

COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS

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IT MAY help anyone planning a study of these pages to have from the beginning some idea what they are about, so I propose here to indicate in the sketchy way that alone is possible in an introduction, first, something of the discussion in which they find their context; next, the general sense of the couplet, complacency and concern, which appears in their title; and, lastly, their position in relation to twentieth-century Thomism and the study of St. Thomas.

It seems a fair statement that the dominant notion of voluntary activity has taken the will as an appetitive faculty whose essential act is an inclination manifested in tendency: the will regards an end, and its activity is process towards that end. The notion can claim a solid basis in the history of thought, for it simply gives Scholastic form to the idea of *eros*, desire for the good, however nobly or ignobly that good is conceived; and the Lutheran Bishop, Anders Nygren, in a famous study¹ which we must consider more at length in a later article, finds that the Greek motif, in contrast to the Christian *agapē*, is that of *eros*. Thomist scholars cannot deny the importance of the *eros* theme in their master; one has only to show them the division of the *Summa theologiae*, where the whole of the second and third parts is devoted to what St. Thomas calls "motus rationalis creaturae in Deum."² So, whether on the level of natural ethics or on that of moral theology (and even, according to Bishop Nygren, in the mystical field), it has been usual to conceive voluntary life as a process-towards.³

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This is the first in a series of three articles.

¹ *Agape and Eros*, tr. P. S. Watson (London, 1953).

² *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 2, prol.

³ Perhaps the ultimate expression of this conception is to be found in John of St. Thomas; see his *Cursus theologicus* 4 (ed. Solesmes; 1946) disp. 32, a. 7, on the procession of the Holy Spirit, and notice the frequency of the words *pondus*, *impulsus*, *inclinatio* in his analysis of love. N. 8: "intellectus trahit objectum ad se . . . appetitus vero allicitur et trahitur ab objecto, et sic objectum est pondus ejus." N. 9: ". . . licet tam processio spirationis et impulsus, quam emanatio actus amandi, amor sit: quia est actus vitalis per modum inclinationis egrediens a voluntate."

This mentality has been left untouched by recent efforts to build a moral theology more expressly based on the doctrine of charity; the study of G. Gilleman,⁴ which attracted a good deal of attention on its appearance, explores and applies the principle, *caritas forma virtutum*, but the governing notion of the book is of will as a "puissance spirituelle de tendance."⁵ And when students of the nobler forms of love set their findings against the *eros* current, they often continue to regard love itself as basically an impulse, a tendency towards union, an attraction, and so forth.⁶ In short, will is the faculty of process to a term, willing is an inclination, and love is a movement towards union; in St. Augustine's words, "Pondus meum amor meus."⁷

Is this view of voluntary activity valid as a definitive interpretation of St. Thomas? Outstanding Thomists would say it is. If we turn back a generation to a classic article on love by H.-D. Simonin,⁸ we find him arguing that St. Thomas went through a development on precisely this point and ended by stressing more than ever the aspect of love which is analogous to movement. In his early years he thought of love as a formation of will which gave it rest; the words *formatio*, *terminatio*, and *quietatio* are to the fore. Later, love is conceived not so much as a term giving tranquillity as a movement whose cause is a form received in intellect and whose act is variously described as *consonantia*, *inclinatio*, *proportio*—terms, it is advanced, which mark the presence in appetite of the term to which it will tend. Now love is the basic act of will; St. Thomas, then, would give the approval of his mature judgment to the view that will's nature is to tend to a term.

However, there is a minority report to record. F. A. Blanche, in an otherwise favorable review,⁹ holds there is a certain exaggeration in Simonin's thesis; the idea of love as a completion and lulling ("apaise-

⁴ *Le primat de la charité en théologie morale* (Louvain-Brussels-Paris, 1952).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20. See chap. 2 of Part 2, sect. 1: "notre être est une tendance" (pp. 102-3); sect. 2: "cette tendance est un amour" (pp. 103-48).

⁶ V. Warnach, *Agape* (Düsseldorf, 1951) pp. 18-19: "'Liebe' im weitesten Sinne bedeutet 'Eine Zuneigung haben' . . . Alle Liebe will ein Weg zur Einheit sein." See also pp. 184 ff.

⁷ *Confessiones* 13, 9 (*PL* 32, 849); see also *De civitate Dei* 11, 28 (*PL* 41, 342): "Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur."

⁸ "Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l'amour," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge* 6 (1931) 174-276.

⁹ *Bulletin thomiste* 3 (1930-33) [523]-[528].

ment") of the will has not disappeared in the later works of St. Thomas, nor indeed has that of formation. Desire is tendency and movement, but love, like delight, implies presence already of the good and hence a state of rest.

Despite the debt we owe to the investigations of Simonin, I believe Blanche's point is justified; in the later works of St. Thomas, as in the earlier, there is the *quietatio* which expresses the psychological repose of the will and there is something like an ontological formation of a potency. However, it also seems to me that the problem is a little more complicated than either Simonin or Blanche realized. For love has two quite distinct but complementary roles that are often overlooked when they are not forced willy-nilly into the ruts provided by the controversy over its self-regarding and non-self-regarding attitudes. The fundamental division, prior to all question of the self, seems to me to be this: in one role love is passive, quiescent, complacent; in the other it is active, striving, tending to an object. It is the latter role that is regularly to the fore in St. Thomas, but it is the former, often only implicit in his thought, that is basic both psychologically and ontologically. And the real problem is that St. Thomas never brought these two notions into careful confrontation or worked out extensively their relations to one another, with the result that two contrasting and unintegrated lines of thought show up in a whole series of questions. I am going into this matter, not to refute the view that love has an active role, for it obviously has, and not to propose complacency as a revolutionary idea, for different authors have seen the need of an aspect that is complementary to tendency,¹⁰ but because the point has to be carefully isolated and accurately grasped if we wish to understand some very basic chapters of Thomist thought and to make available to modern discussions, in the full range of its implications, a very fundamental and far-reaching idea.

The words "complacency" and "concern" call for some preliminary explanation. Although I began with a question on voluntary activity, I shifted almost at once to the question of love. It is love, in fact, as the basic form of willing that is under investigation, and the word might be thought to rate a place in the title. But it is an ambiguous term at best. I am not thinking merely of the unhappy overtones it

¹⁰ See *infra* n. 40.

has in popular literature—one would be willing to overlook them—but even in scientific studies it receives different meanings under the pens of different writers. Sometimes it is taken in its full range and then it is too wide for my purpose, including not only the basic form, complacency, but also different derivative forms. Sometimes it is restricted to interpersonal love and then it is too narrow; a viable theory of willing must be fundamental enough to apply to all instances of the good which, after all, is one of the Scholastic transcendentals.

The opposition I have shown to the idea of love as tendency or appetite may suggest to some that I am following Nygren's division, but that supposition would be incorrect. To anticipate a little, I do not think that Nygren's categories are ultimate; they are conceived too much in relation to the self (*agapē* as self-giving, *eros* as self-seeking) to be primary in relation to the transcendental good and are too opposed to one another to permit of their synthesis in terms of either. Nygren, of course, repudiates synthesis and would cast out *eros* as an alien, but this seems to me to be taking unwarranted liberties with Scripture and showing intellectual defeatism in theology. In fact, I think it will be sufficiently clear in due course that both *agapē* and *eros* are derivative from complacency; complacency is ontologically and psychologically passive, but both *agapē* and *eros* are consequent active forms, seeking the good of the other or seeking the good of self. Whether the two derivative forms are to be listed under the heading of concern is a matter of terminology and, although I think there is some precedent for such a grouping, the question lies outside the bounds of my study.

The terms I have chosen are not immune to criticism. Complacency in English usage has connotations which are poles apart from the Thomist *complacentia*; but it has the root sense of a concept I take to be altogether basic in Thomist psychology of the will, and I think we must just accept its unwelcome connotations as part of the unavoidable limitations of language. It indicates that will, before being the faculty of appetite, of process to a term, is the faculty of affective consent, of acceptance of what is good, of concord with the universe of being, and that the basic act of will is to be understood only if it is regarded not as an impulse to a term, or even the principle of process to a term qua principle, but simply as itself a term. That is to say,

willing basically is the end of a process, a quiescence; only secondarily is it the initiation of another process. All this has to be attached to the meaning of the word *complacentia*, but the very effort required to put it into suitable words is perhaps an indication that our thinking has not dwelt enough on this aspect. Those to whom the Thomist *complacentia* is totally unfamiliar may find an avenue of approach in Aimé Forest's consent to being,¹¹ or in Heidegger's gratitude for the grace of being,¹² or, best of all, in de Caussade's *abandon* to divine providence.¹³ A very useful couplet for comparative purposes is Schleiermacher's absolute dependence (receptivity, surrender to God and the universe, submission to the Whole, esthetic religion) and his freedom (activity, control of nature, spontaneous movement, morality, teleological religion).¹⁴ Schleiermacher's psychology is inadequate to the structure he has erected upon it, but I think if one substitutes *complacentia* for feeling as the central and unifying element and works out a theory of knowing and willing that puts *complacentia* on a rational basis, one may have a framework for incorporating large areas of his fertile thought.

Concern, on the other hand, has no linguistic cognate in the basic terms of Thomist psychology. It corresponds quite accurately, I think, to the *intentio finis* of the *Prima secundae*, but it would multiply confusion to use here the many-faceted *intentio*.¹⁵ Now Weiss has a doctrine of concern and apparently a well-fixed usage that could perhaps be adapted to our needs: "A concern—and each being has a concern—is a 'way of reaching from the concrete present into the abstract future,' enabling the being to focus on that future . . . 'in the shape of a

¹¹ See his *Consentement et création* (Paris, 1943). I have not been able to consult his *Du consentement à l'être* (Paris, 1936).

¹² Especially in the Postscript to *What Is Metaphysics?*; see the volume *Existence and Being* (London, 1949) pp. 380–92. The notion may seem to contrast strongly with the earlier emphasis on care, as does the mystical manner with earlier analysis; see J. Glenn Gray, "Heidegger's Course: From Human Existence to Nature," *Journal of Philosophy* 54 (1957) 197–207. But V. Fagone, "Unité ou discontinuité dans la pensée de M. Heidegger," *Sciences ecclésiastiques* 8 (1956) 317–33, holds for a real continuity.

¹³ *Self-abandonment to Divine Providence*, tr. A. Thorold (London, 1933).

¹⁴ See his Introduction to *The Christian Faith* (Edinburgh, 1928); also the second of the Speeches, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, tr. J. Oman (London, 1893).

¹⁵ On its diverse senses see H.-D. Simonin, "La notion d'*intentio* dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 19 (1930) 445–63; A. Hayen, *L'Intentionnel selon saint Thomas* (2nd ed.; Paris, 1954).

limited, pertinent possibility.'"¹⁶ Tillich's use of the word¹⁷ will also have prepared our minds for its reception into systematic thought, although he tends to make the concept coextensive with that of the religious attitude. In any case, I should like to make it clear that this study is primarily interested in the complacent aspect of willing; concern is considered mainly as clarifying by contrast. Hence, too, I am indifferent to the question whether concern should be taken as the generic contrast to complacency (including *agapē* and *eros*) or as identical with *eros*.

It remains now to give a preliminary account of the position to be taken on the study of St. Thomas. And here it may not be unreasonable to anticipate a protest from the progressives who, offended at the complexity and seeming artificiality of Thomist thought, and sceptical of its relevance to the twentieth century, would ask in regard to this article: Is there to be no end to such studies? My own answer is, quite simply, no. As long as developing history continues to generate new problems and new ideas, there will be occasion to go back to Aquinas for what he is so eminently qualified to supply towards solution of the problems and judgment on the ideas, namely, a set of fundamental principles which, just because they are fundamental, allow of infinite adaptation. It is not necessarily a matter of finding the answer there in so many words, but of reaching a solid ground, a fixed orientation, a panoramic view whose heuristic value is incalculable; it is a matter of discovering and exploiting the assimilative capacity of old but ultimate ideas.

That is the practical side of our objective here. The last few years have brought forth a number of religious studies on the divine *agapē*, the loving concern of a Father who does not spare His only Son that the world may be saved. But those very same decades have seen the rise in the secular world of an unprecedented preoccupation with dread and anxiety; philosophies dealing with despair, nothingness, absurdity proliferate; literature is their faithful echo. The human

¹⁶ See R. W. Browning, "Weiss's Doctrine of Concern," *Review of Metaphysics* 9 (1955-56) 328-58; cf. p. 334. The quotation within my quotation is from Weiss's *Nature and Man* (New York, 1947) p. 53. According to Browning, Weiss has a doctrinal ancestor in Whitehead; his concern applies to natural, animal, and human affairs, as did Aquinas' *intentio finis* and *amor*.

¹⁷ *Systematic Theology* 1 (Chicago, 1951) *passim*.

subject has become aware of himself and his vast emptiness. His being he sees to be in advance of himself; his attitude is dominated by his possibility and his projects. But the ultimate possibility turns out to be impossibility, and the permanent project is to face death with Stoic authenticity. In this situation I do not think we fulfil our task by telling thinking, rational, analytical men: "Your anguish is merely the ultimate expression of the Greek *eros*; the answer to it is the divine *agapē*." No doubt *agapē* is the answer. No doubt, when we have made our best efforts to integrate human aspirations with the divine liberality, we remain in the class of useless and unprofitable servants. But this does not absolve us from doing what we ought to do to render a rational account of the hope that is in us and to present an understanding of God's ways in re-creating us that can be integrated with an understanding of His ways in creating us. To give an ontological basis to the description of the human condition emphasized in existentialist thought we need, I think, a further speculative study of the state Aquinas called being "omnino in potentia in genere intelligibile"¹⁸ in itself and in its relation to mortality and other human phenomena. But to meet the situation with something like a practical counterattack with our natural resources as well as to understand and integrate the divine work that so far excels our resources, we need to discover the Thomist *complacentia boni* and exploit its virtualities. It is in this latter aspect that I hope this study may be useful for the problems of our times, if it has any success at all in approaching the eminence of the Thomist viewpoint. Consequently my first care, leaving applications to a later article, is to study the thought of St. Thomas in his own writings. The results may make long and tedious reading, but only patient attention to the texts will permit a sufficiently accurate grasp of the idea to enable us to apply it with surety to modern problems.

Quite different objections may be put from the conservative side. It has been maintained that Thomist doctrines possess quite enough interest in themselves and need no effort at *rapprochement* with modern ideas. Historians may find that I pay too little attention to Thomist sources and not enough to a comparative study of his earlier and later writings. Others, for whom the Thomist tradition has hardened into

¹⁸ *De malo*, q. 16, a. 12, ad 4m.

something like a complete system, may not take readily to the thesis that St. Thomas "non semper loquitur formaliter," that important aspects of his thought remain unintegrated, that there are basic underlying doctrines which influence his writings without ever coming to adequate formulation, so that one must construct them from scattered traces as one does a dinosaur from fragments. These objections (which, by the way, are not imaginary) all have a point. But if to the first I simply recall the Leonine "vetera novis augere et perficere," and to the second express the hope that the significance of complacency will encourage historians to undertake the study I have omitted, to the third I must oppose the very nature of the human mind and its progress. Sartre has used the simile of a town with orderly streets and squares, houses and offices, surrounded by a monstrous jungle growth that creeps ever closer to engulf the ordered arrangement as the chaos of absurdity engulfs our little patterned areas of meaning. We might reverse the direction of the figure and consider Thomism as a patterned area of thought with long columns reaching out to penetrate the "chaos" of the potentially intelligible, and then we have an image at least for conceiving that one line of his thought may be only partially in liaison with another, and even that the whole centre of operations may shift position. In any case, it seems to me that we must loosen a little our notion of a rigorist Thomist system; he uses terms rather freely in different senses, enunciates principles as universal which are to be taken as true *ut in pluribus*, throws out *obiter dicta* revealing hidden and undeveloped doctrines, and generally, while the rigor of his reasoning and the clarity of his usage are in sharpest contrast to a style that takes flight in poetry just when you want specific explanation, does not at all allow himself to be inhibited by a formalism imposed some centuries later.¹⁹

The order of discussion is this: a first section will attack at once the question of a scheme behind the scheme of the *Summa* psychology, and this will provide, I hope, a background and integrating framework for the two forms of love; a second will take up directly Thomist

¹⁹ Various authors have been drawing attention to the same point: B. Lonergan, in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 3 (1942) 573-76; 7 (1946) 371-72; 8 (1947) 424-25; A. Hayen, *op. cit.* (supra n. 15) p. 18; M.-D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas* (2nd ed.; Paris, 1954) pp. 100 ff.; S. Pinckaers, in *Bulletin thomiste* 9 (1954-56) 361.

intentio boni and *complacentia boni*; a third will study a series of questions in which the failure to integrate these two notions more fully is apparent; then we shall try to draw the Thomist doctrine together into a pattern and confront it with notions current in our day. Finally, an appendix will deal with realism of will and realism of intellect in St. Thomas, a question which is tangential to the whole of my study. This first article includes only two of the projected sections.

FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION: THE DUPLEX VIA

It will enormously simplify discussion and enlighten whole ranges of texts if we can supply from the beginning some framework which will integrate the data on complacency and concern and allow us to see their coherence with one another and with general Thomist psychology. The account of voluntary activity given in the treatise of the *Prima secundae* does not provide the needed basis; it is dominated, as we shall see, by the idea of progress to a goal, and our problem, by hypothesis for the moment, is to add a viewpoint that does not regard progress to a goal. Can this be done within the context of Thomist ideas?

One may think, as a first possibility, of going back to the *Pars prima*, where procession of creatures *from* God is treated, and combining it with later volumes to give as the bipartite scheme of the *Summa*: *exitus a Deo* and *reditus in Deum*. This is the plan that Chenu has made familiar to everyone through his *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, but even those who are satisfied with it as the structural principle of the *Summa* may admit that it does not meet the present requirements. For it is ontological, and what we seek is something psychological as well, a scheme that will integrate the two quite opposed attitudes of will we are to study. Does St. Thomas provide it?

I believe that the fundamental framework on which we can organize the data of both complacency and concern is to be found in St. Thomas' own writings, even if it does not govern the plan of any of them, and that he has given a clear and expressive name to the scheme. It is found in a couplet which divides psychological activity into a *duplex via*: the *via receptionis* and the *via motionis*. There is a double direction

in psychological process: in one direction will is at the end of the process and receives from intellect, but in the other will is at the beginning and moves the other potencies to their activity. This *duplex via* is not architectonic for any work of St. Thomas; it is not even, so far as I know, an important structural element in any subdivision of his psychology; indeed the clearest expression of it seems to be tossed off almost as an afterthought in answer to an objection. But it keeps recurring in various guises with a regularity that stamps it as part of his habitually operative stock of categories, and I believe that, once we grasp its implications, we will find it exceedingly useful, if not indispensable, for organizing the diverse ranges of our data. Here is the best statement I have found of the distinction:

Will and intellect have a mutual priority over one another, but not in the same way. Intellect's priority over will is in receiving (*in via receptionis*), for if anything is to move the will it must first be received into intellect. . . . But in moving or acting (*in movendo sive agendo*) will has priority, because every action or movement comes from the intention of the good; and hence it is that the will, whose proper object is the good precisely as good, is said to move all the lower powers.²⁰

Another closely connected couplet is called "via a rebus ad animam—via ab anima ad res." But the fluid usage of St. Thomas prevents us from giving it a fixed meaning, and the context in which it often occurs swarms with difficulties. Hence I have thought it best not to lose our way at once in useless complexity but to defer fuller discussion of this couplet to an appendix which will appear at the end of the whole study.²¹ For the present it is enough to note the close connection

²⁰ *De verit.*, q. 14, a. 5, ad 5m; for linguistic simplicity I have transposed the phrases, "in via receptionis . . . sed in movendo sive agendo," to "via receptionis . . . via motionis." References to the latter by name are more frequent, but they occur in a way that seems to take the other member for granted: *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 83, a. 3, ad 3m: "secundum ordinem motionis"; *De carit.*, a. 3, ad 12m: "in operando et movendo"; *In Heb.*, c. 11, lect. 1, § 554: "in ordine movendi."—N.B. Paragraph numbers (signaled by §) for the commentaries and opuscula will be given according to the new Marietti editions (1948 ff.) so far as they are available. They will be given for the *Contra gentiles* by counting paragraphs in the Leonine manual edition.

²¹ Meanwhile the reader may wish to consult some of the relevant texts. One set associates the *motus* or *via* from things to soul with intellect, and the *motus* or *via* from soul to things with will: *De pot.*, q. 9, a. 9 c: "Et ideo intelligere nostrum est secundum motum a rebus in animam; velle vero secundum motum ab anima ad res"; cf. *De malo*, q. 6, a. un., arg. 14a; *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1m; q. 50, a. 3, ad 3m, etc. Another set assigns both directions to intellect, according to whether it is acquiring knowledge or using habitual

in idea there is between the *via receptionis* and the *via a rebus ad animam*, and between the *via motionis* and the *via ab anima ad res*.

These terms and distinctions are significant enough in themselves, but it is quite remarkable how far they penetrate into different areas of Thomist thought. A clear example is the twofold function of intellect involved in the *duplex via*. There is a knowledge that is received from things (*via receptionis*), and there is a knowledge that is causative of things (*via motionis*).²² It will help to have some of the texts quoted:

There are two ways in which the forms of things by which intellect knows are related to things: some are productive (*factivae*) of things, some are received (*acceptae*) from things.²³ The similitude of the thing known may be in the knower in two ways: as caused by the thing, as when things are known by a species abstracted from them; or as cause of the thing, as is clear in an artificer.²⁴ Since all knowledge is through forms . . . there will be two ways of knowing: one by forms received (*acceptas*) from things, another by forms which are the causes of things, or are received from the causes of things.²⁵

This opposition is that between the Thomist senses of speculation and art. There is a similar opposition between faith, in which mind is *speculativa veri*, and prudence, which parallels art as conduct does manufacture and production; and this contrast provides a very pertinent addition to our data:

Reason can be considered in two ways: intrinsically (*secundum se*), or in its dominion over lower powers. In its dominion, then, over the lower powers, it is perfected by prudence. And hence it is that all the other moral virtues, by which the lower powers are perfected, are informed (*formantur*) by prudence. . . . But faith perfects reason intrinsically in its function of contemplating what is (*est*

knowledge in inspection of the concrete: cf. *In 2 Sent.*, d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3m; *In 3 Sent.*, d. 14, a. 3, sol. 3; *In lib. de caelo et mundo*, proem., § 2.

²² We take these terms in the sense of Aquinas, which seems notably different from that of Tillich's receiving and controlling knowledge (*Systematic theology* 1, 94-100). Besides fundamental divergences in the general theory of knowledge (for Aquinas knowing is an identity, not a union through separation, and his categories of knowing are quite distinct from other psychological activities like emotional involvement), there is the immediate difference that the object of Aquinas' speculative knowledge is whatever is (God, man, and things), that of his practical knowledge is the to-be-done or to-be-made.

²³ *De anima*, a. 20 c.


²⁴ *Quodl.* 7, q. 1, a. 3 c.

²⁵ *In 4 Sent.*, d. 50, q. 1, a. 3 c. The last words of the quotation refer to the reception of knowledge of material singulars in the *anima separata*; see *In 2 Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 3. On God's knowledge as causative of things, see *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 14, a. 8, and parallels.

speculativa veri); hence it does not inform the lower powers but is itself informed by charity.²⁶

Prudence, then, finds its proper role in the series of acts in the *via motionis*, and one needs no express statement from St. Thomas to realize that faith, as contemplating truth, belongs to the *via receptionis*, in which we receive from things (revelation) but do not cause them. Evidently the scheme of the *duplex via* enters deeply into cognitive theory.

We turn from intellect to will to find there also a twofold function corresponding to the *duplex via*, although the contrast is not set forth with the same sharpness now as it was for intellect. One reason for the obscurity, if the position of this study is sound, would be the failure of St. Thomas to bring complacency and concern into clear confrontation as opposed attitudes of will, and this difference appears in his assigning different virtues for different operations of intellect, while one virtue in the will may fulfil various functions. But the fundamental reason, the reason for these reasons, seems to be that intellect precedes will in one way but follows it in another, so that its two functions are separated psychologically by the intervention of an act of will and may be represented graphically on divergent paths, whereas will is a hinge point and its diverse functions neither appear so clearly to consciousness nor are so easily represented graphically. Consider the following diagram:



Here A and C are different acts of intellect according to the twofold order, A in *via receptionis*, C in *via motionis*. But what of B, the inter-

²⁶ *De verit.*, q. 14, a. 5, ad 11m. See also *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 47, a. 13, ad 2m: "Ratio fidei consistit in sola cognitione. Sed prudentia importat ordinem ad rectum appetitum"; *ibid.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3m: "fides est in intellectu speculativo ut in subiecto," but as "intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus," so faith "per dilectionem operatur."—The illustration of the *duplex via* here is not perfect. Faith differs from science in its dependence on an act of will; in itself, and with respect to its proper object, it is speculative, caused by things in the *via receptionis*, but this *via receptionis* includes an inserted *via motionis* before intellect comes to the term of assent. Again, the exercise of faith is under the dominion of charity: "eius non est formare virtutes inferiores, sed formari a caritate"; however, this can be brought under the general rules linking intellect and will.

vening act or acts of will? On reflection we can see that at least it does double service in the will, being at the end of one process and the beginning of another; but the duality is not immediately apparent.

However, the duality is there. It is usual to speak of a twofold charity, contemplative and active, or affective and effective.²⁷ I am not at all sure that the authors in question mean by the distinction just what I shall mean in the course of this paper,²⁸ but I do believe there is a valid and important sense to the distinction, one which fits the general doctrine of St. Thomas, even though I have not noticed those terms in his writings. Thus, when he distinguishes charity as a general virtue entering into all others and charity as a special virtue with its own proper object, he is at least laying a basis for the distinction between active and contemplative charity: "Although charity is a special virtue if its own proper object is considered, still it is common to all virtues by reason of a certain extension of its dominion (*secundum quamdam diffusionem sui imperii*); hence it is called the form and mother of all virtues."²⁹ Charity as a general virtue governing all others is a motive force, an efficient cause;³⁰ as such it must precede what it governs, whether this be a judgment or some other act coming under charity's universal sway. But charity, like every other act of

²⁷ M. Brocklehurst speaks of active and contemplative charity; see his "Contemplation and Perfection," in *The Christian Vision* (London, 1956) pp. 75-83, where it was reprinted from *The Life of the Spirit* 6 (Dec., 1951). O. Lottin points out that both Aquinas and his successors distinguish an affective and an effective *velle*; cf. *Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 7 (1954-57) 477 (no. 1841).

²⁸ For example, St. Francis de Sales, *Treatise on the Love of God*, tr. H. B. Mackey (Westminster, Md., 1942) p. 231 (Bk. 6, chap. 1), includes both complacency and desires in affective love, and puts obedience to God's commands and acceptance of His decrees together under effective love. Our division would put desires under concern, acceptance under complacency (a later article will explain this more fully). Again, our theory of complacency can leave the will passive; it does not call for those mysterious activities John of St. Thomas requires in the will; see the reference, *supra* n. 3, and also *Comm. in Primam secundae*, disp. 18, a. 4, § xi, quoted by M. J. Faraon, *The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love* (Dubuque, Iowa, 1952) pp. 76-77. Faraon gives a brief commentary, *ibid.*; there is a more detailed exposition in Simonin, *art. cit.* (*supra* n. 8) pp. 216-34, and in R. Morency, "L'Activité affective selon Jean de Saint-Thomas," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 2 (1946) 143-74.

²⁹ *De malo*, q. 8, a. 2 c.; cf. *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 58, a. 6 c. These two texts put the point more schematically, but it is also contained in the questions dealing directly with charity: *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 23, a. 4 (see especially the *responsa ad obiecta*), and parallels.

³⁰ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 23, a. 4 c.

will, follows a judgment, in this case a judgment of faith;³¹ and under this aspect it seems to correspond more to a contemplative, affective function and to the *via receptionis*. As we saw earlier, it is the *duplex via* which reconciles the priorities of intellect and will with respect to one another. "Intellect's priority over will is in receiving," and this priority is fundamental; it is priority *simpliciter*, and it is the priority of faith over charity in the generation of the theological virtues. "But in moving or acting will has priority," and this gives the general basis for the consequent dominion of charity over all the other virtues in their exercise.

Now the priority of intellect over will and the corresponding dependence of will on intellect in the *via receptionis* is the absolutely fundamental point of the thesis of this study. It may be summarily expressed in the formula: The basic act of will is a term rather than a principle. Moreover, it is simply term; it is not a compound act in which an inchoate willing as principle produces another willing as term to provide a parallel with intellect where understanding produces the word. Still less is it a matter of will's producing its own first act, lifting itself by its bootstraps. The two illuminating chapters of Thomist doctrine here are the procession of the Holy Spirit and the fundamental passivity of will.

The perplexities of Thomists on the procession of the Holy Spirit may be schematized from an article by T.-L. Penido.³² Noting that it is not the *processio operationis* in man which supplies an analogy for the Trinitarian processions but rather the *processio operati*, he asks: But is there a *processio operati* in the will as there is in the intellect? Thomists answer almost unanimously yes. However, there agreement ends. On Aquinas himself, some say he denied such a *processio operati* in his *De veritate*, only to affirm it in the *Summa theologiae*. Others maintain he never changed his doctrine and make valiant attempts

³¹ See *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 4, a. 7 c., on the priority of faith. *Ibid.*, ad 5m: "Non potest voluntas perfecto amore in Deum tendere nisi intellectus rectam fidem habeat circa ipsum"; "perfecto" here is in opposition to an imperfect love which itself is prior to faith: "actus voluntatis praeexistit ad fidem, non tamen actus voluntatis caritate informatus." This prior act of will again proceeds from a judgment, and the series may be extended backwards. But finally we must come to a judgment which is simply first in the process: "Voluntas respicit praecedentem potentiam . . . non autem intellectus" (*De verit.*, q. 14, a. 1, ad 3m).


³² "Gloses sur la procession d'amour dans la Trinité," *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 14 (1937) 33-68.

to bring the text of the *De veritate* into conformity with their interpretation of the *Summa* text. On the objective side, some say the term produced in the will is really distinct from its principle, others that it is only rationally distinct. Of the latter, one inquires: Where is the reality of the procession, and the analogy for the Trinity? Of the former: How is the real distinction proved? Here there is a wide divergence. Some argue backwards from God: The Holy Spirit is a distinct term in God and proceeds by way of love; similarly therefore in the human will. . . . Others argue metaphysically: An action which does not produce a term involves a contradiction; but Thomists generally deny the metaphysics of that argument. Again, it is adduced that since there is a term in the intellect, there should be one *a pari* in the will; to which the rejoinder is that Aquinas himself increasingly distinguished intellect and will. Finally, there are those who try analysis of willing itself: Will is drawn *inchoative* and *in fieri* by volition, *complete* and *in facto esse* by the impulse which is the term; to which Penido answers: Why, once will has started on the course of love, does it not continue? why must it pause in its movement to produce a mysterious force (of itself!) with which to move itself farther? Facing this conflict of opinions Penido seriously doubts whether the analogy of love for the procession of the Holy Spirit is really valid at all.

His doubts have been shown, I think, to be groundless. The whole complex structure of arguments and counterarguments collapses when we examine the simple explanation, based on a wide sampling of texts, that B. Lonergan offers in his *Verbum* studies, and discover that the analogy of St. Thomas is not any procession from the will or any procession from something in the will, but the procession of love *in* the will *from* the intellect.³³ It is the positive part of this contribution that

³³ "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 8 (1947) 407; note 20, *ibid.*, gives some of the relevant texts. This was the third article in the series; see the fifth article, *ibid.* 10 (1949) 373-75, for a more precise grasp of the *emanatio intelligibilis* and the *processio operati*.

It may be worth while illustrating graphically the contrasting theories. Of two views on the *processio operati* in the will, one would have it this way:




Here I is the possible intellect, W is the will. A and B are the *dicere* and *verbum* which give an analogy for the Son's procession. C and D are some corresponding pair in will that are supposed to give a similar analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit. But just what C and D are in themselves and in relation to one another, that is the mystery. And

especially engages our attention; the procession of love is an *emanatio intelligibilis* from the inner word as the word is an *emanatio intelligibilis* from understanding. And as the word is a term, so the act of love is a term. I do not think St. Thomas was guilty of arguing backwards from what he attributed to God by analogy to what he must find in man to constitute the analogy. If human love is an analogy for divine proceeding Love, it is because independently of revelation we can discover that human love is a term. And I submit that the scheme which makes this intelligible is the *duplex via* in which love, the first act of will, is a term in the *via receptionis*; only in the *via motionis* is love a principle, but that *via* is analogous, not to the Trinitarian processions, but to the procession of creatures from God.

Secondly, in terminal love will does not lift itself by its bootstraps. As the *duplex via* supplies a scheme for reconciling the respective priorities of will and intellect and showing how the act of love can be a term, so it permits us to take a coherent view of the active and passive aspects of will itself. For will is first passive before it can be active in the sense of being an efficient cause. The famous article of the *Prima secundae*, "Does the will move itself?", puts in a variety of ways the affirmative response to its own question: "It is master of its own act," "it has the power to move itself," "it moves itself," "it actuates its own potency," "it is moved by itself." But all this self-determination supposes that will has already been actuated with regard to the end: "In that it wills the end, it moves itself to will the means to the end," "in so far as it actually wills the end, it actuates its own potency in regard to means to the end."³⁴ And the following article explains that this actual willing of the end, the first

notice that the mystery is in the field of human psychology, not just of Trinitarian theology.

Lonerger's view can be shown as follows:




Here I is the field of intellectual consciousness, divided by the dotted line into intellect and will. A and B are the *dicere* and *verbum*. C is *amor*, and its procession from B is no more mysterious than any other chapter of human psychology. A, B, and C are also actuations of potencies, but this is a matter of a *processio operationis* which both sides agree is irrelevant to Trinitarian theory. Finally, while in us B and C are both a *processio operati* and an *emanatio intelligibilis*, it is the latter aspect that we can find analogously in the divine processions.

³⁴ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 9, a. 3.

act of volition, is not from will itself but from an external object and an external mover.³⁵ The point is put with extreme sharpness in the treatise on grace when St. Thomas distinguishes between *gratia operans* and *gratia cooperans*; here we read of an effect “in which our spirit (*mens*) is moved but does not move [anything],” and another “in which our spirit both moves and is moved.” If the word “mens” troubles us, we have only to read on a bit to find that it applies to will: “In that act, will’s role is to be moved, [but in the other] activity is attributed to the will.”³⁶

Now clearly enough, if there is passivity in the will with regard to its object, it belongs to the *via receptionis* where willing is a term; and, if there is efficient causality in the will, it belongs to the *via motionis* where willing is a principle. A simple graphical scheme restricted to the relevant factors may facilitate a grasp of this point. The following diagram extends one already used and gives the basic relations between will and intellect:³⁷



Omitting the immediate action of God, we have here these elements: X and Y are acts in the sensitive field, A to D are acts in the intel-

³⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 4: “Ipsa movet seipsam, in quantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi consilio mediante. . . . Et si quidem ipsa moveret seipsam ad volendum [finem], oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret, ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita. Hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis.”—The external mover, *quantum ad exercitium*, is God, *quantum ad specificationem*, is the object presented by intellect: *ibid.*, aa. 1, 4, 6; q. 10, aa. 2, 4; etc. The second aspect is a well-worked field; see the classic positions in the second chapter of Simonin, *art. cit.* (supra n. 8).

³⁶ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 111, a. 2 c. See *ibid.*, q. 22, a. 1 c., on the various senses of *pati*, and a. 3 on the difference between sensitive appetite and will in this respect. On the passivity of will in St. Thomas, see B. Lonergan, *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 3 (1942) 533-37; 7 (1946) 611; 8 (1947) 437; notice, in the third reference, the correction of a misprint in the second.—One great obstacle to acceptance of the will’s passivity has been the doctrine that all vital acts must be produced by the subject as efficient cause; the same author has shown that this doctrine cannot appeal to St. Thomas. See his *Divinarum Personarum conceptio analogica* (Rome, 1957) pp. 247-50; also *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 8 (1947) 413-17.

³⁷ The source of this schema will be recognized at once by those who have followed Fr. Lonergan’s lectures on grace.

lectual field, A and C being acts of intellect, B and D acts of will. Specifically, A is the judgment on the good as end, specifying the act of willing the end; it is itself, of course, a word proceeding from understanding, but that aspect is omitted here. B is the passive act of willing the end, in which the will is *mota, non movens*. C is the counsel of intellect searching out means to the end, an activity exercised under the influence of B in the *via motionis*. D is the election of some means to the end, the act in which will is *mota et movens*, reducing itself from potency to act. Finally, X represents the influence of the sensible world on the higher powers in the *via a rebus ad animam*, and Y represents the activity of man, artistic or moral, on his own sensitive nature and the sensible world in the *via ab anima ad res*.

The crucial point is B, where the *via receptionis* ends and the *via motionis* begins, and it is with B as term of the first *via* that this paper will be largely concerned, in the conviction that it is the Cinderella of studies in psychology and spirituality, chronically pushed off the stage by the more palpably evident activity of a will in active pursuit of a good. Although the approach here has been through the doctrine of ends and means, I think it is possible to go beyond that and separate the first act of the will from the idea of an end to be sought. That is, in the doctrine of ends and means, B is first passive and then active. But the evidence to be uncovered will require a passive act at B that is just passive, that is simply the end of a process, a coming to rest, an act that is more accurately named complacency in the good than willing an end. It is an affective response to the good that is, rather than a seeking in any form, selfish or self-giving, of the good that is not. It is under this aspect that love corresponds to and provides an analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity, where the Third Person is a term bringing the divine processions to a close and is certainly not a Love for an object good to-be-made, to-be-done, to-be-attained, or to-be in any way that involves a not-yet. It is attention to this aspect and to the possibility of simple acts of complacency, removed from all notion of striving, that can supply a needed corrective to a culture almost wholly oriented towards the objects of its concern.³⁸ Finally, it is this aspect that separates the present study from all questions of ethics or moral science and shows it

³⁸ Of course, as the history of spirituality shows, there can be exaggeration in the opposite direction too.

to move in a different field from works like *Le primat de la charité en théologie morale*; similarly, it separates this study from discussion of the structure of the human act, on which so much important work has been done in recent years;³⁹ for all these ideas pertain to the *via motionis* and the pursuit of an absent good. But if we have provided in the *duplex via* a scheme for integrating complacency with concern, the next step is to determine with all possible accuracy just what complacency is in itself and in its opposition to concern.

COMPLACENTIA BONI AND INTENTIO BONI

We have now to provide those details of willing as a term and willing as a tendency which alone will guarantee an accurate grasp of the doctrine and assure its intelligent implementation in a full and balanced psychology. This is especially necessary for willing as a term, for complacency. Willing as a tendency, concern for the end, *intentio boni*, has not suffered general oblivion; hence I shall give it scant notice. But, although many Thomists have drawn attention to the complacent aspect of the will's psychology,⁴⁰ they have done so merely

³⁹ See, besides the manuals, O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale au XII^e et XIII^e siècles* 1 (Gembloux, 1942) 393–424; T. Deman, "La 'précepte' de la prudence chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 20 (1953) 40–59; R. Gauthier, "Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain," *ibid.* 21 (1954) 51–100; S. Pinckaers, "La structure de l'acte humain suivant saint Thomas," *Revue thomiste* 55 (1955) 393–412; also reviews by Lottin, in *Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 7 (1954–57) 477–78; Gauthier, in *Bulletin thomiste* 8 (1947–53) 60–86; J. Tonneau, *ibid.*, pp. 87–106; S. Pinckaers, *ibid.* 9 (1954–56) 345–62.

⁴⁰ F. Hatheyer, *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 44 (1920) 88–93, in his article, "Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Gottesliebe," pp. 78–105, 222–41; R. Egenter, *Gottesfreundschaft: Die Lehre von der Gottesfreundschaft in der Scholastik und Mystik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts* (Augsburg, 1928) pp. 10–16 (Warnach, *Agape*, p. 25, thinks Egenter overrates complacency); J. de Finance, *Etre et agir dans la philosophie de saint Thomas* (Paris, 1945) pp. 192–98; *idem*, "La motion du bien," *Gregorianum* 39 (1958) 8, 15, 16, and especially 39–40; L.-B. Gillon, "Genèse de la théorie thomiste de l'amour," *Revue thomiste* 46 (1946) 322–29; A. Forest, "Le réalisme de la volonté," *Revue thomiste* 46 (1946) 457–76. I do not say these authors would agree with my thesis in detail, but they provide a welcome hint that I am not altogether on the wrong track.—Z. Alszeghy's study, *Grundformen der Liebe: Die Theorie der Gottesliebe bei dem hl. Bonaventura* (Rome, 1946), is not primarily concerned with Aquinas, but certain features he describes in St. Bonaventure's notion merit mention: the *dignitas* of God as motive for love (pp. 48–50), the subordinate role of reference to self (pp. 54–77) and the corresponding insistence on objectivity (pp. 77–105), the passivity and quiescence of love (pp. 87–88). Although the author does not wholly approve of attempts to reconcile Bonaventure and Thomas (pp. 118, 121–22, 175), I think these qualities can be found also in Thomist writings on love.—R. Johann, *The Meaning of Love:*

in passing, while intent on other matters; there is needed an *ex professo* study of the idea which will give it sharper determination, show its far-reaching ramifications in Thomist psychology, and help to disclose its implications for our times.

In all this there is no thought of denying Thomist emphasis on willing as tendency. In fact, that very emphasis contributes in its own way to my thesis; that is, if in a framework articulated especially for the opposite viewpoint the doctrine of complacency here and there emerges, the conclusion is that it pertains to the underlying thought structures of St. Thomas, even though it does not come to the fore in his planning. Let us make sure, therefore, of the emphasis on willing as tendency before coming to our main purpose.

Intentio boni

One has only to consult the plan of the *Summa theologiae* and especially its *Pars secunda* to see that there can be no dispute about the general orientation. The three parts, we are told, will be devoted respectively to God, the process by which rational creatures attain to God, and Christ who as Man is our way to God.⁴¹ At the beginning of the *Pars secunda* the principle of division is further specified: the first part treated the exemplar, God, and the creatures He willed to make; now we are to study the image of God, man, and specifically man as the principle of his own acts and master of his works.⁴² This

An Essay towards a Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity (Westminster, Md., 1955), teaches the limitations of a love that seeks the good as a perfection of a potency (chap. 4); with this I am in wholehearted agreement, but I am afraid we part company on fundamental questions of metaphysics and psychology.—Finally, I think I may claim strong support from L.-B. Geiger, *Le problème de l'amour chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal-Paris, 1952). Although there is only passing mention of complacency (pp. 100, 114, 115), the general lines concur with what I have found in St. Thomas: there is an emphasis on the role of intellect in specifying the good in itself as the object of will. Love is the pure affective presence of the subject to the object, depending on intellectual grasp of the good (p. 74). Thus the "objectivity" of love is assured (p. 73). And the question of self is relegated to second place.—However, the good is viewed as attracting, and love as a movement, tendency, etc.

⁴¹ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 2, prol.: "primo . . . de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum; tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum."

⁴² *Sum. theol.* 1-2, prol.: "postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem."

involves a discussion, first, of the end of human life and, then, of the means of reaching that end or losing it.⁴³ The end, of course, is beatitude, and we gain beatitude by human activity,⁴⁴ consequently, most of the *Pars secunda* deals with human activity.

Now human activity is properly human when it is voluntary,⁴⁵ and one may fairly say that this consideration is architectonic for the whole of the *Pars secunda*. It would be tedious to follow its articulation throughout the two volumes, and in any case a few soundings are quite sufficient for a point so obvious. The very definition of will as "appetitus quidam"⁴⁶ is indicative enough, for *appetitus* comes from *petere*;⁴⁷ the contrary of *appetere*, moreover, is sometimes supposed to be a *fugere*.⁴⁸ So dominant is this notion that we can read the flat assertion that every act of an appetitive potency can be reduced either to a "striving for" or a "flight from."⁴⁹ Or, again, that the good in the field of conduct determines the perfection of the will's act.⁵⁰ The point

⁴³ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 1, prol.: "ubi primo considerandum occurrit de ultimo fine humanae vitae [qq. 1-5]; et deinde de his per quae homo ad hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab eo deviare [qq. 6 ff]."

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*: "quia ultimus finis humanae vitae ponitur esse beatitudo. . . ." Q. 2, prol.: "de beatitudine [qq. 2-5] . . . tertio, qualiter eam consequi possimus [q. 5]." Q. 6, prol.: "quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus aliquos necesse est pervenire, oportet consequenter de humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem, vel impediatur beatitudinis via [the rest of 1-2, and all 2-2]."—Human activity in this context has a Pelagian ring now, but for St. Thomas human acts under the influence of grace remain human acts.

⁴⁵ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 6, prol.: "cum autem actus humani proprie dicantur qui sunt voluntarii, eo quod voluntas est rationalis appetitus, qui est proprius hominis; oportet considerare de actibus in quantum sunt voluntarii."

⁴⁶ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 8, a. 1 c. The act of will is an "actualis appetitus boni," *ibid.*, ad 1m; cf. *ibid.* 1, q. 80, a. 1 c., and q. 82, a. 1 c., where the "motus voluntatis" is simply an "inclinatio," and *ibid.* 1-2, q. 50, a. 5, ad 1m, where the "actus voluntatis" is an "inclinatio."

⁴⁷ *De verit.*, q. 22, a. 1 c.: "appetere autem nihil aliud est quam aliquid petere, quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum." See L.-B. Geiger, *op. cit.* (supra n. 40) pp. 41 ff. Notice a change on this point between *In 1 Sent.*, d. 45, a. 1, ad 1m, and *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 19, a. 1, ad 2m.

⁴⁸ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1m: "voluntas igitur se habet et ad bonum et ad malum; sed ad bonum, appetendo illud; ad malum vero, fugiendo illud."

⁴⁹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 45, a. 2 c.: "omnis autem motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam." Cf. *In 3 de anima*, lect. 14, § 813: "semper motus est fugientis aliquid secundum appetitum aut prosequentis."

⁵⁰ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1m: "perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum hoc quod est aliquid bonum alicui ad agendum."

is sharpened by contrast with intellect, which is perfected by having the understood object within it, while will's operation consists in tending to the thing as term.⁵¹ Finally, there is the sovereign role of will in governing other activity.⁵²

In this orientation we naturally expect love, the basic act of both passion and rational appetite,⁵³ to play a dominating role. Love is the very principle of movement tending to the loved end.⁵⁴ It is the first inclination of appetite to the good to be obtained.⁵⁵ It consists in being drawn "according to a certain movement given the lover by what is loved. For what is loved attracts the lover to itself."⁵⁶ And what is true of love as a general form of affective response is true of charity as our particular supernatural love of the good. Charity, too, we can find defined simply in terms of tendency, "an inclination . . . for tending to God."⁵⁷ And, of course, it has a ruling function with respect to other virtues. It is enough here to refer to the article, "Is charity the form of virtue?" where the affirmative answer is explained to mean that charity orders the acts of all other virtues to the ultimate end, and this by way of efficient causality, "magis effective."⁵⁸ One may also consult the Leonine indices to St. Thomas (*s.v.* "caritas") and find such headings as: "It is the root source (*radix*) of all infused

⁵¹ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 23, a. 6, ad 1m: "operatio intellectus completur secundum quod intellectum est in intelligente . . . Operatio autem voluntatis . . . perficitur in inclinatione appetentis ad rem sicut ad terminum." Cf. *ibid.* 1, q. 81, a. 1 c.: "ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti: operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui." On this contrast see M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, "Le désir du bonheur et l'existence de Dieu," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 13 (1924) 162-72; also the appendix to these articles.

⁵² *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 17: "de actibus imperatis a voluntate." Note that the distinction between elicited and commanded acts (*ibid.*, q. 8, prol.) is not the distinction at the center of this paper; there is a partial coincidence, but it is only partial, for some elicited acts are in the *via motionis*.

⁵³ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 25, aa. 1-2; cf. q. 26, a. 2 c.: "prima immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor"; *C. genl.* 4, 19, § 3: "omnium [actuum] . . . amor et unum principium et communis radix invenitur"; *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 20, a. 1 c.; *ibid.* 1-2, q. 4, a. 3 c.; q. 56, a. 3, ad 1m; q. 70, a. 3 c.; etc.

⁵⁴ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 26, a. 1 c.: "amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum."

⁵⁵ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 36, a. 2 c.: "amor . . . est prima inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum."

⁵⁶ *Comp. theol.*, c. 46 (Parma and Marietti; c. 45 in Vivès).

⁵⁷ *De carit.*, a. 9 c.

⁵⁸ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 23, a. 8 c., and ad 1m. See Gilleman, *op. cit.* (supra n. 4).

virtues in so far as they are virtues," "it is the first principle of the spiritual life."

Lastly, if we revert to the primitive image at the origin of most of these ideas, we find it is one of spatial distance; we are *separated* from the good, with the consequence that we have to move *towards* it, it is a *bonum consequendum*. So the relation of one loving to what is loved is threefold, depending on whether the object of love is present, absent but impossible of attainment, or absent but attainable.⁵⁹ Love is a spontaneous impulse *towards*, "est spontaneus motus in amatum,"⁶⁰ and so degrees of charity are determined as follows: *withdrawal* from sin, *advance* in good, endeavor to *adhere* to God and enjoy Him.⁶¹

Clearly the desire of appetite, the striving for perfection, the ruling and efficient role of charity, are prominent enough in Thomist thinking on the will's activity. Our orientation to the good is a tendency, an *intentio boni*.

Complacentia boni

The statements of the previous section, though but a selection from the available matter, are certainly impressive and suggest rather strongly the exclusion of any contrary notions of willing and loving. But, granting all that they say positively, I must insist that they are not the whole story. There is another aspect of charity and, more generally, of voluntary activity which is opposed to tendency as term is to movement and is far better characterized as *quies* than as *appetit*. Nor do I mean by that the *quies* which the will finds in attainment of the ultimate end, for that is the last step in its movement; the *quies* I mean is preliminary to movement. I think this will emerge from the textual evidence, but St. Thomas has not underlined the notion nor, in my opinion, confronted it with his doctrine of *intentio boni*, so that two unintegrated positions on various questions can be noticed. The task here is to underline the notion and sketch, in due course, some areas where unification has not been achieved.

My investigations will be limited largely to the *Summa theologiae* in this second section. This restriction seems justified by my purpose, which is not to write the history of the idea in St. Thomas but to dis-

⁵⁹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 4, a. 3 c.

⁶⁰ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 25, a. 2 c.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, q. 24, a. 9 c.

cover whether he held it at all in his mature period.⁶² Further, it is not the *Secunda secundae* with its captivating treatise on the particular love which is charity (qq. 23–46) that will most engage our attention, but the *Prima secundae* and the general form of human love in so far as it can be determined from the doctrine centered round questions 26 to 39 and from the general psychology of human acts in questions 8 to 17.

This procedure, which may give the appearance of mere caprice, has a more pointed significance. A strongly personalist current in modern philosophy has flowed into studies of love, with the result that the concept in its very basis is determined largely by what is proper to its personalist form; further, there is a stressing of love as unifying, which involves treating it as a principle; and finally there is more than a hint of an irrationalist approach to the problem: love is the ineffable.

One cannot deny the extreme importance of the person both in a general philosophy and a study of love. I wish to make it quite clear that I do not do so in this paper. But I think it is a mistake to build a general theory on what is proper to a restricted form. Being, after all, is somewhat more universal than person. As for St. Thomas, we have to remember that, in the movement of the *Pars secunda* from the general to the particular, what is said in the earlier half is implicit in the later unless reason is shown for excluding it. It does seem true that personal and unifying elements are to the fore in the treatise of the *Secunda secundae* where the first article defines charity as friendship, but it is also true that the account of love in the first volume contains notions that are quite generic, and that love itself as an act of will can be subsumed under the still more generic treatise on human acts. Indeed, if the good has any significance in a theory of love, as it must if love is the basic act of will, there must be a more general form of love than that of persons, for the good is one of the Scholastic transcendentals. And, lastly, the doctrine of St. Thomas on human acts does not provide for a love that is irrational in the sense of being ineffable (we omit the special question of sin); to say that an act of will is specified by intellect is to say it is rational, and I do not know of any unspecified acts of will in Thomist psychology.

⁶² Moreover, I have found no reason to deny Simonin's assertion of love as the *quietatio voluntatis* in the early works.

With this in mind I consult the *Secunda secundae* primarily to ask a question: What does St. Thomas mean when he writes that love is distinguished from hope in this, that love implies union, but hope implies movement?⁶³ If love already gives union, what are we hoping for? If love gives an imperfect union and we hope for a better, in what will this better union consist? A greater love? But, for St. Thomas, there is no essential change in charity when we pass from the earthly form to the heavenly.⁶⁴ Is charity, then, an adequate heading under which to discuss the transition to beatitude? If we insist on the article which compares growth in charity to the approach to God,⁶⁵ are we maintaining clearly the concept which distinguishes charity from hope? If we say with St. Thomas that charity is both union and tendency to union, “*dilectio est actus voluntatis in bonum tendens, sed cum quadam unione ad amatum,*”⁶⁶ is it not evident that we have to rethink the idea of charity as union? The point here is not the superfluous one of reminding readers that beatitude, for St. Thomas, consists in knowing what God is; it is rather that, if union occurs essentially on a more fundamental level, then to try to explain it in terms of charity, or charity in terms of union, is to become involved in serious difficulties, and that point may not be superfluous.

a. *The General Form of Love*

While the question of union must await a better solution in the third part of this study, it is possible to clarify the notion of charity now by going back to the *Prima secundae*, which is related to its twin volume as general to particular.⁶⁷ Love, too, has a more general form

⁶³ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 17, a. 3 c.

⁶⁴ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 67, a. 6; q. 111, a. 3, ad 2m; 2-2, q. 19, a. 8 c.

⁶⁵ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 24, a. 4 c. As the text says, the approach is not *passibus corporis*, but *affectibus mentis*—a phrase with a fascinating history! See P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1950) pp. 111–12, 125–28.—For the curious, I have noticed the following allusions in St. Thomas (the more remote are put in square brackets): *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 3, a. 1, ad 5m; [q. 8, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 9, a. 1, ad 3m]; 2-2, q. 24, a. 4 c.; q. 83, a. 5, ad 3m; *In 4 Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2; *C. gent.* 3, 119, § 4; [*Quodl.* 1, q. 7, a. 2, arg. 3]; *De carit.*, a. 11, ad 5m; *De perf. vitae spir.*, c. 2, § 563; *C. retrahentes*, c. 6 (*prope init.*), § 757; [*ibid.* (*post med.*), § 761]; *In Matth.*, c. 5 (v. 1), § 400; [*ibid.* (v. 41), § 546 (this section of the commentary is an interpolation, according to R. Guindon, *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 25 [1955] 213*–19*)]; *In Ioan.*, c. 6, lect. 4, sect. 5, § 915 (cf. c. 14, lect. 6, sect. 3, §§ 1944–45).

⁶⁶ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2m.

⁶⁷ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 6, prol.; 2-2, prol.

than that of the treatise on charity, both as rational love⁶⁸ and still more as applying to both rational and sensitive love.⁶⁹ However, if we go directly to the treatise on love as a passion, it is not with the intention of applying indiscriminately to rational life whatever we find written there. Nor need we guess when to discriminate, for the point that most concerns us is asserted by St. Thomas himself to hold for both sensitive and rational life.

This point is the analogy between appetite and physical motion. Every moving agent attracts or repels the body moved. In attraction three stages are distinguishable: the agent first gives an inclination or aptitude for being moved; secondly, it gives motion (if the body be not already at the term of motion); thirdly, it gives rest in the term. When the idea is transferred analogously to the field of sensitive appetite, the agent becomes the good which gives "inclination," or "aptitude," or "connaturality" towards the good, and this response of the subject pertains to love. Then the agent gives motion towards acquisition of the good (desire), and last of all it gives rest in the good acquired (delight, joy).⁷⁰

Already in this first attempt of the work to describe the response of appetite in love we have three of the series of ten terms collected by Simonin,⁷¹ and we shall see presently that this verbal abundance has its significance. A later article adds a fourth term: the first act, besides being an aptitude, is a "proportion" to the end, and again this proportion is love. More important, love is also defined by the psychological term I have used in the title of this study: "It is nothing else than complacency in the good." This complacency is distinct from and precedes desire, which is the second step, and joy, which is the third.⁷²

Further on we meet still another term: the first step is a "coaptatio" of appetite to the good. And to come to what is an essential point for our thesis, the analysis of appetite based on the analogy with physical

⁶⁸ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 23, a. 4 c.: "proprium autem obiectum amoris est bonum . . . Et ideo ubi est specialis ratio boni, ibi est specialis ratio amoris. Bonum autem divinum, inquantum est beatitudinis obiectum, habet specialem rationem boni. Et ideo amor caritatis, qui est amor huius boni, est specialis amor." Cf. *ibid.* 1-2, q. 65, a. 5 c.

⁶⁹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 26, a. 3 c.

⁷⁰ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 23, a. 4 c.; cf. *C. gent.* 3, 26, § 15; *Comp. theol.*, c. 107.

⁷¹ *Art. cit.* (supra n. 8) pp. 190-94.

⁷² *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 25, a. 2 c.

motion is extended to all response to a final good, including the rational. After distinguishing natural, sensitive, and rational appetite, St. Thomas continues:

In each of these appetites the name "love" is given to that which is the principle of movement tending to the loved end. In natural appetite the principle of this movement is the connaturality of what has the appetite with that to which it tends; this can be called natural love. . . . And similarly the adjustment (*coaptatio*) of sensitive appetite or of will to something good, that is to say, their very complacency in the good, is called sensitive love, or intellectual or rational love.⁷³

Finally, we may note that the series of terms with which St. Thomas tries to characterize this first act is not yet at an end: the act is a "consonantia,"⁷⁴ and it is the counterpart of "form" in nature;⁷⁵ indeed it is "informatio quaedam ipsius appetitus,"⁷⁶ and the object causes love by adapting and "conforming" appetite to itself.⁷⁷

There is, then, a first "movement" of "appetite" which is a mere complacency in the object and is quite distinct from consequent process towards the object—is, in fact, the principle of all such process: "complacency in the desirable; from which follows all movement towards the desirable."⁷⁸ To put "movement" and "appetite" in

⁷³ *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 1 c. It may be useful to note that sensitive appetite is sometimes called spiritual as opposed to natural; cf. *ibid.*, q. 22, a. 3 c.

⁷⁴ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 29, a. 1 c.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 2 c.

⁷⁶ *De spe*, a. 3 c.: "similiter in appetitu animali, primo quidem est informatio quaedam ipsius appetitus per bonum; et hoc est amor." If the *De spe* and *De caritate* belong to an earlier period, this reference and that in the following note are not so relevant; I do not pronounce on this point. However, the doctrine of the *Prima secundae* which requires a *coaptatio* in the will that desire and movement may follow, seems to assert equivalently a *formatio voluntatis*, even if the intermediate works (*Sum. theol.* 1, q. 80, a. 1 c.; *C. gent.* 4, 19, §§ 2-3) speak of the species in intellect as the form on which follows the inclination of will.

⁷⁷ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 30, a. 2 c.: "ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, in quantum appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem." The word "conformamur" occurs in *De carit.*, a. 1 c.; it refers there to the relation between the habit of charity and its acts, not to that between charity and its object, the good; still the habit is a "formale principium."

⁷⁸ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 26, a. 2 c. See also q. 27, a. 4 c.: "nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat aliquem amorem. Cuius ratio est quia omnis alia passio animae vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo. Omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit: quae pertinet ad rationem amoris. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris." *Ibid.*, ad 1m: "cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione; sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente." Ad 2m: "desiderium rei alicuius semper praesupponit amorem illius rei."

quotation marks, as I have done, is to indicate some departure from the sense ordinarily given those words. And indeed it seems to me that they are seriously misleading if we do not give them a much more general sense than that of process for the one and faculty of desiring or striving for the other. St. Thomas indicates in this context the more general sense for *motus*, namely, simple change in the subject: "Love, even though it does not signify appetite's movement (*motum*) tending to the desirable, does nevertheless signify the movement (*motum*) by which the desirable changes appetite to become an object of complacency to it (*ut ei appetibile complacere*)."⁷⁹ Now if faculties are to be defined by their acts, we must make a parallel modification in our notion of appetite. This St. Thomas does in other contexts: "Although the name of the appetitive power is derived from having an appetite for things not in one's possession, still the appetitive power is not limited to these objects alone, but extends to many others too."⁸⁰ To put it in terms corresponding to his remark on *motus*: Appetite, though it does not necessarily signify a desire for the good, does signify a proportion to the good, a state of being in harmony with the good.

This analysis of love is significant enough in itself and still more so in its virtualities. What St. Thomas has done is take us behind process or tendency to the principle of process. It is true, the whole emphasis is still on love as a principle of action. It is an aptitude for tending, it is a proportion to the end, it is such that desire and movement follow, and so forth. But at least it is clear that love is not itself desire and consequent process but their principle, and this puts us fairly on the threshold of a further question. To be a principle of process implies being first of all something in itself. What, then, is love in itself? If love as a principle explains consequent process, what is it that will explain love?

This is the question that in the order of discovery, *ordo inventionis*, arises last of all. We first notice the object and palpable tendency of love; then we go back to the cause of tendency; finally, with great labor differentiating the elements of psychological consciousness, we conceive the cause in its absolute aspect. Just as God is first conceived as

⁷⁹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 26, a. 2, ad 3m.

⁸⁰ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 59, a. 1, ad 2m; cf. also q. 19, a. 1, ad 2m.

what He is for us and only slowly, with recurrent rebellions, does the human mind move to a consideration of what He is in Himself, so a real effort of speculative intelligence is required to go beyond the vividly felt impulse of desire to its principle and beyond the principle as principle to the principle as absolute.

I said that St. Thomas at least puts us on the threshold of a further question. Does he not do more? Simonin was of the view that the terminology itself of the later writings brings to the fore the idea of movement and tendency. But without claiming any competence in medieval Latinity, I should like to see this established somewhat more thoroughly. I suspect that he has transferred the general emphasis on tendency to the terms describing love itself in its basic act. In fact, of all the words cited, *inclinatio*, *proportio*, *consonantia*, *coaptatio*, *connaturalitas*, *aptitudo*, *complacentia*, *convenientia*, *immutatio*, *intentio*, and perhaps *informatio quaedam*, of all these only *inclinatio* and *intentio* in themselves clearly convey the notion of tending, and *intentio*, we shall see, belongs rather to subsequent movement; the others indicate a relationship, a harmony, an agreement, a resonance, a similarity, a concord, but seem just as well suited to the notion of love as a term as to the notion of love as a principle of tendency.

Moreover, this very proliferation of words has its own meaning. It is fairly obvious that St. Thomas is struggling to express here in a variety of ways an idea that has not yet acquired its own technical name. But principle and tendency are not especially novel ideas; they have been exploited from the time of his earliest writings and have entered largely into the preconceived plan of the *Pars secunda*. Now it is remarkable that in his articles on the names of the Holy Spirit St. Thomas should have pointed out another linguistic lacuna. We have a word, he says, to express the relation of knowledge to its object, scil. *intelligere* (knowledge of this or that); we have also words to express the process of intellectual conception, scil. *dicere* and *verbum*; hence we can use *intelligere* for divine essential knowledge, and *dicere* and *verbum* to add the relations which distinguish Father and Son. But we have no parallel wealth in talking of the will; *amor* expresses a relation to the object (love of this or that); but there are no special words for the process by which love originates and for its relation to its prin-

ciple;⁸¹ and so we must use the same word, *amor*, for both essential love and proceeding Love. Is it mere coincidence that twice in the study of love the lack of a suitable terminology becomes evident? I think rather that there is question of the same lack in one case and the other. The treatise of the *Prima secundae* with its little cascade of different terms for love in itself shows that this aspect has not yet been properly worked out and given its technical name; but the question of the nature of love in itself is solidary with that on its origin as an *emanatio intelligibilis* from the word of intellect, and that is the aspect in view when St. Thomas says we have no special word for proceeding Love in the Trinity.

It is the scheme of the *duplex via*, linking the origin of love with its consequent activity, that enlightens this problem. Simonin in the general conclusion at the end of his work sums up his first two chapters by saying that love is not a static form but an inclination, and it is not the result of the efficient activity of intellect specifying the act of will; he shows the harmony of these two chapters and adds that further study should be devoted to that mysterious attraction exercised by the good on appetite which we call spiration. I cannot but think that the harmony of his two chapters is due in part to a common neglect. Love is first and foremost not an inclination but a passive complacency in the good, not a *motus* that is a tendency but a *motus* that is simply a change in the will. Further, if there are intrinsic objections to the efficient causality of intellect on the will, I should like to see them convincingly stated. As for St. Thomas, if it is true that he never worked out a general theory of efficient causality,⁸² objections based on his authority lose their force as well; in any case, they had little weight with him, for, despite his distinction of efficient and final causality, he does not scruple to speak of willing as an effect of knowing: "quia enim intellectus movet voluntatem, velle est effectus eius, quod est intelligere."⁸³ Finally, this is the *spiratio* of love. As it is the Father and Son who spirate the Holy Spirit in God, so in rational psychology it is the *dicere* and *verbum* that spirate the complacency of love, not the will itself or some mysterious force the will provides.⁸⁴

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, q. 37, a. 1 c.

⁸² This is the view of B. Lonergan, *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 10 (1949) 378, note 89.

⁸³ *In Rom.*, c. 7, lect. 3, § 564.

⁸⁴ One may ask whether this safeguards the freedom of love, and the answer is that some

But, despite the coherence of the picture once it is put together, I do not think that St. Thomas, when he came in the *Prima secundae* to the questions on love, ever consciously assembled in any comprehensive way the scattered elements of his thought. A treatise on the passions is, after all, not the best place for such a synthesis; it is the active role of rational love as an inclination that is especially analogous to the passion of love, and I suppose we should be grateful for such references as we have to the complacent role.

b. *The General Form of velle*

How does the foregoing section square with the general Thomist psychology of the will and its acts? I think it will be found that there is general agreement with important differences in detail. There is general agreement in the threefold structure of love's activity, and to some extent in the nature of the basic act; but where one account speaks of this first act as a complacency, the other, as we already saw, brings out rather its passivity; further, *velle* seems to regard the good almost exclusively as a good to be attained, whereas *amare* seems to remain open at least to a good that simply is.

We may begin with a very significant passage in the question on *intentio finis* in which Aquinas remarks that the will has three ways of regarding the end: willing it absolutely, enjoying it in fruition, intending it as the term of an ordered arrangement of acts.⁸⁵ The parallel of these notions with the three we have just been studying is too striking to be merely fortuitous. *Velle absolute*, *intendere*, *frui*, have obvious affinities with *complacere*, *desiderare*, *quiescere*. Is *velle absolute* to be simply identified with that *complacere* which we have found to

love is free and some is not. The first actuation of will in any given series of conscious acts, and consequently the first act of love, is never free, but subsequent acts are. As we saw, supernatural charity supposes a prior love of the good, so at least charity can be a free act, whereas that prior love (if we go back far enough) is not.

⁸⁵ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4m: "Voluntas respicit finem tripliciter. Uno modo absolute: et sic dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi. Alio modo consideratur finis secundum quod in eo quiescitur: et hoc modo fruitio respicit finem. Tertio modo consideratur finis secundum quod est terminus alicuius quod in ipsum ordinatur: et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam: sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire." The prologue of question 8 says merely: "actus autem voluntatis in finem videntur esse tres: scilicet velle, frui, et intendere."

be the basic act of love? Tempting though it is to assert the identity as self-evident, I am not sure the matter is quite so simple.

A first difficulty is in the failure of St. Thomas to declare the identity, though it is true that there was little occasion in a treatise on passion for referring back to his rational psychology. A second difficulty is more serious: the words *velle* and *complacere* simply have not the same connotation; one we would translate by the English "want" or "wish," *velle aliquid* presumably means to want something; the other has not this sense. The example used in the text confirms the point: "uno modo, absolute: et sic dicitur voluntas, prout absolute volumus vel sanitatem, vel si quid aliud est huius modi." What, we are apt to ask, could willing health be but wanting it?⁸⁶

A third difficulty lies in a parallel St. Thomas makes between willing the end and willing the means. In both there is the proportion to the object and there is the tendency to the object. With regard to the means, these acts are election, which is a proportion, and use, which is a tending and pertains to the second aspect. With regard to the end, the two acts are not named, but they are certainly *velle* and *intendere*.⁸⁷ This is all well and good, and it is heartening to find a link with complacency in the use of the word "proportion" as opposed to tending. But there is a slight flaw, for with regard to the means there are two stages of willing: there is consent, which is expressly described as a complacency in the various means and by implication is an incomplete willing, and election, which chooses among the means⁸⁸ and was de-

⁸⁶ The example is recurrent. See *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 8, a. 3 c.: "sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut sanetur"; q. 9, a. 4 c.: "cum enim aliquis vult sanari, incipit cogitare quomodo hoc consequi possit, et per talem cogitationem pervenit ad hoc quod potest sanari per medicum, et hoc vult." Cf. *De malo*, q. 6 c.

⁸⁷ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 16, a. 4 c. A by-product of this text: St. Thomas no longer seems to call *velle* openly a *tendere*; earlier, he did: "intendere in hoc differt a velle, quod velle tendit in finem absolute; sed intendere dicit ordinem in finem" (*De verit.*, q. 22, a. 13 c.).

⁸⁸ *Consensus* is likened to sense, "quasi experientiam quamdam sumens de re cui inhaereat, in quantum complacet sibi in ea" (*Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 15, a. 1 c.). But there may be many means, and the will may regard them all with complacency: "quorum dum quodlibet placet, in quodlibet eorum consentitur"; hence the necessity of election (*Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3m).—R. Gauthier, *art. cit.* (supra n. 39) pp. 98-100, finds *consensus* superfluous in Thomist doctrine, and shows how its origin was due to an historical accident. I cannot pronounce on the historical accident, but the very necessity of choosing between means supposes some act of will which approves of them all. Cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.* (supra n. 39) 1, 423, note 1.

scribed in the previous text as a complete willing, “ut complete velit id quod est ad finem.” If *velle* and *eligere* are alike in being a complete wanting, *velle* of the end and *eligere* of the means, and consent is opposed to election as a mere approval of means from which the element of wanting is absent, are we to say that complacency and *velle finem* stand in a similar relationship, so that complacency is simply approval of the good and *velle* regards the good as an end to be attained? I think so. We cannot avoid introducing some duality into *velle* if we admit a *velleitas* which is somehow an act of will and yet not a complete *velle*.⁸⁹ It is an act of no importance if the emphasis is on action, as was the case in the text cited. Still, it has to be accounted for in a general theory of willing, and I believe we must group it with complacency in a form of willing that is more fundamental than *velle*, and consists in mere approval of the good without reference to action. If the good is such as to call for action, then mere approval is subject to the scorn in which we hold velleities, but if the good is such as merely to call for approval, then complacency is the right and rational attitude.

One piece of evidence remains to be examined. Has the word *absolute* in *velle absolute* the force of taking willing out of the field of tendency and appetite and identifying it with complacency? It certainly means to deny some element of tendency, but the usage of St. Thomas is not sufficiently fixed for us to argue to an identity on the basis of this word alone. Earlier he opposes *absolute* to *intendere* as *immediate* to *mediate*: *velle* regards the end absolutely according to will's own proper nature, i.e. immediately, but *intendere* introduces some ordination of reason with regard to means.⁹⁰ And later, in the *Prima secundae*, the word

⁸⁹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1m: “terminatio, seu perfectio actus voluntatis attenditur secundum ordinem ad operationem . . . secundum hoc, quod est aliquid bonum alicui ad agendum. Hoc autem est possibile. Et ideo voluntas completa non est nisi de possibili, quod est bonum volenti. Sed voluntas incompleta est de impossibili: quae secundum quosdam velleitas dicitur.” See *ibid.* 3, q. 21, a. 4 c., where the field goes beyond the impossible; also *De malo*, q. 16, a. 3, ad 9m.

⁹⁰ *In 2 Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 c.: “quando appetitus fertur immediate in aliquid, non dicitur esse intentio finis . . . sed quando per unum quod vult in aliud pervenire nititur, illius in quod pervenire nititur dicitur esse intentio. Hoc autem est finis: propter quod intentio dicitur esse de fine non secundum quod voluntas in finem absolute fertur, sed secundum quod ex eo quod est ad finem, in finem tendit”; cf. *ibid.*, a. 5 c.; *De verit.*, q. 22, a. 13 c.: “quandocumque in actu voluntatis apparet aliqua collatio vel ordinatio, talis actus erit voluntatis non absolute, sed in ordine ad rationem: et hoc modo intendere est actus voluntatis”; *ibid.*, q. 22, a. 15 c.; q. 24, a. 6 c.; *In Eth.* 1, lect. 1, § 1: “etsi vires

absolute has a variety of meanings. Thus, *absolute et secundum se* is the manner of willing the end as opposed to that of willing the means.⁹¹ *Respicere bonum absolute* is opposed to *respicere bonum sub ratione ardui*,⁹² and, though one regards the concupiscible power and the other the irascible, both seem to fall under the heading of *intendere*.⁹³ Later the same distinction occurs under a new name: the object of the concupiscible is the *bonum absolutum*, that of the irascible is *bonum contractum, scilicet arduum*.⁹⁴ When we read that "tristitia respicit malum absolute. . . . Timor vero . . . cum quadam arduitate,"⁹⁵ the complexity grows, for sadness itself is relative to love. Finally, we come to a usage that supports the identity of *velle* with complacency, for *absolute* is opposed to absent objects, hence to the good to be acquired: "bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis."⁹⁶

It does not seem possible to assert on positive grounds the identity of *velle absolute* with *complacerere*. Can one appeal to aprioristic considerations? *Velle* is the first act of will with regard to the good, the principle of its pursuit. *Complacerere* is the first act of love, which is the basic act of will and the principle of all others. The two cannot but be identical.

This consideration would be rigorous given one assumption, that St. Thomas had worked out a fully integrated theory of love and was proceeding with the flawless perfection of a logic-machine. But it is just that assumption that is in question. My own view is that his theory was never completed. When the matter comes up in the *Sen-*

sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis"; and see the prologues of qq. 19 and 22 of the *Pars prima*.

⁹¹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 12, a. 4 c.; cf. q. 8, a. 3 c.

⁹² *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 1 c.; cf. a. 2 c.; q. 26, a. 1 c.; q. 42, a. 3, ad 2m.

⁹³ For, in q. 23, a. 4, we learn that the irascible presupposes the concupiscible "quae absolute respicit bonum"; yet within the movement of the concupiscible there is the threefold aptitude, desire, and quiescence.

⁹⁴ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 25, a. 1, sed contra; cf. *ibid.*, ad 1m, where they are opposed "sicut commune proprio." There is a related but not identical distinction in the question on hope, *De spe*, a. 1 c., where desire and hope are distinguished in two ways: (a) the object of desire is any good, that of hope is the *bonum arduum*; (b) desire is absolute, without consideration of possibility or impossibility; hope, however, tends only to the possible good.

⁹⁵ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 42, a. 3, ad 2m.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 30, a. 2, ad 1m.

tences period,⁹⁷ he has already the elements of a complete theory: the first act as quiescence, complacency, connaturality, the principle of all others; but there is no interest in separating complacency and defining it more carefully. The *Pars secunda* is built on the notion of a beatitude to be acquired by acts, and its general psychology, limited by that viewpoint, will not need any clear contrast between willing as complacency and willing as tendency; hence *velle* regards an end to be acquired, even though the absolute attitude to the end is quite clearly distinguished from tendency towards it, and the passive side of willing is brought into focus. Only when questions 26 ff. come to treat of love in itself does an analysis of its character force into the open the truth, never denied, that will's first response to the good is not movement towards it but a simple change in the subject, a complacency. There is now some attempt to fix the nature of this complacency, in witness of which we have the multiplication of terms where no technical term is available. But the matter is not pursued further; St. Thomas does not seem interested (I think we will be able to give reasons for his attitude), and a treatise on passions does not lend itself to such an expansion. On the other hand, when the special form of love which is charity comes up for study, there is the new element of friendship to occupy the scene and push the general and basic discussions of the *Prima secundae* into the background.

This, it seems to me, represents roughly the course of St. Thomas' accounts of love. There is no contradiction between discussions, unless one wishes to press *obiter dicta* and take as universal principles what he implicitly qualifies by the context. But there is, I think, a lack of integration, which shows up in a variety of ways. We shall see more about this in the third section, but meanwhile we can confirm and clarify the basic theme by a further piece of evidence.

c. Complacency and Beatitude

So far we have found a *duplex via* that gives a basic scheme for the admission of a willing that is passive, terminal, and quiescent, along with a willing that is an active tendency. The willing of the end in the Thomist general psychology (*velle finem*) is a passive act in the *via receptionis*, and can be related coherently to subsequent acts of tending

⁹⁷ *In 3 Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1.

in the *via motionis*; if it seems in the *Prima secundae* to be regarded merely as the principle of tendency, still there are hints even there of a stage of mere complacency distinguishable from the aspect in which it is a principle, and, in any case, to be a principle means to be something absolute first. That absolute aspect emerges in the general doctrine of love later in the volume, even though it is still closely tied to the desire and tendency of which it is the moving cause.

Now the character of such a terminal, passive, quiescent willing is similar to that of willing in beatitude. Beatitude is a state where we no longer seek the good but rest in its possession. No one would deny that the distinction between the will that seeks the good and the will that rests in the good accords with the contrast between *viatores* and *beati*. But the point of this paper is that will first rests, then seeks as *viator*, and finally comes to permanent rest in beatitude. Is there any evidence for a prior beatitude or state akin to it which corresponds to that terminal willing we identify with complacency?

It happens that there is such evidence, and it is not the least of the arguments for our thesis. St. Thomas has a well-defined doctrine of a twofold beatitude, perfect and imperfect. Repeatedly in questions 2 to 5 of the *Prima secundae* and afterwards, he distinguishes a perfect beatitude reserved for heaven and an imperfect possible on earth. The former consists entirely in the contemplation of truth and hence is an operation of speculative intellect; the latter consists chiefly (*primo quidem et principaliter*) in contemplation but secondarily in the operation of practical intellect ordering human activities and human passions.⁹⁸

These are primarily two states of intellect, but they involve two corresponding states of will, as appears under different headings. First, there are two ways of possessing the end. There is an imperfect possession, but there is also a prior imperfect possession, "inasmuch as what is willed is in the willer, through a certain proportion . . . to what is willed."⁹⁹ I do not think there can be any doubt that "proportion"

⁹⁸ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 3, a. 5 c. See also q. 3, a. 2, ad 4m; a. 3 c.; a. 6 c.; q. 4, a. 5 c.; a. 6 c.; a. 7 c.; a. 8 c.; q. 5, a. 3; a. 4 c.; a. 5 c.; *In 4 Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 4 c.—For some interesting points on the relation between the position of St. Thomas and that of Aristotle and Dante, see E. Gilson, *Dante the Philosopher* (New York, 1949) pp. 129-42 (chap. 2, § 5: "Primacy of Contemplation").

⁹⁹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 16, a. 4 c.

here is a link with the proportion or connaturality which is the complacency of love, and so we have this complacency giving partial possession of that whose perfect possession will be beatitude.

Secondly, there is a twofold union: "One is real, and is had through conjunction with the thing itself. . . . The other is an affective union, and is had by aptitude or proportion." The first pertains to joy¹⁰⁰ which follows desire and, where the end is ultimate, would be beatitude; but the second pertains to love which precedes desire, to the *complacentia boni* which gives already a certain participation of that which is loved.¹⁰¹ The most complete discussion of the question has it that *unio secundum rem* (described by the word *praesentialiter*) is effected by love through its operations (our *via motionis*), whereas love formally makes the *unio secundum affectum* (our *via receptionis*).¹⁰² Consonant with this is the Thomist doctrine of the presence of what is loved in the lover; it is said to be due to complacency, the *amatum* is in the *amans* "in so far as it is imprinted on its affections by a kind of complacency."¹⁰³ And then we have the assertion of what could only be regarded as paradoxical on the view of love as tendency to the good, but is quite in harmony with its character of passive reception of the good and rest in it: "It pertains to love that appetite is adapted (*coaptetur*) to a kind of reception of the good that is loved, in so far

¹⁰⁰ J. Kopf, *Bulletin thomiste* 6 (1940-42) 439-40, criticizes H.-D. Noble for identifying complacency with joy. From our point of view there is an imperfect joy in the complacency of the will's first act, and there is complacency in the good in the joy of the will's final act; the difference between joy and complacency seems mainly one of connotations.

¹⁰¹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 25, a. 2, ad 2m. There is a metaphysical refinement, although it is not significant for the present question: the union of complacency is said to follow love, but as a relation does a passion; "*unio pertinet ad amorem, in quantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem*" (*ibid.*, q. 26, a. 2, ad 2m). We have only to notice here that this union following love is not that resulting from tendency.

¹⁰² *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 28, a. 1 c. Cf. ad 2m: "*unio secundum coaptationem affectus*," and "*unio realis*" which is the effect of love; also *De carit.*, a. 2, ad 6m: "*de ratione caritatis . . . est quod coniungat secundum affectum . . . sed coniungere secundum rem non est de ratione caritatis*"; *De spe*, a. 3 c.: "*amor, qui unit amatum amanti.*"

¹⁰³ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 28, a. 2, ad 1m. The *corpus* connects the complacency with delectation in presence, with desire in absence: "*per quamdam complacentiam . . . ut vel delectetur . . . vel . . . per desiderium tendat.*" The "ut" leaves the relation ambiguous, to be determined by general lines of doctrine.

as the loved object is in the lover."¹⁰⁴ Far from being a tendency towards the good, love is a passive reception of the good!

Thirdly, there is a twofold fruition: "Fruition denotes a relation . . . to the ultimate end. But an end is possessed in two ways. . . . Perfectly, when had not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, when had in intention only. So perfect fruition is of an end already possessed in reality. But there is an imperfect fruition, too, of an end not possessed in reality but only in intention."¹⁰⁵ And to put the matter briefly, there is an imperfect beatitude which is a participation of the perfect, "through some sort of fruition of the good,"¹⁰⁶ and in consequence of this twofold beatitude there is likewise a true twofold peace.¹⁰⁷

It should be clear by now that the basic act of willing is a term in an imperfect way. Because it is a term it gives rest, complacency, beatitude. But because it is imperfect there remains a *tendere*: "[Will] is not simply quiescent except in what is ultimate. For as long as anything is still awaited, the movement of will remains suspended, even though it has already reached a sort of term (*iam ad aliquid pervenerit*)."¹⁰⁸ We have not yet answered the question with which we began the discussion of complacency: What is the fundamental explanation of the union of love? In fact, it rises even more urgently than before, but the basic thesis, I think, is established.

The framework of the *duplex via* shows how we may integrate a passive, merely affective attitude of the will with its consequent, active pursuit of the good.¹⁰⁹ The questions dealing directly with complacency

¹⁰⁴ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 28, a. 5, ad ea . . . quae . . . obiiiciuntur.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 11, a. 4 c. The second response might offer some difficulty to our general thesis on imperfect beatitude; it tells us that fruition of what is not the ultimate end is only improperly fruition. But perhaps there is room for a refinement of this point: means can be considered just as means, but they can be considered also as part of the universe of being; under the first aspect they give no proper fruition, but perhaps under the second they give a proper but imperfect fruition.

¹⁰⁶ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1m. Cf. *ibid.* 2-2, q. 28, a. 2, ad 3m, on a participation of "divinum bonum per cognitionem et amorem."

¹⁰⁷ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 29, a. 2, ad 4m.

¹⁰⁸ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 11, a. 3 c. Cf. *In 3 Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m, on hating defects in oneself: "non sibi complacet neque quiescit in conditione . . . sui ipsius, sicut cum quis aliquid in se ipso odit."

¹⁰⁹ It may be asked whether this active-passive couplet is identical with that of M. D'Arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love* (London, 1945). I believe not, and it may clarify my study to explain briefly the difference, as I see it. Fr. D'Arcy speaks of taking and

gency, by the very fact that they make it the principle of all movement as well as by other evidence, show that complacency itself is not a movement but a simple change of will. The general rational psychology of St. Thomas puts at the beginning of all volitional activity a passive act that seems at least to share some of the characteristics of complacency. The doctrine on beatitude is in perfect accord, for it asserts a state of will in the imperfect beatitude of earth which is akin to the heavenly state, and the latter is certainly not one of tending to a goal but rather one of quiescence in a term attained. These very general considerations will be confirmed and objections against them clarified in the next section, which will study some evidence for a lack of integration in St. Thomas of the two notions of *complacentia boni* and *intentio finis*.

(*To be continued*)

giving, egoism and self-sacrifice, masculine and feminine; that is, he regards the receiving and giving of a good on the part of a subject or two different subjects. Our passive love does not regard either taking or giving a good, but the passivity of a psychological act with regard to the good that is; similarly, our active love regards the efficiency of a psychological act, which may be directed either to taking or giving. Objectively, the frame of reference for which Fr. D'Arcy's categories are especially appropriate is the personal (personal development and interpersonal communication); our frame of reference is being.