COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS

FREDERICK E. CROWE, S.J.

Jesuit Seminary, Toronto, Ont.

THE PRECEDING article of this study contained an outline of the project. The thesis was that there are two distinct attitudes of willing or loving, which may be called complacency and concern; a first section was to establish in Thomist terms a structure of willing sufficiently broad and firm to account for both; a second would expose the two attitudes in the context of general Thomist psychology; a third, pursue the duality in a series of related questions; a fourth, attempt a larger view of the Thomist position; and only after this basis was laid would any suggestions be ventured on the present relevance of the doctrine.

Two of these sections have been despatched. Let us summarize the findings: A fundamental framework for organizing the data of human psychology is supplied by the *duplex via*, the passive process of receiving and the active process of causation. Love as complacency is a term in the *via receptionis*, coming at the end of process; it is found in this form in the proceeding Love of the Holy Trinity, in the passive aspect of willing, in the simple harmony, agreement, correspondence resulting when the will is adjusted affectively to the good independently of all desire. Love as tendency is at the beginning of the *via motionis*; it is most evident in appetite, desire, the pursuit of beatitude, but perhaps is to be discovered also in an analogous and higher form in the *agapē* which desires to give and communicate the self or what the self has.

Further, if our tentative position on the historical side is correct, St. Thomas never really integrated these two modes of love with one another, or brought them together in sharp confrontation, or employed them as a scheme in the systematic articulation of his works. The doctrine of love as tendency claimed attention throughout his career; the doctrine of love as complacency, explicit enough at times, was nevertheless kept more or less on the periphery of his thought; when it came

EDITOR'S NOTE.—The first part of this article appeared in the March, 1959 issue, pp. 1–39.

to the center in the *Prima secundae* the context did not demand or favor a thoroughgoing treatment, and the doctrine was never developed beyond an inchoate stage.

This article attacks the third of the projected sections and will attempt to verify what is already a surmise. The point is this: If two such fundamental modes of willing exist, they will have various manifestations and there will be implications through wide ranges of doctrine. If the notions have not been perfectly integrated, a cleavage will show up in the areas of doctrine involved; there is an antecedent likelihood of a duality, of discrepancies, inconsistencies, lacunae, of possibilities undeveloped, of principles lying fallow. The purpose here is to examine the positive evidence on the question.

The issues to be handled are complicated enough and, if readers are opposed on principle to complexity, I urge them to read no further in this article, resuming perhaps the study at the beginning of the next if they wish to have a rough idea of the relevance to our times of these questions. At the same time we should be aware of the disabilities under which such a principle will lay us. St. Thomas has a rather fully elaborated doctrine according to which the operations of earthly agents take on an increasing complexity as those agents rise in the scale of perfection, while angelic operations grow simpler as the spiritual being approaches the simplicity of God. Man, standing at the confines of the material and spiritual worlds, is therefore the most complex of beings.[1] In the measure in which this view is valid—and I think the intervening seven centuries rather support than upset it, at least with regard to the visible world—we can spurn complexity in the discussion of human questions only if we also abandon the claim that we know with accuracy what we are talking about.

That does not mean that I promise an exhaustive account of the issues to be handled here. As the Thomist will see by running his eye over the list of headings, they deal with fairly basic questions, some of them long debated and acutely examined in the Schools. They are not a proper object for sketchy discussion. But the thesis being pro-

[1] See *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 77, a. 2 c., for a compact statement. For details: *De spir. creat.*, a. 4 c.; *De anima*, a. 9 c.; a. 10, ad 1m; ad 15m; *C. gent.* 2, 72, § 5; *In 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2m. St. Thomas derived the idea from Aristotle; see *In 2 de caelo*, lect. 17–18. I think we can adopt the principle without committing ourselves to Aristotelian doctrine on heavenly bodies.

posed will hardly gain credence unless the evidence turns out to be recurrent, and the only way to show that is to run quickly through a number of relevant questions. If the thesis proves solid, there may be compensation for this hasty treatment in the new orientation given towards old problems.

A RECURRENT DUALITY IN THOMIST WRITINGS

The Notion of the Good

Let us begin with the very fundamental question of the good, where already, it seems to me, we discover a dual notion at work. On the one hand, the good is the object of tendency and appetite; as the oft-quoted phrase from Aristotle has it, "the good is that which all things desire."[2] The good is the term of movement of appetite.[3] Hence the regularly occurring statement that the good has the character of an end,[4] with the further specification that the good is perfective, that what it adds to being is a notional relation of *perfectivum*.[5]

One can prove the goodness of things in this sense. Being is good, for all things desire their own perfection, and being is a perfection.[6] God is good, as appears from the following argument: The good is the object of appetite; all things have an appetite for their perfection; the perfection of an effect consists in being like its agent cause, and so the agent is the object of appetite in so far as participation in its likeness

[2] *In 1 Eth.*, lect. 1, §§ 9–11. The principle extends also to natural things: As the arrow to its target under the direction of the archer, so natural things to their end; "ipsum autem tendere in bonum, est appetere bonum. Unde et omnia dixit appetere bonum, inquantum tendunt in bonum." Boethius used this as a basis for showing all things are good: "Omne autem tendit ad simile. Quae igitur ad bonum tendunt, bona sunt"; cf. *In Boeth. de hebdom.*, lect. 3, § 41. St. Thomas cites the Boethian argument as an authority in a *Sed contra* (cf. *De verit.*, q. 21, a. 2) but does not seem to have used it widely; as we shall see, he simply reverses the direction of argument in the *Summa theologiae* in order to prove God is good.

[3] *Sum theol.* 1, q. 5, a. 6 c.

[4] *In 1 Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 3m; *De verit.*, q. 21, a. 1, ad 8m; ad 9m; q. 21, a. 2 c.; *Sum. theol.*, 1, q. 5, a. 4 c.; etc. This gives ample support to the position of A. Gardeil that the good is formally constituted by the *ratio finis* ("Bien," *DTC* 2, 837).

[5] *De verit.*, q. 21, a. 1 c.; q. 21, a. 2 c. *Perfectivum* is varied to *perfectum*, but without abandonment of the notion that what is good is good for the subject of appetite: *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 5, a. 1 c.; q. 5, a. 3 c.; q. 16, a. 4 c.

[6] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 5, a. 1 c.; q. 6, a. 1 c. A very full statement on perfection tells us it is threefold: being constituted in being, having in addition those accidents necessary for operating, and reaching the end in another being (*Sum. theol.* 1, q. 6, a. 3 c.).

is the object of appetite; but God is the first agent cause of all things; God, then, will be the object of appetite and must be called good.[7] A roundabout proof, surely, but one that emphasizes the present point. Clearly, in these texts we have to do with a notion of the good that accords perfectly with the notion of love as tendency.

On the other hand, there is an account of the good which is convertible with being, that takes another approach. The modes of being, we are told, divide into special—exemplified by substance, accident, and the grades of being—and general, which are found wherever being is found: "modus generaliter consequens omne ens." The general divide into those that pertain to a being in itself and those that pertain to a being in relation to another, the latter again into modes by division and modes by *convenientia*. This word, for which English seems to lack an accepted technical equivalent, we may translate by "agreement," or "harmony," or "correspondence," or something of the sort. Now if we are going to base a universal mode of being on such a correspondence, we must find a nature open to such a harmonious relationship towards all that is. And that nature is soul. But the soul has cognitional and appetitive powers; the harmonious relationship between being and appetite is expressed by the word "good," that between being and intellect by the word "true."[8]

It seems to me that two quite different viewpoints are operative, perhaps without full reflective consciousness, in these approaches to the notion of the good. In one the good fills a need and satisfies a desire; it is perfective. In the other the good is in harmony with an affective faculty; it is *conveniens*. One would not press a merely verbal difference, but *conveniens* is elastic enough to cover the relations of both intellect and will to being. If this does not exclude the notion of perfecting, for being perfects both intellect and will, at least it is something more generic than the notion of satisfying elicited appetite.

But the reader will, justly enough, ask for evidence not based too narrowly on the meaning of individual terms, since it is the very meaning of those terms that we are investigating. Much more decisive, I think, is the very considerable difference in the way the arguments for

[7] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 6, a. 1 c. See article 3, where the proof that God is good by His essence is based on the account of perfection related in our preceding note.

[8] *De verit.*, q. 1, a. 1 c.

the goodness of being proceed. In one case there is an appeal to the appetite everything has for its own being; we conceive a desire shared by all things, each in its own way, and running analogously through the universe of beings somewhat in the manner of Cajetan's essence-existence relationship. But in the other there is an appeal to the universal relationship any rational "appetite" has for all beings; we do not consider a relationship internal to each and analogously the same in them all, but an external relationship of all beings to one term.

It seems that there are two distinct approaches to the good, and it does not seem that St. Thomas clearly systematized them. The second, in which good is a harmony or correspondence between being and will, is found in both earlier and later works. We have cited the *De veritate*, but the idea occurs in the *Sentences* period with the perhaps significant use of *placere* to express the will's response.[9] It occurs considerably later with the substitution of *referri* for *convenire*.[10] But the notion of the good as perfective is so little abandoned that in the *De veritate* itself it becomes the basis of the whole twenty-first question, and later runs unimpeded through the *Summa theologiae*. What is more, the word "appetite" occurs in both sets of texts whether the relationship is that of desire or what we have preferred to call correspondence or harmony.

Now I believe this is relevant to the question of complacency and concern. If we admit the duality of love described in the preceding article, we can easily account for that encountered now in the notion of the good. The good as perfective is the object of love as appetitive; the good as simply harmonious with affective will is the object of love as complacent. And, if we consult our own experience, does it not bear out some such interpretation? I must confess to a persistent malaise before the argument for the thesis, *omne ens est bonum*, as long as it seemed to base the goodness of all things on an actual or potential

[9] *In 3 Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 4 resp.: Immaterial creatures have a certain infinity in two ways, namely, that they are "quodammodo omnia" in knowledge, and that they have an affective relation to all things, "ad omnes res inclinationem et ordinem habent, ex qua parte accidit eis voluntas, secundum quam omnia placent vel displicent vel actu vel potentia."

[10] *De pot.*, q. 9, a. 7, ad 6m: "Aliquid quod natum sit referri universaliter ad ens; et hoc est vel intellectus, ad quem importat relationem *verum*, aut appetitus, ad quem importat relationem *bonum*; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt."

desire I have for them because I need them to perfect me; but I find it realistic enough to speak of a complacency of the affective faculty in what is, or, in Forest's phrase, of a consent to being.

Further, the Thomist use of *appetere* can often be interpreted without violence in this sense of complacency. In the undeveloped terminology of complacent willing to which reference has been made, what other term was readily available for this sense? What term is now available? Complacency? Consent? Correspondence? Until some term has acquired that precision of technical usage which serves to exclude the haze of literary connotations, none will be wholly acceptable. In any case, the point now at issue seems to have been settled by St. Thomas himself in our favor when he expressly extended the meaning of *appetere* beyond the sense of desire for what we have not.[11] In short, the duality of the Thomist viewpoint on the good seems to correspond quite exactly to the duality of his viewpoint on willing and to have been left, like the latter, without systematic elaboration.

The Good as Good-for-Me

The clarification reached in the preceding section bears on a second question, which therefore, despite its long and famous history, we may now venture to handle with brevity. Over half a century ago, Pierre Rousselot raised an agitation that has not yet subsided by setting up a dichotomy between what he called the physical and ecstatic concepts of love. In the ecstatic conception, love is for the other; in just so far as it includes the thought of self does it cease to be genuine love. According to the physical notion, purely ecstatic love is impossible; love

[11] See the discussion on "appetite" in God, pp. 219–24 infra.—Is the account of the good given in this section relevant to a special problem that occupied St. Thomas, namely, that we do not say that what simply is, is simply good (except in God)? (A number of texts may be found in the third article of Sister Verda Clare on the subject, "Whether Everything That Is, Is Good: Marginal Notes on St. Thomas's Exposition of Boethius's *De hebdomadibus*"; it appeared in *Laval théologique et philosophique* 5 [1949] 119–40.) Why do we insist that a man be virtuous, etc., before we say he is simply good? Because we think of the good as something to be attained for our perfection and of its nonattainment as a state of loss worse than nonexistence. And, of course, the good does perfect us; but is not its loss also a failure to be, so that, in the measure in which we are not good, there is also nonbeing? If this state of nonbeing were really worse than utter annihilation, the problem would recur, but scriptural language on this point is not to be taken as a metaphysical statement but interpreted according to other thought-patterns, for it seems good to God to conserve the lost in their evil and their partial nonbeing.

of self is the measure of all other love, there is continuity between the love of desire and the love of friendship, and love of self is brought into relation with the love of God above all things by reducing the former to the latter as one of its forms: we seek our own good in seeking to become like God.[12]

Rousselot put St. Thomas among those holding the physical conception, and certainly there is no lack of Thomist statements to support that classification.[13] Other students of St. Thomas, however, have objected that the view according to which the good is necessarily the good-for-me is by no means an adequate translation of his thought. A. Thiry contrasts Aristotelian eudaemonism and the corresponding Thomist concept, and adduces the difference between a love of contemplation for the act's sake (based on self-love) and a love of contemplation based on love of the object.[14] L.-B. Geiger asserts, on Thomist grounds, that our love is fixed in God not because God brings us the greatest delight but because He is in truth the good.[15] On the other hand, as Z. Alszeghy rightly points out, self-regarding and not self-regarding are contradictories, not contraries.[16] And, although he would allow a concrete mingling of the two in one person, this is surely said with the requisite rider understood: *non simul, non sub eodem respectu*, etc. In any case, our present question is one of Thomist principles: if love is always physical, it can never be purely ecstatic. If St. Thomas holds the physical concept in the sense defined by

[12] Pierre Rousselot, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen âge* (Münster, 1908).

[13] *In div. nom.*, c. 4, lect. 9, § 406: "Unumquodque amamus inquantum est bonum nostrum"; this whole *lectio* is an emphatic assertion of the physical concept. *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2m: "In eis est naturalis appetitus . . . qui movetur in id quod est eis conveniens." *C. gent.* 3, 108, 5 (Leonine number): "Cum nullius rei appetitus tendat nisi in proprium bonum . . . ."

[14] *Aristote et saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain–Paris, 1957) pp. 254–57; Fr. Thiry's contribution to this symposium is, "Saint Thomas et la morale d'Aristote," pp. 229–58. He cites *In 3 Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1: "Ex duplici parte potest operatio cognitivae affectari. Uno modo inquantum est perfectio cognoscentis; et talis affectatio operationis cognitivae procedit ex amore sui, et sic erat affectio in vita contemplativa philosophorum. Alio modo inquantum terminatur ad objectum; et sic contemplationis desiderium procedit ex amore objecti . . . et sic habet affectionem vita contemplativa sanctorum."

[15] *Le problème de l'amour chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montréal–Paris, 1952) p. 91, with reference to *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 26, a. 3, ad 3m: "Magis autem amamus Deum amore amicitiae quam amore concupiscentiae: quia maius est in se bonum Dei quam participare possumus fruendo ipso."

[16] *Grundformen der Liebe: Die Theorie der Gottesliebe bei dem hl. Bonaventura* (Rome, 1946) pp. 195–97.

Rousselot—and the texts indicate he did—then he cannot consistently exclude from love the regard for self.

As far as the immediate purpose of this article goes, I think we can evade the full force of the difficulty by referring the physical conception to that love which we have called concern and is manifested in tendency. Then the love we call complacency, because its object is being, will neither exclude nor consciously include reference to the self's needs. It will correspond to the *sachbetont* love based on *dignitas* which Alszeghy finds emphasized in St. Bonaventure, and to the objective aspect based on intelligent specification which Geiger finds in St. Thomas. In this love reference to self is absent, not by a kind of positive exclusion, but because the question simply does not arise in the first instance; a love whose frame of reference is being will be quite universal and take thought of self-satisfaction only in a second moment by the addition of restrictive considerations. Moreover, since we do not claim that St. Thomas integrated his many statements on love, the "always" of the difficulty need not weigh on us; it simply does not mean "always," and the seeming universality of the texts adduced is met by referring them to the love of tendency which was regularly uppermost in his mind.

I believe this position is sound enough as far as it goes. But it may be argued that the same problem, "Is a love that is not egoist possible?", must be transferred also to the love of complacency. Granted that there is as yet no question of tendency, the question can still be put, Why is will complacent in the good? Is a good that is wholly without relation to me a possible object of complacency? It may be demanded of us that something analogous to the Thomist physical concept be assigned to the love of complacency as well. If so, we might approach the problem in the following way: B. Lonergan has suggested with regard to the love of tendency that the phrase, *appetitus tendit in bonum sibi conveniens*, refers simply to the specialization of appetite, each appetite having its own proper object: "Appetite as appetite is indifferently egoistic or altruistic: my hunger is for my good; but maternal instinct is for the good of the child; and rational appetite, with the specialized object of the reasonable good, moves on an absolute level to descend in favor of self or others as reason dictates."[17] This, I think,

[17] THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 4 (1943) 484, in the article, "Finality, Love, Marriage," pp. 477–510.

may be adapted to apply to love of the good that simply is. As there is some proper object for that act of sensitive complacency which arises before all desire, so there is a proper object for the rational complacency which approves, independently of rational desire, the good that is. This proper object can be called in a sense the good-for-me, but since the aspect of "me" here relevant is that faculty of the human spirit by which I am open to the good universally, the good-for-me is the absolute good convertible with being or with all that is. This seems to be the force of the opening article of the *De veritate.* The good is a notional relation added to being; it cannot be added except by reference to a term; that term is the "I," not, however, as desiring its own perfection, but as simply corresponding affectively to being and thereby, in fact, being perfected.

Judging the Good and Willing It

We have not yet finished with the notion of the good. It may be granted now that the notion can apply to a good that simply is, as well as to a good that perfects another, and that the good that simply is is good for me in a way parallel to that in which the truth of things is truth for me while remaining absolute and independent of my knowledge. But there are ambiguities in the preceding section, and they emerge clearly with the putting of a further question: The good is a *ratio,* an intelligibility, a *modus essendi,* that is intellectually discoverable in being; where does that *ratio* intervene cognitionally? Before or after the complacent response of will? Do we first judge a thing is good and so love it, or do we first judge a thing to be, then love it, and so judge it to be good?

Of course, the prima-facie evidence is in favor of the first alternative, and I think it safe to suppose that the overwhelming weight of opinion will come down on that side. It will seem pretty obvious that what we call a value judgment must precede any willing of the good. As St. Thomas says repeatedly, the object of the will is the *bonum intellectum,* and this seems to mean the good understood as good; the will, he says, is open to all that intellect proposes to it *sub ratione boni.*[18] As sensitive appetite responds, not to mere imagination, but to that sensitive esti-

[18] *C. gent.* 2, 27: "Voluntas igitur ad quaelibet se nata est extendere quae ei intellectus sub ratione boni proponere potest."

mate of the harmful or helpful which corresponds to intellectual evaluation, so rational appetite responds only when something is proposed to it as good.[19] The law at stake here is extended even to the doctrine of the Trinitarian processions, where we must suppose the Word to express the divine goodness if He is to be a principle of proceeding Love; the Son is a Word, but the analogy is not that of any word we might care to conceive, it is that of a word that enkindles love.[20] In a similar context we are told expressly that there are two acts of apprehension: one of the true, the other of the good; it is the latter that is the perfect apprehension serving as analogy for the divine Word.[21]

How, it may be asked, could things be otherwise on the view that love proceeds rationally from judgment? What sort of blind, irrational love would it be that did not follow intellectual recognition of the good but dictated to the intellect what it is to declare? Such an overthrow of reason would outdo even the ancient *Sit pro ratione voluntas.*

Nevertheless, there is a strong, even rigorous, case for the opposite view; nor does it, I think, involve in any way a love that is irrational. The basic point to be made here is this: If Thomist arguments for the convertibility of being with the good mean anything at all, they mean that will is referable directly to being as being, not primarily to being as good. The datum of the argument in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, is being; the proposition is to show that being is true and good: the middle term is the reference of being to those faculties of the soul which can know and love being. It is being itself that is referred to will, not the good; for we define the good through a notional relation added to being and prove it through proving the relation; it would be ridiculous to

[19] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2m: "Sicut imaginatio formae sine aestimatione convenientis vel nocivi, non movet appetitum sensitivum; ita nec apprehensio veri sine ratione boni et appetibilis. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus."

[20] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2m: "Filius autem est Verbum, non qualecumque, sed spirans Amorem. . . . Non igitur secundum quamlibet perfectionem intellectus mittitur Filius; sed secundum talem instructionem intellectus, qua prorumpat in affectum amoris."

[21] *In 1 Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 c.: "Et quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum, scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spirat amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet." *Displicet* seems to be used here in the neutral sense: will is neither pleased nor displeased, it is simply indifferent (see the variant given by the Parma edition for the words following those quoted).

suppose the relation in order to prove it, and, even if the proof proceeded by another route, we should still have to face the difficulty that it is not the relation which is related, or even the related subject, but simply the subject itself of the relation. On the other hand, it makes sense to say that being is referable to a power of the soul that responds affectively to it, that therefore being acquires a notional relation to the will, and that by reason of this relation we call being good. Even in *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1, where this relation is in the class *perfectivum*, it remains a mere relation of reason added to being. Quite clearly, it is being itself that is referred to will, not being as good.

Now this implies that we have simply to judge that a thing is, in order to love it. There are passages which come close to stating this: Intellect is first aware of being (*ipsum ens*), then of its knowing being, then of its voluntary reaction to being (*se appetere ens*).[22] The simple seriation of this passage rings true to all that we have so far discovered on willing as complacency and related topics. Things are; we know things are, and, knowing our knowing, call them true; we love the things that are, and, knowing our loving, call them good.

Further, there is a striking text in which St. Thomas makes the being of things and not their truth the cause of intellectual truth.[23] Is it not in full accord with the doctrine of the transcendental modes to make the parallel assertion: the being of things and not their goodness is the cause of rational love? I am well enough aware that the parallel may be challenged on the ground that St. Thomas himself contrasts knowledge and love in this point. Another *ratio* intervenes between being and loving: the true regards being immediately, the good through the mediation of another *ratio*, namely, the perfect.[24] But it is only to repeat the point made several times already to say that here and elsewhere, as in the texts quoted at the beginning of this section, we must

[22] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 16, a. 4, ad 2m: "Secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus."

[23] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 16, a. 1, ad 3m: "Licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis. . . . Esse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem intellectus."

[24] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 16, a. 4 c.: "Verum propinquius se habet ad ens . . . quam bonum [se habet ad ens]. Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate: ratio autem boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est."

ask whether St. Thomas bases himself on the view that dogs his whole work, that love is tendency and the good the object of desire or an end. For, if so, there is room left for a more fundamental view of willing and the good; if not, then, of course, our thesis is in ruins, but also it leaves us with grave difficulties inherent in Thomist doctrine.

If love as tendency to an end inspires the statements that prima facie oppose us, then it seems possible to account for the introduction of the notion "perfective" between being and the will's response, and to postulate a value judgment in some general sense for every act of such a love. The process of a human act in the moral sense is governed throughout by the willing of the end. But will of the end cannot be a principle of deliberating and choosing a means unless there is already recognition of the end as perfective. To call it an end is already to imply the notion "perfective" and to require a value judgment as a basis for the tendency of will. But this still leaves room for a willing in the sense of Thomist complacency that is based directly on knowledge of being; if we have succeeded in proving anything at all, it is that the good is not exclusively a motive for action; as in beatitude will does not tend actively but rests in that which intellect apprehends,[25] so that earthly state of will which imperfectly anticipates beatitude is a matter of resting in mere affective correspondence with that which is.

But if one insists that love as tendency is the exclusively valid concept, he will not regard the notion of the perfective as expressing a particular relationship between being and the will; it will necessarily apply universally. However, I think he will find it quite impossible then to maintain the Thomist doctrine on what we now call the transcendental good. Being is all-inclusive; outside being there is nothing.[26] The modes, therefore, that are convertible with being add nothing real to being. They add nothing absolute, and they do not even add real relations; all they add is a relation of reason.[27] Where does the

[25] *C. gent.* 3, 116, 2: "Adhaesio . . . quae est per intellectum, completionem recipit per eam quae est voluntatis: quia per voluntatem homo quodammodo quiescit in eo quod intellectus apprehendit."

[26] See B. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London–New York, 1957) chap. 12.

[27] *De verit.*, q. 21, a. 1 c.: "Oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum"; *De pot.*, q. 9, a. 7, ad 6m: "Aliquid secundum rationem tantum . . . vel negatio . . . vel relatio"; see also *De verit.*, q. 21, a. 1, ad 8m et 9m.

notion of the perfect find its place in this situation? Is it distinct from the notion of being? If so, as prior to the good, it will surely be a transcendental notion too. Is it distinct from the notion of the good? If so, we have two transcendental modes of being in the perfect and the good. If not, what do we mean by speaking of it as an intermediate *ratio* between being and good? I think we are forced to the conclusion that the position taken by St. Thomas on the perfect is a particular one, coherent with a particular view of love, that it does not express the ultimate notion of the good emerging here and there in his writings, that once love is taken as complacency a special *ratio* intervening between known being and affective correspondence is simply superfluous.

When, therefore, God understands His own being, He has understood all there is to be understood in the divine essence; there is nothing left over to be understood in a more perfect act and expressed in a more perfect word which now utters His goodness as well. Similarly with our apprehension of being; if the good is a truly transcendental mode of being, it can add nothing except a relation of reason to what is already apprehended, and that relation of reason is based on the orientation of will to being. There is first judgment of being, then there is mere affective response in the will, or correspondence, or complacency, or, if you like, consent to being.[28] So delicate an act is not likely to impinge on consciousness with the acute clarity of appetite, and so the notion of good will commonly proceed from our orientation to an end to be acquired or the perfective; in any case, minds dominated by longing for the kingdom of God will be led spontaneously to emphasize the latter aspect.

Finally, the good conceived as involving a relation of will to being is not irrational. It is as rational as the judgment of being, this in turn as rational as being itself, and being is rational as deriving from the

[28] This close linking of love with the contemplation of being may suggest to some the position taken in different works by A. Hayen: *L'Intentionnel selon saint Thomas* (2nd ed.; Paris, 1954) pp. 216–22; "Le lien de la connaissance et du vouloir dans l'acte d'exister selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Doctor communis* 3 (1950) 54–72; "Le 'Cercle' de la connaissance humaine selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 54 (1956) 561–604 (cf. p. 599). I should be happy to claim the authority of Fr. Hayen in my favor, and I believe there may be a link with his position in what I have written here, but I think it important to notice one rather fundamental difference: in the above presentation will does not contribute at all to the objectivity of knowledge, or to making knowledge more perfect as knowledge (except, of course, with regard to *other* knowledge, as when I will to study).

Creator. Since only sin is unintelligible,[29] and sin is not something that is, all that is will be the object of complacency.

Speculative and Practical Intellect

The preceding section is directly relevant to the relation between speculative and practical intellect; perhaps a few remarks on that perplexing question will be in order here, brief though they must be.

St. Thomas tells us that it is not speculative but practical intellect that moves the appetite.[30] The doctrine derives from the *De anima* and is recurrent in St. Thomas.[31] Conversely, as it is only practical intellect that moves to action, so it is only practical intellect that is corrupted by passion.[32] Passion, so to speak, is indifferent to truth except when truth interferes with its indulgence; hence it cheerfully allows triangles to enclose two right angles, but is apt to take issue with intellectual pronouncements on divorce, birth control, and the like.[33]

This seems straightforward enough: speculative intellect is concerned with being, practical with doing. The trouble is, there is a meeting point between being and doing, one is not sure to which function of intellect it is to be assigned, and the evidence in St. Thomas is not clearly all on one side. Thus, if one goes back to the *De anima*, one finds that the whole process involving practical intellect is under the influence of appetite of the end, that practical intellect supposes the ends of conduct to be already determined.[34] In other words, it is not

[29] See B. Lonergan on the point, in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 3 (1942) 547–52.

[30] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2m; see supra n. 19 for the text.

[31] *In 3 de anima*, lect. 14, §§ 813–15: Speculative intellect may consider purely speculative questions (the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles) or questions of conduct (*agibilia*); but the former are in no way *agibilia*, and the latter are considered speculatively and universally, not practically; hence in no case does speculative intellect move the appetite. See *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 14, a. 16 c., for a very full statement; also q. 79, a. 11 c.: "Intellectus speculativus est qui, quod apprehendat, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem: practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod appetit, ordinat ad opus"; *C. gent.* 1, 72, 6: "Unde intellectus speculativus non movet; neque imaginatio pura absque aestimatione."

[32] *In 6 Eth.*, lect. 4, § 1169; *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 33, a. 3 c.

[33] The question here is one of opposition of truths, where reason suffers from passion *ratione contrarietatis*; if one is drunk, however, both mathematics and ethics may suffer; cf. *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 33, a. 3 c.

[34] *In 3 de anima*, lect. 15, §§ 821–24: "Appetere est quidam motus in aliud tendens. Sed illud cuius est appetitus, scilicet appetibile, est principium intellectus practici. Nam illud, quod est primo appetibile, est finis a quo incipit consideratio intellectus practici. Cum enim volumus aliquid deliberare de agendis, primo supponimus finem . . . ."

the function of practical intellect to determine the ends it serves; presumably, then, it is the function of speculative intellect. The *Ethics*, though hesitant, would imply the same doctrine, for practical intellect is limited to deliberation on means to ends that are somehow given.[35]

Independent works, too, give speculation this role with regard to ends. Early in his career, St. Thomas linked love with speculative intellect and the contemplative life, saying that will belongs to both speculative and practical intellect in so far as ends pertain to both.[36] This notion persists at least in principle far into the *Summa* period when he still connects beatitude with the exercise of speculative understanding; there seems no reason for postulating an act of practical intellect to account for the delight of will that pertains to beatitude. It agrees also with late texts linking contemplation of the good and beautiful with love: "The contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the principle of spiritual love."[37] For one naturally supposes contemplation, as opposed to action, to be a function of the speculative intellect; at any rate, students of the beautiful would almost certainly demur at finding their pursuits listed among the practical avocations. Yet there is here a "moving" of "appetite."

But, I said, the evidence is not clearly all on one side. Ends seem

[35] *In 6 Eth.*, lect. 2, § 1131: "Finis . . . determinatus est homini a natura. . . . Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non sunt nobis determinata a natura, sed per rationem investiganda . . . . Et secundum hoc determinatur veritas rationis practicae secundum concordiam ad appetitum rectum." But there is a hesitancy; cf. *ibid.* § 1132: "Intellectus practicus principium quidem habet in universali consideratione . . . sed terminatur eius consideratio in particulari operabili."

[36] *In 3 Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 3m: "Coniunctio intellectus ad voluntatem non facit intellectum practicum, sed ordinatio eius ad opus; quia voluntas communis est et speculativo et practico. Voluntas enim est finis. Sed finis invenitur in speculativo et practico intellectu." *Ibid.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4m: "A vita contemplativa non excluditur voluntas et amor, sicut nec intellectus a vita activa et ideo non potest harum gradus distingui secundum gradus duarum vitarum." The argument here had been: knowledge pertains to the contemplative life, love to the practical; but the contemplative is higher than the practical, hence knowledge is higher than love.—In this same period, however, ends are attributed to practical intellect in opposition to speculative: "Sicut in ratione speculativa sunt innata principia demonstrationum, ita in ratione practica sunt innati fines"; *ibid.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 4.

[37] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 27, a. 2 c.; cf. *ibid.*, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3m: the good is "id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui," the beautiful "id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet." See also *In Boeth. de hebdom.*, prol., where contemplation is compared to play as being free from ulterior interest: "Nullam anxietatem patitur, quasi exspectans aliquid quo desit."

to pertain exclusively to practical intellect in other passages. The detailed accounts of law and prudence contrast it with speculative intellect and show that it gives the ends themselves of conduct: In practical reason there are certain basic elements corresponding to naturally known principles; these are ends. And there are other elements corresponding to conclusions; and these are in the field of prudence.[38]

Thus we have practical intellect driven by ends without questioning them, concerned together with speculative intellect about ends, and having as part of its own proper scope the declaration of ends. Similarly, we have speculative intellect kept remote from appetite, and we have it involved in the moving of appetite. Is there a real problem here, or only the fluidity of usage anyone might adopt when he expects his words to be taken in context and not brought together piecemeal from separated discussions? One would like to study the historical side of the question before attempting a final answer, but, on the basis of results so far, these points may be suggested as relevant: The difference between *complacentia boni* and *intentio boni* is real, not merely nominal. If one recognizes this, he can grant that will may respond to the good in passive affection, and so have no trouble whatever in admitting both that speculative intellect "moves" the will and that "moving" the will is the exclusive province of practical intellect; the "moving" is simply taken in two different senses. Speculative intellect moves the will to harmony with the good that it presents as being; practical intellect moves the will to pursuit of the good that may be achieved.

There may be terminological difficulties. One is this: Is the good that is merely contemplated to be called an end? It is standard Thomist practice to identify *bonum* with *finis*, but perhaps if we are going to implement fully the hints he has left on complacency, it would be clearer to reserve the word "end" for the good which is the object of appetite or *intentio*.

Another: At what point will we stop speaking of speculative intellect and begin to speak of practical? It does not seem that we can determine

[38] *Sum. theol.* 2–2, q. 47, a. 6 c.: "Sicut autem in ratione speculativa sunt quaedam ut naturaliter nota, quorum est intellectus; et quaedam quae per illa innotescunt, scilicet conclusiones, quarum est scientia: ita in ratione practica praeexistunt quaedam ut principia naturaliter nota, et huiusmodi sunt fines virtutum moralium . . . et quaedam sunt in ratione practica ut conclusiones . . . ." Cf. *ibid.* 1–2, q. 94, a. 4 c.; q. 19, a. 3, ad 2m; also the text given at the end of n. 36 supra.

this beforehand by distinguishing the good that is from the good that is to be done; for we can study a situation (what is) with the most practical, indeed mercenary, of motives, and we can study rules of conduct (what is to be done) for motives that end with knowing. After all, there is, in the realm of ethics, an element given in the nature of things, and there are necessities and possibilities whose being is potentially derivative from what is; all this can be asserted rationally and loved affectively even though one is not at the moment concerned with personal conduct. The Psalmist joyously proclaims his delight in the law. I have no doubt that he delighted in the deeds by which he kept the law and in the good that keeping the law brought him, and again that he delighted in the law by reason of the love of friendship binding him to its Giver. But can we exclude from the range of his considerations that delight in what is that we have come to know as complacency? There is a noble, disinterested contentment with the law that arises merely from understanding its truth and beauty in itself and as an expression of God's mind, from seeing its place in the given order of the universe, not as graven on stone tablets for a check to my wayward feet but as written for my contemplation on the pages of being as part of all that is. In the preceding article attention was drawn to a moment of sheer complacency even in the course of carrying out one's purpose in the election of means, and it seemed that a fortiori such an act should be distinguished from desire of the end in the Thomist *intentio finis*. There does not really seem to be any limit that we can set to speculative complacency in the field of conduct. In other words, the distinction of speculative and practical intellect is not determined simply by objective factors; the subjective orientation is also relevant. As Aristotle said, "intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo,"[39] and one's purpose can be changed at will.

Possession of the Good

There is one more member to be added to this series of closely linked questions before we leave it for what may be more congenial topics. It concerns the possession of the good and union with it, a question raised in the preceding article and too important to be left unanswered.

As one will by now have come to expect, I find here the same duality

[39] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 14, a. 16 c.; q. 79, a. 11 c.; *In 3 de anima*, lect. 15, § 820.

of thought as in other areas, deriving, in my opinion, from the same twofold aspect of the good. One side of the duality is already familiar. The viewpoint that regards the will as tendency also regards the good as known but absent. We are separated from the good and move towards union with it, not of course *passibus corporis* but *affectibus mentis*. This image governs the division of degrees in charity: withdrawing from sin, advancing in good, adhering to God.[40] In all this, however, one is considered to know the good; otherwise, one would not seek it.

But, on the other side, there are statements according to which the good is possessed simply by knowledge. From the first, St. Thomas writes, we wish to acquire the intelligible end; we acquire it, however, when it becomes present to us through the act of intellect.[41] The doctrine soon receives further refinement: practical intellect is directed to a good that is external to it, but speculative intellect has its good within itself in the contemplation of truth.[42] In slightly different concepts: practical knowledge is not sought for its own sake, and so we do not rejoice in it as in an end; the contrary is true of speculative knowledge.[43]

This agrees with the Thomist position on beatitude. I need hardly labor the point that the possession of God which is the essence of the beatific vision is understanding what God is,[44] and the texts on imperfect beatitude[45] show that here too the emphasis is regularly on the contemplation of truth. Not only knowledge of God but consideration of the speculative sciences too is a certain participation of final happiness.[46] In view of all this St. Thomas can quote with full approval

[40] See THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 20 (1959) 23–25, 37.

[41] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 3, a. 4 c.: "A principio volumus consequi finem intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens nobis per actum intellectus."

[42] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2m: "Intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso, scilicet contemplationem veritatis."

[43] *Sum. theol.* 2–2, q. 8, a. 8, ad 3m: "Cognitionis practicae fructus non potest esse in ipsa: quia talis cognitio non scitur propter se, sed propter aliud. Sed cognitio speculativa habet fructum in seipsa, scilicet certitudinem eorum quorum est." Notice, for the correct interpretation of these texts, *C. gent.* 4, 19, 8: "Nec solum amati cognitio amatur, sed secundum quod in se bonum est."

[44] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 3, a. 8 c.

[45] Listed in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 20 (1959) 36, note 98. See especially *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4m; q. 3, a. 3 c.; q. 3, a. 5 c.

[46] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 3, a. 6 c.; cf. q. 66, a. 3, ad 1m.

Aristotle's pregnant point that the contemplative life is nearer perfect beatitude than the active is, in being less dependent on external goods for its exercise.[47]

We seek, then, to come into possession of the good we already know, and we possess it by knowing it. The paradox requires some explanation within the boundaries of knowing itself, and, of course, the necessary distinction is readily at hand: it is one thing to know *that* God is, and another to understand Him or to know *what* He is;[48] it is by understanding Him that we possess Him definitively as our final good, and consequently He is in some measure an absent God and an absent good while we lack the beatific vision.

So much is familiar and would need no emphasis here did it not force into clearer light the conditions of complacency and concern. Complacency regards the good that is, and there is possession already by the mere fact that we know it to be and respond affectively; that is true, but the knowing involves some measure of understanding. It is common in the prolonged agony of personal suffering to ask over and over: Why did this have to happen? To accept pain and loss is hard enough at any time, but the crushing factor is a sense of their futility; one cannot bow down before a completely irrational fate that blindly takes its toll of human happiness and say, "It is good." Job pours out his torrent of why's and searches the reason and wisdom of God's ways, and in a homelier sphere Pippa's simple awareness of a God giving order to the universe is reason enough to sing, "All's right with the world!" So the Saviour of us all not only drew courage from understanding the purpose of His dying but tried to communicate its meaning beforehand to His disciples that they too might understand and, understanding, accept and, accepting, have within themselves

[47] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 4, a. 7 c. See also article 8 on our dependence on friends, and *In Boeth. de hebdom.*, prol.—In these paragraphs on union with God I have touched rather lightly on a very controverted chapter of Thomist theology. But perhaps the reader will grant that my limited purpose allows me to bypass the controversy. First, I do not have to take sides in the dispute over the ontological or intentional presence of God; I presume all agree that there *is* intentional presence, either *sensu aiente* or *negante*, and that is enough for me. Next, within this intentional context, I am concerned only with that aspect of union which is possession of the good, and the one relevant point here is that intellect, not will, is the primary potency in that possession. There is a summary of recent discussion on union with God in Ch. Baumgartner's "Bulletin de théologie dogmatique," *Recherches de science religieuse* 47 (1959) 125–35.

[48] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 3, a. 8 c.

the counterweight to anxiety. To understand the good that is is to possess it already, and we can assert this to be essential beatitude without denying their importance to corporeal factors accompanying the *lumen gloriae.*

The good that is not yet is the object of concern. Obviously God is not a concern in the sense that He is not yet, but our understanding of God is a not-yet and so our possession of Him by understanding is a concern, as likewise are all those things or artifacts or operations which are involved in coming to understand what He is. Where another end than union with God is pursued, concerns, ultimate and intermediate, will vary accordingly. Further, it seems possible to include under this heading not only those concerns which manifest our regard for self but equally those concerns which express our care for others; and so divine *agapē* and mother love and a friend's sacrifice can be grouped under one analogous concept and linked with desire for salvation and even with wholly selfish pursuits.

The shift of will from one state to another is effected by intellectual advertence to new factors: "According to the different aspects of the apprehended object, different responses will follow in the will."[49] One may understand the form and purpose of a thing and consent to its being; one may know, without understanding it fully, that something is and then there may be consent to its being on a priori grounds with desire for further understanding; one may know and consent to the being of a thing but at the same time recognize its state of potentiality and desire its actuation. I earlier quoted texts on the knowledge that is causative of things; but St. Thomas tells us that the good of nonexistent things works causally too.[50] The correspondence between

[49] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 40, a. 2 c.: "Quia vis cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum, secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi motus in vi appetitiva."

[50] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 5, a. 2, ad 2m. The response aims at showing how "bonum ad plura se extendit quam ens," how nonexistents can be good without being; St. Thomas says, "non secundum praedicationem, sed secundum causalitatem." I do not know how much of this is due to a superfluous concern for saving Dionysius. Certainly St. Thomas assigned a causal role to ideas, and this at least is prior to the causality of goodness. I am inclined to think that being and the good are convertible from the viewpoint of complacency even here; the relation of complacency and desire with regard to the nonexistent would be this: complacency regards the nonexistent only in relation to being, as potentially part of the universe, while desire adds a relation to operation, to intervention, to making the nonbeing be.

intellect and will is far-reaching, and there can hardly be any other limits to the possible complications of willing than the possible complications of judgment on being and its modes. It is impossible to follow up all the emerging lines of thought now. The main point here is that possession of the good by understanding is correlative to the love of complacency. For the rest I must be content to distinguish elements as clearly as possible, leaving their exploitation to another occasion.

Thus, to judgment of what is there corresponds an affective complacency of the will which comes to rest in this act as in a term. But the same intellect which has arrived at knowledge of what is may advance to a knowledge of what is not yet but could fittingly be; the result in will is a *velle finem*. This, in its first stage, is still passive, still receiving, still a form of complacency; but a further judgment makes us aware that the good which is not yet can be effected through our own efforts and by appropriate means, and then will responds with the first indeterminate *intentio finis*.[51] At this point deliberation about means can occur, the *via motionis* has begun, and freedom emerges. That radical anxiety, indeterminate, without definite object, about which modern thinkers talk, would seem to follow on a judgment that may be a counterpart to the judgment issuing in *intentio finis*. That is, as we may advert to the possibility of effecting or reaching the totality of what can be, so we may advert to the possibility of not reaching it, the possibility of loss, of loss indefinitely, loss on the total scale. The derivative anxieties about this and that are a simpler matter, concerning some particular end or the means to it.[52]

[51] *Intentio* supposes an ordering of something to an end but does not suppose that ways and means are determined. It supposes an ordering of something to an end; *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3m: *intentio* is an act of the will, "praesupposita ordinatione rationis ordinantis aliquid in finem"; *ibid.*, a. 5, sed contra: "intentio finis importat ordinationem alicuius in finem." It does not suppose determination of the means, which is a function of the *electio*; for *intentio*, it is enough if we intend the end as one to be acquired by means, even though the means are not yet determined in particular; cf. *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3m.

[52] The points still demanding clarification are many; let us notice two of them. First, what is the possibility of hating being? As there is a complacency in nonbeing based on its potency of being, so there may be a hatred of being as threatening other being or involving nonbeing; as we saw, it is possible to hate defects in oneself (THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 20 [1959] 38, note 108). In this, hatred corresponds to complacency; regularly, however, it

Complacency in God

If the reader has had the patience to follow the argument thus far and the curiosity to wonder about its validity, it may have occurred to him that the problem of willing in God might provide a crucial test case, for one can scarcely predicate tendency or desire for the end in any meaningful sense of God, and surely the difficulty must have presented itself to St. Thomas. There is, in fact, a persistent concern with the problem in his writings, there is a correction of the one-sided "tendency" view of willing, but the notion of complacency does not emerge with the clarity one might expect. If the doctrine of St. Thomas on God had come up for extensive study after his discussion of complacency in the *Prima secundae*, it might have undergone a more radical rethinking, but we can hardly do more than make conjectures on that question now. The evidence, then, is coherent with my thesis but not decisive in itself. I present it under the two headings of essential love in God, which is common to the three Persons, and notional love, which proceeds as the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.[53]

Peter Lombard, after discussing in his *Sentences* the knowledge of God and His omnipotence, begins to treat of God's will. St. Thomas, in his commentary, puts the question we expect of him, "Is there a will in God?"[54] and this recurs whenever the same context provides a similar opportunity. The radical reason given here for the affirmative answer is that there is knowledge in God; where there is knowledge there is judgment of what is consonant and what is not (*conveniens et repugnans*); and what is judged to be consonant must be willed or desired (*volitum vel appetitum*).

---

connotes a *fugere*, and then it corresponds without difficulty to the love of *intentio*.—Secondly, an earlier article distinguished contemplative and active charity, aligning the first with complacency; but now it seems that complacency requires understanding of being, whereas charity does not. Is this a contradiction? For St. Thomas, there is no charity without the judgment of faith, and all judgment supposes some understanding; it is the same with complacency. But the understanding may be of the imperfect type which B. Lonergan in *Insight* calls "heuristic," and I earlier cited Browning's Pippa as illustrating the complacency based on this sort. For the difference between earthly and heavenly complacency, we have to remember, as we do for charity, that love is based directly on judgment, not on understanding, and therefore does not change essentially in glory. Cajetan has a discussion that may be helpful; cf. *In Sum. theol.* 2–2, q. 24, a. 7, n. xxii.

[53] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 37 *passim.* [54] *In 1 Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 1.

A few years later the question recurs in the *Quaestiones disputatae,*[55] and this time there is evidence of a much more serious effort to grapple with the problem. Knowing and willing are based on two quite different orientations to things of a spiritual nature. Knowledge regards the *ratio* of things and is therefore found only in immaterial subjects; but will and every form of appetite regard things in their concrete existence, and this sort of relationship to things may be found in all beings, material or immaterial.[56] Appetite, then, is a universal attribute of all things. Of course, only in the most immaterial natures will the inclination to other things which is in question be free, and it is precisely freedom which distinguishes will. To God, therefore, the supremely spiritual being, it most properly belongs to have a will.

The *Contra gentiles* contributes a variety of arguments under the heading, "Quod Deus est volens."[57] The first two repeat more succinctly those of the two works we have seen, but the third develops a distinct point: It belongs to every being to desire (*appetere*) its own perfection and its conservation in existence, either by tending towards the acquisition of what is lacking or resting in possession of it once it is acquired. The desire naturally corresponds to the grade of being, and in intellectual beings it is will. Now what belongs to every being belongs above all to God; so in God too there is a will, "qua placet sibi suum esse et sua bonitas." Other arguments follow, partly old, partly new.

The *Compendium theologiae* makes two brief points: God understands Himself and He is the perfect good; but the known good is necessarily loved and this requires will. Again, God is the first mover; but intellect does not move except through appetite, and intellectual appetite is will.[58]

The *Summa theologiae* takes up and develops the third argument of the *Contra gentiles,* basing itself on the relation everything has to its natural form (or to any other natural perfection), either tending to acquisition when the form is lacking or resting in its possession. This relationship is called *habitudo ad bonum.* Now as there are natural forms, so there are intelligible forms; hence there will be a *habitudo* in

[55] *De verit.,* q. 23, a. 1.

[56] See A. Hayen, in *Doctor communis* 3 (1950) 63, for a textual correction of this article. In the Appendix to my third article I shall return to the distinction St. Thomas makes between intellect's orientation to things and will's.

[57] 1, 72. [58] Chap. 32 (Parma ed.).

intellectual natures to the good known through intelligible form. This, however, means being endowed with will; God, therefore, as being intelligent, will also have will.[59]

There are manifest differences in this series of attempts to work out the notion of will in God. The *De veritate* goes far beyond the *In libros Sententiarum*, and the *Contra gentiles* beyond the *De veritate*. The *Compendium theologiae* differs from the *De veritate* on the importance of freedom, and the *Summa theologiae* introduces a point unknown to the argument of the *Contra gentiles* which was its source. But it does not seem profitable to spell these differences out in greater detail here, for the series does not evolve into a positive exposition of complacency. The significance of the differences, I think, may lie rather in the haunting dissatisfaction they evidence with the notion of will as appetite, and, of course, that is very relevant here. At any rate, the point is faced directly in the "objections" and responses of different articles. In the commentary on the *Sentences* this difficulty is put as the first argument of the article: Will is appetite, there is no appetite except in what is imperfect, hence there can be no will in God. St. Thomas grants it is wrong to speak of appetite in God, for the object of appetite is what is not yet possessed. Even in ourselves we do not properly speak of appetite when we are united with the object of will, but rather of love. Similarly, the objection that will's act is to tend to its object, the end, is met with the answer that tending is only accidental to willing; willing takes this form when the object is at a distance. God, however, loves Himself and delights in Himself.

In the *De veritate* the eighth argument again brings up this question of appetite in God. The answer: Process to the term and rest in the term are operations of the same nature; hence to tend to the good and to love and delight in the good acquired both belong to the faculty of appetite, although it derives its name rather from the first form of operation, and it is this which belongs to the imperfect. The *Contra gentiles*, on the other hand, is willing to speak in a qualified way ("ut ita dicam") of appetite in God.[60] So is the *Compendium theologiae*, and

[59] 1, q. 19, a. 1. One may usefully consult also the questions on love in God: *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 20, a. 1, and parallels.

[60] 1, 72, § 9: "Ipse igitur non solum est finis appetibilis, sed appetens, ut ita dicam, se finem. Et appetitu intellectuali, cum sit intelligens: qui est voluntas. Est igitur in Deo voluntas." Notice that the third argument proceeds from appetite for being but is transferred to God as a *placere* in His being. See also *ibid.*, chap. 74, § 3.

without hedging the word round with an "ut ita dicam."[61] The *Summa theologiae* returns to the pat answer of earlier works: Will in us belongs to the appetitive faculty; that faculty is named from the act of appetite, yes, but it is not restricted to appetite for what it lacks, it can also love what it has and delight in it. And in this sense we say God has will.[62]

One hesitates to tell St. Thomas, in regard to a question to which he returned at least five times, that he could have reached the same result by a simpler route. But, since in these passages the love which is analogous to love in God comes with the possession of the good at the term of process and is posited in God by negating the process, and the *Prima secundae* develops a little better the notion of a complacency that is prior to appetite, it does not seem rash to conjecture that if St. Thomas had worked out his theory of complacency earlier, making its object not an end even in a corrected sense but simply being, there might have been a noticeable revision in his proof for the existence of will in God.

If we turn now to divine notional love, we find ourselves on somewhat different ground. Here many characteristics of the love of complacency are predicated of the Holy Spirit, though not under the name of complacency. Thus, the Third Person is conceived as proceeding from the *Verbum* and the *Dicens*, from the Word and the One uttering the Word.[63] That is to say, it is not as tendency that this Love is primarily conceived, but as proceeding, as term, as bringing process to a close. And some of the most forthright statements relating intellect and love according to this viewpoint are made in Trinitarian discussions.[64] Clearly, whatever may be said about the tending of love to

[61] Chap. 32 (Parma ed.): "Deus est primum movens. Intellectus autem non utique movet nisi mediante appetitu; appetitus autem sequens intellectum, est voluntas. Oportet igitur Deum esse volentem."

[62] 1, q. 19, a. 1, ad 2m. See *ibid.*, q. 59, a. 1, ad 2m: the faculty of appetite extends to many other acts besides that of appetite, "ad multa alia."—In the preceding article (THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 20 [1959] 21, note 47), I alluded to a change between the *Sentences* period and the *Summa* on the question of appetite, but it is really of little significance. Between the two works there has been some wavering on the application of the word *appetitus* to God, and perhaps in the early work St. Thomas had not adverted to the metonymy involved in calling the will "appetite," but there has been no radical revision.

[63] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 93, a. 6 c.: "Cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem Verbi a Dicente, et Amoris ab utroque . . . ."

[64] See the list of texts given by B. Lonergan, in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 8 (1947) 407, note 20.

the loved object, an important principle of explanation for the Holy Spirit is found in His relation as term to the Word.

Further, He is analogous to the "impression that what is loved makes on the affection of the one loving,"[65] and when we remember the texts already seen on the presence of the loved object in the lover by complacency and on complacency as reception of the good into the affective faculty,[66] we have all we need to conceive the divinity of the Holy Spirit as the presence of God in divine proceeding Love. Finally, He is "something remaining in the lover,"[67] so that the divine processions reach an internal term in the Love which is the Holy Spirit.[68] Not only does nothing in all this require us to think of love as a tendency, but it can be brought beautifully into harmony with the theory of love as complacency. Since much of this ground was covered in a prior article, there is no need to dwell on the matter here.

All this, however, does not prevent the notion of *tendere* being also called into play. The explanation of the Holy Spirit begins with an account of the will as an inclination;[69] the name "Spirit" has some reference to a "vital motion and impulse," to a "being moved or impelled towards doing something";[70] the loved one is in the lover "as inclining . . . and impelling,"[71] and the object of love is in the will as the term of movement in a proportionate motive principle.[72]

Here again are two sets of ideas not easy to reconcile unless we recognize a second aspect of love formulated perhaps but vaguely before the Trinitarian treatise was written, and not set in clear contradistinction to the love of tendency even afterwards. If we grant that point, which of the two is to be retained and exploited in the Trinitarian analogy? Clearly, the Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the

[65] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 37, a. 1 c.: "Quaedam impressio . . . rei amatae in affectu amantis."

[66] THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 20 (1959) 37-38.

[67] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 37, a. 1, ad 2m: "Aliquid manens in amante."

[68] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 27, a. 3, ad 1m.

[69] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 27, a. 4 c.; *C. gent.* 4, 19, 2–3.

[70] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 27, a. 4 c.: "Processio autem quae consideratur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impellentis et moventis in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, non procedit ut genitum vel ut filius, sed magis procedit ut spiritus: quo nomine quaedam vitalis motio et impulsio designatur, prout aliquis ex amore dicitur moveri vel impelli ad aliquid faciendum."

[71] *C. gent.* 4, 19, 10: "Ut inclinans et . . . impellens."

[72] *C. gent.* 4, 19, 4.

analogy of *complacentia boni*. For that is love in its basic form, love as a term, love in clearest dependence on the word, love as passive. Nor is there any loss to Trinitarian theory through discarding the notion of love as tendency. St. Thomas felt obliged to assign a Scholastic sense to the word "Spirit" and did so in terms of tendency, but we can drop that attempt today and so avoid the incongruity of comparing the Holy Spirit with an impulse *ad aliquid faciendum*. Moreover, the divinity of the Spirit is as well conceived through the presence of the loved object in the will by complacency as by its presence as the term of movement. The twofold *habitudo*, to the Word as principle and to the divine goodness as object,[73] still remains. The difference between a procession which results in a similitude by reason of the mode of procession (*generatio*) and one that does not on this account result in a similitude but for another reason, also remains. There seems to be no significant loss and a clear gain.

Complacency and the Religious Life

I have been speaking of complacency as a simple correspondence of will with judgment of being, but it would be unrealistic to forget that this supposes a will in that ideal state in which love follows almost automatically on right judgment. What if will is not in the ideal state? What relation has complacency to the divided heart which Scripture and the spiritual writers describe? Again, we have been occupied with the contrast between complacency and concern and have found that they represent two complementary aspects of the general psychological and spiritual life. But complementarity here has a certain peculiarity. The will is a reflective faculty; as we can will other objects, so also we can will an act of will.[74] It would seem that similarly we can be complacent about concern, recognizing it as a rational element in the pattern of the universe, and can be concerned about complacency, intent on fostering it, and perhaps thereby correcting an imbalance in our psychological life. This point too invites our reflection.

It happens that these two points can be clarified together through the study of a concrete instance which will close this section on the dual notions of love and the good to be found in St. Thomas. It is

[73] *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 37, a. 1 c. et ad 2m; *C. gent.* 4, 19, 8.
[74] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 17, a. 5, ad 2m.

true, however, that the duality now is not so much of two opposed views working somewhat latently at cross-purposes as of two complementary realities exerting a mutual influence on each other. However, the importance of the question may excuse its somewhat awkward inclusion in this section.

The concrete instance I have in mind is the "concern" that is characteristic of the religious life, and the matter may be introduced by a question. What accounts for the difference in structure between that part of the *Summa theologiae* which treats of man's progress towards God and such a work as the *De perfectione vitae spiritualis*?[75] One would expect a rather close correspondence, for surely to seek the perfection of the spiritual life and to seek God cannot but have coincident paths.

Nevertheless, the differences in structure are notable. The *Summa* is regulated, as we have seen, according to the ideas of the *via motionis*. We seek beatitude, which is attained through human acts, and so the work will take up first the acts themselves and then their principles.[76] The principles are internal (potencies, habits, virtues)[77] and external (God, through law and grace).[78] The *Secunda secundae* gives particular cases where its twin volume dealt with generalities,

[75] I presume the background of this opusculum is familiar to readers, at least in a general way. More information may be had in P. Glorieux, who has given us a whole series of studies on the question: "Pour qu'on lise le *De perfectione*," *Vie spirituelle* 23 (*Supplément;* June, 1930) [97]–[126]; "Le 'Contra impugnantes' de saint Thomas: Ses sources. Son plan," *Mélanges Mandonnet* 1 (Paris, 1930) 51–81; "Les polémiques 'Contra Geraldinos': Les pièces du dossier," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 6 (1934) 5–41; " 'Contra Geraldinos': L'enchainement des polémiques," *ibid.* 7 (1935) 129–55; "Pour une édition de Gérard d'Abbéville," *ibid.* 9 (1937) 56–84, esp. 61–65; "Une offensive de Nicolas de Lisieux contre saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* 39 (1938) 121–29. See also D. L. Douie, *The Conflict between the Seculars and the Mendicants at the University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1954); he gives many references.—The bitterness of the dispute that raged in medieval Paris over the religious orders, their state and function, is not without echo in the writings of St. Thomas himself and explains the amplitude with which he treated these questions. Still, his ruling passion even in such stormy circumstances was for truth, for understanding, for orderly and objective argument. Such an attitude goes a long way towards lifting discussion out of its historical context and enables us to study his essential doctrine without recalling old controversies. This applies especially to the *De perfectione*, the most systematic of the three chief polemical works, written, St. Thomas tells us in the final passage, "a contumeliis abstinendo."

[76] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 6, prol.

[77] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 49, prol.

[78] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 90, prol.

and the *Pars tertia* makes a further advance, studying that unique and superlative way that God has given us in Christ. In this perspective, charity takes its place as part of the supernatural organism of virtues which are the internal principles of activity on the way to God; it is, of course, the heart of the organism, it may even open on new horizons not envisaged in the original plan (St. Thomas was not a logic machine), but at least the structural principle is that of the *via motionis*, the pursuit of God and beatitude.

If we turn now to the *De perfectione*, we find another plan, coherent enough in itself, but a little baffling in comparison with the one we have just seen. Here we begin by noting that charity is the basic measure of perfection (chap. 1), and is divided into love of God and love of one's neighbor (chap. 2). Ten chapters on love of God follow, of which four distinguish various grades, ending with the higher love *viatores* may have for God. This pertains not to precepts but to a higher impulse, it is a matter of the counsels, and the general means to it is renouncement, *revocatio ab affectu temporalium* (chap. 6). The next six chapters discuss this *revocatio* as effected through the counsels. Chapters 13 and 14[79] are on love of one's neighbor, and St. Thomas then turns to states of perfection, those who are in those states, and various more particular points of the controversy which occasioned the opusculum.

There is an extraordinary emphasis on *revocatio ab affectu temporalium*. It is true that the practice of *revocatio* involves the exercise of the virtues, but this exercise has nothing like the prominence it has in the *Summa*, where prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are discussed in a series of 126 questions (47 to 170 of the *Secunda secundae*). Again, both precept and counsel pertain to the *via motionis*,[80] and charity in the *De perfectione* remains the form of the virtues;[81] still one must say that the active life is now quite secondary. It is secondary in the life of religious, whose orientation is most especially to the love of God and the contemplative life (chaps. 16 and 17); it is secondary

[79] In this and the following paragraph I use the divisions of the Parma and Marietti editions. Vivès (Frette) makes three chapters of their chapter 14.

[80] *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 108, a. 4 c.: "Praecepta . . . data de his quae sunt necessaria ad consequendum finem aeternae beatitudinis. . . . Consilia vero . . . de illis per quae melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem praedictum."

[81] This seems to be the sense of the phrase: "Omnia exteriora nostra, verba et opera, ex divina caritate firmentur," c. 5, § 568.

in the episcopal state, which seems ordered to the love of one's neighbor (*ibid.*), for a bishop's active works are an overflow of his love of God, and he must be outstanding in contemplation as well as in action, "in actione praecellere . . . et in contemplatione praecipuum esse" (chap. 18).

Further, this viewpoint is maintained whenever St. Thomas has occasion to discuss the contemplative side of religious life. The *Contra impugnantes* is built on the derivation of the word "religion." This comes from *ligare*, and the idea is that vows are a restrictive force removing a great many liberties and thus channeling energies into one direction, that is, love of God.[82] The *Contra gentiles* takes a similar position: the divine law includes counsels for drawing men away from the cares of this life, so far as that is possible on earth.[83] The commentary on Philippians makes perfection consist in charity as usual, and distinguishes a threefold adherence of love, of which the relevant form is a love of supererogation established by withdrawing the heart from earthly things, for the more we suppress cupidity, the more charity will flourish.[84]

The *Contra retrahentes* deals with a host of less fundamental questions but reiterates the point that the counsels contribute to the increase of charity by withdrawing the heart from objects that rival God in the affections.[85] The *De caritate* follows the lines of former works on the positive nature of perfection and the negative means to it, and gives a systematic exposition of the impediments to charity.[86] A disputation now grouped with the *Quodlibetales* likewise insists on the negative aspect of religious life and explains the totality of the holocaust.[87] Finally, we may glance at a passage of the *Summa theologiae* which, though inserted in the articulation of another general scheme, shows the same mentality. The religious state, we read, may be considered from three viewpoints. We can look on it as the exercise of tending to perfect charity, as the retreat of the soul from external

[82] Pars 1, c. 1, §§ 5, 9.

[83] 3, 130, § 1: "Dantur in divina lege consilia, quibus homines ab occupationibus praesentis vitae retrahantur, quantum possibile est terrenam vitam agenti."

[84] C. 3, lect. 2, § 126: "Fit removendo cor a temporalibus . . . quia quanto deficit cupiditas, tanto plus crescit caritas."

[85] C. 6, § 761. [86] A. 10 c.

[87] *Quodl.* 3, q. 6, a. 3. It was really a *quaestio disputata*; see P. M. Pession's introduction to Vol. 1 of the *Quaestiones disputatae* (Marietti, 1949) p. xiii.

solicitudes, and as the holocaust by which one offers himself and his possessions to God. Although the first viewpoint seems positive enough, St. Thomas explains it negatively: tending to charity is a matter of removing by vow the three things that hinder total application of the heart to God.[88]

I have given only selected elements of the rich Thomist doctrine on the religious life, but at least we can see that religious are to tend to the very positive end of charity and use the rather negative means of *revocatio ab affectu temporalium.* If the emphasis laid on abnegation seems disproportionate, it may be because it was the counsels and their place in the spiritual life that were at the heart of the Paris controversy. In any case, we can easily complete the story from other works. Thus, in assigning the causes of devotion (and his *devotio* is surely relevant here), St. Thomas distinguishes God, the external cause and the chief one, and ourselves, operating internally by meditation or contemplation. For devotion is an act of will, and every act of will depends on mental factors, the object of will being the good proposed by intellect.[89]

This is a distinctively positive view and it parallels different statements on the means of generating and increasing charity.[90] It is clearly complementary to the viewpoint dominant in the works on religious life, and sometimes we find the two joined in one discussion. For example, St. Thomas gives two ways to dispose ourselves for acquiring charity: hearing the divine word and meditating on good things; and two ways to dispose ourselves for its increase: separation of the heart from earthly things, and firm patience in adversity.[91]

[88] 2–2, q. 186, a. 7 c.

[89] *Sum. theol.* 2–2, q. 82, a. 3 c.: "Causa devotionis extrinseca et principalis Deus est. . . . Causa autem intrinseca ex parte nostra, oportet quod sit meditatio seu contemplatio. Dictum est enim quod devotio est quidam voluntatis actus ad hoc quod homo prompte se tradat ad divinum obsequium. Omnis autem actus voluntatis ex aliqua consideratione procedit, eo quod bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis."

[90] *In 3 Sent.* d. 23, q. 2, a. 5, ad 5m: "Non potest affectus firmari in aliquo per amorem in quo intellectus firmatus non est per assensum." *In Ephes.*, c. 3, lect. 5, § 181: "Ex vi cognitionis inducitur ad magis diligendum: quia quanto Deus magis cognoscitur, tanto et magis diligitur." *Sum. theol.* 2–2, q. 4, a. 7, ad 5m: "Non potest voluntas perfecto amore in Deum tendere nisi intellectus rectam fidem habeat circa ipsum."

[91] *In duo praecepta caritatis . . .*, prol., §§ 1155–59. The point here is the conjunction of the two aspects, not the functions assigned to each. I doubt if St. Thomas means to say that reading and meditation have nothing to do with the increase of charity. This work, after all, is a set of sermons, where we should not look for scientific formulation.

The picture begins to take shape. The governing notion of the *Pars secunda* is effective love, love of an end, later specified as charity. On occasion the affective side of charity is treated, to be sure, but the structural principle takes love as effective. On the other hand, the structural principle of the *De perfectione* and its parallels takes love as affective. True, effective love is operative for the increase of charity, but it is the increase of charity in itself as a term (*via receptionis*) that is the objective, not of charity as the governing factor in an active life. That increase is operated positively (on our part) by way of contemplation; it is operated negatively by removal of obstacles through the counsels; the word *affectus* in *revocatio ab affectu temporalium* is significant. Briefly, in the *Summa* effective love is at home with affective love as a guest; in the *De perfectione* the roles are reversed.

Because religious life is our own operation (under grace), it is in the *via motionis*. But it is in the *via motionis* in the peculiar way that regards charity as a term and not as a principle, that seeks charity because it is the will's rest in God, who is in truth the greatest good. There is here something of the character of a feedback in industry, but also a difference. A primitive hunter may take time out from hunting to make a spear, a spearmaker may take time out from making spears to make a tool with which to make spears, but all this looks directly to further production. Unless the toolmaker is an artist, he does not make tools for the sake either of making them or of having them. The way of the counsels, on the contrary, is not concerned primarily with greater production and activity. That will indubitably follow in the same way as episcopal charity overflows in care of the flock of Christ. But the direct concern of the way of the counsels, in the Thomist view, is the more basic occupation of contemplation, affection, adherence to the greatest good, or the psychological state we have called complacency, though here, more than ever, the unwelcome connotations of the word make it less than ideal as a name.

The reflexive nature of the voluntary and the consequent overlapping of attitudes of complacency and concern may explain why it is possible to have different groupings in dividing the forms of love. We saw that St. Francis of Sales puts obedience to God's commands and acceptance of His decrees together under effective love. In so far as acceptance of His decrees is an act of will that we must strive to elicit, it would be legitimate to include this under the heading of

concern too. On the other hand, in so far as decrees relate to what already is for us, and commands to what is to be done by my agency, acceptance of decrees and obedience to commands fall into different categories, the first coming within the object of complacency, the second of concern.[92] In a similar way one may justify Tillich's making concern coextensive, as he seems to do, with the religious attitude; for all our complacency in what is, our security in the faith, our rest in God's activity, may, by the merest trick of a question or a doubt or a fear, become the object of our concern. The concrete psychology of an individual man may exhibit the most intricate patterns imaginable. The only task here is to distinguish the elements at the basis of the pattern and thus provide the means of a methodical elimination of extreme attitudes and a correction of imbalance. In this task no point of vantage is more basic than being and, I think, no division of being more relevant than that of what is from what is not yet but may be through my efforts and concern.

This section has been long; let the conclusion be brief. The evidence is that two lines of thought on love and the good run through the writings of St. Thomas, never contradicting one another outright but never fully integrated either: in the figure used earlier, two columns of understanding advancing into the surrounding chaos, making their way with profit but neither wholly organizing the territory taken nor maintaining liaison with one another. If some of my particular arguments call for correction, perhaps in spite of that the cumulative evidence of a number of test cases will make the general thesis plausible. It remains now to test the doctrine, not in its validity as an interpretation of St. Thomas, but in its significance for our times and the manifold problems of our generation.

(To be concluded)

[92] Likewise the division between free and passive operations of the will may shift position. Complacency in the first instance is passive, as is desire of the end. But given the most general judgment possible of the end and the corresponding desire for it, one can freely choose and pursue more particular objectives, among them my own complacency in the good. The principle at stake here is explained in *Sum. theol.* 1–2, q. 1, a. 7, taken in conjunction with q. 9, a. 3.