

## INDWELLING: PRESENCE AND DIALOGUE

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According to a law operative from the earliest Christian time, the desire to tap and fruitfully mine a particular vein of Scripture demands from theology precision. Precision, not for its own sake, in the interest as it were of a perfectly consistent system, but precision as a guarantee of rectitude, a test of simplicity, and finally a pledge of flexibility. These are the hinges of any understanding, and theology is no exception, as history shows so clearly: in the successful issue of the dogmas of the Incarnation and the Trinity, resolved in terms of nature-person-relation, as well as in the impasse of the sixteenth-century controversy over actual grace, which never succeeded in accurately posing the question.

Our times have witnessed the rediscovery, as it were, of two exceptionally rich veins of Scripture: the Mystical Body and the mutual indwelling of man in God and God in man. Rather than separate them too radically, we would better speak of two scriptural themes, for neither possesses as yet the inner consistency to be set apart as a distinct "doctrine." It may well be that, beneath a surface of diverse expression, these two veins actually lead to a common lode. If so, then a complete explanation would have to show, by one unified set of principles, how one complements the other and how they are mutually illuminating.<sup>1</sup> This intuition can at present, however, but guide us from afar, put us on our guard lest any explanation proposed for the one would exclude a future synthesis with the other. For a fruitful understanding of the Mystical Body demands a precise grasp of the nature and functioning of society, which—should someone possess it—has not as yet been succinctly formulated. The positive development of sociology and social psychology is providing a fuller perspective from which to take our bearings on man in and of his social dimension, but the unified vision is yet to come. With the indwelling, on the other hand, it seems that we are in possession of the requisite precision tools. At least the burden of this essay is to show that we are

<sup>1</sup> This is the express intent of P. De Letter, S.J., in "Grace, Incorporation, Inhabitation," *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 19 (1958) 1 ff.

by putting them to work. If at the end one be not convinced, let him not doubt the worth, much less the existence, of these instruments, but rather consider that they have been clumsily employed.

Since the indwelling is an intentional, intersubjective union, we need sharp psychological principles. Since it terminates an eternal mission of the Trinity Itself, it would be ideal should this psychology be open to the transcendent, adequate as well to a unified expression of the processions within God.<sup>2</sup> And finally, since the union is one of Creator with creature, a clear metaphysical grasp of unparticipated and participated being is prerequisite.<sup>3</sup>

But this is not yet enough. Our tools must be precise primarily because the theme in Scripture is so rich, containing as it does the vibrant notes of God inhabiting His temple, dwelling with His people and revealing throughout His salvific patience—promising, cajoling, preparing His people for a union that He would not consummate alone. Nothing but finely analogical principles can furnish an understanding flexible enough to meet these demands. And here we must be careful not to isolate the indwelling texts in Jn 14: "If anyone love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him and we will come to him and make our abode with him." "In that day you will know that I am in my Father, and you in me and I in you." These must be read first in the context of John himself—in the First Epistle, for example, where the same indwelling is a function of faith and love (1 Jn 4:12-16)—then in that of the New Testament preaching, especially the Acts, where the coming of the Holy Spirit initiates Messianic times precisely in effecting what could only be promised before: remission of sins (Acts 2:15-21, 38-39). This primitive catechesis plunges us directly into the teaching of the prophets, who promised this new and hitherto unique dwelling of God with His own in terms of a new alliance (Ez 37:26-28) when people will know God *because* He forgives their sin (Jer 31:34; Lk 1:77) and they will find the law in the recesses of their being, written on their hearts (Jer 31:33).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bernard Lonergan, S.J., *Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica* (Rome, 1957). The background for this work is to be found in a series of articles entitled "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 7 (1946) 349-92; 8 (1947) 35-79, 404-44; 10 (1949) 3-40, 359-93.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. B. Lonergan, S.J., *De constitutione Christi* (Rome, 1958) pp. 71-82.

He who comes, comes to forgive and to reconcile, and it is in this forgiveness and the new union it makes possible that we know Him for what He is. The Spirit gives substance to our hope by pouring forth the love of God in our hearts, and by His presence we are conscious of God's love for us (1 Jn 4:13)—but the proof that God loves us is that Christ, while we were yet sinners, died for us (Rom 5:5-8).

The same laws, then, that were operative throughout the long period of preparation and climaxed in our reconciliation on Calvary will be verified in our sanctification by the Spirit. The sonship that the Spirit consummates is a share in the sufferings of Christ (Rom 8:17). God in us is He who revealed Himself in the atonement: He is in us to work our salvation in such a way that we ourselves work it.<sup>4</sup> Although so intimate to us as to narrowly approach a substitution, the structure of the indwelling and that of salvation itself is rather a pact, a dialogue. Uncreated love makes possible and effects the created response, a response corresponding at once to uncreated initiative and its created substructure: an ordered response of faith, hope, and unifying love.

Understanding, then, calls for a metaphysics that knows how to order, rather than oppose, uncreated presence and its created actuation. And since the same laws must operate in the constitution of Christ and the beatific vision, theology has always demanded that a deeper grasp of one throw light on the others as well. A just demand, since our Lord Himself is the exemplar of our life with God, which is to be incorporated in His Son Incarnate, and the beatific vision is the connatural terminus of our adopted sonship. But let us beware of a too-facile identification of the way with its goal. To say that they are essentially the same means that the way leads ineluctably to its goal, for it is proportioned to it from within, already prefigures it. As St. Paul tells us, the Spirit is the pledge of our salvation (Eph 1:14). But the goal is consummation, vision, sheer fulfilment, whereas now we walk, grope in semidarkness, are told to work out our salvation in fear and trembling. Eternity wipes out *concern*, the historical dimension of love, its response to tasks yet before it, and permits its roots of

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Vincent Taylor, *The Atonement in New Testament Teaching* (London, 1958) esp. pp. 184-85, 196-97.

*complacency* with all that is good and true to flower in the unfailing light of day.<sup>5</sup> The danger of taking the Johannine texts for the indwelling exclusive of their Old Testament resonances and the salvific extensions of Paul is that the imagery tends to give an ahistorical picture, evacuate the dynamics of our response, the concern that must complement consent here below. Indeed, the very proliferation of the metaphor of "abiding with" would mislead us—as does the very word "indwelling"—were we not to realize that the prime analogate is one of pure act: of Father and Son dwelling with, abiding within, one another.<sup>6</sup> St. Paul corrects any incipient Gnosticism by linking the mutual indwelling of love with its revelation on Calvary, and so reminding us that our dwelling in God must show forth the same love, reveal the same basic structure (Rom 5:5-11; 8:14-27). So an understanding that would throw light on the beatific vision as well must not fail to take into account both aspects of union with God as it is here below: sealed by a deep consent of one's whole being to God's election, yet vibrant as well with concern for the kingdom.<sup>7</sup>

#### THE MATRIX OF SCRIPTURE

Granting, then, the context of salvific love and atonement, the most pertinent passages of Scripture are found in St. John, where the theme of mutual personal presence is illustrated first by mutuality of knowing, and complemented by a mutuality of life and operation. But one thread winds through all the expositions: the mutual union of the believer with Christ is the image, the extension, of that of the Word with the Father. The Spirit effects this union with water and confirms it with His teaching (Jn 3:5; 16:13-14), but the union is with Christ and thereby with the Father. The Spirit, then, cannot come alone, but must bring with Him the Father and the Son, who will together make their home with the believer (Jn 14:23).<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For a profound study of the structure of love, see Frederick Crowe, S.J., "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas," *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 20 (1959) 1-39, 198-230, 343-95; cf. esp. pp. 9-19.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. F. Puzo, S.J., "La unidad de la Iglesia en función de la Eucaristía," *Gregorianum* 34 (1953) 162-66.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. De Letter, *art. cit.*, pp. 14-16.

<sup>8</sup> Although this is the most explicit of the texts, it is not the most important, for it suppresses the "economy" according to which the three are present.

The uncreated analogate, then, is the procession of Son from Father, by which they remain completely and lucidly present to one another in a union whose every element is personal, including that by which they are distinct from one another.<sup>9</sup> But St. John gives us an analogate from creatures as well, for the creature united to God remains created. Christ would make us *friends*, His friends and friends of the Father (Jn 15:13–15; 16:26–27). Friends, radically, because we have been initiated into the secrets of His heart, initiated by the Spirit, but friends authentically only if we respond to this revelation of love, respond by faith and love, which mean holding fast to His commandments (1 Jn 5:1–5).

Yet friendship demands a common ground, mutuality of interests, sympathetic inclining towards the same good. Where it appears to be spontaneous, it is really but the immediate consciousness of an affinity, already mutual but hitherto unrevealed. But who could be further apart than a faithless creature and his provident Creator? For Aristotle, friendship between man and God was unthinkable from the mere fact of the great distance between them.<sup>10</sup> Add the moral dimension—a creature who easily forgets, turns away, even refuses the advances of a God of mercy—and friendship is impossible. Impossible, that is, unless the faithful partner be willing to forgive the other; and morally speaking impossible even then, unless the other can somehow be turned from his faithlessness. Such friendship, like any personal union, will have to be a mutual dialogue, but all the initiative must come from one side, from the faithful partner who must so work it that the other can and will respond afresh, become a grateful partner, if never a worthy one. But this *is* the new alliance promised by the prophets: a union between God and man wrought by eternal love, a pact *cut* with unfaithful humanity which would turn infidelity to constancy, forgiving the past and ensuring the future by engraving God's law on the very hearts of men (Jer 31:3, 34). There is no change in eternal love. What is changed is man's heart of stone. It is divine friendship which works the alliance: "Greater love than this no one has, that one lay down his life for his friends"; and the authentic sign of the alliance is the same friendship consummated: "I will strike an eternal alliance

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Lonergan, *Divinarum personarum*, pp. 150–53.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1159a 1–5; *In 8 Eth.*, lect. 7, §§ 1635–37.

with them. . . . I will make my dwelling above them . . . and I will be their God and they my people" (Ez 37:26-27). The final key to understanding this pact, this unique mode of friendship, is the mystery that worked it: the cross. For God worked our reconciliation in the flesh of His Son, that by the power and the example of this visible sign we might die with Him, work out our salvation through, with, and in Him, in fear and trembling.

These, then, are the ways of uncreated love wherever we meet it. Whether it be in the mission of the Son to reconcile or of the Spirit to unite, it is always this love which makes possible and effects a created response. What takes precedence is always the personal act of God. This means that any created effect must be accounted for by God's personal uncreated presence, and not the other way around,<sup>11</sup> for whatever takes precedence by that very fact effects and explains its created complement. But something more is implied by Scripture: our presence *to* God precedes any experience we may have of it. Any mutuality, then, will have to originate in God. This is, we feel, the key to a coherent and unified understanding of the indwelling. Nor is it new in itself, though its exposition may well be. It is really nothing but a restatement of St. Augustine's synthesis of Scripture on the divine initiative, this time in psychological terms, terms calculated to throw yet fuller light on a variety of texts: that we love God because He first loved us, that what the Spirit effects in us is a recognition of this love God has for us, a love eternal which initiates and carries through a dialogue with contingent beings by working a change in *them* (Col 3:10; Gal 6:15; 2 Cor 5:17).

#### SOME PRINCIPLES

1) The very essence of the indwelling is the presence of the person *to* God from all eternity. Although this goes against the grain of images flowing from the word "indwelling," images of God somehow inside us, and appears to destroy the very intimacy that this theme of Scripture wants to convey, it enjoys the sanction of Sister Elizabeth of the Trinity<sup>12</sup> and will prove to offer a much richer grasp.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Karl Rahner, S.J., *Schriften zur Theologie* 1 (Einsiedeln, 1960) 365-72; originally appeared as an article in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 63 (1939) 137-57.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. M. Philippon, *Spiritual Doctrine of Elizabeth of the Trinity* (Westminster, Md., 1947) *passim*, esp. pp. 70-72.

The import of this first principle turns on the way God knows. Whoever admits that all things are present to Him in the single grasp He has of Himself, and then realizes that He can never be an object to Himself, already possesses the key. For God does not know creatures as objects. They are rather present to Him, present in their lucid subjectivity in the simple act whereby He is present to Himself, present, needless to say, as subject.<sup>13</sup> Creatures are present, it is true, as other, as distinct from Him, but this does not make them objects. Rather, even this "otherness" is transparent to God, who projects them as other, to be other. Two conclusions follow immediately. From the very structure of God's knowledge, we are closer, more transparent, finally more supple to Him than we are to ourselves—be it as creatures or as adopted sons. And furthermore, since it is this personal presence to God which, willed, gives us existence, there is no opposition in God between presence and actuation. Causality is not an impersonal category when it is God causing. The personal element may not appear to an untrained observer, but it is always there as long as we remain in the uncreated order.

2) This personal grasp which God has of us is nothing less than our salvation. (And it would be the salvation of all men if it were not for sin, that terrible refusal to be human that admits of no explanation.) For our salvation is revealed and accomplished in Christ—not, to be sure, in such a way as to preclude co-operation, as though eternity were some static and impoverished state before history. Rather, as eternity comprehends the unraveling of time in an ever-present now, so our salvation—the will and the achievement—is contained in the eternal act whereby the triune God redeems us.

This is why we can say that the essence of the indwelling of the Trinity in the souls of the just is their presence to God from all eternity, and yet not deny the reality of their created response. In other words, we can insist that the dialogue is constituted by an eternal act without thereby compromising the fact of a dialogue. For this is the precise office of a metaphysics of participation: to affirm that the created response is nonetheless real even though it adds nothing to eternal

<sup>13</sup> For St. Thomas on God's knowing, begin with *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 19, a. 5, and follow through *In lib. de causis* 13; *In 12 Metaph.*, lect. 9, § 2614; *De verit.*, q. 22, a. 2; *C. gent.* 1, 47.

love. Nothing short of such a metaphysics—one which forces the mind to become conscious of and so utilize its proper limits—can handle the plenitude of unparticipated Being together with the consistency of participated.<sup>14</sup> For us this means simply that the clue to understanding our union with God lies in the way of acting of the Uncreated, not in an analogy with created unions. Nor are we in danger of “depersonalizing” the union by respecting the distance of uncreated and created, for this very “distance,” we shall see, is itself capable of effecting a union immeasurably more intimate than any created analogy could even suggest.

3) This brings us to the key principle. Rather than explain the dialogue from its fundament in the justified soul, we begin with the truth of God’s personal love for contingent creatures, a truth testified by God Himself. The very truth of this revelation postulates a *terminus ad extra* in the creatures loved—a created, contingent term, since God’s eternal love terminates in history. The fact that a personal dialogue has begun with this person at such a time in the economy of salvation, with you or me, signals something new, not in God, but in the creature. And it is through this created term that the creature loved may personally verify God’s love for him and respond to it (1 Jn 4:12–16). If its whole *raison d’être* is to be the instrument of an interpersonal exchange, this ought to warn us once and for all never to consider this created quality of the soul as anything but the temporal expression of eternal love, the created effect of uncreated presence.

Now we may see more clearly that personal presence and efficient causality are not mutually exclusive concepts, but rather complementary facets of a union that must comprehend the created and uncreated. The roots of causality are imbedded deeply in an uncreated act of knowing and willing that is pure presence. But a sound natural theology might have told us this much. We say further (applying rigorously all three principles): what constitutes the indwelling, dialogue that it is, is not the created term but the eternal mission of the

<sup>14</sup> Cf. L. Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas* (Paris, 1953) pp. 327–41, 377–88. Barth’s admission that analogy is the touchstone of a Catholic theology has been reviewed by Bouillard in his study, *Karl Barth: La parole de Dieu et existence humaine* 2 (Paris, 1957) 190–217.



Holy Spirit.<sup>15</sup> We say "eternal mission"; for it is not the fact of *arriving* that sets off the mission as personal to the Holy Spirit, but the fact of *being sent*. For "being present in the soul" has nothing exclusive about it, while the one sent is clearly distinguished from the one sending. Furthermore, by concentrating on this eternal act which follows, St. Thomas insists, the *ratio* of the processions,<sup>16</sup> we can underline the uncreated, distinctly personal foundations for a created effect.<sup>17</sup>

#### WITHIN THE TRINITY

We can say that what eminently constitutes our union with God is our presence to Him from all eternity. But if this presence is to be fully personal, then we must be known and loved by each Person according as He is God and according as He is distinct: to the Father as initiator, to the Son as the means of our salvation and thus the perfect witness of this loving initiative, and to the Holy Spirit as sanctifier. For the missions are coeternal with the processions and mysteriously imitate them: the Son is sent as Saviour *because* He is Son, and similarly the Spirit, *as* proceeding from Father and Son, is the sanctifier. This is the sense in which the Trinity expresses in Itself the economy of salvation: God's design of salvation is coeternal with Himself, and it so conforms to His inner life of self-expression that the salvific roles of Son and Holy Spirit are already prefigured in Their very processions. This does not make the *raison d'être* of the Trinity soteriological; for it is the processions that provide the pattern for the missions, and not vice versa. We are merely insisting that there is no before and after for God. The Son generated is at once the Saviour to be sent, and the Spirit spirated is from eternity God's Gift to souls. And if it is God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who discerns His elect in advance, they are nonetheless present distinctly to the Son and Holy Spirit in so far as the role of each in the soul's salvation carries the stamp of His eternal procession, and thus they are present to the Father as well, as originator, principle within God, and initiator of the economy of salva-

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Lonergan, *Divinarum personarum*, pp. 206-15.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 43, a. 1.

<sup>17</sup> The *terminus ad extra*, as a created entity, will always engage the three Persons acting in common. Only if this term formally constitutes the indwelling are distinctly personal relations inexplicable.

tion. (Perhaps a more profound view would reveal that one presence is no more personal than the other. For the divine act which is common to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is an ordered, concerted, intentional act, and not a natural, impersonal type of causality. The desire, then, to establish relations to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit *as* distinct may be quite unnecessary, since any relation of an intellectual creature with his Creator would have to be interpersonal. But be this as it may, the search is fruitful in so far as it forces us to elucidate more and more the uncreated aspect of our election to share the life of God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.)

What we have described may be more familiar to some as revelation, redemption, sanctification (and creation too) *active sumpta*. Without a sound philosophy of the kind which revelation demands, we would be tempted to say that man's part is but a yes, and since this yes already *is* in God, our explanation would soon betray our faith, leaving no room for the response that Scripture insists is there. We say rather that the very truth of the assertions of our faith—that the world was created in the beginning, that our Lord was born of the Virgin Mary, died on the cross, and the rest—the very truth of this faith demands that the contingent term, whatever it is, be real; demands, for example, that the world exist. This contingent term does not constitute the act—for God is not in time by the fact that He creates in time. The created term is but the temporal effect outside of God which follows upon His uncreated act as a participation of it.

If it is true that East and West have usually approached the data of revelation from opposite directions—East concluding to the created effects from the divine presence, and West explaining personal presence through the operation of the created *habitus*<sup>18</sup>—understanding the dialogue from the analogy of uncreated act orders both tendencies in a higher synthesis. It is eminently the Greek solution that is accepted. But at the same time, any description of the dynamics of mutual presence has to come from man's side, from the apparatus required for a created response. Uncreated presence calls forth created process to consummate a dialogue already begun. The created effect, while real, adds nothing to divine act.

It will be objected, no doubt, that such a generic exposition tells us

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Rahner, *op. cit.*, pp. 350–53.

nothing. Valid for creation as well, how can it be patient of an interpersonal interpretation? We have already suggested that no action of God can be impersonal. But there is more to be said. What finally specifies this union as interpersonal and supernatural is God's eternal intention. Understanding Himself to adopt a creature in His Son, He understands as well that such is not creation but re-creation. He understands that regeneration implies a personal union transcending His own order of creation. But being God, He can act only as God: uniting a creature to Himself cannot mean alteration in Him. The change, the specific structure of this new union, will be found, not in the simplicity of God, but in the creature. In other words, the dialogue, while demanding a created term and consummated through it, is not constituted thereby. It is rather uncreated act that works the created, assuring not only its reality but its proper reality as an authentic, free response.

It may still be objected that we have no union with Persons, that the created term is produced by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in common, and a created principle leads only to the Creator. Leaving aside for a moment the fact that even production is personal with God, that for Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to act by one eternal act is to act in concert, we may respond, in the terms of the objection, that the true principle of this unique dialogue is the uncreated divine intention. In virtue of this intention, the elect are present from all eternity to the Persons, *as* distinct and *in* their saving missions. This presence, eminently personal, makes use of a created quality and habitus to consummate itself with the creature. This created term, however, is but instrumental: instrumental to God and to the created subject. It need not stand in the way of interpersonal communication any more than physical expression must be thought to deprive human love of its personal depths. Rather, such is the way men must respond to another's having accepted them for what they are. With their whole person, yes, but expressed in signs and symbols that, while multiple and often insignificant in themselves, nevertheless set the whole personality in motion towards the other. Words, gestures, tokens become signs of a deep personal acceptance of another, while these signs in turn serve to engage the partners more and more personally in that mutual acceptance.

Just as the personal, enduring acceptance of the other that *is* love

does not dispense with but rather calls forth concrete expressions, so the union willed and worked by God elicits in man a created term, an instrumental power whereby he may recognize the reality of union, express this recognition, and through his expression grow in intimacy with God Himself, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who has from all eternity personally elected and accepted him.<sup>19</sup>

#### THEOLOGICAL DEMANDS

Besides giving a unified account of the riches of revelation, any proposed schema for the indwelling must also submit to the rigors of theology, providing an understanding fruitful for the Incarnation and the beatific vision as well.<sup>20</sup> So, before exposing the climactic theme of friendship, we must sketch the speculative parallels. (Since this must remain very schematic here, presuming the present literature and responding to certain salient points, one unfamiliar with the controversy or little inclined to such discussions would more profitably skip to the following section.)

We have already noted how the analogy with the beatific vision must be nuanced. Our union with God in this life is not yet sheer fruition, but rather one of detachment and growth, comprehending profound consent and gnawing concern in a synthesis that spells life, motion, pilgrimage. God is in us working our salvation so that we too may accomplish it, by faith and hope that issue in love. Such a union would not be consummated directly in the intellect, *per modum visionis*, but rather in the depths of the soul, so as to generate powers and habitus whereby man might respond as befits his composite, developing structure. But to insist that the response be so mediated does not imply that the union is any less intimate. For the intimacy lies first with God, and just as it is His uncreated presence to the intellect which effects the beatific vision through the *lumen gloriae*, so it is His presence to the soul (or better, the soul's presence to Him) that works the dialogue of living faith through the "second nature" of created grace with its consequent habits and gifts.

But how precisely do they differ? And can we explain at once the similarity and the difference? In short, can our schema handle the

<sup>19</sup> Cf. De Letter, *art. cit.*, and Crowe, *art. cit.*

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Pius XII, *Mystici corporis*, AAS 35 (1943) 231 ff. (DB 2290).

analogy? St. Thomas resolved the beatific vision controversy by insisting that the essence of God is present to the intellect as its form.<sup>21</sup> This has provided the prime analogate for the contemporary proponents of quasi-formal causality.<sup>22</sup> Let us pinpoint the psychology at issue. Specifically, the essence of God takes the place of the *species intelligibilis* in natural cognition: the phantasm in its intelligibility, which is grasped, before conceptualization, in a simple understanding or insight.<sup>23</sup> The genius of this explanation lies in placing the union *before* the concept, so that the analogy is vision, the immediate vision of insight into phantasm. But if the essence of God "informs" the possible intellect, what need of anything more? Where does the *lumen gloriae* come in? Why posit it at all? St. Thomas introduces it as the ultimate disposition to form,<sup>24</sup> but this is just an analogy, as Rahner insists; for there is no simple *informatio* here,<sup>25</sup> nor is it the only analogy, and this must be noted as well. For the *species intelligibilis* is "as form" to the possible intellect only in so far as it is ordered to act, the act of understanding. It is, then, in human cognition, more properly an instrumental cause of understanding at the service of the agent intellect, whose act can alone explain understanding as an act. In the beatific vision, it is true, it is not the agent intellect, but the divine essence, as intelligibility itself, that actuates the possible intellect to see what is present to it. But Catholic doctrine insists that the act be personal, the union interpersonal. If this is the most cogent reason for the *lumen gloriae*,<sup>26</sup> then we have a typical example of a Thomistic synthesis here: form remains subordinate to act, even if in this case it is the form which actuates.<sup>27</sup> This ought to put us on our guard against emphasizing one analogy suggested for the *lumen gloriae*, i.e., ultimate disposition to form, to the neglect of the other, i.e., *habitus* to act.<sup>28</sup> An ex-

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 12, a. 5; *De verit.*, q. 8, a. 3; *Comp. theol.* 105.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Rahner, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-59; De Letter, "Created Actuation by Uncreated Act," THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 18 (1957) 60-92.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Lonergan, THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 7 (1946) 372-79.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *De verit.*, q. 8, a. 3; *C. gent.* 3, 53; *Comp. theol.* 105.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Rahner, *op. cit.*, p. 359, note 1.

<sup>26</sup> The analogy from "too much light" is singularly unsatisfying. Cf. *Quodl.* 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m.

<sup>27</sup> For the relation of form and act in the whole of St. Thomas, see J. de Finance, S.J., *Esse et agere* (2nd ed.; Rome, 1960) pp. 111-19.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *In 3 Sent.*, d. 14, a. 1, q. 3; *C. gent.* 3, 53; *Comp. theol.* 105.

planation must show rather how one completes the other in structuring this union *sui generis*. Although an exposition from the side of form gives a real sense of intimacy, we are left with the ambiguous notion of quasi-formal causality, an appeal for a specifically supernatural mode of causality,<sup>29</sup> as well as an exegetical problem with the other analogy St. Thomas does employ, that of habitus to act. A solution more in line with the genius of Thomistic metaphysics would also do more justice to the immediate texts by proposing that the beatific vision too is an actuation, and this as God acts in creatures. The immediacy of vision is explained by the unique intentional union, and this union is consummated in act through the *lumen gloriae*, which is nothing but the *terminus ad extra* of the divine eternal intention. It is a union of person to person as creature and Creator can unite, and it is the final consummation *in* the creature of his presence to God from all eternity, so that now at last he can know God as God in Christ has known him (Phil 3:12).

The analogy of eternal actuation—implying a real created term whose reality adds nothing to the uncreated—is seen most clearly in the Word's assuming a human nature, "seen," that is, as the only possibility left for a clear and consistent understanding. Here dogmatic controversy has brought the data clearly into relief: the divine Person assumes a human nature in such a way as to leave the two natures unconfused and the Person unchanged—one subject, one *esse*, one divine Person. But how can the temporal reality of this eternal act of God be expressed if there is no change in the nature assumed, no qualitative adjunct such as in the adopted union of grace? There must be rather a created expression of the act of assumption whereby the nature is substantially united to one Person. Since the union is one consummated by the *esse* of the Word of God, the *terminus ad extra* must be on the side of *esse*.<sup>30</sup>

This leads to the secondary *esse*—not as constituting a human person in Christ, since it is not natural but supernatural, nor as the cause of the assumption (which is the *esse* of the Word), but merely the expression in time of this eternal cause, and as such totally subordinate to it. Whether this is what St. Thomas meant when he affirmed it de-

<sup>29</sup> Cf. De Letter, *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 19 (1958) 4.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Lonergan, *De constitutione Christi*, pp. 71-80.

pend on further research, but one thing is certain: he was constrained to propose it for one reason or another.<sup>21</sup> We have suggested a reason. The fact that we cannot see or imagine it ought not weaken our resolve to stand by the consequences of an authentic metaphysics applied to the dicta of faith. A recent discussion in *Revue thomiste* may be said to have implicitly confirmed the reason we have given—confirmed it in the sense that the principle of divine actuation with a *terminus ad extra* could alone resolve a discussion confessed to be unresolvable.<sup>22</sup>

### "I HAVE CALLED YOU FRIENDS"

No concern for parallel theological constructions ought to obscure the primary text of Scripture: "You are my friends . . . because all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you." In fact, the aim of weaving the Incarnation and the beatific vision to a single texture with the indwelling is to show how the original pattern, its working out, and the finished product form but one continuous process.

Friendship is the best possible image for this divine economy, for it suggests immediately interpersonal union. We need not look for some kind of physical fusion, or try to "fill" our inside with God. St. Augustine has already warned us about taking the spatial metaphors of Scripture too literally: God contains the universe intentionally, eminently, as only spirit can contain something other. But granted interpersonal union, the real question is, how is such possible? And what can be its structure? For Aristotle, the very thought of friendship with God was contradictory; but given the fact of God's love, we have its possibility as well, and Aristotle's grasp of friendship can supply us with an analogy.

In essence, the friend is another self. He would be present to me as I am to myself, and I would have him so. For us this means in and through conscious acts; for the subject unfolds only in contact with an object, and another is present to me only in a multiplicity of aspects. But God possesses Himself immediately, totally, and in perfect lucidity—and in the same act possesses others. Objects, then, to Him, are rather projected subjects, more present to Him than they can ever

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Quest. disp. de Verbo inc.*

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *Revue thomiste* 18 (1958) 197–213; 19 (1959) 59–78, esp. p. 69.

be to themselves. What singles out the intellectual creature, therefore, is not only that he is created capable of responding, but that he is present to God *as* another subject, an eventual partner in a dialogue. This forbids us to conceive the indwelling as nothing more than the intellectual creature's recognition of God's presence to all creation. This would put the source of the dialogue in the creature, and necessarily in the created structure of grace, whereas in fact such recognition is already contained in the intellectual creature's presence to God, where the dialogue is initiated and eternally constituted by a specific divine intention towards this creature after His own image.

The creature, however, must respond to this predilection of eternal presence from within his properly historical self. Whereas he never was and never is absent from God, God will ordinarily be present to him only intermittently, as a prevailing *intentio* seeking varied and multiple expression—in short, as a human consciousness can sustain the presence of another. The law of such friendship here below is an ever-penetrating stamp of the other on one's prevailing sentiment leading to an ever more flexible and imaginative expression of constancy. Only after death will discrete and multiple expression give way to the simple presence of vision, with the creature possessing God as God has always possessed him.

The ground of this friendship is clearly that "He has first loved us." And the same laws operate in its exercise as well. God took our place, dying for us, sinners that we are, that we might die with Him. God, in His Spirit, is in us—and we in Him—that we might live to Him. What makes this dialogue of love unique is that one partner takes all the initiative. For Aristotle, for whom friendship is more loving than being loved,<sup>33</sup> such a union would be inconceivable; for at the basis of his dialogue is not some divine intervention but possession of self. Only the virtuous man can contract genuine friendship, for such is but an extension of that spontaneous turning to self and delight to be with himself that marks the good man.<sup>34</sup> Here revelation, without compromising the psychological laws in operation, gives them infinitely more depth and perspective: man, before God, does not possess but begs consistency. The Christian—as the Jew before him—implores that he

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1159a 25; *In 8 Eth.*, lect. 8, § 1646.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1166a 20-35; *In 9 Eth.*, lect. 4, §§ 1807-13.



might be "enough of one piece" to love. Yet the Christian begs with an indefatigable hope, sensing that he could not even pray thus were not God already with him, knowing that this love that he would excite is but his vacillating response to God's untrammelled faithfulness.<sup>35</sup> Being loved comes before loving, consent to God's love for us is the wellspring of any concern for His glory. The essence of this union, the ground of the dialogue we must live out, is the presence of the person *to* God, where he is loved with an eternal love, where "those whom He has foreknown He has also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son" (Rom 8:29).

Finally, this conviction directs one's response; for the uniqueness of this union between Creator and creature is reflected in its created term, in the very duality of created love, whose roots lie in receptivity, yet an active receptivity that ever seeks expression. While both receptivity and expression, complacency and concern, are created effects in us, they nonetheless differ in that God works the first one alone, but the second along with us and in virtue of the first.<sup>36</sup> An ever-deepening awareness of this gratuitous election, achieved of course in and through service ("you are my friends if you do the things I command you"), gives us a foretaste of the beatific vision, approximating here below the eternal possession God has of us.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. St. Gregory the Great, Homily for Pentecost (Third Nocturn); Lk 17:10.

<sup>36</sup> *Sum. theol.* 1-2, q. 111, a. 2.