

COMPLACENCY AND CONCERN IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS

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THIS STUDY originated in the view that the notion of love as a tendency towards the object loved, of love as an inclination, a principle of activity in pursuit of an end, could not pretend to give more than a partial account of the reality. Not only did it seem inadequate as a basis for a metaphysics and psychology of willing and seriously ineffective as a guide in dealing with the aberrations and correcting the imbalance in one's spiritual and cultural life, but it did not seem either to take full account of the thought of St. Thomas himself, however justly it might appeal to him for what truth it in fact contains.

The first two articles have been devoted to collecting and evaluating the textual evidence in St. Thomas for a more basic form of love, opposed to tendency as rest and term are to inclination and process, and most often characterized by him as complacency. The evidence for such a form of love seems to me to be striking once it is assembled, and its integration with the rest of Thomist thought sufficiently easy once an underlying framework is brought to light, but I do not pretend that either step lies waiting to be noticed on the surface of his writings. Even when St. Thomas puts a question under its own proper *Utrum*, one has always to remember, using the familiar iceberg metaphor, that his answer is nine-tenths hidden, that the austere simplicity of the *Respondeo dicendum* rests on a thought-structure that goes far beyond the immediately visible application. And when the question is not expressly put, as ours was not, difficulties are multiplied.

The data therefore were not easy to find, harder to disengage from their context, and hardest of all to evaluate in themselves and in the importance attributed to them by St. Thomas. The general mentality of the Middle Ages, as of all ages in which God is regarded as the *summum bonum* in Himself and for men, could not but be dominated by their interpretation of the Davidic "Unam petii a Domino, hanc

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requiram, ut inhabitem in domo Domini omnibus diebus vitae meae" (Ps 26:4), and their understanding of "Ascensiones in corde suo disposuit" (Ps 83:6) served as perpetual exhortation to progress towards a distant goal. Hence the summary description of the *Pars secunda* as *de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum*. When these obvious notions were inserted into a psychology of love deriving from St. Augustine's "Pondus meum, amor meus,"¹ we can understand not only how in the *motus ad Deum* love could be the ruling force, the *motor, mater, finis, et forma virtutum*,² but also how little express provision would be made for the opposite aspect of love, references to which, if they existed at all, could be only occasional and give the appearance of conflicting with the prevailing view of love as tendency.

Nevertheless that opposite doctrine appears. The general lines of Thomist metaphysics and psychology call for it, statements about it emerge at intervals, it becomes the object of a more direct though not sustained inquiry in the questions devoted to the basic notion of love late in St. Thomas' career, and a number of interlocking concepts permit its extension through immediately adjacent areas of the Thomist "system." I do not think there can be much doubt either about the fact of this complementary aspect of willing or about the general character of its acts and objects, even while I grant that there is still a great deal of work to be done on the history of the notion prior and subsequent to St. Thomas, on a precise evaluation of its importance in his thinking, and on its implications as they expand throughout the field of willing.

But that further work may be undertaken with more energy if complacency, in the sense defined, is thought to be of some practical moment in the contemporary situation. Accordingly, after presenting a summary of my findings so far, I propose in this article to confront the notion of complacency with those of *agapē* and *eros* as they appear in some of their chief modern exponents. If this confrontation suggests, however imperfectly, the role that complacency might play in an integral theology and philosophy as well as in a balanced program of living, my main purpose, that of staking off an area of thought for

¹ *Confessiones* 13, 9 (*PL* 32, 849).

² *In 3 Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3; see also *In 1 Tim.*, c. 1, lect. 2, § 13; *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 23, a. 8 c.; etc.

more exact investigation, will be achieved. Let us, then, collect our findings and present them in somewhat freer fashion than was possible in an exegesis of St. Thomas that tried to adhere closely to the text.

A key point of the theory is one I have largely assumed from the brief but, I think, decisive discussion of B. Lonergan: the rational character of love in its procession from the word of intellect. To say that love is a rational act in the field of rational consciousness is to say that it is an *emanatio intelligibilis* from a mental word, from a judgment, from an affirmation of what is. And this is a key point, for it withdraws the emphasis at once from a not-yet which is supposed to occupy the will excessively in its tendency to an end, and directs attention to the existing world and will's passive response to it.

The ramifications of this idea extend from Trinitarian theology to human willing through all its ranges. In the Trinity, the Third Person is proceeding Love, and the analogy for the procession is not some puzzling antics of the will within itself but the quite clear and distinct procession of an act of love in the human will from the word of intellect. The Holy Spirit is not, in St. Thomas' definitive mind, a nexus joining Father and Son,³ or a Love that in some obscure way goes out from Father to Son and in equal obscurity comes back from Son to Father (how this is conceived I simply cannot fathom), but Love proceeding from the Word uttered by the Father as *Dicens*: "We can love with a rational and holy love only that which we bring to actual conception in the intellect. But the conception of the intellect is a word, and so love must take its origin from a word. The Word of God, however, we call the Son, and so it is clear that the Holy Spirit is from the Son."⁴ Other theories of the Third Person may be perfectly orthodox; like the shamrock allegedly used by St. Patrick and St. Basil's rainbow they may have a useful symbolic function, or give an impulse to piety, or provide an analogy for an isolated dogma of faith; but they do not seem sufficiently fundamental to assimilate the data of revelation on the Holy Spirit and order it in a coherent whole with that on the Father and the Son and the activity of the Three in the created universe.

³ He uses the word, but not to explain the procession of the Holy Spirit: *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 37, a. 1, ad 3m; 2-2, q. 1, a. 8, ad 3m; *Contra errores Graec.*, c. 9, § 1047.

⁴ *De rat. fid.* 4, § 967.

What the Holy Spirit is in the Trinity, the act of complacent love is analogously in the *imago Dei*, man. It is true St. Thomas did not clearly make the Holy Spirit the love of complacency, but all that we have discovered about this form of love serves admirably as analogy for the Holy Spirit, while the use of love as tendency leads to insoluble difficulties. In the Trinity, the basic character of Love is not to be a principle, or to tend to anything, or to unite, but to proceed in virtue of an Understanding uttering the Truth of what God is. In the *imago Dei*, the same holds true: this is clearest in the perfect beatitude of the vision of God, where we have the fulness of truth that is due to understanding in the *lumen gloriae* what God is, and the consequent procession of perfected human love for God. Love no longer needs to pursue the good or to be a principle of its pursuit; its function is to rest in the good now possessed by understanding. In the imperfect beatitude that it is possible to enjoy on earth there is the truth that comes from contemplation of what is and can be known in this state, and there is in the will the procession of a love that corresponds in a simple affective relation to this good that is already in some measure possessed.

The love I have been describing in relation to intellect has an object, though it is not conceived as going out to that object in inclination but as standing in passive relation to it through the mediation of knowledge. How is that object to be characterized more precisely? This is to ask in what will is complacent when it loves, and we must answer: in the good that is. If we ask further how the good is defined, we can say only that it is whatever is in so far as it is the object of complacency. We have not here a vicious circle, but the simultaneous definition of two terms by one relation. On the side of the object the relation is not real, nothing is added to being over and above its being to make it good, and so the notion of the good derives from the subject's relation to it in willing; the order is: being, knowledge of being, love of being, the notion of being as good. What I am asserting here is simply the twofold openness of man's spiritual nature to the infinity of being, with the consequent denominations added to being. Man is such that he can know and love what is; his potentiality is infinite in both respects. And being, the object of this openness, derives from the duality of man's spiritual orientation the two transcendental char-

acters, true and good. Nothing real is added or can be added to being to make it true; it is called true because the human mind is open to it in the capacity to know. Similarly it is called good because the human will is open to it in the capacity to love.

Can the act of this love be further characterized? As an ultimate in psychology it is not subject to resolution into simpler elements; all one can do is multiply the description of those factors which may help us to isolate it in our experience and integrate it in our thinking. We may say, then, that it is the affective correspondence with being in which the being of the things we know pleases us and the divine being pleases God: "Placet sibi suum esse."⁵ This pleasure is not sensible gratification; it is consent to being, harmony with all that is, peace with the universe. It neither rebels at necessity nor grasps at possibility. It does not desire or seek or strive or fret or sorrow. It is the human spirit at rest in relation to its object, at the end of process. If we think of the Trinitarian processions as having taken place, the Holy Spirit will be God's final mood in which divine immanent activity reached its term and became quiescent. If we try to pierce beyond such a temporal conception, we will think of the Holy Spirit as an activity which is a state like joy and happiness, as an eternal restful joy-ing that corresponds to the divine is-ing by which I have heard a philosopher describe God's being. Something analogous is true of God's image, in the successive stages of earthly affection and heavenly beatitude. Finally, within this universal frame of reference (universal because it regards being) one could include the special complacency which is interpersonal love; I do not doubt that this would give new and absorbing interest to the study, but I am content here to indicate its place in what I conceive to be the integral Thomist view of loving and willing.

Love in us as in the Holy Trinity is a term, then, before it is a principle. It looks back to its source before it looks ahead to a goal. It does not need explanation through any attraction or inclination or tendency; it is enough that the good is and that we come to know it is and have the power to joy in its being. Moreover, it is in the basic instance a purely passive term. The doctrine that a "vital" act must be produced by the subject faculty has gained widespread acceptance in

⁵ *C. gent.* 1, 72, § 4.

the schools, but it does not seem to be part of Thomist thought and, as far as I can see, claims no support from independent metaphysics. As ontologically, then, love is passive, so psychologically it is a coming to rest, a fruition, perfect or imperfect, a complacency in the tranquil possession of the good that is. Man is made for the contemplation of truth, which is a short way of saying that he is made for the contemplation through truth of being, and love is the natural complement of the truth.⁶

But all this shows only one aspect of love. Repeatedly, after studying the fact of will in God, Aquinas asks whether God wills other beings besides Himself,⁷ and the affirmative answer is explained in the final discussion (that of the *Summa theologiae*) in terms of the natural tendency beings have towards the diffusion and communication of the good they possess. It is the Thomist conception of the divine *agapē* in its widest range, of which certainly the splendid and striking expression is the Cross, but which has to be conceived theologically in ultimate and universal terms of being and willing. Sartre holds that all human desire is desire for being and, specifically, for being God.⁸ I think this insight, subject to a correction to be made presently, is true and basic. The point, however, I would make here is that God's *agapē* can be conceptualized along similar lines; His "desire" is for our being and, specifically, for our being divine, His sons, becoming God, *secundum quod possibile est*. It is not a desire in God if we understand desire as appetite for what is lacking to oneself in perfection, but I see no reason why it should not be called by some name which subsumes it with desire under a common notion.⁹ Where the frame of reference is

⁶ Love is "quoddam . . . complementum" in beatitude: *In Ioan.*, c. 17, lect. 1, § 2186; see also *In 4 Sent.*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 2; *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 3, a. 4 c.; *C. gent.* 3, 26, § 12 ("Item. Si aliquis actus . . ."); *Comp. theol.*, c. 107.

⁷ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 19, a. 2; see also *In 1 Sent.*, d. 45, a. 2; *C. gent.* 1, 75.

⁸ H. J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (London, 1952) p. 138. Sartre, of course, regards God as merely an ideal.

⁹ The specification of love as *amicitia* and *concupiscentia* is familiar. St. Thomas introduces this division into the divine love of creatures, going so far as to attribute to God a kind of appetitive desire; *In 3 Sent.*, d. 32, a. 2, ad 2m: "Deus quamvis non amet aliquid concupiscendo sibi, amat tamen concupiscendo alteri, ut non fiat vis in verbo concupiscentiae quae anxietatem, non proprietatem desiderii importat"; *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 20, a. 2, ad 3m: "Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo, non amat creaturas irracionales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi concupiscentiae; in quantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam bonitatem et nostram utili-

being, not the self, the tendency to communicate and the tendency to receive belong together under the heading of what-is-to-be, the not-yet, and it will not seem improper to speak of God's holy concern for His children.

As the creative mind of God conceives the possible worlds and wills that other beings be, so man, His image, looks beyond what is to the possible. The human mind is not limited to affirming existence; it can also advert to what is lacking, what is not, and it is fertile too in invention, in creating ideally what may be. So there arises in man a new type of love: the *intentio boni*, desire, tendency. There is then a transition from complacency to concern, from passivity to activity. The passive actuation which is complacency in an ideal end becomes the principle of operations for achieving the ideal. The affective contemplative charity which is at rest in its object takes on a new function to govern in effective charity all the least details of the soul's involvement in the universe and its ascent to God. The point of actual transition may vary with age, temperament, calling, and the changing day-to-day circumstances of the external situation. But in an ordered study of God and the universe, one must give it a fixed place. And so, following the ontological division of St. Thomas, one would say that for God the transition occurs at q. 44 of the *Pars prima*, where the theme shifts from the divine being (the object of His complacency) to the *processio creaturarum a Deo* (the object of His concern). For man, the transition occurs with the *Pars secunda*, where having studied the world that is and has come to be without our intervention, we begin to consider the world of becoming and especially *our* becoming, where events are at least partially subject to our own dominion.

But this tendency in us divides again according as the object of it is our own being or that of others. It may be that we have an unusual

tatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis." The phrases, "quasi concupiscentiae" and "ut non fiat vis in verbo," recall a dozen others we meet in St. Thomas: "quaedam impressio," "ut ita dicam," "per modum habitus," "quantum ad aliquid," etc. The pattern allows an intriguing comparison with modern practice; nowadays it is pretty well taken for granted that an original thinker has to forge a new vocabulary to express his pioneering insights, but St. Thomas was content to enter a "quasi" with the old words, as if to say: "We really ought to have a new word for this, but you can get the idea and we leave it to language to catch up later on."—There is a modern precedent for subsuming aspects of friendship and desire under the general heading of concern in Heidegger's "Fürsorge" and "Besorgen"; cf. *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen, 1953) pp. 121–22.

interest and extraordinary fertility in forming ideas of what we may ourselves become, and this would be the ground of Sartre's claim, but surely this view is not the whole truth. As God, so His image is capable in its degree of *agapē*, the love which is not directed to self but overflows in concern for others. As general complacency in being takes on a new dimension in interpersonal relations, so also does concern for being. There is a concern for others that adds new depth to our general concern for the becoming of the world. In the popular mind this pairs with concern for self to form the sharply opposed notions of *agapē* and *eros*. But the two can be brought together in a basic community when the reference is to becoming, and then for-oneseif and for-another may unite in the same sort of act.¹⁰

Both forms of concern could be studied at length in St. Thomas. The first is already explicit in many studies of Thomist charity, especially with regard to the *communicatio bonorum*. The second has been studied in some of its elements. Perhaps a further study uniting those elements and setting the whole in one perspective would be useful. In this field we could exploit to the full the common notion of love as an attraction to the good: *pondus meum, amor meus*. Here too falls the study of Christian hope and Christian striving for the goal: "Quae quidem retro sunt obliuiscens, ad ea uero quae sunt priora, extendens meipsum, ad destinatum prosequor" (Phil 3:13-14). But here too belong the stress of tension, the anxieties of an uncertain conflict, the weariness of a prolonged and unremitting strife. Likewise, but in a lower plane, the efforts of the human race to advance in culture: science, the arts, technology, the control of the natural universe—in short, the full expansion of the Thomist *ars* and *prudentia*.

In all these fields it would be useful to have St. Thomas' mind exposed in detail and the details gathered into a synthesis, but there are limits to what can be done in a single essay. Some of the data on the pursuit of the *summum bonum* were given in the first article. One could collect the data on anxiety; true, this is not a dominating concept, but it does occur,¹¹ and the references to *sollicitudo* and

¹⁰ See the last phrase in the quotation from the *Summa* in the preceding note: "Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis."

¹¹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 35, a. 8 c., where the question is of species of sadness: "Anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod refugium: unde alio nomine dicitur angustia."

providentia in the treatise on prudence¹² as well as the recurring discussion, in the studies of religious life, on the value of the counsels for ridding ourselves of worldly solicitude¹³ would supply useful orientations. Again, while I would not contend that St. Thomas had a technology, I think he provides some principles of extraordinary value for guidance in this field.¹⁴ And lastly, as throughout the whole range of the *via motionis* complacency may make itself felt in acceptance of the conditions of operation, of tools and materials and ability, so the *via motionis* itself can be put to the service of the *via receptionis*. There are activities looking to involvement in the world and their own continuance, and there are activities looking to freedom from involvement and their own cessation, activities that reflect back to feed their affective source. And so the problem of transition occurs in both directions and the achievement of proper balance can become seriously complicated in the concrete.

One would wish, too, to study the history of the notion of complacency, to know what influences brought it to formulation in St. Thomas. I think we may judge from the studies of O. Lottin¹⁵ and

¹² *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 48, a. 1, ad 5m; q. 49, a. 6; q. 55, aa. 6-7; etc.

¹³ See the references in the second article of this series, *supra* pp. 224-28.

¹⁴ In *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 96, a. 2 c., with regard to man's dominion over the world, St. Thomas distinguishes the power to command (my control of my imagination, passions, etc.) and the power to use (control of the corporeal universe); we cannot command the weather but we can discover its laws and use them to modify agriculture, then discover more remote laws and use them to modify the weather, etc. This seems to supply a wider context for the principle made famous centuries later by Bacon: "Natura parendo vincitur," *Novum organum*, Bk. 1, Aphorisms 3 and 129.—A second line to be pursued is the firm Thomist doctrine on our intervention in the material universe. It is limited to bodily action; *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 117, a. 3, ad 3m: "Ad exteriora . . . corpora immutanda apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit . . . nisi mediante immutatione proprii corporis," another statement echoed by Bacon, *Novum organum*, Bk. 1, Aphorism 4. It is now almost a proverb that, in the last analysis, we can only move things. This is certainly true of the external world, for what are we doing but moving things, whether we force columns of air through the voice box in an operatic aria, or push the button releasing the hydrogen bomb? But Aquinas keeps the point in perspective; it refers to "exteriora corpora."—A third line is a specification of the second, being Aristotle's doctrine on the role of hands, the *organum organorum* for man: Whereas God gave other animals better natural powers in the way of instincts and equipment for the strife of living, he gave man reason instead, which is in potential possession of all knowledge, and hands, by which he can prepare an infinite variety of instruments for an infinite variety of purposes (*Sum. theol.* 1, q. 76, a. 5, ad 4m; see also *De anima*, a. 8, ad 20m).

¹⁵ *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* 1 (Louvain-Gembloux, 1942) 393-424.

R. Gauthier¹⁶ that it had not made its appearance as such in technical thought before the thirteenth century, but the reality is there, expressed in the attitude of the saints and the homely wisdom of the people; it is there *in actu exercito*, we might say. Further, there is almost certainly a close relation in object between the love exposed by Z. Alszegehly in his study of St. Bonaventure¹⁷ and Thomist complacency. But the psychological analysis does not seem to have been carried out by either Bonaventure or Thomas to its last determinations. In earlier times an important and influential Alexandrian school had made charity intermediate between the active life of purification and the subsequent contemplative life,¹⁸ and, though the intention may not have been to show a strict sequence, the scheme would tend to obstruct the realization that at the basis of all purification or action and prior to them lies a pure act of affective response to being. There is also the later history of the notion to be examined; Billuart seems to have attempted a rehabilitation of the Thomist *simplex volitio*, but his conception has drawn criticism from S. Pinckaers in a recent article.¹⁹

¹⁶ "Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954) 51-100. A. Stévaux, "La doctrine de la charité dans les Commentaires des Sentences de saint Albert, de saint Bonaventure, et de saint Thomas," *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 24 (1948) 59-97, has some useful information on the sources of the doctrine of love, but expressly sets aside a particular consideration of complacency (p. 63).

¹⁷ *Grundformen der Liebe: Die Theorie der Gottesliebe bei dem hl. Bonaventura* (Rome, 1946). See pp. 36-41: the basis of love is that things are good in themselves, not merely for me; pp. 42-53: God is loved for what He is, not for what He is for man; other indications in note 40 of the first article, *supra* p. 19.

¹⁸ See the article, "Charité," *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* 2 (Paris, 1953) 523-69, and especially 551-57; this section of the article is by J. Farges and M. Viller.

¹⁹ "La structure de l'acte humain suivant saint Thomas," *Revue thomiste* 55 (1955) 393-412. I think we must grant to Père Pinckaers that *velleitas*, *appetitus inefficax*, and the like, are not adequate terms in which to describe the first act of will. On the other hand, I think Billuart may have been on the track of a good idea: a basic form of willing which is not pursuit of an *appetibile*; he plays down the appetitive function, but does not find the positive substitute. Pinckaers himself seems to remain on the plane of *effectus*, the dynamism of willing the end penetrating the willing of the means, etc.; see p. 396, "La volonté qui est la faculté de l'efficence." Dom Lottin's review, in *Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 7 (1954-57) 477-78, restores the perspective of a twofold willing, affective and effective. Then we can make *simplex volitio* share with complacency the character of passive origin and affective response without reducing it to that inferior type of willing which is unsuitable, in Pinckaers' view, for the "source de tout le dynamisme volontaire" (p. 410). A *velleitas* is such a *simplex volitio* that does not pass, as it ought, from passive actuation to active efficacy.

Finally, while the historical and speculative questions lack a definitive treatment, it does not seem too early to introduce the general notion into practice in the daily spiritual and cultural life, and here, if it be really fundamental, it cannot fail to have an expanding impact whose force and range are hard at the moment to predict, and whose complexity, especially when we consider the interaction of complacency and concern on one another, renders any simple outline impossible.

Some of these lines of investigation are beyond my competence; as for the others, perhaps their textual study here would induce tedium and risk dimming the clarity of the main argument. In any case, I think we have reached a point where a fairly clear comparison of the idea with other trends of thought is possible. That comparison will be a test of the power of the Thomist notion of complacency and reveal whether it has such significance as warrants further research along the lines indicated.

THOMIST COMPLACENCY AND NYGREN'S AGAPĒ

It is proposed now to bring the Thomist idea of love into relation with other concepts that have claimed support, and here the fame of A. Nygren's work²⁰ imposes on us the attempt at comparing his *agapē* with Thomist *complacentia*. If my remarks are largely critical of Nygren's thesis, this should not be taken as denying the debt the theological world owes him. It is simply that in the comparison to be instituted it is not the general validity of *agapē* as a significant concept or the felicity of Nygren's positive account of it that is relevant; it is, first, the location of his categories in a larger whole, the legitimacy of his making them ultimate and wholly exclusive of one another; and, secondly, the theological principles implicit in his procedure of defining *agapē* to be *the* form of Christian love and excluding *eros* as an alien. First, then, the notion of *agapē* and its place in a larger theology.

Agapē, as Nygren derives the notion from the Scriptures, is primarily God's own love. It is characterized by its unselfishness; it is

²⁰ Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, tr. P. S. Watson (London, 1953). I shall refer to this edition. Part 1 of Nygren's work had appeared in English in somewhat abridged form in 1932; Part 2 was translated by Watson and issued in two volumes in 1938 and 1939; for the present edition Watson has added his own, unabridged version of Part 1.

God's way to man; it is freely given and "seeketh not its own"; it is sovereign and independent with regard to its object; it is poured out on "the evil and the good"; it is spontaneous, unmotivated, groundless; it is the divine self-giving epitomized in the Cross; it loves and creates value in its object.²¹

This love, so simply and beautifully described, must, if we would have an integral theology, be related more explicitly to the created universe and to God Himself. The relation to the universe is already indicated. *Agapē* loves and creates value in its object. The divine *agapē* is causative of the goodness of things, not dependent on it. Nygren puts, motto-like, at the head of Part 2 of his book, the statement of Luther: "Amor Dei non invenit sed creat suum diligibile, amor hominis fit a suo diligibili." And this, he says, expresses "with incomparable clarity" the difference between God's love and man's.²² The statement is truly of a splendid clarity and profound theological significance. A Thomist cannot but agree wholeheartedly with Luther here; he will echo Nygren's praise of its clarity; he will balk only at the word "incomparable." For Aquinas, from the beginning to the end of his career, in some eighteen passages scattered through nine different works, taught in almost the same words the same contrast of divine and human love with a clarity that perhaps bears comparison.²³

²¹ See Nygren's very clear summary, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-10. ²² *Ibid.*, pp. 724-52.

²³ A reviewer, J. Burnaby, in *Journal of Theological Studies* 40 (1939) 408-10, noted without giving exact references that the real source of this doctrine is the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas. The point is of extreme importance, both historically and doctrinally, and I think it well to quote at length the Thomist texts I have collected with the help of the Bergamo indices (*s.v.* amor, § 21).—*In Matth.*, c. 12 (v. 18), § 997: "In homine praecedit gratia; secundo diligit; tertio eligit. In Deo vero est e converso. Et hoc est, quia voluntas in homine non est causativa huius effectus, quae est gratia, sed amor et voluntas Dei est causa gratiae."—*In Ioan.*, c. 5, lect. 3, § 753: "Cum enim bonum solum sit amabile, aliquod bonum potest se dupliciter ad amorem habere, scilicet vel ut causa amoris, vel ut ab amore causatum. In nobis autem bonum causat amorem; nam causa amoris nostri ad aliquem est bonitas eius. Non enim ideo bonus est, quia nos eum diligimus; sed ideo diligimus eum, quia bonus est: unde in nobis amor causatur a bono. Sed in Deo aliter est, quia ipse amor Dei est causa bonitatis in rebus dilectis; quia enim Deus diligit nos, ideo boni sumus."—*In Rom.*, c. 1, lect. 4, § 67: "Dei enim dilectio non provocatur ex bono creaturae, sicut dilectio humana, sed magis ipsum bonum creaturae causat."—*Ibid.*, c. 9, lect. 2, § 763: "Electio autem et dilectio aliter ordinantur in Deo et in homine. In homine enim electio praecedit dilectionem, voluntas enim hominis movetur ad amandum ex bono quod in re amata considerat. . . . Sed voluntas Dei est causa omnis boni quod est in creatura. . . . Unde non propter aliquod bonum quod in homine eligat Deus

It is when we turn to the relation of *agapē* to God Himself that we find Nygren deficient. How does he understand this relation? Several times he approaches the question, but nowhere have I found a thoroughgoing answer. Quite evidently he means *agapē* to be in some sense an ultimate factor. St. John is praised for bringing this to formulation in the simple phrase, "God is love" (1 Jn 4:8, 16), even though he is considered to have weakened his position by accounting for God's love to man through God's love for His Son.²⁴ But this identification of God and love leaves a multitude of questions unanswered.

eum diligit, sed potius eo quod ipsum diligit, praefert eum aliis eligendo."—*In Dion. de div. nom.*, c. 4, lect. 9, § 409: "Amor, quo Deus amat existentia, est operativus bonitatis in ipsis."—*Ibid.*, lect. 10, § 439: "Invenitur etiam in . . . amore humano, alia conditio per quam differt a divino: amor enim in nobis causatur . . . ex pulchritudine et bonitate; non enim ideo aliquid est pulchrum quia nos illud amamus, sed quia est pulchrum et bonum ideo amatur a nobis . . . voluntas autem Dei est causa rerum et ideo amor suos facit bona ea quae amat et non e converso."—*In Eph.*, c. 2, lect. 2, § 86: "Cum amor hominis causetur ex bonitate eius qui diligitur, tunc homo ille qui diligit, diligit ex iustitia. . . . Quando vero amor causat bonitatem in dilecto, tunc est amor procedens ex misericordia. Amor autem quo Deus amat nos, causat in nobis bonitatem."—*In 2 Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1 c.: "Sicut enim scientia Dei a nostra differt in hoc, quia nostra scientia causatur a rebus, sua autem est causa rerum, ita etiam noster amor ex bonitate dilecti causatur, quae ad amorem sui trahit: amor autem divinus bonitatem rebus profundit."—*Ibid.*, ad 2m: "Cum dilectio Dei bonitatem creaturae causet. . . ."—*In 3 Sent.*, d. 32, a. 1, ad 4m: "Sicut intellectus divinus non informatur rebus quas cognoscit per essentiam suam, ita nec voluntas eius informatur rebus quas amat, quia eas per bonitatem suam amat et amando communicat eis suam bonitatem" (see also *ibid.*, a. 2, ad 2m).—*De verit.*, q. 27, a. 1 c.: "Sicut scientia Dei est causa rerum, non causata a rebus, ut nostra, ita voluntas eius est effectrix boni, et non causata a bono, sicut nostra."—*Ibid.*, ad 2m: "Ipsa acceptatio quae est in voluntate divina respectu aeterni boni, producit in homine acceptato aliquid unde dignus sit consequi bonum illud; quod non contingit in acceptatione humana."—*C. gent.* 3, 150, § 4: "Dilectio Dei est causativa boni quod in nobis est: sicut dilectio hominis provocat et causatur ex aliquo bono quod in dilecto est."—*Sum. theol.* 1, q. 20, a. 2 c.: "Amor noster . . . non est causa bonitatis . . . , sed e converso bonitas . . . provocat amorem. . . . Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus."—*Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 4 c.: "In nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum; sed ex bono praeexistente incitatur ad diligendum. . . . In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas eius, qua vult bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod illud bonum ab eo prae aliis habeatur."—*Ibid.* 1-2, q. 110, a. 1 c.: "Quia enim bonum creaturae provenit ex voluntate divina, ideo ex dilectione Dei qua vult creaturae bonum, profuit aliquid bonum in creatura. Voluntas autem hominis movetur ex bono praeexistente in rebus: et ideo est quod dilectio hominis non causat totaliter rei bonitatem, sed praesupponit ipsam vel in parte vel in toto."—*Ibid.*, ad 1m: "Illud quod est homini gratum in alio homine, praesupponitur eius dilectioni: causatur autem ex dilectione divina quod est in homine Deo gratum."—*Ibid.* 3, q. 86, a. 2 c.: "Hoc interest inter gratiam Dei et gratiam hominis, quod gratia hominis non causat, sed praesupponit bonitatem . . . sed gratia Dei causat bonitatem in homine grato."

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 146-59.

Is God's love for the world the ultimate character of the divine being? I would not attribute to Nygren a view that I must consider blasphemous; God is what He is absolutely, utterly transcending creation, without need of His creatures and without intrinsic relation to them.²⁵ But if it is something like creation, predicated of God temporally by reason of its temporal effects, are we to say there is no love in God unless He bestows it on the world? Is, then, God's eternal love, conceived as the Father's self-communication to the Son, the real ultimate? If so, we should like to know whether the Son also loves the Father with an eternal love, and whether it too is self-communication; how the Father Himself is conceived, whether as principle of His self-giving or not; how the love He has for the Son is to be taken, whether as a Third in the Trinity equal to the Father and Son or not; if so, whether He also loves the Father and Son. Questions of subtle theology, no doubt, hard to be understood and unnecessary for salvation. It is not the contention here that they all belong to faith or piety or reverent reception of divine grace. It *is* the contention that he who sets out to give an integral theology of love, essays something like an ultimate statement of what God is, and undertakes to criticize other conceptions of God and His love on this basis, is obliged to attempt an answer. One cannot do theology by half measures.

I do not think Nygren has thought the matter through or realized even vaguely either the towering achievement or the rigorous rational necessities of the theological thought that he sets aside so easily in favor of Luther's alleged return to the purity of the Christian message. What Aquinas taught cannot possibly be put into a few paragraphs here, but the headings can be given to indicate that he

²⁵ Nygren writes, *ibid.*, p. 153: "[The positive significance of John's Agape-metaphysic] lies in its attempt to do full justice to the fact that God is in His very 'essence' Agape. When we speak of God's love we are not speaking of something contingently displayed by God, but of that which in every respect and all circumstances characterises His mind and will towards us. God is not only love in relation to sinners, but His love is eternal; before the foundation of the world the Father loved the Son." Again, p. 201: "God does not love in order to obtain any advantage thereby, but quite simply because it is His nature to love—with a love that seeks, not to get, but to give."—Although phrases in these statements could be taken to mean an essential orientation in God towards the world, I do not attribute that sense to them; I merely say that Nygren has not thought the matter out and clarified his position. Is God's love for the world contingent or necessary? Or in what sense contingent and in what sense necessary?

did advert to the questions and attempt an integral view. For him God is being, absolute and without relation to the world. He is the fulness of being; as Damascene says, "Velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum."²⁶ He is a being of intelligence and will, so we can form a concept of divine love as essential to His being, identical with it, common to the Father, Son, and Spirit. On the basis of the Trinitarian revelation we can conceive divine Understanding uttering an eternal Word and the Word issuing in eternal Love; and this proceeding Love, *amor notionalis*, is entirely contained within the Trinity, is a term of the internal processions, and is not to be explained by relation to the created universe.

Now Nygren conceives the divine love of the Scholastics as self-love in an egoist sense, and their Trinity as the divine Being eternally circling about Itself and bent upon Itself. But he has seized on "amans, quod amatur, amor," as the distinctively Augustinian analogy for the Trinity,²⁷ although it is but one of many in Augustine, and, finding it taken up by Bonaventure²⁸ and Marsilio Ficino,²⁹ has assumed that it represents Catholic theology.³⁰ This is a serious historical error; the only analogy that might claim a privileged status in Catholic theology is the Thomist one of *Dicens*, *Verbum*, and *Amor*, which, of course, also derives from Augustine, and the distinctive character of Love here is its rational procession from the Word. On the doctrinal side, Catholic theology does not deny that God loves Himself, but to think of this in terms of egoist selfishness is utterly to distort the doctrine; the correct analogue is the affective response of will to being, and when that has been grasped not only does egoism disappear but along with it the useless and misleading images of God circling about Himself and bent back upon Himself; we are dealing in non-spatial categories.

On the other hand, God's love for the universe is contingent and secondary. Contingent, i.e., in its term, for the act of love is simply God's unchanging and eternal reality. When Aquinas read, without benefit of modern exegesis, "In caritate perpetua dilexi te" (Jer 31:3), he was ready to find a meaning which would save Jeremiah's scholasticism; but, even in the assigned sense of eternal love, the

²⁶ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 13, a. 11 c.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 541-42.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 629.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 678-79.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 739-40.

effects are temporal.³¹ Further, this love is secondary, not ultimate; there is a notional relation of proceeding Love, as of the Word from which it proceeds, to any possible world, but it is conceived subsequent to the internal constitution of the Trinity.³²

God's love for the universe derives, then, in our ordering of concepts, from His eternal love, whether the latter be taken in its absolute aspect as identical with His being or in its relation to the *Dicens* and *Verbum* as the Holy Spirit. And that derivation makes it rational. Now Nygren's *agapē*, despite his protests, never clearly escapes the note of irrationality. It is a first; as such, it is unmotivated, spontaneous, groundless. One can see in this doctrine a concern to keep God's love sovereignly free and independent of creatures. But we have also to avoid making it irrational. Aquinas never doubted that God's communication of Himself was absolutely gratuitous, that God receives nothing from creation. But neither did he remove one imperfection to substitute another. If God is not selfish, neither is He blind. If He has nothing to gain from creation, still He creates rationally, "non ex appetitu finis, sed ex amore finis."³³

To crowd a long chapter of Thomist theology into a short paragraph, divine proceeding Love is the "ground" of God's love of the universe, and the divine Word is the "ground" of proceeding Love. Just as the divine being and all possible worlds are uttered in the single Word, so they are the object of the single act of proceeding Love.³⁴ In the special love which God has for His rational creatures, by which He makes them share in His divine nature, the first gift and the reason for all other gifts is His Love; but that Love is the Holy Spirit.³⁵ And this Love is rational in Itself by reason of Its procession

³¹ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 13, a. 7, arg. 3 et ad 3m; *ibid.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 2m.

³² *Ibid.*, q. 37, a. 2, ad 3m.

³³ *De pot.*, q. 3, a. 15, ad 14m: "Communicatio bonitatis non est ultimus finis [creationis], sed ipsa divina bonitas, ex cuius amore est quod Deus eam communicare vult; non enim agit propter suam bonitatem quasi appetens quod non habet, sed quasi volens communicare quod habet; quia agit non ex appetitu finis, sed ex amore finis." On this idea see P. Donnelly, "Saint Thomas and the Ultimate Purpose of Creation," *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 2 (1941) 53-83, esp. 67-71.

³⁴ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 37, a. 2, ad 3m.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 38, a. 2 c.: "Donum, secundum quod personaliter sumitur in divinis, est proprium nomen Spiritus Sancti. Ad cuius evidantiam, sciendum est quod donum . . . importat gratuitam donationem. Ratio autem gratuitae donationis est amor: ideo enim damus gratis alicui aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo quod damus ei, est

from the Word;³⁶ but that is a topic on which perhaps enough has been said already in the course of these articles.

Such is the breadth of the Thomist view of divine love. In this sketchy outline it will be called meaningless to non-Thomists. But further expansion here would, I think, be useless, for there is a prior issue which blocks its fruitful discussion. The prior issue is the more general one of theological principles governing goals of discussion. One naturally thinks first of the objective bases of the theological structure which operate as an *a priori* in the selection and determination of details. On that side reviewers have recognized and Nygren himself admits that his position on love is solidary with Protestant theology on justification. St. Thomas would say: As God in creating man also gave him activity, so in re-creating man to a "new being" God gave him a new and corresponding supernatural activity. But in consonance with the thesis of merely imputed justification, Nygren cannot really make *agapē* an act of man and finally, not without ambiguity, states that God alone is the subject of this love.³⁷

But there is a deeper ground of difference. The real issue here is methodological; it concerns the very nature of the theological adventure. This comes clearly to light in Nygren's treatment of *eros*. For him *eros*, we must remember, includes every form of longing for self-fulfilment, hence the manifold scriptural data on winning the crown, desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ—in short, Christian

amor quo volumus ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod amor habet rationem primi doni, per quod omnia dona gratuita donantur. Unde, cum Spiritus Sanctus procedat ut Amor . . . procedit in ratione doni primi." (Notice, *ibid.*, a. 1, ad 4m, a clarification to protect the divine transcendence: the Holy Spirit is not constituted as God's gift to us, but He *can* be given to us and so is called *Donum*.)—*In Ioan.*, c. 5, lect. 3, § 753: "Licet enim amor notionaliter sumptus sit principium omnium donorum quae nobis donantur a Deo. . ."

³⁶ *De pot.*, q. 9, a. 9 c.: "Deus intelligendo se, concipit verbum suum, quod est etiam ratio omnium intellectuum per ipsum . . . et ex hoc verbo procedit in amorem omnium et sui ipsius."

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 733: "The subject of Christian love is not man, but God himself. . . ." P. 736: "Christian love, according to Luther, is God's own love. . . ."—It is the qualifying addition to the first phrase, "yet in such a way that the Divine love employs man as its instrument and organ," that introduces the ambiguity. For Aquinas, man is the instrument of God in everything except sin; but an instrument has its activity. What, in Nygren's position, is the difference between God's love using man as an instrument, and God's love operating without any instrument?

longing and hope. Now all this must be rejected on the ground of its simple and irreducible opposition to *agapē*; it is due to the infiltration of a Greek motif into the Christian message. The Church fell prey, from the *Didache* onwards (and even in the New Testament itself), to the *eros* current and was subject to its deteriorating influence till the genuine Christian message was restored by Luther. Aquinas is given credit for acknowledging the initiative of God in the salvific work of grace, but, since he includes *eros* in a synthesis with *agapē*, his initial concession cannot save him from the almost universal condemnation of the Church's thinkers between St. Paul and Luther.³⁸ *Eros* and *agapē* cannot be synthesized.

What is the difficulty with such a synthesis? For two classes of men it does not exist. The nonthinker will not see the opposition or, if he does, will shelve the problem of its resolution. Again, a thinker in the Thomist tradition will not declare the problem insoluble on principle. Seeing that *agapē* will not reduce to *eros*, nor *eros* to *agapē*, while yet they share a common name and have the same generic good as object, he searches for a more fundamental concept which will subsume both under itself by the addition of further determinations even though these are exclusive of one another. This he finds in the will's attitude to being; *agapē* and *eros* then take their place in the category of willing what-is-to-be, one in self-communication, the other in self-attainment.

But Nygren belongs to an intermediate class. He is a systematic theologian and so is committed to a unified view of the data of revelation. On the other hand, he seems definitely influenced by Protestant thinking on scriptural categories and their role in faith and theology. I am not thinking here of the controversy on the sources of faith, *sola scriptura* vs. Scripture and tradition. While I by no means consider that an obsolete question to be consigned to the junk heap of theological arguments, neither do I regard it as the critical issue today between Catholics and Protestants. The critical issue is the one Newman faced with scrupulous intellectual honesty in the anguish

³⁸ Although Nygren protests (pp. 38-40, 209-10) that his aim is scholarship, not evaluation, it is evident that for him Luther's alleged recovery of the New Testament *agapē* in its purity is pure gain, that the *eros* current had adulterated the Christian message. I do not, in these paragraphs, go into the notion of faith which allows him to reject an element that the Scriptures proclaim.

of personal decision and set before the thinking world in the challenging pages of *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. The problem is complex, but the pertinent question here is whether faith and theology are to be restricted to the categories originally used in revelation. *Sola scriptura* has come to mean for many not only the denial of a parallel or supplementary source, but the refusal to think outside the terms of the one source that is admitted.³⁹ Nygren's problem, then, could be put in the following terms. *Agapē* and *eros* are not to be unified on the basis of either one or the other, and a new unscriptural concept to unite them on a deeper level is excluded on principle; but a thinking mind cannot digest irreducible contradictions, and so, since the divine *agapē* can on no account be sacrificed, the only remaining course is to eject *eros* from the true content of the Christian message. Instead of unity by synthesis under new thought-forms, Nygren achieves unity by separation of the deposit into its disparate elements and expulsion of the lower forms.

The problem touched on here is quite general in theology.⁴⁰ If we

³⁹ A similar mentality with regard to the original deposit may be found among Catholics. One must, of course, notice an important difference, for no Catholic will reject such binding formulas as the Nicene *homoousios*. However, it is one thing to give assent to dogmas defined by the Church and another to see the implications for theological procedures of such definitions, and so Scholastic theology is subjected today to an incessant criticism which bases itself on the difference between Greek and Hebrew thought-forms, as if that difference were a solution to the problem of a theological method and not rather a datum of the problem itself. The mere reiteration of a difference asserted without qualification and applied without regard to its pertinence has something of the style of a gramophone record stuck in its track and is really beginning to have somewhat the same effect on the nerves. There is no question here of denying the gains that have accrued to positive theology through the discovery of the thought-patterns peculiar to the Hebrew mind. But what is needed now to bring them into the harmony of the Catholic whole is to add to a recognition of the difference the discovery of the community of Greek and Hebrew. One could anticipate at least a basic community in those who are created in the image of the same God, redeemed by the same Son, and sanctified by the same Spirit. To follow that lead and conceive accurately in what this community consists would not only show the bridge over which the transition from Hebrew to Greek thought actually occurred in God's Church but would, by the same token, show the legitimacy of going backwards to interpret Hebrew experiences in categories unknown to the Hebrews themselves. But such a conception supposes rather favorable conditions of philosophical formation and scientific detachment; I doubt that it will prevail in our generation.

⁴⁰ The reader will find another example in "The Origin and Scope of Bernard Lonergan's 'Insight,'" *Sciences ecclésiastiques* 9 (1957) 290-91, where I have briefly indicated how the Hebrew category of eternity must be transposed to the Greek if one wishes to

cannot now go into it treatise-fashion, neither can it be omitted if we hope to bring out the real differences between Nygren and the Thomist on the form of Christian love. For the Thomist there can be no thought of excluding from his unified system any part of what he regards as the deposit of faith. He takes it for granted that God's revelation is not self-contradictory. But he also takes it for granted that God's meaning is not confined within any human categories, not even those which He Himself has used and sanctioned. He does not confuse the absolute character of truth as truth with a supposed absolute character of the ideas as ideas which are posited in truth. That is, the divine guarantee giving us absolute assurance of an article of the Creed by no means assures us that the conception formulated in that article represents absolute understanding and the absolute idea. The one absolute understanding and the one absolute ideational content are in the divine mind. It follows that all the ideas conceived by the restless human mind are in principle potential instruments of theology and, *datis dandis*, potential formal elements in definitions of faith. They are also, of course, potential elements of heresy. And so the development of dogma which on one side is called for by the necessities inherent in the human subject supposes on the other some means of discriminating authoritatively and objectively between truth and falsity and guaranteeing continuity of the developed stage of doctrine with the embryonic. But is it so difficult to believe that in the nineteen centuries since Christ God has shown a providence towards His people that matches that of the nineteen centuries before the Incarnation? Are we really expected to maintain that with the giving of the Spirit God withdrew a measure of divine assistance in attaining understanding of His ways? At any rate, Catholic thought supposes the divine guarantee and sets no boundaries to the possibilities of advance in penetrating God's meaning. But such a mentality is quite at home with the Greek and Scholastic forms of thought that have been employed by the Church. Their relevance is established in fact by conciliar definitions and in

construct an integral theology. One need not construct a theology, but if one does a metaphysics is necessary. The reason the problem is general is that revelation is communicated in terms that relate the divine realities to us, whereas an integral theology must be conceived in the context of being.

principle by an enlightened methodology. What to the Protestant is a chronic source of poisoning in Christianity is to the Catholic an opportunity the rejection of which would condemn us to obscurantism; for intelligence, like gold, is where you find it.⁴¹ The difference, then, between the Thomist and Nygren on the question of love is only an instance of the fundamental differences separating Catholics and Protestants on the method of theology and the development of dogma; it is those fundamental differences, in my opinion, that must be settled before we can successfully discuss particular doctrines.

THOMIST COMPLACENCY AND MODERN EROS

Our final step is to test the significance of Thomist complacency in relation to modern philosophical discussions of *eros* or the phenomena founded in *eros*. By contrast with the last section, the difficulties here are considerable; the variety of writers to be studied, the complexity and obscurity of some of their thinking, the increasing divergence of their interests from those of Thomism, all contribute to block a fruitful encounter. But if difficulties are a deterrent, they also conceal opportunities, so that in face of them one should not take refuge in flight but merely exercise sobriety in his expectations. The Thomist and the modern philosopher stand today with a great gulf fixed between them, and often their only notice of one another is to hurl names across the intervening abyss. In this situation one should not expect an easy bridging of differences, but one must nevertheless have the courage to throw out spans from likely spots on one's own side, willing to make inadequate moves in the hope of finding those on the other side who will put forth a like cooperative effort for contact. The following paragraphs are just such a tentative experiment.

I select three points where the attempt at contact seems indicated, and begin with a philosopher of the last century who, at any rate, is

⁴¹ This has been put as follows with regard to the Thomist program: "The thought of Aquinas on *gratia operans* was but an incident in the execution of a far vaster program. If on the surface that program was to employ the Aristotelian scientific technique against the die-hard traditionalism of the current Christian Platonist and, at the same time, to inaugurate historical research by appealing to the real Aristotle against the Parisian Averroists, in point of fact no less than in essence it was to lay under tribute Greek and Arab, Jew and Christian, in an ever renewed effort to obtain for Catholic culture that *aliquam intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam* which is the goal of theological speculation." B. Lonergan, in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 3 (1942) 572-73.

clear on what he wants to say in this matter. Schopenhauer's thinking was dominated by the notion of the world as will; and will, in unconscious nature and still more so in man and brutes, is endless striving:

Willing and striving is its whole being, which may be very well compared to an unquenchable thirst. But the basis of all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain. Consequently, the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain originally and through its very being. If, on the other hand, it lacks objects of desire, because it is at once deprived of them by a too easy satisfaction, a terrible void and ennui comes over it, *i.e.*, its being and existence itself becomes an unbearable burden to it. Thus its life swings like a pendulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui.⁴²

We have to do here unmistakably with *eros*, with an *eros* doomed to suffer, whether from the pain of frustration or the boredom of attainment. What does Schopenhauer advise in this apparently hopeless situation? There is a twofold escape. The first, only partially effective, is offered by the contemplation of art. "All anxiety proceeds from the will, and knowledge, on the contrary, is in and for itself painless and serene."⁴³ In the genius of the great artists there is a release from slavery to the will, there is a shift from practical tendency to the contemplative. Art is will-less knowledge of the Ideas.⁴⁴

But this is only a temporary escape. The definitive way is that of complete denial of the will to live. Salvation is in asceticism. Chastity and poverty are lauded as steps in this direction. The Christian quietists were on the right track, and the Sanskrit writings are even better than the Christian on denial.⁴⁵ Schopenhauer's goal, however, is not a positive one; his asceticism does not aim at freeing the will for a higher good, but at the complete suppression of all willing and striving, the extinction of activity, the silence of absolute nothingness.⁴⁶

⁴² *The World as Will and Idea* 1, § 57 (p. 198). Page references are given according to the Durant edition, *The Works of Schopenhauer: Abridged* (New York, 1928). For a perspective on Schopenhauer, see F. C. Copleston, *Arthur Schopenhauer: Philosopher of Pessimism* (London, 1946).

⁴³ *The World as Will and Idea* 3, chap. 31 (p. 298).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 1, § 36 (p. 105), and 3, chap. 31 (pp. 293-315). ⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 1, § 68 (pp. 220-39).

⁴⁶ Copleston, *op. cit.* (supra n. 42) p. 188: "The Christian Faith directs the attention of man to the Beatific Vision of God, the philosophy of the Vedanta (or one form of it, at least) to re-absorption into the Absolute, the philosophy of Plotinus to union with the One; but Schopenhauer holds out as the highest and final goal . . . absolute nothingness." On Nirvana as a fulness, a completion, not a mere extinction of feeling, see also Fr. Tay-

Half a century later Nietzsche, after an initial period of agreement, reacted with extreme sharpness against Schopenhauer's denial of the will to live. Schopenhauer's "saint" reaches superiority by asceticism, by saying "No" to life; Nietzsche's superman realizes himself by affirmation, saying "Yes" to life with acceptance of all it offers. Nietzsche substituted strength, joy, creative work for Schopenhauer's pity and pessimism. Schopenhauer's mood was one of resignation, Nietzsche's one of defiance.⁴⁷

Where Schopenhauer preached the will-less knowing of art, Nietzsche detests knowing without desire, which he irreverently calls "immaculate perception."⁴⁸ Willing emancipates, for it is creative.⁴⁹ One of his recurring themes is that of self-surpassing;⁵⁰ "he who discovered the country of 'man', discovered also the country of 'man's future'."⁵¹ He is the bitter enemy of Christianity in its opposition to *eros*: "Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly, but degenerated to vice."⁵² Asceticism has a purpose but one totally different from that attributed to it by Schopenhauer; it means "an *optimum* of the conditions of the highest and boldest intellectuality."⁵³ Poverty, humility, chastity are not virtues; rather they are cultivated for freedom, as conditions of the best existence.⁵⁴ And, in fact, asceticism does not abolish willing; it substitutes a concealed willing with nothingness for its object:

Not suffering, but the senselessness of suffering was the curse which till then lay spread over humanity—and the ascetic ideal gave it a meaning! . . . The explanation . . . brought in its train new suffering . . . it brought all suffering under the perspective of *guilt*; but in spite of all that—man was *saved* thereby, he had a

mans, "Deux tentations actuelles: Bouddhisme et Existentialisme," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 78 (1956) 157-76; there is a résumé of the article in *Philosophy Today* 1 (1957) 43-47. J. Collins, *A History of Modern European Philosophy* (Milwaukee, 1954) pp. 696-98, describes the hesitations of Schopenhauer himself on the same point.

⁴⁷ F. C. Copleston, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Philosopher of Culture* (London, 1942) pp. 142-62.

⁴⁸ *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, § 37 (pp. 132-35). Quotations and references are given according to the Modern Library edition: *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* (New York, 1954).—The translator has out-Nietzsched Nietzsche here; the German reads: "Von der unbelebten Erkenntnis." The allusion is made with that ignorance of the real Catholic doctrine which we have come to expect.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, § 42 (p. 153); § 56 (p. 230).

⁵⁰ See, for example, *ibid.*, § 34 (pp. 122-26).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, § 56 (p. 239).

⁵² *Beyond Good and Evil*, §168 (p. 470).

⁵³ *The Genealogy of Morals*, Third Essay, § 7 (p. 730). ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, § 8 (p. 731).

meaning . . . he could now 'will' something. . . . All this means . . . a will for Nothingness, a will opposed to life . . . but it is and remains a *will!*⁶⁵

A third and very important point of contact will be found in certain features of the existentialist movement. Although communists have charged this with being a quietism—naturally a capital defect to those whose ideal is not to interpret the world contemplatively and affectively, but to change it—it seems fairly obvious that in the thinkers who, with or without their own agreement, have been labeled existentialist, the same *eros* which occupied Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is again in the foreground, only now with a more penetrating attempt to give its phenomena an ontological foundation and with a rather distinctive complex of accompanying moods. Let us take some elements from their doctrine, relying on interpreters to elucidate some of the obscurities,⁶⁶ and doing them the justice of

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, § 28 (pp. 792–93).

⁶⁶ See A. De Waelhens, *La philosophie de Martin Heidegger* (1st ed.; Louvain, 1942); W. Brock's Introduction to *Existence and Being* (a collection of four of Heidegger's shorter works; London, 1949); J. Wahl, *A Short History of Existentialism* (New York, 1949); J. Collins, *The Existentialists: A Critical Study* (Chicago, 1952); H. J. Blackham, *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (London, 1952). I owe a good deal also to the unpublished notes of a seminar conducted by B. Lonergan at Boston College in the summer of 1957; there is a brief study of *ex-sistere* in his *De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica* (Rome, 1956) pp. 14–19.—The reader will recognize the ideas summarized in my text as Heideggerian, at least in the sense that they owe their systematic formulation to his penetrating analysis, even if they have, as it were, escaped his control and acquired a kind of independent existence. I have not considered it my task to distinguish the intention of the master from the clarifications introduced by followers, but I should add two remarks with reference to the work of Heidegger himself. The first: Collins notes that his later writings modify some of the apparently extreme positions of the earlier; one instance he gives (*op. cit.*, p. 178) regards the meaninglessness of the world—things are now seen to have an intrinsic significance, not merely that supplied by my projects. The other: Heidegger repeatedly tells us he is concerned with the ontological and not the mere ontic. Care, for example, is not taken just as actual concern or unconcern; it may have that sense, but here it is taken as the very structure of human existence (*Sein und Zeit* [7th ed.; Tübingen, 1953] p. 192). As this whole it is not reducible to the various acts of willing and striving (*Wollen und Wünschen, Drang und Hang*); all these are derivative (*ibid.*, pp. 194–96). Similarly, possibility of being is not to be understood as an addition to a being that already is, e.g., the possibility of being able to do something, or negatively as the *merely* possible, the not yet actual; no, it is rather the original, positive, ontological determination of *Dasein* (*ibid.*, pp. 143–44). And "project" is not taken ontically with reference to some particular plan devised; in the ontological sense of the word, *Dasein* is constituted as projecting (*ibid.*, p. 145). What is this distinction between ontic and ontological? W. Brugger's *Philosophisches Wörterbuch* (Freiburg, 1947) p. 246, understands it in relation

remembering that for some this phase of thought was meant to be only a phase, that the real interest is in a philosophy of being.

In this preliminary phase, then, the object of study is the being of man. But man is not taken here as a given essence, a substance with categorial properties. Human reality cannot be defined because it is not given; it is possibility. Man's task is to become himself, to realize his possibilities. Not as if these possibilities were defined; man looks to the future, but this future is not an essence recorded in heaven. Man, then, is what he makes of himself, and this very "what" is determined by his own decision. Consequently there is an emphasis on the notion of project. The being of man, as looking to the future, is in advance of itself, is in anticipation of a "not yet." Liberty is man's being, but at bottom it is his lack of being. Man is condemned to be free; he must forever choose himself, that is, make himself, and this original project, this choice of himself, is worked out in unending particular choices. To exist is to arrive at a decision and to renew it.

But can one not look back as well as ahead? Yes, but then we encounter the thrownness of human existence. We find ourselves cast into the world, already in a condition of becoming. This existence has a contingency, a facticity, a mere brute "is-ness," which as such is devoid of meaning. However, one inserts areas of meaning into the world, constructs an intelligible world by one's activities and projects. Objects become determined in the light of this orientation; they are revealed in a complex of instrumentality.

What defines the mode of existence of the human being, if not as human nature, at least as a universal human condition? What is the structure of the phenomena described? It is care. Care looking to the future, self-projecting, in advance of itself, concerned for what is to be; care looking to the past, to my being already found cast into a world; care bound up with other beings encountered in the world, in the grip of particular preoccupations. Care everywhere determines human existence. Theory is not exempt, for like practice it is a possi-

to the Scholastic *intelligibile in potentia, intellectum in actu*; this seems to me to be on the right track, but I think a further step can be taken with the aid of B. Lonergan's contrast between the realism based on "looking" and the realism based on intellectual grasp and reasonable affirmation. I shall have to return to this, for I do not think the present problem can be settled without ontological and epistemological foundations.

bility of existence of a being whose being is determined by care. Poetry, that "most innocent of occupations," has also its care; as the thinker's care is to utter being, so the poet's care is to name the holy. Reference to the past is no help, for there I encounter my original situation of abandonment with a personal existence to be realized.

It is dread that reveals to me the human condition. Dread is the experience of nothingness, whether that nothingness is conceived as that outside the world in which the world is suspended, which ever threatens to invade the world with its horror, or (in Sartre's version) as particular nothingnesses introduced into particular beings, lying "coiled in the heart of being—like a worm." There is the permanent possibility of finding oneself face to face with nothingness and discovering it as a phenomenon; this possibility is dread or anguish. Nausea arises as experience of the worthlessness of existence, its meaninglessness. It takes one unawares when the intelligible world one constructs is nihilated and one is plunged back into sheer is-ness. The absurdity of human existence appears in the contingency of its origin which lacks justification, and in the impossibility of attaining a goal. What man faces from the outset is death, the capital possibility, the possible impossibility of existence.

We have been illustrating the modern interest in *eros*, understanding that term in its widest sense as human concern, and we may be able to bring our illustrations into one perspective with Thomism by means of the following rough orientation. At the basis of this modern interest we put the shift from object to subject in the history of thought. Not that a philosophy of the subject is intrinsically doomed to take the direction indicated, for thinkers of the very first rank have studied the subject in a broader context and assigned deeper foundations, but simply that the "everyday" subject is most acutely aware of his desires, needs, unsatisfied longings, and it is inevitable, given time and occasion for its emergence, that a current of thought will develop in which this aspect of the subject will claim the hegemony. The emphasis then will fall on will, but one can regard the will and its desires in different moods and so, according to various determinants, one may be moved to aim at its suppression or at its promotion to a colossal power striding the world for conquests. Further, the early stages of thought are apt to be marked by literary

and ethical and descriptive and phenomenological accounts, but again it is inevitable that one will come to an ontology of the subjective condition of man, relating it to being, giving his self-becoming a basic structure in which his relation to the world is constitutive and into which knowing, willing, and other human activities are inserted in the attempt to formulate an integral and coherent account of the data.

Now in this perspective it seems possible to make a serious and profitable contact with Thomism. While not denying that St. Thomas laid far more initial emphasis on the objective universe of being, one will notice that he too had a philosophy of the human condition and that he expressed a basic feature of it by saying that man is just potency in the sphere of intelligent being: "omnino in potentia in genere intelligibilium"; he is the being whose spiritual being is in advance of itself. At the same time he is the being whose orientations are linked to a material substratum which is given, and this material condition is a basis for a being-in-the-world which determines and limits at least in a partial way the fulfilment of his spiritual aspirations.

But in the complex structure which man is there is a hierarchy, and in the diverse relationships and orientations of the subject this hierarchy reappears. The ruling relations and their referent are set forth by St. Thomas in the first article of the *De veritate*: the human soul has a twofold correspondence with being, through knowledge and will. Over against the subject with his great emptiness, his desire to be, there lies the objective fulness of the universe to which the subject is oriented. But in this twofold relationship it is knowing, not willing, that has the primacy. Further, within willing the relationship is not primarily one of striving and frustration; it is a correspondence which is restful and fulfilling and is operated, not by conscious effort laboriously executed, but at least in the first instance by natural spontaneities.

It has often been noticed that a child has a seemingly tireless energy in asking, "What is that?" The answer he receives may be little more than a name, but even that name confers something like a substantial and intelligible form on the chaos around him, and he accepts it with gratitude in the exercise of the natural correspondence

of his mind with being. Have we not reason to assert a like correspondence of the child's will with being? I think so. While one would like to see the matter tested by systematic observation and intelligent experiment,⁵⁷ one's own unstudied experience indicates that to the boundless intellectual curiosity of children and its natural satisfaction with the truth there corresponds a natural complacency and sheer delight, an initial universal joy, in the things that are. They are in the age of disinterested intellectuality, innocent of ulterior purpose, at one with the universe. Not only that, but along with this natural complacency in what is there goes a magical attitude, an uncritical sense of omnipotence, towards what can be in the realm of doing and making.

The situation described is that of a man who in his very constitution is a potency to *become* and in whom nevertheless a natural correspondence with *being* is psychologically prior in the soul's faculties. Still, the other side soon comes to light. Man discovers the limitations of things and their consequent hostility and conflict with one another.⁵⁸ Intellectual curiosity is found to be in competition with other forces; its satisfaction is seen to involve a long, laborious development entailing the sacrifice of more immediate goods. The child's delight in the universe of being is gradually clouded over and perhaps eventually superseded by the conviction that things in the world are hostile to his being; his initially universal and spontaneous joy gives way to a pattern of suspicions, resentments, fears, and anxieties.⁵⁹ Then, too, the magic of his omnipotent imagination is corrected by the discipline

⁵⁷ H. S. Sullivan, *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (New York, 1953), has a good deal to say about infant anxiety. I do not know whether any corresponding work has been done on infant complacency.

⁵⁸ According to St. Thomas, the root of conflict between things is not that they are not good, but that they are limited goods; *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 65, a. 1, ad 2m: "Creatura corporalis, secundum suam naturam, est bona: sed non est bonum universale, sed est quoddam bonum particulare et contractum: secundum quam particularitatem et contractionem sequitur in ea contrarietas, per quam unum contrariatur alteri, licet utrumque in se sit bonum." Nothing, then, will be hostile to man in his universal openness, but many things will be hostile to him in his pursuit of limited objectives.

⁵⁹ I have not dealt with the reduction of these to a basic form; in the view of St. Thomas, corresponding to love as the basic response to good there is hate as the basic response to evil; cf. *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 23, a. 4 c.; and q. 29, *passim*.—There is a volume of essays entitled *Love and Violence* (London-New York, 1954, based on *Etudes carmélitaines*, 1946), many of which are relevant here.

of experience as he learns that success in his projects involves a careful calculation of means, a struggle with intractable materials, and the repelling of alien forces ever present to defeat his plans.

In this situation a philosopher who calculates only human resources, who finds himself alone in God's absence or, at least, in God's "fail," may be led to renounce the struggle or he may leap joyfully into the conflict, willing that the weak should perish for the survival of the fittest. Or, finally, he may turn to analysis. And then the vastness of his horizons together with the emptiness of his spirit's actual attainment strikes him with a sense of homelessness unknown to the innocent delight of childhood. The increments of knowledge that were such a joy to him are now reduced to little isolated islands of meaning introduced into a wasteland, the ephemeral results of an unremitting effort to stave off absurdity. He discovers that the good which is the object of his intention, the anticipated fulfilment of his desires, can also be unattainable, and that on the total scale. The good that is has dissolved into absurdity; the possibility of being turns out to be the sovereign possibility of death; the way seems open to the experience of dread and anguish in that total dimension dealt with in so much recent writing.

If this rough sketch of the basic structure for a *rapprochement* has any validity at all—and I repeat here my earlier description of it as a groping from the Thomist side for points of contact—then there seems to be a possibility of bringing Thomist complacency to bear on some of the psychological problems to which the last century has given birth. I would not take a simplistic view of the matter; in fact, there is an epistemological problem of considerable difficulty that must be solved before Thomist complacency can be exploited in all its virtualities, and we shall come to it presently. But at least there are some directly relevant points that lie nearer the surface. To the endless striving, then, of Schopenhauer's will one opposes a will that has the double function of striving and resting; and this resting will not be an ennui that lacks an object for which to strive but, at least when willing is subordinated to contemplation, a joy complementary to an intellect that is fully occupied with its object. To Nietzsche's dissatisfaction with being and preoccupation with becoming, one opposes a will that regards being peacefully, to his

active "will be" a passive "is"; and by the same stroke one settles the basic laws of right and wrong that regulate efforts to become. To a human existence whose structure is simply defined by care, one opposes not only the hope that modifies care from within, but a complacency that offsets care from without and reduces it to a subordinate rank below a prior correspondence with being. The mature philosopher and theologian equipped with a balanced view of man and the universe recovers the natural and spontaneously joyful orientation to being that the child originally had and lost in the desert of his concerns. And not to take the one-sided view that Thomism has only to teach and not to learn, we may say that he recovers it enriched with penetrating analyses of areas untouched in the Middle Ages.

These are general structural lines. It may help to indicate more in particular how the corrective influence of Thomist complacency will operate, and then it will be convenient to divide the natural level from the supernatural. Not that there are two worlds now any more than there were in the thirteenth century, but that circumstances now force a separate consideration of the two levels of our one world. On the supernatural level an extended discussion is unnecessary; it will be enough to say a word on the role of faith, from which the corresponding functions of hope and charity and such virtues as humility and patience can be easily derived.

Faith, in the view of St. Thomas, is contemplative of what is.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ As assenting to what is on the authority of God, the act of faith is *certus, infallibilis, super omnia firmus*, etc.; there is nothing in the Thomist or Catholic view to correspond to the refusal of all security in faith now taught by some Protestants.—The general comparison of Catholic and Protestant mentalities in regard to complacency and concern would be extremely interesting, but I have not pursued it. If it is true, as Nygren holds on the question of love, that Protestantism represents a breakup of the Catholic synthesis, one could not expect a simple divergence of two trends. The breakup will itself result in divergent trends, each of which will have to be related to the synthesis. Thus Nygren's *agapē* follows the direction of creaturely inactivity, retaining, however, the joyous aspect of Christian charity. But it has been argued that this same denial of proper activity to the creature is at the root of Protestant pessimism; cf. L. Stefanini, "Ottimismo tomistico e pessimismo esistenzialistico," *Sapientia Aquinatis* 1 (Rome, 1955) pp. 562-72. Against both these developments there is the trend that has come to be known as the Protestant ethic. Max Weber has noted, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London, 1930), the influence of a certain ideological current of Protestantism on the capitalistic spirit. The influence derives from the notion of the "calling," introduced but not exploited by Luther. Weber describes it as the exit of asceticism from the monastery to enter into

What is, has meaning; and the intelligibility of the object is matched subjectively not only by the partial and anticipatory satisfaction of intelligence but also by the concord of the well-disposed will. Faith is opposed to the solicitude of prudence; it is in tranquil possession: "Composui et pacavi animam meam, sicut parvulus in gremio matris suae: sicut parvulus, ita in me est anima mea" (Ps 130:2). It is *speculativa veri*, St. Thomas says. Popular writers are much in the habit of loading the adjective "speculative" with the adverb "coldly." This usage could be given a qualified approval, but I doubt if those most prone to it would wish to bother with the distinctions that enable us to conceive a point accurately. At any rate, for Thomas knowledge is not simply cold; it has its immediate counterpart on the affective side in an act of complacency which is genuinely loving despite its apparent lack of warmth. It may on the surface bear a resemblance to quietism, but it is an exceedingly important factor in the spiritual life. De Caussade's *Self-Abandonment to Divine Providence* is one outstanding representative of this aspect of spirituality, and it is remarkable how closely that book's interest in the concrete events of history parallels existentialist obsession with the individual existent. But what could be farther from de Caussade's loving abandonment than the disgust experienced by some of our modern thinkers in the contemplation of existence?⁶¹

Faith operates also in the field of action to give complacency in ends and means. Schopenhauer's denial of will has a superficial resemblance to Ignatian indifference and to the doctrine on desires elaborated by St. John of the Cross in the opening chapters of *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*, but he lacks the complacency in possibility

activity in the world. Asceticism undertakes now to remodel the world, and this influence is most noticeable, through the intermediacy of various factors, in the area of material goods. Concomitantly, the new spirit is suspicious of culture which has no immediate value; the fine arts, for example, tend to disappear.—As his critics say, Weber may have pushed a good point too far, but there is a contrast too obvious to be ignored between the strong contemplative current always flowing in Catholicism and the rather exclusive emphasis on activity that characterizes a good deal of practical Protestantism.

⁶¹ Of course, the same mentality which rejoices in creatures as symbols and mysteries of God and expressions of His creative power will also reject them as insipid if they presume to be His "rivals"; but this is a "disgust" based on a defect of intelligibility in comparison with the signified, whereas Sartre's disgust is based on a defect of meaning *tout court*.

which faith would have supplied, and so his difference in purpose is almost total. Nietzsche had a better grasp of the positive function of asceticism, but his own lack of faith leaves him without adequate definition of ends or assurance of means, and, since his dissatisfaction with what is is almost total, the joy he preaches has a hollowness not to be concealed.

We may take a concrete manual in illustration of the present point. The *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius, as a highly organized instrument for bringing a specific decision to birth, function chiefly in another area than de Caussade's writings. But at least two important factors link them with the spirit of abandonment. First, they recognize throughout the unpredictable nature of grace and await its guidance while disposing the exercitant to respond. That is, there is a permanent passive element in the life ruled by the Holy Spirit, and the *Exercises* respect it, though without reducing spirituality to automation. Secondly, even the very active effort of the decision (the Ignatian election) supposes a *velle absolute* which we have linked closely with complacency. To take a significant text, the grace petitioned in almost all the exercises of the decisive second week is "cognitionem intimam Domini . . . ut magis ipsum amem, eumque sequar."⁶² If we distil the elements of this passage, we have no trouble arriving at the Thomist *contemplatio veri, complacentia boni* with its *velle absolute*, and *intentio finis* with its pursuit of the goal by appropriate means.⁶³ Again, the General Examen of the same manual, though it has to do with personal sins, begins with thanksgiving and only afterwards turns to self-accusation and purpose of amendment.⁶⁴ But thanksgiving is properly the act of those who have been passive, who have received without doing; it presupposes what is and the will's complacency in what is. And this complacency precedes the *intentio boni* of amendment in the Ignatian prayer.

Thomist complacency operates on the natural level too, and this needs underlining most of all. What faith does to relieve concern

⁶² Second Week, First Day, § 104.

⁶³ This *intentio finis* accented in the Second Week illustrates the noblest possible *eros* of the soul, while the communion of the Third and Fourth Weeks (with their anticipation in the Three Modes of Humility) and of the *Contemplatio ad amorem* illustrates the Christian *agapē*. Nygren, of course, repudiates such a transition from *eros* to *agapē*.

⁶⁴ First Week, § 43.

need not be demonstrated, and the simple examples given, the first that came to mind, were hardly intended to prove a point no believer would deny. But we must go further back to meet the needs of our day. As apologetics had to be introduced into Catholic theology on a more systematic basis in modern times and then various propaedeutics to apologetics, so we have to find in a sort of natural gratitude for the universe of being something like a propaedeutics to supernatural complacency. St. Thomas had a keen sense of the strategy of apologetics and did not lack skill in its tactics,⁶⁵ he could write feelingly of the anguish suffered by the great pagans who glimpsed the unattainable possibilities of man,⁶⁶ he was better aware than most of the enormous emptiness of the human spirit, "omnino in potentia in genere intelligibilium,"⁶⁷ but apologetics was a subordinate question to him and anguish was hardly a present problem at all. The emptiness of man issues in anguish only when God is absent and the universe of being meaningless. Since he found neither condition accepted in his world, St. Thomas could take the affective response of will to faith and knowledge almost for granted and concern himself in the study of voluntary activity with the *motus hominis in Deum*. In this area his recognition, on beginning the *Pars secunda*, of the desolate waste in which the human spirit originates is balanced anticipatively by his knowledge of the *via* which is the Incarnate Word and His sacramental system to be treated in the *Pars tertia*. Anguish on the grand scale, as a total horizon, was hardly known to him. Today a new program is called for. Not that the mere propaedeutic to contemplative charity which a natural concord with being supplies can cure the world's anxiety any more than a history of civilization can be a substitute for revealed truth, but that an effort to meet the problem on the level of its occurrence is indicated as a preliminary to the full solution—not to speak of its utility for those who wish to integrate nature and supernature in the cultural fulness of Catholic life.

The possibilities here seem to me to be significant, but I hardly

⁶⁵ See *C. gent.* 1, 2; *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 8 c.; *Quodl.* 4, q. 9, a. 3 (= a. 18).

⁶⁶ *C. gent.* 3, 48, § 15: "In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia." The context is a discussion of beatitude; St. Thomas has been describing the pagan attitude in face of the infinite possibilities of the human mind doomed to frustration.

⁶⁷ *De malo*, q. 16, a. 12, ad 4m.

know how to begin to indicate the direction of advance. One might first of all note the role of a philosophical hope, such as it is: "Could we not conceive of a philosophy of existence linked, not solely to experience of separation, forlornness, and profound melancholy, but also to feelings of hope and confidence? This objection to Heidegger has often been voiced by Gabriel Marcel."⁶⁸ Still, this does not go very far. Hope itself is in the field of *intentio finis*, and we can go back to a still more fundamental stage, past the prospect of what will be to the contemplation of what is. There are elements in modern schools which can be enlisted in support of this campaign. Forest has a doctrine of "consent to being" in which being is considered as a gift to metaphysical vision; contemplation has the value of a correspondence, an accord with being, in which the human spirit comes to a repose and peace which is a love beyond desire, and we share the peace that nature realizes in its productions and especially in its silence.⁶⁹ Heidegger, too, recognizes a grace of being which calls for a corresponding gratitude on the part of man, for an original thanking; he asserts the need to surrender to the demands of being, to preserve the truth of being; in sacrifice of all the things that are to preserve the favor of being, man's gratitude comes to expression.⁷⁰ Jaspers preaches the acceptance of oneself and the whole of one's personal situation; all the general human limitations as well as my own particular limitations are the material out of which I have to make my life; they are to be overcome by being accepted and used.⁷¹ This acceptance of the universe, so often the theme of popular humor, has a leading role in the present program, and Jaspers' ideas may be supplemented by one of St. Thomas. The latter often quotes Aristotle on the saddening effect of Ananke, "necessitas contristans

⁶⁸ J. Wahl, *A Short History of Existentialism* (New York, 1949) p. 26.

⁶⁹ Based on his *Consentement et création* (Paris, 1943).

⁷⁰ *Existence and Being* (London, 1949) pp. 380-92. Notice, however, for the accurate transposition of this doctrine to Thomism, that Heidegger distinguishes being (*das Sein*) from that which is (*das Seiende*), and talks of the sacrifice of that which is for the preservation of being. In this study I do not distinguish being from what is.

⁷¹ H. J. Blackham, *op. cit.* (supra n. 56) pp. 43-65. To these three writers we may add M. Scheler with his religious reverence for being and surrender to its benevolent domination (see J. Quentin Lauer, *The Triumph of Subjectivity* [New York, 1958] pp. 166-67), and G. Marcel with his concern for the restoration of natural religion and reverence for life as a foundation for a Christian superstructure (see his *Homo Viator* [Chicago, 1951] pp. 93, 98-99, 161-65).

est."⁷² But at least once he took occasion to draw a distinction; talking of the necessity imposed by vows, he remarks that if this necessity is a constraint, it brings sadness; but in a well-disposed will it is not a constraint, it strengthens the will and so is rather a cause of joy.⁷³ Necessity, then, is an object of complacency to the rational will, that is, to the will that follows without internal conflict a well-instructed intellect. The force of this appears when we remember that God in His interior life is all necessity, but there is no melancholy in God.

But I believe these tentatives in the direction of Thomist complacency only bring out more clearly the basic need on the philosophical level, and we cannot avoid any longer facing the fundamental question. For complacency has a rigorous prerequisite in the contemplation of being. But what is this being we contemplate, and in what sort of act do we contemplate it? These are the prior questions and until we have settled them we cannot profitably undertake any further efforts needed to arrive at peace with being. And here it seems to me that some existentialist thinkers, in passing from the human situation to ontology, lose themselves in mythic accounts of being and nothing that have no more than poetic value. They would go beyond what to them is the mere is-ness of things, they would reject the mere ontic for the ontological, but in the transition being becomes something as vague and poetical as the Olympian gods, something which is not the Christian God nor yet His creatures, something in short uncomfortably like a myth. A myth of being calls for a complementary myth of nothing, and this follows as the night the day. Nothing, though it neither exists nor can be taken strictly as an object, is somehow revealed; it is conceived as active, as a negative foundation for the being which erupts from it, as that in which the world is suspended or, coming closer to home, as a worm lying coiled at the heart of particular beings. We experience it; we encounter it; it is posited as a mysterious objective non-object of experiential consciousness.⁷⁴

⁷² *In 5 Metaph.*, lect. 6, §§ 829-30; *In 3 Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1 c.; *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 31, a. 7, arg. 2; 2-2, q. 88, a. 6, arg. 2 and ad 2m.

⁷³ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 88, a. 6, ad 2m.

⁷⁴ The rigorous argument for the mythical character of this "being" and "nothing" is simply that they are conceived as something apart from God and all the things that are; but what is apart from God and all the things that are is a mere concept; if the concept

But if being is whatever is, to be intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, and is coincident with the real, then it is not something apart from God and things in the world; the myth of being vanishes and along with it the myth of nothing as a quasi-objective reality. Further, the is-ness of things is no longer contemptible to philosophy and disgusting to the human subject. It is the crowning perfection of things in the universe, as much nobler ontologically than their forms as the forms themselves are lifted above the chaos of mere potency. In fact, it seems necessary to grasp once more the significance of forms in order to reinstate existence to its place of pride in philosophy. When the forms of things are overlooked, it is impossible to reach the Thomist act of existence in the fulness of its ontological perfection. There is no possibility of knowing whether a thing is, unless we know in some way or other, perfectly or confusedly, by proper quiddity or genus or accidents or negations, what it is of which we ask whether or not it exists.⁷⁵

And why are forms overlooked? Is it not because insight into phantasm is lost to reflective consciousness? Once a critique of the human mind becomes part of the philosophic program, the effect of

is projected into the real world, it becomes a myth. A second line of reasoning, which will not, however, win general agreement, is the following: Nothing is proved to be "there" by the simple fact that otherwise we could not truly make such judgments as, "There is nothing there," "Peter is not here"; see Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York, 1956) pp. 6-12, 16-21; Heidegger, *What Is Metaphysics?* (in the volume *Existence and Being*, London, 1949) pp. 361 ff. This argument is based on the view that knowledge requires an object of confrontation—in this case, of experiential confrontation. It corresponds to the view in other schools that being is something visible, confronting one's senses; when doubts arise on that notion of being, obscure attempts may be made to reach it behind the veil of nothing. A third, confirmatory point is the flight to poetic language and mysticism to bolster up the position.—Notice that the myth of nothing has its counterpart in the mythical conception of sin entertained by many Christians.

⁷⁵ *In Boeth. de trin.*, q. 6, a. 3 c.: "De nulla re potest sciri an est, nisi quoquo modo sciatur de ea 'quid est' vel cognitione perfecta vel saltem cognitione confusa. . . . Oportet enim scientem, hominem esse, et quaerentem, quid est homo, per definitionem scire quid hoc nomen 'homo' significat. Nec hoc esset nisi aliquam rem quoquo modo conciperet, quam scit esse, quamvis nesciat eius definitionem. Concipit enim hominem secundum cognitionem alicuius generis proximi vel remoti et aliquorum accidentium, quae extra apparent de ipso. . . . Sic ergo et de Deo et aliis substantiis immaterialibus non possemus scire 'an est,' nisi sciremus quoquo modo de eis 'quid est' sub quadam confusione. [But not, in the present case, by genus or accidents.] Ita ergo de formis immaterialibus cognoscimus 'an est' et habemus de eis loco cognitionis 'quid est' cognitionem per negationem, per causalitatem et per excessum."

this loss cannot be concealed. Lacking consciousness of the insight that corresponds to form and is objectified in the concept, we find ourselves apt to substitute a seeing that has for object what is just another phantasm and to go off on those futile missions that have been likened to searching for the elephant on whose back the world rests, the turtle on which the elephant is standing, and so on. Further, if insight vanishes from consciousness, the judgment of existence loses its high rank in cognitional operations; one does not gather the evidential grounds that will enable him to verify his insight and pronounce the sovereign "is" that corresponds to the invisible and unintuitable act of being; one merely looks at things to see whether they are. Many consequences follow. For example, one does not see anything in the structure of things to correspond to an elephant or turtle. Again, that which is, as cognitively attainable in so cheap a fashion, will seem a paltry object for a philosophy of being, so one will label it the merely ontic and postulate as the real object a being (*Sein, être*) that is distinct from the things that are.

On the other hand, when it is realized that the content of insight is a spiritual and intelligible form going beyond data and conceptualized in a word that is neither imaginable nor sensible, and that judgment's role is the verification of that unimaginable concept, then judgment of existence is seen to be a new act of knowing on the highest level, and existence itself to be the crowning perfection of being. Disdain for the sciences would then be impossible; as giving knowledge of the forms of things, they would assume once more their Thomist role in the contemplation of the universe of being. Disgust with the is-ness of things would not perhaps be eliminated so simply, but at least existence would resume its true ontological rank and, though it is not like quiddities the direct object of understanding, it would not for that reason fall into the dark kingdom of absurdity, for it is intelligible in reference to its extrinsic causes; one could take that further step and thus establish the abyss separating Sartre and de Caussade in the contemplation of what is.⁷⁶

Whether philosophers agree or not with the argument of these

⁷⁶ It is perhaps obvious enough that I have drawn here on B. Lonergan's *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London-New York, 1957). See also his paper, "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 32 (1958) 71-81.

last paragraphs, they will probably grant that the question discussed there is prior to that which has been the theme of this study. To return now to that theme. Once the true contemplation of being has been re-established, whether by the intellectual purification described or by other means, I do not think any further operation is per se required in the human soul to excite the affectivity of will. To know that the world is intelligible is to be automatically complacent and, unless patterns of resentment and hostility have taken shape to block the emergence of peaceful moods, that complacency should be discoverable to reflective consciousness. The experience will be most vivid with regard to objects that have been something of a mystery and so, by way of example, I invite the reader to make the experiment of studying the account Lonergan gives of world process in the fourth chapter of his *Insight*.⁷⁷ Does it "reconcile" one to the universe to learn that astronomically large numbers and enormously long periods of time have an intelligible role in the scheme of things, that they give meaning to an obscure area of the universe of being? If so, he has in that subtle sense of "reconciliation" an experience in miniature of Thomist complacency. The experience is possible to all on the natural level. By developing this attitude of reconciliation and adding some counterpart of the purifying exercises on which Aquinas insists in his studies of the religious life, unbelievers will have the chief factors for the formation of a natural complacency to offset the anguish of a life that is otherwise bounded wholly by

⁷⁷ The reader may wonder why I refer to this section of *Insight* rather than to the notion of the good developed in chapter 18. But the reason will be clear if he remembers that ethics belongs to the *via motionis*, that that chapter is entitled "The Possibility of Ethics," and that there is a generalization there from the good that is the object of appetite (sensitive and rational) to a good that extends beyond those objects (pp. 604-7). The procedure is similar to the Thomist one of beginning with a will that is an appetite seeking, and ending with a will that is beyond appetite. Now I have followed the line of the *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, where the explicit basis is known being, and will is simply conceived as being in affective correspondence with known being; hence the relevant sections of *Insight* are those in which areas of the universe of being are elucidated, just as the relevant sections of the *Summa theologiae* are those which explain what things are.—Of the two Thomist ways of generalizing the notion of the good, one (that of the first article of the *De veritate*) may seem more Platonic and a priori than the other, but we have to note that this "Platonic" way is based on knowledge of what soul is, and that knowledge supposes a long experience of the soul's capacity to love the things that are; in this respect it is Aristotelian enough, I believe.

concern. Further, when the evil in the universe forces itself upon their attention, as it must, they will have something like a fixed base from which to survey it and should be able to find in it, not a reason for abandoning consent to being, but a ground for anticipating and seeking a further intelligibility that goes beyond anything they have yet discovered.

With the philosophical foundations established for complacency in being, it will be possible to formulate the corresponding theology and, from this broader base, to expand and implement the idea in literature and the arts, sermons and spiritual direction, and the whole area of human attitudes and conduct. Wordsworth's lines on the value of "a wise passiveness" have affinities with such a program.⁷⁸ A friendly critic of the clergy, when he asked whether we must *always* preach a moral in our sermons, shows another area for exploration.⁷⁹ So does the literature on the therapeutic value of acceptance.⁸⁰ And, in general, our program seems to supply a needed positive psychological factor in the current campaign for the relief of anxiety. We have tranquilizers to replace the mandrakes of ancient times,⁸¹ but they operate from below consciousness through its neural determinants and appear to have no radical effect on the real trouble. We have analysis which meets the problem on the same level by laying bare to consciousness the root of particular anxieties, but a usually undefined force is assumed to become positively operative once analysis has done its work. Complacency supplies that positive factor from above, acting on the highest level to counteract the concern that was initially at fault.⁸²

⁷⁸ *Expostulation and Reply*.

⁷⁹ O'Brien Atkinson, *How to Make Us Want Your Sermon* (New York, 1942) p. 15.

⁸⁰ See, for example, J. P. McIntyre, "Counselor-Centered Acceptance," *Catholic Educational Review* 56 (1958) 299-305; the article refers especially to the work of Dr. Carl Rogers.

⁸¹ H. Rahner, *Mythes grecs et mystère chrétien* (Paris, 1954) pp. 281-85, has an account of the ancient use of mandrakes to give contemplative calm and freedom from the anxieties of temporal desires.

⁸² The point was put in Aristotelian terms by Fr. Bernard Lonergan in a conversation I had with him some years ago: "Contraries are cast out by contraries, and the contrary of anxiety is complacency." From reflection on that remark developed first an application to the spiritual life ("Complacency and Concern," *Cross and Crown* 11 [June, 1959] 180-90) and then the present study of the thought of St. Thomas.

But it is useless to multiply examples of application here. The real question for the reader of this study is whether its basic thesis is true or not. While naturally one does not commit to publication an idea that one judges to be incorrect, still a conviction of the general truth of a notion does not exclude hesitations on many points of detail and on the accuracy of the application attempted to special historical and concrete situations and currents of thought. Perhaps, however, if the central thesis is accepted, one may hope with regard to those points for merciful and intelligent criticism.

APPENDIX

THE "REALISM" OF INTELLECT AND WILL

The question of the relative "realism" of intellect and will is so closely linked with the thesis of these articles as to deserve special consideration. However, in order not to overload the main text with very complicated objections and answers on tangent matters, I have relegated its discussion to an appendix.

Our thesis dealt directly with the character and operations of the will, but the supposition implicit throughout, when it did not enter expressly into the argument, was that intellect and will stand in a parallel relationship to being. Each is in passive correspondence with all that is. (Intellect here is, of course, *intellectus possibilis*.) Now there is a considerable array of textual evidence in St. Thomas, the force of which is to deny just this similarity. The case was put, now a good many years ago, in a brief article of M.-D. Roland-Gosselin. Drawing up an impressive list of fifty-three texts in verification, he asserted a doctrine which may be summarized as follows: Love is for a real good. As opposed to knowledge, it is in the dynamic order. In St. Thomas it is not a parallel we have between intellect and will, "c'est une opposition flagrante," an opposition sufficient in itself to establish the real distinction of the two faculties. The realism of will surpasses the realism of thought, for the true is a determined, limited perfection, while the good is perfection *sans plus*. The true gives us the species of the being known, the good is the being itself.¹

Recently, much the same position has been taken by J. de Finance, who argues for the existential nature of love as compared with the abstract consideration of essences proper to intellect. While he rejects as *simpliste* the reference of knowledge to forms alone as if existence were unknowable, and of appetite to existence alone as if desire were unspecified, he holds nevertheless that intellect's orientation to existence is an instance of appetite. It is the dynamic aspect of intellect that refers it to existence and, stripped of this appetitive dynamism, intellect becomes a pure faculty of essences.²

These assertions, as bearing the closest relationship to our thesis and constituting in part a challenge to it, must be studied honestly, and the first step will be to convince ourselves of the solid basis they enjoy in the

¹ "Le désir du bonheur et l'existence de Dieu," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 13 (1924) 162-72.

² *Etre et agir dans la philosophie de saint Thomas* (Paris, 1945) pp. 183-207. See also R. Johann, *The Meaning of Love* (Westminster, Md., 1955) *passim*. Notice that "existential" in the present context refers to the Thomist act of existence, not to the mode of being of the human subject.

writings of St. Thomas. We may begin with the contrast mentioned very early in this study between the *via a rebus ad animam* and the *via ab anima ad res*. These opposed directions are linked by St. Thomas with the fundamental difference between intellect and will, so that at times the first seems for him to be quite simply and exclusively the way of intellect, the second with equal exclusiveness the way of will.³ There is a similar use of the familiar pair, *via receptionis*—*via motionis*; the first member pertains to movement from sense to intellect, the second to movement from will to sense (and so to things): "It is the nature of sensitive appetite to be moved by rational appetite. . . , but of the [intellectual] cognitive powers to receive from the sensitive."⁴ Coherently with this viewpoint an uncountable number of texts assert that knowing is a matter of the intentional presence of things in the mind, whereas willing has for its object things as they are in themselves.⁵ And the contrast, as Roland-Gosselin noted, is considered sufficient to prove the real distinction of will from intellect.⁶

These various points merely ring the changes on the doctrine, "Verum et falsum sunt in mente, bonum autem et malum sunt in rebus." St. Thomas derived it from the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle,⁷ but it is so much a part of his thinking as to enter into the very structure of his treatises. When we consult the *Pars prima* with a view to its doctrine on *verum* and *bonum*, we may be surprised, given the known intellectualism of St. Thomas, to find him treating first the good (q. 5), and only considerably later coming to truth

³ *De pot.*, q. 9, a. 9 c.: "Nos enim cognitionem intellectivam a rebus exterioribus accipimus; per voluntatem vero nostram in aliquid exterius tendimus tamquam in finem. Et ideo intelligere nostrum est secundum motum a rebus in animam; velle vero secundum motum ab anima ad res." *De malo*, q. 6, a. un., arg. 14a: "Actio intellectus est secundum motum ad animam; actus autem voluntatis est secundum motum ab anima"; the argument is tacitly accepted by St. Thomas. See also *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1m; q. 15, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 40, a. 2 c.; q. 66, a. 6, ad 1m; etc.

⁴ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 50, a. 3, ad 3m.

⁵ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 16, a. 1 c.: "Cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente: appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam." *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 22, a. 2 c.: "Per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt. . . . Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem secundum quod in seipsis est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum." *Comp. theol.* 46: "Non perficitur amatio in similitudine amati, sicut perficitur intelligere in similitudine intellecti, sed perficitur in attractione amantis ad ipsum amatum." See also *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 19, a. 3, ad 6m; a. 6, ad 2m; q. 27, a. 4 c.; q. 59, a. 2 c.; q. 82, a. 3 c.; *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 40, a. 2 c.; q. 66, a. 6, ad 1m; *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 26, a. 1, ad 2m; q. 27, a. 4 c.; *De rat. fidei*, 4, § 965.

⁶ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 59, a. 2 c.: "Alterius autem virtutis est, quod aliquid habeat in se quod est extra se, et quod ipsum tendat in rem exteriorem. Et ideo oportet quod in qualibet creatura sit aliud intellectus et voluntas."

⁷ *In 6 Metaph.*, lect. 4, §§ 1230-40.

(q. 16). But on the ground of Aristotle's principle the order is perfectly natural. St. Thomas asks first whether God is (q. 2), then what God is, which reduces to saying what He is not (qq. 3-13); thirdly, he turns to the divine operations, knowing, willing, and so forth (qq. 14 ff.). Now in the given perspective, *bonum* will be an attribute of God, for it is a property of things as they are, and so discussion of its nature will fall in the second division; but *verum* has to be considered as resulting from a mental operation of God, and so only in the third division does it come up for discussion.

The pattern is clear and definite. Moreover, it goes further than the mere assertion that the good is a property of things, while truth is an act of mind. There was a period at least in his life when St. Thomas held that the object of intellect was essences and the object of will the concrete, existential good. The good and true, he says, add the relation, perfective, to being. But being is composed of essence (*species*) and existence; by reason of the first alone it perfects intellect and is called true, by reason of the second it perfects will and is called good.⁸

In short, intellect is passive and static, will active and dynamic; intellect receives the *intentiones* of things abstractly, will goes out to things in themselves; intellect has essences for its object, will has the individual concrete existent. Not all this is of present concern. The accent on the activity of will is probably due to the prevailing notion of willing as appetite and tendency, and with regard to that question there is no need to travel again all the ground covered in the preceding hundred pages. But on the other headings something should be said to correct what I think is a one-sided view, so I attempt now to sketch the evidence for the other side, and conclude with some suggestions towards an explanation of the apparently contradictory statements of St. Thomas.

The evidence for the other side divides into two parts. First, intellect is not characterized simply by the *via a rebus ad animam* and is not concerned merely with abstract essences. But, secondly, neither is will characterized simply by its concrete orientation. Père de Finance has already called for a balanced view on these points, but it will help to have some documentation.

Intellect is not characterized simply by the *via a rebus ad animam*. Both

⁸ *De verit.*, q. 21, a. 1 c.: "Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectivum perfectivi. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerari: scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid subsistit in specie illa; et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectivum dupliciter: Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tantum. Et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus. . . . Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum." Notice the "non solum . . . sed etiam" with regard to the good.

members of the twofold way are applied to the cognitive process itself. In other words, not only does knowledge come to us from things (*a rebus ad animam*), but we can apply our habitually held knowledge back again to concrete reality (*ab anima ad res*). The point came up with reference to infants in the state of original justice; an argument ran that, even though their senses were not sufficiently formed, they would have had perfect knowledge by infusion and would thus be independent of senses. The answer distinguishes the two ways and argues that the senses would still be needed *secundum motum ab anima ad sensus* in order to bring habitual knowledge to actual inspection.⁹ The point came up again with reference to Christ; the question was whether He had knowledge *per modum collationis*, and again the twofold way of knowing was invoked to answer it: intellect's relation to phantasm is a double one, and just as there is a reception in intellect from phantasm, so there is a return from intellect to phantasm.¹⁰

But is this knowledge that returns to things simply knowledge? Perhaps it is more practical than speculative, thus coming under the dominion of the will and sharing the will's character; if so, the original contrast of intellect and will stands. One can certainly find texts in support of the view that all knowledge of the concrete is practical. To mention just one, it is argued in a work written towards the end of St. Thomas' life that Christ needed knowledge of singulars only for practical conduct.¹¹ But the weight of evidence is against taking such incidental statements as expressing all the nuances of his thought, for when he articulates his mind more fully, the truth is seen to be much less simple. For example, he once distinguishes the return to sense which is proper to practical conduct from another return which we must suppose to be merely speculative.¹² And in the most detailed statement I have noticed, he expressly provides for the return to the con-

⁹ *In 2 Sent.*, d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3m: "Anima ad suum actum phantasmatis indiget, non solum ut ab eis scientiam accipiat secundum motum qui est a sensibus ad animam, sed etiam ut habitum cognitionis quam habet circa species phantasmatum, ponat secundum motum qui est ab anima ad sensus, ut sic inspiciat in actu quod per habitum cognitionis tenet in mente." Word usage is fluid; the process is *motus* or *via* or *processus*, the point of departure may be *a rebus* or *a sensibus*, the return may be *de priori ad posterius*, etc.

¹⁰ *In 3 Sent.*, d. 14, a. 3, sol. 3: "Uno modo sicut accipiens a phantasmatis . . . secundum motum qui est a rebus ad animam. . . . Alio modo secundum motum qui est ab anima ad res, in quantum phantasmatis utitur quasi exemplis in quibus inspicit quod considerat, cuius tamen scientiam prius habebat in habitu." Cf. *ibid.*, sol. 5, ad 3m.

¹¹ *Sum. theol.* 3, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3m.

¹² *De verit.*, q. 10, a. 5 c.: "Mens . . . singularibus se immiscet, in quantum continuatur viribus sensitivis. . . . Uno modo, in quantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam. Et sic mens singulare cognoscit per quamdam reflexionem. . . . Alio modo, secundum motum qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires."

crete of both practical and speculative intellect. The first is illustrated in a builder conceiving the plan of a house and realizing it in materials. The second is illustrated by the difference between forming an abstract notion of the heavens and turning to the concrete in order to contemplate *these* heavens.¹³ In fact, as Lonergan has brought sharply to our attention, the activity of judgment in contrast with that of abstraction *always* involves a return to the concrete. That is why moral fault is not imputed in sleep; the ligature of the senses prevents proper judging. We understand the *quod quid est* by abstraction from particular place and time, but we judge (*componit autem aut dividit*) by applying our abstractions to things in the concrete.¹⁴

I think these few paragraphs are enough to demonstrate that for St. Thomas intellectual operations are not characterized simply by a movement from the concrete to the abstract. A full account of the *duplex via* in cognition would go far beyond the indications given here,¹⁵ but our sole concern at

¹³ *In lib. de caelo et mundo*, proem., § 2: "Invenitur autem processus de priori ad posterius in consideratione practicae rationis secundum quadruplicem ordinem: primo quidem secundum ordinem apprehensionis, prout artifex primo apprehendit formam domus absolute, et postea inducit eam in materiam. . . . Similiter . . . in consideratione rationis speculativae. Primus quidem [ordo] secundum quod proceditur a communibus ad minus communia . . . ; universalia enim considerantur secundum formam absolutam, particularia vero secundum applicationem formae ad materiam; sicut Philosophus . . . dicit quod qui dicit *caelum*, dicit formam, qui autem dicit *hoc caelum*, dicit formam in materia."

¹⁴ Cf. THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 8 (1947) 50. A number of references to St. Thomas are given; we may take one sample, *C. gent.*, 2, 96, *ad fn.*: "Operationi autem intellectuali nostrae [in contrast to angelic] adiacet tempus, ex eo quod a phantasmatibus cognitionem accipimus, quae determinatum respiciunt tempus. Et inde est quod in compositione et divisione semper noster intellectus adiungit tempus praeteritum vel futurum: non autem in intelligendo quod quid est. Intelligit enim quod quid est abstrahendo intelligibilia a sensibilibus conditionibus. . . . Componit autem aut dividit applicando intelligibilia prius abstracta ad res: et in hac applicatione necesse est co-intelligi tempus." Notice, *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 84, a. 8 c., that sensible things are called the "terminus et finis iudicii," and St. Thomas quotes Aristotle to show that the end of natural science is to know this concrete world.

¹⁵ It may be useful to note that the movement from concrete to abstract and back again is not to be completely identified with the couplet *resolutio-compositio*. There is a partial coincidence, for the return to the concrete is always a *compositio* and the rise to the abstract is always a *resolutio*, but *resolutio-compositio* have a wider use, since they can both function within the abstract order.—Again, our *duplex via* is to be distinguished from that which J. Glanz exposes in his *Die Einheit des menschlichen Handelns bei Thomas von Aquin* (Homburg-Saar, 1932) pp. 33-37; he refers to the process from agent intellect to phantasm and from phantasm to possible intellect. These seem to me to reduce to the one *via a rebus ad animam*.—I have discussed some other aspects of this extremely complex problem in "Universal Norms and the Concrete 'Operabile' in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Sciences ecclésiastiques* 7 (1955) 115-49, 257-91. At about the same time A. Hayen covered

the moment is to oppose the view which allows the will a realism which it denies to intellect. If will regards the concrete, so does intellect; if will has its dynamic side, intellect has too, and this on a more fundamental level, for it is the dynamism of agent intellect reducing the potentially intelligible to meaning that is at the source of both knowing and willing, at the source of abstraction as well as of judgment. But if this is taken as the "natural appetite" of intellect, it should not be confused with the appetite which is will, as if it were just an instance of willing; that would eliminate the real distinction of the two faculties. Neither does this orientation to being depend on willing, at least in the first instance; willing depends rather on knowledge that has come to its term in judgment, otherwise it is not an *appetitus sequens intellectum*.

We have now to consider the alleged existential orientation of will, and here too, even more surprisingly, the textual data show another side of the matter and lead us to modify at least the exclusive emphasis on existence in our notion of willing. Are sensitive appetite and intellectual appetite distinct? The *Summa theologiae* answers: Yes, they have to be, for both are passive potencies, they will be characterized by their active correlatives, and these differ as *apprehensum per intellectum* and *apprehensum per sensum*. Now this difference turns out to be that of universal and particular, so that will is said to seek its singular object only in so far as this falls under the *ratio* of a universal good, or even to have as object simply the universal good.¹⁶

The same point had already been made in trenchant fashion in the *De veritate*, where we find it stated of will that it seeks goodness as such, "bonitas . . . per seipsam," but of sensitive appetite that it seeks this concrete good, "haec res bona." More in detail, there are three appetites: natural, sensitive, and rational. Both natural and sensitive appetite tend to the thing itself which is desirable, one unaware that it is desirable, the other knowing it is but not seeking the desirability as such, "non . . . in ipsam rationem

some of the same ground in "Le 'Cercle' de la connaissance humaine selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 54 (1956) 561-604. It is impossible to do justice to his study in a footnote; methodologically, I think we agree that there is need of uncovering and articulating the implicit scheme that gives Thomist thought its coherence despite disconcerting shifts of usage; doctrinally, the crucial question regards the strategic significance of his basic couplet, exercise-expression, which I confess I have not yet grasped clearly.

¹⁶ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 80, a. 2 c. Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2m: "Appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum. Unde Philosophus dicit . . . quod odium potest esse de aliquo universali." And *De malo*, q. 8, a. 3 c.: "Appetitus ergo rationalis, qui est voluntas, habet pro propria ratione objecti bonum universale."

appetibilitatis." But will tends directly to this abstract quality itself, "in rationem appetibilitatis absolute"; hence, first and chiefly to goodness itself, and only secondarily to the concrete thing in which there is found a participation of the good. Summing up, St. Thomas lists the objects of the three appetites as follows: (1) "haec res in quantum talis res," (2) "haec res in quantum est conveniens vel delectabilis," (3) "ipsum bonum absolute."¹⁷

This doctrine recurs with a certain regularity. Thus, St. Thomas distinguishes the natural appetite for the good which depends on general moral principles, such as that we must do what is right, from the appetite for this particular good; the first is for a yet indeterminate good, but the second is determined in particular, it is here and now to be chosen.¹⁸ This is similar to the distinction between what is naturally willed and what is freely chosen as a particular instance. The first is the good in general, and with regard to it will is not free; but under the general good many particular goods are contained, and will is not determined to any of them.¹⁹ And, finally, this agrees with the position adopted on the moving force of universal reason. When St. Thomas wrote his commentary on the *De anima* and found Aristotle vacillating on the point, he carried the vacillation over into his commentary,²⁰ but the doctrine of the *Summa theologiae*, especially that on the basic principles of human acts and on law, no longer leaves any doubt that

¹⁷ *De verit.*, q. 25, a. 1 c. Other texts: *De verit.*, q. 22, a. 4, ad 2m; q. 25, a. 1, ad 3m, 6m, 7m. Q. 22, a. 4, is the strict parallel to the *Summa* article quoted in the preceding note, but it is less helpful on the present point, for it distinguishes sensitive and intellectual appetite by reference to freedom. Freedom indeed proves the distinction of will but does not show its primary characteristic; we have seen that the first act of will is never free. At the time of the *De veritate* St. Thomas thought the basic difference was the freedom of the will (see q. 22, a. 4, ad 1m et 4m); but even in the *Pars prima* he has ceased to argue on that basis, and I think the *Prima secundae*, q. 9, a. 3, would mean its definitive abandonment. Compare *De verit.*, q. 22, a. 4, ad 1m, with *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 80, a. 2, ad 1m.

¹⁸ *De virt. in comm.*, a. 6 c.

¹⁹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 10, a. 1 c.: "Principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum: et etiam ipse finis ultimus . . . et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam." *Ibid.*, ad 3m: "Naturae semper respondet unum. . . Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis . . . respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum. . . Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur."

²⁰ *In 3 de anima*, lect. 16, §§ 845-46: "Ratio autem practica, quaedam est universalis, et quaedam particularis. . . Haec autem iam opinio movet, sed non autem illa quae est universalis. Aut si utraque movet, illa quae est universalis, movet ut causa prima et quiescens, particularis vero ut causa proxima, et quodammodo motui applicata." I have not emended the text, which has either lost a whole phrase or had a superfluous "sed" or "autem" inserted.

for him *ratio universalis* is a motive power.²¹ Now, "vis cognitiva non movet nisi mediante appetitiva,"²² and it will be quite in accord with the motive power of general principles to find a kind of abstract quality in willing the ends of conduct.

We have examined a few samples of the textual evidence on the realism of will and intellect and, as so often happens when we pursue the thought of St. Thomas on a question, have reached rather ambiguous results. If we like, we have the choice of two opposed positions: we can follow one set of data characterizing intellect as abstract and will as concrete; we can follow another and find in intellect an orientation to the concrete existent, while we make the object of will the universal *ratio boni*. If it is objected that the second choice would be based on a one-sided view, we must answer that the first is guilty of a similar sin of omission.

Can the two viewpoints be combined in a single conception? There have been those who find a ready solution to such difficulties as this: St. Thomas simply contradicts himself. This answer has many advantages: it is simple, it is ego-satisfying, it eliminates the problem and so the drudgery of interpretation. It may even on occasion be the right answer. It has one serious drawback as a general method: it forgets that we go to the great thinkers not primarily to judge but to learn and that, by rushing in with a facile judgment before undertaking the labor of learning, we deprive our intelligence of that enlargement which a genuine effort to understand might have effected.

On the other hand, it seems necessary to loosen the rigidity of older notions in which St. Thomas was regarded as a man with the answers and Thomism as a codified system cut in granite. What we have to see in St. Thomas is intelligence puzzling over the data of the universe, beginning from mere possibility, taking enormous strides, but coming nowhere near the completion of a system which would involve ultimately the understanding of *ipsum esse*; we have to discriminate in his writings between conquests of definitive validity and exploratory operations in various directions carried to various stages of perfection; we have to recognize that the assumption, *semper formaliter loquitur*, breaks down not only in fact but also in principle when one remembers the inevitable local and temporal determinants that give disproportionate emphasis to particular questions, the inherent limitations of a language that cannot keep pace with the fertility of mind, especially the mind of genius, and above all the very nature

²¹ *Sum. theol.* 1-2, qq. 9-10, *passim*, on intellect as a moving power; *ibid.*, q. 90, proem., on law as a principle of human acts.

²² *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 20, a. 1, ad 1m.

of intellectual progress in an indefinitely complex universe where vast areas remain to be worked out and a universal thinker must touch on many topics to which he cannot give detailed answers, and enunciate in an evolving science many principles which are useful and indeed true, but true only *ut in maiori parte*. All of which amounts to saying that St. Thomas was not a logic machine deducing conclusions from a concept of being.

If, with this in mind, we avoid extreme views, I do not think there is any real difficulty in reconciling most of the data collected in the foregoing paragraphs. What is needed, instead of a rigid adherence to answers, is the flexibility to follow St. Thomas in his purpose and locate his answers in a perspective that gives each its due proportion. What is behind the diversity of his statements on will? I suggest something like the following. The basic fact is that will follows intellect and regards the object as intellect presents it. But a second-degree principle is that intellect is structured in a way will is not. The objective of intellect is knowledge of what is, but it arrives by stages at this goal, puzzling, getting an insight, formulating the idea in abstract concepts, testing the concepts, pronouncing the judgment of existence. Will awaits the outcome of this process and responds to the object presented on its completion. Hence, while intellect heads for the concrete through the mediation of a distinct abstract moment, will has a relative simplicity in its orientation to the concrete. A third factor will be the creativity of intellect. It envisages possibility. But, because of the orientation to being, this possibility must be concrete, emerging from the matrix of the actual situation and bearing some relation to the operative range of actual resources. Will responds again to the object presented by the completed judgment, but now the object is concrete only by an extension of the actual to its concrete possibilities.

Such a scheme is a help in correlating many Thomist statements. It shows that will regards the concrete but also that it by no means does so in the manner of animal appetite. Judgment presents an intelligible object and according to the grade of intelligibility will be the response of will; the *what* or species or essence is relevant; we do not give our personal love to a turnip. Likewise, we can account for the fact that charity is essentially the same on earth as in heaven. For it follows directly and simply on judgment, not on understanding, and, although we must have some understanding in order to believe in God, it need not be understanding by grasp of quiddity. The structured constitution of intellect allows us to pass from faith to vision; charity, as a simpler response, remains constant. Similarly, velleities find their place in this scheme. After all, they are real acts of will and must be accounted for. Now, although their object neither exists nor ever will exist,

they do not fall outside the concrete orientation of the will; they represent concrete possibilities which a lukewarm disposition fails to realize.

These points might be illustrated in the theological problem of the imitation of Christ. What do we will in this practice? Not the mere aping of His actions, else we should all grow beards and speak Aramaic. Are we willing an ideal or something concrete? The answer seems to be that we are willing a concrete possibility through the intermediacy of an ideal. What counts is not the mere aping but the spirit of Christ. But to form in ourselves the spirit of Christ means grasping the meaning of His life, seeing it to be good, and willing it as an end. That is, the ideal, conceived abstractly and willed as a general form of life, enables us to make the transition from the there and then of Christ's circumstances to the quite different here and now of our own. But the ideal is conceived abstractly only as a moment in the intelligent affirmation of the concrete, and when I will this form of life the object is concrete as my concrete possibility.

If we turn now to intellect with its two apparently opposed sets of data, we find that a similar flexibility of viewpoint has no difficulty in effecting a similar reconciliation. Intellect has two quite distinct operations, one of which is abstractive and regularly regards abstract essences, the other of which is concrete and regards existence. Which of the two is most characteristic? In a fully articulated system the question must be answered, but in common attitudes as well as in the emergence of the scheme the question is hardly even put. One thinks of intellect in accordance with the point being made. Now I think that in the common view science is regarded as abstractive. We consider that one knows chemistry when he has mastered the chemical laws and properties of the elements and their compounds; we do not ask him to map out the universe in concrete application, to analyze this table and this pen and ink, before granting him that he knows. We take it for granted, of course, that his knowledge is applicable to concrete problems, but we are obscurely aware that one possesses knowledge abstractly. And, in fact, there seems to be no other way of possessing it; as Lonergan says, our knowing "is irretrievably habitual,"²⁸ and habitual science is abstract. There is no real difficulty, then, in affirming both that speculative science is knowledge of the concrete world and that knowledge of the singular is needed only by practical intellect. Science aims at knowing *this* world and verifies its general laws in *this* instance; but *this* has the force here of an *individuum vagum*, standing for any of the particular applications that might be made but will not be. Practical intellect, however, selects *this*

²⁸ *Insight*, p. 277.

singular not just as an instance but as pertaining in its own concrete singularity to the project in hand; it has the force of a *singulare designatum*.²⁴

Further, it seems likely that the historical context combined with ordinary usage to reinforce this mentality in St. Thomas. To distinguish clearly between essence and existence and to notice that this structure is linked with the distinction between abstractive understanding and concrete judgment, is not to ensure the immediate implementation of the idea in every department of thought. The inventive genius is sometimes too close to his discoveries to exploit them fully, even if he wished to. It is not to be expected, then, that St. Thomas should remind us in every article of this distinction or even advert to it mentally in every context. In fact, his mind seems to have moved habitually on the plane of abstract understanding. It is true that he was concerned not with possible worlds but with this one. It is also true that he was concerned not with *als ob* constructs but with true explanation; the factual question-and-answer method of his chief works is sufficient evidence of that. But if we consult the relative importance accorded to the *Sed contra*, which generally constitutes a proof from authority, and the *Respondeo dicendum*, which is generally not a proof but an attempt to explain, we have to admit that the emphasis is on abstract understanding. This entered so thoroughly into his mentality that it led to statements we find incomprehensible in ours. We read, for example: "the divine knowledge has a necessary relationship to its objects, but the divine will has not."²⁵ To us it will seem that the divine knowledge of, say, the Incarnation is as con-

²⁴ The distinction is explained in *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 30, a. 4 c. I do not intend to say that it formulates exactly the difference between scientific and practical knowledge of the concrete singular, but I do think it gives a clue to the solution. It is not exact, for the *individuum vagum* does not exist as such, it is only an abstraction; but both the scientific and practical singular exist. It does seem to give a clue to the difference, for the singular of practical intellect is *designatum* in a way the singular of scientific verification is not. There may, of course, be an objective indifference in the means of practical conduct (e.g., I may pay a debt with any one of a thousand five-dollar bills I have in my pocket), but what makes the difference is that it is always *my* conduct that is in question. My freedom is for my own acts, not someone else's. There is a permanent a priori *designatio ex parte subiecti*. Scientific verification, on the other hand, selects a singular, but objectively it is indifferently this or that, and on the subjective side particular conditions are scientifically irrelevant.

²⁵ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 19, a. 3, ad 6m: "Divinum scire habet necessariam habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita." Cf. *ibid.*, a. 6, ad 2m; also *In 1 Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1m: "Scientia Dei vere et perfecte est omnium, sed non voluntas." *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 20, a. 2, ad 2m, appears to correct the emphasis: "Per hoc quod ab aeterno [creaturae] in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus cognovit res in propriis naturis: et eadem ratione amavit."

tingent as the divine willing of it. But that is because we are thinking of the *scientia visionis*, not of the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*.²⁶ In the latter, of course, the Incarnation is necessarily contained as a possible; and it is just this knowledge that is apt to appear in the foreground when the dominant drive is to understand.

There is no real need, then, to suppose that in the matter of judgment St. Thomas contradicts in the *De malo* what he affirms in the *Summa theologiae*. If in one he seems to imply that the assent of intellect terminates at the concrete,²⁷ and in the other that it is a matter rather of positing a concept as correct,²⁸ the reconciliation may not lie on the surface but the attempt to reach it brings a rewarding enlargement of understanding. Rational judgment does terminate at the concrete, but it does so if, and only if, we can posit a concept as correct. There is the emergence in this *De malo* text, centuries before its time, of a subtlety of cognitional theory which only the long-tested procedures of modern science could adequately illustrate to our more pedestrian minds, and even those procedures have not yet suggested it to the scientists themselves. Namely, that judgment is not a matter of looking at things, but of forming a concept, testing its implications, grasping the unconditioned that enables us to posit the concept, and in that positing knowing what is. Without such formation of concepts and grasping of the unconditioned, at least in some vague way, there is not rational judgment, but only animal looking. On the basis of mere animal looking it is impossible to affirm rationally that God is, and so St. Thomas quite consistently states that our knowledge of the existence of God is the knowledge of the truth of the proposition that God is.²⁹ We have no experience of God, but we conceive Him and find grounds for assenting to the concept as right and so affirming that God is. The difficulties urged against such an affirmation by the logical positivists are merely a survival of the notion that verifying is a matter of looking.³⁰

Hence, one can agree with those who affirm that Thomist thought is existentialist (in the Scholastic sense),³¹ but one does so without denying its strongly conceptual character. For that conceptual character is not a de-

²⁶ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 14, a. 9 c.

²⁷ *Sum. theol.* 2-2, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2m: "Actus autem credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad rem: non enim formamus enuntiabilia nisi ut per ea de rebus cognitionem habeamus, sicut in scientia, ita et in fide." On the act of faith as assent, cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1.

²⁸ *De malo*, q. 6, a. un., ad 14m: "Assentire non nominat motum intellectus ad rem, sed magis ad conceptionem rei, quae habetur in mente; cui intellectus assentit dum iudicat eam esse veram."

²⁹ *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m.

³⁰ Cf. B. Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 671-72.

³¹ Cf. E. Gilson, *Le thomisme* (5th ed.; Paris, 1948) p. 506.

fect to be extenuated. Its justification lies very simply in the fact that unless we form concepts we do not really know what we are talking about. This may sound harsh, but it is to be taken literally. The *what* is the essence, essences are the object of understanding, and understanding, to become fully possessed of itself, to control and exploit its own virtualities, must conceptualize. Objections to that argument require the formulation of a counter-theory of knowledge, and how will it be formulated without concepts?