³*Ibid.* p. 381-384.

teem them without being completely ignorant of the evolution of medieval thought. Especially is this so when one succeeds in grasping that the idea of the supernatural is a theorem, that it no more adds to the data of the problem than the Lorentz transformation puts a new constellation in the heavens. What Philip the Chancellor systematically posited was not the supernatural character of grace, for that was already known and acknowledged, but the validity of a line of reference termed nature. In the long term and in the concrete the real alternatives remain charity and cupidity, the elect and the *massa damnata*. But the whole problem lies in the abstract, in human thinking: the fallacy in early thought had been an unconscious confusion of the metaphysical abstraction, nature, with concrete data which do not quite correspond; Philip's achievement was the creation of a mental perspective, the introduction of a set of coordinates, that eliminated the basic fallacy and its attendant host of anomalies.

Still this assertion of dogmatic continuity must not obscure the existence of a "Copernican revolution" in theory: the centre of the whole issue shifted violently; certain developments were released at once; others followed in a series of intervals, change implying further change, till the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas mastered the situation. It is necessary to grasp the logic of this movement if St. Thomas's thought is to be understood.

Philip himself presented the idea of sanctifying grace. The idea of the divine virtues, *quibus recte vivitur*, was a commonplace out of Augustine, but it was difficult to define their quality of *divine* as long as men doubted with the Lombard⁷⁴ whether a virtue was a qualitative form or an internal act. Further, there was the concrete question of the effect of infant baptism. In this matter many followed St. Anselm and affirmed that the Holy Spirit is given in two manners: to infants by the remission of sins; to adults by the bestowal of the virtues.⁷⁵ This view, given priority of place in a Brief of Innocent III,⁷⁶ rested both on the difficulty of conceiving justifying faith as

⁷⁴2 d. 27 c. 6, 12, p. 447, 451f.

⁷⁵Landgraf, *Die heiligmachende Gnade*, loc. cit. p. 46.

⁷⁶Ad maiores Ecclesiae causas, 1201 A. D., See DB 410.

anything but an act⁷⁷ and on the tendency to conceive grace as a psychological liberation of the will.⁷⁸ However, the study of Aristotle, the reaction against the obviously heretical demand of Waldenses and Cathari for the rebaptism of those baptized in infancy, and finally the shift in the theory of grace, enabled Philip to make a closer study of the doctrine of our life in Christ. The result was a fourfold distinction: *vivificari* or sanctifying grace; *illuminari* or faith; *uniri* or charity; *rectificari* or justice.⁷⁹ This position spread rapidly, was profoundly developed by St. Albert,⁸⁰ and as the more probable view received approbation from the Council of Vienne.⁸¹

The development of the theory of liberty is more obscure. In strict logic there could hardly be any theory of liberty as long as grace was conceived psychologically to the practical neglect of the idea of merit. But strict logic does not rule even the exercise of thought, and it is easy enough to justify an investigation in which one is interested by making a distinction to which one is not entitled. By and large, however, it should seem that the theorem of the supernatural did release speculation on the nature of liberty. Dom Lottin, who has studied the period in all its arid detail, speaks of the twelfth century writers as defining liberty,⁸² of the first third of the thirteenth as evolving theories,⁸³ and of the period subsequent to Philip as writing treatises.⁸⁴ He credits Philip with putting the questions that were discussed by Alexander of Hales, Odo Rigaldi, St. Albert and St. Bonaventure, and to the latter galaxy he attributes the initial stages of a philosophic doctrine of freedom.⁸⁵

⁷⁷Landgraf, *Gerechtigkeitsbegriff*, loc. cit. p. 169; also Grundlagen für ein Verständnis der Busslehre der Früh- und Hochscholastik, *Zschr. kath. Theol.* 51 (1927) 186.

⁷⁸*Die heiligmachende Gnade*, loc. cit. p. 31-38.

⁷⁹*Ibid.* p. 42, 56-62, 64.

⁸⁰Doms, *Die Gnadlehre des sel. Albertus Magnus*, cap. 1-9 (Breslau 1929)

⁸¹DB 483.

⁸²Lottin, "Les définitions du libre arbitre au XIIIe siècle," *Rev. Thom.* 10 (1927) 104-120, 214-230.

⁸³Lottin, "La théorie du libre arbitre pendant le premier tiers du XIIIe siècle," *Ibid.* 350-382.

⁸⁴Lottin, "Le traité du libre arbitre depuis le chancelier Philippe jusqu'à S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Ibid.* 446-472, 12 (1929) 234-269.

⁸⁵*Ibid.* 12 (1929) 266f.

A more complex movement results from the theorem of the supernatural displacing the fourfold scheme of the states of human liberty. In the early period the necessity of grace was in terms of the liberation of liberty; but the new analysis explains this necessity in terms of human finality, so that one cannot be surprised to find in the *Commentaries on the Sentences* of St. Albert and of St. Thomas a vigorous rejection of *non posse non peccare* both in the name of the supernatural and in the name of a coherent idea of freedom.⁸⁶ Still this is only the first phase of the movement. The dogmatic data force a revision of the solution: the old *non posse non peccare*, which had been a line of reference for the whole of grace, returns in its proper perspective as the moral impotence of the sinner;⁸⁷ and the scheme of the states of liberty reappears in the transposed form of the states of human nature.⁸⁸

Finally, superposed on this complexity, comes the whole question of actual grace.⁸⁹ As long as grace was simply grace, it was possible to say that grace is one or many or the equivalent many of an increasing one. But the elaboration of the idea of sanctifying grace, which seems to have absorbed most of St. Albert's attention,⁹⁰ was not without a strange influence on wider aspects of the issue. Thus in both the *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *De Veritate* St. Thomas asked: Is there but one grace in each individual? In the earlier work⁹¹ only the number of habitual graces seems to be considered. In the later⁹² the question really is whether there are graces that are not habitual; indeed one may even discern an attempt to formulate the difference between general providence and such non-habitual graces.⁹³

⁸⁶St. Albert, *Summa de Creaturis* 2a q. 70 a. 5; *Commentum super Sententias* 2 d. 25 a. 6. St. Thomas, *Commentum* 2 d. 28 q. 1 a. 2.

⁸⁷St. Albert, *Summa Theologica* 2a q. 100 mem. 2-4. St. Thomas, *De Veritate* q. 24 a. 12.

⁸⁸St. Thomas, *Summa* 1a 2ae q. 109.

⁸⁹See Lange's chapter on *Praeparatio ad gratiam* in his *De Gratia* (Freiburg i Br. 1929); Landgraf, "Die Vorbereitung auf die Rechtfertigung und die Eingiessung der heiligmachenden Gnade in der Frühscholastik," *Scholastik* 6 (1931) 42-62, 222-247, 354-380, 481-504; Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade in der Frühscholastik," *Zschr. kath. Theol.* 55 (1931) 177-238, 403-437, 562-591.

⁹⁰See Doms, *Die Gnadenlehre des sel. Albertus*, p. 163-168.

⁹¹St. Thomas, 2 d. 26 q. 1 a. 6.

⁹²De Ver q. 27 a. 5.

⁹³*Ibid.*, q. 27 a. 5; q. 24 a. 14 15. Cp. 1a 2ae q. 109.

5. CONCLUSION. Since any further examination of St. Thomas's thought lies outside the scope of an introduction, we may at once conclude. The pivotal moment in the history of *gratia operans* was Philip the Chancellor's formulation of the idea of the supernatural habit. Earlier writers did not possess the distinctions necessary to treat satisfactorily the problem whose existence St. Augustine had established. On the other hand, the transposition of the issue effected by Philip only gradually worked towards a new synthesis and the period of transition, with all its fluidity, was still dominant when Aquinas came on the scene. Accordingly there is a notable antecedent probability that in the development of St. Thomas's thought on grace⁹⁴ great importance is to be attached to variations in his treatment of *gratia operans*.⁹⁵

II. THE GENERAL MOVEMENT OF AQUINAS' THOUGHT

Philip the Chancellor's formulation of the supernatural habit resolved justification into a twofold operation: as supernatural, grace effected the meritoriousness of human acts, elevating them above the merely human level; as a habit or virtue, grace operated psychologically, effecting the moral goodness of the will. This line of thought dominates in the three great *Commentaries on the Sentences*, St. Albert's, St. Bonaventure's and St. Thomas's.

Next, Peter Lombard's error in identifying *gratia operans* with *gratia cooperans* was discovered. It had passed unperceived in the midst of the labour of developing the idea of the supernatural. But St. Thomas in his *De Veritate* came face to face with the fact that St. Augustine was speaking of two graces, one that initiates us in the spiritual life by giving good will, another that enables us to translate our good intentions

⁹⁴The existence of some development in St. Thomas's thought on grace has, perhaps, always been known: Capreolus 2 d. 28 q. 1 a. 3 § 4 *in fine*; Did. Deza Hispalensis 2 d. 28 q. 1 a. 3 not. 1 *in fine*; Caietanus 1a 2ae q. 109 a. 109 a. 6; Dominicus Soto, *De natura et gratia lib. 2 cap. 3*.

⁹⁵See 2 d. 26 q. 1 a. 6 ad 2m; *Ibid.* a. 5; *De Ver* q. 27, a. 5 ad 1m; 1a 2ae q. 111 a.2.

into good performance. This forced a broadening of the category, *gratia gratum faciens*, and stimulated attention to what we term actual grace.

Finally, this attention brought to light another datum. Grace is needed not only after justification that we may persevere; it is also needed before justification that we may prepare for it. That this earlier grace must be internal, a divine operation within the will, was first formulated in St. Thomas's *Quodlibetum Primum*. Clearly, it gives an actual grace that is *operans* to combine with the *De Veritate's* actual grace that is *cooperans*. Thus we find in the *Summa* the first expression of his final position: grace is divided into habitual and actual; each is subdivided into operative and coöperative.

Our purpose is to present this general movement of thought, to set forth a series of different positions, to provide a sketch of broad contours under six headings.

1. THE UNITY OF GRATIA GRATUM FACIENS. Sanctifying grace, the principle of transcendental value that consistently had slipped through the fingers of earlier analysis, became an accepted and established notion in the first half of the thirteenth century. As usual, however, this general agreement only covered over a number of subsidiary issues on which unanimity was not obtained. Was sanctifying grace to be identified with the infused virtues? If distinct, was it radicated in the substance of the soul or in its faculties? In either case, was it to be conceived as some single grace or as a common property of many graces? Of these questions, the most fundamental was the last. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we outline how it was treated in St. Bonaventure's *Commentary*⁹⁶ and in St. Thomas's,⁹⁷ for such an outline will explain how the unity of sanctifying grace obscured the multiplicity of divine operation and divine coöperation.

⁹⁶R. P. Mandonnet has affirmed that St. Bonaventure was a *baccalaureus sententiarum* in the years 1250-1252. *Bull. Thom.* (1926) 96.

⁹⁷Commonly attributed to 1254-1256. On the subject of grace I have not come across any internal evidence that would imply a revision of St. Thomas's *Sentences* subsequent to the *De Veritate*. On this question, see A. Hayen's article in *Rech. theol. anc. med.* 9 (1937) 219-236.

St. Bonaventure had no doubt that sanctifying grace was one. Grace was God's image in the soul: an image of the One must be one. It was the life of the soul: one living being has only one life. It was the principle of merit and divine acceptance: but God either accepts or rejects. It was the seed of eternal glory: but one fruit springs from a single seed.⁹⁸ Accordingly, when we read in the *Glossæ* that a single grace does not suffice for sanctity, that there is a prevenient grace giving love and knowledge of God and then a subsequent grace preserving us in purity, this cannot mean that there are many sanctifying graces. It can only mean that one sanctifying grace has many effects.⁹⁹

Now, this one grace is, as it were, located in the faculties of the soul and not in its substance; not only does reason lead to this conclusion but also the authority of St. Augustine. For did he not say that grace is to free choice as the rider to the horse? and is not his whole account of divine operation in terms of good will?¹⁰⁰ On the other hand though, in the faculties, sanctifying grace is not to be identified with the virtues. For then either of two errors follows: one mortal sin completely destroys all the virtues; or else one mortal sin does not completely destroy sanctifying grace.¹⁰¹ Hence grace and the virtues must be distinct as are light and colour. Without light colour is invisible; yet one light illuminates all colours. Similarly sanctifying grace is distinct from the virtues yet one grace informs them all.¹⁰²

It is in terms of this discussion that St. Thomas asked, *Utrum gratia sit multiplex in anima?*¹⁰³ He points out that if grace is identified with the virtues, there must be many graces really distinct. Next he denies the utility of any analogy from light and colour: one light informs many colours only in so far as the many colours are on a single continuous surface; but the virtues are in different faculties and grace, informing these many subjects, necessarily becomes many. Further he rejects

⁹⁸ d. 27 a. 1 q. 1, *Vives* 3, 266 ff. ⁹⁹*Ibid.* ad 1 m. ¹⁰⁰ d. 26 a. 1 q. 5, *Viv.* 253.

¹⁰¹ d. 27 a. 1 q. 2, *Viv.* 269. Note that the argument would not hold against the Scotist identification of grace with charity.

¹⁰² d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, *Viv.* 269. ¹⁰³ 2 d. 26, q. 1, a. 6.

a similar view based on the analogy of light: grace is one at its source and centre in the substance of the soul, but its many rays inform the different virtues. Finally he gives the opinion he favours: grace and the virtues are essentially distinct; the virtues are said to be informed by grace not because grace is in them but it is their origin; accordingly grace is one.

As to the objection, grace must be many, for it is both preventive and subsequent, St. Thomas gives the same solution as had St. Bonaventure. One and the same grace is preventive and subsequent, operative and coöperative. The differences implicit in these distinctions are not the differences of many graces but of the many effects of one grace.¹⁰⁴

2. THE AMBIGUITIES OF GRATIA GRATIS DATA. In St. Thomas's *Summa* and ever since it was written, *gratia gratis data* has denoted graces of public utility such as inspiration and thaumaturgy. On the other hand, in Peter Lombard's *Sentences* it denoted the grace of justification and stood in opposition to *gratia gratis dans*, the uncreated grace that is God himself.¹⁰⁵ But between these two periods of definite meaning there was a time when *gratia gratis data* was more a sweeping gesture than an exact concept, more a catalogue than a category; *gratia gratum faciens* came to denote the essential feature of justification and the other term was left with a roving commission. This ambiguity naturally conspired with the problems outlined above to conceal the real difference between operative and coöperative graces.

Thus Dr. Doms has drawn up a list of eight senses of *gratia gratis data* in the writings of St. Albert the Great. 1. Rational nature and its faculties. 2. Natural moral goodness. 3. Adam's praeternatural gifts before the fall. 4. Unformed habits, servile fear, imperfect movements towards salvation. 5. Inspiration, miracles, and the like. 6. The assistance of the angels. 7. The indelible character received in baptism, confirmation and orders. 8. The divine activity which not only conserves in being and moves to action but also conserves in goodness and moves to good action.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.* ad 2 m. ¹⁰⁵ d. 27, c. 7, Quaracchi 1, 448.

¹⁰⁶Doms, *Die Gnadenlehre des sel. Albertus Magnus*, pp. 167-168.

St. Bonaventure's *Commentary* marks an advance, for *gratia gratis data* is clearly distinguished both from human nature¹⁰⁷ and from general concursus.¹⁰⁸ Still the latter categories are understood in quite a narrow sense, and so great is the field left for *gratia gratis data* that St. Bonaventure himself finds it hard to suppose that any adult is ever without it.¹⁰⁹ Not only does it include the gifts of the Spirit enumerated by St. Paul,¹¹⁰ but also anything whatever that may be conceived as added to nature: it may be like a habit as servile fear or an inborn tendency to piety; or it may be actual as any appeal or speech by which God awakens the soul of man.¹¹¹

In his *Commentary* and up to the twenty-seventh question of the *De Veritate* St. Thomas never seems to presuppose that any definite meaning can be assigned to *gratia gratis data*. Whenever the matter comes up, alternative possible meanings are discussed. However it is clear that the alternatives cover a wide field: he attributes the conversion that prepares for justification to any occasion, an admonishing voice, loss of health, or anything of the sort;¹¹² he goes so far as to insist that the light which shone round St. Paul on the way to Damascus was a corporeal and external, not an internal, light.¹¹³

¹⁰⁷He writes for instance: *Accipitur enim gratia uno modo largissime, et sic comprehendit dona naturalia et dona gratuita. . . . Alio modo accipitur gratia minus communiter, et sic comprehendit gratiam gratis datam et gratum facientem. . . .* 2 d. 27, dub. 1, Viv. 3, 262.

¹⁰⁸See for instance: 2 d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6m, *Ibid.* ad 5m, Viv. 493; 2 d. 28, a. 2, q. 3, Viv. 302.

¹⁰⁹*Sine hac quidem gratia gratis data vix aut numquam aliquis, habens usum liberi arbitrii, reperitur.* 2 d. 28, a. 2, q. 1 conc., Viv. 295. ¹¹⁰1 Cor. 12, 8.

¹¹¹. . . *vocatur hic gratia gratis data, quidquid illud sit, quod superadditum est naturalibus, adiuvans aliquo modo et praeprans voluntatem ad habitum vel usum gratiae, sive illud gratis datum sit habitus, sicut timor servilis, vel pietas aliquorum visceribus inserta ab infantia, sive sit etiam aliquis actus, sicut aliqua vocatio, vel locutio, qua Deus excitat animam hominis, ut se praepraret. . . .* 2 d. 28 a. 2 q. 1 conc., Viv. 295. On the whole question, see Mitzka, "Die Lehre der hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachende Gnade," *Zeit kath. Theol.* 50 (1926) 27-72, 220-252.

¹¹²2 d. 28 q. 1 a. 4 corp. Fr. Stuffer has discussed the point in an article, "Die entfernte Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachende Gnade nach den hl. Thomas von Aquin," *Zeit kath. Theol.* 47 (1923) 1-23, 161-184. For lists of discussions of Fr. Stuffer, see *Bulletin Thomiste* (1924) 217 f., (1926) 188 f. Interesting because independent are: De Vooght, "A propos de la grâce actuelle dans la théologie de S. Thomas," *Div. Thom. (Plac.)* 5 (1928) 386-416; and E. Neveut's many articles in *Div. Thom. (Plac.)* 30 (1927)

So much for the fact of an ambiguous *gratia gratis data*. As is apparent, the whole treatise on grace was in process of formation. In consequence of this fluidity, of the unity of *gratia gratum faciens* and the ambiguities of *gratia gratis data*, we shall find that in their *Commentaries on the Sentences* St. Albert, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas conceive operative grace to denote the habitual graces infused at the instant of justification.

3. GRATIA OPERANS IN THE THREE GREAT COMMENTARIES.

According to St. Albert's *Commentary* operative grace is what makes meritorious action possible.¹¹⁴ This operation is not efficient but formal causality, for its effect is not something distinct from grace but rather the diffusion of grace itself by the activity known as information.¹¹⁵ As operative grace gives the possibility of merit, so coöperative grace makes good acts actually meritorious: the meritorious act is conceived as a compound of matter and form, with the matter proceeding from free will and the form of merit coming from grace.¹¹⁶

123-126; 31 (1928) 213-230, 362-385; 32 (1929) 15-42, 357-382, 459-463, 537-562. A radical criticism of all this discussion is that it makes no pretence to historical perspective. If anything is evident, it is the fundamental necessity of such perspective.

¹¹² d. 28 q. 1 a. 4 ad 3m.

¹¹⁴ . . . *gratia praeueniens est quae omne nostrum meritum praeuenit, et haec est quae operatur bonum esse in voluntate per informationem voluntatis; oportet enim voluntatem habitualement esse informatam gratia, antequam bonus actus meritorius eliciatur ex illa. . . .* 2 d. 26 a. 6.

¹¹⁵ St. Albert asks what does operative grace operate: it cannot produce itself; there is no use saying it produces the will which already exists; and if you suggest that it produces the goodness of the will, that only means that it informs the will, produces itself in the will. He answers as follows: *Dicendum ad primum quod operans dicitur quia operatur esse bonum in voluntate, et dicitur operari sicut forma facit esse, non sicut efficiens. Hoc autem facere quod est formae non est nisi diffusio sui in formato. Et ideo bene concedo quod forma absolute accepta, actu formae non efficientis, facit se in formato. Nihil facit se secundum eandem considerationem acceptum: sed quia forma non proprie facit sed dat, et suum dare est diffusio sui et informatio, ideo forma dat esse quod est actus illius formae, et operatur, et hoc (quod operatur) est esse suum in formato. Primae autem objectiones procedebant quasi gratia esset operans per modum efficientis et non formae.* 2 d. 26 a. 7. Cp. S. Thomas 2 d. 26 q. 1 a. 5 ad 2m, 1a 2ae q. 111 a. 2 ad 1m.

¹¹⁶ *Subsequens autem invenitur primo in ea (voluntate) quae meretur, quia habitum immediate sequitur actus: et ideo dicitur cooperans quia libero arbitrio [liberum arbitrium?] in merito ministrat materiam actus, sed formam per quam est efficacia meriti dat gratia quae est in anima et libero arbitrio. . . .* 2 d. 26 a. 6. Cp. S. Thomas 2 d. 26. q. 1 a. 5 ad 4m

In this coöperation the respective provinces of the two factors are so beautifully demarcated that a problem of grace and freedom does not arise. This remains true, even though free choice is the subordinate member of the partnership, as long as this subordination has no other basis than the fact of matter's dependence on form.¹¹⁷ However St. Albert recognizes another ground of subordination, and this, though not analyzed as *operans* and *coöperans*, is in terms of efficient causality. Grace, he asserts, rules free will to make free will like an obedient beast.¹¹⁸ It is a *primum movens*, an habitual form that causes motion as do natural forms of weight and the like.¹¹⁹ Finally, as Scotus was later to maintain, this influence transcends the the division of motions into natural and violent: the habitual form in question is a *habitus voluntarius*, an inclination or spontaneity within the will itself.¹²⁰

In St. Bonaventure's *Commentary* the same ideas recur in a somewhat broader setting and with grace as an efficient cause receiving more attention. Six senses are assigned the couplet *praeveniens et subsequens*; they arise from the different meanings assigned the terms, grace, and from the different effects of grace; the list reveals the fluid state of thought at the time; it contains elements we shall meet again in St. Thomas.

Grace, then, may mean every gift from God: in this sense St. Gregory in his *Moralia* makes natural gifts prevenient and gratuitous gifts subsequent. It may be restricted to *gratia gratis data* and *gratia gratum faciens*: then the former is pre-

¹¹⁷See the second of the three reasons in note 119 below.

¹¹⁸See the third of the three reasons in note 119 below.

¹¹⁹. . . et bene concedo quod liberum arbitrium est secundarium in illo opere tribus de causis: quarum una est, quia gratia est primum movens, sicut habitus movet in modum inclinantis naturae ad impetum actus alicuius, ut grave declinat deorsum; secunda est, quia ipsa non dat proprietatem sive accidentalem formam, sed formam substantialem meriti, a qua est tota efficacia meriti, ita ut actus sine forma illa non est meritorius nec valeret vitam aeternam; tertia causa est quam tangit Augustinus, quia regit liberum arbitrium, et liberum arbitrium est ut iumentum obediens. 2 d. 26, a. 7.

¹²⁰Si dicas quod gratia movet et excitat liberum arbitrium ad agendum, et ideo est principalior: tunc quaeritur, utrum moveat naturaliter vel violenter. Dicendum quod nulla est divisio, quia voluntarius motus nec naturalis nec violentus est, et ipsa gratia movet ut perfectio naturae. Sed verum est quod movet in modum naturae, sicut dicit Tullius de virtute. Tamen est habitus voluntarius: et ideo in talibus nati sumus suscipere (perfectionem?); et perfectio est ab assuetudine in virtute civili; sed in gratia perfectio est ab infusore gratiae. 2 d. 27 a. 7.

venient and the latter subsequent. Again, it may be confined to sanctifying grace, which is prevenient, and eternal glory, which is subsequent. However, in the strict sense, grace is sanctifying grace, *gratia gratum faciens*, and this is divided into prevenient and subsequent according to its different effects. Thus, it overcomes evil and makes for good: so we read *gratia praeveniens hominis voluntatem liberat et praeeparat, subsequens vero in quantum eadem adiuvat*. Next, it makes for good in two ways, as a principle of information and as a principle of motion: hence *gratia praeveniens praevenit voluntatem ut sanemur, et subsequitur ut sanati vegetemur*.¹²¹ Finally, as a principle of motion, it both initiates us in good will and makes good will effective: accordingly *gratia praevenit voluntatem ut velit, et subsequitur ne frustra velit*.¹²²

To the last form of the distinction St. Bonaventure devotes a special question, *An gratia comparetur ad animam in ratione motoris?* Though by grace is meant sanctifying grace, still there is no difficulty in establishing an affirmative answer; as the reader may suspect, the secret of this facility is that he neglects to consider actual grace; all dogmatic sources on grace are assumed to refer to habitual grace.¹²³ The difficulty for St. Bonaventure was to explain how grace, an accident in the potencies, can be conceived as moving its own subjects. Two solutions were known and both are accepted, the one to account for operative, the other for coöperative grace.

The first solution we have already seen indicated in St. Albert. Grace moves after the fashion of a disposition or tendency. Just as weight disposes corporeal objects to their motions, so grace is a spiritual weight pulling the soul towards God. More precisely, free choice is self-moving, both mover and moved; grace acts upon it as mover, making it move itself the more excellently. This solution regards grace as coöperating with free will.

The second solution points out that one must take into con-

¹²¹Observe that the Augustinian *gratia sanans* is interpreted as a *gratia elevans*. The same procedure is to be found in S. Thomas 2 d. 26, q. 1 a. 5 corp.

¹²²2 d. 27 dub. 1, Viv. 263.

¹²³2 d. 26 a. 1 q. 6, Viv. 254.

sideration not only the subject in which an accident inheres but also the subject by which it is produced. Thus light is not only an accident inhering in the air but also an operation of the sun upon the air. Similarly grace is not only an accident in the will coöperating with the will; it also is an operation which God effects upon the will. In this sense grace is operative, and it prevents free choice.¹²⁴

This brief indication of the positions of St. Albert and St. Bonaventure naturally lead to the position of St. Thomas who combines the former's insistence on the principle of information with the latter's on the principle of motion in his article, *Utrum gratia dividatur convenienter in gratiam operantem et cooperantem*.¹²⁵ In the context grace uniformly means sanctifying grace.¹²⁶ The response to the article may be paraphrased as follows:

Grace produces in us a number of effects which follow one upon the other. First it gives a participation of divine reality; second it causes the meritoriousness of our acts; third there is the reward of merit, eternal life, which is the final effect of grace. Again one human act follows on another: first there is the internal operation of the will; second there is external action which is a complement to willing.

Now these sequences seem to be the reason why St. Augustine gives various meanings to the terms, *prevenient* and *subsequent*. Thus the sequence of merit and reward leads him to name the principle of merit a *prevenient* grace and eternal glory a *subsequent* grace: *gratia praevenit ut pie vivamus et subsequitur ut semper cum illo vivamus; et nunc praevenit ut vocemur, et tunc subsequitur ut glorificemur*.

Again the sequence of internal and external acts leads him to say that *prevenient* grace causes the motion of a good will while *subsequent* grace is the principle of its completion by an external deed: *praevenit voluntatem ut velit bonum; subsequitur ut compleat*. In fact this seems to be his meaning in nearly all the texts cited by the Lombard.¹²⁷

¹²⁴*Ibid.*

¹²⁵2 d. 26 q. 1 a. 5.

¹²⁶The articles of the single question of the twenty-sixth distinction ask: Is grace a creature? Is it an accident? Is it in the soul or in its faculties? Is it a virtue? Is it divided into operative and coöperative? Is it mutiple? Throughout St. Thomas speaks of habitual grace, and in the last article he admits only one grace.

¹²⁷Observe St. Thomas's close attention to the positive data. He has observed that nearly all the Lombard's citations refer to the distinction between good will and good performance. This he tries to express by a distinction between internal and external acts.

Finally the sequence of *esse* and *operatio* appears when he attributes to prevenient grace the healthy state of the soul and to subsequent grace its meritorious acts: *praevenit ut sanemur et subsequitur ut sanati negotiemur.*

So much for the distinction between grace as prevenient and as subsequent. The couplet, *operans et cooperans*, since obviously it refers only to the present life, can have only two of the three senses above defined. These are:

Uno modo ut per gratiam operantem significetur ipsa gratia, prout esse divinum in anima operatur, secundum quod gratum facit habentem; et per gratiam cooperantem significetur ipsa gratia secundum quod opus meritorium causat, prout opus hominis gratum reddit.

Alio modo secundum quod gratia operans dicitur prout causat voluntatis actum; et cooperans secundum quod causat exteriorem actum in quo voluntas completur vel¹²⁸ perseverantiam in illo.¹²⁹

This passage is clarified by reference to the objections. The basic distinction is between grace as a formal cause and grace as an efficient cause: in the former sense grace makes a man acceptable to God the way whiteness makes a wall white; in the latter, inasmuch as a habit or virtue is the efficient cause of an act, grace by means of the virtues, *mediante virtute*, effects the meritorious motion of the will.¹³⁰ Thus the scheme of the division is:

Gratia: {	{Formaliter:	{Operans: Gratum facit habentem (A).
	{Effective:	}Cooperans: Opus gratum reddit (B).
	{Effective:	{Operans: Causat voluntatis actum (C).
	{Effective:	}Cooperans: Causat exteriorem actum (D).

The first member (A) offers no difficulty. Sanctifying grace makes a man acceptable to God; in this operation it is a formal cause.¹³¹

The second member (B) is understood as it was by St. Albert: the

¹²⁸Parma edition gives "per."

¹²⁹d. 26 q. 1 a. 5 corp.

¹³⁰*Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia operans secundum unam acceptionem dicitur operari in anima non effective sed formaliter, secundum quod quaelibet forma facit esse aliquod in subiecto, sicut albedo facit esse album; unde per hunc modum gratia dicitur operans quia formaliter hominem Deo gratum facit. Secundum vero aliam acceptionem dicitur operans effective, secundum quod habitus effective causat opus; ita enim gratia motum meritorium voluntatis operatur eliciendo ipsum, licet mediante virtute, propter quod operans dicitur. Ibid. ad 2m.*

¹³¹. . . sicut albedo facit esse album. . . Ibid. ad 2m. . . albedo formaliter facit album partem . . . Ibid. ad 3m. Cp. S. Albert above note 115.

meritorious act is a compound of matter and form; free choice gives the matter and grace supplies the form.¹⁸²

The third member (C) turns on a notion already familiar from our study of St. Albert and St. Bonaventure. A virtue acts as a natural principle, *per modum naturae*, so that grace in causing the virtues moves the will, just as the form of weight moves a body downwards.¹⁸³ However St. Albert had not attempted to say whether this influence was operative or coöperative and St. Bonaventure had understood it as coöperative. In the *De Veritate* and the *Prima Secundae* St. Thomas will adopt the latter view, but here he advances the anomalous opinion that graces operates efficiently by coöperating with free will.¹⁸⁴

The fourth member (D) indicates the origin of this anomaly. Neither St. Albert nor St. Bonaventure had attempted to take into account the fact that St. Augustine had based his distinction between divine operation and divine coöperation on the difference between good will and good performance. St. Thomas had noted the prominence of that difference in the texts cited by Peter Lombard and he expresses it in terms of the distinction between external and internal acts. Since Aristotle had remarked that in moral matters the internal act is more important than the external, St. Thomas suggests that grace may suitably be divided into *operans* and *cooperans* according as it causes the principal or internal act and the subordinate or external act.¹⁸⁵

Finally, the four members do not denote four graces but one and the same grace which has different effects . . . *quocumque modo distinguitur (gratia), maxime quantum ad duas distinctiones, operans et cooperans,*

¹⁸² . . . *liberum arbitrium ministrat substantiam actus, et a gratia est forma per quem meritorius est; unde illud quod gratia ministrat est sicut ultimum complementum, et propter hoc dicitur cooperans, quasi complens illud quod per liberum arbitrium ut praeiacens exhibetur. . . .* Ibid. ad 4m. Cp. S. Albert above note 116.

¹⁸³ *Inclinat in talem actum per modum cuiusdam naturae. . . . Sicut gravitas dicitur operari motum deorsum. . . .* Ibid. ad 3m. Cp. S. Albert above note 120.

¹⁸⁴ *Ad tertium dicendum quod si accipiatur gratia operans secundum primam acceptionem, tunc planum est quod effectus quos operatur formaliter, ipsa sola operatur; sicut enim sola albedo formaliter facit album parietem, ita sola gratia formaliter gratum facit. Sed secundum aliam acceptionem verum est quod ipse motus voluntatis non est a gratia sine libero arbitrio; et tamen quia se habet gratia ut principale, quia inclinat in talem actum per modum cuiusdam naturae, ideo ipsa sola talem actum dicitur operari, non quod sine libero arbitrio operetur, sed quia est principalior causa, sicut gravitas dicitur operari motum deorsum. Ibid. ad. 3m.*

¹⁸⁵ . . . *dicitur cooperans non propter principalitatem liberi arbitrii ad gratiam, sed propter principalitatem actus ad actum; actus enim interiores in moralibus potiores sunt exterioribus, ut in X. Ethic. Philosophus dicit; unde convenienter gratia secundum quod causat principalem actum, dicitur operans; et secundum quod causat secundarium, dicitur cooperans. Ibid. ad 4m.*

*praeveniens et subsequens, non differunt essentia sed ratione tantum; una enim forma est quae dat esse et quae est principium operis; unus etiam habitus est qui elicit actum extrinsecum et intrinsecum; unde eadem gratia est operans et cooperans. Nec dicitur praeveniens et subsequens propter ordinem gratiae ad gratiam, sed propter ordinem effectus ad effectum.*¹³⁶

Closely connected with this position is the obscurity enshrouding the division of graces. St. Thomas had just said: . . . *Apostolus large accipit gratiam pro quolibet dono quod nobis gratis a Deo confertur; et haec quidem dona plura et divisa sunt. Sed nos hic loquimur de gratia prout est primum donum, gratam faciens animam.*¹³⁷

4. THE MULTIPLICITY OF GRATIA GRATUM FACIENS. In the article of the *Commentary*, just cited, St. Thomas had answered negatively the question, *Utrum gratia sit multiplex in anima?*¹³⁸ The same question under a different form reappears in the *De Veritate*; he asks, *Utrum in uno homine sit una tantum gratia gratum faciens?*¹³⁹ The extremely significant answer runs more or less as follows:

Grace is either *gratis data* or *gratum faciens*. The former denotes such gifts as inspiration and thaumaturgy: obviously it is multiple. The latter denotes either the gratuitous will of God or else a created gift that perfects man formally and makes him worthy of eternal life.

Now if you mean by grace this created gift, then grace cannot but be one in each individual. God accepts the individual and only consequently the individual's acts; *respexit Deus ad Abel et ad munera eius*.

If however you mean by grace the gratuitous will of God, then plainly grace is one not only with regard to each individual but also with regard to all of them together. God is simplicity.

The one possibility of many graces arises if you term every effect of gratuitous divine will a *gratia gratum faciens*, if for instance you call good thoughts and pious desires sanctifying graces. More fully, . . . *ex parte autem effectuum divinatorum (gratia) potest esse multiplex; ut dicamus omnem effectum quem Deus facit in nobis ex gratuita sua voluntate, qua nos in suum regnum acceptat, pertinere ad gratiam gratum facientem; sicut quod immittat nobis bonas cogitationes et sanctas affectiones.*

*Sic igitur gratia, secundum quod est quoddam donum habituale in nobis, est una tantum, secundum autem quod dicit effectum aliquem Dei in nobis ordinatum ad nostram salutem, possunt dici multae gratiae in nobis.*¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶d. 26 q. 1. a. 6 ad 2m.

¹³⁷*Ibid.* ad 1 m.

¹³⁸*Ibid.* corp.

¹³⁹*De Ver* q. 27 a. 5. ¹⁴⁰*Ibid* corp.

The awkwardness of the division is palpable. The many graces seem to come in as an afterthought; asserted tentatively with an *ut dicamus* and a *possunt dici*, they are characterized none too happily as the effects of the gratuitous divine will by which God accepts us into his kingdom. In the *Contra Gentiles* the division will be given a new basis; divine acceptance will give way to the divine aid necessary for man to attain a transcendent finality.¹⁴¹ And in the *Summa Theologica* synthesis appears: grace denotes the special love God has for those whom he is leading to eternal life; it denotes this love in itself, as when we speak of the grace of predestination; or it denotes this love in its effects, as when we speak of supernatural entities in the soul—motions or habits¹⁴²—fitting man for his last end.¹⁴³

On the other hand, one has only to read earlier attempts at the division of graces, especially 2 d.28, q.1, a.1-4 and *De Ver q.24, a.14-15*, to realize that the awkward cross-division¹⁴⁴ of the article we are discussing marks the turning point in a long effort to get things in order. What, then, was the immediate cause of this assertion of a multiplicity in *gratia gratum faciens*?

I think the answer admits little doubt: the immediate cause of the development was a hitherto unnoticed point in St. Augustine. In treating the unity of sanctifying grace both St. Bonaventure¹⁴⁵ and St. Thomas¹⁴⁶ in their *Commentaries on the Sentences* had raised the objection that grace was both operative and coöperative, both prevenient and subsequent. The answer they gave was that this distinction did not imply a multiplicity of graces but only a multiplicity of effects from one and the same sanctifying grace. Now in the *De Veritate*, in the very article under consideration, this objection is repeated in a variety of ways to receive uniformly a new answer. The most significant of these is, perhaps, as follows:

¹⁴¹*C Gent* 3: 52 147 150-153. ¹⁴²1a 2ae q. 110 a. 2. ¹⁴³*Ibid.* a. 1.

¹⁴⁴Habitual grace appears twice: first in opposition to the gratuitous will of God; second among the effects of that will.

¹⁴⁵2 d. 27 a. 1 q. 1 ob. 1.

¹⁴⁶2 d. 26 q. 1 a. 6 ob. 2.

3. *Praeterea, nullus habet necesse petere id quod iam habet. Sed habens gratiam praeventem, necesse habet petere subsequentem secundum Augustinum. Ergo non est una gratia praeventis et subsequens.*

*Ad tertium dicendum quod quantumcumque homo habeat habitum gratiae, semper tamen indiget divina operatione. . . . Et ideo habens gratiam necesse habet petere divinum auxilium, quod ad gratiam cooperantem pertinet.*¹⁴⁷

Plainly this objection was decisive against the earlier view, for one cannot pray for something that is only notionally distinct from what one already has received. A real distinction had to be introduced between operative and coöperative, prevenient and subsequent grace. To introduce such a distinction the category of grace in its strict sense, *gratia gratum faciens*, had to be enlarged.

5. GRATIA OPERANS IN THE DE VERITATE. The fundamental text, with the addition of a phrase dropped in some manuscripts and in the printed editions,¹⁴⁸ runs as follows:

Quinto quaeritur utrum in uno homine sit una tantum gratia gratum faciens: et videtur quod non. Nihil enim contra se ipsum dividitur per operantem et cooperantem. Ergo diversae sunt gratiae, operans scilicet et cooperans; et sic in uno homine non est una tantum gratia gratum faciens.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia operans et cooperans potest distinguere et ex parte ipsius gratuita Dei voluntatis et ex parte doni nobis collati. Operans enim dicitur gratia respectu illius effectus quem sola efficit; cooperans dicitur respectu illius effectus quem sola non efficit sed cum libero arbitrio cooperante.

Ex parte vero gratuita Dei voluntatis gratia operans (A) dicitur ipsa iustificatio impii, quae fit ipsius doni gratuiti infusione; hoc enim donum sola gratuita divina voluntas causat in nobis; nec aliquo modo eius causa

¹⁴⁷De Ver q. 27 a. 5 ad 3m.

¹⁴⁸De Ver. q. 27 a. 5 ad. 1 m. The line in roman type is not to be found in the printed editions. The internal evidence for its inclusion seems overwhelming. Not only is the omission easily explained by homoioteleuton, but without it the sentence in which it stands lacks both balance and sense and is contradicted immediately by St. Thomas in three distinct phrases: first and second, when he states that *operans* (A) and *operans* (C) are *operans* because free will does nothing; third, when he explains *cooperans* (B) by pointing out that free will does something. Nor is there any lack of external evidence: with minor variations our reading is found in *Cod Vat Ottob* 204, 208, 214, 187 *Urb* 134; it is missing in *Cod Vat Lat* 781, 785, 786, *Reg.* 1883, but one must recall that the autograph part of *Lat* 781 ends with *De Ver* q. 22 a. 11. For the MSS references I am indebted to the President of the Commission for the Leonine Edition, R. P. Suermont, O. P.

est liberum arbitrium nisi per modum dispositionis sufficientis. Ex parte vero eiusdem gratia cooperans (B) dicitur secundum quod in libero arbitrio operatur, motum eius causando, et exterioris actus executionem expediendo, et perseverantiam praebendo, in quibus omnibus aliquid agit liberum arbitrium. Et sic constat quod aliud est gratia operans et cooperans.

Ex parte vero doni gratuiti eadem gratia per essentiam dicitur operans et cooperans: operans (C) quidem secundum quod informat animam; ut operans formaliter intelligatur per modum loquendi quo dicimus quod albedo facit album parietem; hoc enim nullo modo est actus liberi arbitrii; cooperans (D) vero diceretur secundum quod inclinatur ad actum intrinsecum et extrinsecum, et secundum quod praestat facultatem perseverandi usque in finem.

The underlying division of grace has already been discussed in the preceding section: grace is either an habitual gift or any effect of the gratuitous will of God accepting us into his kingdom. Thus the scheme of the sub-divisions is as follows:

Gratia ut quilibet effectus divinae voluntatis gratuitae:

 }A. *Operans: Iustificatio impii.*

 }B. *Cooperans: Operatio Dei in libero arbitrio, etc.*

Gratia ut donum habituale:

 }C. *Operans: Animam informans.*

 }D. *Cooperans: Inclinars ad actum intrinsecum, etc.*

The first sub-division, A and B, is of graces really distinct.¹⁴⁹ The second sub-division, C and D, is of graces notionally distinct.¹⁵⁰ Further, there is not a real distinction between *operans* (A) and *operans* (C), an oddity that results from the basic cross-division.

We are already familiar with the distinction between the formal and the efficient causality of habitual grace. But while in the *Sentences* St. Thomas divided each of these into *operans* and *cooperans*, here the formal causality of the habit is said to be *operans* (C) and its efficient causality to be *cooperans* (D). Essentially this is an improvement to be retained in the *Summa*,¹⁵¹ for it eliminates the anomaly of the *Sentences* where an operative grace coöperates with free will.¹⁵² Still this improvement is at the expense of sacrificing the Augustinian connection of opera-

¹⁴⁹*Et sic constat quod aliud est gratia operans et cooperans. De Ver q. 27 a. 5 ad 1 m.*

¹⁵⁰*Ex parte vero doni gratuiti eadem gratia per essentiam dicitur operans et cooperans. Ibid.*

¹⁵¹*1^a 2^{ae} q. 111 a. 2.*

¹⁵²*d. 26 q. 1 a. 5 ad 3m. Cited above note 134.*

tion with good will and coöperation with good performance: where the *Sentences* attributed internal acts to operative grace and external to coöperative, we now find both internal and external attributed to coöperative, B and D.

The great advance of the *De Veritate* is to be found in the first pair, *operans* (A) and *cooperans* (B). Here we find the enlarged category of *gratia gratum faciens*. But *operans* (A) calls for no comment: it is the justification of the sinner in which free acts are no more than disposing causes. On the other hand, nothing can be added at this stage of our inquiry to what has already been said on *cooperans* (B): it is the grace for which one has to pray no matter how much habitual grace one has received; ¹⁵³ it is illustrated by the divine gift of good thoughts and holy aspirations; ¹⁵⁴ it is defined as any effect, apart from habitual grace, by which God gratuitously accepts us into his kingdom.

6. GRATIA OPERANS IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA. In the *De Veritate* operative grace was discussed incidentally. In the *Summa*, as in the *Sentences*, a separate article is devoted to the issue. The response may be summarized as follows:

A grace may be either a habit or a motion, but both habits and motions may be operative, and both may be coöperative. For grace operates inasmuch as the soul is purely passive; it coöperates inasmuch as the soul is both passive and active.

Now there are two kinds of human acts, interior and exterior. With regard to the former, the will is purely passive, notably when a will, formerly evil, is made good; with regard to the latter, the will is not only passive but also active, and so grace coöperates. In this fashion, grace as a motion is divided into operative and coöperative.

On the other hand, habitual grace like any other form has two effects, *esse* and *operari*. Accordingly, inasmuch as habitual grace cures or justifies the soul or makes it acceptable to God, it is said to be operative. But inasmuch as it is a principle of meritorious acts, it is coöperative.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³*De Ver* q. 27 a. 5 ad 3m.

¹⁵⁴ . . . *sicut quod immittat nobis bonas cogitationes et sanctas affectiones. Ibid.* corp.

¹⁵⁵*1a 2ae* q. 111 a. 2. This article will be given a more detailed study later.

¹⁵⁶d. 28 q. 1 a. 4. Cp. S. Bonaventure, 2 d. 28 a. 2 q. 1 conc., cited above note 111. According to Dr. Doms, St. Albert does not appear to have treated the matter. *Gnadenlehre des sel. Albertus*, pp. 163 ff.

¹⁵⁷*De Ver* q. 24 a. 15.

Thus we have as a final scheme of division:

Gratia:	{	Motus:	{	Operans: <i>actus interior.</i>
			}	Cooperans: <i>actus exterior.</i>
		Habitus:	{	Operans: <i>effectus formales.</i>
			}	Cooperans: <i>principium operationis.</i>

The most striking feature of this scheme is that while in the *De Veritate* actual grace was only *gratia cooperans*, here it is both *operans* and *cooperans*. A clue to the possible origin of this development is given in the *corpus articuli* when St. Thomas illustrates actual grace as operative by referring to conversion, *cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat*. Now if we examine St. Thomas's successive treatments of the preparation for justification, we find the following development. In the *Sentences* this preparation is ascribed to providence working through such external causes as admonitions or loss of health.¹⁵⁶ In the *De Veritate* the period of transition has begun: alternative to external causes there is mentioned a *divinus instinctus secundum quod Deus in mentibus hominum operatur*.¹⁵⁷ Finally, in the *Quodlibetum Primum*, which belongs to the second Paris period, the beginning of conversion is attributed exclusively to such an internal operation, and any other view is branded as Pelagian.¹⁵⁸ Since this internal operation is prior to justification, it must be an actual grace. It is difficult to doubt that such is the origin of St. Thomas's idea of actual grace as operative.

7. CONCLUSIONS. Since, however, further discussion of the interpretation of these passages would take us beyond the scope of the present article, we may now give our conclusions.

¹⁵⁶*Quodl* 1 a. 7. The passages just cited from the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate* do not mention the Pelagians. *Contra Gentiles* 3, 152 mentions them yet attributes the *initium fidei* to habitual faith consequent to charity. In the *Summa*, 1a q. 62 a. 2 ad 3m., there is an assertion of internal grace prior to justification and an implication of its necessity. Probably this passage is prior to the *Quodlibetum Primum*; in any case the essential advance takes place in *Contra Gentiles* 3, 149, which attributes all initiative to God on the ground that the creature is an instrument.

There is a clearly defined development in St. Thomas' thought on *gratia operans et cooperans*. In the *Sentences* actual grace is neither operative nor coöperative. In the *De Veritate* it is said to be coöperative. In the *Summa* it is both operative and coöperative.

The deficiencies in St. Thomas's earlier thought are matched by similar deficiencies in the thought of his immediate predecessors. We are dealing with the development, not of a single mind, but of the speculative theology of grace itself. The nature of this general movement was discussed in the first section. Here certain precise points have come to light: the great *Commentaries on the Sentences* reveal a preoccupation with sanctifying grace; simultaneously the external graces of special providence, internal illuminations and inspirations, and many other things are lumped together under a general rubric of *gratia gratis data*. On the latter point there are noteworthy differences between St. Albert, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas; still the general statement remains true. Speculation on habitual grace is reaching its peak of perfection, but speculation on actual grace is hardly beyond its preliminary stages.

Though our inquiry is not as yet sufficiently advanced to outline St. Thomas's elaboration of the idea of actual grace, we have found two points to be of special interest. The category of *gratia gratum faciens* is enlarged in the *De Veritate* to make room for the divine gift of good thoughts and holy affections; this enlargement coincides with an advertence to the fact that St. Augustine's *praeveniens* and *subsequens* must be two graces really distinct; there follows the affirmation of a divine guidance and aid that is distinct from habitual grace and is termed *gratia cooperans*. Further, the actual grace that is operative in the *Summa* is explicitly illustrated by conversion; now on this point St. Thomas's thought had a long and nuanced history, as is apparent from a comparison of 2 d.28 q.1 a.4; *De Ver* q.24 a.15; *C. Gent* 3: 149, 152; 1a q.62 a.2 ad 3m; *Quodl* 1 a.7; *De Malo* q.6 a.1 ad 1m ad 21m; 1a 2ae q.9 a.6 ad 3m; 3a q.85 a.5.

(To be continued)