GRACED COMMUNITIES: A PROBLEM IN LOVING

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R ELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE is at the heart of Josiah Royce's philosophy. His early "religious insight" of 1883 was a conviction about the reality of the All-Knower. It persisted throughout his life. In his final fifteen years (1902–16) he entered more and more into the "philosophy of life" movement. This led him to focus even more oñ divine life. In 1912, after his breakthrough to a maximal insight into C. S. Peirce's method and theory of signs, Royce expressed his mature thought most notably in his *The Problem of Christianity* (1913).[1] From then until his death he found the ideas of Spirit and community becoming increasingly life-giving and much more significant.[2] They enabled him to practice his new method—which I call "interpretive musement"—better than ever before.[3] It consisted in a free, playful, yet communally disciplined process

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[1] J. Royce, *The Problem of Christianity* (2 vols.; New York: Macmillan, 1913); hereafter *Problem* in text, *PC* in notes; also available in reprints, esp. the one-volume edition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968). Except for Scripture citations, references within parentheses in the present article are to the 1913 edition: e.g., (1:xi–xii) = *PC*, Vol. 1, pp. xi–xii.— Already in 1918 Gabriel Marcel detected that *only* in Royce's later interpretative method of philosophizing had he finally (after having used less than effective instruments for so many years) succeeded in finding the *fitting medium* not only for communicating his message well but even for having it "essentially understood"; see Marcel, *Royce's Metaphysics* (Chicago: Regnery, 1956) 147.

[2] See Royce to Prof. Mary Whiton Calkins, March 20, 1916, *The Letters of Josiah Royce*, ed. John Clendenning (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970) 644–648, esp. 645; hereafter *Letters*. In general, the mature Royce's idea of Spirit is as profound, pervasive, and analogical as is his idea of community. In 1915 Royce stated that his *sense* of "spirit" was not only "indeed Pauline" but also "perfectly capable of exact and logical statement" and thus Peircean; see J. Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan, 1916) 131; hereafter *HGC*. As Pauline, Royce's idea of Spirit was biblical and carried its "mystical, superindividual, and romantic" senses along with many others. It was "difficult to understand"; especially so, perhaps, if one tried to reduce to a fixed concept the "perfectly real, concrete, and literal life of what we idealists call the 'spirit' " (ibid.). As Peircean, this idea expressed itself in the logic of "communities of interpretation and of their spirit." Royce indicated to Prof. Warner Fite that the epsilon relation (whereby an individual entity *belongs* to a set) is the logical foundation for his theory of community. Lying behind this indication is the whole of Royce's distinctive logical System Sigma; see *Letters* 604–9, esp. 609, and *Royce's Logical Essays*, ed. D. S. Robinson (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, 1951) 350, 357, 377–78; hereafter *RLE*.

[3] For a description of interpretive musement, see further on in the text. For Royce's description of interpretation, as a third and irreducible mode of human knowing, see *PC* 2:109–221, esp. 158–63. Unlike perception and conception, interpretive knowing has for its object "minds and signs of minds." For example, a person tries to read his friend's unspoken

of knowing. Appreciatively sensitive to the living and ever fluent contexts of the communities about him, he sought to win close personal touch with "minds and signs of minds," whether these took him into the realms of ethics or logic, scientific methodology or international insurance.

Most Americans scarcely recognize the name Josiah Royce. Among those who do, most have discarded him with stereotypes that quickly foreclose genuine listening to him, especially in his mature period (1912–16). He has been labeled "idealist" (in any of a half-dozen senses), "Hegelian" (although he disallowed this: e.g., in 1:xi–xii), "absolutist," "pneumatologist" (because of his mature emphasis on the Spirit),[4] "too Germanic" (although he was the son of '49ers and prided himself on being a Californian), "overintellectualistic," and so forth.

Where do these denigrating remarks come from? Given the way the mature Royce grew more ready to admit his limits (2:336), these remarks seem to me not to derive from a careful and critically balanced study of the "new light . . . new experience" that Royce saw had produced his "essentially new aspect of philosophical idealism" (2:422).[5] Rather, they have far oftener proven to be beams in the beholder's eye than real specks in Royce's.

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preference, or a translator tries to grasp from the Hebrew text the genuine intent of Isaiah and convey it faithfully to an English reader, or a banker tries to discern through the varied signs connected with a candidate for a loan the latter's reliability. Consisting in a cognitive process rather than a single act, interpretation is distinctive because, operating in a field of signs, its basic logical structure is not dyadic (subject-object), as in perception and conception, but triadic (threefold): from sign-sender through sign-interpreter to sign-receiver.

[4] See n. 2 above and n. 9 below. Although some theologians accept the Pauline-Johannine notion of *pneuma* without qualm, they may feel uneasy with the mature Royce's admittedly Pauline-Johannine idea of Spirit (*PC* 2:16; *Letters* 646). Various factors, working singly or together, may produce this uneasiness. (1) Since many have cut their first theological teeth on the bones of modern (rather than contemporary) European philosophical thought, a theologian so trained may tend to stay within his or her almost purely intellectualistic context rather than leap into that aesthetico-pragmatic-cognitive ambience of American philosophy, which understanding Royce calls for. (2) Although knowing that such American philosophers of religion as James, Royce, and Hocking belong to the "philosophy of life" movement, a person may neither center empathetically on *life* nor deal with Royce's idea of life at that "higher than third level of Peircean clarification" which suits it. (3) Instead of adopting the mature Royce's interpretational (triadic) mode of knowing, one may fixate in a subject-object (dyadic) epistemology. (4) Although knowing that, for the late Royce, a "fundamental idea" is a highly dynamic "sign of mind guiding an interpretive process," one may try to reduce Royce's idea of spirit to a mere concept. (5) The life of the divine Spirit, whether in human minds and human communities or in Itself, not only eludes ultimate definition but is a disquieting mystery. Any of these factors, then, will prevent a broad, coherent, yet intimate insight into Royce's "indeed Pauline" sense of "spirit" and seed the uneasiness of misunderstanding this idea.

[5] *Letters* 645.

If one expects that the mature Royce's professedly Christian philosophy of religion had to draw upon the New Testament, he might reasonably inquire how competent and accurate was Royce in hermeneutics and New Testament exegesis. This question would have surprised Royce; for in his final years he saw himself mainly as a comparative methodologist, a logician, and a Christian ethician and metaphysician rather than as a Scripture scholar (1:x, xxix; 2:15–16). However, some recent investigators highly appraise Royce's achievement and accuracy even in hermeneutics and exegesis. For example, German scholar Karl-Otto Appel sees Royce's mature work in the theory of hermeneutics as indispensable: "Royce's idea of the 'community of interpreters,' expounded in the second volume of his last [major] work, *The Problem of Christianity* (1913), provides perhaps the most important single contribution to the extension and development in hermeneutic and social philosophical terms of Peirce's semiotic."[6] Concerning Royce's competence as an interpreter of the New Testament, Dieter Georgi, Frothingham Professor of Biblical Studies at Harvard Divinity School, sums up his appraisal as follows: "In the *Problem*, then, Royce sensed and stressed the corporate and historical dynamisms at work within the interpretation process more concretely and skillfully than Bultmann or Heidegger have done. For these reasons, in his mature work, Royce considerably surpassed Bultmann as an interpreter of the New Testament."[7]

Reassured by such recommendations, we can investigate Royce's question whether we should love graced communities as such. Our main investigation seeks a Roycean exegesis of the apostle Paul's descriptions of how his early Christian communities were led to transform Jesus' doctrine of love. It then presents three philosophical reasonings on this question. It concludes by highlighting three points: the shift in method employed, a fitting way of translating Royce's answer into practice, and an application of his answer to the justice area. However, before this main investigation, we first need to familiarize ourselves with a central theme and some basic terms in the mature Royce. Thus equipped, we can fittingly enter Royce's method of interpretation and then through it detect the Pauline development of the early Christian doctrine of love.

In the *Problem* Royce identified the highest human good with one's transformation under grace into an essentially new life (1:171, 207, 345,

[6] Karl-Otto Apel, *Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1981) 135. Robert S. Corrington finds Royce offering "a more general analysis of interpretation than anyone before him"; see his "Royce's Community of Interpretation: The Horizon of Hermeneutics" (unpublished dissertation, Drew University, Madison, N.J., 1982) ii.
[7] Georgi's 1982 Foreword (vii) to the present author's forthcoming study of Royce's mature philosophy of religion.

405). The individualistic self is deeply alienated and morally detached from any genuine community. For example, when a passionate careerist encounters the pressures and institutions of society, he becomes more tense and hostile, even as he becomes more sophisticated in winning his ends, despite others. Further contacts, either with manipulators more powerful than himself (e.g., organized crime) or with the disabled or uncouth or outcasts of society, only make him more dedicated to his own career, without time or care for others. But one day he chances on a loyal community (perhaps a truly loving family open to the needs of others). Under its influence he comes to the point of committing himself whole-heartedly to the shared life of this community with its universal openness. This conversion to genuine loyalty also leads him to promote the birth or growth of genuine loyalty in all other minded beings he can touch. Just as grace was needed for his moral transformation, so his new life of practically serving the overall interest of his new community needs grace to maintain and foster it. He could wilfully violate the living unity with his fellow loyalists by not following the superhuman source of that unity (i.e., by "sinning against the Holy Spirit"). His genuine loyalty reaches full maturity the day he enters into his community's atonement process to heal wounded community life and restore lost individualists to the unity of genuinely loyal life. In sum, Royce understands conversion as a process of interpretation occurring between an individualist, a saving community, and its Spirit (1:xvi; 2:312–13).

The taproot of Royce's mature thought is his distinction between two essentially different levels both of reality and of consciousness: the level of the individual and that of the genuine community (1:343, 405).[8] An individual is the unique object of a knowing and affirmative interest which constitutes a self as "be-loved"—ultimately be-loved by the divine Spirit. If the individual is united through transforming loyalty to a level of existence that is essentially higher than his own grade of individualist being, he is on the way to his highest good—as we just observed with the converted careerist. Otherwise he is a lost individual, at least for the time being (1:405).

A community is different from a society or a social institution. A human community requires not only considerable temporal process but also appreciatively shared memories of idealized past events, along with communally shared hopes of anticipated and enhanced life together (2:57–69, 99–103). In a society, by contrast, this shared awareness of common idealized past and future events may or may not be present.

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[8] Pointing out the relation between the traditional doctrine of Christ's "two natures" and his own thesis about the "two levels," Royce claimed sole responsibility for asserting this relation; see *PC* 1:203, n. 1.

And in a social institution, taken simply as a group's consensually established way of procedure, these shared awarenesses will not be present; for a society's only requisites are the mutual acceptance of some purpose and the co-operative organization of means to achieve it, and the requisite for a social institution is simply a consensus that establishes a procedure.

Human communities arise spontaneously but are caught in historical antecedents and societal pressures. Thus they tend defensively to prefer their own interests. So communities, such as a family or clan or nation, tend to build up loyalties that are naturally exclusivistic. *As* natural, these closed or chauvinistic communities lack a moral commitment to all human selves and to all genuine communities. Natural communities need to be transformed at least as much as their morally detached individualistic members.

By contrast, genuinely loyal communities seek a universal cause and promote the rise of genuine loyalty in all minded beings. But such communities can begin and be maintained only by grace "as from above" (2:102). There exists, then, both a highest Beloved Community and its Spirit-Interpreter. From them derive all humanly embodied finite beloved communities (e.g., graced family, genuine Church).

A human family, then, may be either a merely natural community or a genuine community, depending on whether its members are only naturally (= exclusivistically) dedicated to the family or are universally loyal. Communities are seriated by grades into small, intermediate, great, and universal. The "Great Community" embraces all human beings of all time. The "Universal Community" embraces all minded beings of all time (e.g., God, angels, humans, and possibly other minds). When viewed as graced, the universal community is called the "Beloved Community" in its greatest scope, whereas a Pauline church and the worldwide Christian Community (insofar as graced) would be instances of small or intermediate beloved communities respectively.

Aware of the moral disorder at work in merely natural human communities, we can appreciate Royce's care to clarify exactly what he meant and did not mean by his second or saving level of reality—which he called "man the spiritual community" (2:406). To forestall misidentifications of this key term, Royce first eliminated counterfeit candidates: not the collective biological population called the human race; not ourselves as a culturally trained community whose members, as socialized animals, are guided simply by customs and conventional do's and don't's; not humanity viewed as a series of historical adventures, some tragic, some successful. Rather, Royce specified, by man the spirtual community "I mean man in the sense in which Paul conceived Christ's beloved and universal Church to be a community,—man viewed as one conscious

spiritual whole of life ... the essential source of the salvation of the individual" (1:405–6). This community, intended for all human selves, is beloved by the Spirit of Christ,[9] constitutes "the realm of grace," and already embodies seminally the announced kingdom of heaven to come.

After this introduction to Royce and to some of his basic ideas, we seem prepared to consider an issue central to his religious philosophy: whether we should love graced communities as such. In gist, Royce's argument is that the highest human good consists in every human individual's being transformed from his attitude of isolated and immoral self-preference into becoming a loyal member of a universal community. Each does this by committing himself wholeheartedly to deeds of service to some beloved nonexclusivistic community. For this transformation and growing practical service to occur, two conditions must be met. The human individual must be empowered to love the beloved community as

[9] See nn. 2 and 4 above. Royce identified Christ with the "spirit of the Church" and with the "spirit of the universal community" (*PC* 1:206, 212, 354; 2:16), and identified the name "Christ" with the symbol of the Spirit that unifies Christians (*PC* 2:425–28). These Roycean usages derive from the "Christ = Spirit" formulas of the early Pauline letters and reflect an early theology of many Christians in the apostolic churches (*PC* 1:187, 192, 196). Without reading dogmatic statements about the Trinity into *PC*, one can fittingly interpret Royce's identification of Christ with the spirit of the Church (and with the spirit of the universal community) in terms of a dynamic and/or teleological identity.—In systematic Trinitarian theology a binatarian is one who identifies the glorified Christ in personal supposit (*in hypostasi*) with the other Paraclete and then, mutually opposing this one Person to the Father, holds only two Persons in the one divine nature. To raise the question whether Royce is a binatarian is to mistake him for a systematic theologian, to exceed textual evidence, and to violate his nonontological style of thought.—Although Royce's imprecision on just which kind of identity he attributes to Christ and the "spirit of the universal community" may be a neuralgic point for some dogmatic theologians, it keeps windows open for other thinkers; for it can remind them of the often unnoticed imprecision of their own usages of "spirit" and invite them to explore more carefully into Royce's many senses of "spirit." Concerning our senses of "Spirit," even when limited in its application only to the God of the Christians, we say "Spirit" of God when the divine reality is viewed either as one or as triune. We can designate the Father or Son or Holy Spirit as "Spirit." And even when referring to the Trinity's economy of saving the human race through the Word and the Third Person, we can say "Spirit" of either "Sent One" whether viewed in an eternal *ad intra* reality or in a historic mission in world process. Nor have we as yet even surveyed our usages of "spirit" for created realities, where imprecision may abound yet more.—Concerning Royce's refined senses of "spirit," his most frequent usage of the term designates finite individuals and their communities: e.g., "the human spirit" or "the spirit of [humankind's] Great Community." (See my article "The Idea of Spirit in the Mature Royce," *Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society* 19, no. 4 [Fall 1983]). More rarely, Royce used "Spirit" to symbolize the divine nature itself (*PC* 2:15–16, 219–20). Hence to be uneasy that more havoc may come from Royce's usages of "Spirit" than from our own seems both to show less confidence in the "Spirit of the Church" than Royce had and to forget his directive that genuinely loyal persons need to "discern spiritually the things of the spirit" (*PC* 2:361).

a reality distinct from, and higher than, any human individual. He must also, through his genuine loyalty towards the universal community, come to love its every human member, actual and potential.

HOW DID PAUL TRANSFORM JESUS' DOCTRINE OF LOVE?

The better to enter into Royce's interpretation of the early development of the Christian doctrine of love, we will follow his own three major steps. (1) We will describe the external and internal contexts for this development. That is, just what was the *preaching* of Jesus which impinged upon the early Christian communities of interpretation? And in Jesus' early followers, what was the internal set of simple human *motives* (psychological, aesthetical, and ethical) which moved these first Christians to love communities as such? (2) With Royce we will expose Jesus' doctrine of love. (3) We will trace how, in mutual interaction with the early Christian communities, Paul transformed Jesus' doctrine to include love for the Church as such, as well as love for individuals.[10]

External and Internal Contexts (1:49-74)

The doctrine of Christian love originates from Jesus' love for his Father and for his Father's kingdom of heaven—that "union of the blessed with their Father" (1:50). From Jesus' two-leveled love sprang his central teaching about the Father and about that fundamental social entity which he and his Father love. This doctrine is the life-giving seed contained in Jesus' various parables.

During the apostolic age, then, the followers of Jesus had to interpret just what this kingdom meant for them. Experiencing the Spirit of the risen Lord active in their assemblies, they were led to the shared awareness that Jesus meant the kingdom of heaven to be made real among themselves by their co-operative choices. This was to occur *in* the felt union (koinonia) of the faithful, *through* the guidance of his Spirit leading them, and *for* their future experience whenever the Master returned (1:50). In brief, the explicit birthing of the idea of the Church and of its mission arose from the earliest Christians' desire to follow Jesus' teaching about the kingdom. Their desire led them in practice to embody this teaching by deeds of consciously co-operative life. They believed that this communal life of theirs was being guided into the future by the Spirit towards a judgment by the Master on his return.

Expanding our focus to include human selves of any time and place—whether or not they have heard the Christian doctrine of love—we begin with Royce to reflect carefully and critically on the interacting sets of

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[10] Here I rely mainly on *PC*'s second lecture "The Idea of the Universal Community" (1:49-106), drawing assistance from its fourth and tenth lectures ("The Realm of Grace" and "The Body and the Members").

motives which lead any human beings to become conscious of both the idea and the ideal of a universal community (which includes all minded beings: human, angelic, divine, etc.). We can discover how this consciousness arises by alternating our focus between the psychological and the ethico-aesthetic motives which lead towards this idea and ideal. Hence, to identify the psychological motives first, we start with ordinary people's encounters with small-size communities and then with larger ones (1:61–63).

For example, people notice how a ship's crew co-operate to set sail or how the members of a well-trained orchestra work together. Upon experiencing groups like these which act for a purpose, people are moved psychologically to adopt three beliefs. (1) These social groups somehow have a *life* of their own, different from the lives of individual members. (2) Somehow, too, each of these groups has a *mind* of its own, evident from its correction of straying members. (3) These social groups *tend to* form communities of *higher levels* (e.g., linking family to clan to tribe, or uniting churches at local, regional, and universal levels). If members encounter strangers unfamiliar with the members' language, rites, crafts, or other customs, they become conscious that their own tribal (or other) community has indeed a life of its own and a mind of its own. Its social products (language, rites, customs, etc.) show this communal life and mind as convincingly as an individual's handshake reveals his own individual life and mind.

But as soon as one recognizes these psychological motives which lead people to think of their social groups as distinct from individuals, objectors immediately protest: "Don't personify or 'thingify' or idealize communities!" "Remember they are *merely* operational unities." Responding like Royce, we confine ourselves at this stage to a simple working hypothesis. Without yet expressing any metaphysical theory, we will proceed by treating these living purposeful communities as if they had their own life and mind.

Focusing next on ethico-aesthetic motives in people everywhere, we find that all of them do more than form the above-mentioned three beliefs about the social groups they live in (1:66–74). They also love their families, serve their religious groups, live and even die for their nation. They appreciate these communities as somehow having more value than their individual lives alone. In their family and "church" and nation they find something that calls them to right rather than wrong choice. Also in these groups they can and often do find something beautiful, even sublime. And they show that they detect when their common life is healthy and growing, as well as when it becomes sick or even degenerate.

These ethico-aesthetic motives, as well as the psychological ones, are irrepressible in the human psyche's operations. These motives lead both

to the idea of a level of life higher than that of any separated individual and also to the ideal of a universal community—first, of all human persons, and later, of all minded persons. This ideal arises from the tendency to form higher levels of community and to find something increasingly powerful, beautiful, and sublime in them. Thus the idea and ideal of the universal community is just as irrepressible in the human psyche as is its desire for the true, the good, and the beautiful.

Royce had set the contexts—the one which surrounded Jesus' teaching in the early Christian assemblies of the apostolic age, the other which underlies the psyche of every potential hearer of that doctrine. Because the human psyche is irrepressibly motivated to produce and treasure the idea and ideal of the universal community, it is a well-attuned human matrix for the doctrine of the kingdom. Royce was ready, then, to show how Jesus' doctrine of love depends on the doctrine of the kingdom.

Jesus' Doctrine of Love (1:74-91)

As contained in Jesus' sayings and parables, his doctrine of Christian love is based on the Father's love for each individual human person. The Father regards and loves each person as a member of the kingdom of heaven and as one destined to its fulness (1:197-98). Since the Father makes His sun shine and rain fall on good and evil people alike, Jesus develops the Old Testament doctrine of love by expanding its scope to include even one's "enemies." As Royce portrays Jesus' doctrine, "One is to love one's neighbor because God himself, as Father, divinely loves and prizes each individual man. Hence the individual man has an essentially infinite value, although he has this value only in and through his relation to God, and because of God's love for him" (1:80).

Just as the Jesus of the sayings rejoices in the Father's love for each person, so he invites everyone to rejoice in the consciousness of this love itself and to delight in all people, since they too are God's beloveds. Because love is divine in its origin and goal, it includes an assertion of each person's relatedness to God, "for the God who loves me demands ... that I should be his own" (1:81). Strengthened by the Father's great love for him and eagerly anticipating the final victory of God's will, one recognizes that his first duty is to promote love in all, to extend the kingdom by teaching love to all (1:85). To do this when encountering the evils of life, he also needs to extend emphathetic mercy to those in misery, as the Father does. In brief, Jesus' doctrine of love is positive, strenuous, even heroic. It makes simplified popularizations of it—like "Have no thought for oneself " or "Live wholly for others"—shrivel up in their own inadequacy before the genuine sunshine of this doctrine.

In it, however, Jesus left something unclarified, even while wanting his Spirit-led people to discover and develop a right way to engage in

practical activity in society. He wanted that way to be both genuinely loving and yet well ordered. For example, if an early Christian simplistically interpreted the golden rule to mean that he was to satisfy his neighbor's needs, what would result? He would soon discover that it is not his own call to meet all those needs. But how discern which needs he should meet, which not? Here the early Christian communities found a task for interpretation and communicated their findings to Paul.

Paul's Transformation of This Doctrine (1:91–106)

"Paul" in Royce means the Paul of Romans, of 1 and 2 Corinthians, of Galatians, Philippians, and 1 Thessalonians.[11] According to Royce, the experiences that Paul had with the early Christian communities taught him first to conceive of "church" in reference to the local Christian assembly (e.g., at Damascus, Antioch, Jerusalem, Philippi, etc.). Only gradually did he become aware of the body of Christ as a universal corporate reality (1:104).

Paul found each local church small enough that it kept all its members in touch with one another, particularly through their worship assemblies. Accepting and trusting one another, they became aware through their communications not only of the physical needs, dangers, works, and successes of each member, but also of the way these were related to the health of the whole body of Christ locally present (1:102). In this way Paul gradually came to experience the local church as a perceptible institutional instrument for fulfilling his Master's intent about the kingdom. He found this intent being embodied in many of his missionary locales. Everywhere he went it fitted in neatly with people's deepest interests. He gradually became aware that this intent was to be realized in a world-wide body.

Paul faithfully transmitted Jesus' doctrine on love. In 1 Corinthians 13 he expressed this doctrine more completely than anywhere else in the

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[11] Royce's acquaintance with the Scripture scholarship of his decades schooled him to distinguish ordinarily between Paul's authentic writings and the NT writings that stem from Christians in the "Pauline tradition." Moreover, by concentrating on Christianity's earli*est* writings, Royce transmitted the Pauline Paul (of the authentic letters) and did not encapsulate him in the Lucan Paul of the Acts (which Royce did not use for Pauline exegesis). Yet he also relied upon the fourth Gospel and Ephesians (esp. Eph 5:25–28) for his interpretation of Jesus and early Christianity. Present-day refinements of seventy further years of scriptural scholarship may thus find some remnants of fundamentalism in Royce. But he had his reasons for relying as heavily upon Ephesians and the fourth Gospel as he did upon Paul's earliest letters. His reasons were Christian tradition and integrity of view; for he recognized that traditionally Christians have imbibed their Jesus more from the fourth Gospel than from the Synoptics. Moreover, he realized that Ephesians and the fourth Gospel present Jesus and his mission with more of an insightful meditative wholeness than do the Synoptics. See *PC* 1:206.

New Testament. Yet Paul's letters also reveal an inevitable development of this doctrine; for in them the term "neighbor" often becomes "fellow member" of the Christian community. These letters show Christ loving his bride, the Church, as well as individual Christians. Jesus had sacrificed himself for her, willing gradually to transform her into a fully beautiful reality (Eph 5:25–28). Similarly, those faithful to Christ are called to love this new corporate reality which he has united to himself in the Spirit. Thus, besides God and the individual human persons, Paul explicitly proposed another kind of being to be loved: the Church as Christ's bride. The whole value of each Christian as an individual hangs on his membership in this body of Christ; for outside it he is lost (1:97). Let each live together, then, in such a way that their assembly both be worthy of the Christ who loves it and simultaneously "so help the individual brother that he may be a fitting member of the Church" (1:103).

Because Christ dedicated himself wholeheartedly for his Church as well as for each member in it, his love is that of "graced loyalty." Accordingly, each Christian's love should be formed by "graced loyalty." Jesus imitated his Father's love for both the whole human community summoned to salvation and for every unique human person called to salvation in and through that community. So by his espousal covenant with his bride, Jesus, the servant of the Father and of humankind, became one new reality with her, an instrument for the salvation of all. Hence the individual Christian's love should include, besides commitment to God, neighbor, and self, a graced loyalty towards the Father's Beloved Community as embodied in the spousal covenant between Christ and transformable humankind. That is, the individual Christian's affective and practical dedication to the Church should be so wholeheartedly loving as to be atoning (or paschal). The maturation of a genuine Christian's graced loyalty toward the Church inevitably evokes the courageous will to follow Christ faithfully and resolutely into deeds of Father-like charity and of atonement and through them into a fuller life for all (1:xix-xx, 43–44, 322–23; 2:377).

Paul recognized that his Christians experienced, sometimes even perceptibly, the "unity of the Spirit" binding them into one body (1:74). Through reciprocal influence, this unity was both source and fruit of these Christians' genuine loyalty and atoning deeds in, with, and for the Church. In the Spirit which generated such unity Paul also recognized the glorified Lord who was both divine life and head of the Christian communities (1:104).[12] What Paul's quantum leap in explicitating the

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[12] See n. 9 above.

doctrine of Christian love consisted in, then, can be grasped more clearly if we muse over Royce's own summary:

> In God's love for the neighbor, the parables [of Jesus] find the proof of the infinite worth of the individual. In Christ's love for the Church Paul finds the proof that both the community and the individual member are the objects of an infinite concern, which glorifies them both, and thereby unites them. The member finds his salvation only in union with the Church. He, the member, would be dead without the divine spirit and without the community. But the Christ whose community this is, has given life to the members—the life of the Church, and of Christ himself. 'You hath he quickened, which were dead in trespasses and sins.'[13]
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> In sum: Christian love, as Paul conceives it, takes on the form of Loyalty. This is Paul's simple but vast transformation of Christian love. (1:98)

MUSEMENTS SUPPORTING LOVE FOR COMMUNITIES AS SUCH

For centuries many Christians have had a great deal of love for the Church and not merely a love for individual Christians in the Church. As just seen, Royce interpreted how Paul developed Jesus' doctrine of love into a doctrine that included a love for graced communities as such. Yet, as far as my sampling permits a tentative generalization, most theologians have not attended directly to the complementary and yet distinctive kind of love presupposed by Paul's development of Jesus' doctrine of Christian love.[14] Alerted by the contrast between Royce's

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[13] Eph 2:1.

[14] Guided by Walter J. Burghardt, Avery Dulles, and Joseph A. Fitzmyer (to whom I owe thanks but not the onus of responsibility for this report), I sounded out some leading theologians on Royce's question: Should graced individuals, besides loving all individual persons, also love graced communities as such? This question is clarified if we first develop it positively. E.g., does the Charity Christ breathes into his members impel them not only to love God, self, and neighbor as individuals, but also to love graced communities as such? Or again, if Christ redemptively loves his bride the Church, should his Christians redemptively love all graced communities as minded beings that image his Father's Trinitarian Community of Life? This question is brought into still sharper focus if we put it negatively. E.g., if the objects of a person's love are *only* God, neighbor, and myself, viewed as individuals, but not graced communities, viewed as communions in the Spirit, is the healthy, well-ordered development of that person's love severely blocked or, at best, held in immaturity? In my pioneer research into theologians on this question, I sampled pertinent passages in systematicians (de Lubac, G. Gilleman, James Gustafson, Richard McBrien, Karl Rahner, and Eduard Schillebeeckx), in exegetes (Marcus Barth, Joseph Fitzmyer, Victor Furnish, and Juan Luis Segundo), and in students of pneumatology (Yves Congar, Hans Küng, Jürgen Moltmann, and Heribert Mühlen). Tentatively, I read the meaning of this sample as follows. Like the Fathers, these theologians often refer to the mystery of the Church, to faith in it, and to dedicated service to it. Taking the Trinity (formed by the Holy Spirit as the "We" of the Father and of the Son) for his paradigmatic Community, Mühlen applies this model by analogy first to Christ (the "We" of the Logos and of humankind-to-be-redeemed) and then to the Church (the "We" of Christ and of

exegesis and this apparent theological lacuna, we can bring the interpretive process of this essay to completion by comparing and contrasting the foregoing Roycean interpretation of Paul's doctrine of love with some reasonings built upon a philosophy of the Christian religion. Accordingly, after briefly describing the method of interpretative musement, I will, as a philosopher of the Christian religion, try to find and create a trio of musements upon the central question of the present study. I hope they will be a trio of consistent and cogent reasonings which, when united with Royce's exegesis of Paul, will illumine that question.

In general, Royce teaches that Christian love for those realities which are genuine human communities must focus directly upon them qua beloved communities. It must not love these communities only indirectly and derivatively, as if they were simply the sum of their individual members, loved as individuals. Of course, love for individual persons is always required; yet it is never enough for genuine Christian love. Christians' love of God as undivided Unity in Three Persons is paradigmatic; for when this love bears upon the Trinity, it should focus directly upon the divine life in community, the shared divine koinonia, rather than directly upon any one or all of the Three Persons, even though Christians' love of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit as Three Persons is clearly also essential to their love of God. According to Royce, then, Paul taught that Christians' love should take part in the love that Christ their head had, not only for each individual but also for the sacred communions in God, in the kingdom, in Christ, in the Church, and in humankind as redeemed.

The Method of Interpretative Musement

Theologians should profitably notice philosophers of religion, especially if the problems the latter raise and the approaches they take

humankind-as-graced-and-instrumentally-redemptive). Gilleman and de Lubac, by focusing on the Trinity's koinonia and on the Pauline *mystērion* respectively, closely approach, yet do not directly address themselves to, Royce's question. In his *Theological Investigations* Karl Rahner also approaches this question both in Vol. 5 and in his recently Englished Vol. 20, "Concern for the Church," yet does not treat it directly. In sum, I found no theologian dealing directly with Royce's question about the ethico-religious exigence to love graced communities as communal realities on a higher-than-individual level. Furthermore, I found no theologian asserting with Royce that the only way in which love for individuals can become rightly ordered is if that love is transformed by a love for graced communities as such and if it operates in the ambience of such a community's felt saving love for oneself. One's love for individuals, then, participates in the Three Persons' *kind* of love for Their uncreated Beloved Community and for all created individuals insofar as these are destined for the created kingdom of God which is being realized through world history by the well-ordered love and action of the Trinitarian Community working *ad extra* in a redemptive way.

promise to cast light on important theological questions. As a philosopher of religion, Royce raised a problem about the adequacy of traditional interpretations of Christian love; yet his problem has not been directly attended to by the theologians I surveyed.[15] In my turn, as a philosopher of religion, I am here inviting theologians to the adventure of breaking away from the captivating paths of professionalized mental routines and to an experiment in interpretive musement as an alternate way of theological reflection.

What happens when a theologian muses like Royce or Peirce upon a mystery, such as God, or Christ, or Church, or Holy Spirit? Procedurally, his will-to-interpret promotes a deepening familiarity with the mystery. His search for a fuller understanding of the mystery will be furthered by comparing and contrasting different perspectives on the mystery. He will enter these perspectives by alternating the fundamental categories which he uses to approach the mystery. This will lead, gradually and serially, to a discerning familiarity with the mystery, a familiarity that becomes increasingly adequate and interpersonally disciplined.

For instance, one can seek this kind of familiarity with the mystery of Christ's Church if one reverently and rhythmically employs such pairs of ideas as "human" and "divine," "temporal" and "eternal," "mind" and "sign of mind," "individual" and "community," "self-identical entity" and "ever-fluent process," etc. By comparing and contrasting the interpretations of the Church which thus arise, one can enter into a knowledge of it that is increasingly concrete and personally challenging.[16]

To engage in musement like this, one needs to insist from the start on making room for freely playing with possibilities. One needs to resist any a priori channeling of this adventure in musement on mystery. Thus from the start one needs to stand firm against initiating the raising of questions, against slipping into some oft-tried method, against settling down into a familiar mood supposedly conducive to doing theology, and against accepting traditional formulae without context or critical discernment. These taboos are needed if one is to avoid imposing control upon the mysterious life in which one muses by receiving signs. Positively, this adventure in musement calls one to be sensitively free and imaginatively creative. It calls one to play freely with possibilities with alert receptivity and inner novelty, both in solitude and with others. In this way one will begin comparing and contrasting successive pairs of "signs" and thus learn how to engage in a mental dance by rhythmically alter-

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[15] See n. 14 above.

[16] The fathers of the Second Vatican Council engaged in a somewhat similar comparison-contrast of alternative perspectives in their Constitution on the Church, esp. at the close of no. 9. See *The Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: America, 1966) 26.

nating one's steps. We hinted at this mental dancing in our example above of musement on the mystery of the Church.

Interpretive musement is valuable. By requiring love of genuine community for this musing on mystery, interpretive musement roots thinkers in *caritas*; for one must loyally love not only individual persons but also the created and Trinitarian communities in which the divine Spirit ministers as their Source of unity and love. Such musement also liberates thinkers from absolutizing one or other metaphysical position. It highlights how inadequate is any position that poses as a statement of the comprehensive truth about reality.

Musements That Support Love for Graced Communities as Such

As grist for his reasonings, a philosopher of religion can borrow Christian beliefs—say, about the Trinity or providence—without giving or expecting a faith-assent to them. The starting points for the three following musements, then, will be the Trinity's causality *ad extra*, the nature of the Third Person as the indwelling bond of the Triune Community, and the dynamisms deeply at work in an individual if examined as simply a human person or as also a beloved child of grace.

Our first musement will start from the Trinity's *ad extra* action of creating finite minded individuals. Our analogous knowledge of an agent focuses on three moments in his action.[17] With awareness of possibilities and free commitment, a minded agent is receptive to the attraction of something valuable (some good) and adopts it as his own intended goal. (We indicate this influence upon the agent by the goal intended and his correlative orientation of mind by the shorthand expression "final causality.") Then, as an aid needed for guiding the (at least partial) attainment of this goal, the minded agent creates or finds in his awareness some model or exemplar of the action or artifact which he intends to produce when carrying out his intent. (We indicate this moment of sign-creation by "exemplary causality.") Lastly, through choice and physical activity, the agent actually produces this action or artifact within some historical processing community. (We indicate this production, in a

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[17] Here our Royce-like presupposition is a process of communicating life that occurs between real, individual, minded members of a community who address, interpret, and cooperate with one another. Set in this communitarian context, our resultant interpretation of causality as paradigmatically found in the many-phased process of vital interpersonal communication differs significantly from some traditional causal notions: e.g., from Aristotle, who made the individual organism his paradigmatic causal agent and thus inverted priorities, as well as from Hume and Kant, whose nominalistic phenomenism precluded "close personal touch" with the two kinds of real mutual interaction between members themselves and between a community and its members. See *RLE* 161, 193.

shorthand phrase, by "efficient causality" or "agent causality.") And so, to our first musement.

1) Suppose that the supreme reality is a Trinity of Persons in one nature, an uncreated intersubjective communion (koinonia) in which life, knowledge, and love are communicated. Suppose, too, that this divine community freely intends, is the exemplar of, and actually produces a universe of created minded beings. Suppose, finally, that antecedent to creation the only reality and value is this Trinitarian community in its goodness.

Then, according to final causality, the only goodness which this uncreated koinonia can value and intend is its own living community. But then, if this Trinity of Persons actually intends to create finite minds, the latter have to be linked inextricably to the Trinity's own Beloved Community, Its sole goodness. Such linkage is possible for finite minds, however, only if these latter are intrinsically directed to some finite communion which circulates life, knowledge, and love, in a finite likeness of Trinitarian communion, in a created "kingdom of God."

Furthermore, according to exemplary causality, the creative art of the divine community will guide its *ad extra* creative agency, according to its finite sign or model of the divine community. Thus the Trinity's making and developing of any universe will accord with this internal meaning or guiding sign which will be unavoidably present and at work in any created reality, whether rational or subrational; for just as on the infinite level the Father cannot be Father unless He expresses His life in His Son who reflects Him infinitely, so the divine Community, if It chooses to express Its Reality on a finite level, can do so only as guided by a finite community-like "sign" or model which reflects the only Reality God is, that divine koinonia of an intersubjective communion wherein life, knowledge, and love are circulated. At its own level, then, the created universe should be a beloved community and one fittingly composed of an ascending series of finite beloved communities.

Finally, according to that kind of agent causality proper to Three Persons co-operating in Their action of creation, the life, knowledge, and love characteristic of the unity of these "Three Conspirators *ad extra*" must coconstitute the unique free choice which brings the finite universe into being and process. Their free conspiring in one Will-to-interpret Their Community in finite style integrates existential choice, playful wisdom, and infectious joy. This conspiracy holds in being and process a real, universal, but finite community that includes as one of its real levels the great human community with all its members. Fittingly, then, did Royce concur with Peirce in musing about our universe as a community in which "the nature of things" (life-giving fatherly firstness) is bonded

to "attuned minded beings" (factual filial secondness) by a "third world of signs" (integrating spiritual thirdness); for the universal finite community of these three interlinked "worlds" provides for minds that stand in loyal love of the universe and that ponder the linkages of these "worlds" a sufficient clue of that triadic community of agency from whose life, mind, and unitive love our universe arises (2:395, 411).

We find this musement confirmed if we next contrast the three foregoing reasonings against our existing world. Despite disorders and community breakdowns, we find that communal life among finite minded beings emerges abundantly. There are families, linguistic-economic-cultural communities, the Church, and the presently hoped-for "great community" of all humankind. Consequently, if one desires the coming of God's kingdom even in its temporal anticipations but fails to love and serve these created communities as bodies divinely intended to aid humankind's temporal advance towards the kingdom, such a one would reveal a contradiction-in-will.

2) Next, suppose with Heribert Mühlen[18] that, since the Holy Spirit is the unity-bond of Father and Son ("One Person *in* Two [divine] Persons"), He can fittingly be designated as the "We" of the Trinity—that is, as the "We" constitutive of their intersubjective communion of life. Suppose, too, that this same personal "We" (the Third Person) is the missioned unity-bond between the divine Word and that humanity which both was hypostatically assumed in the virgin and is now incarnationally elevated throughout the entire human community. Then this Spirit (now "one Person *in* many [human] persons") constitutes the new saving koinonia which is the whole Christ. Jesus, glorified as Lord, employs his Mystical Body to call sinful individuals to conversion and to life at a human-divine level. Hence it seems most fitting that the Holy Spirit will again be "one Person in many persons," constituting the personal "We" that is the active source of the unity of Christians both with their Head and with each other. Since this Spirit of love cannot treasure any of Christ's redeemed communities any less than does Christ in his self-dedication to his bride,[19] the Loyalty of the Spirit must embrace each local Christian community, as well as today's world-wide body of those professing belief in Christ and that "universal Church" which stretches "from Abel, the just one, to the last of the elect."[20] Accordingly, when poured into the hearts of the faithful, this Spirit will instil within their *caritas* something of His own uniquely Personal, as well as communally Trinitarian, love for these koinonias whose unity and life He

[18] H. Mühlen, *Der Heilige Geist als Person* (Münster: Aschendorf, 1963) 100, 306–7; see also his *Una Mystica Persona* (Munich: F. Schöningh, 1964).

[19] Rev 3:9; Eph 5:25–27.

[20] Constitution on the Church, no. 2 (*Documents* 16).

constitutes (2:15). So, like this Spirit, we should love graced communities as such.

3) Our final musement arises when a person compares and contrasts both his own ideal self with his factually experienced self and this pair with other individuals and communities—with merely natural communities as well as genuinely loyal ones. Suppose, then, that none of the Three Persons of the Trinity can be "Himself" unless He freely gives Himself in love to the two other Persons and to Their shared life. Suppose, too, that human persons are constituted in the image of God as persons essentially related to others, even if essentially unique. Then a human person can find truest self-fulfilment only through a transcendent giving of himself to others.[21]

Yet toward this notion of such giving of oneself one experiences a certain ambivalence. This reveals in part one's actual self with its love-hate tendencies toward society and other individuals. To say the least, these ambivalent tendencies generate "turbulence" in the individual and in society. What, then, would loving another morally detached individual simply as such consist in? It would mean loving a person who is, like oneself, just as pulled apart by divergent tendencies and rendered just as acutely defensive against the demands of society. Hence to love only another morally detached individual simply as such is to engage in caprice, exclusion, and hopelessness; for such individualistic love has to be arbitrary in its selection of a beloved and can offer no hope of healing and integrating either onself or one's beloved or this "dangerous pair."[22] Nor does it offer hope of continuously avoiding unfair self-assertion.

However, the saving ambience of a genuinely loyal (graced) community may enter into such a couple and empower them to love each other in a transformed way. Then the above-mentioned wholehearted giving of onself to a genuine community with its openness to the universe of all minded beings becomes feasible indeed.

For one's truest self-fulfilment lies in that life-situation and growth-environment which both heals one's felt divisions and draws forth one's own potentials to the full. But one cannot even conceive of such a life-enriching situation and environment except in some ideal community of persons who know, love, and rejoice in one another and in their sharing of "one conscious spiritual whole of life" (1:406). Hence, by one's inmost self-ideal and one's quest for self-identity, as set within the context of finding oneself actually individualistic and in need of healing, one is directed from within to love that kind of community which heals and integrates oneself. In sum, our inmost nature directs us to love graced communities as such.

[21] See The Church in the Modern World, no. 24 (*Documents* 223).
[22] *HGC* 63.

CONCLUSION

We find, then, by exegesis of Paul's doctrine of love and by philosophical musements, that *caritas* directs us to love, besides individuals, graced communities as such. Some final words seem in order about our shift in the method of dealing with our question and about our pragmatic response to it.

Having neglected "the world of signs," most metaphysicians have attempted to base their positions on just one or two categories. For example, they may start from substance or process, or from reality and process taken as coultimate categories. Similarly, they may build upon the universal and/or the individual, upon the absolute and/or the relational, yet leave out the Spirit of sign-interpretation which brings both to unity. Experience shows how inadequate such positions are for generating a holistic view of reality (2:274–76). In the present essay I have replaced such category-based metaphysical thinking with the kind that benefits from a method of interpretive musement. For this I employed the life of interpretation. This kind of life process unites into community many minded beings: finite individual selves, communities of various rank, and the divine Spirit. My hope is that this method of interpretive musement, when based on genuine loyalty (and on grace), provides a more human way of philosophizing.

This shift in method, however, heightens the felt need for some guide in the unavoidable practical choices that mark everyday human living. I make no claim of having settled our question theoretically. But practically, our working hypothesis for directing life-preferences can become: act as if graced communities are real hyperpersonal realities that both love us and call for our loving loyalty. By moving into the future through decisions prompted by love for both kinds of reality—individual persons and Spirit-unified communities—we bring both into fuller presence and development. Pragmatically, we can act as if various beloved communities are actually loving, nurturing, fostering us, trusting our free creative responses to their guidance, and calling us to that kind of intelligently discerning loyalty that puts order into our love for other individuals and ourselves.

The practical exigence upon us, then, will be to return dedicated love and service—of course, to each Person in the Holy Trinity, to Christ as the human-divine Person, and to all individual persons we are privileged to live with, seen or unseen—but also to all the beloved communities giving us life. In ascending order, these will include all graced human families as such, humankind itself as graced and called by the Spirit of Christ, the Christian community baptized by Christ's Spirit into taking part in the divine life, the hypostatic community of the Second Person

in the human nature of His past, present, and future selves and the holy Trinitarian Koinonia Itself. These communities challenge us to respond in faithfulness to them because their actually mixed life of deeds and ideals calls out: "Create us; make us more present or more real in your midst!" (2:428). If our deeds carry out this call, we will have found a pragmatic way both to acknowledge the Holy Spirit's presence and activity in such genuine community that touches our lives and to help heal, through atoning deeds, those nongenuine communities that afflict us and others. By responding this way, we will render the presence of the Spirit a perceptible reality for the people and communities that we in turn touch. We will also allow both our talents and shortcomings to become clay in the Potter's hands as He molds us into living signs of His loving Spirit.

Concerning justice, I view it as an aspect of human life that requires both ethico-religious and communally institutionalized dimensions in individuals and society. Experience shows that a focusing on just one or other "kind" of justice can often impede the process of human development. Instead, we need to integrate at least seven "kinds" of justice into one well-ordered "will to promote life." That is, we need to combine the traditional triad (of commutative + distributive + legal kinds of justice) with the more contemporary tetrad (of linguistic + "socially solid" + procedural + "history-and-hope-appreciative" kinds of justice)[23] even while remaining open to demands from some still uncharted kinds of justice. Because this multifaceted justice requires the integration of many dimensions, I view the process of radical ongoing conversion, in individuals and in communities, as an indispensable condition for promoting integral human justice. (Royce would call this the need for a transformation into a loving loyalty for humankind's Great Community.) For without such continuing conversion and discerningly loving loyalty to communities as such, individualistic loves become more disordered and the societal structures produced and fostered by them grow increasingly unjust.

My closing reflection concerns us Christians today. It arises from the contrast between Jesus' wholehearted commitment to his Father's kingdom and the seeming lack of commitment for graced communities in his present-day disciples' doctrine of the kingdom. That kingdom is, of course, both an eschatological reality and an ideal already partially

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[23] Instances of these four contemporary kinds of justice may be found described in Paul VI's *Paths of the Church*, near close, John XXIII's *Peace on Earth* (New York: America, 1963; based on official Latin text of *AAS* 55, 257–304), John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1971), and H. Richard Niebuhr's *The Responsible Self* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) respectively.

realized in our space-time world. This embodied foreshadowing of the kingdom comprises, besides individual members, both the various graced communities of humankind and the universal community of the Logos-Spirit sent to gather into unity all nations of history and all realms of minded beings. Jesus' reported directive, "Seek ye first the kingdom," has many meanings. Among these, might one be "Commit yourself wholeheartedly to graced communities as embodiments of the kingdom, as part of his body to be lovingly fostered, sacrificed for, and beautified, the way Christ loves his Church"?[24]

[24] This is the fourth in a series of articles in philosophical theology by the John Courtney Murray Group. The central theme of the series is the development of an inculturated theology for the U.S., through the retrieval, in a theological context, of classical North American philosophy. The first three articles appeared in December 1982 and March and September 1983.