

ST. THOMAS' THOUGHT ON *GRATIA OPERANS*

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THIS article continues the investigation already defined. We are concerned to determine what St. Thomas held at different times on various points connected with the theory of *gratia operans*. His theory of operation has already been treated, and now we come closer to our subject to outline his concept of freedom, his ideas on divine action in the will, his explanations of the possibility of contingency and of sin.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

Successively St. Thomas transcended four influences in developing his theory of the will and its freedom. First of all, in his *Sentences* he rejected St. Albert's view that *liberum arbitrium* was a third faculty distinct from both intellect and will.¹ In the second place, this term, *liberum arbitrium*, loses its place of importance; it had its origin in the Stoic *autexousion* and it persisted until the *Pars Prima* with distinct questions devoted to it and to the will;² but in the *Prima Secundae* there are sixty-three articles in a row, and though all treat of the will, the term, *liberum arbitrium*, fails to appear in the title of a single one.³

More complex is the role played by the idea of freedom as non-coercion. This relic of the pre-philosophic period of medieval thought appears in the *Sentences*, but there any tendency to assert that the will is necessitated but not coerced and therefore free is rejected.⁴ On the other hand, in the *De Veritate*, the *De Potentia* and the *Pars Prima* one does find incidental statements to the effect that non-coercion makes necessary acts free: of necessity yet freely

NOTE.—Previous articles in this series: "St. Thomas' Thought on *Gratia Operans*. Its General Movement" (*THEOL. STUD.*, II [1941], 289-324); "Habitual Grace as *Operans et Cooperans*" (*ibid.*, III [1942], 69-88); "St. Thomas' Theory of Operation" (*ibid.*, pp. 375-402).

¹ 2 dist. 24, q. 1, aa. 1-3; for St. Albert, see Lottin, "Le Traité du libre arbitre depuis le chancelier Philippe jusqu'à S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Rev. Thom.*, X (1927), 446-72; XII (1929), 234-69.

² *De Ver.*, qq. 22, 24; 1a, qq. 82, 83.

³ 1a 2ae, qq. 6-17.

⁴ 2 dist. 25, q. 1, a. 4; cf. 2 d. 28, q. 1, a. 2.

God wills his own excellence,⁵ the Holy Ghost proceeds,⁶ the human will tends to beatitude,⁷ the demonic will is fixed in evil,⁸ and perhaps the sinner is impotent to avoid further sin.⁹ This lapse in the teeth of contrary theory was repudiated with extreme vehemence in the later *De Malo* as heretical, destructive of all merit and demerit, subversive of all morality, alien to all scientific and philosophic thought, and the product of either wantonness or incompetence.¹⁰ The Church agrees that it is an heretical view,¹¹ and the historian cannot but regard the relevant passages in the *De Veritate*, the *De Potentia* and the *Pars Prima* as a momentary aberration.

The fourth influence St. Thomas overcame was the Aristotelian doctrine that the will is a passive potency: "appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum."¹² It was in this way that Aristotle conceived his first mover as moving the animated heavens,¹³ and it was on this ground that St. Thomas affirmed God to operate in all operation as the *primum appetibile*.¹⁴ Accordingly, in the *De Veritate* and the *Pars Prima* the act of appetition is passive,¹⁵ and is described passively as *inclinari vel non inclinari*;¹⁶ the will is a *mobile* with an act, *moveri*;¹⁷ it has no parallel to the distinction between *intellectus agens et possibilis*.¹⁸ Of course, this position is not rigidly maintained: the *Pars Prima* attributes to the will a *moveri ex se*, and there are stronger expressions in the *De Veritate*.¹⁹ It remains that the active *se movet* is predicated not of the will but of man,²⁰ and this is what accords with the explicit theory; for the will moves the intellect and all the other potencies; but the motion of the will itself is attributed to the intellect;²¹ and an infinite regress in the mutual causality exerted by intellect on will

⁵ *De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 4.

⁶ *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 5m.

⁷ *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 3m (2 ser.); cf. corp., ad 4m (1 ser.), and 1a, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1m.

⁸ *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 10, 5a, ad 5m.

⁹ *Ibid.*, a. 12, ad 10m (2 ser.)

¹⁰ *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1; cf. *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 7.

¹¹ DB, 1094.

¹² *De Anima*, 3, lect. 15.

¹³ *Met.*, 12, lect. 7; cf. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: 1924), Introd., p. cxxxiv.

¹⁴ *C. Gent.*, 3, 67; cf. 1a, q. 105, a. 5.

¹⁵ *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 3; 1a, q. 80, a. 2.

¹⁶ *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 4.

¹⁷ 1a, q. 82, a. 2, ad 2m, ad 3m; a. 3, ad 2m.

¹⁸ 1a, q. 83, a. 4, ad 3m.

¹⁹ 1a, q. 105, a. 4, ad 2m; *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 6: "potest exire in actum volendi respectu cuiuslibet et non exire"; *ibid.*, a. 8: "actio voluntatis in quantum est actio non solum est a voluntate . . ."

²⁰ 1a, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3m.

²¹ *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 12; 1a, q. 82, a. 4.

and by will on intellect is avoided by affirming the intellect to be the first mover.²² These facts have been investigated by the brilliant Thomistic student, Dom Lottin, who has explained that the great development in the *De Malo* and the *Prima Secundae* was due to the challenge offered by the Parisian Averroists with their doctrine of determinism.²³ In these later works St. Thomas conceived the distinction between the specification and the exercise of the act of will. The specification is caused by the intellect;²⁴ the exercise, by the self-motion of the will;²⁵ and this self-motion involves a first mover acting on the will itself.²⁶

In the light of these developments it becomes a fairly simple matter to evaluate the relative importance of different elements in St. Thomas' theory of freedom. A free act has four presuppositions: (A) a field of action in which more than one course of action is objectively possible; (B) an intellect that is able to work out more than one course of action; (C) a will that is not automatically determined by the first course of action that occurs to the intellect; and, since this condition is only a condition, securing indeterminacy without telling what in fact does determine, (D) a will that moves itself. All four are asserted by St. Thomas but with varying degrees of emphasis at different times.

In the *De Veritate* the first ground of the will's indeterminacy is the objective possibility of different courses of action: "quia multis viis ad finem ultimum perveniri potest."²⁷ From the *Sentences* to the *Pars Prima* the centre of the stage is held more and more by the capacity of intellect to think out different courses of action; and in the *Pars Prima* this line of thought receives its crown in the observation that in working out a course of action, an *operabile*, the intellect does not move in the mould of the scientific syllogism but on the model of the dialectical syllogism or the rhetorical persuasion; "et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est."²⁸ Finally, while it was always

²² *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 12, ad 2m; 12, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3m.

²³ Lottin, "Motion divine et liberté humaine," *Rech. théol. anc. méd.* VII (1935), 52-69; 156-73.

²⁴ *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1; 12 2ac, q. 9, a. 1.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

²⁶ 12 2ac, q. 9, a. 3.

²⁷ *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 6.

²⁸ 2 dist. 25, q. 1, a. 1; *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 1; *C. Gent.*, 2, 48; 12, q. 83, a. 1. The advance in the *Pars Prima* seems due to *Eth.*, 6, lect. 3, 4; on connected notions see *Post. Anal.*, 1, lect. 42, §3; *Phys.*, 2, lect. 15; *Peri Herm.*, 1, lect. 14, §§8, 24; also *Met.*, 2, lect. 2; and *C. Gent.*, 2, 28-30.

maintained that the will is not determined by the intellect,²⁹ it is only in the *De Malo* and the *Prima Secundae* that one finds an explicit answer to the question: What does determine the will? As we have seen, Aristotelian passivity of appetite is then transcended and the freedom of man yields place to the freedom of the will; in consequence, attention is concentrated on the negative factor that the will is not determined by the intellect,³⁰ and on the positive factor that the will moves itself and in this self-motion is always free either to act or not act.³¹

Obviously, to select one of these four elements and to call it the essence of freedom, in the sense that freedom remains even though others are eliminated, is not the doctrine of St. Thomas.³² St. Thomas asserted all four, and he never excluded any one of the four. Moreover, the varying emphasis that is found in different writings is explained satisfactorily by the accidents of historical development. Finally, if one desires to know how the four are related, one has only to distinguish between proximate and prior causes in the ontological order. Why is the will free? Because it is not determined by the intellect and because it does determine itself. Why has man free will? Because man has an intellect that arrives contingently at different courses of action.³³ Finally, why are there free creatures? Because there is an universe in which different courses of action are objectively possible. Thus the first cause is the objective possibility of different courses of action; the second

²⁹ 2 dist. 25, q. 1, a. 2; *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 6; 1a, q. 82, a. 2.

³⁰ 1a 2ae, q. 10, a. 2; q. 13, a. 6; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

³¹ 1a 2ae, q. 9, a. 3; q. 10, a. 2: "quantum ad exercitium actus . . . voluntas a nullo obiecto ex necessitate movetur"; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1: "si consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte exercitii actus, non movetur ex necessitate"; *vide n. 19 supra*.

³² Yet such was the view of Bannez: "Habemus itaque necessarium esse ad libertatem actus voluntatis quod indifferentia medii eligendi iudicetur per intellectum, et simul iudicetur tale medium determinandum ad finem . . . Quotiescumque actus voluntatis oritur ex praedicta radice iudicii, semper erit liber. Unde rursus colligo. Quidquid antecesserit, vel comitabitur, vel supervenerit ad actum voluntatis, si non tollat iudicium illud circa medium respectu finis, non destruet libertatem operationis. Haec consequentia evidens est. Quia stante definitione actus liberi, necesse est actum esse liberum" (In 1m, q. 19, a. 10 [Romae 1584], 381F, 382B).

³³ The argument ran as follows: What is hot, heats; what is cold, cools; but the doctor may kill or cure, for knowledge is a *causa ad utrumque*. Still, the doctor cannot both kill and cure the same patient in the same illness. Hence knowledge as a cause implies the intervention of another factor that selects between alternatives. This other factor is the choice, *electio, proairesis*. *Met.*, 9, lect. 2, §§1792, 1793; lect. 4, §§1819, 1820.

cause is the intellect that knows this objective possibility; and the proximate cause is the will that selects, not because determined by the intellect, but through its own self-motion.

DIVINE ACTION ON THE WILL

In virtue of the theorem of the analogy of action St. Thomas always held that God was more a cause of the will's act of choice than the will itself. This may be inferred from the *Sentences*;³⁴ it is stated incidentally in the *De Veritate*;³⁵ it is the subject of a special chapter in the *Contra Gentiles*;³⁶ it is taken for granted in the *Pars Prima*.³⁷ This doctrine gives rise to special difficulties with regard to freedom and the possibility of sin, and these difficulties we shall consider presently;³⁸ but the doctrine itself is clear and indisputable, and so we need not be concerned with it here.

But besides the act of choice there is the will itself with its acquired orientation of natural and supernatural habits and dispositions,³⁹ and since the analogy of action is a theorem, God co-operates in the production of the choice because he operates in the production, maintenance, or modification of the orientated will that chooses.⁴⁰ Now, we have already studied one instance of such divine operation, namely, the infused habit,⁴¹ and it is our present purpose to inquire into the development of similar divine interventions within the will. This inquiry will prove to be a study of the influences exerted on St. Thomas by Avicenna, St. Augustine, Eudemus, and finally Aristotle.

For Avicenna the lowest of the emanating intelligences was the *intellectus agens* which produced and ruled the minds of men. Consistently St. Thomas refused to ascribe any such role to a created intelligence; with equal consistency he transferred this very role to God.⁴² Thus at all times St. Thomas affirmed divine interven-

³⁴ Combining 1 dist. 37, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m, with the remark on God causing the act of choice in 2 dist. 28, q. 1, a. 4.

³⁵ ". . . actio voluntatis in quantum est actio non solum est a voluntate ut immediate agente sed a Deo ut primo agente qui vehementius imprimit" (*De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 8).

³⁶ *C. Gent.*, 3, 89.

³⁷ "Non est autem distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio et ex praedestinatione, sicut nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda et causa prima . . . ; id quod est per liberum arbitrium est ex praedestinatione" (1a, q. 23, a. 5; cf. *C. Gent.*, 3, 70).

³⁸ *Vide* sections 3 and 4, *infra*.

³⁹ Cf. THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 74-82.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, III (1942), 395-400.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, III (1942), 82-87.

⁴² 2 dist. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5m, ad 1m; *De Ver.*, q. 22, aa. 8, 9; *C. Gent.*, 3, 87-89; 1a, q. 115, a. 4; q. 105, a. 4; *Quodl.* 1, a. 7; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

tion in the will; and Avicenna had provided the speculative framework through which God entered.

However, if in the *Sentences* this entry appears to consist solely in creation and the infusion of habitual grace, the influence of Holy Writ and of St. Augustine made a wider breach in the *De Veritate*. The objections to q. 22, a. 8 in the latter work begin with the citation of Proverbs 21:1: "Cor regum in manu Dei est; quocumque voluerit, vertit illud." This is followed up by a citation from St. Augustine's *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*: "Manifestum est Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit." To such objections there was no riposte. St. Thomas was content to explain that they meant that God could and did change the will of man.

His concept of such change is defined as follows: "Cum igitur Deus voluntatem immutat, facit ut praecedenti inclinationi succedat alia inclinatio, et ita quod prima aufertur et secunda manet."⁴³ The question arises: Does *inclinatio* mean a choice, or an antecedent orientation? All that can be said with certainty is that it does not, in the context, mean a hypothetical or future choice, but either a past choice or orientation; for only the latter can be a *praecedens inclinatio*, only the latter can be taken away to have something else substituted in its stead.

Two modes of such change of will are distinguished: the infusion of a habit and the simple motion. The former has already been examined. The latter is described thus:

Immutat voluntatem dupliciter: uno modo movendo tantum: quando scilicet voluntatem movet ad aliquid volendum sine hoc quod aliquam formam imprimat voluntati; sicut sine appositione alicuius habitus quandoque facit ut homo velit hoc quod prius non volebat.⁴⁴

Plainly, this states a change in the previous orientation of the will effected without the infusion of a habit. It may be understood by a consideration of the opposite case of the impotence of the sinner: as we have seen,⁴⁵ the sinner may be unable to avoid sin either because of a vicious habit or else because of a single mortal sin which leaves behind in the psychological continuity of the will a *vis et inclinatio* to evil; in like manner God may change what man

⁴³ *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 8.

⁴⁵ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 76-79, discussing *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 12.

⁴⁴ *Loc. cit.*

cannot, either by infusing a new habit or by substituting one inclination for another.

After St. Augustine came Eudemus posing as Aristotle. By juxtaposing Aristotle's theory of chance and fortune with Aristotle's theory of prudence, Eudemus had been faced with the difficulty that not only the imprudent sometimes make good out of sheer luck but also the prudent have to be lucky. For the prudent man in the concrete is prudent because he takes counsel; but even if he takes counsel about taking counsel, one cannot suppose an infinite regress. What accounts for the *initium consiliandi*? Eudemus answered by dividing men into three classes, the imprudent, the ordinarily prudent, and those favoured few whose *initium consiliandi* comes from an *instinctus divinus*.⁴⁶ But St. Thomas with his firmer grasp of wider principles saw that the need of some divine influence was universal; indeed, the problem of the *initium consiliandi* was but a particular case of the more general doctrine of Aristotelian premotion.⁴⁷ And thus it is that we find St. Thomas attaining precision in his account of the *initium consiliandi* only in the measure that his theory of the will and of its premotion develops.⁴⁸

This brings us to our fourth influence, Aristotle. It has been shown already that in the *Sentences* St. Thomas described the preparation for justification in terms of an Aristotelian premotion that was either an object for the will, such as an admonition, or else a new factor in the apprehension of the object, such as ill health, or finally anything else of the sort.⁴⁹ Let us term such promotions external. Now, we have already come across an entirely different type of premotion, namely, the infusion of habitual grace as it is described in the *Contra Gentiles* and the *Prima Secundae*.⁵⁰ This premotion, which is within the will as such, may be termed internal.

Such premotion makes its first appearance in the *De Veritate* in the form of an actual grace preparatory to justification. It is

⁴⁶ Cf. Deman, "Le 'Liber de Bona Fortuna' dans la théologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Rev. sc. phil. theol.*, XLVI (1922), 38-58.

⁴⁷ Cf. *THEOL. STUD.*, III (1942), 381-3.

⁴⁸ Compare the texts: *C. Genr.*, 3, 89; 1a, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3m; *Quodl.* 1, a. 7; *In Rom.*, 9, lect. 3; *In 2 Cor.*, 3, lect. 1; *In Phil.*, 1, lect. 1; all these are vague or intellectualist. But *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1; 1a 2ae, q. 9, a. 4 are explicitly a motion in the will. See also *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3, 11a; 1a 2ae, q. 80, a. 1, 3a; q. 109, a. 2, ad 1m.

⁴⁹ 2 dist. 28, q. 1, a. 4.

⁵⁰ *C. Genr.*, 3, 149; 1a 2ae, q. 113; cf. *THEOL. STUD.*, III (1942), 82-87.

looked upon, not as absolutely necessary, but only as an alternative to the external premotion of the *Sentences*. And one may be inclined to identify it with the change of will described above; for in this passage, as in the other, there is to be found an appeal to St. Augustine's doctrine in the *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* to the effect that God operates in many ways within the hearts of men.⁵¹ The next text of importance seems to belong to the second Paris period when St. Thomas denounced as Pelagian the view he formerly held, namely, that the preparation for justification could be explained in terms of admonitions, ill health, or anything of the sort. In this article of the *Quodlibetum Primum*⁵² it is stated that the preparation for justification can be accounted for only by a divine operation within the will itself, of a type proved by Proverbs 21:1: "Cor regis in manu Dei; quocumque voluerit vertet illud." While this citation is again reminiscent of the article in the *De Veritate* examined above, the theoretical explanation is not in terms of change of will but of the Eudemian *initium consiliandi*.

This position of the *Quodlibetum Primum* finds a congruous speculative background when in the *De Malo* a distinction is drawn between the two lines of causation that converge in effecting the act of choice in the will: there is the line of causation *quoad specificationem actus*; there is another line *quoad exercitium actus*. Thus we have two first causes: the object that is apprehended by the intellect as the end, and the agent that moves the will to this end. The consequent process is that the will moves the intellect to take counsel on means to the end, and then the object apprehended as means, together with the will of the end, moves the will to a choice of the means.⁵³ Thus the rejection of the Aristotelian passivity of the will eliminates the old position that the intellect is first mover; now there are two first movers, the intellect *quoad specificationem actus*, and God *quoad exercitium actus*. Both are required for the emergence of an act of choice; on the other hand, the lack of either will explain the absence of the subsequent process of taking counsel and choosing.

How perfectly this position synthesizes the various elements and influences hitherto considered appears in the *Prima Secundae*. There we find the proof of an external first mover of the will of the type postulated by Eudemus derived from the fact of change of will:

⁵¹ *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 14c.

⁵² *Quodl.* 1, a. 7.

⁵³ *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

. . . manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid *cum hoc prius non vellet*; necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum: et quidem . . . ipsa movet seipsam, in quantum per hoc quod vult finem reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem . . . Et si quidem ipsa moveret seipsam ad volendum [finem], oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita; non autem est procedere in infinitum: unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam capite Eth. Eudemicæ.⁵⁴

The same position takes a more general form almost immediately: because God creates the soul, He alone can operate within the will; again, because the will tends to the *bonum universale*, this tendency cannot be the effect of any particular cause but only of the universal cause, God.⁵⁵ Hence:

. . . Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum; et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle . . . sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum; sicut in his quos movet per gratiam.⁵⁶

Now, this special motion, which is a grace, may indeed be habitual grace, a point we have studied already;⁵⁷ but it may also be an actual grace that is a change of will. Parallel to *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 8, and to *Quodlibetum Primum*, a. 7, there is the following sentence in the *De Malo* in the account of psychological continuity:

. . . ex causa vero extrinseca, puta cum Deus immutat voluntatem hominis per gratiam de malo in bonum, secundum illud Proverb., 21:1: 'Cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud.'⁵⁸

And—what is still more pertinent—there is the *actus interior* which is an actual grace that is *operans*, "praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat."⁵⁹

THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTINGENCE

This problem has already been presented. On the one hand, St. Thomas maintained not only free acts but also all terrestrial

⁵⁴ 1a 2ae, q. 9, a. 4.

⁵⁶ 1a 2ae, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3m.

⁵⁸ *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 5; cf. THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 81.

⁵⁹ 1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 6; cf. 1a, q. 54, a. 2.

⁵⁷ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 82-87.

activity to be contingent;⁶⁰ on the other hand, he affirmed God's eternal knowledge to be infallible, His eternal will to be irresistible, and His action through intellect and will to be absolutely efficacious.⁶¹ Now, if God knows every event infallibly, if He wills it irresistibly, if He effects it with absolute efficacy, then every event must be necessary and none can be contingent. Such is the problem. An account of the solution offered by St. Thomas falls into three sections: first, certain fallacies must be seen through; secondly, the basic solution has to be presented; thirdly, variations on the basic theme have to be noticed.

The first fallacy lies in a misconception of time. To a temporal being our four-dimensional universe has three sections: past, present, and future. To an eternal "now" this division is meaningless. On this point St. Thomas never had the slightest doubt: he was always above the pre-Einsteinian illusions that still are maintained by our cosmology manuals;⁶² strenuously and consistently he maintained that all events are present to God.⁶³

The second fallacy lies in supposing God's knowledge of the creature, or His creative will and operation, to be some reality in God that would not be there if He had not created. God is immutable. He is entitatively identical whether He creates or does

⁶⁰ *De Ver.*, q. 6, a. 3; *C. Gent.*, 3, 72, 86, 94; *Met.*, 6, lect. 3; 12, q. 116, a. 1, 3; q. 115, a. 6; *Peri Herm.*, 1, lect. 14, §§11 ff.

⁶¹ ". . . ut, scilicet, ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile cadat sub eius cognitione, et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum cadat sub eius voluntate, sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa" (*Peri Herm.*, 1, lect. 14, §16). More explicit statements in references to be given below, nn. 68-79.

⁶² The *nunc* of a temporal being changes inasmuch as the being itself changes; the *nunc* of an immutable being is timeless, eternal (*Phys.*, 4, lect. 18, §§4, 5). There would be as many times as motions, and so no simultaneity, were not all motions caused by the temporal motion of the celestial spheres (*Phys.*, 4, lect. 17, §3, 4). Different worlds have no common time (1 dist. 37, q. 4, a. 3, *post med.*; 2 dist. 2, q. 1, a. 2). Without motion and a measure for it, such as space, there could be no time (*Phys.*, 4, lect. 17, §§7, 10). "Before time" is an illusory figment of the imagination (2 dist. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 13m; *Met.*, 12, lect. 5, §2498). God produces time just as any other creature (*Phys.*, 8, lect. 2, §19; *C. Gent.*, 2, 31-38). Neither God nor even an angel knows or wills either at a time or during a time; both stand outside the network of temporal relations just as much as outside the network of spatial relations (*Peri Herm.*, 1, lect. 14).

⁶³ 1 dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5, and ad 4m; *C. Gent.*, 1, 66, 67; 12, q. 14, a. 13; *Peri Herm.*, 1, lect. 14, §19; *Quodl.* 11, q. 3, a. 3; *ibid.*, 12, q. 3, a. 3. Ingenuously, Bannez attempted to explain why St. Thomas was resting his case on the idea of time; he said St. Thomas wished to give all sorts of solutions (In 1m, q. 14, a. 13 [Romae, 1584] 314B). St. Thomas does not seem to offer more than one solution for foreknowledge, and that is in terms of time.

not create. His knowledge or will or production of the created universe adds only a *relatio rationis* to the *actus purus*.⁶⁴ They are predications by extrinsic denomination.⁶⁵ Further, it is to be observed that a fallacy on this point is closely connected with fallacious ideas of time. For there can be no predication by extrinsic denomination without the actuality of the extrinsic denominator: else the *adaequatio veritatis* is not satisfied. Accordingly, to assert that God knows this creature or event, that He wills it, that He effects it, is also *ipso facto* to assert that the creature or event actually is.⁶⁶

The third fallacy is a confusion of hypothetical with absolute necessity. If A, then A—granted the protasis, the apodasis follows necessarily. But this necessity is not absolute, standing in its own right, but hypothetical, resulting only from the protasis. Moreover, what hypothetically is necessary, absolutely may be either necessary or contingent. On this point St. Thomas is so insistent that no more need be said.⁶⁷

A fourth fallacy is post-Thomist. It fails to grasp that God is not some datum to be explained, that He is absolute explanation, pure intelligibility in Himself, and the first cause and last end of everything else. Accordingly, attempts are made to explain God, to explain the attributes that are identical with God, to reconcile the predicates that have their ontological ground in the absolute simplicity of God. The result is a pseudo-profundity ending in insoluble problems, such as: How can God know the contingent? How can His *concursus* make Him omnipotent without destroying human liberty? and so forth.

So much for the fallacies that befog the issue and lead down blind alleys. Our next point is to observe an identical line of thought running from the *Sentences* to the *Pars Tertia*. In the *Sentences*:

Praescientia Dei non imponit necessitatem rebus scitis . . . ratione adaequationis ad rem scitam, quae [adaequatio] ad rationem veritatis et certitudinis scientiae exigitur; quia adaequatio ista attenditur scientiae Dei ad rem, non secundum quod [res] est in causis suis in quibus est ut

⁶⁴ 1a, q. 13, a. 7.

⁶⁵ Cf. THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 380, note 25.

⁶⁶ "Actually is" where the present tense of the "is" is not my present nor yours but God's; compare the Augustinian eternity of truth.

⁶⁷ 1a, q. 14, a. 13, ad 2m; 1 dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m; *Pari Herm.*, I, lect. 14, §21.

possibile futurum tantum, sed ad ipsam rem secundum quod habet esse determinatum, prout est praesens et non futurum.⁶⁸

This passage defines briefly and exactly the issue with which St. Thomas deals. The equation of intellect and reality in certain knowledge might be thought to impose necessity on the known. St. Thomas admits that it would, if the known *qua* known were future, for certain knowledge must be verified. If the future is known with certainty, then necessarily it must come to be; and what necessarily must come to be, is not contingent but necessary. But St. Thomas denies that God knows events as future. He is not in time but an eternal "now" to which everything is present. Hence when you say, "If God knows this, this must be," the "this" of the apodasis must be taken in the same sense as the "this" of the protasis. But the "this" of the protasis is present; therefore, the "this" of the apodasis is present; it follows that "this must be" is not absolute but hypothetical necessity: "Necesse est Socratem currere dum currit."⁶⁹

It may be worth while pointing out that the same solution is to be had if one argues in terms of the second fallacy given above. "God knows this" is true by an extrinsic denomination. There is no extrinsic denomination without the actuality of the extrinsic denominator. Therefore, the actuality of the "this" is included in the protasis, and its reappearance in the apodasis is not absolute but hypothetical necessity: if A, then A.

Moreover—and now we come to grips with the issue—the solution not only is not a mere function of time but not even an exclusive function of knowledge. Exactly the same solution holds if the objection takes the form: If God wills this, this must be:

. . . quamvis voluntas Dei sit immutabilis et invincibilis, non tamen sequitur quod omnis effectus eius sit necessarius necessitate absoluta, quam habet res a causa sua proxima, sed solum necessitate conditionata, sicut et de praescientia dictum est.⁷⁰

Take the tip, and you will find that the solution given for knowledge is equally valid for divine will. Nor is there any use objecting that there is no parity, that knowledge as such is not causal, while will is; for, according to St. Thomas, God does not know

⁶⁸ 1 dist. 40, q. 3, a. 1.

⁶⁹ 1 dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m.

⁷⁰ 1 dist. 47, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m.

passively, by being acted upon by the object after the fashion of our senses. He knows actively: "scientia Dei est causa rerum"—part of the production of the object and not its subsequent effect.⁷¹

What holds both for divine knowledge and divine will also holds for divine operation which is by intellect and will. Nor is this position peculiar to the *Sentences*. In the *Pars Prima* fate, the *virtus instrumentalis* of divine government,⁷² is said to be contingent in one sense but necessary, hypothetically, in another:

. . . fatum secundum considerationem secundarum causarum mobile est; sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis sed conditionatae; secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram, Si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit.⁷³

And so far from weakening in the course of time, this solution is again affirmed in the *Pars Tertia* where an explicit generalization is made:

. . . aliquid potest dici possibile vel impossibile dupliciter: uno modo simpliciter et absolute; alio modo ex suppositione. Simpliciter ergo et absolute loquendo, possibile fuit Deo alio modo hominem liberare quam per passionem Christi . . . Sed ex aliqua suppositione facta, fuit impossibile: quia enim impossibile est Dei praescientiam falli et eius voluntatem seu dispositionem cassari, supposita praescientia et praecoordinatione Dei de passione Christi, non erat simul possibile Christum non pati . . . et eadem ratio est de omnibus his quae sunt praescita et praecordinata a Deo, ut in prima parte habitum est.⁷⁴

So much for the existence of a basic solution of the problem of contingency to be found not only in the first book of the *Sentences* but also in the third part of the *Summa*.

Once this basic solution is grasped, it is an easy step to the doctrine of divine transcendence. The solution as such is negative. It does not affirm a property of divine knowledge, will, and action; as such, it only solves an objection. But because the objection can always be solved by distinguishing between hypothetical and absolute necessity, it is not difficult to discern a prop-

⁷¹ I dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1; *C. Genr.*, 1, 67; 1a, q. 14, a. 8.

⁷² *THOMAS STUD.*, III (1942), 392-5.

⁷³ 1a, q. 116, a. 3.

⁷⁴ 3a, q. 46, a. 2.

erty, to state positively what the objection and its solution put in a negative form.

Such a positive statement is the affirmation that God knows with equal infallibility, He wills with equal irresistibility, He effects with equal efficacy, both the necessary and the contingent. For however infallible the knowledge, however irresistible the will, however efficacious the action, what is known, willed, effected, is no more than hypothetically necessary. And what hypothetically is necessary, absolutely may be necessary or contingent.

This brings us to our third point, namely, the accidental variations on the basic theme. It has already been shown that in the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate* St. Thomas did not hold the causal certitude of providence, and that he affirmed it in the *Contra Gentiles* through a qualification of the Aristotelian refutation of determinism by means of the *per accidens*.⁷⁵ Thus it is in the *Contra Gentiles* that the positive doctrine of divine transcendence makes its first appearance, and it does so in the form of a retort: You object that providence is necessarily efficacious; I retort that therefore what providence intends to be contingent will inevitably be contingent.⁷⁶ In the *Pars Prima* the same position is expressed more positively in terms of the efficacy of the divine will: God produces not only reality but also the modes of its emergence; among these are necessity and contingency.⁷⁷ In the commentary on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias* we are told to conceive the divine will as standing outside the order of contingency and necessity.⁷⁸ In the *De Substantiis Separatis* there is a useful analogy from the geometer who not only makes triangles but also makes them equilateral or isosceles at his pleasure.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 388-90.

⁷⁷ 1a, q. 19, a. 8.

⁷⁹ *De Subst. Sep.*, 14 (13). This is not the whole story; the variations are more nuanced and more complex. We think of any creature as a contingent being; but Aristotle thought of the heavens as necessary beings; hence the apparent anomaly of the *via tertia*, (1a, q. 2, a. 3); regularly St. Thomas uses the term *contingens, possibile*, in three senses: a corruptible creature; the *per accidens*; the free act of will. In the *Sentences* contingency is regularly ascribed to the proximate cause (1 dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5; dist. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m; dist. 40, q. 3, a. 1; dist. 47, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m); but it is seen in *De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 5 that this implies that God could not create a contingent (corruptible) being such as a cow. Henceforth we find it stated that God not only gives being but also the mode of being. This does not seem to have anything to do with *ad modum liberi* which has its counterpart in the *ad modum naturae* of the virtues; its reference is to the analogy of action (*De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 3m; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3m; cf. THEOL. STUD., III [1942], 395-400). Another and different point is that from 1a,

⁷⁶ *C. Gent.*, 3, 94.

⁷⁸ *Peri Herm.*, I, lect. 14, §22.

However, these variations on a basic theme must not be taken to imply that divine transcendence is a property that can be attributed to any creature, even to the Bannezian *praemotio*:

Hoc autem non potest dici de voluntate humana nec de *aliqua alia causa*: quia omnis alia causa cadit iam sub ordine necessitatis vel contingentiae; et ideo oportet quod vel ipsa causa possit deficere, vel effectus eius non sit contingens sed necessarius.⁸⁰

If, then, a *gratia operans* were to produce a contingent effect with irresistible efficacy, it could not be a creature; it would have to be God.

Again, though the geometer can make triangles either equilateral or isosceles at his pleasure, still his pleasure does not extend to the possibility of making equilateral triangles with only two sides equal. Similarly, when God irresistibly produces a contingent effect, He does so, not through a necessitated, but through a contingent, cause.⁸¹ So much for the possibility of contingency.

THE POSSIBILITY OF SIN

One has only to read St. Thomas to realize that this question did not worry him a great deal,⁸² and our present purpose is to discover the root of this strange insouciance; for the problem has worried others. Bannez offered to solve it by means of a two-lane highway: along one lane there is what God effects, and that must be; along the other lane is what God does not effect, and that cannot be. This solution does not appear to be perfect, inasmuch as it gives the impression that, though God does not cause the sinner's sinning, He does make it impossible for him to do what is right.⁸³ Molina

q. 14, a. 13, ad 2m it might be argued that St. Thomas did not consider temporal objects to be really and ontologically present to God but only cognitively; in fact that seems to be the meaning of that text, but not of other texts; and so I fancy it might better be argued that in the *Pars Prima* St. Thomas was following what he thought to be the line of least resistance for the understanding of his readers.

⁸⁰ *Peri Herm.*, 1, lect. 14, §22; cf. *Met.*, 6, lect. 3, §1222.

⁸¹ 1a, 19, a. 8; *Peri Herm.*, 1 lect. 14, §22; etc.

⁸² 2 dist. 37, q. 2; *C. Gent.*, 3, 162; 1a, q. 49, aa. 1-3; *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 1, 2; 1a 2ae, q. 79, aa. 1-3. Contrast on the angels 1a, q. 63, aa. 5, 6, with the probably later *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 4.

⁸³ "... alia futura contingentia cognoscit Deus in suis causis prout sunt determinata a prima causa: malum vero culpae futurum cognoscit in sua causa quatenus non est determinata a prima causa ad bene operandum" (Dom. Bannez, In 1m, q. 14, a. 13 [Romae 1584], 314D).

also offered to solve the problem with a four-lane highway: two lanes are in the hypothetical order of the *futuribilia*, in which God knows what Peter would or would not do under given circumstances; two more lanes are in the real order in which God provides or does not provide the situations in which Peter sins or does not sin. And this solution is thought to lack perfection inasmuch as in the hypothetical order God does not appear to be God; as R. P. Garrigou-Lagrangé asked R. P. d'Alès, "Is God determining or determined?"

A first observation is that St. Thomas appears to have thought neither in a two-lane nor in a four-lane but in a three-lane highway. Thus he distinguishes between what God wills to happen, what He wills not to happen, and what He permits to happen:

Deus igitur neque vult mala fieri neque vult mala non fieri sed vult permittere mala fieri, et hoc est bonum.⁸⁴

This strange trichotomy is also implicit in a distinction between the way God wills moral evil and the way He wills physical evil:

. . . unde malum culpae, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus *nullo modo* vult; sed malum naturalis defectus vel malum poenae vult volendo aliquod bonum cui coniungitur tale malum.⁸⁵

There is what God wills in no way whatever, and what He wills by willing something else; the second of these implies a third way of God's willing, namely, God's direct willing of the something else. Further, this trichotomy is found not only in the voluntary order but also in the order of the realities willed:

. . . sicut creatura decideret in nihilum nisi contineretur a Deo, ita etiam deficeret in *non bonum* si non contineretur a Deo. Non tamen sequitur quod nisi contineretur a Deo per gratiam, rueret in *peccatum*; nisi solum de natura corrupta quae de se habet inclinationem in malum.⁸⁶

If, then, we prescind from the case of moral impotence in corrupt nature, we have a distinction between *non bonum* and *peccatum*; and if we add to these two the obvious third, *bonum*, we have our trichotomy with regard to the terms of activity.

⁸⁴ 1a, q. 19, a. 9, ad 3m; on why it is good to permit evil, see 1a, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3m.

⁸⁵ 1a, q. 19, a. 9, c.; cf. 1a, q. 49, a. 2; 1a 2ae, q. 79, a. 1.

⁸⁶ *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 4, ad 22m.

Nor is St. Thomas content with a trichotomy of the will and of the objects willed; he also suggests a trichotomy in the intellectual field. Objective truth is commensurability of the object to the intellect; it is the inverse of subjective truth, in which the intellect conforms to the object; and it is of two kinds, absolute and relative. Relative objective truth is commensurability to a created intellect. Absolute objective truth is commensurability to the intellect of God. Now, falsity is the negation of truth and has all its divisions. Interestingly enough, in the *Pars Prima* St. Thomas asks if there is absolute objective falsity. He answers:

... in rebus dependentibus a Deo falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit ex ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit; secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in Scripturis, secundum illud Ps. 4: 'Ut quid diligitis vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium?' sicut per oppositum operatio virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, sicut dicitur Ioan. 3: 'Qui facit veritatem, venit ad lucem.'⁸⁷

In this passage an assertion of absolute objective falsity appears as an afterthought; it begins hesitantly with a *nisi forte*; but it gains momentum as it proceeds, and it ends on the level of the Joannine antithesis of Light and Darkness.

In this doubtful passage what appears decisive is the argument offered: *malum culpae* must be an absolute objective falsity if it consists in *subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus*—that is a definition. But does the sinner really withdraw from the ordinance of divine intellect? It is not too difficult to find passages in which St. Thomas states or implies as much. Thus, after maintaining in 1a, q. 103, a. 7 that nothing can occur *praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis*, St. Thomas at once proceeds to ask whether anything can revolt *contra ordinem divinae gubernationis*. The answer to this is a distinction between general and specific ends, between universal governance and its execution by particular causes. In the response St. Thomas is content to deny revolt in the former sense. His idea is from Boethius: "non est aliquid quod summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere." His argument is that the sinner

⁸⁷ 1a, q. 17, a. 1, c.

does not withdraw totally from divine governance, for the sinner intends some good; and the implication is that in some partial manner the sinner does withdraw and therefore is rightly punished.⁸⁸

Again, St. Thomas does not seem to represent God planning both merits and sins on the sixteenth century model. His idea of the divine plan and divine providence is intimately connected with the idea of law, the law which the sinner violates.⁸⁹ Both are defined as *ratio ordinandorum in finem*.⁹⁰ And it is in this context that St. Thomas' brief yet downright solutions of the question whether God is responsible for sin, have their full validity.⁹¹ Thus we are brought to the conclusion that *malum culpa* really is a *subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus*, and that therefore it is absolute objective falsity.

This means that the trichotomy found in willing and in the objects willed is also found in the more fundamental order of truth: besides the positive objective truth of being and the negative objective truth of not-being, there is also the objective falsity of moral lapse. To develop the argument further, it is necessary to translate this objective falsity into terms of subjective truth. When, then, it is said that moral lapse is objective falsity, it is not implied that moral lapse is not objective. Obviously it is objective, and so it admits the subjective truth to be found in empirical affirmations of its existence and empirical classifications of its kinds. What objective falsity excludes is understanding, the explanatory science that follows an empirical science when the object of the empirical knowledge is objective truth. For, obviously, the possibility of our understanding anything is ultimately due to the object's commensurability to the divine intellect; and in absolute objective falsity it is precisely this commensurability that is lacking. We can know sin as a fact; we cannot place it in intelligible correlation with other things except *per accidens*; that is, one sin can be cor-

⁸⁸ 1a, q. 103, a. 8.

⁸⁹ Read *C. Gent.*, 3, 111-114.

⁹⁰ Compare 1a, q. 22, a. 1, with 1a 2ae, q. 91, aa. 1 ff. Still, there is a real difference inasmuch as reprobation is a part of providence (1a, q. 23, a. 3); but that does not settle the issue until it is shown just how reprobation forms part of providence. Is it part of a mechanistic blueprint, as the modern mind is prone to assume? Or is it a toleration of failure in a universe of finalistic spontaneity?

⁹¹ See references given above, note 82.

related with another, for deficient antecedents have defective consequent; but the metaphysical surd of sin cannot be related explanatorily or causally with the integers that are objective truth; for sin is really irrational, a departure at once from the ordinance of the divine mind and from the dictate of right reason. The rational and the irrational cannot mix, except in fallacious speculation. And this precept is not merely relative to man; it is absolute. The mysteries of faith are mysteries only to us because of their excess of intelligibility; but the *mysterium iniquitatis* is mysterious in itself and objectively, because of a defect of intelligibility.

If such a view appears very strange to modern theologians who tend to affirm an universal intelligibility that embraces even sin, still it could not fail to fit spontaneously and harmoniously into the categories of Thomist thought. Aristotle's universe had only a limited intelligibility; it included the *per accidens*,⁹² which could never be an object of science, and which radically refuted even natural determinism. Now, St. Thomas departed from this position by his affirmations of divine providence and divine transcendence, and such a departure leaves terrestrial contingency intact. Moreover, it gives the *per accidens* intelligibility, not absolutely, but only inasmuch as coincidences, concurrences, interferences are reducible to the divine design. Accordingly, if sin is a withdrawal from the ordinance of divine intellect, if it is something that God wills neither to be nor not be, if, in a word, it is a third member of the trichotomy we have been examining, then sin is a *per accidens* that does not reduce to divine design. Thus, however much the unintelligibility of sin may sound strange to the modern theologian, for St. Thomas it was no intruder into the Aristotelian frame-work but, on the contrary, a partial acceptance of Aristotelian views.

It will serve both to clarify the foregoing and to verify the hypothesis that we have been developing, if we turn to the manner in which St. Thomas contrasts predestination and reprobation. Both predestination and reprobation are eternal. But while predestination gives the elect both their merits and their consequent reward, the reprobate have their sins from themselves alone, and thus sin is

⁹² THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 388-90.

a cause of punishment in a way in which merit is not a cause of glory.⁹⁸ Now this position is not explained by the Bannezian two-lane system, for on that system God's policy of inactivity makes the defect of sin inevitable, so that the sinner has not his sins merely from himself, nor really is there any difference between right action's relation to glory and sin's to punishment. Again, the Molinist four-lane theory has perhaps never claimed to be more than the solution of a problem St. Thomas is presumed not to have noticed. In any case, I fail to see how it could be considered as an interpretation of the data in St. Thomas on contingency and sin.

But the trichotomy we have been examining leads precisely to the position on reprobation that has been outlined. Because sin is a surd, an irrational, an objective falsity, it cannot have as antecedent either cause or non-cause, where by non-cause is meant a policy of inaction that makes sin inevitable; for both cause and non-cause are instances of intelligible correlation, and the irrational cannot be so correlated. Thus, while reprobation precedes in virtue of divine omnipotence and omniscience, still this precedence is a mere empirical, and in no way an intelligible, antecedence. It does not cause, or lead to, or result in, the sin. And so it leaves sin to be a first in its own order, to be due to the sinner alone, and to be a ground for punishment in a way in which merit is not a ground for glory.

CONCLUSIONS

This article brings to a close our survey of the materials St. Thomas had at hand for the evolution of his concept of actual grace as operative and co-operative. As is apparent, the theory of liberty we have outlined had the singular merit of making possible a theory of operative grace; for on this theory, as opposed to that of Scotus,⁹⁴ the free act emerges from, and is conditioned by, created antecedents over which freedom has no direct control. It follows that it is possible for God to manipulate these antecedents and through such manipulation to exercise a control over free acts themselves:

⁹⁸ *In Rom.*, 9, lect. 2, *ad fin.*; cf. 1a, q. 23, a. 3; *C. Gent.*, 3, 163.

⁹⁴ See the comparisons in J. Auer, *Die menschliche Willensfreiheit im Lehrsystem des Thomas von Aquin und Johannes Duns Scotus* (München: 1938).

... creatura rationalis gubernat se ipsam per intellectum et voluntatem; quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem, qua creatura rationalis gubernat se ipsam tamquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo.⁹⁶

Indeed, both above and below, both right and left, the free choice has determinants over which it exercises no control. God directly controls the orientation of the will to ends; indirectly He controls the situations which intellect apprehends and in which will has to choose; indirectly He also controls both the higher determinants of intellectual attitude or mental pattern and the lower determinants of mood and temperament;⁹⁶ finally, each free choice is free only *hic et nunc*, for no man can decide to-day what he is to will to-morrow.⁹⁷ There is no end of room for God to work on the free choice without violating it, to govern above its self-governance, to set the stage and guide the reactions and give each character its personal role in the drama of life.

Still, none of these created antecedents can be rigorous determinants of the free choice: God alone has the property of transcendence. It is only in the logico-metaphysical simultaneity of the atemporal present that God's knowledge is infallible, His will irresistible, His action efficacious. He exercises control through the created antecedents—true enough; but that is not the infallible, the irresistible, the efficacious, which has its ground not in the creature but in the uncreated, which has its moment not in time but in the co-operation of eternal uncreated action with created and temporal action. Again, the antecedents *per se* always incline to the right and good.⁹⁸ But the consequent act may be good or it may be sinful: if it is good, all the credit is God's, and the creature is only His instrument; but if it is evil, then inasmuch as it is sin as such, it is a surd (preceded, indeed, by a divine permission which is infallible without being a cause or a non-cause), and so in the causal order a first for which the sinner alone is responsible.

⁹⁶ 1a, q. 103, a. 5, ad 3m; cf. *C. Gent.*, 3, 113: "Participat igitur rationalis creatura divinam providentiam, non solum secundum gubernari sed etiam secundum gubernare; gubernat enim se suis actibus propriis et etiam alia." Also, *ibid.*, 3, 90, Amplius.

⁹⁶ *C. Gent.*, 3, 91.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3, 155.

⁹⁸ For the detailed account of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, cf. *In Rom.*, 9, lect. 3, *ad fin.*; also the correction of St. Augustine, *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 8 ad ob.; and 1a 2ae, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1m.

II. ACTUAL GRACE AS *OPERANS* et *COOPERANS*

The earlier articles in this series, and what has preceded in this one, have been bracketing the present inquiry. First, the whole field was reviewed, and so actual grace was studied from above. Next, we took up the parallel and complementary question of habitual grace. Thereafter, the materials for a concept of actual grace were assembled. If now we have to deal directly with actual grace as operative and co-operative, our method remains unchanged, inasmuch as now we bracket the principal text, *1a 2ae*, q. 111, a. 2. Thus our first concern is *gratia cooperans* in the *De Veritate*; next, *gratia praeveniens* in the *Contra Gentiles*; in the third place, the idea of conversion from the *Sentences* to the *Pars Tertia*; then, the definition of *gratia operans*; and finally, after we have seen how St. Thomas applies his analysis of the will and his theorem of universal instrumentality to the doctrine of grace, the content of the *auxilium* that is *operans et cooperans* in the *Prima Secundae*.

GRATIA COOPERANS IN THE *DE VERITATE*

In his *Sentences* St. Thomas had acknowledged only a single grace in each individual.⁹⁹ Distinctions between *praeveniens* and *subsequens* as between *operans* and *cooperans* were not real but notional.¹⁰⁰ But when the same issue recurs in the *De Veritate* the authority of St. Augustine forces the recognition of an actual grace that is *cooperans*.¹⁰¹

... gratia cooperans dicetur secundum quod [gratuita Dei voluntas] in libero arbitrio operatur, motum eius causando, et exterioris actus executionem expediendo, et perseverantiam praebendo; in quibus omnibus aliquid agit liberum arbitrium.¹⁰²

These few lines are not very informative, nor will much more be learnt by detailed study.

There is an objective obscurity in the phrase, *motum eius causando*, for one cannot expect St. Thomas to conceive the motion of the will more clearly and distinctly than he conceives the will itself.¹⁰³ In the *De Veritate* it is not taken for granted that the will of the

⁹⁹ 2 dist. 26, q. 1, a. 6; cf. THEOL. STUD., II (1941), 308-10.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 2m.

¹⁰¹ *De Ver.*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 3m; cf. THEOL. STUD., II (1941), 318-320.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, ad 1m; cf. THEOL. STUD., *ibid.*, 320-322.

¹⁰³ Cf. *supra*, p. 533-541.

end is a distinct act from the choice of means; on the contrary, willing the end is to the will what the sense of touch is in the organ of sight;¹⁰⁴ and though the desire of happiness is the principle and foundation of all willing,¹⁰⁵ still the question whether the will intends end and means in one act or in two, is met with the response that sometimes it is one act and sometimes two.¹⁰⁶ Under these circumstances it is not surprising that a single phrase from St. Augustine's *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* is interpreted in terms of general co-operation in *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 3m, of change of will in q. 22, a. 8, of internal premotion of the will in q. 24, a. 15. Thus, while *motum eius causando* means God's co-operation in the choice, perhaps it does not exclude change of will or premotion of will, though certainly it does include some activity on the part of the will itself: "aliquid agit liberum arbitrium."

With regard to the second effect of *gratia cooperans*, namely, *exterioris actus executionem expediendo*, there is an interesting series of responses on the text from Jeremias, "Non est in homine via eius, nec viri est dirigere gressus suos." On three different occasions this is proposed as an objection against free will. In the *De Veritate* a possible interpretation in terms of man's natural incapacity for meritorious action is set aside on the authority of a reputed St. Gregory of Nyssa, who interpreted the text in terms of external providence; man proposes but God disposes.¹⁰⁷ In the *Pars Prima* external providence is still the main interpretation and man has full autonomy in his choices, *supposito tamen divino auxilio*.¹⁰⁸ In the *De Malo* two interpretations are put forward on an equal footing: the first is that the execution of choices remains in the hands of God; the second recalls that "non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei" and explains this in terms of the Eudemian first mover that accounts for the *initium consiliandi*.¹⁰⁹ The interest of this series of responses is that it links the *gratia cooperans* of the *De Veritate* with that of the *Prima Secundae*; for the latter seems to combine the two ideas of the *De Malo* inasmuch as "ad hunc actum [exteriorem] Deus nos adiuvat et interius

¹⁰⁴ *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 1m.

¹⁰⁸ *1a*, q. 83, a. 1, ad 4m.

¹⁰⁹ *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1m.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 14.

confirmando voluntatem ut ad actum perveniat et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo."¹¹⁰

The third effect, perseverance, needs no comment. It stands between impeccability, which excludes the possibility of sin, and habitual grace, which eliminates antecedent tendency to sin.¹¹¹ It results from the combination of good choices and good performance, and so, in the abstract, does not add to the ideas examined above. In closing this section we may note that the *gratia cooperans* of *In 2 Cor.*, 6, lect. 1 appears to be the same as that of the *De Veritate*.

GRATIA PRAEVENIENS IN THE CONTRA GENTILES

Already we have had occasion to draw attention to a development in the concept of habitual grace as prevenient. In the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate* the free acts in the instant of justification are informed by the infused grace yet are said to precede the latter from the viewpoint of material causality. In the *Summa* this distinction is dropped and the infusion of grace is characterized as *motio moventis*, while the consequent free acts are the *motus mobilis* on the analogy of Aristotelian physics.¹¹² The later analysis seems much more in accord with the truth of divine prevenience, and its origin is, perhaps, a chapter in the *Contra Gentiles* in which there occurs the phrase, "motio moventis praecedit motum mobilis."¹¹³ The main argument there is drawn from a series of aspects of man's instrumentality with respect to his supernatural end, but there is also a confirmatory argument from Scripture. The history of one of the texts involved, Romans 9:16, throws no little light on St. Thomas' correlation of divine prevenience with instrumental theory.

¹¹⁰ 1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2.

¹¹¹ *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 13.

¹¹² THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 82-87.

¹¹³ *C. Gent.*, 3, 149. The phrase, "motio moventis praecedit motum mobilis ratione et causa," is not free from all appearance of ambiguity. Franciscus de Sylvestris Ferrariensis in his commentary on the passage tried to take *motio moventis* as the Aristotelian *actio in passo*, which really is identical with the *passio*, the *motus mobilis*. One might be inclined to interpret the phrase on the analogy of 1a 2ae, q. 113, a. 6, and this would make the *motio moventis*, the infused grace, really distinct from the *motus mobilis*, the free act. In the third place, one might take the *motio moventis* as the notional relation that is the *actio in agente*, and perhaps this is the most obvious meaning of the final words, *ratione et causa*. As a fourth interpretation there is the confident Bannezian view that St. Thomas evidently is thinking of their *praemotio physica*.

In the comment of the *Glossa Ordinaria*¹¹⁴ on the text, "Igitur non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei," one learns that the text is not satisfied by a mere assertion of the necessity of divine mercy. Free will also is necessary, yet one cannot say, "Non miserentis est Dei sed volentis est hominis." Entire credit, then, must be given to God; for God "hominis voluntatem bonam et praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam; volentem praevenit ut velit; volentem subsequitur ne frustra velit."

If the author of the *Glossa* was content to repeat the Augustinian formulae, St. Thomas in his *Sentences* makes a first, very brief, speculative effort to interpret the text in terms of change of will.¹¹⁵ But in his *Commentary on Romans* he argues out the issue to conclude to instrumentality:

Sed si hoc solum intellexisset Apostolus [scilicet, sine me nihil potestis facere], cum etiam gratia sine libero arbitrio hominis non velit neque currat, potuisset e converso dicere, Non est miserentis Dei sed volentis et currentis; quod aures piaae non ferunt. Unde plus aliquid est ex his verbis intelligendum, ut scilicet principalitas gratiae Dei attribuat; semper enim actio magis attribuitur principali agenti quam secundario; puta, si dicamus quod securis non facit arcam, sed artifex per securim. Voluntas autem hominis movetur a Deo ad bonum: unde supra 8:14 dictum est, 'Qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi sunt filii Dei.' Et ideo hominis operatio interior non est homini principaliter sed Deo attribuenda; Phil 2:13: 'Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate.'¹¹⁶

In this passage the argument proceeds from Scripture to the instrumentality of man. The inverse procedure was followed in the chapter of the *Contra Gentiles* where arguments for prevenience from instrumentality were followed by an explanation of Scripture.

Hinc est quod dicitur, 'Non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit,' et, 'Non volentis (scilicet, velle) neque currentis (scilicet, currere) sed miserentis est Dei,' quia scilicet oportet quod ad bene volendum et operandum homo divino praeveniatur auxilio; sicut consuetum est quod effectus aliquis non

¹¹⁴ PL, 114, 501. This argument is to be found in St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c. 32, PL, 40, 248. The *Glossa* makes no acknowledgement but does cite another passage from St. Augustine which, according to an editor of St. Thomas (Vivès, 8, 339 n.), is also from the *Enchiridion*, c. 98, PL, 40, 277; but while this passage does contain the *incipit*, I have not been able to find the closing words there.

¹¹⁵ 2. dist. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1m.

¹¹⁶ *In Rom.*, 9, lect. 3.

attribuitur proximo operanti sed primo moventi; attribuitur enim victoria duci quae labore militum perpetratur . . . ¹¹⁷

In the context of this passage, as also to a less extent in that of the preceding, the reader will notice the absence of the later, fully developed, theory of the will. However, as Romans 9:16 has given us the connection between grace and instrumentality, so will the theory of conversion give the connection between grace and the developed theory of the will.

CONVERSION

Though the *Contra Gentiles* correlated prevenience and instrumentality, it still explained the *initium fidei* by a gift of faith resulting from charity.¹¹⁸ The *Pars Prima* in its turn explains conversion by instrumentality: just as heat cannot generate flesh unless it act as the instrument of a nutritive soul, so too the powers of an angel cannot be directed to a supernatural end without the aid of grace.¹¹⁹ But now there is this notable difference, that three types of conversion are distinguished: the perfect conversion of the beatific vision, the meritorious conversion of habitual grace, and the preparatory conversion that does not involve the infusion of a habit but simply the *operatio Dei ad se animam convertentis*.¹²⁰ Such preparatory conversion had been variously conceived: in the second book of the *Sentences* it was an external Aristotelian pre-motion or else God's co-operation in the free choice;¹²¹ in the fourth book and in the *De Veritate* the alternatives were an external pre-motion or an *instinctus divinus* within the will.¹²² But in the *Quodlibetum Primum* of the second Paris period the alternative of an external pre-motion was eliminated on dogmatic grounds while the internal motion of the will was explained in terms of the Eudemian first mover.¹²³ To complete the movement there was needed only

¹¹⁷ *C. Gent.*, 3, 149.

¹¹⁸ *C. Gent.*, 3, 152, first and last paragraphs. According to Dr. Landgraf (*Zschr. f. kath. Theol.*, LI [1927], 181), the term *prima gratia* invariably denoted justifying faith until the middle of the thirteenth century. In fact, *prima gratia* still has that connotation, though, of course, no one now connects it with the *initium fidei*.

¹¹⁹ Ia, q. 62, a. 2, c.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 3m; cf. the words, "praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat," in the description of *gratia operans* in Ia 2ae, q. 111, a. 2.

¹²¹ 2 dist. 28, q. 1, a. 4.

¹²² 4 dist. 17, q. 1, a. 2 sol. 1, ad 1m; *De Ver.*, q. 24, a. 15.

¹²³ *Quodl.* I, a. 7; on the Eudemian first mover, cf. *supra.*, p. 539.

the developed theory of the will. But though this was had in the *De Malo*,¹²⁴ and though the text, "Igitur non volentis neque currentis, etc.," turns up immediately,¹²⁵ it is only through the context that one can gather that grace effects the will of the end. Thus, while there is in the *De Malo* some difference from the vague appeal of the *Contra Gentiles* to customary speech,¹²⁶ this difference is mainly potential.

Such potentiality seems reduced to act in the *Prima Secundae*. God as external principle moves the will to the end and in special cases He moves it by grace to a special end.¹²⁷ Conspicuous among the latter is conversion, which is expressed entirely in terms of willing the end:

. . . necesse est enim, cum omne agens agat propter finem, quod omnis causa convertat suos effectus ad suum finem, et ideo necesse est quod ad ultimum finem convertatur homo per motionem primi moventis . . . ; sic igitur cum Deus sit primum movens simpliciter, ex eius motione est quod omnia in ipsum convertantur secundum communem intentionem boni . . . ; sed homines iustos convertit [Deus] ad se ipsum sicut ad specialem finem quem intendunt et cui cupiunt inhaerere sicut bono proprio . . .¹²⁸

This passage has a special bearing on *gratia operans*, which finds its illustration, "praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat."¹²⁹ But not only does *gratia operans* effect the will of the end in the case of conversion; it would seem to do so in all instances of divinely inspired action for, once the end is willed, grace becomes co-operative.

Cooperari alicui videtur pertinere ad inferius agens, non autem ad principalius; sed gratia principalius operatur in nobis quam liberum arbitrium, secundum illud Rom. 9, 'Non est volentis neque currentis sed

¹²⁴ *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, ob. 2a, ad 1m.

¹²⁶ ". . . consuetum est quod effectus aliquis non attribuitur proximo operanti sed primo moventi" (*C. Gent.*, 3, 149).

¹²⁷ *1a 2ae*, q. 9, a. 4; a. 6, ad 3m. In the latter passage, "ad aliquid determinate volendum" might be thought incompatible with "sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur," of *1a 2ae*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 3m. Strictly, there is not the slightest incompatibility: grace moves the will to God, who is determinate indeed but also the *bonum universale* (q. 9, a. 6) beyond all limitation or classification; further, grace moves the will to God not by adding "potency" in the sense of limitation and contraction, but by being a further actuation, and so giving expansion and enlargement. The really free are those who enjoy the freedom of the sons of God; perfect love of God is perfect detachment from created excellence and perfect liberty in choice.

¹²⁸ *1a 2ae*, q. 109, a. 6.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, q. III, a. 2.

miserentis Dei.' Ergo gratia non debet dici cooperans.

Ad tertium dicendum quod cooperari dicitur aliquis alicui, non solum sicut secundarium agens principali agenti, sed sicut adiuvans ad praesuppositum finem. Homo autem per gratiam operantem adiuvatur a Deo ut bonum velit; et ideo, praesupposito iam fine, consequens est ut gratia nobis cooperetur.¹³⁰

Here the metaphysical category of instrumentality is given a psychological content. The objection from Romans 9:16 states the metaphysical minimum that grace is a principal cause. The answer is in terms of the dependence, psychological as well as metaphysical, of the choice of means on the will of the end. For a more detailed account of this dependence, we turn to the *Pars Tertia*:

. . . de paenitentia possumus loqui dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad habitum . . . ; alio modo possumus loqui de paenitentia quantum ad actus quibus Deo operanti in paenitentia cooperamur.¹³¹ Quorum actuum primum principium est Dei operatio convertentis cor, secundum illud Thren., 'Converte nos, Domine, ad te, et convertemur.' Secundus actus est motus fidei. Tertius est motus timoris servilis, quo quis timore suppliciorum a peccatis retrahitur. Quartus actus est motus spei, quo quis sub spe veniae consequendae assumit propositum emendandi. Quintus actus est motus charitatis, quo alicui peccatum displicet secundum se ipsum et non iam propter supplicia. Sextus actus est motus timoris filialis, quo propter reverentiam Dei aliquis emendam Deo voluntarius offert.¹³²

This instance of divine operation and our co-operation may be due in its first four acts to actual grace.¹³³ Nor is it difficult to distinguish the operation from the co-operation. The first act does not presuppose any object apprehended by the intellect; God acts directly on the radical orientation of the will. On the other hand, the acts of faith, of servile fear and of hope obviously presuppose an intellectual apprehension. Further, conversion is the cause of the other acts; it is their *primum principium* in the passage quoted, and in the *ad tertium* from it proceeds the act of fear. But

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 3m.

¹³¹ In the very next article we are told that the acts of faith, servile fear, and hope may precede justification (3a, q. 85, a. 6). Hence the divine operation here in question ('Dei operatio convertentis cor') may be an actual grace; cf. 1a 2ae, q. 112, a. 2, ad 2m.

¹³² 3a, q. 85, a. 5.

¹³³ Cf. *supra*, note 33.

what is this causality? "Homo per gratiam operantem adiuvatur a Deo ut bonum velit; et ideo, praesupposito iam fine, consequens est ut gratia nobis cooperetur."¹³⁴ Thus there appears a notable parallel between habitual grace and actual as operative and cooperative: in both cases operative grace changes the radical orientation of the will, *motio moventis*, and then the changed will responds in a new way to the apprehensions of intellect, *motus mobilis*.¹³⁵ Thus instrumental theory and psychological theory work into synthesis with the Augustinian *in nobis sine nobis* and, no less, the *nobiscum*.

THE DEFINITION OF GRATIA OPERANS

The early medieval theologians tended to multiply terms with respect to grace not so much to denote differences of meaning as to keep pace with the facility of St. Augustine's rhetoric. After Peter Lombard, however, the couplet, *operans et cooperans*, became the dominant formula, with the result that in the early thirteenth century we find Peter of Capua and Philip the Chancellor explaining *praeveniens et subsequens* to have the same meaning as *operans et cooperans*.¹³⁶ In his *Sentences* St. Thomas held to this identification, except in the case of the beatific vision which was a *gratia subsequens* but not a *gratia cooperans*.¹³⁷ On the other hand, the *De Veritate* and the *Summa* reveal a marked tendency to differentiate the two pairs of terms. Thus, *praeveniens et subsequens* suggests a sequence, and so we find both *De Veritate*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 6m and 1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 3 drawing up lists of graces or of effects of grace. The *Summa* gives the sequence: (1) a spiritual cure; (2) good will; (3) good performance; (4) perseverance; (5) glory. Any item is said to be *praeveniens* with respect to those that follow, *subsequens* with respect to those that precede; so that the same thing may be, from different viewpoints, both preventive and subsequent.

On the other hand, *operans et cooperans* tends to be used to denote diversity of causal function. If our suggested reading is correct,¹³⁸ the definition of the *De Veritate* is:

¹³⁴ 1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, ad 3m.

¹³⁵ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 82-87.

¹³⁶ See Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade in der Frühscholastik," *Zschr. f. kath. Theol.*, LV (1931), 179-81.

¹³⁷ THEOL. STUD., II (1941), 315 f.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 320, note 148.

Operans enim dicitur gratia respectu illius effectus quem sola efficit; cooperans vero dicitur respectu illius effectus quem sola non efficit, sed cum libero arbitrio cooperante.¹³⁹

In any case, this certainly is the definition of the *Summa*, where we find:

Operatio enim alicuius effectus non attribuitur mobili sed moventi.¹⁴⁰ In illo ergo effectu in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens, operatio Deo attribuitur; et secundum hoc dicitur gratia operans. In illo autem effectu in quo mens nostra et movet et movetur, operatio non solum attribuitur Deo sed etiam animae; et secundum hoc dicitur gratia cooperans.¹⁴¹

Such a definition implies that one and the same grace produces some effects by itself and others in conjunction with free will. This entitative identity of *gratia operans* with *gratia cooperans* was affirmed in principle in the *De Veritate*:

. . . relatio non multiplicat essentiam rei. Sed cooperans supra operantem non nisi relationem addit. Ergo eadem est gratia per essentiam operans et cooperans.¹⁴²

However, the undeveloped state of the theory of the will prevented the *De Veritate* from making the same actual grace both *operans* and *cooperans*.¹⁴³ In the *Summa* this difficulty disappears and there is no reason for supposing that the following represents a statement of principle that is not also a statement of fact:

Divisio debet dari per opposita. Sed operari et cooperari non sunt opposita: idem enim potest operari et cooperari. Ergo inconvenienter dividitur gratia per operantem et cooperantem.

¹³⁹ *De Ver.*, q. 27, a. 5, ad 1m.

¹⁴⁰ *Operatio effectus* is attributed, not to the *mobile* but to the *movens*; on the other hand, *operatio immanens* is attributed, not to the *movens* (the object seen, understood, willed) but to the *mobile*; I see the colour though the colour causes my seeing; cf. *De Anima*, 3, lect. 12: "iste motus simpliciter est alter a motu physico. Et huiusmodi motus dicitur proprie *operatio* ut sentire et intelligere et velle. Et secundum hunc motum anima movet se ipsam secundum Platonem, in quantum cognoscit et amat se ipsam." The essential difference of the motion that is properly *operatio* is that it is *actus existentis in actu* while the motion of the Physics is *actus existentis in potentia*.

¹⁴¹ Ia 2ac, q. III, a. 2.

¹⁴² *De Ver.*, q. 27, a. 5, Sed contra.

¹⁴³ Cf. supra, p. 554-556, and THEOL. STUD., II (1941), 322.

Ad quartum dicendum quod gratia operans et cooperans est eadem gratia; sed distinguitur secundum diversos effectus, et ex supra dictis patet [in corp. art.].¹⁴⁴

Thus, one and the same grace is both operative and co-operative; it is operative when God alone acts; it is co-operative when {both God and the will combine to produce an effect.

There is a slight anomaly to the definition inasmuch as it is not grace but God that is conceived as operating and co-operating. However, this is fully in accordance with the ideas of St. Augustine, who spoke perhaps exclusively of divine operation and co-operation, to leave the coinage of the terms *gratia operans et cooperans* to early medieval theology. To quote only the passages St. Thomas quoted in the *Summa*:

. . . cooperando Deus in nobis perficit quod operando inceptit; quia ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens.¹⁴⁵
. . . ut autem velimus operatur; cum autem volumus, ut perficiamus, nobis cooperatur.¹⁴⁶

But not only did St. Augustine speak of God operating and co-operating; it is also true that this viewpoint fits in very nicely with St. Thomas' instrumental theory. Man is not the instrument of grace, but man is the instrument of God. Moreover, man is not an instrument in the same sense as irrational creatures, "quae tantum aguntur et non agunt";¹⁴⁷ on the contrary, he participates in divine governance not only by a *gubernari* but also by a *gubernare*,¹⁴⁸ being governed by God on a level above that of his own self-governance.¹⁴⁹ Thus the two effects of the one grace, *mens mota et non movens* and *mens mota et movens*, stand in splendid harmony with the theories of providence, instrumentality, and the nature of the will.

However, this differentiation of *operans et cooperans* from *praeveniens et subsequens* was not without its price. St. Augustine no more identified *gratia operans* with *cooperans* than *praeveniens* with *subsequens*. For him divine operation was at the beginning of the

¹⁴⁴ 1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, ad 4m.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Sed contra.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, corp.; but the reading of the passage in Migne is: "Ut ergo velimus *sine nobis* operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur" (PL, 44, 901).

¹⁴⁷ 1a, q. 103, a. 5, ad 2m.

¹⁴⁸ *C. Gent.*, 3, 113, Praeterca.

¹⁴⁹ 1a, q. 103, a. 5, ad 3m.

spiritual life; it was illustrated by the good will of Peter offering to die for our Lord and then denying him. On the other hand, divine co-operation was a later and more perfect grace, illustrated by the good will of Peter when he confessed Christ publicly and died a martyr. "Ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens."¹⁵⁰ Presently we shall have to return to this divergence between the definitions St. Thomas proposes and the Augustinian texts to which he appeals.

ACTUS INTERIOR ET EXTERIOR

In his *Sentences* St. Thomas had attempted, not very successfully,¹⁵¹ to correlate St. Augustine's good will and good performance with the technical terms, *actus interior et exterior*. In the *De Veritate* this attempt was given up.¹⁵² In the *Summa* it reappeared, for in the response to 1A 2ae, q. 111, a. 2 grace is divided into actual and habitual; each of these is subdivided into *operans et cooperans*; the latter terms are defined; and the definitions are applied first to actual and then to habitual grace. The application of the definitions to actual grace reintroduces the *actus interior et exterior*:

Est autem in nobis duplex actus. Primus quidem interior voluntatis: et quantum ad istum actum voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem ut movens, et praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat. Alius autem actus est exterior, qui cum a voluntate imperetur, ut supra habitum est, consequens est quod ad hunc actum operatio attribuitur voluntati; et quia etiam ad hunc actum Deus nos adiuvat et interius confirmando voluntatem ut ad actum perveniat et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo, respectu huiusmodi actus dicitur gratia cooperans. Unde post praemissa verba¹⁵³ subdit Aug., 'Ut autem velimus, operatur; cum autem volumus, ut perficiamus nobis cooperatur. Sic igitur, si gratia accipiatur pro gratuita Dei motione qua movet nos ad bonum meritorium, convenienter dividitur gratia per operantem et cooperantem.'¹⁵⁴

Since this passage has received a notable variety of interpretations, it may be well to begin by passing some of them in review.

Cajetan simultaneously offered two interpretations. One of them may be excluded at once, namely, that St. Thomas pre-

¹⁵⁰ Cf. THEOL. STUD., II (1941), 291.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

¹⁵³ I.e., in the Sed contra.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 322.

¹⁵⁴ 1A 2ae, q. 111, a. 2.

scinded from the underlying acts of will and spoke only of the *forma meriti*.¹⁵⁵ Such a view cannot be had from the text: *motione gratuita* is not *motione gratuita qua gratuita*; *bonum meritorium* is not *bonum meritorium qua meritorium*. True, St. Thomas did speak of the *forma meriti* in his *Sentences*,¹⁵⁶ but there is abundant evidence that his thought on grace developed notably in the interval.¹⁵⁷ Finally, if *actus interior voluntatis* does not mean an act of will, then what would?

The systematic Bannezian interpretation of the passage is that *gratia operans* is the *praemotio physica*, the *applicatio potentiae ad actum*, while *gratia cooperans* is the consequent act. Against this, other followers of Banez object that such an interpretation does not fit the data;¹⁵⁸ it gives a *gratia operans et cooperans* for the internal act, and then another *gratia operans et cooperans* for the external act. A more radical objection has already been proposed, namely, that St. Thomas defined and affirmed the Aristotelian premotion, while the Bannezian system runs counter to an imposing number of Thomist doctrines and texts.¹⁵⁹

Franciscus Zigon has maintained¹⁶⁰ that *mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens*, does not mean what it says; it is to be taken in the sense of *voluntas mota et se movens sed non movens membra corporis*. Now, it is perfectly true that before St. Thomas had his developed theory of will, he was content to be rather vague in speaking of divine operation. Examples of this have been given already.¹⁶¹ But St. Thomas also taught that the mind progresses from the general and confused to the particular and precise; and it would be hard to be more precise than *mens mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens*.

Cajetan's other interpretation was that the *actus interior* might be identified with the act produced by the Eudemian first mover of 1a 2ae, q. 9, a. 4; and this act is to be considered free both because the will can dissent and because God moves the will sweetly ac-

¹⁵⁵ In 1m 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, III; ed. Leon., 7, 319.

¹⁵⁶ 2 dist. 26, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m; THEOL. STUD., II (1941), 316 f.

¹⁵⁷ THEOL. STUD., II (1941), 318-23.

¹⁵⁸ For references, see Del Prado, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (Friburgi, 1907), I, 236 ff., in note.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 387-88.

¹⁶⁰ Zigon, *Divus Thomas Arbitrarius Controversiae de Concursu Divino*, (Goritiacae, 1923).

¹⁶¹ C. Gent., 3, 149; In Rom., 9, lect. 3.

ording to its condition.¹⁶² The reasons given for asserting freedom do not seem convincing. The will cannot dissent in the same act, for then it would be both willing and not willing the same object, not merely at the same time but by one and the same act. No doubt it can dissent in another act; but how does that freedom make the other act free? Again, it is true that God moves the will according to its condition; but the Thomist texts which affirm that the condition of the will is to be free when *mota et non movens* were repudiated in the *De Malo*;¹⁶³ and even when St. Thomas held the Aristotelian theory of the will as a passive faculty, he wrote: "si voluntas ita movetur ab alio, quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum."¹⁶⁴ Later, when he had corrected the Aristotelian position by distinguishing between specification and exercise of the act of choice, he argued: "voluntas est domina sui actus, et in ipsa est velle et non velle; quod non esset si non haberet in potestate movere se ipsam ad volendum; ergo ipsa movet se ipsam."¹⁶⁵ Now if freedom, *domina sui actus*, proves self-motion, then necessarily the absence of self-motion, *mota et non movens*, proves the absence of freedom. That is the *modus tollens* of the hypothetical argument: deny the consequent and you must deny the antecedent.

John of St. Thomas advanced that the *actus interior* was the will of the end, an indeliberate act, and a free act.¹⁶⁶ If it is the will

¹⁶² In 1m 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, I; ed. Leon., 7, 319.

¹⁶⁴ 1a, q. 105, a. 4, ad 3m.

¹⁶³ Cf. *supra*, p. 534.

¹⁶⁵ 1a 2ae, q. 9, a. 3, Sed contra.

¹⁶⁶ This is somewhat simplified. John of St. Thomas considers *gratia operans* to be the *qualitas per modum transeuntis* (i.e., the Bannezian *praemotio*) which is prior to both deliberate and indeliberate acts (*Cursus Theol.*, in 1m 2ae, q. 111, a. 2; disp. 23, a. 1, VII [Vivès, 1885], 6, 804). The basis of this view is the assumption that if we elicit an act we produce it (*ibid.*, IX, p. 805), which is to confuse *operatio effectus* with *operatio immanens* (cf. *supra*, note 140). However, he goes on to assert that the effect of *gratia operans* is the act which we elicit without deliberation (*ibid.*, X, p. 805), while the effect of *gratia cooperans* is the act consequent to taking counsel (*ibid.*, XI, p. 806). Later, in meeting an objection he advances that the indeliberate act effected by *gratia operans* is free (*ibid.*, XVII, p. 808). His ground for this is to be discovered in 1a, q. 63, a. 5, c. and ad 3m, where we learn that the good angels merited in the first instant of their creation but the bad angels could not sin in the first instant because that operation is from the cause of their being. But in the later *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 4, St. Thomas rejects this reason as invalid and gives an entirely new solution, to the effect that in the first instant the angels acted in the natural order, and so neither merited by a perfect conversion to God nor sinned by aversion from him. Perhaps the view of the *Pars Prima* might lead to the conclusion John of St. Thomas drew from it; but in point of fact St. Thomas came to a different conclusion and perhaps this was from fear of arriving at his disciple's view.

of the end, it must be an indeliberate act; for to deliberate is to take counsel about the means; and to do that presupposes the will of the end. However the freedom of this indeliberate act is open to the same objections as Cajetan's second opinion.

Fr. Norbert del Prado has attempted to buttress this position. Bannez had said: "Nullus effectus, cuius Deus solus sit causa, potest esse contingens."¹⁶⁷ Perhaps with this in mind, del Prado attempted to distinguish between mere passivity and *mota et non movens*. In the latter case there is an *actus voluntatis* and so a *voluntas agit*.¹⁶⁸ But this appears to involve a confusion of *operatio immanens* and *operatio effectus*. Every *operatio effectus* involves an *agere* in the sense of activity, but, as is clear from the *corpus*, God alone operates an effect.¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, an *operatio immanens* may be purely passive yet attributed to the patient: seeing, understanding, willing the end are passive; yet I see, understand, will the end. But because in these instances *operatio attribuitur mobili*, one has no reason for asserting that the *mobile* is active.

Fr. del Prado has another argument: justification is a *gratia operans*; but, "dum iustificamur, Dei iustitiae consentimus";¹⁷⁰ therefore, the effect of a *gratia operans* is a free act. The major premise does not seem free from flaws. It is not St. Thomas but the hypothetical second objicient who implies that the grace of justification is from every point of view a *gratia operans*. According to St. Thomas, justification basically is the infusion of habitual grace; again, according to St. Thomas habitual grace is *operans* in its formal effects and *cooperans* in producing the meritorious acts of free will.¹⁷¹ Hence inasmuch as "per motum liberi arbitrii dum iustificamur, Dei iustitiae consentimus," habitual grace is not operative but co-operative; on the other hand, since this motion of free will is effected by the habitual grace, the total operation is due to grace: "ille tamen motus non est causa gratiae

¹⁶⁷ In 1m, q. 19, a. 8, conc. 6 (Romae, 1584), 370 E.

¹⁶⁸ Del Prado, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, I, 237, note on Gonet.

¹⁶⁹ "Operatio alicuius effectus non attribuitur mobili sed moventi; in illo ergo effectu in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens. . . ." (1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2); cf. *supra*, note 140.

¹⁷⁰ Del Prado, *op. cit.*, p. 234, 5.

¹⁷¹ ". . . habitualis gratia in quantum animam sanat vel iustificat sive gratam Deo facit, dicitur gratia operans; in quantum vero est principium operis meritorii, quod ex libero arbitrio procedit, dicitur cooperans" (1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2).

sed effectus; unde tota operatio pertinet ad gratiam." The significance of these final words is that they repudiate the earlier view of the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate* which made the free acts in justification prior to the infused grace from the viewpoint of material causality.¹⁷²

So much for interpretations of *actus interior et exterior* which appear unsatisfactory. The difficulty of the passage would seem to be this: it gives a *duplex actus*, one internal to the will and one external; but the theory of the will gives a *triplex actus*, will of the end, choice of means, and bodily execution. If we denote the pair by A and B, and the trio by X, Y and Z respectively, then the possible interpretations may be listed as follows: (1) A is X and B is Y; (2) A is X and B is Z; (3) A is X and B includes both Y and Z; (4) A includes both X and Y, and B is Z; (5) A is Y and B is Z. Something can be said for each of these possibilities.

There is strong external evidence for the last on the list, namely, that the internal act is the election and the external act the bodily execution. Time and again, even in his later works, St. Thomas indisputably uses the terms in that sense: in the *De Malo* in treating internal and external sins;¹⁷³ in the *Prima Secundae* in the general theory of morality,¹⁷⁴ in contrasting the aims of divine and of civil law,¹⁷⁵ and in comparing the Old Law and the New;¹⁷⁶ and in the *Secunda Secundae* in treating the virtues.¹⁷⁷ This widespread and contemporary uniformity is imposing. On the other hand, it is not a law of nature nor can it do more than establish a strong antecedent probability with regard to a different text and context. Indeed, when St. Thomas was treating morality, law, virtue and sin, the only part of the *actus voluntarius* that could concern him was the election and its execution. Grace moves in a broader context, nor is there a complete lack of external evidence that the *actus interior voluntatis* has a special reference to the end. Thus, in the *Prima Secundae*:

... in actu autem voluntario invenitur duplex actus, scilicet actus interior voluntatis et actus exterior. Et uterque horum actuum habet

¹⁷² Cf. THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 86.

¹⁷³ *De Malo*, q. 2, a. 2, c., ad 1m, 5m, 6m, 8m, 11m, 12m, 13m; a. 3, etc.

¹⁷⁴ 1a 2 ac, qq. 18-20.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 98, a. 1.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 108, aa. 1-3.

¹⁷⁷ 2a 2ac, qq. 2, 3, 24-43, in the divisions of questions; in text, especially q. 3, a. 1; q. 31, a. 1, ad 2m.

suum obiectum: finis autem proprie est obiectum interioris actus voluntarii; id autem circa quod est actio exterior est obiectum eius. Sicut igitur actus exterior accipit speciem ab obiecto circa quod est, ita actus interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine sicut a proprio obiecto . . . ¹⁷⁸

This quotation is the more convincing because it is truncated. There seems to me little doubt that the *actus exterior* is the merely corporeal act, and it might be argued rather soundly that the proper object of the election is the end, because in choosing the means what the will really wills is the end.¹⁷⁹ Still, it must be conceded that in another context *actus interior* might mean simply the will of the end, especially since the act of will, properly so called, is with respect to the end.¹⁸⁰

If one turns from general usage to the text itself of 1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, the second or third of our list of possibilities seems to attain overwhelming evidence. For four cogent reasons the *actus interior* should be identified with willing the end. The first reason is the *solutio ad tertium*: operative grace effects good will, and so, with the will of the end attained, grace becomes co-operative.¹⁸¹ The second reason is that the principal instance of the *actus interior* is conversion, "praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle"; but just a few questions previously,¹⁸² St. Thomas had explained conversion in terms of the first mover directing created wills to his end. The third reason is that in conversion there are free acts resulting from the divine motion,¹⁸³ and in the article on repentance in the *Pars Tertia*,¹⁸⁴ in which both divine operation and our co-operation are said to be illustrated, we have a *primum principium* which is *Dei operatio convertentis cor* to correspond to *voluntas mota et non movens*, and then a series of acts to correspond to man's free co-operation. The fourth reason is from the developed theory of the will: because the will is *domina sui actus* it

¹⁷⁸ 1a 2ae, q. 18, a. 6.

¹⁷⁹ ". . . ea vero quae sunt ad finem non sunt bona vel volita propter se ipsa sed ex ordine ad finem . . . ; unde hoc ipsum quod [voluntas] in eis [mediis] vult est finis" (1a, 2ae, q. 8, a. 2, c.).

¹⁸⁰ ". . . si autem loquamur de voluntate prout proprie nominat actum, sic proprie loquendo est finis tantum . . . (*Ibid.*).

¹⁸¹ 1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, ad 3m.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, q. 109, a. 6.

¹⁸³ ". . . hominis est praeparare animam, quia hoc facit per liberum arbitrium; sed tamen hoc non facit sine auxilio Dei moventis et ad se attrahentis ut dictum est [in corp. art.]" (*ibid.*, ad 4m).

¹⁸⁴ 3a, q. 85, a. 5.

moves itself, it is *se movens*;¹⁸⁶ but this self-motion presupposes the activity of an external principle, moving the will to the end in virtue of which it moves itself to the means;¹⁸⁷ thus only in the will of the end is the *voluntas mota et non movens*. The nature of the *actus interior* seems demonstrably to be the will of the end effected by the Eudemian first mover.

At first sight the *actus exterior* seems to be the purely corporeal execution: "qui cum a voluntate imperetur." But a few lines later we have: "interius confirmando voluntatem ut ad actum perveniat et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo"; and these words seem to make it clear that the external act includes an internal act of will. One might endeavour to evade this by saying that the act at which the will arrives, "ut ad actum perveniat," is the causal influxus, the production of the bodily execution. But this is not satisfactory, for the need of grace in good performance is not to aid efficacious will in effecting its *imperium* but to change mere good desires into efficacious willing. Once the will really wills, the bodily act follows: indeed, "tanta est facilitas ut vix a servitio discernatur imperium."¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, to will yet fail to perform means that really the will fails:

. . . animus, quanto perfecte sibi imperat ut velit, tunc iam vult; sed quod aliquando imperet et non velit, hoc contingit ex hoc quod non perfecte imperat; imperfectum autem imperium contingit ex hoc quod ratio ex diversis partibus movetur ad imperandum vel non imperandum; unde fluctuat inter duo, et non perfecte imperat.¹⁸⁸

In this passage the *imperium* is taken strictly as an act elicited in the intellect, and the question treated is the ordering of an act of will. However, though the *imperium* is elicited in the intellect, this is done under the influence of the will.¹⁸⁹ Accordingly, the responsibility for failure to act devolves ultimately upon the inefficacy of the will of the end, or, more generally, upon the failure or inability of rational appetite to dominate the situation.¹⁹⁰ It would seem that the obvious meaning of *interius confirmando*

¹⁸⁶ 1a 2ae, q. 9, a. 3, Sed contra.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 17, a. 9, Sed contra.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 5, ad 1m.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, a. 1.

¹⁹⁰ See the commentary on the text, "Non enim quod volo bonum, hoc facio: sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago" (*In Rom.*, 7, lect. 3). In the case of the sinner the *volo* is inefficacious, the *ago* a complete act; in the case of the justified the *volo* is efficacious, but the *ago* is a *motus primo-primus*.

voluntatem ut ad actum perveniat is also the right interpretation; *actus exterior* includes the act of will that orders the bodily execution.

For these reasons we are led to consider as alone probable the third of the hypotheses listed above: the internal act of will is with respect to the end; the external act is not merely the bodily execution but also the act of will commanding this execution. It is true that there is a lack of symmetry to this conclusion, but not a lack of symmetry that is unexplained. For the radical anomaly of the passage is that St. Thomas is illustrating his metaphysically conceived definitions of *gratia operans et cooperans* by St. Augustine's temporal sequence of *operando incipit* and *cooperando perficit*. St. Thomas' definitions are in terms of a single grace that is both *operans* and *cooperans*, while St. Augustine's phrases refer to two graces separated by a notable interval of time.¹⁹¹

Thus, fully to understand 1a 2ae, q. 111, a. 2 one must grasp that the new wine of speculative theology is bursting the old bottles of Pelagian controversy. The Pelagians took their distinction between good will and good performance from the Stoics. The exigences of controversy made St. Augustine model his divine operation and co-operation into a point-for-point refutation of Pelagian error. But St. Thomas was engaged in the far vaster task of working out the intelligible unity of all dogmatic data. He had to take into account not merely the text, "Nemo potest venire ad me nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum,"¹⁹² but also such a general text as, "qui spiritu Dei aguntur, ii sunt filii Dei."¹⁹³ Hence, while St. Augustine is content to affirm his *operatur incipiens*, St. Thomas has to take a broader view to consider the beginning of the spiritual life not as unique but as a single instance

¹⁹¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 563-564.

¹⁹² In the *Commentary on John*, 6, lect. 5, St. Thomas distinguished three ways in which the Father draws us: first, through the intellect, whether this be by the objective evidence of miracles or by the internal revelation of the type granted Peter, to whom flesh and blood did not reveal Christ's divinity; secondly, through the action of the intellect on the will, for "trahit sua quemque voluptas", and in Christ there shines forth the majesty of the Father and the beauty of the Son who is Truth; thirdly, through direct action on the will, the *instinctus interior*, "cor regis in manu Domini." This exposition does not go much beyond *C. Gent.*, 3, 89-91.

¹⁹³ On this text the *Commentary on Romans*, 8, lect. 3, also appeals to the *instinctus interior*, to the fact that man is not the principal cause of his free acts. The position is indistinct as in the *Contra Gentiles*.

of a more general law; accordingly he does not say, "cum voluntas incipit bonum velle," but, "praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle." The general law is that man is always an instrument; that his volitional activity deploys in two phases; that in the first phase he is governed, *mota et non movens*, while in the second he governs, *et mota et movens*; that the first phase is always a divine operation while in the second the theorem of co-operation necessarily follows;¹⁹⁴ and finally that, inasmuch as motions to the *bonum meritorium* and its supernatural goal are graces,¹⁹⁵ the general law of instrumentality then becomes the special gift of *gratia operans et cooperans*. Now this adaptation of the speculative materials of instrumental and voluntary theory into a doctrine of grace not only implies that conversion is but a single instance of *gratia operans*, but also involves that good performance is but one instance of *gratia cooperans*. As is plain from the *Pars Tertia*, the *gratia cooperans* need not refer to an external act; for in the *actus quibus Deo operanti in paenitentia cooperamur*,¹⁹⁶ the divine operation is *Dei operatio convertentis cor*, while our co-operation consists in the internal acts of faith, servile fear, and hope. Thus the logic of speculative theology reaches far beyond the exigences of controversy, nor can incidental anomaly or lack of symmetry be surprising when, to the interpretation of Augustinian texts, St. Thomas brings a technique of metaphysical analysis that is adapted and evolved to embrace the whole range of Scriptural teaching and Catholic doctrine.

CONCLUDING SUMMARY

The thought of Aquinas on *gratia operans* was but an incident in the execution of a far vaster program. If on the surface that program was to employ the Aristotelian scientific technique against the die-hard traditionalism of the current Christian Platonists and, at the same time, to inaugurate historical research

¹⁹⁴ The phrase, "consequens est . . . ut cooperetur" (Ia 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, ad 3m) reveals the theorem that underlies the proximate analogy of operation. Unless co-operation were a theorem, it could not be a conclusion to the fact *praesupposito iam sine*. On the theorem, cf. THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 399-400.

¹⁹⁵ ". . . operationes Dei, quibus movet nos ad bonum, ad gratiam pertinent" (Ia, 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, Sed contra). More explicitly in the *corpus* actual grace is the gratuitous motion by which we are moved to meritorious good.

¹⁹⁶ 3a, q. 85, a. 5.

by appealing to the real Aristotle against the Parisian Averroists, in point of fact no less than in essence it was to lay under tribute Greek and Arab, Jew and Christian, in an ever renewed effort to obtain for Catholic culture that *aliquam intelligentiam eamque fructuosissimam*¹⁹⁷ which is the goal of theological speculation.¹⁹⁸ Within the frame of so universal an undertaking the treatment of any particular issue could not but be incidental. The works of St. Thomas do not include a *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*. They are made up of the two great strategic campaigns—the *Contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologica*—to think out the Catholic position in philosophy and to put new order into the sprawling theology dominated by the Lombard's *Sentences*. Supporting these vast movements were the successive drives of the *Quaestiones Disputatae*, the forays of the *Quodlibetales*, the emergencies met in the *Opuscula*; finally, the base of all these operations lay in the commentaries on Holy Writ and on Aristotle where, I think more than elsewhere, the wealth of the theologian and the stature of the philosopher stand revealed.

It is not to be regretted that St. Thomas did not adopt a specialist viewpoint, for it is the nemesis of all specialization to fail to see the woods for the trees, to evolve *ad hoc* solutions that are indeed specious yet profoundly miss the mark for the very reason that they aim too intently at a limited goal. There is a disinterestedness and an objectivity that comes only from aiming excessively high and far, that leaves one free to take each issue on its merits, to proceed by intrinsic analysis instead of piling up a debater's arguments, to seek no greater achievement than the inspiration of the moment warrants, to await with serenity for the coherence of truth itself to bring to light the underlying harmony of the manifold whose parts successively engage one's attention. Spontaneously such thought moves towards synthesis, not so much by any single master stroke as by an unnumbered succession of the adaptations that spring continuously from intellectual vitality. Inevitably such a thinker founds a school, for what he builds is built securely, and what the span of mortal life or the limitations

¹⁹⁷ DB 1796.

¹⁹⁸ If it is true that the acceptance of Christianity led to the withering of Icelandic culture, then the human importance of the Scholastic effort of *fides quaerens intellectum* may be measured by the contrasting intellectual vitality of Western Europe.

of his era force him to leave undone, that none the less already stands potentially within the frame-work of his thinking and the suggestiveness of his approach. Finally, the greater such a genius is, perhaps the more varied will be the schools that appeal to him; for it is not to be taken for granted that the ever lesser followers of genius will be capable of ascending more than half-way up the mountain of his achievement or even, at times, of recognizing that one mountain has many sides.

Such was the stamp of Aquinas, and in the particular and limited field that has been the object of this study it was his lot to work out to its term a prolonged effort in theological speculation. Peter Lombard had divided grace itself into operative and co-operative, and, in so far as he attempted any systematic explanation of its nature and its necessity, he tended to conceive it psychologically.¹⁹⁹ When St. Thomas began to write, the theory of the supernatural habit had been explored, yet the distance that remained to be traversed before grace could be divided into habitual and actual, to be then sub-divided into *operans* and *cooperans*, may be measured roughly from the ambiguities of St. Albert's *gratia gratis data*,²⁰⁰ from his opinion that *liberum arbitrium* was a third faculty distinct from intellect and will,²⁰¹ from his curious distinction between *virtus divina increata* and *virtus divina creata* with its origin in Avicennist biological lore.²⁰²

In his *Sentences* St. Thomas did not advance beyond St. Albert, inasmuch as the latter conceived only habitual grace as *operans et cooperans*.²⁰³ Yet already the master of speculation is at work. The *virtus divina creata* was rejected.²⁰⁴ The analogy of operation was affirmed, though as yet the premise of the proximate analogy was but creation and conservation.²⁰⁵ *Libera arbitrium* was identified with intellect and will.²⁰⁶ Perfection in operation was correlated with the degree of actuation in being, and the role of habits was seen on a cosmic scale.²⁰⁷ Divine knowledge of the contingent future was explained by inverting the Aristotelian position: Aristotle had denied that the contingent future was true; St. Thomas affirmed its truth, to deny that it was future to God.²⁰⁸

¹⁹⁹ THEOL. STUD., II (1941), 297-301.

²⁰¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 533.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, II (1941), 312-318.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 398.

²⁰⁷ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 69 ff.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 310-312.

²⁰² THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 376.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, III (1942), 376.

²⁰⁶ Cf. *supra*, p. 533.

²⁰⁸ Cf. *supra*, p. 544.

Finally, a parallel solution was indicated for the problem of divine will and contingency, and this gave at once a negative statement of divine transcendence.²⁰⁹

In the *De Veritate* wider reading forced the acknowledgement that the sinner cannot avoid future sins without grace,²¹⁰ and that the justified need other graces besides the supernatural habit.²¹¹ Thus the theory of habits was retouched,²¹² and actual grace emerged as *cooperans*;²¹³ but whether actual grace was divine co-operation, or a change in the orientation of the will, or any internal premotion, was not clearly conceived.²¹⁴ At the same time, providence as predestination was granted a statistically certain causality,²¹⁵ and the positive conception of divine transcendence made its first very incomplete appearance in the affirmation that God himself produces the mode of contingency in creating corruptible beings.²¹⁶

The *Contra Gentiles*, that vast undertaking to think out the Catholic position in Aristotelian terms, insisted on the prevenience of divine grace and expressed this dogmatic fact in the metaphysical category of instrumentality.²¹⁷ Concomitantly, the premises of the proximate analogy of operation shifted from their earlier exclusive attention to creation and conservation to embrace application and instrumentality;²¹⁸ again concomitantly, the causal certitude of providence was affirmed generally by denying the absoluteness of the Aristotelian *per accidens*;²¹⁹ and in the same context the theorem of divine transcendence moved to positive statement with respect to the contingency not merely of the corruptible but also of the *per accidens* and the free choice.²²⁰ Already the main lines of the Thomist position had been laid down, though the problem of the *initium fidei* was solved by the prevenience of habitual grace,²²¹ and there was no precise statement of the manner in which divine activity makes the human will its instrument.

Such questions gradually found their solution in the *Pars Prima*, the *Quodlibetum Primum*, and the *De Malo*. On dogmatic grounds,

²⁰⁹ Cf. *supra*, p. 544-545.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, II (1941), 318-320.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, II (1941), 320-322.

²¹⁵ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 389-90.

²¹⁷ Cf. *supra*, p. 556.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 390-91.

²¹⁰ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 75 ff.

²¹² *Ibid.*, III (1942), 70 ff.

²¹⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 554.

²¹⁶ Cf. *supra*, note 177.

²¹⁸ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 398-99.

²²¹ Cf. *supra*, note 118.

²²⁰ *C. Gent.*, 3, 94.

the preparation for justification became exclusively the effect of an internal grace,²²² and later the way was opened for a definition of this grace when a distinction was drawn between the specification and the exercise of the act of will,²²³ and analysis advanced from the liberty of man as a rational creature to the liberty of the will as a self-moving faculty.²²⁴ Seen in this perspective, the *Prima Secundae* naturally possesses its long series of questions on the will, on habits, and on grace, and it is upon the answers there given that converge the multitudinous developments of the previous fifteen years. Still, as if to insist upon meaning and to condemn terminological primness—the solitary achievement of lesser minds—St. Thomas employed different analogies for *motio moventis* and *motus mobilis* in treating actual and habitual grace. In actual grace the two are identified: “actus moventis in moto est motus,”²²⁵ according to Aristotle’s *actio in passo*;²²⁶ in habitual grace the *motio moventis* is the infused habit while the *motus mobilis* is the entitatively distinct and causally dependent free act with its analogy in Aristotle’s physical theory of natural motion proceeding from form.²²⁷ None the less, in both cases the same theory of instrumentality and of freedom is in evidence: the will has its strip of autonomy, yet beyond this there is the ground from which free acts spring; and that ground God holds and moves as a fencer moves his whole rapier by grasping only the hilt. When the will is *mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens, dicitur gratia operans*. On the other hand, when the will is *et mota et movens, dicitur gratia cooperans*. In habitual grace divine operation infuses the habit, to become co-operation when the habit leads to free acts;²²⁸ in actual grace divine operation effects the will of the end to become co-operation when this will of the end leads to an efficacious choice of means; and though the expression of this is perturbed by a divergence between St. Augustine’s controversial concerns and St. Thomas’ speculative interests,²²⁹ still this superposition of different view-points fails to hide the fact that metaphysics and psychology, divine providence and human instrumentality, grace and nature at last have meshed their intricacies in synthesis.

This fact of synthesis cannot perhaps be expressed, for synthesis in a field of data is like the soul in the body, everywhere at once,

²²² Cf. *supra*, p. 558.

²²³ Cf. *supra*, p. 533.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁵ Ia 2ae, q. 110, a. 2, c.

²²⁶ THEOL. STUD., III (1942), 377-78.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, III (1942), 82-87.

²²⁸ Ia 2ae, q. 111, a. 2, c.

²²⁹ Cf. *supra*, p. 561.

totally in each part and yet distinct from every part. But to be certain of the fact of synthesis is as easy as to be certain of the fact of soul. One has only to remove this or that vital organ and watch the whole structure tumble into ruin; the old unity and harmony will disappear, and in its place will arise the irreconcilable opposition of a multiplicity. Thus, to St. Thomas co-operation was a theorem, something known by understanding the data already apprehended and not something known by adding a new datum to the apprehension, something like the principle of work and not something like another lever, something like the discovery of gravitation and not something like the discovery of America.

Remove this key position and it becomes impossible to reconcile human instrumentality with human freedom: one can posit a *praedeterminatio physica* to save instrumentality, or one can posit a *concursum indifferens* to save self-determination; one cannot have a bit of both the antecedents and the whole of both the consequents. There is a material resemblance between the Molinist *gratia excitans* and the Thomist *gratia operans*, but the resemblance is only material, for the Molinist lacks the speculative acumen to make his grace leave the will instrumentally subordinate to divine activity. But the Bannezian has exactly the same speculative blind-spot: because he cannot grasp that the will is truly an instrument by the mere fact that God causes the will of the end, he goes on to assert that God also brings in a *praemotio* to predetermine the choice of means.

To take another instance of this break-up of synthesis into irreconcilable alternatives, we have seen that St. Thomas did not entirely give up the Aristotelian position of the unintelligibility of the *per accidens*; in the case of sin it remained a surd to thought. And this Aristotelian survival accounts perfectly for the triple category—the positive truth of what is, the negative truth of what is not, and the objective falsity of *malum culpae*—in which the Thomist *artifex divinus* operates. But remove this key position and you will find yourself confronted with a choice between divine governance and divine sanctity. The Bannezian position with its double category leaves no doubt about divine governance, but it has been thought very open to the objection that God by his inactivity is as responsible for sin as by His activity He is responsible for merit. At the opposite pole, the Molinist rightly attempts to obtain more than two categories, but by his *scientia media* he arrives at four, and, as these are ambiguous, generates further

differences on the issue of *ante et post praevisa merita*, with divine governance slightly more prominent on one view and with divine sanctity more clearly in evidence on the other.

To take a third instance of the bipolarity of disintegrating synthesis,²³⁰ St. Thomas affirmed divine transcendence: with equal infallibility, efficacy, irresistibility, God knows, wills, effects both the necessary and the contingent; nor does it make the slightest difference whether the contingent in question be present, past, or future relatively to us, for the question is of God, who is not in time. Now, such a transcendence the Bannezian more than admits in God; he transfers it to the *praedeterminatio physica*, a creature, in the hope of saving the freedom of the will; and by that very transference he reveals the thoroughness of his transposition of Thomist thought, which explicitly affirmed the exclusiveness of this divine attribute.²³¹ On the other hand, the Molinist equally fails to understand divine transcendence, but instead of conferring it on a creature he takes the opposite route to find refuge in divine knowledge of the *futuribilia*. And as the Bannezian failure to understand transcendence was employed to defend the *praedeterminatio physica*, so the Molinist failure was employed to generate through the *scientia media* an excess of categories for handling the surd of sin.

At this point our study may end. Our purpose throughout has been to determine the thought by following through the thinking of St. Thomas on *gratia operans*. We have examined the situation when he began to write; we have seen in itself and in its various ramifications the historical development of his own position; we have found grounds for suggesting that his position stands as a higher synthesis to the opposition of later theories. Many other questions might have been introduced, as the reader familiar with this field will be aware; but they have not seemed to belong to this investigation. May it be found by those who, like St. Thomas, are drawn "admirabili delectatione et amore veritatis quae est ipse Filius Dei," to have thrown some light on the principles, the method, and the doctrine of the *Communis Doctor*.

²³⁰ On bipolar disintegration in the general historical field, cf. A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford, 1939), V, 376-VI, 132.

²³¹ *In Ioan.*, 6, lect. 5.