

FINALITY, LOVE, MARRIAGE

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L'Immaculée Conception

IN THE recent fermentation of Catholic thought on the meaning and ends of marriage,¹ the basic component of novelty would seem to be a development in biological science. Quite other factors, no doubt, account for the intense and widespread interest aroused; but the ground of the intellectual problem must be placed, I think, in a new scientific insight. To this Dr. H. Doms has given full prominence, and I cannot but agree that, if Aristotelian biology was aware of a distinction between fecundity and sex, it did not admit any systematic elaboration and application of that distinction.² On the other hand, modern biology makes such elaboration and application inevitable. There results more than a suggestion that as fecundity is for offspring so sex has a personalist finality of its own.

To Dr. Doms this implies that the theologian is confronted with the task of thinking out afresh the theory of marriage.³ Now if one cannot avoid suspicion of new beginnings, at least one can agree with Fr. Ford in desiring the assimilation of new insights into the traditional theoretical framework.⁴ However, Fr. Ford's own discussion of "Marriage: Its Meaning and Purposes," though notably constructive, was more positive and doctrinal than analytic and explanatory; and if the former approach is more important to us as Catholics, it is the latter that is more relevant to the solution of problems. None the less it remains a large and long task, in which it is convenient to distinguish two stages: first, a preliminary general outline of a modified theoretical position; second, the systematic elaboration of definitions, theses, proofs, that normally is the cumulative product of a succession of professorial notes and handbooks.

The present paper is concerned with a preliminary speculative outline; it aims at no more than a brusque occupation of strategic

¹ For a bibliography, see J. C. Ford, S.J., "Marriage: Its Meaning and Purposes," *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES*, III (1942), 333 f.

² Dr. H. Doms, *Du sens et de la fin du mariage*, (Paris, 1937), esp. pp. 72 ff.; "Amorces d'une conception personaliste du mariage," *Rev. Thom.*, XLV (1939), 755-57; for Aristotelian biology, Doms refers to Mitterer, *Zeitschrift f. kath. Theol.*, 1933, pp. 492-98.

³ *Rev. Thom.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Ford, *op. cit.*, pp. 373 f.

theoretical points on finality, on love, and on marriage. On finality is affirmed, besides the absolute reference of all things to God and the horizontal reference of each thing to its commensurate motives and ends, a vertical up-thrust from lower to higher levels of appetition and process; thus are provided the empty categories of the ultimate solution, since horizontal ends are shown to be more essential and vertical ends more excellent. Next, an account of the nature of love is attempted, and this opens the way for a discussion of the "primary reason and cause of marriage" mentioned in the papal encyclical, *Casti Connubii*.⁵ Here the argument draws upon Aristotle's classic on friendship and Aquinas' transposition of Aristotelian analysis,⁶ and it endeavors to formulate an ascent of love from the level of two-in-one-flesh⁷ to the level of the beatific vision. Finally, there emerges the problem of inserting the vertical up-thrust of love from sex to divine charity into the horizontal process from fecundity to offspring; and such insertion has to be made on the background of the general field of human process. For it is only in the cosmic breadth of a simultaneous context of nature, history, and grace, that appear at once the justice and the assimilative capacity of the, on the whole, traditional view that the most essential end of marriage is the procreation and education of offspring but its most excellent end lies on the supernatural level of personalist development.

VERTICAL FINALITY

The common instances of finality fall into two classes: the response of appetites to motives and the orientation of processes to terms. But, if we are to formulate the notion of vertical finality, it is extremely important to break away from instances and to conceive things generally. First, then, the mere fact of response or of orientation does not constitute finality. Any positivist will admit that appetites do respond to motives, that processes are orientated to terms. Quite

⁵ *AAS*, XXII (1930), 548; or *DB*, 2232.

⁶ So manifold is the dependence of Aquinas that an understanding of the *Secunda Secundae* on charity is attained most easily by reading first the eighth and ninth books of the *Ethics*.

⁷ Dr. Doms' *Zweieinigheit* is, of course, scriptural: Gen. 2:24; Matt. 19:5, 6; Eph. 3:31; I Cor. 6:16. Aristotle appears to have coined the somewhat similar adjective, *syndyastic*, "two-together-ative," *Eth. Nic.*, VIII, 14, 1162a 17; cf. the praise of *erôs* in Plato, *Banquet*, 189c-193d.

coherently, any positivist will deny final causality since, beyond such concomitance and correlation, causality requires that appetite respond because of motive, that process be orientated because of term. Moreover, causality is not yet final causality. If appetite responds because motive moves, if process is orientated because an intelligent agent envisages and intends a term, there is causality indeed; but it is efficient and not final. No doubt, in the concrete, such efficiency is connected intimately with finality. But rigorously one must maintain that there is final causality if, and only if, appetite responds because the motive is good; if, and only if, process is orientated because the term is good.

For the final cause is the *cuius gratia*, and its specific or formal constituent is the good as cause. Under this formal constituent may be had either of two material differences: the good may be cause as motive for the response of appetite or as term for the orientation of process. But with regard to the formal constituent itself it is necessary to distinguish between *qui* and *quo*, between the good thing which is motive or term and the mode of motivation or termination. Now in our hierarchic universe God is at once absolute motive and absolute term: "omnia Deum appetunt",⁸ "omnia quaerunt assimilari Deo."⁹ On the other hand, the mode in which the different grades of being respond to God as motive or attain Him as term is always limited; this remains true even in the beatific vision in which the infinite as motive is apprehended finitely and as term is attained finitely.¹⁰ Further, the ground of such limitation is essence: remotely it is substantial essence; proximately it is the essence of an ontological accident, the essence, say, of sensitive appetite, of rational appetite, of infused charity; for it is essence that limits, that ties things down to a given grade of being, that makes them respond to motives of a given type, that assigns them their proper and proportionate ends. Finally, there are many grades of being, each with its defining essence and its consequent and commensurate mode of appetition and process; accordingly one has to think of the universe as a series of horizontal strata; on each level reality responds to God as absolute motive and

⁸ *De Ver.* q. 22, a. 2. ⁹ *C. Gent.*, III, 19.

¹⁰ ". . . actu aliquo finito infinitum ad modum infiniti finito modo videtur." Lennerz, *De Deo Uno* (Romae, 1931), §184.

tends to Him as absolute term; but on each level it does so differently, for the limitation of essence reappears in the limitation of the mode of appetition and response, of process and orientation.

Thus the application to the hierarchic universe of the notional distinction between *finis qui* and *finis quo* has given two distinct types of finality: the absolute finality of all things to God in His intrinsic goodness;¹¹ the horizontal finality of limiting essence to limited mode of appetition and of process. But now attention must be drawn to a third type of finality, that of any lower level of appetition and process to any higher level. This we term vertical finality. It has four manifestations: instrumental, dispositive, material, obediential. First, a concrete plurality of lower activities may be instrumental to a higher end in another subject: the many movements of the chisel give the beauty of the statue. Second, a concrete plurality of lower activities may be dispositive to a higher end in the same subject: the many sensitive experiences of research lead to the act of understanding that is scientific discovery. Third, a concrete plurality of lower entities may be the material cause from which a higher form is educed or into which a subsistent form is infused: examples are familiar. Fourth, a concrete plurality of rational beings have the obediential potency to receive the communication of God Himself: such is the Mystical Body of Christ with its Head in the hypostatic union, its principal unfolding in the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit by sanctifying grace, and its ultimate consummation in the beatific vision which Aquinas explained on the analogy of the union of soul and body.¹²

If the existence of such vertical finality has always been recognized,¹³ its ground and nature have hardly been studied. Partly this neglect may be explained by an unduly apologetic conception of *finis operis*; for if one defines *finis operis* as resulting from the abstract nature of the thing, then necessarily one restricts finality to horizontal finality; absolute finality becomes a difficulty, and vertical finality subjectively inconceivable. But not only is such a restriction arbitrary; it cannot claim even the sanction of tradition, which defines *finis operis* not in

¹¹ See Fr. Donnelly's two articles, THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, II (1941), 53-83; IV (1943), 3-33.

¹² *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1; *C. Gent.*, III, 51.

¹³ E.g., *Gen.* 1:29 f.; *C. Gent.*, III, 22, "In actibus autem . . ."

terms of abstract nature but as *id in quod opus ab agente ordinatur*.¹⁴ However, a perhaps stronger reason for the neglect of vertical finality lies in the fact that modern science throws a great deal of light on its nature. Straightforward metaphysics suffices for a knowledge of absolute and of horizontal finality: the former results from the idea of an absolute good; the latter results from the theorem of essence as principle of limitation. But vertical finality seems to operate through the fertility of concrete plurality.¹⁵ Just as the real object tends to God as real motive and real term, just as the essence of the real object limits the mode of appetite and of process, so a concrete plurality of essences has an up-thrust from lower to higher levels. But just as this fact is shrouded in the mists of Aristotelian science—and here we generalize Dr. Doms' complaint against Aristotelian biology—so it is most conspicuous to one who looks at the universe with the eyes of modern science, who sees sub-atoms uniting into atoms, atoms into compounds, compounds into organisms, who finds the pattern of genes in reproductive cells shifting, *ut in minori parte*,¹⁶ to give organic evolution within limited ranges, who attributes the rise of cultures and civilizations to the interplay of human plurality, who observes that only when and where the higher rational culture emerged did God acknowledge the fullness of time permitting the Word to become flesh and the Mystical Body to begin its intussusception of human personalities and its leavening of human history.

The difference of vertical from absolute and from horizontal finality is quite clear. Absolute finality is to God in His intrinsic goodness: it is universal; it is unique; it is hypothetically necessary, for if there is anything to respond to motive or to proceed to term, then its response or tendency can be accounted for ultimately only by the one self-sufficient good.¹⁷ Horizontal finality results from abstract

¹⁴ E. g., *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1 c.

¹⁵ The *per se* results from the essence of either ontological substance or ontological accident; it remains that the *per accidens* results from the interplay of a plurality of essences. Such interplay as interference is prominent in Aristotelian and Thomist thought, as previously I had occasion to point out (*THEOLOGICAL STUDIES*, III, 1942, 387 ff.); but besides interfering, different essences may complement one another; it is the latter possibility that is the ultimate root of vertical finality.

¹⁶ There is a noteworthy affinity between modern statistical law and the *contingens ut in maiori parte*, between modern "chance variation" and the *contingens in minori parte*.

¹⁷ See J. E. O'Mahony, *The Desire of God* (Cork, 1929), pp. 159 ff.

essence; it holds even when the object is in isolation; it is to a motive or term that is proportionate to essence. But vertical finality is in the concrete; in point of fact it is not from the isolated instance but from the conjoined plurality; and it is in the field not of natural but of statistical law, not of the abstract *per se* but of the concrete *per accidens*. Still, though accidental to the isolated object or the abstract essence, vertical finality is of the very idea of our hierarchic universe, of the ordination of things devised and exploited by the divine Artisan. For the cosmos is not an aggregate of isolated objects hierarchically arranged on isolated levels, but a dynamic whole in which instrumentally, dispositively, materially, obedientially, one level of being or activity subserves another. The interconnections are endless and manifest. Vertical finality would seem beyond dispute.

But if one acknowledges that the same thing, besides its absolute reference to God, may have one finality horizontally and another vertically, there arises the question of systematic comparison between the latter two types of end. First, then, a horizontal end is more essential than a vertical end: for the horizontal end is the end determined by the essence of the thing, while the vertical end is had only by escaping the limitation of isolated essence through the fertility of concrete plurality. On the other hand, a vertical end is more excellent than a horizontal end: for the horizontal end is on the lower level of being but the vertical on some higher level; and from the very concept of hierarchy the higher is the more excellent. Inversely, one cannot say that the vertical end is nonessential or that the horizontal end is not excellent. For the vertical end, though it escapes the limitation of isolated essence and its abstract *per se*, none the less results from the same essence when in concrete combination with other essence. Again, though the vertical end is more excellent, still it is so only relatively; all finality is ultimately to the absolute good, and all is limited in mode of appetition or of process, so that the difference in excellence between higher and lower is never more than a difference in mode with respect to the absolute good.

With perfect generality this establishes hierarchic criteria of more essential and more excellent ends. Universally, the horizontal end is more essential, the vertical end is more excellent. Thus the essential end of oxygen is to perform the offices of oxygen as oxygen; but its

more excellent end is its contribution to the maintenance of human life and this end oxygen attains not in isolation nor *per se* but in combination with other elements and within the human biological process. Similarly, we have to establish the contention of Aquinas that the most essential good of marriage is the child but its most excellent end lies on the supernatural level.¹⁸

THE CONCEPT OF LOVE

The difficulty of conceiving love adequately arises from its essential concreteness and from the complexity of the concrete. Even on a preliminary analysis there are at least four simultaneous aspects. For any activity is at once the act of a faculty and the act of a subject. As act of a faculty (*principium quo*) love is, in the first instance, the basic form of appetite: it is the pure response of appetite to the good, *simplex complacentia boni*,¹⁹ while desire, hope, joy, hatred, aversion, fear, sadness are consequents of the basic response and reflect objective modifications in the circumstances of the motive good.²⁰ But again, as act of a faculty, love besides being the basic form of appetite is also the first principle of process to the end loved;²¹ and the whole of the process is thus but the self-expression of the love that is its first principle. Further, love is the act of a subject (*principium quod*) and as such it is the principle of union between different subjects. Such union is of two kinds, according as it emerges in love as process to an end or in love in the consummation of the end attained. The former may be illustrated by the love of friends pursuing in common a common goal. The latter has its simplest illustration in the ultimate end of the beatific vision which at once is the term of process, of *amor concupiscentiae*, and the fulfilment of union with God, of *amor amicitiae*.²²

So much for a general scheme: love is the basic form of appetite;

¹⁸ “. . . proles est essentialissimum in matrimonio, et secundo fides, et tertio sacramentum” (*Suppl.*, q. 49, a. 3 c). “. . . primus finis respondet matrimonio hominis, inquantum est animal, secundus, inquantum est homo, tertius, inquantum est fidelis” (*ibid.*, q. 65, a. 1).

¹⁹ *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 25, a. 2 c. ²⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 25, aa. 1, 2; q. 27, a. 4; q. 28, a. 6.

²¹ “. . . principium motus tendentis in finem amatum” (*ibid.*, q. 26, a. 1).

²² The terms, *amor concupiscentiae*, *amor amicitiae*, vary somewhat in connotation in St. Thomas; contrast: *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 26, a. 4 c et ad 1m; q. 27, a. 3 c; q. 28, a. 2 c; II-II, q. 23, a. 1 (*Eth. Nic.*, 1156a 4).

it is the first principle of process; it is a ground of union of different subjects both in their process to a common end and in the consummation of the end attained. But besides this multiplicity of aspects, to be verified in any instance of love, there also is a multiplicity of appetites and of loves generating within a single subject tensions and even contradictions. Inevitably such objective tensions obscure the nature of love, and a clarification is our next task. For there seems to be some confusion as to the meaning of the tag, *appetitus tendit in bonum sibi conveniens*. This, I think, means no more than the specialization of appetite: there are many appetites, but not any one responds to any motive; each has its proper object, to which it is specially fitted, and to that alone does it respond. Certainly, I cannot grant that the tag contains some facile and obscure metaphysic of selfishness. For appetite as appetite is indifferently egoistic or altruistic: my hunger is for my good; but maternal instinct is for the good of the child; and rational appetite, with the specialized object of the reasonable good, moves on an absolute level to descend in favor of self or of others as reason dictates. Just as food suits hunger, just as care of her child suits a mother, so the reasonable good suits rational appetite; on the other hand, being unreasonable is what suits mistaken self-love.

This contention is fundamental, but it is not new. As Aristotle saw with remarkable clarity and set forth in a famous chapter of his *Ethics*, the opposition is not between egoism and altruism but between virtue and vice. The wicked are true friends neither to themselves nor to others.²³ On the other hand, a wise and thorough egoist will take to himself what is best; but that is knowledge and virtue; and as he attains these, he becomes the opposite of what is meant by a selfish man. Thus only by being a true friend to oneself can one be a decent friend to others; and the value of one's friendship, from any viewpoint, rises only with an increase in true friendship to oneself.²⁴ But what is true friendship? The question touches a methodological defect in Aristotle's thought. Intent on a practical goal, he defined virtue empirically and ruled out discussion of an absolute good. In this manner he excluded what really is the logical and the ontological first in his ethical theory: for it is only in a tendency to an absolute that one can transcend both egoism and altruism; and such tran-

²³ *Eth. Nic.*, 1157a 16 ff.; 1166b 2 ff.; 1169a 12 ff. ²⁴ *Ibid.*, IX, 8; cf. 4.

scendence is implicit in the Aristotelian notion of true friendship with its basis not in pleasure nor in advantage but in the objective loveliness of the virtuous man.²⁵ For objective loveliness involves an absolute good, and so what is implicit in Aristotle became explicit in Aquinas when he affirmed that man and, as well, all creatures according to their mode naturally love God above all things.²⁶ And, of course, this love of God above all is only a particular case of the general theorem that absolutely all finality is to God.

It remains that the true account of selfishness be given, for it is necessary for an understanding of love and, still more, of the ascent of love. In beatitude, then, which is the ultimate consummation of love in union, there is a simultaneous and full actuation of all potencies, but in the process to consummation the very multiplicity of appetites gives rise to an inner tension. In this tension the rational part of man is at a disadvantage,²⁷ for natural spontaneity takes care of itself while knowledge and virtue have to be acquired. Things were otherwise before the Fall: then reason had its preternatural gifts and grace a full abundance, so that man's inner justice and rectitude were in a stable equilibrium with reason totally subjected to God, and lower appetites to reason.²⁸ Now it is the loss of this rectitude that underlies the familiar opposition between the idealism of human aspiration and the sorry facts of human performance. "The spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak" (Matt. 26:41). "It is not what I wish that I do, but what I hate, that I do" (Rom. 7:15). To quote the Philosopher: "Most men will what is noble but choose what is advantageous."²⁹ To quote the Theologian: "Even without grace man naturally loves God above all things but, from the corruption of nature, rational will seeks self."³⁰

But the point to which we would particularly draw attention is the dialectical and social aspect of this tension and opposition. For while it may happen that after each failure to carry out ideal aspiration man repents and reasserts the primacy of the ideal over the real, of

²⁵ *Ibid.*, VIII, 3-7; esp. 1156b 7 ff.

²⁶ *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3 c; *Quodl. I*, a. 8 c et ad 3m.

²⁷ *In I Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4m. This line of thought I developed in an earlier article in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES*, III (1942), 69 ff.

²⁸ *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 95, a. 1. ²⁹ *Eth. Nic.*, 1162b 35.

³⁰ *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3 c.

what ought to be over what is, it may also happen that after repeated failure man begins to rationalize, to deform knowledge into harmony with disorderly loves. Such rationalization may involve any degree of culpability, from the maximum of a sin against the light which rejects known truth, to the minimum of precluding such futurible advance in knowledge and virtue as without even unconscious rationalization would have been achieved. Moreover, this deformation takes place not only in the individual but also and much more convincingly in the social conscience. For to the common mind of the community the facts of life are the poor performance of men in open contradiction with the idealism of human aspiration; and this antithesis between brutal fact and spiritual orientation leaves the will a choice in which truth seems burdened with the unreal and unpractical air of falsity. Thus it is that a succession of so-called bold spirits have only to affirm publicly a dialectical series of rationalizations gradually to undermine and eventually to destroy the spiritual capital of the community; thus also a culture or a civilization changes its color to the objectively organized lie of ideology in a trans-Marxian sense and sin ascends its regal throne (Rom. 5:21) in the Augustinian *civitas terrena*. To pierce the darkness of such ideology the divine Logos came into the world; to sap its root in weak human will He sent His Spirit of Love into our hearts; and in this redemption we are justified, rectified, renewed,³¹ yet never in this life to the point that greater justification, rectification, renewal ceases to be possible.³² Finally, just as there is a human solidarity in sin with a dialectical descent deforming knowledge and perverting will, so also there is a divine solidarity in grace which is the Mystical Body of Christ; as evil performance confirms us in evil, so good edifies us in our building unto eternal life; and as private rationalization finds support in fact, in common teaching, in public approval, so also the ascent of the soul towards God is not a merely private affair but rather a personal function of an objective common movement in that Body of Christ which takes over, transforms, and elevates every aspect of human life.

THE PRIMARY REASON AND CAUSE OF MARRIAGE

It is in this complex field of human struggle that the encyclical, *Casti Connubii*, places the primary reason and cause of marriage. It

³¹ *Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 1 ff.; *De Virt.*, a. 10, ad 14m. ³² *DB*, 803.

quotes the Roman Catechism to the effect that conjugal love is to be a pure and holy love, not such as the mutual love of adulterers, but such as the mutual love of Christ and His Church. This divine charity, it asserts, is to be effective as well as affective, to be proved by deeds and, above all, by mutual support in a continuous development of the Pauline "interior man," so that through their life in common husband and wife progress daily in virtue and most of all in charity towards God and their neighbour. As though anticipating the objection of the pseudorealists, the encyclical goes on to insist that Christ our Lord is not only the complete model of sanctity but also a model set before all by God Himself; that this model is to be imitated by all, no matter what their station or state of life; that, as the example of the saints confirms, all can and should strive with God's help to attain the very summit of Christian perfection. Finally, according to the encyclical, it is this mutual influence toward development, this sustained effort of common improvement, that, rightly is acknowledged by the Roman Catechism as even the primary reason and cause of marriage; though in this context marriage is to be understood, not strictly as an institution for the proper rearing of children, but broadly as two lives at one till death, lived in intimacy, lived in pursuit of a common goal.³³

If I have paraphrased this passage fairly, I think there can be no doubt that the encyclical is speaking of a process of development through conjugal love to the very summit of Christian perfection. Now such a process cannot but be an end (*finis operis*) of Christian marriage. For, if we prescind from the mind of God, then first there must be the objective ordination which is presupposed by the universal exhortation of the encyclical; second, there will be actual desire of attainment in some individuals; third, there will be some measure of actual attainment. Of these the first is *finis operis*, the second *finis operantis*, the third efficient causality. But what the encyclical is concerned to affirm is the first, the objective ordination, the duty of husband and wife to advance together in the spiritual life.³⁴ But how

³³ AAS, XXII (1930), 548; or DB, 2232.

³⁴ Fr. Ford (*op. cit.*, p. 372) argued from the authority of Fr. Hürth and from the explicit reference of the encyclical to the Roman Catechism that the intention of the encyclical was to speak not of an end (*finis operis*) but of a motive (*finis operantis*). Three questions may be distinguished: first, the mind and intention of theologians employed in the composition of the encyclical; second, the objective meaning of the document; third, the impli-

can this be so? How can a natural institution have a supernatural end? The general answer lies in our already formulated category of vertical finality: all Christians are called to the imitation of Christ, to the summit of Christian perfection; but from marriage there is a dispositive up-thrust giving a new modality to that high pursuit, for husband and wife are called not only to advance but to advance together. Such is the generic answer. To make it specific one has to set the complex nature of love in the empty category of vertical finality; one has to study the ascent of love from the level of nature to the level of the beatific vision.

On any level, then, love has a passive aspect (A) inasmuch as it is response to motive good, an immanent aspect (B) inasmuch as it is a perfection of the lover, and an active aspect (C) inasmuch as it is productive of further instances of the good. But on the level of

cation of the document. I am inclined to regard the first question as only remotely relevant. As to the second, neither the encyclical nor the catechism mentions any specific type of causality; they speak of reasons and causes; they do not state whether the causes are material, formal, efficient, or final; much less do they distinguish different kinds of final cause. As to the third, three types of implication may be distinguished, namely, formal, material, scientific. I have failed to discern in either document a formal implication of some specific type of causality; on the contrary, each is concerned with its essentially doctrinal function and neither seems to have theoretical preoccupations or the intention of settling some speculative issue. On the other hand, there is, of course, material implication of specific types of causality, for the causes assigned must, as a matter of fact, belong to some specific type. Thus, the beauty of the bride and the size of her dowry are motives (*Cat. Rom.*, II, VIII, 14); the procreation of children intended by the Creator from the beginning is an end (*ibid.*, 13); sexual impulse seems an efficient cause (*loc.cit.*); the hope of mutual aid is a motive (*loc.cit.*); the requirement that husband and wife be joined in a pure and holy love, such as Christ's for His Church, is a precept presupposing an objective ordination and so a *finis operis* (*ibid.*, 24). However, though such material implications exist, properly they do not pertain to the document but to a reader's use of philosophic categories in interpreting the document; and so to argue, in virtue of a parallelism, from the material implication of one document to the material implication of another seems remote enough to be doubtful. This doubt is confirmed by the fact that the encyclical begins by referring to q. 24 in the catechism and, without changing its topic, ends by referring to q. 13 (*loc. cit.*); but the former deals with a precept which presupposes an objective ordination and so an end, while the latter deals with a motive; such ambiguity of material implication, besides accounting for current difficulties of interpretation, also shows that the material implications lie outside the attention and intention of the document. Nor is it altogether irrelevant to recall both that the encyclical notably expands and develops the idea of the catechism and that its *primaria causa et ratio* is a much stronger phrase than the latter's *prima igitur est*. Finally, even if it were certain that the encyclical were speaking of a motive, there would remain the possibility of a scientific implication of an end. Such a deduction we make in the text.

reason there is superposed on each of these three aspects a fourth of reflection and freedom (D) inasmuch as rational love examines and selects its motives (A), deliberately wills its own immanent perfection (B), and freely proceeds to effect further instances of the good (C). Now in man this rational process is embedded in a field of natural spontaneity and infused virtue. On the level lower than reason, appetite, in its triple aspect of passivity, immanent perfection, and activity, is very obviously the work of God who implants in nature its proper mode of response and orientation.³⁵ But on the level of reason itself, there is an antecedent spontaneity to truth and goodness through which God governs the self-government of man.³⁶ And on the highest level of grace there is a heightening or elevating transformation of the rational level's antecedent spontaneity, so that the truth through which God rules man's autonomy is the truth God reveals beyond reason's reach, and the good which is motive is the divine goodness that is motive of infused charity.³⁷ Finally, these three levels are realized in one subject; as the higher perfects the lower, so the lower disposes to the higher; and it is in this disposition of natural spontaneity to reinforce reason, of reason to reinforce grace—for all three come from and return to God³⁸—that is to be found the ascent of love that gives human marriage a finality on the level of Christian charity and perfection. Such is the thesis; we proceed to verify it, considering first love as passive; second, love as immanent; and third, love as active.

In the first place, then, love is passive response (A) to motive good. But motive good is either God Himself or else some manifestation of divine perfection. If the former, God may be apprehended by reason, by faith, or by vision. If the latter, the motive may be the excellence of a person, of a state of affairs such as peace or a happy family, or finally a thing. Superposing the reflective aspect of freedom (D) upon the multiplicity of motives for the passive aspect (A), we arrive at the question of the right order of loving. Now God, the ground of all excellence, is to be loved absolutely: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind" (Matt. 22:37). As Aquinas elaborates the precept,

³⁵ *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 103, a. 1, ad 3m. ³⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 5, ad 3m.

³⁷ For a fuller statement, cf. THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, III (1942), 576.

³⁸ Cf. O'Mahony, *op. cit.*, pp. 62 ff.

God is to be loved above all things,³⁹ more than self,⁴⁰ as good in Himself more than as good to us,⁴¹ because of Himself (whether the "because" is understood of the formal cause, for God is goodness itself, of the final cause, for God is the end of all, or of the efficient cause, for God is the cause of all good);⁴² God is to be loved immediately,⁴³ totally,⁴⁴ and without measure or limit.⁴⁵ On the other hand, creatures are to be loved according to the measure of their excellence, which also is the measure of their proximity to God by assimilation. Still such proximity and assimilation may be actual or potential, and so we may love others not only according to the assimilation they already possess but also according to the assimilation we wish them to have.⁴⁶ But whence that wishing? It is the insertion of other proximity and love into the order of divine charity. It is the vertical up-thrust, the ascent, that crosses from lower to higher levels of appetite and process. Not only is it true that man should love other objects in virtue of his love of God; it is also true that he can love God only in an ascent through participated to absolute excellence. Thus, love of others is proof of love of God: "If we love one another, God abides in us and his charity is perfected in us" (I John 4:12). Hatred of others is proof of hatred of God: "If anyone says, 'I love God,' and hates his brother, he is a liar. For how can he who does not love his brother, whom he sees, love God, whom he does not see?" (*ibid.*, v. 20). Now towards this high goal of charity it is no small beginning in the weak and imperfect heart of fallen man to be startled by a beauty that shifts the center of appetite out of self; and such a shift is effected on the level of sensitive spontaneity by *erôs* leaping in through delighted eyes and establishing itself as unrest in absence and an imperious demand for company.⁴⁷ Next, company may reveal deeper qualities of mind and character to shift again the center from the merely organistic tendencies of nature to the rational level of friendship with its enduring basis in the excellence of a good person.⁴⁸ Finally, grace inserts into charity the love that nature gives and reason

³⁹ *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3 c.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, ad 3m.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 6.

⁴⁷ Cf. *Eth. Nic.*, 1167a 3-7; 1157a 7-11.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 3.

⁴² *Ibid.*, q. 27, a. 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 5.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 26, aa. 4-13, esp. aa. 4, 7, 8, 13.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, VIII, 3-7.

approves. Thus we have a dispositive up-thrust from *erôs* to friendship, and from friendship to a special order of charity.

In the second place, love is an immanent perfection (B) with three formal effects: a moral effect, a relative effect, and a unitive effect. It has a moral effect, for as our loving is orderly or disorderly, we make ourselves virtuous or vicious; just as technique makes a good job, so virtue makes a good person.⁴⁹ Thus, as we have pointed out already, true love of self is love of virtue, while to love self wrongly is to hate self. But consequent to this moral effect there is a relative effect: a good person is a lovable person; and it is only the friendship based upon this loveliness that Aristotle considered worthy of the name.⁵⁰ But when love is habitual and reciprocated, there emerges a third formal effect: then love unites; it makes lovers parts of a larger unit⁵¹ with each to the other as another self, a *dimidium animae suae*.⁵² Now in the union that is the Mystical Body of Christ we are all "severally members one of another" (Rom. 12:5), parts of a larger unit in which we are to love "thy neighbour as thyself" (Matt. 22:39). But in fallen man this objective unity of the Mystical Body runs ahead of its appetitive component of love; and much the same is true of man's objective unity in a common humanity with its historical solidarity, and even of the objective unities of states and nations, of occupations, of time and place.

On the other hand, in marriage the initial drive is not in an intellectual apprehension of objective unity calling for its appetitive component but precisely in the appetitive component itself. Husband and wife are made for one another by sexual differentiation and are brought to one another by sexual attraction. Moreover, this bringing together is such as to involve a full realization of the existence of another self: for there is no reasonable basis for marriage except the basis of a contract that holds for life, while the self-surrender to a life partner in that contract is also no more than the rational form,

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 5, 1106a 14 ff. ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 1156a 17, b 7.

⁵¹ *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3; II-II, q. 26, a. 3; cf. *Politics*, 1337a 29; 1253a 20. The idea of friends as parts of a larger unit is closely connected with the idea that all friendship is in a *κοινωνία* (*Eth. Nic.*, 1161b 11).

⁵² *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 28, a. 1; *Eth. Nic.*, 1171a 33; cf. *ibid.*, 1161b 29; 1166a 32; 1169b 7; 1170b 6.

postulated by man's rational being, of the mutual self-donation contained in the marriage act itself.⁵³ Both on the level of spontaneity and on the level of reason, marriage is the real apprehension, the intense appetite, the full expression of union with another self. Again, what holds of husband and wife holds equally though differently of parents and children: for children do not come as distinct selves but, as Aristotle observed, as parts of self that gradually become distinct.⁵⁴ Finally, not only does marriage concretely unfold the meaning of love, the meaning that there are other selves, on the levels of natural spontaneity and reflective reason; it also does so on the level of grace. What Adam saw in Eve taken from his side,⁵⁵ what Christ our Lord confirmed,⁵⁶ has been transposed to another and higher order by the very fact of incorporation in the Body of Christ. For now it is "because we are members of his body, made from his flesh and from his bones. For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two shall become one flesh" (Eph. 5:30 f.). As fornication has taken on the note of sacrilege,⁵⁷ so marriage has become the sacrament of the union of Christ and His Church. It is the efficacious sacrament of the realization of another self in Christ, and its up-thrusting finalistic drive, its primary reason and cause, is to the very summit of Christian perfection in which in due order all members of the Mystical Body are known and loved as other selves.

This goal is to be attained by love under its third, its active aspect (C). In this activity and productivity love looks back to the motive good (C₁), it actuates its own immanent perfection (C₂), and it moves towards its ultimate end and consummation (C₃). With respect to its motive good, active love is productive in four ways. Seeking its own self-perpetuation, it effects contemplation of the motive good. Seeking its own self-expression, it effects imitations and reproductions

⁵³ See Doms, *Du sens et de la fin . . .*, pp. 61 ff.

⁵⁴ *Eth. Nic.*, 1161b 18; cf. 1167b 17 ff.

⁵⁵ "Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife and they shall be two in one flesh" (Gen. 2:24).

⁵⁶ "What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder" (Matt. 19:6).

⁵⁷ "Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them members of a harlot? By no means. Or do you not know that he who cleaves to a harlot, becomes one body with her?" (I Cor. 6:15 f.).

of the motive good. Separated from the motive good, it seeks possession of it. And if the motive good itself is merely a project, love endeavors to produce it. These four types of love active with respect to its motive good are enumerated not because they are always distinct, but only because they may be distinct. Further, of the four, three are too obvious to need comment; but the self-expression of love is an idea that may benefit from illustration. Such self-expression, then, is the aspect of volitional efficiency in the principle, *bonum est sui diffusivum*: its primary instance is God manifesting His perfections by creation,⁵⁸ and to this corresponds the effort of all creation to attain ever greater assimilation to God,⁵⁹ whence the precept, "You therefore are to be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48). But the same movement of self-expression, which is quite distinct from willing means for ends,⁶⁰ has innumerable other instances of which the most relevant is that of the family; there the mutual love of husband and wife effects reproductions of its motive in children, and the filial love of children responds to parental education in seeking assimilation to the parents.

Next, active love, besides looking back to the motive good, also reflects and actuates more fully the immanent perfection of love (C₂). Contemplation, expression, possession, or achievement of a motive good is also an actuation of true or false self-love according as the right or wrong motive is loved and in the right or wrong measure;

⁵⁸ *DB*, 1783. ⁵⁹ *C. Gent.*, III, 19.

⁶⁰ Means are willed, not at all for their own sake, but only for sake of the ends. On the other hand, what is loved in love's self-expression is loved in itself though as a secondary object and from a superabundance of love towards the primary object which is imitated or reproduced. Thus, God loves creatures not as mere means but as secondary objects; similarly, Christian charity is to love one's neighbour for the sake of God, yet this is not to make a mere means of one's neighbour, but to love him in himself and for himself as a manifestation, actual or potential, of the perfection of God. Parallel to this position in the volitional order, there is a similar position in the ontological order. There the mere means is represented by the mere instrument; but the mere instrument emerges only from a limited viewpoint. Reality is either act or potency: as act, it is end; as potency, it is what is for the end. The mere instrument is had only inasmuch as the act of lower potency subserves the act of higher potency in another subject; and this is from a limited viewpoint, since the act of lower potency is the perfection and end of that potency before it is instrumental to higher act; the plane is built to fly and only consequently to its actual attainment of flying does man fly. Hence, it is gravely misleading to term means and instrument whatever is not primary end.

simultaneously it is an increase or decrease in the lovableness of the lover and so an elevation or debasing of the union of friendship. But this last and most relevant aspect may best be approached from another angle. For just as habitual and reciprocated love has the formal effect of constituting a union, of setting up mutual other selves, so a common end, defined by a common motive and sought in the common effort of friends sharing a common life, actuates the common consciousness of mutual other selves. On the plane of marriage this is the *totius vitae communio, consuetudo, societas* of which the encyclical speaks; but the same idea in its proper generality is worked out by Aristotle in the following manner. The basic principle is that, as a man is to himself, so also he is to his friend. Now a man is to himself in consciousness of his being, and he is conscious of his being through activity; hence to be to his friend as he is to himself, the common consciousness of mutual other selves has to find a common activity; and since activity results from response to motive, this common activity presupposes a coincidence of views, profound or superficial, on the meaning of life, on what makes life worth while and sets a goal to human striving. Hence, "Whatever it is that men value in life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises or hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life." Now this expansion of a common consciousness in a common life cannot but be, as we have indicated already, also an expansion and development of a common conscience. For one's ideas on life, one's moral conscience, one's deeds, the expressed ideas of others near one, and their deeds, all are linked together in a field of mutual influence and adaptation for better or for worse. So Aristotle continues, "The friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve—whence the saying, Noble deeds from noble men."⁶¹

⁶¹ *Eth. Nic.*, IX, 12, 1171a 33 ff. The two sentences in quotation marks are from Ross's translation (Oxford). The rest of the passage I have expanded.

Evidently enough, such an expansion of conjugal love into a common consciousness and conscience the Church protects by the Pauline privilege, by the impediments of mixed religion and disparity of cult, and, in cases of utter failure, by the *separatio mensae et thori*. However, our point is not merely such recognition of fact but the dynamic ascent of love, the up-thrust from love on a lower level to more perfect love on a higher level. Now already in discussing love as passive (A), and as immanent (B) we have indicated such ascents; but if by ascent one understands development, then from the nature of the case the ascent of love comes only from love as active (C). Further, we have implied that such ascent is a dispositive influence: the lower is not the mere instrument of the higher, nor material from which it is educed nor obediential potency for it; but granted several levels of activity and love, then there is an intensification⁶² of the higher by the lower, a stability resulting not from mere absence of tension but from positive harmony between different levels, and, most dynamic, the integration by which the lower in its expansion involves a development in the higher. Thus, *erôs* leads to company; but company reveals deeper qualities of mind and character to set up a human friendship; a human friendship cannot but intensify the mutual charity of members of the Mystical Body; finally, it is in charity to one another that, in truth and reality, as St. John so clearly taught, people come to the love of God. But next, sexual differentiation makes man and woman complementary beings for the living of life: it sets up spontaneously a division of labor not only with regard to children but also with regard to the whole domestic economy; each partner is part of a larger whole, invited to fit into that whole, and so intense is the intimacy of that common life, so serious its responsibilities, that reason seals it with an inviolable contract and grace with a sacrament. Now in that contract and sacrament, consummated in the flesh, another self is most intensively apprehended, loved, realized. So married life is launched, but the human and infused virtues that already exist will be tested by the life in common; they will be heightened by the almost palpable responsibility of children; they will develop in the midst of trials faced together; they will be purified in the serenity of old age, when perforce

⁶² Aquinas recognizes two grounds of love: the excellence of the object and our proximity to it; to the former he attributes the species of love; to the latter its intensity (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 7; cf. aa. 8, 9, 11).

the self becomes selfless as the field of enjoyment contracts to joy in the enjoyment of others, in the romping vitality of grandchildren. This educative process is objective; it comes whether willed or not; but if, as should be, at some time people begin to co-operate with the scheme of things, then their hearts turn and settle on the real meaning of life; their goal will be not just fun but, here below, the humanistic goal of the Aristotelian good life, and supernaturally the beatific vision. Then their mutual actuation of a common consciousness and conscience will be a rejection of the world's dialectical rationalizations, a focal point in the stream of history for the fostering of growth in the mind and heart of Christ, a pursuit of the highest human and eternal ends. Such surely is the meaning of the encyclical when it affirms that marriage, considered broadly as *totius vitae communio, consuetudo, societas*, has as its primary reason and cause a mutual influence, a sustained effort of common improvement, tending to the very summit of Christian perfection. Any insertion of spontaneous union or human friendship into charity, which is friendship in Christ, has not the ground of supernatural excellence achieved but the end of such excellence to be achieved.⁶⁸ It follows that the compenetrating consciousness of lives shared by marriage is dynamic and reaches forth to will and to realize in common the advance in Christian perfection that leads from the consummation of two-in-one-flesh to the consummation of the beatific vision.

THE HIERARCHY OF ENDS IN MARRIAGE

The hierarchy of ends in marriage can be understood only in the context of the more general hierarchy in human process. Man has three ends: life, the good life, and eternal life. Now by man is meant not an abstract essence nor a concrete individual but the concrete aggregate of all men of all times. Thus, as in current physics, the viewpoint is four-dimensional; or, as in medieval philosophy, the viewpoint is eternal, seeing *omnia simul*; for though the things seen are at different times in their internal temporal relationships, still it is possible and proper for the human intellect to imitate the divine and by abstraction stand outside the temporal flow in which really, though not of necessity intentionally, it is involved. The importance

⁶⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, a. 7.

of adopting this viewpoint arises from a difference in man's three ends. The emergence and maintenance of human life is repetitive. But the attainment of the human good life is an historical development, a unique process, not repeated for each individual, as is life, but a single thing shared by all individuals according to their position and role in the space-time solidarity of man. Finally, the end of eternal life stands completely outside both the measurable time of repetitive life and the ordinal time of progressive good life. Such differences make it imperative that we view human process not in the distorting cross-section of any particular instant of time but from outside time.

Corresponding to the three human ends—life, the good life, and eternal life—are three levels of human activity: there is the level of "nature" understood in the current restricted sense of physical, vital, sensitive spontaneity; there is the level of reason and rational appetite; and there is the level of divine grace. Throughout, nature is characterized by repetitiveness: over and over again it achieves mere reproductions of what has been achieved already; and any escape from such cyclic recurrence is *per accidens* and *in minori parte* or, in modern language, due to chance variation. But in contrast with this repetitiveness of nature is the progressiveness of reason. For if it is characteristic of all intellect to grasp immutable truth, it is the special property of the potential intellect of man to advance in knowledge of truth. Nor is it merely the individual that advances, as though knowledge were classically static, a fund whence schoolboys receive a dole. On the contrary, to the historian of science or philosophy and still more to the anthropologist, the individual of genius appears no more than the instrument of human solidarity; through such individuals humanity advances, and the function of tradition and education is to maintain the continuity of a development that runs from the days of primitive fruit-gatherers through our own of mechanical power on into an unknown future. But not only are nature and reason contrasted as repetitive and progressive. There is also a contrast between the organistic spontaneity of nature and the deliberate friendships of reason. By "organistic" spontaneity I would denote the mutual adaptation and automatic correlation of the activities of many individuals as though they were parts of a larger organic unit: this phenomenon may be illustrated by the anthep or the beehive; but

its more general appearance lies in the unity of the family, a unity which nature as spontaneously and as imperiously attains in the accidental order as in the substantial it effects the unity of the organism. Now it is not by organistic spontaneity but by mutual esteem and mutual good will that reason sets up its comparable union of friendship; and in accordance with our eternal viewpoint we may note that human friendship is to be found not only in the urbanity and collaboration of contemporaries but much more in the great republic of culture, in contemporaries' esteem for the great men of the past, on whose shoulders they stand, and in their devotion to men of the future, for whom they set the stage of history for better or for worse. A third contrast between nature and reason is in point of efficiency. While nature with the ease of a super-automaton pursues with statistical infallibility and regularly attains through organistic harmonies its repetitive ends, the reason and rational appetite of fallen man limp in the disequilibrium of high aspiration and poor performance to make the progress of reason a dialectic of decline as well as of advance, and the rational community of men a divided unity of hatred and war as well as the indivisible unity of fraternity and peace. Last of all, the process of divine grace contrasts with the characteristics both of nature and of reason. Of itself it is neither repetitive as nature nor progressive as reason but eternal and definitive. It is not the statistical spontaneity of nature, nor the incoherent liberty of man, but the gratuitous action of God. It is the trans-rational spontaneity of revelation and faith and intuition, the trans-organistic efficacy of the Mystical Body of Christ, the uniqueness of eternal achievement: God with us in the hypostatic union, God holding us by the theological virtues, God and ourselves, face to face, in the beatific vision.

Now the correspondence of these three levels of contrasting activity with the three ends of man is only essential. Nature sets its goal in the repetitive emergence and maintenance of life; reason supervenes to set up the historically cumulative and so, on the whole, ever varying pursuit of the good life; grace finally takes over both nature and reason to redirect both repetitive spontaneity and historical development to the supernatural end of eternal life. From such integration there result projections from one level of activity to another: what essentially is natural or rational or of grace receives secondary elements from projec-

tion and transference. Thus nature is spontaneous but reason makes it rational by a host of juridical entities: things become property; they are subjected to laws and regulations; they are enmeshed in a web of human creations. Again, reason seeks its goal of the good life not only in the purely rational pursuits of knowledge and virtue, the Aristotelian beatitude,⁶⁴ but also in a greater excellence added to nature's pursuit of life; and so it is that by arts and crafts, by applied science and technology, by economics and medicine, by marriage and politics, reason transforms the natural *nisus* towards life into a rational attainment of an historically unfolding good life. In like manner grace takes over both nature and reason. The purely rational pursuit of philosophy is made into an instrument as the handmaid of theology; reason itself as reasonable faith is elevated to the level of grace; virtuous living is transformed into merit unto eternal life; repetitive preaching becomes the space-time multiplication of a unique revelation; repetitive doing is elevated into sacraments and liturgy. Inversely the distinctive eternity of the order of grace is submitted to human progress inasmuch as grace sets up a human society or a human science or human advance in virtue; and it is submitted to natural repetitiveness inasmuch as it embraces even the recurrent aspects of human existence.

Now we have been engaged in establishing a basic system of reference for the discussion of any hierarchy of human ends. For such a basic system will prescind from all secondary elements by transference and projection to attend only to the three contrasting types of activity and their three essentially correlated ends. Diagrammatically, then, our system is

P	to	P'	to	P''
Q	to	Q'	to	Q''
R	to	R'	to	R''

where on the level of grace the movement is from the Mystical Body on earth (P), through further communication of sanctifying grace (P'), to the triumphant Mystical Body in heaven (P''); on the level of reason the movement is from the life of knowledge and virtue (Q), through advance in knowledge and virtue (Q'), to man's attainment of the historically unfolding good life (Q''); and on the level of nature the move-

⁶⁴ *Eth. Nic.*, X, 6-9.


ment is from physical, vital, sensitive spontaneity (R), through the actuation of such spontaneity (R'), to the emergence and maintenance of human life (R").

Next, within this skeletal structure of all human process have to be placed the various elements of marriage. As is to be expected, some of these elements are primary, that is, integral parts of the basic types of activity, while others are secondary, that is, by-products of the substantial unity of man and of the integration of human activities.⁶⁵ Thus, on the level of nature, there are fecundity and sex (Z), their actuation in the organistic union of man and wife (Z'), and their horizontal end of adult offspring (Z"); now, these are all primary elements, for they are part of the spontaneous tendencies (R) that terminate in the emergence and maintenance of human life (R"). Again, on the level of reason, there is the friendship of husband and wife (Y) and the marriage contract (Y'); and these are not primary but secondary elements, for they are not necessarily part of the life of knowledge and virtue but conditioned integrations of organistic union within the life of reason.⁶⁶ Further, as a result of such integration, there is the subsumption of the finality of fecundity to offspring under the finality of reason to the historical expansion of the good life; so that while the actuation of fecundity (Z') is for adult offspring (Z"), the end of marriage (Y') is a procreation and education of children (Y") that make the historical process continuous. Finally, on the level of grace, there is the special order of charity between husband and wife (X) and the sacramental marriage bond (X'); and these are not integral parts of the process of grace but rather incorporations of the human friendship and contract

⁶⁵ Hence marriage may be specifically human, as Dr. Doms rightly insists (*Du sens et de la fin . . .*, pp. 17 f. and *passim*), without being a primary element on the rational level of human process, without resulting from the life of reason as such. Inversely, when Aquinas attributes the *bonum proles* as pertaining to marriage inasmuch as man is an animal (*Suppl.*, q. 65, a. 1), there is no necessary implication that marriage is not specifically human.

⁶⁶ It is practically to confine the ends of marriage solely to the generation of offspring, to assert with St. Augustine and St. Thomas that woman was given man as a helpmate in the work of generation and that in any other work another man would be a greater help (see Doms, *op. cit.*, p. 226, n. 31). But there is this kernel of truth in the old position, that marriage is not a primary element in the life of knowledge and virtue; *per se* one does not marry to become a philosopher or an ascetic; were the contradictory true, the counsel of virginity would invite us to forsake not only the life of spontaneous nature but also the life of reason for the sake of the life of grace.

on the supernatural level; and as reason redirects the finality of fecundity to offspring into a finality to educated offspring for the sake of the historical process, so grace effects a further redirection to Christianly educated offspring (X'') that the Mystical Body of Christ may grow to full stature. Hence, as a preliminary scheme, we have the following, in which the symbols have the meanings already assigned and arrows denote horizontal and vertical finalities.



First of all, then, from the viewpoint of marriage, the relevant part of natural spontaneity (R) is bisexual fecundity (Z). Fecundity offers no difficulty. As far as human operation is concerned, it is primarily on the level of nature and its ultimate term is the repetitive emergence of adult offspring. But sex is more complex. Not only is it not a substance but it is not even an accidental potency as intellect or sense. Rather, it is a bias and orientation in a large number of potencies, a typical and complementary differentiation within the species, with a material basis in a difference in the number of chromosomes, with a regulator in the secretions of endocrinal glands, with manifestations not only in anatomical structure and physiological function but also in the totality of vital, psychic, sensitive, emotional characters and consequently, though not formally, in the higher nonorganic activities of reason and rational appetite. But for all its complexity sex remains on the level of spontaneous nature and there, clearly, one may easily recognize that in all its aspects it definitely, if not exclusively, has a role in the process from fecundity to adult offspring. For elementally sex is a difference added to fecundity, dividing it into two complementary semifecundities and so obtaining for offspring the diversity in material cause sanctioned by the impediment of consanguinity. More promi-

nently, sex is the principle of reunion of the divided semifecundities, bringing together on the level of sensitive attraction and local motion what had been separated and placed in different beings on the level of physiology. Finally, sex unites not only the semifecundities of spermatozoon and ovum but also their bearers: it makes male and female complementary beings, postulating their life in common, automatically setting up a division of labor in this life, and automatically providing offspring with a home, that is, with an environmental womb for infancy, childhood, and adolescence. Thus, from one viewpoint, sex is but an aspect of an elaborate process of fecundity. Simple fission in an amoeba gives another adult amoeba. But the more complex the life form, the more elaborate the process from fecundity to adult offspring. Sex is the elaboration of the process.

Still, what from one viewpoint is merely instrumental, may from another be act and perfection and, therefore, end. The science and skill of the doctor are mere means to my health yet not mere means to the doctor in whom they are actuations and perfections at the basis of his vocation, his professional status, his social role, his lifetime occupation. In general, all act is end: it is what potency is for; and though the actuation of a potency may be mere means from some limited viewpoint, always it is at least a material end to the actuated subject. Thus, sex as a differentiation of fecundity is merely an instrument of fecundity in the latter's process to adult offspring. But at the same time it is a quality and capacity of subjects or persons. To them its actuation is at least a material end, that is, an end that can and ought to be integrated with higher ends. Further, the actuation of sex involves the organic union of a concrete plurality and, as such, it has a vertical finality. Such an up-thrust follows from our general theory. In the vegetal and animal kingdoms it has its verification in the measure of truth that may be attributed to theories of evolution in terms of statistical laws and probabilities regarding combinations of genes through random mating.⁶⁷ But in man the up-thrust is to the human and personalist aspects of marriage, to projections from fecundity and sex to the levels of reason and grace. For if the human family was not left to the invention of reason, if its root lies in sexual differentiation,

⁶⁷ For a professional but non-mathematical account of this theory, see Shull, *Evolution* (New York, 1936), chaps. V-X.

its release in the attraction and compulsion of *erôs*, its repetitive fulfillment in a mutual actuation that reabsorbs husband and wife back into the elemental rhythms of the biosphere, its autumnal glory in the spontaneous devotion of parents to each other and to children, of children to parents and to one another, none the less the human family is never merely such spontaneity, repetitiveness, organisticity. Man is rational. Even if often reason is no more than the mere servant of irreflective appetite, even then the actuation of bisexual fecundity is a friendship of pleasure and mutual advantage. But, as Aristotle observed, husband and wife have only to be decent people for their friendship to be one of virtue,⁶⁸ that is, one based upon the objective loveliness of qualities of mind and character. Here it is remarkable to note that Aristotle counted the friendship of virtue something rare,⁶⁹ so that a minimum of virtue, simple decency, obtains for husband and wife what only exceptional virtue obtains elsewhere. Such, then, is the dispositive up-thrust of sex to human friendship, an up-thrust that is realized when even a mediocre life of knowledge and virtue (Q) sets up a human friendship (Y) to incorporate on the level of reason an actuation of *erôs* and sex (Z'). But in like manner the life of grace (P) embracing this friendship (Y) effects a further projection to the supernatural level, namely, the special order of charity (X) that obtains between husband and wife.⁷⁰

Next, both of these projections have up-thrusts of their own. The human friendship of virtue (Y) finds in married life an educative process and so has a tendency not merely to the expansion of the friendship but also to advance in the whole human life of knowledge and virtue (Q'). In like manner, the special order of charity (X) has an up-thrust to advance in the whole of Christian perfection of which the principal part is sanctifying grace (P'). For in both cases there is, in love as active, the expansion of a common consciousness and conscience and, if it is more usual to think of people advancing in human perfection and working out their salvation under the conditions of married life, it is no less accurate to think of married life as the matrix of conditions that supplies an up-thrust to advance in human and supernatural perfection. Indeed, there is a special appropriateness in the latter viewpoint:

⁶⁸ *Eth. Nic.*, 1162a 25.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 1156b 24 f.

⁷⁰ *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 11.

as we have seen already, human development is a personal function of an objective movement in the space-time solidarity of man, and married life a series of steps upward through love of one's neighbour to the love of God.⁷¹

But were this the full analysis one would have to accept a position somewhat similar to that of Dr. Doms. Marriage would have its center in the organistic union (Z'); on the level of nature it would have a horizontal finality to the biological resultant of offspring (Z''); and it would have a vertical up-thrust to personalist ends in friendship (Y) and advancing virtue (Q'), in a special order of charity (X) and the whole of Christian perfection (P'). However, it is only generically that a human friendship and a special order of charity satisfy the up-thrust of bisexual fecundity. Unlike the more facile life of ignorance and selfishness, the life of knowledge and virtue incorporates on the level of reason not merely organistic union but also the whole process from bisexual fecundity to adult offspring. Now this difference happens to correspond to the distinction drawn in the encyclical between marriage in a broad sense and marriage in a strict sense: the former is a human friendship—*totius vitae communio, consuetudo, societas*⁷²—to which sex as unitive disposes; the latter is the contractual bond that incorporates on the level of reason the concrete totality of sex, both its unitive tendencies and its horizontal finality in the process from fecundity to adult offspring.

Here three points are to be observed. First, marriage is the rational form, the incorporation on the level of reason, not of the child nor of the fecundity of parents, but of sex and of the finality of sex to the child. Not the child, for it advances to the level of reason by divine action, by the infusion of the soul. Not the fecundity of parents, for the marriage is valid even though the parents are sterile. It incorporates sex, for the sexual deficiency of impotence is a diriment impediment; and it incorporates the finality of sex to the child, for the object of marital right is *actus per se apti ad prolis generationem*. In the second place, marriage is more an incorporation of the finality of sex than of sex itself. Of course, it is just the opposite that seems true to phenomenologist scrutiny, for that ignores the metaphysical principle that what is prior *quoad se* is posterior *quoad nos*, and that the more ultimate final

⁷¹ Cf. *sup.* pp. 485 ff., 495 ff.

⁷² *Loc. cit.*

cause enters more intimately into the nature of a thing than the more proximate.⁷³ But, as we argued above, on the essential or horizontal level of natural spontaneity, sex is but a differentiation of fecundity and a means to the adult offspring that is the end of fecundity. If, then, reason incorporates sex as sex is in itself, it will incorporate it as subordinate to its horizontal end, and so marriage will be an incorporation of the horizontal finality of sex much more than of sex itself; nor is this to forget vertical finality, for vertical and horizontal finalities are not alternatives, but the vertical emerges all the more strongly as the horizontal is realized the more fully. Third and lastly, the incorporation of natural finality to adult offspring involves a redirection of that finality to higher ends. The life of reason and rational appetite has its end, here below, in the historical unfolding of the human good life (Q"); the life of grace has its end in the triumphant Mystical Body in heaven (P"). Hence when the finality to adult offspring (Z") is incorporated on the level of reason, it becomes a finality to educated adult offspring (Y"); and when it is incorporated on the level of grace, it becomes a finality to Christianly educated offspring (X"). The latter subsumption and redirection of lower under higher finality is clearer than the

⁷³ Cf. *In Lib. de Causis*, lect. 1. This, I think, touches upon a fundamental methodological error in the analysis presented by Dr. Doms. I agree that sex is to be distinguished from fecundity, as impotence from sterility. I agree with the validity of the question: What is the ontological significance of bisexuality? It is only a terminological difference when he asserts that the meaning of marriage is union and I say that the act and end of bisexuality is union, or when in different ways we both place two ends beyond this union. But when he speaks of this meaning of union as immanent, intrinsic, immediate, I distinguish: in the chronological order of human knowledge or of the development of human appreciation, the union is first; but in the ontological order the ordinations to the ends are more immanent, more intrinsic, more immediate to the union than the union itself. For what is first in the ontological constitution of a thing is not the experiential datum but, on the contrary, what is known in the last and most general act of understanding with regard to it; what is next, is the next most general understanding; etc. Thus, the proximate end of bisexuality is union; but of its nature, bisexuality is an instrument of fecundity, so that the end of fecundity is more an end of bisexuality than is union; similarly, bisexual union has a vertical up-thrust to higher unions of friendship and charity; and these enter more intimately into the significance of bisexuality than does the union on the level of nature. See my note on *immediatio virtutis*, THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, III (1942), 376, for references to this line of Thomist thought. As to the difficulty that frequently procreation is objectively impossible and may be known to be so, distinguish motives and ends; as to motives, the difficulty is solved only by multiple motives and ends; as to ends, there is no difficulty, for the ordination of intercourse to conception is not a natural law, like "fire burns," but a statistical law, which suffices for an objective ordination.

former. Christian parents are the representatives and the instruments of Christ and His Bride, the Church, and so they generate children to have them regenerated in Christ and they educate them for their eternal role in the triumphant Mystical Body in heaven. But just as the life of grace wills offspring for the full expansion of the Mystical Body, so also the life of reason wills offspring for the continuity of reason's own historical unfolding of the human good life. It is this elevation of lower finality that makes the end of marriage not only the procreation but also the education of children, with the former the material and the latter the formal condition of historical continuity; further, the relativity of history accounts for the relativity in the obligation of parents to educate. But as theologians, let alone parents, rarely think of the historical process, it must be noted that we speak not of a *finis operantis* but of a *finis operis* and that we do so in its most general terms. No one will find a motive in the historical process as such. What moves men and women is some concrete aspect of history, a national destiny, the maintenance of a cultural tradition, the continuity of a family; and even this will be apprehended by parents, not in its abstract generality, but concretely as the good of bringing into the world and leaving in it behind them others like themselves.⁷⁴

This brings us to our main analytic conclusion. The process of bisexual fecundity (Z, Z', Z'') is in man integrated with the processes of reason and of grace. Such integration takes place by projection, by the incorporation of the lower level of activity within the higher. The incorporation on the level of reason is generically a friendship (Y) and specifically a contractual bond (Y'); the latter has a horizontal finality to the procreation and education of children (Y'') but the former has a vertical up-thrust to advance in human perfection (Q'). Similarly, the incorporation on the level of grace is generically a special order of charity (X) but specifically a sacramental bond (X'); the latter has a horizontal finality to the procreation and Christian education of children (X''), but the former a vertical up-thrust to advance in Christian perfection (P').

Now if this analysis satisfies the exigencies of modern data and in-

⁷⁴ Aristotle in his *Politics* (1272a 27-30) considers this motive so natural as not to be a matter of choice. He exaggerates, but at least reveals implicitly the strength of the tendency of educated parents to have educated children.

sights, it is no less true that it leads immediately to the traditional position on the ends of marriage. For the criteria of more essential and more excellent ends may be applied in three ways, to the organistic union (Z'), to the marriage contract (Y'), and to the sacrament (X'). The first application gives the traditional position on polygamy: the horizontal finality of organistic union to offspring is more essential than the vertical up-thrust to monogamous marriage; hence, under special circumstances, divine providence might permit polygamy for the sake of the more essential end and find other means to secure the more excellent personalist end. The second and third applications to monogamous marriage itself, whether contract or sacrament, are parallel: in both cases the horizontal finality to procreation and education of children is more essential than the vertical finality to personal advance in perfection; and if we take the terms "primary" and "secondary" in the sense of more and less essential,⁷⁵ we have at once the traditional position that the primary end of marriage is the procreation and education of children. Further, our less essential vertical finality corresponds at least roughly with the traditional secondary ends of *mutuum auxilium* and *honestum remedium concupiscentiae*. For mutual aid is the spontaneous division of labor in the organistic union; it is the companionship and the good deeds of friendship; it is mutual support in spiritual advance to Christian perfection; it is all three, not isolated on the levels of nature, reason, and grace, but integrated and inseparable in the expansion of love into a common consciousness and conscience in the pursuit of life, the good life, and eternal life. The virtuous remedy for concu-

⁷⁵ Objection to the use of the terms "primary" and "secondary" has this much justification, that considerable care is required to use them properly. Most commonly, they are used in a non-scientific sense: "primary" means "more important"; and this greater importance is known through the unanalyzed type of inference Newman termed the illative sense. But they may also be the instruments of systematic thinking, and then they are of themselves generic to be determined specifically in the context. Such possible specifications are numerous. Above, we used "primary" and "secondary" of more and less essential ends; previously, we used them to denote elemental and resultant factors in human process. In *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 2, Aquinas called the end of the first cause primary and that of secondary causes secondary. In the *Sentences (Suppl.*, q. 65, a. 1) he distinguished between an actuation and its by-product as primary and secondary: the primary end of eating is health, the secondary end is feeling fit for work. But I would not say that another specific meaning is to be found in *Quodl. V*, q. 10, a. 19, ad 2m (see Doms, *op. cit.*, p. 89); the ultimate disposition to a form does not precede but results from the infusion or emergence of the form (e.g., *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 8).

piscence would seem but the reverse aspect of the same thing. For if the virtuous remedy is sometimes understood narrowly as a legitimate outlet for sexual impulse, still such a view hardly squares with the fact that there is much more than sex in sexual impulse. The sexual extravagance of man, unparalleled in the animals, has its ultimate ground in St. Augustine's "Fecisti nos ad te, Domine, et irrequietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te." The ignorance and frailty of fallen man tend to center an infinite craving on a finite object or release: that may be wealth, or fame, or power, but most commonly it is sex. Thus marriage, not merely by the outlet of intercourse, but in all its aspects is a virtuous remedy: the manifold activities of the home drain off energies that otherwise would ferment; the educative process of the life-in-common and the responsibility of children develop character and mature wisdom; the pursuit of Christian perfection establishes a peace of soul that attacks concupiscence at its deepest root. In this fashion it would seem that the traditional secondary ends may be identified with the vertical up-thrust to friendship and charity, to human and Christian perfection.

It remains that the strength of this up-thrust is not to be exaggerated. An integral part of Catholic thought on marriage is the doctrine that virginity is preferable to marriage, widowhood to second marriage, temporary abstinence to use within marriage (I Cor. 7:25-40). The precise implications of this doctrine are not too clear. Because of his position on original sin, the Pelagians charged St. Augustine with a rejection of Christian defense and praise of marriage.⁷⁶ St. Augustine answered that marriage was good but concupiscence evil, indeed a disease to be tolerated only for the sake of children.⁷⁷ Now it is quite certain that by concupiscence St. Augustine does not mean simply the spontaneous tendencies by which two beings are invited to function as parts of the larger unit of the family; along with that natural phenomenon he also means an effect of original sin, a constituent in original sin, an instrument in its transmission, and in fallen nature a fecund cause of actual sin.⁷⁸ Such global and concrete thinking was alone possible in the fifth century. It does not admit direct

⁷⁶ S. Augustinus, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, I, 1 (CSEL, XLII, 211).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, VIII, 9 (p. 220 f.) et *passim*.

⁷⁸ E.g., *ibid.*, XXIV, 27 (p. 239 f.) where almost all these aspects are united in a single passage.

transference to the more elaborate conceptual field of later theology though, as was lamentably conspicuous in the case of Baius and Jan- senius, a realization of the illegitimacy of such direct transference has not always been had. Account, then, must be taken of later develop- ment, and in this the main factor would seem to have been the theorem of the supernatural and its concomitant position that Adam's immunity from concupiscence was not natural but preternatural. Now since in the lifetime of Aquinas this theoretical advance was still in process of development,⁷⁹ it would be easy to attach too much significance to his maintenance in the *Sentences* of the essentially Augustinian position of an *excusatio matrimonii et copulae*.⁸⁰ In any case that rigorous view seems to have been dropped by moral theologians,⁸¹ while the dynamic Thomist position⁸² would take its basis not in the explicit argument of the *Sentences* for the *excusatio*, namely the eclipse of rational control in orgasm, but rather in broader considerations of different states of human nature. Fundamental would be the position that in the state of integral nature virginity would have been neither praiseworthy nor virtuous.⁸³ Hence, absolutely, what is best for man is the full actua- tion of all his capacities. But in the disequilibrium of fallen nature, with lower spontaneity taking care of itself, with reason apt to be mis-

⁷⁹ The general movement I have outlined in an earlier article (THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, II, 1941, 301 ff.). On Adam's immunity from concupiscence, contrast *In II Sent.*, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3 c, and *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 95, a. 1. The former passage distinguishes between a natural and a gratuitous original justice to place the subjection of the body to reason in natural justice; the later passage makes the subjection of the body to reason an effect of grace.

⁸⁰ *Suppl.*, q. 49, aa. 1, 4-6. For the parallel position of St. Thomas' master: Clifford, "The Ethics of Conjugal Intimacy according to St. Albert the Great," THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, III (1942), 1-27. The intermediate character of this position might be illustrated by a comparison of extremes. Thus, St. Augustine, who did not envisage the hypothetical state of *natura pura*, argues from the phenomena of concupiscence to original sin (*op. cit.*, V, 6 ff. [pp. 216 ff.]); but C. Pesch in his very representative *Praelectiones Dogmaticae* (III, §196) maintains the same phenomena to be natural. But I fear I am rushing through a very large and complex historical question. May I say that the views, so briefly expressed here, do not pretend to settle any issue, but only to indicate that the vast questions involved account not a little for the difficulties of the past in arriving at a satisfactory theory of marriage.

⁸¹ See Ford, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

⁸² For a timely insistence in this matter on the distinction between Thomism as a vital school of thought and Thomist history, exegesis, apologetic, see M. B. Lavaud, O.P., *Rev. thom.*, XLIV (1938), 760.

⁸³ *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 98, a. 2, ad 3m.

led by the historical aberrations of the *civitas terrena*, with the wisdom of God appearing folly to man, man's best is not full actuation of all potentiality but rather concentration on the higher levels of activity. Such concentration is commended to all, though in the triple form of virginity, widowhood, and temporary abstinence in marriage. So understood, the counsel does not imply any negation of an objective up-thrust from organistic union to a common pursuit of Christian perfection, though indeed it does emphasize the limitations of such an up-thrust under actual circumstances and the need of supplementing it by an opposite procedure. Excellent is the instrumentality of husband and wife to Christ and His Bride, the Church—an instrumentality that participates the love of the principal causes and brings forth to them the children that extend to full stature the Mystical Body. Excellent is the Christian home, a focal point that turns aside the influences of the world to rear children in an atmosphere of wholesome fear and love. But the bulwark of that excellence, the palpable proof of its ever doubted possibility, is the greater excellence that rises, not through organistic tendency but immediately, to concern with the one thing necessary, our eternal embrace with God in the beatific vision.

With this note of qualification, I may end. The purpose of the paper has been, as stated at the outset, a speculative outline that would manifest some of the assimilative capacity of traditional views. Necessarily, an outline is lacking in definition and in detail, for it is not a treatise. Much less can I claim to have fitted into it all that ancient and modern theorists have contributed to the subject. But if I have succeeded in hitting upon some pivotal points, perhaps I may hope that this labor will merit the scrutiny, the corrections, and the developments of others.

NOTE.—In accordance with the author's wish, it is planned to make this article the starting point of a discussion, with a view to clarifying and developing its contribution to the theory of marriage. Comments from readers are invited.—
EDITOR.