

CURRENT THEOLOGY

MARIOLOGY

OUR LADY'S COOPERATION IN THE REDEMPTION. Progress in the theses dealing with Mary's coredemptive functions continues. The proposal, discussion, and even elimination of new views are part and parcel of theological progress and of that proper development and elaboration of the deposit of faith—providing always that new theories are not some ill-thought-out and spurious hypotheses. It is well known that theologians are still divided on fundamental issues, the principal difference being that which concerns Our Lady's share in the objective redemption. [Cf. THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, 1 (May, 1940) 2, 187-189].

There are agreements along with the differences of opinion. Thus, all agree that Mary had her part in the redemption, subjectively considered. And all who dispute the question of the redemption, objectively considered, have assumed certain positions, to which, recently, objection has been made. For both the defenders and antagonists of Mary's immediate cooperation in the redemption, objectively considered, hold unanimously that the immediate principle, or grace, whereby Mary could be conceived as cooperating, depended essentially and unconditionally on the achievement of the redemption by Christ. If Mary was privileged to collaborate at all, she was enabled to fulfill her function formally as a redeemed person; her incapacity to collaborate was remedied through some grace, and this grace was a *gratia Redemptoris*.

A new theory which upsets these fundamental agreements has been proposed. In 1939, J. Lebon, S.J., published an essay, entitled, "Comment je conçois, j'établis, et je défends la doctrine de la médiation mariale." [*Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 1939, pp. 655 ff.] The new opinion is also defended by the Reverend Sylvester O'Brien in his second article on "The Universal Mediation of Mary," [*Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 57 (April 1941) 880, pp. 289-308].

The essay of Father Lebon is marked as tentative; it opens a new field for discussion and for progress, either by elimination or modification. The fundamental position is taken that if Our Lady was enabled to cooperate in the redemption through sanctifying grace, then other persons also with sanctifying grace can be considered as collaborators. For the grace in Mary and in others is specifically the same. He seeks, therefore, something in Our Lady in which no other shared, and makes the divine maternity the immediate principle of Our Lady's collaboration. Christ did not belong to the fallen race because of a personal title; Mary did not, through her title of Mother of God. Mary indeed received her prerogative of extraordinary sanctifying grace, and even from the first moment of her existence, in view of the foreseen merits of Christ the Redeemer; this is defined in the

Ineffabilis Deus of Pius IX. But her ability to cooperate as Mother of God was not conferred *intuitu meriti Salvatoris*.

Father Lebon hopes to evade certain difficulties in the doctrine of the mediacy of grace through this theory. In making the divine maternity the immediate principle whereby Mary is associated with Christ in meriting the redemption, the principle, *principium meriti non cadit sub merito*, is safeguarded. For Mary's association is not to be ascribed to the merits of Christ's cross. All her effective cooperation is radicated in the prerogative of the maternity; it is conferred on her *intuitu maternitatis, non intuitu gratiae sanctificantis per merita Christi collatae*. Lebon asks if it does not belong to the divine wisdom to confer on Mary the power to collaborate—a power through grace—in view of the fact that the same wisdom decreed that she should be mother and cooperatrix. Certainly, grace derived from the merits of Christ was required for the *personal redemption* of Mary, and for her *personal* merits for her own crown; but not for her merits which availed, with those of Christ, for the redemption of man. Thus, while the maternity is an immediate principle, of itself it is not a ground of meriting, and hence needs (and postulates in view of the divine intention) a special gift to remove its insufficiency.

The first criticism of the proposed theory of Father Lebon to come to hand is that of Father Tummers, S.J., in his article, "Het Mede-Verdiens van de H. Maagd in het Verlosingswerk." [*Bijdragen van de Philosophische en Theologische Faculteiten der Nederlandsche Jezuïeten*, 3rd part, 1940, 1, 199-213]. Only the first part of the article has appeared; some of its criticisms of Lebon's theory are reported.

Father Tummers seeks light on several important points. If the maternity is *le principe immédiat* of Mary's cooperation, one asks how this—it is a relation—can be such a principle. Again, if the maternity is an immediate principle, why is there need of supplying for an insufficiency; there should be no alleged insufficiency. Again, the prerogative of the maternity is held in no way to have depended on the merits of Christ. Further, there are difficulties in the view that Mary collaborated in the redemption but not through a grace which came from the cross. Finally, since the theory holds that a special gift was given Our Lady, and one not of a justificatory character, whereby Mary could merit, and merit *de condigno*, the defender is forced to contend, against the traditional view, a grace which is neither *gratia gratis data* or *gratia gratum faciens*; it must be some *gratia sui generis*.

Lebon's fundamental positions lead him to certain corollaries. In Christ there was a renunciation of His own life for the redemption of men, and this act proceeded from the virtue of religion. Correspondingly (and cooperatively) there was a renunciation made by Mary whereby she forewent her maternal rights to the life of her Son. According to Lebon, "Dans

le plan divin de la rédemption et selon la volonté divine, ces deux renoncements sont associées *en un hommage religieux total* (italics ours) que Jésus opère et que Marie 'co-opère' avec lui." Father Tummers objects that the two acts are on so different a plane that they cannot form the alleged *hommage religieux total*.

Again, Father Lebon, with St. Thomas, makes no real distinction between the *gratia personalis* and *gratia capitalis* in Christ, however clear are the two aspects of the same grace. Through His personal accidental holiness Christ can be conceived to have merited the vision for Himself on the title of merits; through the grace He had as head of the race, He can be conceived to have merited the redemption of the race. Now it is disputed whether Christ needed accidental holiness (sanctifying grace) at all in order to merit in either case. The Salmantans asserted the absolute need of such grace; Suarez, noting that Christ was on the plane of the supernatural by the grace of the Union, denied any need of accidental holiness, sanctifying grace, as a requisite for the capacity to merit.

However this disputed point may be settled, it is not clear how a similar question can arise in the case of Our Lady. In order to merit she would need sanctifying grace, and by this she would be on the plane of existence in which her merits would be applicable to those who were to be enabled to reach their end, the vision. She has no prerogative which is analogous to the Hypostatic Union of her Son. Father Lebon sees this lacuna in his theory, and hence he is driven to introduce the *don spécial* . . . "qui, sans la (Marie) justifier, était le principe de la proportion objective entre son acte de Corédemptrice et la récompense de la vie éternelle."

But one asks if this gift is sufficient for the carrying out of the task assigned. It is supposed to serve the function of enabling Mary to merit in a way in which the *gratia unionis* would in the view of Suarez. Yet the only known principle which is proportionate to life eternal and the vision is the participation in the divine nature through sanctifying grace. In Mary this is not sanctifying grace in the view of Father Lebon, for it does not justify. Indeed, Lebon must hold this, for in his view this gift is given before she is conceived as having received personal redemption through the merits of Christ, and Mary cannot be conceived as being justified before the Immaculate Conception. Hence, it would seem that we are driven to the common opinion, namely, that in whatever way Mary merited to share in the work of redemption, she had that share through having sanctifying grace, and this was a *gratia Redemptoris*. It would seem that the common opinion that Mary cooperated, *formally as a redeemed person*, should not be abandoned, and that, whatever view is held concerning the measure of her collaboration, all her capacity to share and to merit is due somehow to the merits of the cross.

Thus, in his first article, Father Tummers brings sharp criticism to bear on one point, the immediate principle of Mary's cooperation; a second article will consider the difficulties which are encountered in the matter of Mary's *condign* merit. On the other hand the critic calls attention to the many questions which are opened up for discussion. The clarification of these will mean real progress in a very subtle and beautiful part of our Marian theology. We must remember that Father Lebon has put forth his theory as tentative; he leans, however, to the acceptance of his own view. This is clear from the title of his essay, and also from these words in the body of it: "Cette manière de comprendre et d'expliquer l'intervention de la Vierge dans l'acquisition du mérite rédempteur, est-elle à rejeter de prime abord, comme insoutenable et impossible? Il ne me semble pas que son impossibilité soit évidente. . . ." Father Tummers appreciates the keenness of the new theory, and remarks in conclusion that "wij met geen faux problème te doen heoben,"—we are not dealing with a spurious theological problem.

HYPERDOULIA. ARCHEOLOGICAL NOTICES. THE BASILICA AT BETHLEHEM. It has been known for many centuries that the basilica at Bethlehem was built so that the sanctuary of the church is above the grotto of the Nativity. One descends a circular stairway from the upper church to come to the place where the altars of the Nativity and Magi stand. A summary account of the archeological certainties and problems concerning this site appeared in the *Oriens Christianus* [35 (1939) 227-234] by A. Rucker under the title, "Bericht über die archäologischen Ergebnisse der Untersuchungen in der Geburtskirche in Bethlehem." According to Rucker the old dispute concerning the builder of the present structure is settled; some held that it is the Basilica of Justinian (525-565), while others held that it is the work which Constantine (306-337) undertook. The archeological data favor Constantine. The most important of the recent discoveries is that of an octagonal building whose foundations were found over the grotto in the repairs which were undertaken in 1934.

This octagon has given rise to numerous questions. There is no doubt that its foundations supported some sort of a building over the grotto—but Christian or pagan? Constantinian or earlier? An architectural unit with the rest of the church or an intrusion or an ancient building absorbed in the new church of Constantine? One of the greatest archeological authorities in the Church, Father Vincent Abel, O.P., who was present during the repairs of 1934, came to the conclusion that the octagon was part of Constantine's work and is to be dated about 320 A.D.; it served to mark the most sacred part of the shrine. Abel argued ingeniously to show that the octagonal structure within the church did not destroy the general architectural unity of the basilica. This part of his thesis was criticized as the least convincing. The essays of Abel appeared in the *Revue Biblique* in 1936 (544-573) and 1937 (93-121).

As early as 1934 an alternative opinion appeared from Father Mamert Vionnet; it reappeared, taking into account the opinion of P. Abel in 1938. In this view the octagonal foundations are the sub-structure of an older church over the grotto which was in ruins by the time of Diocletian (196 A.D.). When Constantine came to build his church a century and a quarter later this shrine was too venerable a Christian relic to be destroyed. It was included in the plans of Constantine's architects even though it did not fit in with the architectural unity of the new church.

Vionnet goes a step further. It is well known from Origen and St. Jerome that to prevent the Christians from paying their devotions at the shrine of the Nativity, the Emperor Hadrian (117-135) constructed a temple of Venus and Adonis at the grotto. It is the claim of Vionnet that the Christians of the 2nd century made Hadrian's pagan temple into a church, keeping the octagonal form of Hadrian and laying mosaics in the floor with Christian symbols. Black crosses on a white base have been uncovered.

But while the inference made from the crosses seems at first glance to be correct, P. G. de Jerphanion, S.J., remarks in his "Bulletin d'archéologie chrétienne et byzantine," [*Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 6 (Jan.-June 1940) 1-2, p. 150] that the crosses may be no more than geometrical floor-designs which are found elsewhere without any specific Christian significance; similar designs are found in Herculaneum which was destroyed in the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 A.D.

SANT MARY MAJOR IN ROME. In the bulletin of P. G. de Jerphanion, already mentioned, there is a note showing how the basilica of St. Mary Major in Rome is a century-old witness of the orthodox faith in Mary's maternity, through its connection with the church in Ephesus where the Council declared that Our Lady is truly *Theotókos*. We recall that in the divine office for August 5, the nocturns of *S. Mariae ad Nives* have the story of the first construction of the church on the Esquiline under Pope St. Liberius (356-366). But after some seventy years the church needed reconstruction and enlarging. This was done by Pope St. Sixtus III (432-440) whose reign followed upon the Council of Ephesus in which the heresy of Nestorius was condemned.

The entire history of the construction of this basilica is to appear in the three-volume work of August Schuchert, *S. Maria Maggiore zu Rom*. The first volume has been issued (1939) from the Pontifical Institute of Christian Archeology; it contains the early history of the first construction under the title, *Die Grundungsgeschichte der Basilika und die ursprüngliche Apsisanlage*. De Jerphanion has high praise for this volume; in the conclusion of his review he calls attention to a point not noted by Schuchert, namely, that in its form, dimensions, and proportions, the basilica of Our Lady

which Sixtus III built, is very nearly a replica of the church of St. Mary in Ephesus in which the Council of Ephesus was assembled. The similarity cannot have been coincidental; St. Mary Major, the "Bethlehem of Rome," is a monument of faith in Mary's motherhood of God. The lines of the Ephesian church are known through the excavations and studies of the Austrian Archeological Institute. Even today the ruins of this church at Capouli, near modern Ephesus, are named in the Turkish language, *Panaghia*, which is a memory of the ancient name of Our Lady, *Panagios*—*The All-Holy One*—among the Greeks.

De Jerphanion also remarks upon an opinion, "trop récente pour mériter le nom de tradition," which asserts that at Panaghia Capouli the tomb of Our Lady is to be found. This opinion became widespread after Brentano's publication of the visions of Sister Catherine Emmerich (1852), but history and archeology point definitely to a site near Jerusalem in which the body of Our Lady lay for the short time between her death and assumption.

RELIEFS IN CONSTANTINOPLE. The same bulletin of de Jerphanion notes from the report of archeological studies of the Manges quarter of Constantinople by Demangel and Mamboury, the second appendix of the volume which deals with the *Virgin Orante* of Gulhané. The authors thus describe it: "De la beauté tout courte, pure, irréelle, faite pour toucher par sa grâce spirituelle l'âme mystique des croyants qui venaient se prosterner devant elle." This relief is the work of the ivory-carvers of Constantinople in the 10th century. There is a surprising detail in the relief—the hands are pierced "pour laisser jaillir des flots d'une eau sanctifiée. On en a d'autres exemples."

VENERATION OF THE SAINTS

THE CULT OF THE MARTYRS. An interesting, informative and well-documented essay on the cult of the martyrs appears in Johannes Quasten's "*Vetus superstitio et nova religio. The Problem of Refrigerium in the Ancient Church of North Africa*" [Harvard Theological Review, xxxiii (Oct. 1940) 4, 253-266]. The great number of martyrs in the early African church led to an early development of the martyr-cult; here also the danger of misconceiving the right doctrine which underlay the cult and the infiltration of abuses from somewhat analogous ceremonials among the pagan population occasioned problems for the leaders of the African church. The widespread devotion to the martyrs is seen in the many churches erected to their honor in Africa and in the many shrines built to contain their relics. The care of the bishops is seen also in the effort to procure accurate accounts of martyrdoms. St. Augustine insisted on first-hand accounts of witnesses and the attestation of the local bishops. Again, precautions were taken not to admit these *Acts* to the rank of dignity of the Scriptures.

There were abuses to deal with and dangers to be avoided, as might be expected in a populace recently converted from and still living amidst pagans who honored their dead and celebrated city-heroes and semi-deities with religious pomp. The pagans were accustomed to bring decorations of flowers etc. to the graves of their ancestors, because they were benefactors, and they offered sacrifices to the heroes and demi-gods. The consumption of the sacrificial foods and libations often led to abuses, such as drunkenness and revelry. Among the Christians the practice of honoring the dead continued, and with it the attendant abuses were not always avoided.

Eventually the banquetings and sacrifices among the pagans are found to have distinctly Christian analogues among the Catholics. The honor done to departed pagans fell into desuetude among the Christians; the funeral Mass took its place. The sacrifices to the pagan heroes, being undiluted idolatry, had no place among Christians, but the martyr-cult with its ceremonial of honor and the invocation of the martyr and the plea for his intercession for the Church and people fully replaced whatever a convert had relinquished in the way of attachment to his former practices.

This substitution of a new world of underlying ideas was not the work of a day, nor was it accomplished without the presence of abuses. St. Ambrose adopted direct and somewhat sudden measures to prevent abuses; he prohibited the ceremonies which led to revelry and occasioned a danger of relapsing into pagan superstitions and errors. St. Augustine, in the view of Quasten, dealt more tactfully and successfully with similar dangers in Africa. He acted through councils rather than through edicts, the councils of Carthage leading the way; thus reform was slowly accomplished through the local bishops. There was no direct prohibition of honoring the dead; first, there was clear instruction concerning the difference between the cult of the martyr and the honoring of the dead; next, the gifts which were made to the dead as benefactors were replaced by alms-giving to the poor—"a substitution of ideas," says Quasten, "of utmost importance both for the history of religion and for culture." The honor paid to the martyrs was allowed to develop separately; they were honored as benefactors of the whole Church and as intercessors for the Church and the individual faithful.

Quasten's essay touches upon a very delicate point in dealing with analogies between the pagan customs at a tomb and the Christian ceremonies at the tomb of a martyr or an ancestor. In the history of religion there is no argument which has been abused more frequently in modern times than the argument from analogies, and nothing could be more desirable than that students and writers of that science give a slow and careful consideration to the legitimate procedure in concluding from analogies, such, for instance, as is outlined in the *Lehrbuch der geschichtlichen Methode* of A. Feder, S.J. (Pustet, 1924). Because of the many writers who have been careless in this

matter, it will serve us here to recall certain points which have been legitimately omitted from or not emphasized in the essay just discussed.

First of all the Christian cult was directed to a martyr—and without any offering of sacrifice to the martyr. The martyr was a real person who had died for the faith. True, sometimes piosity added to the story of the martyr and occasional stories of pagan heroes are found attributed to Christian martyrs; again, because of obscurity of sources or careless procedure a saint was honored who never existed, though this happened more frequently in the Middle Ages than in the early centuries. But in all cases the honored martyr was considered a peculiar Christian possession and a reality of the Christian past. There is no case, as certain writers leaning more on puns than on history have asserted, where a pagan demi-god or hero became a Christian saint or martyr. Saint Pelagia was never Venus Pelagia; Saint Dennis did not evolve out of Dionysos. No missionaries ever converted a pagan populace by preaching that some local deity was in reality the Christian Saint So-and-so. Whatever continuity between pagan and Christian cults is found, it is not applicable historically to the object of the respective cults.

Secondly, external ceremonials and ritual surround both the pagan and Christian worship. There are hundreds of similar features. Yet historians must be careful in drawing conclusions from the analogies. The attitude of the early Church writers should caution modern scholars against haste. Intelligent men were living and writing at the very time when the alleged continuity from pagan to Christian customs was going on. In the days of Sts. Jerome and Augustine the same arguments from analogy were being put forth as are heard today. St. Jerome had this to say to the charge concerning the similarity of ceremonies offered by Vigilantius: "All that was done to idols, and hence is abominable; but this is done to martyrs, and so is to be received by all." (MPL 33, 346) Theodoret mentions that the Christian saints now replace the pagan deities. All writers of the time deny that any sacrifice is ever offered to a saint or martyr. Hence no matter how many similarities in ceremonials may be shown, the rituals are essentially different and are not in continuity.

Concerning the less fundamental similarities this important point is not to be missed. The early Christians were men with men's instincts to develop the sensible accompaniments of religious adoration. Given the Christian reality of the martyr, and given the fact that human imagination and convention are externalized in certain more or less parallel lines in widely separated instances, there is less reason for asserting a dependence of the Christian customs on the pagan practices. One runs the risk of the fallacy: *Post hoc; ergo, propter hoc*. And especially in one very important point the martyr-cult fails to have any pagan analogue: in the preservation and honoring of the martyr's relics.

Finally, analogues cannot obscure the fact that in the spirit which animated the martyr-cult, Christian devotion was far removed from and even opposed to pagan worship. Against polytheism the Church preached an unquestioned monotheism, and no heresy against the first article of the Creed was threatened by the cult of the martyrs. The abuses we hear of are drunkenness and revelry, and the danger of being contaminated again with pagan superstitions and errors. Christians were clear on the fact that saints and martyrs were friends of God and could intercede for men. These doctrines had to be reiterated, true, and they were preached repeatedly, for it is clear that historians must recognize that every convert from paganism did not shed all his pagan attachments and superstitions at the church door. Yet he lost many of them, for the catechumenate was not short in the early centuries, and one of its most emphatic lessons was concerned in pointing out the difference between the Christian God and His court of saints and martyrs and the gay or gloomy Olympus of the pagan world.

THE CULT OF HOLY IMAGES. Certain of the considerations put forth above and others also will need to be brought to bear on the recent book of Edwyn Bevan, *Holy Images. An Inquiry into Idolatry and Image-Worship in Ancient Paganism and Christianity* (London. Allen and Unwin. 1940. vii—184). In this work the author has developed into a book what was undertaken incidentally and as the topic of a digression in his Gifford Lectures of 1933, which appeared under the title, *Symbolism and Belief*.

Professor Bevan's book is a scientific work; with its presentation of facts one will need rarely to quarrel in essential matters, but with its interpretation of historical facts and inferences made from them there seem to be grave defects. If one may need to point to a definite tendentiousness of the writer, this is not to be set down to bias, but, it seems, to a lack of broadness and depth in dealing with a theme where training in theology is a requisite. The author divides views on image-worship into three large schools. The Jewish-Moslem view is anti-iconic; exception, however, is noted among the Jews; the brazen serpent was a representation, and there were symbols allowed in later worship. Another view is found, according to the author, in the early Church; representations are allowed for the stimulation of devotion; they are not honored. The Church is alleged to have "out-Puritaned the Puritans" in this respect before the time of Constantine. It seems that the Catacombs give singular rebuttal to this historical summary, as will be noted later. The third stage, wherein images are the object of worship, is set down as being crystallized out in dogmatic definition at Second Nicea in 787. Kisses, bows, prostrations are approved. In dealing with the medieval writers, the author finds Saint Thomas "studiously restrained in his attitude toward image-worship." Finally, the

author is of the opinion that Protestant forms of religion have lost in taking an extreme position against images for the purposes of religious worship.

The tendentiousness of the book is evident in the impression given that the worship of images is an intrusion and a novelty in Christianity, that it is not genuinely Catholic, nor traditional. The bent of the author shows in the way in which several historical facts are treated. For instance, it is presumably significant that there are few allusions to the Crucifix (the cross with the figure) until the 7th century. True, any representations of the suffering Christ are only scattered in the 5th and 6th centuries. But there is no ground for the inference that anti-ionic views explain this. Has Bevan reflected that the Christian art of the first six centuries portrayed the glories of Christ—a natural manner of acting in a persecuted sect? Moreover, can Christians not have wished to spare the sensibilities of converts from paganism, in whose eyes the ignominy of the cross or the sufferings of Christ might offer unnecessary difficulties? In the Catacombs we see the portraits of Christ the King and the Good Shepherd, and these are the subjects of adornment in the basilicas of the 4th to the 7th centuries. The cross appears, and, in fact, seems to have been the first representation which received relative cult; even among the Iconoclasts there was a group which exempted *staurolatría* from the charge of idolatry. The pointed question may be put to Bevan: Why is the conclusion drawn that images in the early centuries were not venerated? Why is he certain that they were only for the stimulating of devotion? He has made a distinction which is very subtle, and documentary evidence is asked to support it.

Again, in this book St. John Damascene is portrayed as ransacking the patristic sources in support of image-worship, as if tradition could yield only reluctant or distorted testimonies in its favor. In somewhat triumphant a tone it is noted that the dictum of St. Basil, *The honor done the image passes through to the principal*, comes from a passage where the Cappadocian Doctor is discussing the relations of the Son (the Image) to the Father in the blessed Trinity. This principle is also quoted in the dogmatic decree of Second Nicea (cf. DB 302), though it is not quoted as Basil's in the conciliar citation. Comment is required on several points of which Professor Bevan has made use.

Concerning the sparseness of early patristic testimonies the historian must take into account several points. The early Church was fighting its slow battle of progress among peoples who had been idolatrous. Many passages in the early sources excoriate image-worship; obviously these attack pagan idolatry, and especially for attributing to the idol itself some supernatural efficacy. That such passages throw any light on how a Christian regarded the image of Christ or of Our Lady or of the Apostles is to be denied; they can support the inference that as far as the wood or stone or marble or painting itself is concerned, no inherent magical power would

be accepted by Christians; they do not support the inference that Christian images were only for the stimulating of devotion, for the objects portrayed were legitimately the objects of Christian cult.

Again, the scattered testimonies concerning images have some explanation in the circumstances of the early centuries. The poverty of the Christians, their proscription in the Empire, the absence of opportunities to build churches are historical facts which account for the rarity of images, and for little discussion of them. In view of the circumstances it is astounding that archeology has discovered such a wealth of representations. As soon as Christianity emerged from the centuries of oppression we find increasing wealth of ornamental and devotional images, together with the explanation of them—and not as some phenomenon which is an intrusion in Church practice, but as a genuinely Catholic manner of acting in widely spread parts of the Church. In view of these considerations, to say that there were images, but no cult was paid to them, seems to be a seizure of the wrong end of the historical stick.

Another historical fact to be taken into account in this matter is that ordinary religious practices pass without much notice or comment until some crisis brings them into prominence or makes them the topic of discussion. In the case of Iconoclasm, politics, not theology, prompted an attack on the ordinary procedure and practice of the Church. The Greek court was anxious to conciliate its Eastern foes, Semitic peoples, mostly Arabs, and, as often, it did not hesitate to adopt an anti-Catholic attitude or doctrine for the furtherance of its political aims. Certain adulatory churchmen undertook to search the patristic sources for anti-iconic passages which would favor Semitic views, and how poor a job could be done may be seen from the reading of their effort in the Sixth Actio of Second Nicea (cf. Mansi, *Collectio Conciliorum*, xiii, coll. 291 ff.) The reader of Professor Bevan's book may be permitted to doubt if the writer read this part of the Council carefully.

Concerning the quotation of the principle, *The honor done the image passes through to the principal*, it is true that St. John Damascene quotes it out of the *De Spiritu Sancto ad Amphilochoium* of St. Basil. It also appears in the dogmatic decree of the Council (DB 302), and it was directly quoted from its source in St. Basil in the Council (Mansi, *ibid.* col. 69). But a reading of the Fourth Actio of the Council (Mansi, *ibid.* 1 ff.) will convince a reader that the intelligent bishops at the Council are not to be charged with witting or unwitting amphibology in using the principle. Upon reading this part of the Council one may again be permitted to doubt that Professor Bevan read it carefully, though it is a primary source for an historian who sets out to write on image-worship in Christianity.

The Fourth Actio was held on the Kalends of October, 787. Tarasius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, opened the proceedings by bidding that the "books of the holy fathers" be brought forth and read where they touch upon the worship of images. Several biblical testimonies were read and commented on; then followed passages from the Fathers of the Church—incidentally one may note that the *catena* of tradition is a continuity embracing biblical and patristic sources. After the citation of St. Athanasius' *Fourth Sermon against the Arians*, Tarasius thus comments: "The very nature of things teaches that *the honor done the image passes through to the principal*; likewise, dishonor. The father [Athanasius] used it for an example." Athanasius argued against the Arians from an example of the Emperor and his image; the principle is implicit in his words, and Tarasius introduced it explicitly in his comment.

Next follow two quotations from St. Basil, the first of which has the principle explicitly, and in the same words as Tarasius; the second has it implicitly. Both citations have to do with the doctrine of the Trinity. Following the second citation of St. Basil, the Presbyter John comments on the fact that St. Basil's mind is that the object and the image are not two but one—words which are strikingly near those which will be quoted later from Saint Thomas. It is evident in these citations that the Council was satisfying itself on the legitimacy of the principle in an application to a doctrinal matter; Athanasius and Basil supported them in using it doctrinally; not one listener present could have thought that either Athanasius or Basil were talking about image-worship; obviously they were not. The mind of the council concerning the principle will also be found in the numerous times it occurred (cf. Mansi, *ibid.* 58, 114, 123, 151, 258, 262, 270, 274, 323 etc.) A principle, so evidently apt and accurate, was naturally included in the decree of the Council; for it indicated briefly and clearly that image-worship is relative, not absolute.

We now turn to Professor Bevan's comment on Saint Thomas, who is "studiously restrained in his attitude toward image-worship." Aquinas discusses this topic in the *Summa*, II-II, 81, a.3 ad 3 (on religion), II-II, 94, 2, ad 1 (on idolatry), and III, 25, 3-6 (on the adoration due to Christ). On his treatment there is an interesting comment of Saint Robert Bellarmine, which may profitably introduce a discussion of the Angelic Doctor. During the discussions caused by Molina's work on efficacious grace the adherents of Bañes drew up a Memorial for Pope Clement VIII in 1597. It was given to the papal theologian, Bellarmine. At the end of the Memorial the writers had added *ex abundantia* errors in theology outside the domain of grace. Bellarmine deals with the charges, among which he found one against himself. In Father Broderick's *Blessed Robert Bellarmine* (II, 47) the view of Bellarmine on Saint Thomas is printed. For our purposes the following quotation is pertinent.

It has pleased the authors of the Memorial to have a hit at Robert Bellarmine before concluding, because he does not use St. Thomas' language about the worship due to images. Robert Bellarmine's answer is that he does not speak like St. Thomas because St. Thomas does not speak like the Popes and the ecumenical Councils. St. Thomas had not been able to examine the testimonies of the Popes and Councils, as it was only after his death that they were either committed to writing, or published if written much earlier. If he had seen them, he would certainly have expressed himself differently, for he was a most exact observer of ecclesiastical regulations. . . .

The state of the question is this. In the second General Council of Nicea it was expressly defined that "the images of Christ are to be venerated and adored in a becoming manner, but not with the adoration of *latria*, which is to be paid to God alone. . . ." This was the doctrine of the Church about the year 800 A.D. when the iconoclast heresy was rampant. During the early times of the Schoolmen, however, that is, after the year 1100 A.D., the acts of the aforesaid Council . . . were hidden away in archives, only to be discovered and published in the present century. The consequence of their disappearance from view in the Middle Ages was that Alexander of Hales began to teach that images of Christ should be adored *cultu latriae* because Christ who is God is so adored. Thus was a novelty, unheard in former ages, introduced into the Church; and because there were no plain ecclesiastical pronouncements to be adduced to the contrary, some theologians, including St. Thomas, who was a disciple of Alexander of Hales, admitted the new opinion, though not a few cried out against it.

In our own day, when the iconoclast heresy came to life again, the Council of Trent, which embraced the doctrine of St. Thomas willingly in other matters, did not think well to imitate his manner of speaking about this matter. In its 25th session it avoided not only the word *latria* but the word *adoratio* also. . . . This, then, is the reason why Bellarmine did not adopt St. Thomas' style. . . . Why, then, do the Friars Preacher take him to task. . . .

It is an acceptable view of later theologians that the prohibition of *latria* in the Council has to do with *absolute* latreutic cult. The passages of the Angelic Doctor are accepted as proving that *relative* latreutic cult is allowable with respect of Christ, and in general that the same sort of cult is given the image as is paid to the principal without the image, the difference being between the relative and absolute worship. The basic reasoning for this is stated in *Summa*, 25, 3, corp. where St. Thomas, citing the principle, *The honor done the image passes through to the principal* (from Damascene's works, not from St. Basil or the Council), deduces his

argument: "Motus qui est in imaginem in quantum est imago, est *unus et idem* cum illo qui est in rem." The same principle is stated negatively in II-II, 81, 3, ad 3: "Motus qui est in imaginem prout est imago *non consistit* in ipsa, sed tendit in id cuius est imago." St. Thomas is touching upon a different point from that which was at issue in the Council; in fact it is a deeper theological point, for it touches on the problem of explaining the relativity of cult; it is adopted by many theologians today as one of several probable opinions. Bellarmine, indeed, did not hold it, for he thought that the Council prohibited *all* latreutic cult to images, both absolute and relative; he gives other reasons for his position in his treatise *De Imaginibus* (the danger of saying that we pay *latría* to an image of Christ, the occasion heretics may take to blaspheme the faith, etc.). In comment on Bevan's "studious restraint" of St. Thomas, it may be noted that he omitted to treat the point which was precisely at issue at Nicea, that he did not have the acts of the Council, and that his principles carry him legitimately to the same positions as those taken in the Council. Again, in arguing to relative latreutic cult to images of Christ, he may be said to have advanced upon the position taken at Nicea, and to have developed, without adverting to it, what was implicit in the declaration of the Council.

MISCELLANEA

NAMES FOR GOD IN RITES OF MISSIONARY COUNTRIES. Certain recent decrees of the Holy See concerning the Chinese and Malabar rites, and the use of certain native words as names for God have aroused interest in problems of doctrine and Church history. The controversies arose long ago in the missions of the Far East, and thus a notice concerning the rites out of two Indian periodicals of standing will not be out of place.

To insure immediate publication of a recent decree of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda His Excellency Leo P. Kierkels, C.P., Delegate Apostolic of the East Indies used the pages of *The Clergy Monthly* [4 (Aug. 1940) 2, 33]. This decree affirmed that since the oath concerning the Chinese rites was no longer obligatory on missionaries, neither was a similar oath concerning the Malabar rites. Because of doubts submitted to the Apostolic Delegate, there appeared a letter by his hand in a later issue [*ibid.* (Oct. 1940) 4, 98], in which he says in part: "Although the Roman document under consideration recalls the abolition of a similar oath about the Chinese rites—some of which have now been allowed—said document contains no clause permitting any of the Malabar rites. Those rites were not forbidden because of the oath, but the oath was imposed to enforce the prohibition of the rites. Only the oath has now been abolished, while all other prescriptions of Benedict XIV in regard to the matter remain in force, unless there be decisions of the Holy See ordering otherwise."

For a clear summary of the question of the Chinese rites one may consult an Indian periodical of longer standing, the *Promptuarium*, in the first number of its readapted form [37 (Jan. 1941) 1, 10-19], under the title, "Circa Quasdam Caeremonias Sinicas." There is an orderly account of the historical origins of the question, of the decrees of the Holy See both of the past and present, and a comment on the present situation. To the summary a brief and essential bibliography is added. The precautions of the Holy See concerning the discussion of the knotty question have been observed.

Questions and doubts concerning two points especially arose in the Chinese missions in the early years of the 17th century. First, could certain Chinese words be permitted

for designating the One God, and secondly, and more importantly, did certain ceremonies in honor of Confucius and of revered ancestors so partake of a religious nature as to make it imperative to forbid them to Chinese converts? Jesuit missionaries were of the opinion that the names could be used without errors in the faith in the One God, and that the ceremonies could be permitted on the ground that they were of a civil and not of a religious nature such as would make them the occasion of idolatrous worship. Franciscan and Dominican missionaries held that in both practices there was a grave danger of wrong and superstitious faith in the converts. Now certain historians have fallen into the error of declaring that these differences on the missions were the mere reflection of quarrels between the Orders in Europe; in reality too much was at stake, and a truer historical perspective has recognized that the priests on the missions were concerned for the true faith, its proper and allowable evangelization. The controversy was not concerned with some superficial matter but with one which involved theology, cannon law, missionary procedure, and to some extent diplomatic usage.

In 1643 Father Morales, O.P., submitted the matter to the Holy See, which, after examination, declared in 1645 that such usage was infected with superstition. Thereupon the Jesuits presented their opinion, and to the detailed document the Holy See answered in 1651 with a declaration that there was no superstition in the usages. Secondary important questions now arose: Which of the replies of the Holy See was obligatory? Were the same points submitted? How accurately? The eventual answer to these questions came in 1704, and was published only in 1709; it proscribed the use of the Chinese words as names for God and it forbade the permission to converts to continue with ceremonies having to do with the honoring of Confucius, the Emperor, and ancestors. Clement XI reaffirmed this position of the Holy See in 1715.

A complication arose in 1720 when the Apostolic Visitor of the Chinese Missions, Cardinal Mezzabarba, issued certain *Permissiones*. These were understood to mitigate the prohibitions of the decrees, and they were issued under secrecy. The Bishop of Peking published them in two pastoral letters, and brought upon himself the severe censure of Clement XII in 1735. Because of this new flare-up of the question the whole affair of the Chinese rites was again submitted to study at Rome. Under Benedict XIV in 1742 the last Pontifical document (the Constitution *Ex quo*) was issued in which the use of the names and ceremonies was forbidden, and an oath of obedience imposed on the missionaries. The legislation of 1742 has been the controlling factor in the conduct of mission instruction until the issue of the recent decrees.

The reason for new legislation is to be found in the change of circumstances which is due to the evolution of culture and thought in the East. In 1914 the Chinese government declared that the ceremonies in honor of Confucius were purely civil in their nature. This declaration reflected the opinion and attitude of the people. Thus in 1935 in the East, and in 1936 in Rome, the new attitude was taken into account in the regulations for the instruction of converts; the fundamental principle was admitted that *now* the ceremonies were considered as merely civil in their nature.

It is to be noted that the present legislation of Propaganda does not touch in any way the disputes of the past; the legislation is not a disavowal of the principles which led to the former decrees; in fact, the whole matter of the dispute of the past is not touched upon, nor is it to be introduced. As the *Osservatore Romano* noted (Dec. 16-17, 1939), "The Instruction passes no judgment on the past controversy, and is far from a disavowal of what was enacted." There is a recognition that the times and thoughts have changed, and that acts which were differently judged in the past are now considered not to be intrinsically evil in themselves, but indifferent, and hence allowable in certain circumstances. Finally, there was now no need of an oath concerning obedience to the old legislation.

PATRISTIC PREACHING. With extensive quotations from the Fathers, the Reverend Edward L. Heston has concluded his series of five articles on "The Dogmatic Preaching of the Fathers," in the March *Ecclesiastical Review*. The richness of the patristic treatment of doctrine is pointed out and illustrated; doctrine is developed and made clear, and the practical effects of doctrine on conduct are pointed out. In fact, it is noteworthy that the exhortations to Christian conduct are based on doctrinal foundations, for in this matter the Fathers followed the example of St. Paul who used the sublimest of Christian mysteries for the instruction of the faithful in matters of morals. It is not within the scope of the author to point out that though the Fathers use many concrete examples for the benefit of their hearers, they do not indulge in the use of the profane story, and never in the "funny" story.

EXEMPLA IN MEDIEVAL PREACHING. It seems that the "story" began to be popular in preaching during the middle ages. Interesting material on the point has been published in Dorris A. Flesner's article, "The Use of Exempla in Medieval Preaching," [*Lutheran Church Quarterly*, 14 (April 1941) 2, 148-163]. The *exempla* include examples in general, and especially, illustrative stories. The author remarks that after the foundations of SS. Francis and Dominic, the level of preaching was higher; on this topic we may recall the early pages of Father Mandonnet's *Saint Dominique* (Paris, 1937, Vol. I, part 1), where it is explained how the two orders combined the monastic spirit with the apostolate of the word among the people. Professor Flesner credits Anno of Cologne with introducing *exempla* into preaching. This was in the 12th century; following this time books begin to appear—*corpora, promptuaria, catenae* etc. The early works have stories of Our Lady, of saints, of miracles; by the 14th century in Bromyard's *Summa Praedicatorum* more than a thousand *exempla* have been collected—"culled from every imaginable source, profane and sacred, and belonging to every class of fiction from fables to jests." Occasionally mere witticisms and sometimes even indecent narratives are included in the later works, though in general they are edifying.

MANUSCRIPTS OF ST. THOMAS. Theologians should not miss the interesting and informative article of Father Robert E. Brennan, O.P., on "The Autograph of the Angelic Doctor." [*Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, 41 (April 1941) 7, 681-686] Aquinas had a poor hand, and it is important to know how to decipher it for he corrected, improved, and occasionally revised the sheets from his copyists. He had his stenographical short-cuts—*t qd iposse e ee nece e n ee* means *et quod impossibile est esse necesse est non esse*. He used old paper, for any paper was precious in his day, and he was a careful religious. But he had good ink, thanks be to God, and it has not faded greatly in view of the fact that the writings are seven centuries old now. He tucked in occasional ejaculations, such as *Ave Maria* when he tried out a newly-cut quill. He was a rapid composer and dosed enough occasionally to make worse mistakes than poor spelling—in one place he wrote down and crossed out *Deus est summum malum*.

SCOTUS ON DOGMATIC THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE. There is a mounting bibliography concerning the question whether or not theology is a science, and these articles, monographs, and books cover the point in itself and also in the opinion of the scholastic theologians. A rather substantial list of recent works is to be found in the article of Father Antonius M. Vellico, O.F.M.—an article which is to be added to the growing list since it deals with Scotus' view on the point—"De caractere scientifico theologiae apud Doctorem Subtilem." (*Antonianum*, 16 (Jan. 1941) 1, 3-30) The writer cites Aristotle's views from the *Analytica Posteriora* (Bk. I, ch. 2), and the definition of a science which the scholastics drew from the passage: *Scientia est cognitio certa et evidens per causas*.

Gathering evidence from the writings of Scotus, Father Vellico notes the four conditions demanded of a discipline, if it is to be called a science in the Aristotelian sense: 1) certain knowledge; 2) the necessity of the object (Scotus: *Apud Aristotelem de contingentibus non est scientia*); 3) evidence; 4) conclusions through syllogistic reasoning. Because of the lack of one or another of the conditions Scotus does not consider theology a science in itself or in God. In those who are *in via* it is not a science according to the definition above, especially because of the lack of evidence, for it proceeds from articles which are accepted on faith; however, in another sense it is a science inasmuch as it has certain knowledge; in itself it is a *habitus* tending by its nature to truth.

SUAREZ' METAPHYSICS. Suarezians and anti-Suarezians will find interesting, the latter, provocative, material, in the article of Father Hunter Guthrie, S.J., "The Metaphysics of Frances Suarez." [*Thought*, 16 (June 1941), 61, 296-311] Suarez "cast about for a central theme which would define his position as a Christian thinker and serve as a fundamental basis for his metaphysics." He chose the notion of creaturehood, utterly unknown to the Greeks, formulated eventually by the scholastics as consisting in finitude essentially: "The creature was thought to be a composition of an infinite principle (which was existence or act) and a principle of limitation (which was essence or potency). Moreover, these two principles were commonly thought to be really distinct." This theory influenced thought in three ways, in emphasizing necessity rather than creation (the independence of existence was corrected by the Christians in their theodicy); it led to the analysis of the *fact* of creaturehood, not of its *right*; in the Greek view the *being* of creatures was thought independent and absolute in its own right; finally, it had influence on physical and mathematical thought. The real distinction of the two principles can be traced back "through Avicenna to Plato and his doctrine of separated ideas."

Suarez' contribution to metaphysics consists in his insistence on dependence as the essence of creatureship. This dependence denoted in its formal concept "a double relation of man to his Maker: first, the relation of created essence (which is totally *ab alio*) to the Creator's essence (which is totally *a se*); second, a relation of created existence to a creative Cause." In this scheme there is "no longer any necessity for the Avicennian doctrine of a real distinction between essence and existence." Not holding to this, Suarez could hold that the first object which is known to the intellect is the actual physical essence of the material object. "This," Father Guthrie says, "is the material object of the scientist; and since, according to Suarez, it is the proper object of the human intellect, it follows—contrary to the commonly held opinion among Scholastics—that man is capable of constructing an inductive metaphysics. By this bridge and this alone will science and philosophy join forces."

RITE OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION IN THE SOCIETY OF JESUS. An interesting historical article on the origin and meaning of the *Professio super Hostiam*, the rite used for the profession of the last vows in the Society of Jesus, is found in the *Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu* [9 (July-Dec. 1940) 2, 172-188] by A. Zeiger, S.J., under the title, "*Professio super Hostiam. Ursprung und Sinngehalt der Professform in der Gesellschaft Jesu.*" The various ways in which religious vows were pronounced may be grouped into three classes, *Professio super altare, in manus, and super Hostiam.*

The profession upon the altar is the oldest form. It was in usage among the Benedictines. The candidate stood or knelt at the altar, the Abbot and community in choir attended as witnesses, the candidate read the vows, laid them on the altar, and signed them there. The ceremony occurred at the offertory, and a relic of the *paterna potestas* of Roman Law is seen in the fact that the family offered their son to the Order at this moment.

The profession into the hands of another became customary after the 12th century, and especially among the knightly orders. The ceremony took place in a chapel, where the

superior occupied a throne; the candidate knelt, folded both his hands within those of the superior and pronounced his vows in the presence of the community.

The profession upon the Host has been customary in the Society of Jesus since its beginnings four centuries ago. The Father General or his delegate says the Mass; after the Communion of the celebrant the candidate kneels at the top step of the *pradella*, and after the *Domine, non sum dignus*, reads his vows, and places the copy of them in the left hand of the celebrant who is facing the candidate with the raised Host. The celebrant then places the copy of the vows on the altar and turns to communicate the candidate. The witnesses of the vows are any members of the community who are present and also *extern* witnesses who are present. For validity it is required only that the vows be publicly pronounced before the properly appointed person before witnesses.

Father Zeiger notes several differences in this ritual from that of the older orders. The ceremony takes place generally in a public church, and not in a community chapel; it occurs between the Communion of the celebrant and that of the candidate; it follows a ceremonial form not occurring in the other modes of profession; above all the ceremony is so fixed that on the day of last vows candidates who are priests do not celebrate Mass; they communicate at the Mass of the General or of his delegate. There are no words peculiar to the ceremony, and hence one must look to history to see if the reason for its insertion at the Communion is symbolic of an exchange of gifts between God and man (the candidate offers himself; his requital is the Holy Eucharist), or if the stability and constancy of the candidate are symbolized in the recitation of the vows immediately before the raised Host.

Suarez conjectures that the Jesuit ceremony began with the Order itself. Yet it seems that certain forerunners of it may be discovered. In the early 14th century a form of profession of the Franciscans at Perpignan in 1331 orders that the candidate recite the *Confiteor* after the priest's Communion, and then read his vows which he then lays on the altar. It does not appear that the priest faces the candidate; nor does the candidate put his copy into the hands of the celebrant. Until other sources give more light on the matter it seems that the Jesuits first introduced the ceremonial. It was followed at the profession in Saint Paul's outside the Walls on April 22, 1541; this was the first official reading of vows after the foundation of the Order on September 27, 1540. But on this day St. Ignatius and his companions followed the ceremony which had been used on Montmartre in Paris on August 15, 1534.

Where did St. Ignatius and his companions find the ceremony? Apparently it is to be traced to the medieval custom of enforcing an oath by swearing by the Blessed Sacrament and also to the promises which were made by the Crusaders. Indeed we have a notice in a letter of St. Ignatius of 1542 where he swore an oath by the Blessed Sacrament on an important matter which came up between him and an embassy from the Portuguese King. The custom derived from the emphasis put on oaths when they were sworn by some *corporeal thing*. It is noticeable in the various medieval *ordeals*, for some of which there are Church blessings; again the hilt of the Crusader's sword formed with the blade a cross; at the cross-piece there was a slot for relics, and thus an oath by the sword was an oath by a holy thing. The most sacred corporeal object by which one could swear was the Body of Christ in the Host. Truth, fidelity, constancy, stability, and the like virtues of service and obedience were thus emphasized.

Such an origin and signification do not therefore argue that even in the days of St. Ignatius the symbolism of an exchange of gifts between man and God was not admitted. Through the vows one gives oneself entirely to God; in the Communion one receives the Body and Blood, Soul and Divinity of Christ. In more recent times the ceremony has been thought to emphasize this exchange. We have no direct information on the thoughts of the early Jesuits; the presumption, therefore, is that the older symbolism prevailed. Father Zeiger notes that both symbolic features are profitably included in the ceremony of the Society, since both have their solemn lessons for the candidate and for the audience.