

SOUL-BODY UNITY AND GOD-MAN UNITY

ROBERT NORTH, S.J.

Marquette University

IN ONE RECENT ISSUE of a theological journal abroad, several articles deal with various aspects of "God's saving presence in the man Jesus Christ." The last three of these contain reactions of the Dominican Schillebeeckx and the Jesuit Schoonenberg to a bold hypothesis of the Augustinian Hulsbosch. The divinity of Christ is seen to consist in the perfection or elevation of His humanity.¹

This formula takes as its point of departure an assurance regarding the body-soul relation in man which happens to be identical with what we defended in a recent volume.² Hulsbosch specially links this problem with the name of Teilhard de Chardin, and has in fact specialized in Teilhard's thought and unmistakably shows its influence.³

So daringly new an approach to the perennial Christological mystery is of sufficient intrinsic urgency to merit presentation here. But our goal is proximately to evaluate the extent to which it really is, as claimed, a corollary of the evolutionist body-soul relation. To the extent that this claim is valid, our own position is weakened or strengthened by being wedded to the reformulation of a dogma of incalculably greater delicacy.

That Hulsbosch chose to link his true and valid conclusions with an ephemeral evolutionism is a pity, we will see Schillebeeckx saying. Though he meant by this chiefly to accept and bolster Hulsbosch's conclusion, he in fact thereby asserted that the validity of the evolutionism was independent of whatever judgment one might make about the Christology which he rather shares with Hulsbosch. Perhaps not all will agree that such complex issues warrant such a simple compartmentalizing. Here is the relevant passage:

Frankly I rather regret personally that he chose to tie down his exposition inside an evolutionary framework. This outlook, with its inherent thoroughgoing "monistic" psychology (= *Anthropologie*), is still doubtful in many points. Such a background can only be a stumbling block for any fully new explanation of the already far too delicate problem of the man Jesus. Did p.

¹ A. Hulsbosch, "Jezus Christus, gekend als mens, beleden als Zoon Gods," *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 6 (1966) 250-73.

² R. North, *Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul* (Milwaukee, 1967) pp. 166, 225. Parts appeared in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES* 24 (1963) 577-601, "Teilhard and the Problem of Creation"; and *Continuum* 1 (1963) 329-42, "Teilhard and the Many Adams."

³ A. Hulsbosch, "De Kosmogeenese van Teilhard de Chardin," *Annalen van het Thijmgenootschap* 47 (1959) 317 ff.

254 really have to say that even Jesus is “the unfolding of possibilities lying latent in matter itself”? Precisely over any such “unfolding” at all there is currently a ferment among philosophers and theologians; we are far from any consensus on definite basic positions. Everything about evolution is still in a very experimental stage. Discussion bound to be evoked by Hulsbosch’s new Christology could have been kept more serene if he had not coupled his first presentation of it so inexorably to an evolutionist outlook, legitimate enough in itself but still in need of clarification on some really basic issues. Admittedly he drew his own new insight about Christ from this evolutionary environment, which thus self-evidently forms the context of his whole theological exposition. For himself it is thus not just one of various possibilities for an introductory paragraph, but is the veritable *Sitz im Leben* of his new interpretation.⁴

We may regard the above advertence to the “discussion bound to be evoked” as an invitation to foster this dialogue, with more detailed citation (and virtually complete presentation) of the three original articles than would normally be expected.

THE HULSBOSCH COMPARISON FORMULA

A first relevant passage in Hulsbosch is imbedded a few paragraphs down in the second page of his article (p. 251):

We need a new approach to the person of Jesus. Man himself is nowadays seen ever more in a unity of his being replacing a dualistic concept [of soul distinct from body]. Should not the same revision also take place in regard to the unity of Christ? I am convinced it should. The early Fathers were already familiar with the idea that the unity of Christ shows a resemblance to man’s own inner unity. But at a moment which could inevitably conjure up the spectre of monophysitism, it was dangerous to compare [the unity of God and man in Christ to the unity of soul and body in man]. But in fact it cannot be said that the divine and human in Christ together form a third reality in the same way as soul and body were then seen to form a man. Today we can no longer accept the notion of man as a juxtaposition of soul and body. He is an absolutely indivisible subject. Can this insight not give us precisely the clue to a better understanding of the unity of Christ? Unless we can attain this, modern Christians and Catholics will inevitably tend ever more to see Christ simply as a man, a man so remarkably filled with grace that He could be called “divine” but not in a strictly proper sense.

What Hulsbosch so far asserts explicitly could hardly be claimed to bear any necessary relation to modern science at all, much less to a questionable evolutionism. Really he is rather fishing up and heartily

⁴ Eduard Schillebeeckx, “Persoonlijke openbaringsgestalte van de Vader,” *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 6 (1966) 274–88 at p. 275.

subscribing to the defined dogma and Thomist conviction that "the soul is the form of the body."⁵ But his renewed awareness is doubtless largely due to what Teilhard has so persuasively set forth ascribing our spiritual or conscious activities to an evolutionally organized "inner face" of matter itself, rather than to any other component distinct from matter.

The more explicit link with modern science which provides the outset-point for Hulsbosch is a purely extrinsic analogy (p. 250):

Despite the vast disproportion between theology and physics, we may here make our own what a physicist has said. . . . After reporting on his pioneering journey inside the atom and naming some thirty particles out of which it is shown to be constituted, he asks himself whether this variety of particles may be taken as expression of our total ignorance of the true nature of matter's ultimate structures.⁶ . . . However much physics relates to the measurable while theology is concerned with what only in faith can be known, still each of these two sciences deals in its own way with the same thing: cosmic reality. . . . When the physicist in face of the complexity of matter confesses his ignorance, he attests that same yearning for a tranquilizing synthesis which characterizes the theologian's search for an explanation of the revelation of God in Christ.

KNOWN AS MAN, CONFESSED AS GOD

Perhaps an even more significant allusion to the soul-body problem in scientific and Teilhardian perspective is contained in the very title which Hulsbosch chose and which Schillebeeckx (p. 274) lingers upon savoringly. "Jesus Christ is *known* as man, but is *confessed to be* the Son of God." A scholarly approach to the soul or to the divinity of Christ or to any other problem should begin with the *facts* which we have in our hands (experimentally or as a genuine datum of our faith), rather than from any theorizings or deductions however sublime and traditional.

One such given is that I know myself to be a *material being*, and I know myself to have (in common with other men) certain activities called "spiritual" and perceptibly surpassing the activities of all other kinds of matter. It is laudable and inescapable to try to tie down these activities to some characteristic of man which he does not have in common with the brute or stone. But when one asserts with Plato that this root principle is an angel or pure spirit imprisoned within the

⁵ DS 902. On the anomaly and limitations of such a dogma, see pp. 223-26 of my *Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul*.

⁶ G. O. Jones, with J. Rotblat and G. J. Whitrow, *Van atoom tot heelal* (Utrecht, 1963) p. 50.

cage of bodily flesh, then he must be recognized as speaking no longer from experience, but giving a deductive hypothesis based on experience. Equally a deductive hypothesis based on experience, not a datum of experience itself, though vastly more realistic and also enjoying a certain enigmatic support from faith, is the Thomist claim that the soul is *form* (really "shape") of the body. A third deductive hypothesis is that of the ancient materialists: these human activities apparently "spiritual" in the sense of transcending animality are just an illusion and are wholly accounted for by the visible and measurable aspects of matter itself. A fourth deductive hypothesis, really on the same footing whether we like it or not and whether we consider it in fact different from the third or not, is Teilhard's claim that there really are spiritual activities and they are due to an inherent quality of matter itself which escapes quantitative observation and is even observed as "consciousness" only when its units are combined in complex organized masses of trillion trillions of units.

In all this the only admissible scientific attitude is to inquire not "What can there be inside a human being, *different* from matter, which enables him to think?" but "How can we explain the experienced datum that a *material thing thinks*?"⁷ In exactly the same way, Hulsbosch insists by his title that the given datum of experience, passionately defended against Docetists by faith and tradition, is "Jesus was a man." The *fact* that He was God can also be called a datum, though it is much more obscurely and tentatively expressed in the earliest sources of our information. At any rate, the *mode* in which it is possible for a man to be unmistakably man and yet simultaneously somehow God is a mystery, which must be "sounded," and for which an explanation must be sought. Or at least so Hulsbosch thinks, and we think he is right. Here is how he outlines his program (p. 250):

The history of Christology is at bottom a search for the unity of this person who became known as man and confessed as the Son of God. The Church in her confession has always held fast to the unity of these so diverse components, but in speaking of "two natures" she has called forth a tension that has persisted until today and in fact is felt today more keenly than ever. What is inevitably conjured up is the image of a Christ divided into two layers. Pastorally, with Schoonenberg, we can pose the question of "whether such a Christ divided between two 'layers' has anything to say any more to the man of today."⁸

Views recalling ancient adoptionism and Arianism keep gaining ground among Catholics. This claim may be hard to prove by direct citation, but is experi-

⁷ See Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul, p. 18.

⁸ Piet Schoonenberg, "Over de Godmens," *Bijdragen* 25 (1964) 166-86 at p. 168.

enced as a current mentality. On the one hand, we eagerly emphasize the human life of Jesus. On the other hand, we can scarcely manage a metaphysical discourse combining in one formula the transcendence of God with the historical man Jesus of Nazareth.

CHRIST INVOLVED IN EVOLUTION?

After having taken up the body-soul equation which we have already quoted, Hulsbosch continues with another insight of the type which earned Schillebeeckx's disapproval (p. 251):

[The view of Christ as a mere man] cannot effectively be refuted by merely repeating traditional Church formulas, because it is precisely the validity [relevance rather than truth] of these that is contested. . . . We might candidly face up to some facts pointing even to an occasional *NT* portrayal of Him as mere man. Instead of this, we will take note of two weighty considerations of a more speculative nature.

First of these is the place of Christ in evolution. We can divide into three phases the evolution of our earth from its obscure beginnings up to today. First there was matter without life, then there was plant and animal life, and thirdly there was man. Since Teilhard de Chardin has involved Christ too in evolution, we are somewhat oriented to the thought that the coexistence of the human race in the person of Christ can be called a fourth phase of evolution. But there is a built-in difficulty for human thought in managing to conceive that new reality as a unity. [The parallel "second weighty consideration" will be hypostatic, p. 254.]

Here Hulsbosch is plainly, though tacitly, espousing Teilhard's theory of "continuity through discontinuity" effected by *critical thresholds*. Just as in the boiling of water, continuous quantitative increase produces at certain levels a qualitative change or new and different reality. Teilhard further theorized that the whole human race is at present on the verge of another critical upward step, namely a greater unification with and in itself by convergence on an Omega Point, which is or at least involves Christ in the created universe. Insofar as such theorizing is warranted, the union of divinity and humanity in the (physical ? or only mystical ?) Body of Christ can be seen as a parallel to the union of spiritual with bodily reality in man, or of life with inorganic matter. Hulsbosch quotes a recent demonstration that the whole passionate dispute between vitalism and biological mechanism arises from the assumption that "living matter" is either "just matter" or "matter plus life." It is not matter plus life; it is materiality itself attaining to a fuller unfolding.⁹ The simplicity of this

⁹ A. G. M. van Melsen, *Natuurwetenschap en techniek: Een wijsgerige bezinning* (Utrecht, 1960) 130-39.

view is compelling, because it respects both the unique value of life and the unity of the living being (p. 252):

Man is distinguished from the lower animals by his capacity of reflex knowledge. For the explanation of the whole unique subjectivity of man, there is postulated the existence of a rational soul distinct from the material body. Traditional theological terminology even includes unhesitant allusion to the separation of soul and body in death. That notion of a "separated soul" encounters in our day ever fiercer resistance. We cannot regard the essential unity of man as sufficiently secured in any system which makes him the combination of one material and one spiritual component. The solution is precisely as in the vitalism controversy. Just as living matter is nothing other than the unfolding of nonliving matter into a higher phenomenological form, why cannot we also say that man's being is [a similarly discontinuous] unfolding of animal life, and that the intellectual life of man belongs to the variety of forms in which it is possible for matter to appear?

This view had already been put forward in an earlier article.¹⁰

We know the difference between living and nonliving matter. In the same way there is also matter with sensitive activity and matter with intellectual activity. By this we mean simply that we may not drag any static element into the unfolding of reality, whether we call such a static element "life" or "matter" or "soul." It is matter itself which is appearing in ever new forms; it becomes ever different, raises itself to ever higher levels. . . . The living being is not matter plus life, but living matter. Man is not matter plus spirit, but—at any rate, in a definite sector of his bodiliness—animated matter capable of those activities which we call spiritual.

THE "LIFE" CANNOT BE OTHER THAN WHAT LIVES

Hulsbosch then (p. 253) bolsters his argument by taking up the point which independently furnished the major thesis of my recent volume on Teilhard:

We hear it said that God at a given moment after the origin of life on earth took an animal body and inserted into it a spiritual soul. At first sight this seems like a good explanation. But upon closer look we find ourselves up against scarcely acceptable consequences. In a certain sense God would be making inroads into the innerworldly order of things. Precisely in the very thing which makes man man, the evolution of life on earth would be registering failure. It keeps on running along a sidetrack of bodily life; but in his veritable being, man would not belong to the matter from which he took his origin. At the point where a foreign element intrudes, man would have to be seen as a juxtaposition of two heterogeneous items. But if we consent to regard man's intellectual life rather as something for which matter itself contains the capa-

¹⁰ A. Hulsbosch, in *De Bazuin* of Oct. 16, 1965, p. 5.

bility, any threat of duality is surmounted and man can really be grasped as a unity.

This reasoning can be continued with regard to Jesus of Nazareth. First of all, Hulsbosch faces frankly the fact that we seem headed toward the conclusion that Jesus was a mere man. "Regarding living being, we have said that 'life' must not be sought in some separate element that is *different* from the inorganic matter in which it took its rise. Regarding man, we have claimed that the presence of intellectual activities in no way forces the assumption of an immaterial soul as a reality distinct from the material body. In both cases we have progressed toward a better view of the real unity of the being."

Turning then to Jesus: since Scripture insists firmly that He is a man taken from among us, must we not then abandon the notion that His special prerogatives differentiating Him from other men are to be reduced to a separate divine principle distinct from His human nature? Hulsbosch finds that such an alleged divine principle would be just as alien to the true unified being as the allegedly separate spiritual soul. In both cases there would be something brought in from outside, making the person of Jesus doubly a juxtaposition of two realities, the divine nature being admittedly even far more heterogeneous than the human soul.

Must we not here also say (p. 254 continues) that matter itself includes among its potencies that of being bearer of the activities which characterize Jesus? In that case the prerogatives which set Jesus apart from other men should be called "divine" in the sense of godlike. "As long as we are really serious about insisting on the personal unity of the man Jesus, we must say that here too we have an unfolding of the capabilities which lay latent within matter."

This was the utterance which so shocked even Schillebeeckx, despite his warm approval for the thesis which it rather irreproachably summarizes. Perhaps we might permit ourselves more distress at the word "new" in the sentence which follows: "Jesus is a man; He is man in a new and higher way." As will appear from the reasonings of Hulsbosch and of his two sympathetic critics, and as is even more prominent in Teilhard, Christ represents not really a "new" or higher level to which mankind after a long time was raised. Rather, Christ is the *primordial* man, the exemplar for whom the whole of creation exists, and in whom chiefly it is the image of God. Of course, Hulsbosch's word "new" is not meant to deny this, only to express "different" and "higher" in a time-bound hierarchy of evolutionary realizations.

Jesus is this "new" man above all in His glorification, which made evident that in Him manhood had crossed a higher threshold. This

mode of viewing, Hulsbosch avers, would doubtless give full expression to the unity of Christ. But the price really seems to be too high. He would no longer be seen as the Son, one with the Father in His divine nature. He would be just the human vehicle of an unusual grace.

RELATION OF EVOLUTION TO CHALCEDON

The second major area in which Hulsbosch is sympathetic to modern distaste for aging theological tags concerns the hypostatic union. Before following him here, we might introduce this bridging part of Schillebeeckx's evaluation (p. 274):

Hulsbosch's study of the unity of Jesus Christ, "who is *known* as man and *confessed* as Son of God," fights on two fronts. Against alarming modern tendencies to downgrade Christ to the level of an ordinary man among fellow men, doubtless prophetically superendowed but in a line with other religious geniuses, he reacts by striking a blow for the primacy of love of God, though seeing it as bound up with love of men. But he also voices vehement criticism of traditional views prompted by such dogmatic formulas as "two natures in one person" or "hypostatic union." He in fact claims to see a thread of continuity between the two excesses he combats: precisely because our experience of reality cannot live with a "split-level Christ" which he himself rejects, some conclude that Christ cannot rationally be conceived except as an *ordinary* man, so that nothing has been essentially altered by His coming into our world. The latter view reduces ultimately to theorizing about the Chalcedon dogma "true God and true man" without due concern for one of its two items, though it had been precisely the Council's concern to deny any *combining* or consequent duality of Godhead and manhood in Christ. Hulsbosch combats the modern leveling tendency by purging from traditional Christology just that which modern man can no longer integrate in his outlook. By defending untouchably the recaptured original intention of the "true God and true man" formula, he aims efficiently to hijack (*opvangen*) for orthodoxy a good part of dissenting modern views. In our day there is no probative force in censures, anathemas, or invocations of authority; what is true can and must make sense to modern man when set forth in its fulness. Our belief is no abracadabra. In what has been revealed to us we must be able to recognize what our heart had so long craved: revelation is at its deepest the joyous discovery that God has in fact effected in Christ the very thing our spirit had yearned for, redemption. Thus revelation is inextricably bound up with the meaningfulness of human existence. If really then modern man can find no place in his life for "two natures but one person," we must reappraise what this formula really meant to impose as dogma. This attitude does not presuppose that we maneuver public opinion as the ultimate criterion of whether or not to accept the datum of faith. But it does play an indispensable role in our striving toward assigning to the unconditionally preaccepted aim of the dogma its proper place in the total framework of our human experience of faith.

To this we will say a fervent amen. Well then, according to Hulsbosch (p. 254), the Chalcedon dogma of the hypostatic union bears an unmistakably static imprint. "Until recently it was normal in theology to speak of Christ in such a way that any development in Him from an earthly to a heavenly state of being was purely a side issue. It did not need to clutter up whatever had to be said about the hypostatic union. Such inflexibility is alien to the New Testament, which plainly reckons with a genuine human development in Christ. However much closer current theology clings to the New Testament data than before, the basic problem of the combining of human and divine in one person has not vanished. The more we recognize true man in the biblical Jesus, the more we must keep on confessing that He is simultaneously Son of God. The more we learn about His true manhood, the more difficult such a confession becomes; and that is scarcely a mere question of feelings."

SOME PROBLEMS OF CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE

Hulsbosch would be only too happy to go along with Aquinas when he says (*Sum. theol.* 3, q.9, a.1, ad 1m) that we cannot admit a genuinely divine knowledge within the human soul of Christ without thereby destroying the proper operations of each respective nature within Him, and indeed destroying any human knowledge within Him at all, since the knowledge He did have would have no human faculty proportioned to it. But how then can modern theology struggle to base the self-consciousness of Jesus in His divine person? He has the self-awareness of being Son of God, but the mode of this awareness in Him bears the features of human self-consciousness. "Can we theologically tolerate the formula that Jesus in His human self-awareness knows that He is Son of God?¹¹ Impossible!" Here Hulsbosch is not arguing either as a scientist or as a dilettante against trained theologians. He is asking theologians to be consistent with their own convictions.

"Whatever awareness Jesus had of being God's Son, as a human awareness can never be the *adequate* reflection of a divine subjectivity. The personality of Jesus cannot be deeper than the depth of the human subjectivity which He experiences in His human self-consciousness" (p. 255). It is not obvious why this should be so, as we will explain after a moment. But it is also not quite obvious whether Hulsbosch is fully subscribing to this view, or merely setting forth along with its tragic

¹¹ E. Gutwenger, "Het kennen van Christus," *Concilium* 2/1 (1966) 84-97; *Bewusstsein und Wissen Christi* (Innsbruck, 1960) p. 55; B. Lonergan, *De verbo incarnato* (2nd ed.; Rome, 1961) p. 273; *De constitutione Christi* (Rome, 1961) p. 83. On the limitations of Jesus' knowledge in relation to Protestant insistence that "whatever else he may be, he is a man," see D. M. Baillie, *God Was in Christ* (New York, 1948) p. 16.

flaw a modern outlook with which he is in fundamental sympathy. At any rate, he pauses to consider an objection handled by textbook traditions. He had said that a human awareness could not reflect a divine subjectivity *adequately*, i.e., fully in every way. But it is said that a *genuine* though not adequate reflection would suffice, just as in the beatific vision of ordinary men a comprehensive knowledge of God is not prerequisite to a genuine personal relation with Him. Hulsbosch denies the parity. No more of God is in fact known in the beatific vision than the subjective experience of the viewer can support, and there are facets of God's being which simply remain irrelevant to the blessed; God is not there attained in His proper transcendence but only in the created reality of human experience. "Similarly Christ in His human consciousness cannot attain the divine transcendence; the personal self-awareness which He can attain is trammled within created measures. When Jesus is aware of Himself as the Son, that admittedly includes an altogether special relationship to God. But that is portrayed as only gradually and not absolutely from the start distinct from the relationship which other men have to God."

Here there seems to be a weakness in his argument. Apparently Hulsbosch is claiming as a theologian to be able to deny a certain kind of relationship to God as having been experienced by Jesus. In order to lay down such a denial, the theologian himself must have a certain kind of grasp of the type of relationship which he is denying. But if a theologian can envision such a relationship to God even in order to deny it, then it is not clear why Jesus in His human consciousness could not have "envisioned" it, i.e., been aware of it as a mysterious thing mysteriously belonging to Him. Thus it would not be true that "Christ in His human consciousness cannot attain the divine transcendence." Hulsbosch might well answer: "Perhaps theoretically it *could* be so, but Scripture just does not describe it that way." Even if such an argument from silence could be admitted as conclusive in the present beyond-Scripture speculations, it would seem that he has overstated his case at this point. But it is not clear that this detail is fundamental or indispensable to his thesis.

CHRIST IS GOD BY BEING MAN IN A SPECIAL WAY

The problem is next taken up from a wholly different point of view. The Son of God became man. That is revealed to us as a saving mystery. "Actuation of that salvation can take place only in the sector of the human. This man is Son of God in that this man is in contact with God in a way that separates Him from ordinary men. But this can mean nothing other than a special way of being-man, since the whole actuality

of the mystery still lies precisely in the sector of the human. In reflecting on the mystery, it is doubtless convenient to set the two natures over against each other, but a divine nature juxtaposed beside the human gets us nowhere." Here (p. 255) follows what Schillebeeckx (p. 276) cites in full as kernel of the Hulsbosch thesis to which he gives his own "one hundred percent approbation":

The divine nature of Jesus is relevant to the saving mystery only insofar as it alters and elevates the human nature. And whatever that is must be called a new mode of being man. We keep turning around in the same circle: the divine nature is here irrelevant except insofar as it elevates the human nature. To the extent that it does this, it puts us in contact with a *human* reality. When one says "Jesus is, besides man, also God," such an "also God" cannot form part of the salvation reality. The mystery borrows its whole reality from what belongs to the human sphere.

Despite the impressiveness of Schillebeeckx's approval, it is not altogether clear here why the divine nature, even if juxtaposed in dualist fashion, could not have the effect of elevating the human nature. Or at least one would have welcomed a further spelling out of this argument. We may notice here the cautious and sympathetic terms by which Schillebeeckx (p. 275) in fact dissociates himself from the Hulsbosch rejection of the hypostatic union formula:

Because our human thinking is factually determined by history, it is inadmissible to stay simon-pure in a vacuum by just repeating old dogmas and reaffirming their materiality. Mere repetition of identical words and formulas which grew up in and out of another era may well bypass exactly the relevance which the dogma has for our day. Our knowledge cannot gaze out upon history like a landscape, because we are not above it. In *our* situation the fifth-century dogmatic formulas are experienced in faith in a different way than earlier. Thereby the past itself becomes different for us, and becomes awakened to new life. For example, a Jewish-Christian's understanding of "Son of God" was nuanced somewhat differently from that of a Christian from pagan background, even though both were expressing rightly the exclusive relation of the man Jesus to God.

Hulsbosch is extremely sensitive to this law of human life. His aim is to give a genuine interpretation to the dogma of the hypostatic union, in such a way that while holding firmly to the word of God and consequently to the basic intention of the Church dogma, it can become really operative in a *Weltanschauung* of modern psychology. One may raise the question whether his new explanation of the relation between the truly divine and the truly human in the person of Christ meets head-on the essential nub of the dogmatic datum. One may even wonder whether his article rightly expresses the traditional content of the "hypostatic union" concept. Or is it—on the basis of expressions which in fact

can all too easily be found in our dogma textbooks—somewhat tendentially distorted in such a way that it can be more comfortably demythologized?

Postponing until later what Schillebeeckx has to say more positively in defensive reappraisal of Chalcedon, we may here note that the article by which Piet Schoonenberg expresses his reaction to Hulsbosch is more tolerant of his attack on the hypostatic formula.¹²

I think he has achieved something worth while in forcing a reappraisal of the question [but I am not quite ready to agree with his answer that duality in Christ can be evaded only by making His divinity an “aspect” of the Father’s own.] Instead, I will propose some elements which still have to be mulled over, in view of an eventual stance. It seems to me difficult to transpose directly into Hulsbosch categories the dogma of Chalcedon, which incidentally does not itself exclude the historicity of Jesus’ human and even (in the way explained by Rahner) divine nature, nor does it ever say that the sole person in Christ is the divine person of the Word. *DS* 302 says we must “acknowledge one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten. . . in two natures ‘running together’ in one person and one hypostasis.” This formula evokes rather “divine-human” than just “divine” as description of the person of Christ.

Schoonenberg here supports the view that the divine person of the Word in becoming man becomes more person, in that it takes on an I-thou relation to the Father.¹³ He rather doubts, though he does not exclude, that this I-thou relation can be equated with a nonhypostatic self-revealing Presence of the Father in Christ. But he agrees that more indirectly the Hulsbosch formula may represent the Chalcedon content.

ORIGEN DISTORTING JOHN CAUSED TWO EXTREMES

We must recognize that every human utterance is situation-bound. Schoonenberg bluntly lays it on the line that the Chalcedon situation was one in which John’s straightforward declaration that “the Word *became* flesh” had been transformed by Origen into “the Word *took on* flesh.” This reformulation brought with it a never-ending tension between Arian subordinationism and Sabellian modalism, between Nestorian “two persons” and Monophysite “one nature” (p. 305):

¹² P. Schoonenberg, “Christus zonder tweeheid?” *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 6 (1966) 289–306 at pp. 303 ff. The references to Rahner are on p. 302; see below.—Note that John Knox, *The Church and the Reality of Christ* (New York, 1962) p. 96, denies that any formula explaining the Incarnation as presence of some authentic human capability extraordinarily or absolutely in Jesus is as good as Chalcedon, though on p. 85 he approves “dynamic personal medium of God’s saving action,” as W. Norman Pittenger, *The Word Incarnate* (New York, 1959).

¹³ E. Schillebeeckx, “Het bewustzijnsleven van Christus,” *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 1 (1961) 227–50; further treated on Schoonenberg’s p. 292.

That tension could be harnessed by the Councils only in hypostatizing Son and Spirit, and the wonder is that they never took the further step of Trinitarian Pre-existence later worked out by theologians. . . . Hulsbosch claims to have preserved the *NT* datum equally well but in a pre-Origen situation, much as one might claim to transpose mathematical formulas into a non-Euclidean system. But it is not all that easy. The fact that such a formulation was possible before Origen does not mean that it is possible in today's situation. If Chalcedon succeeded in making explicit what was really latent in the *NT*, then after being once recognized it can never simply be locked up in a closet and ignored. Similarly, for example, even if *dato non concessio* humanity at first knew God only implicitly, it could never return to any such merely implicit knowledge. Must we say that in the same way we cannot turn back the clock on the divine hypostasis in Jesus? [The answer will have to involve, first, that Pre-existence as commonly understood *without* reference to Incarnation was a sidetrack; secondly, the Church demand of hypostasis *could* conceivably have been situation-bound; thirdly] a positive proof is required that the definitive saving revelation of God in Christ *could not* have been realized in His very mode of being man. . . . The ultimate question becomes whether human nature is so *capax infiniti, capax Dei* that it can itself in Jesus "express" an infinite God. Perhaps Hulsbosch can seek a proof of this in what he has already drawn from the Bible about man as image of God. . . . But how can we avoid passing to a similar divinity of all men, a myth of Jesus as simply man? . . . Perhaps his Being-for-others can be shown to have an absoluteness whereby He as man is for all both Lord and Servant as God's infinite revelation and presence.

We will notice later what here worries Schoonenberg about reducing Christ to merely one of various divinizations of man, and similar expressions of Baur and Barth.

CYRIL: THE HUMAN MEASURES OUT THE DIVINE

We have given extended comments of Schillebeeckx and Schoonenberg as a coda to Hulsbosch's own exposition of two objections drawn from the modern mentality against current Christological formulations. One is biological and one is soteriological. He finds them very cogent. But he sets them forth as a challenge. They are not the last word on the question. Yet a direct attack on them is scarcely feasible. There lies before us only the possibility of a thoroughgoing reappraisal of the whole problem. Hulsbosch sets about this (p. 256) by invoking some relevant items from an earlier research of his on Cyril of Alexandria.¹⁴

Against a reproach about how he distinguishes the natures in Christ, Cyril replies: "In our opinion, there is just one Son, and He has one nature, even

¹⁴ A. Hulsbosch, "De hypostatistische vereniging volgens den H. Cyrillus van Alexandrië" [*Quod unus sit Christus*, PG 75, 1289], *Studia catholica* 24 (1949) 65-94; *metra*, PG 75, 1320.

though with it He has taken on flesh that has a true soul. For, as I observed, the human is become of Him, and we think no otherwise of Him than that in the same manner He is God as well as man." The words "one nature" here can be and have been misunderstood. Reference to flesh and true soul are sufficient indication that the other nature too is represented. But what Cyril is focusing on is the one nature, because the divine nature of the Logos takes on the human in order to manifest itself. The human remains a created reality, but becomes nevertheless the means for the divine nature of the Word to manifest itself. Cyril says that Christ is "in the same way God as well as man," "same way" being undoubtedly the human way: the concrete human perceptible form of Christ encompasses His being-God as well as His being-man. The divine is of itself without limit, but appears under human "measures," *metra*. . . . Cyril's position that Christ is in the same human measure God as well as man, sound in itself, can be taken in two ways: the old conciliar way, and the new way which I am proposing here.

For Cyril (p. 257), the divine which is of its nature unlimited is limited by the measure of the human into which it is poured like water into a vessel. Admittedly not Cyrillan, but better, would be the claim that the "measure" is not distinct from the thing measured; Christ is not a man *in* whom appears the presence of God; that would make of Him a *mere* man and play havoc with the dogma. Rather the man as such is the presence of God. Because the man Christ remains a true creature revealing God by His whole human personality, creation as a whole is thereby also a manifestation of God, though in lesser and varying degrees.

This dictum "the human is the measure in which the divine appears" is thus supported by Schillebeeckx (pp. 276-77) as the only rational approach to the mystery of Christ:

Since 1953 I have firmly opposed the formulation "Christ is God and man," and also the confusing expression "the man Jesus is God." In this I was in the good company of Aquinas, *Summa* 3, 16, 11 ad 1: "Vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, habet gratiam unionis. Non: Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus." The proper formula would be "Jesus Christ is the Son of God *in* humanity." The deepest sense of revelation is that God reveals Himself in humanity. We cannot seek farther, above or beneath the man Jesus, His being-God. The divinity must be perceptible *in* His humanity itself: "he who sees me, sees the Father." The human form of Jesus *is* the revelation of God. Expressions such as "Jesus besides being man is also God" evacuate the deepest meaning of the Incarnation. Christ could be no revelation of God for us if *besides* the man Jesus we still needed a revelation of His [divine] "nature"—which in any case would then have to manifest itself in a *created* form. Thus the mystery lies neither beyond nor beneath the man Jesus, but in His being-man itself. Hulsbosch says rightly that "the human is the measure in which the

divine appears." The divine, remaining what it is, is perceived in the measure of the human. To this formula Thomas could have subscribed: "the human measure is the mode in which God appears upon earth." Thus we do not have present a man, Jesus, in whom is realized a presence of God which is *distinct* from Him. The man-Jesus Himself is the presence of God.

God is nowhere accessible otherwise than in His created manifestations. This position of Hulsbosch, however much overlooked by theologians, seems to me irreproachable. The world of human experience is the *only* access to that type of truth, even though it is not a curtaining horizon. Human-corporeal perception is the basis of all our knowledge, even precisely when it manifests the transcendent. The known earthly situation is also our only access to explicit and actual knowledge of other eventual realities. For this very reason God's revelation happens in a human happening, and faith cannot be detached from our experience in a tangible world among fellow men.

If Christ is God, we know this only out of His mode of being man. It must be clear from His human situation: He must be man in a different and absolutely unique way. And when we have said that, we have said everything that can be said about Christ. We have no further anything to look for either beyond or deeper than His being man, such as "*Besides* this being-man, there is also a God Jesus." The "*besides*" is altogether out of place. Indeed, it is contrary to the whole of Christian tradition—a point which Hulsbosch seems to have missed, thus creating a straw man to attack.

Schillebeeckx (p. 277) continues that Aquinas, while maintaining the "one person, two natures," and denying a "human person" in Christ, never uses careless expressions implying that the personal subjectivity of Jesus is something beyond or other than what the man Jesus Himself as subject is (*Sum. theol.* 3, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m; *On John*, Lecture 1, 7). "The Word is man in that manner in which everyone else is man, namely, as subject of humanity (bearer of 'human nature')." Basis of the personal humanity of Jesus is not the divine person but "the human nature" (*Sum. theol.* 3, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3m). This man Himself is the person of the Son of God (3, 2, 10c), so that in him humanity itself attains an unimaginable fulfilment (3, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1m: "non Deus sed homo perficitur"). Thomas calls this person pre-existent, there speaking of Christ not *simpliciter* but as the same person rooted in the divine nature, that is, the divine Son (3, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3m). Looking at the *term* of a dogmatic development, whereby of three divine persons only the second became man, he sees this presupposed in *the man Jesus*: "For Him, a man who is not simultaneously person is unthinkable; not even in Christ can a nature subsist impersonally" (3, q. 16, a. 12, ad 1m). "Jesus does not possess human nature *minus* the human person; rather the human person is identically the person of the Divine Word; there is no question here of a one plus a one making a two" (p. 278; *Quaestio disputata de*

unione Verbi 2, ad 2m; *Sum. theol.* 3, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2m). The unlimited God Himself can appear in the limited measure of the human; God is before us in a human mode, "the Word Himself is personally man" (*De unione Verbi* 2, rendering *quasi* not "as if" but "so that He is in fact"). Cajetan soberly but unhesitatingly paraphrases this "The Word Himself is a human person".¹⁵

These scholastic refinements, despite their static speculativeness, urges Schillebeeckx (p. 279), show that the person is not a refinement extrinsic to the nature; the nature is contents or mode of being of the person. Hence the proper subjectivity of Jesus Christ is a human subjectivity in which God the Son manifests Himself personally. We must speak of the person of the man Jesus according to the human expressions by which this person reveals Himself to His fellow men in Palestine and in the Gospels. Only because in this man something absolutely unique is perceptible could the Church be led to her notion of hypostatic union. But we can only understand what this formula means to her by living through those human experiences by means of which she attained it. Our modern mentality can rightly bracket as myth whatever kind of "inner-divine hypostases" are not perceived *within* the humanity of Jesus as the implication or consequence of its uniqueness. What Hulsbosch calls a "new" approach is by Schillebeeckx called more properly a retracing of the same living approach the Church herself went through, as against a lifeless and misleading parroting of ready-made formulas. Even the formulas of the *NT* itself do not give us the facts of Jesus' life directly, but only as worked over by the nascent Christology of the primitive community's faith.¹⁶

CREATION CONTAINS GOD WITHOUT PANTHEISM

Leaving one further aspect of Schillebeeckx's critique for later consideration, we may here return to Hulsbosch's own expression of his case (p. 258):

In his quality of subject, every man is in some sense the midpoint of the universe. He knows always from within his own subjectivity and finds himself confronted by everything in his environment. In this sense he is the dead center of all reality and stands midway among all men. The universe and mankind confront him insofar as he knows them. "Insofar as he knows them" is the expression of a limitation not merely on the material contents of his knowledge but also on his mode of knowing. He does not know all things, and the number

¹⁵ Cajetan on 3, q. 2, a. 5: n. 2, Leonine ed. 35A.

¹⁶ Willi Marxsen, dialogue with Bultmann and Käsemann in *Der Streit um die Bibel* (Gladbeck-W, 1965); *Anfangsprobleme der Christologie* (2nd ed.; Gütersloh, 1964); *Die Auferstehung Jesu als historisches und als theologisches Problem* (Gütersloh, 1965).

of other men he does not know is vastly greater than the ones he does; but this is less significant than the deficiencies with which he knows what he does know.

Hulsbosch goes on to show how reality is in fact itself affected by its interplay with the knowing subject, and is known differently by different men or by animals. Our mode of knowing God is faith. As long as we are in the flesh, we must attain God through His gleams in creation (Sir 17:8), including other men and, above all, Jesus. In Jesus, doubtless, God is uniquely present; but no presence of God to men apart from creatures is possible. Not the formula "one person in two natures" itself, but certain images which it conjures up, are incompatible with the epistemology sketched on p. 260:

The offending images hang together with a dualistic view of man, sundering two factors not only as regards the knowing subject, but also as regards the known object. There is a connection between that dualism in which the soul as seat of intellectual activities is distinct from the material body, and that dualism which separates God from the creation in which He manifests Himself. The latter dualism claims God can be attained directly in bypassing the material creation, and in Christ there is present at the side of a human nature also a divine person as the proper subject. Against that, I claim that man's intellectual light must be seen in function of the undivided cosmic reality which man is, just as God's presence to man must be seen in function of the undivided cosmic reality in which He reveals Himself: the universe, man, Christ. Renouncing psychic dualism demands also renouncing Christological dualism. But just as the overcoming of psychic dualism need not entail the downgrading of that human value expressed in the biblical "image of God" and "child of God," so also the overcoming of Christological dualism need not jeopardize the place both in creation and in soteriology due to Christ as Son of God.

These lines give us the clearest formulation of the alleged parallel between the unity of principle of spiritual and material activities in man, and the unity of principle between human and divine activities in the man Jesus. The statement seems carefully formulated, moderate, and convincing. At most one might sniff something ominously like pantheism in the elimination of duality between God and creation. To this Hulsbosch could doubtless reply with Teilhard that it is no more pantheistic than Paul's "God will be all in all."¹⁷

The next thing to take up is the implication of "the Son" as Jesus' own name for Himself. First we must accept the recently vindicated authenticity of the three passages Mk 13:32, Mk 12:6, and Mt 11:27.¹⁸

¹⁷ 1 Cor 15:28; see my *Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul*, pp. 111-16.

¹⁸ B. M. F. van Iersel, "*Der Sohn*" in *den synoptischen Jesusworten* (Leiden, 1961).

The least we can conclude from these is that Jesus is not just a man like other men. But this does not exclude applicability of the term "Son" to the human subjectivity of Jesus. The question is whether He is Son and person in what He is as man, or apart from what He is as man. Christ is uniquely (Col 1:15) the "image of God" which all men are; this revelation of God in the case of other men was never assumed to be founded in a subjectivity different from what the man himself as subject is. Jesus too is *this* revelation of God in any case. Moreover, when we say that God from eternity brings forth a Son like Himself, this remains for us meaningless speculation except insofar as we can point to this being-Son in a created expression available to us.

In current discussion of the divinity of Christ there is a panic-stricken concern to safeguard His uniqueness; but precisely when the divinity is located outside His humanity, the man Jesus risks being reduced to the level of any other man (p. 262). Jesus taught us to serve God by serving our fellow men, and thus His own earthly life becomes emphasized. His cry of abandonment on the Cross is what men of today find the most relevant thing about him in the whole Bible. The Resurrection can nowadays be less easily taken in stride than heretofore; Paul's "preach a crucified Christ, scandal to the Jews and folly for the pagans" becomes now "preach a risen Christ, scandal for Christians and impossibility for scientists." The unwillingness of our contemporaries to admit that the transcendent divine and the created human are united in one man results in their seeing the man Jesus as a *mere* man; and to this snare orthodox Catholics also fall prey if they interpret sacrosanct formulas to mean that the divinity of Jesus is something apart from His manhood. Hulsbosch (p. 263) formally rests this part of his case; one might show in Scripture a solid foundation for his more acceptable insight into the traditional formula.

Against the claim that revelation and created reality are identical, the objection may be raised that until man is present there can be no revelation. But, in fact, even vanished primordial reality leaves traces for man to perceive later. God's highest revelation is in Jesus, "true God and true man"; but if we put this in the equally valid form "true God and true creature," we see how creation unreservedly is revelation. Every creature reveals God by what it is itself, and of course in no higher degree than corresponds to its own reality. Whatever thing or man around us does not reveal God we call "evil." Just as the individual reveals itself more in its voice than in its hair, so God is revealed in Christ as center of the whole creation and in each creature in the measure of its value. By looking on Christ in unrealistic isolation, we have been tempted to consider His divinity something apart from His

human creaturehood. But Christ is "Light of Light" precisely insofar as He is created man. We may feel that Hulsbosch's line of thought is here dependent upon an acceptance of the Scotist "cosmic Christ," which was the subject of a massive research in my Teilhard volume and also in a paper for the 1966 Scotist congress at Oxford.

OUR WORLD NEEDS GOD'S CONCURSUS

Hulsbosch approaches (p. 264) the theme of another major chapter of my volume. "The Christological dilemma is not only that we have regarded Christ as too isolatedly taken in Himself. We have also accustomed ourselves to regard the creation too isolatedly. We confess that God created the world, but to make contact with the world we feel no further need of God." This is the pendant of a parallel absurdity in current theology manuals which Rahner repeatedly pillories. We have irresponsibly been willing to give up the direct and paramount influence of God in the production of our bodies, as the price we had to pay for keeping Him as the producer of our souls.¹⁹ Concursus is the sound and traditional Catholic doctrine which shows how the immediacy of creation's dependence upon God extends far *beyond* the production of "souls," but does not appear *differently* in their case.²⁰

Hulsbosch admits that in saying that Christ is nothing "other" than man, he appears a heretic in the eyes of those who have the habit of looking upon creation in isolation. From that standpoint they are even undoubtedly right in making him out a heretic. But he claims to elude such a charge because for him "the divine worth of Christ shines out in the fact that He as creature reveals the Father." Philip wanted to see the Father directly, but Jesus told him: "He who sees me, sees the Father" all he can (p. 265). "Death of God" means ultimately a blighting dualistic outlook which no longer sees the world as presence of God but as simple effect of an absent God. By regarding Christ as revelation of the Father, we see the divine dimension rooted in the Creator but expressed in the created dimension which is the man Christ. "Dimensions" here means not parts or juxtaposed realities, but a single reality seen from two viewpoints. It is perhaps a bit surprising that Hulsbosch does not choose to advert to the identity between the etymology of "dimension" and his own earlier citation from Cyril, whereby God in Himself is in the "infinite measure" or rather complete lack of limit, while in Christ He is received or revealed in human *measure*.

¹⁹ K. Rahner, *Hominisation* (New York, 1966) p. 22; *Erscheinungsbild* (Freiburg, 1959) p. 13.

²⁰ *Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul*, pp. 240-59; but in the preface contributed by Rahner (p. xi), note his newer reserves to what he had earlier said about concursus.

"I can call Christ a creature, and then say that He is man; I can call Christ revelation of God, and then say that He is God." When Jesus says "He who sees me, sees the Father," this implies that He as a distinct person is revelation of the Father. But such "distinctness of person" is to be sought in the human subjectivity of Jesus rather than in a pre-existent divine person. Hulsbosch acknowledges that in this he has come around to essential agreement with an article of Schoonenberg which he had previously questioned.²¹ But he does not take up here an objection which his wording here of itself arouses. If "I can call Christ revelation of God, and then say that He is God," and if I must also say that every creature in its own lesser measure is revelation of God, then must I not end up by calling the whole creation and every other creature God also? How are we to evade what Baur made of Kant against Schleiermacher: by Christ we mean ideal man, man-as-such; and this is not fully realized in any one man; "the historical Jesus cannot be so identical with the God-man idea as to exclude its expressions in other men?"²² This seems to be a kind of reverse of Barth's statement: "Precisely God's deity when rightly understood includes his humanity. . . . This is a Christological statement. . . . Our question must be 'who or what is God in Jesus Christ?'"²³ A reply might well be sought in our notion of the mystical Christ, somehow taking up the whole creation in Himself as head. But Hulsbosch, in fact, faces up to this objection in a different way and at a later point: "Jesus is revelation of God in virtue of the unique knowledge by which He is bound to the Father. But this does not deny that the whole creation as creation of God possesses a divine dimension, as the OT shows especially regarding God's wisdom as a divine presence in creation: Prv 8:22 ff.; Ps 139:17 f.; 19:2 ff.; 92:5 ff." (p. 266).

REVISED VIEW OF PRE-EXISTENCE

Granting that revelation of the Son can occur only via Christ as man, the problem still remains whether it is a pre-existent Son who reveals Himself: "the glory which I had with God before the world began" (Jn 17:5), the bread given from heaven. But Hulsbosch sees Jesus possessing this glory precisely as man seen and heard by men. Being truly God as well as truly man in His human subjectivity, to it also He can ascribe pre-existence by a kind of retrojection, much as when we say

²¹ A. Hulsbosch, *Werkgenootschap van katholieke theologen in Nederland, Jaarboek 1963/64* (Hilversum, 1965) pp. 112 f.; P. Schoonenberg, "Over de Godmens," *Bijdragen* 25 (1964) 166-86.

²² Peter C. Hodgson, *Formation of Historical Theology: A Study of Ferdinand Christian Baur* (New York, 1966) pp. 46, 104.

²³ Karl Barth, *The Humanity of God* (Richmond, 1960) pp. 46 f.

“The Chief Justice was born in 1908”: the person as we know him now is rightly named as subject of those activities which preceded. The divine dimension of Jesus is truly divine, and therefore from eternity. Since the revelatory divinity of Christ does not exclude that of the whole creation, the pre-existence of Christ is paralleled by that of (personified) Wisdom in the fashioning of the world (Prv 8:22). “The harmony of the universe, the complexity and distinctiveness of creatures, the laws of nature and the wisdom of man able to give the right orientation to his subsistence, are all clarified by the Wisdom of God everywhere present and instructing men” (p. 267); the *NT* authors reflect this *OT* view in ascribing cosmic significance to Christ’s redemptive act (Rom 8:23).

If we need say no more of Christ than that as man He is revelation of the Father and thus true God, then what are we to say of the Spirit? Paul, in fact, calls the glorified Christ Himself “a quickening spirit” (1 Cor 15:45, echoed in fifteen texts); but in Jn 16:7 and Acts 2:33 Christ and the Spirit are distinguished. At any rate, the Spirit is never subject of crucifixion and resurrection. Comparing Trinitarian texts like Eph 1:17 and Gal 4:6, Hulsbosch concludes: “We may say that Christ is revelation of the Father but can be known as such only through the Spirit; and this amounts to saying that the Spirit is the revelatory dimension of Christ” (p. 268). The term “revelatory dimension,” while in one aspect here identical with “the Spirit,” is said by Hulsbosch to take the place of “divine nature” in his new-sounding formula “Christ is nothing other than man revealing God, and therefore truly God.” Christology can thus be rewritten significantly, substituting “Holy Spirit” for “divine nature” wherever it occurs. Spirit and Christ are two names for the same reality, since the Spirit is God as revealing Himself in the form which is Christ. If from Christ you think away the Spirit, you think away everything.

But how can true divine sonship be retained, Hulsbosch asks (p. 269), if the divinizingly revelatory function is shared in gradual degree with all the other creatures? Our dogma is that creatures are sons by adoption and Christ is the Son by nature; and this tolerates no mere gradation. But dogma also insists that Christ is true man and therefore true creature, thus only in degree distinct from other creatures; His “grace of headship” is a created grace. Hence theology has always been perplexed about how the relation of the Son to the divine Father could be expressed in an *opus ad extra* effected by the Trinity without distinction of persons.²⁴ Hulsbosch sees in the innovation proposed by him nothing

²⁴ H. Lyons, “The Grace of Sonship,” *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 27 (1951) 438–66, needfully correcting St. Thomas.

which does violence to the fundamental fact that Christ in the created grace of His humanity is center of the Christological salvation-order. What he objects to is making the personal subjectivity of Christ a pre-existent divine reality distinct from anything human.

The whole *NT* attests that Jesus stands in a different relation to God than *other* men. As unique created revelation of God, Jesus is man in a unique way. Less felicitously in the traditional Christology, Christ's humanity, though "of infinite dignity," is reduced to the common level of any other humanity (p. 270). That is not right. Especially as glorified (1 Cor 15:45 f.), but even in teaching men to say "Our Father," Jesus sets Himself apart from other men in His dealing with the Father.²⁵ The Father makes Himself known to Jesus otherwise than to the disciples. The greatest anguish of Jesus was not His betrayal by men but His abandonment by the Father. That sonship which He possessed embryonically from His conception Hulsbosch sees Him "turning in" by obedience and death, in order to receive it to the fullest as the New Man by the sending of the Spirit. Hence the Infancy Narratives can never be demythologized of their essential content (p. 271): "Jesus is procreated by the Spirit, and *therefore* will be called Son of God" (Lk 1:35). Any difficulty in God's thus finding expression in the creation ever vivified by Him can be seen only by the inveterate dualist who mutters: "Let God stay in His spiritual sphere, the material is our domain." "Our Father, which art in heaven, comma, stay where you are."²⁶ Against this Hulsbosch declaims that revelation, for the simple reason that it itself comprises the whole of cosmic reality, can never involve violation of nature's laws.

Hulsbosch's final paradox is that in the *NT* Jesus is never the brother of men, yet men are His brothers.²⁷ His earthly life cannot be evaluated alone but only in relation to the completion which He has attained as firstling of creation. Confession of God's transcendence remains an empty word if we think we know all about the world around us. But the physicist with whom Hulsbosch began confesses that what we truly know about atoms is equivalent to ignorance of what matter

²⁵ But note Raymond E. Brown, "Does the NT call Jesus God?" *Theological Studies* 26 (1965) 549: Where Jesus calls men his brothers in Jn 20:17, "We cannot accept the contention [that he] is making a careful (and theological) distinction between his own relationship to the Father and the relationship of his disciples to the Father."

²⁶ Jacques Prévert, cited in Gabriel Vahanian, *The Death of God* (New York, 1961) p. 55; see Rahner as cited in n. 19 above and in *Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul*, p. 233.

²⁷ Hulsbosch seems to be here relying on Wilhelm Michaelis, "Prototokos," *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* 6 (Stuttgart, 1959) 879, and related essays of his focused in our exegesis of Col 1:15; *Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul*, p. 131.

really is ultimately. No less modest should be our assurance as to whether we have the last word about God's mode of revealing Himself in the universe around us, in men, and in Christ. "Yahweh's works are unfathomable; where man thinks he has done, he has only begun" (Sir 18:6 f.).

SCHOONENBERG FURTHER ON PRE-EXISTENCE

We have already noticed the relatively mild reserves of Schoonenberg regarding the elimination of "hypostatic." He shows much more concern with the invalidity of "Pre-existence" in his general critique (p. 289). Hulsbosch speaks pastorally to the man of today, but does he do justice to Scripture and tradition? To Scripture, yes, certainly. There Jesus is called Christ and Son of God because in Him God definitively or eschatologically speaks His word to us and offers us His salvation. This Christology uses what has been called "the revelation-model instead of the two-nature model."²⁸ Just bypassing Chalcedon cannot be equated with being confronted with two natures and then rejecting one of them, the divine.

No Christian, however, can ignore the Church's tradition in modernly revising the formulas for revealed data. Hulsbosch revered that tradition, in seeking to transpose it from an old epistemology to a more contemporary one. In this Schoonenberg hopes to support him explicitly, and better, but setting forth the issues in his differing hermeneutic, of which Hulsbosch has in fact taken notice.²⁹ That article is thus summarized (p. 290). It is a question whether our faith requires the Son's pre-existence or subsistence as divine person before or apart from His Incarnation. This is not equivalent to doubting that a divine hypostasis of the Word was present in the Christ of human form; and Schoonenberg is still reserving judgment as to whether a divine hypostasis, ordered to but really distinct from His humanity, constitutes the man Jesus.

Pre-existence of the Son from eternity alongside the Father and the Holy Spirit independently of the Incarnation has always been a tenet no less of the Orthodox and the Reformed than of the Catholic Christology. Calvin made the divinity of Christ something transcendent even to His humanity and "outside" it. But whether we say "outside" or "before," the implication is neither temporal nor spatial, but merely that the subsistence of the Son is independent of the Incarnation. This implies the "two-nature pattern" which Hulsbosch sweeps away. Schoonenberg is ready to follow him, but somewhat more hesitantly.

²⁸ John McIntyre, *The Shape of Christology* (London, 1966).

²⁹ P. Schoonenberg, "Over de Godmens," *Bijdragen* 25 (1964) 166-86; "De eenheid van Christus en de preëxistentie van de Zoon," *Werkgenootschap van katholieke theologen in Nederland, Jaarboek* 1963/64 (Hilversum, 1965) pp. 92-111; discussion, pp. 112-19.

Can we really say that pre-existence is irrelevant to us? Admittedly we know nothing of God except what is revealed to us in creatures; but we there experience Him as transcendent. By our very inability to say what God is, we confess His transcendence (p. 291). It is not a priori excluded that in some similar way we detect and confess in the man Jesus an "inexpressible" element which would equally mean His transcendent or pre-existent divine Sonship. Far from being irrelevant, an acceptance of this position would require a return to the Cappadocian Trinitarian formula in preference to the speculations of Hippo and Aquino. So the question must be posed. And having been posed, its pre-existence-alternative must be rejected. Or at least, without pronouncing upon what may or may not be the Trinitarian state of affairs within God Himself, Schoonenberg can affirm that, *as known by theology* and within the person-categories of our psychology, there was no person of the Son independent of the Incarnation.

Obvious barriers to pre-existence lie in the "two-layer" and "one plus one making two" fallacies. The situation which would have resulted in Christ has been not ineptly called schizophrenia. In less dramatic terms, we cannot take seriously as historical reality a Jesus growing in knowledge though His only person already knew everything. His human freedom too would be unintelligible. Thomism escapes these hazards by claiming that even in the Trinity there is only common and not personal knowledge and willing.³⁰ A better answer would be that the divine knowledge or will never stands beside the human like one plus one, but activates it (p. 292). Still, the difficulty is not thereby solved.

In the supposition of pre-existence we throw back the dualism into the divine nature itself, where the Son in relation to any possible "works *ad extra*" is undifferentiated from the Father and yet simultaneously identical with the creature whose sole person He is, and even center of the whole creation. To reply that He is this in the way proper to the Second Person, in their dependence on the Father, does not diminish either the transcendence of His relation to a work *ad extra*, or the *creaturely* relation which the person of Jesus has to the (rest of) creation.

Even more clearly: as goal of creation, the pre-existent Son would have to be the Thou towards which we yearn, though He is mediator; He would be offerer and receiver, a virtual duality. "I cannot accept a Son who creates His own humanity, or a man who is priest towards his own divinity" (p. 293). Moreover, pre-existence without relation

³⁰ See E. Schillebeeckx, "Het bewustzijnsleven van Christus," *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 1 (1961) 227-50 at pp. 242 f.

to Incarnation or Pentecost is tritheism: God would be three times His conscious self.

Thomism evades this difficulty by pretending to make within the Trinity real "persons" of what is nothing more than the conciliar "hypostases": no trace of consciousness or freedom is found either in Boethius' "individual substance of rational nature" or in Richard of St. Victor's "incommunicable existence of a nature."³¹ The Thomist Son and Spirit are terms of God's immanent knowing and willing, but do not themselves as persons know or will. This was a sly maneuver to avoid three gods, but disillusioning to whoever has an esteem for what "person" means. Brauns's effort to save both by distinguishing "being otherwise" from "being other" is unconvincing.³² What he rightly sets forth about dialogue among the persons fits well and only Schoonenberg's notion of the Father's dialogue with Jesus or with the Spirit in us.

LAIR OF THE NT PRE-EXISTENCE FORMULAS

Schoonenberg takes up what Scripture says of the Son's pre-existence (p. 294). The *NT* dictums echo Jewish apocalyptic, rabbinics, and canonical Wisdom.³³ The former two groups envision the Pre-existent as a *man* up there with God: apocalyptic reckons with "a Son of Man hidden to be revealed," and the rabbis with a Messiah pre-existing really only in soul, but otherwise only ideally in God's plan. But the real basis for the *NT* Jesus' pre-existence is the *divine* wisdom present with God from or before the moment of creation, in Jb 28:20-28; Bar 3:32-38; Prv 8:22-31; Sir 1:4-9; 24:3-22; and Wis 7:25; 9:9-11. The bubbling rock in the desert which Philo calls wisdom is called Christ in 1 Cor 10:4. Also, Jn 12:41 and 8:56 show Isaiah and Abraham seeing Christ, though this can relate rather to their seeing His eventual place in the salvation plan. Similarly, the Christ in whom "all things have their being" (1 Cor 8:6; so Col 1:15 ff.; Heb 1:2) only insofar as echoing the Wisdom books hints at a pre-existence before creation; likewise John's Prologue insofar as it combines the Greek *Logos* with the Jewish *Memra* (p. 295).

³¹ Aquinas, *Sum. theol.* 1, q. 29, a. 1; 1, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4m.

³² M. Brauns, *Het geheim van het goddelijke persoonlijkheden* (Bruges, 1958).

³³ Rudolf Schnackenburg, "Jesus Christus, II. Neutestamentliche Christologie," *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* 5 (2nd ed.; Freiburg, 1960) 934 ff. See now the lineup of texts (with 2 Cor 8:9, Heb 11:26, Ap 22:13 replacing Jn 12:41 and Eph 1:4, and 1 Enoch 48:3 replacing Baruch and Sirach) in F. B. Craddock, *The Pre-Existence of Christ in the New Testament* (New York, 1968), called "a category once functional but now anachronistic."

Outright assertion of the pre-existent Christ does indeed flicker in Eph 1:4 and Jn 17:5; less clearly Jn 8:58 and Phil 2.³⁴ Moreover, all *NT* formulations of the Incarnation seem to imply that the Word was already *there* to "become" flesh. But none of these texts really describes a previous existence of Christ in Himself within the Godhead. They are all compatible with a divine *decision* of the Incarnation from eternity, even if this decreed future *Person* is personified as in Wisdom. At any rate, this in some sense pre-existent Reality is never credited with any personal activity; His whole reality is to "be there," upholdingly (Heb 1:3), or really to "be coming." But this was enough to overpower the Hellenistic thought-world.³⁵ Justin's *Apology* 2, 10, with overtones of Plato and the Stoa, describes God's Logos communicated partially to all men but totally to Christ. Yet neither he nor Hippolytus nor Tertullian ever considers this divine Word or Spirit in Christ otherwise than in relation to the Incarnation. From their formulas, ambiguity was bound to arise as to how Christ differed from the Prophets, who also had their share in God's spirit; thus came the adoptionism of Paul of Samosata, condemned in terms intriguingly rejecting Nicaea's later *homoousios*.

Novatian is the first in the West to explicitate that the Son has a "substance" of His own and is born of the Father before all time: "otherwise the Father would not always have been Father" (*Trinity* 31; Schoonenberg, p. 297). The same argument is pressed by Origen to show that God must have always been Creator; so before the material creation there must always have been created spirits (destined eventually to be united as souls with human bodies), with the Logos and Holy Spirit above them. These pre-existent souls have vanished from theology's purview, but we must not overlook how the pre-existent Logos was no more pre-existent than they, and was related to the eventual created bodily beings. Some of the Church Fathers transformed these Origenist pre-existent souls into angels, in order to give the pre-existent Christ something to do in shepherding such... creatures.

Origen's thoughts fathered equally Arianism and the orthodox reactions against it (p. 298). But pre-existence did not find its way into the Nicene Creed (*DS* 125), only into an anathema subjoined to it (*DS* 126), which was adopted at Constantinople (*DS* 150) and thus got into the Credo of the Mass. But all these formulas, plus *DS* 272, 294, 301, 500, 3025, are such as to leave open *some* possibility that the exist-

³⁴ André Feuillet, "L'Homme-Dieu considéré dans sa condition terrestre de Serviteur et de Rédempteur," *Revue biblique* 51 (1942) 58-79.

³⁵ J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (3rd ed.; London, 1965) pp. 95-136.

ence of God as Son from all eternity is in relation to His eventual human nature. However, after Nicaea and Constantinople, their formulations taken over from Origen and Hippolytus dropped away the emphasis on what had been originally paramount: the Logos is such in relation to creation, the Son is such with relation to His Incarnation (p. 300). "Pater generat Filium incarnando eum," or "ab aeterno generat Filium incarnandum."

A nonlinear view of God's eternity finds the Incarnation equally present to Him at, after, or before creation. Thus the pre-existent-Son formula is correct in implying that there never was a "not yet" within God; He could not become "more God" with the passage of time, but with the passage of *our* time He could become more *God for us*. In this connection the two Dutch pioneers are in agreement against the bulk of scholastic speculation that the *relations* between God and creation are *real*, not only from creatures toward God but from God toward creatures.³⁶ The *dependence* which this implies in God is a purely logical one, therefore in our minds rather than in Him, though the relation is really in Him. Scholasticism itself admits real relations *within* God of the independent towards the dependent, namely, of the origin-Father toward the originated Son and Spirit. And God's anger and joy may be anthropomorphisms, but His love for us (1 Jn 4:8, 16) is not an *ens rationis* (p. 302).

Schoonenberg takes calmly in stride the fact that these real relations of God to creatures presuppose that there are, in a real but divine way, change and becoming in God. St. Thomas was recently shown to have unvaryingly denied such change.³⁷ But he patently means only such change as implies imperfection in the mutant, or any pantheistic evolutionism (*DS* 126, 3001, 3024). Neither Thomas nor Ottolander really faces the question of whether without imperfection God really changes in His real relations to His creatures. But Rahner has faced and answered this with the formula "God *others* (changes, *ändert*) Himself on the Other."³⁸ True, God is not pantheistically evolving; but neither is He any kind of an unmoved mover. Whoever cannot reconcile that with God's perfection had better re-examine whether he is hampered by a too-human notion of perfection with too little scope for divine

³⁶ So E. Schillebeeckx, "De zin van het menszijn van Jezus, de Christus," *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 2 (1962) 127-72 at p. 130.

³⁷ P. den Ottolander, *Deus immutabilis: Wijsgerige beschouwing over onveranderlijkheid en veranderlijkheid volgens de theo-ontologie van Sint Thomas en Karl Barth* (Assen, 1965) pp. 3-78.

³⁸ K. Rahner, "Theos im NT"; "Probleme der Christologie," *Schriften zur Theologie* 1 (Einsiedeln, 1954) 125 ff. and 196 ff. Cf. F. Malmberg, *Über den Gottmenschen* (Basle, 1960) pp. 62-65.

freedom (p. 303). It is no Sabellian "three-hat" Godhead to say that God *becomes* trinity (from eternity, or rather *in* His eternity) by communicating Himself totally to, and being present in, the man Jesus as word, and the Church as Spirit.

HYPOSTATIC UNITY RATHER THAN UNION

We have thus surveyed the whole of both the positive presentation of a "new Christology" by Hulsbosch, and Schoonenberg's support of it chiefly on the basis of reappraising "pre-existence." From Schillebeeckx we have excerpted chiefly his uneasiness about evolutionism and about how the basically valid Chalcedon notion of hypostasis has had to be manhandled. We may now conclude by according due emphasis to his own revised and constructive notion of "hypostatic *unity* rather than *union*." In the primitive Christology, he says (p. 280), the historical man Jesus Himself, though not beyond or outside His faith-relation to the primitive community, is experienced eschatologically as the concrete forgiving nearness of God.

The record of this experience in the *NT* is revelation already illumined and thus interpreted by human historical faith. The portrayal of Christ in Paul is different from that in Mark or in John. The primitive community, inverting the order which seems natural to teachers of a later day, came to grips first and longest with the divine presence manifested in Jesus' public activity, only secondly with His person, and last of all with what His birth and youth must have been like. Chalcedon is just one more in a series whereby first Paul, then the Synoptics, then John had re-expressed, with the help of thought patterns current in each respective milieu (p. 281), the forgiving presence of God in the man Jesus. In terms like those of Hulsbosch we can hope to recapture and hold firmly that prime fact even if we thereby drop out of sight some specific interpretations which had been found to be very suitable by those respective past ages. We must learn from recent rehabilitation of Church Fathers once branded heretical that even outright denial of a term like hypostatic union might be some man's way of clearing the deck for a renewed and deeper grasp of the mystery of Christ. Such a try must, of course, be tested against the *sensus ecclesiae*, by anguished reappraisal rather than blind hurling of anathemas.

In this spirit of respectful cosearching, Schillebeeckx feels he must serenely ask whether the Hulsbosch formula does full justice to the personal unity of Christ demanded by the whole Christian tradition and crystallized in 1 Cor 3:23: "Christ is of God." To be sure, God is in Christ only as the infinite measured by the finite, and we can never

speak of God and man in Him as one and one making two, any more than we can say that one and one make two as an expression of the fact that metaphysically God is more one with *every* single man than that man is one with himself. My being-myself and my being-creature are neither two components nor two partial aspects of my being, but both are equally expressions of my totality (p. 282). Whatever inescapable duality is involved in every creature's being simultaneously "of itself" and "of God" is only a low-key aspect of the unique way in which Paul says Christ is "of God." And by this norm Hulsbosch does indeed place the mystery of Christ in exactly proper and biblical perspective.

But to vindicate this we have already been forced to spell out that not even the most relentless expulsion of dualism can escape admitting some kind of duality. Any man's "being-of-God" is the very constitutive of his "being-himself," his human subjectivity. So the "being-of-God" on a higher plane in Jesus *is* His human subjectivity. Jesus does thus, though uniquely, what every creature and especially every man does: "re-present (make present)" God by what the creature itself is. But to claim that we prove the *uniqueness* of Jesus' "making God present" *from* what we already know of the hypostatic union is to stand the history of revelation on its head. First and proximately and from the *NT* data we know that Jesus had a unique way of "making God present just by being the man He was," and *from this* the reasoning Church was able to grope toward her hypostatic formula.

"And here I must part company with Hulsbosch," Schillebeeckx says (p. 283), "because I claim rather that the dogmatic confession of hypostatic union never was meant to express anything other than the implications of Jesus' unique mode of being man, a uniqueness which would have to remain a mere meaningless word unless the hypostatic formula had been found." The dogma formulates God's absolute and forgiving presence in Christ, which *is* the hypostatic union itself. It does not follow that we have to swallow all the secondary and too-dualistic speculations with which the dogmatic formula has been escorted down through history.

In the case of Jesus, God did not merely "creatively posit" or infuse the being of a particular human subjectivity as He does for every man, but He creatively posited this special human subjectivity as His own. This is what ought to be called the "hypostatic unity." Preference of unity to union is here relegated by Schillebeeckx to a footnote comprising one half of one percent of the total of his article, but it looms into a massive six percent of the brief summary in English which he himself contributes on p. 288. The summary there wholly bypasses the following much more fascinating sidelight: His special way of being man

involves also a special *mandate* for Jesus—just as the ordinary way of being man is always a mandate, a vocation which the man is commissioned to work out in his historical situation. When Jesus says “I” to the Father, it is *this man* who is speaking, not a subjectivity lying somewhere outside and distinct from the humanity. So *instrumentum conjunctum*, “tool hooked on,” is an unacceptable paraphrase of the true valid dogmatic formula of hypostatic unity. The nature is never a tool of the person, but is the content of the person and his mode of being and acting (p. 284). We can say Jesus is the human way of being God, but we cannot say Jesus is the divine way of being man. “Mode of being” indicates nature, and the nature of the man Jesus is by definition human and not divine. This mystery is possible only because in no system of counting is any man ever “one” next to God in such a way that along with God he makes up “two.” Nor is “human nature” ever a number one beside a number two which is “divine nature”: God encompasses and includes whatever else there is. Finally, the man Jesus, being *in* His manhood Son of God by power of the Spirit, is the *personal* revelation-form of the God who is three in persons.

KNOWLEDGE OF ABSOLUTE NEED NOT BE ABSOLUTE

Secondly, or perhaps rather as root of his above disagreement with Hulsbosch, Schillebeeckx focuses his dismay at reducing Christ's unique mode of being man to the procedure of creation itself. This is presented as a sort of corollary of the correct observation that the revelatory character of any creature can be no greater than the creature itself is. But we detect an ambiguity in the fact that “creative” is a term which can be applied to *any* activity of God, even including redemption. God *makes* men and things be in such and such a particular mode, and to that extent they are revelation of God in whatever they are or do. In this sense the uniqueness of the man Jesus, this “new way of being man,” is also a new creation. Hence, however oddly, Augustine hit the nail on the head when he said that Christ's humanity was not first created and then assumed but “created by the very fact of being assumed”³⁹ (p. 285).

The creation which in that case occurs is the act of setting a man in hypostatic unity with God. As a person distinct from the Father, the personal man Jesus is the revelation of the Father; and the basis of that distinction of persons is not the “pre-existent divine Son,” as Hulsbosch rightly says, but the human subjectivity of Jesus. In a summary (page 288) Schillebeeckx spells out even more clearly in English: “This unique mode of being-man therefore must imply a Trinity in God him-

³⁹ *Against Arian Talk* (PL 42, 688).

self, even if one should feel forced to abandon the idea of 'pre-existence' as an illusory concept, due to our essentially human, historical way of approaching reality." There is nothing quite like that sentence explicitly in the Dutch. Moreover, even in the Hulsbosch formulas which Schillebeeckx favors and adopts, it is not clear why the lesser revelation of God which is contained in every man and every creature should not simultaneously produce a lesser Trinity.

This difficulty is promptly faced in a more roundabout way. The human subjectivity of Jesus is indeed the basis of distinction in person between the man Jesus and the Father. Yet, against Hulsbosch, Schillebeeckx cannot explain the absolute uniqueness of this man and the fact that He is God's absolute nearness otherwise than with the words "hypostatic" and "consubstantial," *homoousios*. This man is the *personal* revelation-form of the Father. If you conjure away the hypostatic unity, the absoluteness of Jesus' human uniqueness is taken away. He would then be only one in a row of religious geniuses who have in fact brought men nearer to God.

Though Hulsbosch rightly holds that a reality which we do not know is irrelevant for us, and that Scripture does no more than call *this man* Son of God, still the further conclusion that "we too can say no more about it" seems to Schillebeeckx to smuggle in some epistemological presumptions which are neither evident nor widely shared. Let us grant that Merleau-Ponty was right, and that "our knowledge of an absolute" discerned behind shifting situations has in our tradition too often been confused with "an absolute type of knowledge." The absolute ever more evades our grasp, yet ever anew beckons it. Though the created reality of Jesus must forevermore remain outset-point for clarifying His uniqueness, still the very uniqueness of the Sonship of this man can turn out to be precisely the revelatory form of the Father (p. 286). The Absolute in Him gives itself to us in the form of a fellow man.

We know no more about the divine Son, it is true, than what the man Jesus reveals; but also no less. It is no "essentialism" to insist that the divine hypostasis is relevant to us insofar as the man Jesus is relevant to us. This hypostasis is not beyond but in the man whom Scripture calls as man the Son of God. "Jesus experiences Himself in presence of the Father as Son, and on the basis of this human experience sees Himself as coming from the Father," Schillebeeckx finds Hulsbosch saying rightly. But an ordinary man's expressing himself to his fellow men and thereby revealing something of the creative God, is an altogether different thing from God's own expressing of Himself personally in every utterance of the autonomous free man Jesus. This has always

been the explanation of the human uniqueness of Jesus offered by the tradition of our faith. Hulsbosch has not sufficiently stressed that this explanation of God's absolute and forgiving presence in Jesus "must be ultimately a superstructure" (*dat deze duiding louter een bovenbouw zou zijn*), not a mere explicitation of the experience of Christ's unique personality. What the man Jesus says is personal revelation of the selfhood of God. In this case, every psychological insight (*anthropologische zeggings*) is theological too, and every theological dictum also inextricably conveys something about human psychology.

What Hulsbosch has rightly said against the "two natures" as a sort of one plus one has derailed us. He could have nuanced it and thus saved the essential, instead of throwing out the hypostatic-union formula, at least in the form in which it has become spelled out. Anyway, he does keep the essential of it as long as he insists that Jesus in His human awareness has "an experience of God essentially (and not merely in degree) divergent" from that of other men. This way of viewing things admits that the essential otherness is present from the moment of Jesus' conception "through the Spirit of God."

Schillebeeckx concludes (p. 287) by adverting to Bousset's merit in purging theology from the notion of Christ as a "demigod" who "doubles for God."⁴⁰ Along with this came a fear that Christocentrism needlessly complicates the directness of man's simple *OT* approach to God.⁴¹ Rohde thought he had simplified Christology by his thesis that Jesus was just an ordinary man who by his ascension became "Son of God."⁴² Well, simplicity is often a pledge of truth and richness; but it can also be a token of scantiness. Sure enough, it complicates things to regard Jesus anthropomorphically as a middleman we have to go through to get to another *man*. But Thüsing has rightly seen in Paul that God's creative Glory can so appear in Christ that He promotes instead of hindering the goal "that God may be all in all."⁴³ This Pauline and more deeply Johannine vision of a Jesus "all on God's side and yet all on man's side" is what the Church has called "hypostatic unity."

⁴⁰ Wilhelm Bousset, *Kyrios Christos: Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christentums bis Irenäus* (Göttingen, 1921) p. 150.

⁴¹ We might suggest here the relevance of Gabriel Vahanian's strange horror of "the Christic Man" as a parody of "the *NT* New Man" and as keystone of that baneful "religiosity, which is to Faith what the Peeping Tom is to love: curiosity without involvement": *The Death of God* (New York, Braziller, 1961) pp. 15, 67.

⁴² Edvard Rohde, "Gottesglaube und Kyriosglaube bei Paulus," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 22 (1923) 54 ff.

⁴³ W. Thüsing, *Per Christum in Deum: Studien zum Verhältnis von Christozentrik und Theozentrik in den paulinischen Hauptbriefen* (Münster, 1965) p. 261.

CONCLUSIONS⁴⁴

1) Strict unity of God and man in Christ, as of the soul and body in man, is a primary datum of revelation which has become progressively neglected in theologizing.

2) Jesus Christ has always been *known* to be man, real man as a thing we can really know, but *confessed* to be Son of God, as a thing which is mysterious and ever beckons us towards better understanding.

3) Revelation is inextricably bound up with the meaningfulness of human existence. Formulas which genuinely block the intellect of modern man enshrine a truth which by patient effort can be more acceptably reformulated.

4) Chalcedon's formula of two natures and one person in Christ but three persons and one nature in the Trinity uses "person" without implication of separate cognitive (self-) awareness, in a way which is incompatible with modern psychology and universal way of speaking.

5) Just as there are facets of the divine being which will simply remain irrelevant to the beatified creature viewing, so there is in Jesus a creaturely human awareness of the God to whom He is in a special or rather unique relationship.

6) When it is said "Jesus is, besides man, also God," such an "also God" cannot form part of the salvation reality. The divine nature of Jesus is relevant to the saving mystery only insofar as it alters and elevates the human nature.

7) The very thing which Chalcedon most sought to safeguard is destroyed if we interpret it as meaning that the divinity of Christ is a separate thing from His humanity, a "one plus one making two."

8) The same intolerable "one plus one making two" has crept into theologians' viewing of the *soul*, which they meanwhile claim to be the *form* or structural principle of the "body" (meaning really *whole material person*).

9) The living being is not matter plus life, but living matter; man is not body plus soul, but animated body; Christ is not a human nature plus God, and not "God *assuming* a human nature," but God-*become*-man.

10) Pre-existence of the divine nature of Christ as Son *apart* from its (foreseen) Incarnation is hinted in the *NT* only in Eph 1:4 and Jn 17:5, but is plausibly traceable to the nonhypostatic Wisdom of

⁴⁴The first seventeen propositions are all contained within the three Dutch articles, and seem to be sound and acceptable as there contained, though not everything there is sound and acceptable even in the judgment of the other two contributors.

Prv 8:27 and the rabbinic Pre-existent "*man* up there with God" and apocalyptic "Son of Man hidden in order to be revealed."

11) The "Pre-existent Christ" is really due to Origen, and equally fostered Arianism and the orthodox reactions against Arianism, but in Origen is linked with assurance that there must have been an equally pre-existent created universe of souls or spirits to relate to Christ. Stripping our revealed datum of its Origenist accretions leaves open the formula "The Father generates the Son by incarnating Him . . . from eternity He generates the incarnand Son."

12) In first saying that the Son has a "substance" of His own and "was born of the Father before all time, otherwise the Father would not have been Father," Novatian in the West implies rightly that there never was a "not yet" within God, wrongly that there was an "already" *preceding* some event of human time.

13) Because God is necessarily related to time-bound changes at least in the walkabout humanity of Jesus, real relations must be admitted in God toward creatures, only not such relations as imply imperfection.

14) Cyril's formula "the human is the measure in which the divine appears in Christ" is compatible with the careful formulations of *Sum. theol.* 3, q. 3.

15) As Christ is the revelatory di-mension (= measure) of the Father, so the Spirit is the revelatory dimension of Christ.

16) The unique person of Jesus the God-man is an unfolding of possibilities which were somehow latent within matter itself, and were precisely by their *uniqueness* distinct from the mode in which material creation reveals God, and man is His image.

17) "He who sees me, sees the Father also" (Jn 14:11) as much as he *can*, must be our constant answer to an outlook which no longer sees the world as presence of God but as simple effect of an absent (dead) God.

18) Other affirmations of these three Dutch theologians, especially where they disagree and correct one another, are subject to rigorous appraisal; but even if eventually rejected, need not diminish the usefulness of the seventeen propositions focused above.