flourishing" to be affected by procreative technologies. These include "the meaning of the family; the meaning of self-identity; the meaning of sexuality and marriage; the sanctity of individual human life." In both ethical and public-policy discussion, it is important to consider both the consequences of technologies, "whether they will dissipate our respect for persons," *and* whether each possibility is "in itself an act of disrespect." Different assessments of these issues in relation to reproductive technologies make for the present ethical pluralism and thus for a more difficult public-policy task. Even given uncertainty about the precise status of the embryo, McCormick urges that significant respect is due in view of its potentiality and that to deprive it of that respect is to risk serious "erosion of respect for human life" in general.[95] The difficulty, of course, is in determining exactly what practical limits that "respect" will involve, given uncertainty and disagreement about its grounding and extent.

McCormick reaches for agreement on the basis of a "basic ethico-prudential judgment," "a safeside moral rule of prudence against the slide to abuse."[96] In so defining the judgment, he indicates the importance both of proceeding cautiously when the moral character of specific acts is unclear and of taking into account in the moral evaluation of such acts the social ramifications of their institution as practices. McCormick would not prohibit marital IVF, albeit some embryos do not survive the process; but when social risks are added to the possibility of unjust treatment of the conceptus, he disapproves embryo research, donor methods, surrogate motherhood, embryo freezing, and their commercialization. His suggestion demonstrates that if any consensus about IVF (or abortion) is to be achieved before every ethical unclarity is resolved, then that consensus will of necessity be limited to the middle ground, probably provisional, and not susceptible of universally persuasive "proof."

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PASTORAL ON WAR AND PEACE: REACTIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

1984 turns out to be neither the year of totalitarian terror foreseen by Orwell nor the occasion for nuclear Armageddon. Instead, it has seen the re-election of Ronald Reagan, who offers to the voters both a continued military buildup and renewed arms-control negotiations. Despite the protests of the European peace movement and numerous denunciations by religious bodies, the initial deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles has occurred without major difficulties for the authorities of NATO. Some observers may conclude that it is as if *The Challenge of*

[95] "Procreative Technologies" 174. [96] Ibid.

Peace, the celebrated and controversial pastoral letter approved by the U.S. bishops in May 1983, and the parallel documents issued by various European hierarchies had never been issued. Certainly, if one looked for an immediate transformation of electoral politics as a result of the pastoral on war and peace, and if one judged the effectiveness of the pastoral only in such terms, one would be disappointed (or perhaps relieved) by the course of events in 1984. In fact, the bishops themselves were divided on just how much weight they wanted the pastoral to have in shaping public policy. The central fact that has to be recognized about discussion of the pastoral on war and peace at the end of 1984 is that it serves as a major point of reference both for the shaping of the future of arms-control negotiations and for the process of fashioning the pastoral on the U.S. economy and Catholic social teaching. *The Challenge of Peace* makes only occasional appearances on the nation's editorial pages, even though it has to be recognized as a cornerstone in the edifice of contemporary American Catholic political theology. At the same time, it goes into a second career as a topic for probing and debate of the type commonly found in scholarly quarterlies and as a source of questions and suggestions for extended development in theology and for new positions in the practical life of the Christian community. The end of 1984, then, gives us the opportunity to reflect on the pastoral at a stage between debate over current events and definitive scholarly assessments, and to see how it contributes to and is assessed in the ongoing debate in the churches and in the public arena over the morality of warfare in the 20th century.

First, it may be helpful to call attention to some general overviews of important areas of the recent literature related to the pastoral and the topics it covers. For instance, Mark Heirman has written a useful comparative overview of the various pastoral letters and statements issued by the bishops' conferences on issues of war and peace in 1983. Heirman points out that for the first time one theme has been addressed by most of the bishops' conferences in the industrialized world from Japan to the United States, from Ireland to Hungary; but at the same time his account is sensitive to the different national situations and priorities of the various conferences.[97] The basis for an instructive ecumenical comparison with similar statements issued by such ecumenical bodies as the World Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches can be found in David Hoekema's overview of Protestant statements on nuclear disarmament in *Religious Studies Review*, though it does not consider the condemnation of nuclear deterrence by the

[97] Mark Heirman, "Bishops' Conference on War and Peace in 1983," *Cross Currents* 33 (1983) 275–87.

Vancouver Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1983.[98] Hoekema presents the Protestant statements as examples of the Church's role of pastor meeting the needs of its people without falling into the institutional responsibility of the chaplain or the disregard for political feasibility of the prophet. Hoekema's piece is accompanied by Judith Dwyer's very clear and compact review of the Catholic literature, including both the various statements by individual bishops and earlier statements of the U.S. Catholic Conference and the major contributions to the internal Catholic debate over the pastoral.[99] She ends by calling attention to the possibility of fruitful ecumenical dialogue on this topic. A more ambitious but sprightly and competent introduction to the general literature, both religious and secular, on the ethics of deterrence has been put together by Barrie Paskins, who served on the Church of England committee that drafted the lengthy and abortive statement *The Church and the Bomb*, and can be found in the *Modern Churchman*.[100]

Three collections of articles that grow directly out of the pastoral can provide a useful focus for this survey. One is in book form, *The Catholic Bishops and Nuclear War*, edited by Judith A. Dwyer, S.S.J. The other two are special issues of journals: the March 1984 issue of *Thought*, which is devoted to the morality of nuclear deterrence, and the fall 1983 issue of *Cross Currents*, which actually appeared in the early part of 1984. All attempt to provide a clash of divergent opinions, though the *Cross Currents* issue carries very little material that is to the "right" of the bishops' pastoral, if one uses this common and unsatisfactory term. The Dwyer volume, particularly by means of the titles of the particular essays, invites us to focus on the meaning of realism in the bishops' letter and in the divergent assessments that have been offered of it. Francis X. Meehan puts the matter thus: "The times are urging upon us the realistic way, the way of nonviolence.... The very impetus of the just-war teaching is pushing us to a development of doctrine which will finally teach a very simple word: no more violence, only nonviolence from now on, war no more."[101] Meehan wants to move beyond the complementary relationship between just-war teaching and nonviolence which he finds

[98] David A. Hoekema, "Protestant Statements on Nuclear Disarmament," *Religious Studies Review* 10 (1984) 97–102.

[99] Judith Dwyer, "Catholic Thought on Nuclear Weapons: A Review of the Literature," ibid. 103–7.

[100] Barrie Paskins, "Bibliography: The Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence," *Modern Churchman* 26 (1984) 35–39.

[101] Francis X. Meehan, "Nonviolence and the Bishops' Pastoral: A Case for a Development of Doctrine," in *The Catholic Bishops and Nuclear War*, ed. Judith Dwyer, S.S.J. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1984) 89–107, at 104.

in *The Challenge of Peace.*[102] He makes it clear that he wants to avoid a simple casuistic confrontation between the two positions and to present them as a duality in "living tension."[103] He correctly insists that force is something always less than ideal and that it is something "which therefore must be moderated, diminished, progressively abolished."[104] At the same time, he wants a doctrine of nonviolence which does not commit Christians to passivity in the face of evil. Meehan's fundamental position is that by a process of development toward the eschatological goal the Church will come to teach a doctrine of nonviolence without losing its fundamental capacity for political action and without contradicting its prior teaching. Meehan's essay is a particularly sophisticated and interesting example of the family of "left" interpretations of the pastoral which both affirm the truth of nonviolence and present the pastoral as a way station on the road to nonviolence. It is particularly important because it takes the important steps of looking at the problem in dialectical terms and of taking seriously the presumption in favor of nonviolence that is built into just-war theory. This enables Meehan to present the development toward nonviolence as something more than a simple movement from error to truth or from darkness to light. Meehan's position suffers from two major problems. One is the clear refusal of the bishops in the third and final drafts of the pastoral to put just-war theory and pacifism on an equal footing as a basis for public policy and their clear reaffirmation of authoritative Church teaching that "governments threatened by armed, unjust aggression must defend their people."[105] The more fundamental problem is that his argument does not turn on any real alteration of the situation but is a matter of achieving a deeper understanding of Jesus' ethic and the values affirmed in nonviolence. If the fundamental facts of political division and aggressive violence which have provided the basis for the Church's authorizing a response of limited but effective violence continue to hold and if the political and social situation does not yield objective evidence of the influence of eschatological transformation, then it is not easy to see how a development from just-war theory to nonviolence is possible (as contrasted with a conversion from one to the other).

Meehan's belief that realism leads to nonviolence would be hotly contested by two of his colleagues in the Dwyer volume as well as by James Finn. Finn writing in *This World* on "Pacifism, Just War, and the

[102] See National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace* (Washington, D.C.: USCC, 1983) pars. 74 and 121.

[103] Meehan 96.

[104] Ibid. 100.

[105] *The Challenge of Peace,* par. 75.

Bishops' Muddle," chides the bishops for producing a "corrupting union" of pacifism and just-war theory and for adopting "a policy that separates the twinned elements of deterrence—the weapons and the political will to use them—and jettisons the political will."[106] In the Dwyer volume Michael Novak acclaims the bishops for resisting pacifism and for not rejecting deterrence, but then censures them for failing "to strengthen the clarity of soul necessary to make deterrence work."[107] For Novak, deterrence is not a morally perplexing policy which urgently requires justification, but is rather a matter of moral obligation in the present political situation. Novak, here as elsewhere, assesses the pastoral primarily in political terms and finds it wanting in its view of how to deal with the Soviet Union. William O'Brien of Georgetown has a more penetrating piece, in which he sorts out realist and idealist elements in the pastoral. He continues to insist on the central importance of "just cause" in modern warfare, namely, the goal of protecting freedom and fundamental human rights.[108] He attributes the "evenhanded" and "disinterested" character of the bishops' discussion of the Soviet threat to the influence of "secular humanism." This is, I suggest, an implausible bit of name-calling; the attitudes to authority, conflict, and force that divide realists and idealists can be found among both the religious and the secular at any time in the last century. It is also gratuitous, since the fundamental direction of thought that O'Brien objects to was already manifest, by his own account of things, at Vatican II in *Gaudium et spes*. Novak and O'Brien both fail to explore the possibility that the bishops' reluctance to dwell on the nature of the Soviet threat arose fundamentally from a reluctance to provide handles that would legitimate the national-security policies of the Reagan administration and would distract public attention from their belief that arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union needed to be carried on with a serious commitment. The political use to which the French bishops' letter was put confirms the wisdom of the American bishops' reluctance to engage in a thorough critique of the Soviet Union, even though this means that their treatment of just cause loses in comprehensiveness and balance. Like Novak, O'Brien believes that deterrence is indispensable and that it ought not to be weakened. In his assessment of the pastoral, O'Brien is willing to challenge not merely the bishops' conclusions but also one of their key starting points, namely *Gaudium et spes*, which he finds "typical of the fuzzy thinking that has

[106] James Finn, "Pacifism, Just War, and the Bishops' Muddle," *This World* 7 (winter 1984) 31–42, at 36.

[107] Michael Novak, "The U.S. Bishops, the U.S. Government—and Reality." in *The Catholic Bishops and Nuclear War* 65–87, at 84.

[108] William V. O'Brien, "The Challenge of War: A Christian Realist Perspective," in *The Catholic Bishops and Nuclear War* 37–63, at 46–47.

provided the American Catholic bishops with a superficially impressive backdrop of authority that elicits more respect than it deserves."[109] More positively, O'Brien continues to argue for the necessity of moving away from "the clearly suicidal and immoral policies such as MAD"[110] and to press for the necessity of thinking about limited nuclear war aimed at counterforce targets both as a morally acceptable possibility in itself and as the basis for a satisfactory deterrence policy. Paradoxically, O'Brien's main contribution to the debate is to argue as one who cares deeply about the Catholic Church's position but who is not hindered by conventional pieties from following the logic of the argument even when it leads in ominous directions. The logic of his critique of the bishops is put here with particular clarity and concision.

Francis X. Winters takes a quite different approach to the problem of deterrence. He welcomes the "radical" challenge of the bishops to national policy, which in his view consists in their efforts to combine a prohibition of any use of nuclear weapons (including retaliatory uses) with a rejection of unilateral nuclear disarmament and at the same time "to forbid Catholic officers to participate in certain integral functions of the present deterrent strategy, such as attacking civilian centers."[111] Winters believes that mere possession of nuclear weapons meets the need for what McGeorge Bundy has termed "existential deterrence," since a declaratory policy of nonuse could be "instantaneously reversed by the president."[112] Instantaneous reversal, however, is only feasible if the weapons are deployed and if there are definite targeting policies and programs. This brings us closer to the *status quo* than to a posture of mere possession. Officers presumably would have to be willing to contemplate the prospect of using the weapons, an action which Winters regards as immoral in all cases. I am inclined to agree with him that possession of nuclear weapons does have a significant deterrent effect, but I would also agree with the realists that changing declaratory policy alters very little in the adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union and so cannot effect a moral transformation of our present impasse.

Winters persistently sees subtlety in the bishops' letter where others would discern inconsistency or at least serious tension. A separate article by Winters reporting European episcopal views on nuclear deterrence argues that the European conferences have arrived at a consensus that "nuclear weapons have lost any legitimacy as military instruments of

[109] Ibid. 50.

[110] Ibid., 53. The acronym stands for "mutual assured destruction."

[111] Francis X. Winters, S.J., "The American Bishops on Deterrence—'Wise as Serpents, Innocent as Doves,' " in *The Catholic Bishops and Nuclear War* 23–36, at 29.

[112] Ibid. 33.

justice and security."[113] Winters argues that this consensus has been endorsed by the Holy See in Cardinal Casaroli's address of Nov. 16, 1983 at the University of San Francisco.[114] Winters spells out the three key points of the consensus in more detail:

> (1) No bishop or episcopal conference has approved the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances whatsoever; (2) those episcopal statements which explicitly treat the issue uniformly condemn all use of nuclear weapons; (3) no episcopal statements call for immediate and unilateral dismantling of the present arsenal, although they uniformly insist that the right to retain this arsenal is limited in duration.[115]

Here one must observe that (1) and (2) taken together do not entail that there is an episcopal consensus that any and every use of nuclear weapons is morally wrong. The "centimeter of ambiguity" (a phrase coined by Bryan Hehir) remains open. In fact (1) and (2) are precisely the positions that show a rejection of nuclear war and an unwillingness to forbid every use. On this point there is convergence between the European conferences and *The Challenge of Peace*, where the sceptical treatment of the possibility of limited nuclear war is not based on the premise that every use of a nuclear weapon is morally wrong. Winters carefully refrains from stating that there is a clear consensus against any possible use, but his formulations are worked out with more caution than clarity. There are, of course, very strong prudential arguments against the bishops' appearing to offèr an a priori legitimation of the actual use of nuclear weapons. The morality of using nuclear weapons is the specific topic of Judith Dwyer's own essay, which also serves as a very good introduction to the American pastoral.[116] Her volume as a whole constitutes a useful and well-focused extension of the debate that accompanied the issuing of the pastoral.

The morality of nuclear deterrence is the single focus of the March 1984 issue of *Thought*. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and ex-Governor of California Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown stake out the two principal opposing positions in the political debate. The Weinberger position, which stresses John Paul II's affirmation of the duty of Christians to resist aggression and offers the move away from countervalue targeting and the goal of preventing war as the main moral justifications

[113] Francis X. Winters, S.J., "After Tension, Détente: A Continuing Chronicle of European Episcopal Views on Nuclear Deterrence," *TS* 45 (1984) 343–51, at 351.

[114] Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, "The Vatican's Position on Issues of War and Peace," *Origins* 13 (1983–84) 435–40.

[115] Winters, "After Tension, Détente" 350.

[116] Judith Dwyer, S.S.J., "The Challenge of Peace and the Morality of Using Nuclear Weapons," in *The Catholic Bishops and Nuclear War.*

for deterrence, fails to address the points of disagreement between *The Challenge of Peace* and the policies of the Reagan administration, especially on the first use of nuclear weapons and the problem of extensive collateral damage to civilians as a result of counterforce targeting.[117] The Brown position stresses the unhealthy character of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and maintains that new weapons systems will not set the superpowers free from "their mutual hostage relationship" and "the curse of mutual assured destruction."[118] Brown relies on psychological analogies to denounce the policies of the Reagan administration; but then, like most Democrats, he turns back to some very stale clichés about "the need for a strong defense" and the role of cultural exchanges in breaking down barriers. This combination of bombs and ballerinas leaves the essential moral perplexities of deterrence untouched, even while it allows the author to maintain a stance of moral superiority at low cost.

A more refreshing approach to the overworked territory of political debate on the options available to policymakers can be found in John Ahearne's essay "Nuclear Deterrence: A Pragmatist's View of the Moral Issues." Ahearne, who served in the Defense Department under James Schlesinger and was subsequently chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, approaches the debate over deterrence versus unilateral disarmament as a matter of different estimates about the likelihood and seriousness of negative outcomes. The pragmatist adopts a sceptical view of the Soviet Union but also realizes that a nuclear war would have disastrous consequences. So the pragmatist looks for a middle ground between the unilateralists and the hard liners which Ahearne designates as Group A and Group B. He concludes: "The pragmatist would endorse supporting such approaches as a verifiable freeze or builddown ... recognizing that the probability of success is low because both A and B are opposed to it (Group A dislikes the verification, Group B the freeze)."[119] The value of Ahearne's piece does not consist in a resolution of the fundamental moral dilemma but in the schema he offers for interpreting the two sides to each other.

Robert Roth, S.J., a Fordham philosopher, argues that the pastoral offers stronger arguments in criticism of deterrence than in favor of it and that its conclusion in favor of deterrence needs stronger support than the bishops have given it.[120] This, he thinks, is to be found primarily in a clearer statement of the likely consequences of Soviet domination.

[117] Caspar Weinberger, "The Moral Aspects of Deterrence," *Thought* 59 (1984) 5–9.

[118] Edmund G. Brown, Jr., "Nuclear Addition: A Response," ibid. 9–14, at 12.

[119] *Thought* 59 (1984) 78–90, at 90.

[120] Robert Roth, S.J., "Nuclear Deterrence and the Bishops' Pastoral Letter," ibid. 15–24, at 19.

Roth thinks (erroneously) that in the bishops' letter "every possible use of nuclear arms is judged to be morally unsatisfactory." But he is interested in exploring "an alternative which would specify no mass destruction of civilians, intended or not, and no first use."[121] Here he comes close to the views of William O'Brien and this writer.

O'Brien's essay in this collection makes a similar criticism of the pastoral's rejection of the possibility of limited nuclear war. O'Brien now accepts the pastoral's position against first use, but he holds that the "constantly changing technical situation seems to warrant rejection of a permanently valid judgment that nuclear war cannot be controlled."[122] Like the pastoral itself, O'Brien calls for improved command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) facilities for U.S. and allied forces.[123] O'Brien's real concern is not to make limited nuclear war feasible or winnable; rather, it is "to make possible a nuclear deterrent that will be the more effective, since it will be based on a credible will to fight aggression with means that are both morally permissible and have good prospects for success."[124]

A conception which has been thought to be of central importance in explaining the working of deterrence is the "firebreak" between conventional or nonnuclear weapons and nuclear weapons. Michael Klare, a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, believes that "preservation of the firebreak is an essential barrier against the outbreak of nuclear war"[125] (a view which expressed in this way is a simple tautology) and that the firebreak is subject to erosion as a result of the development of high-tech conventional weapons and of miniaturized nuclear weapons capable of being aimed at discrete targets, as well as by military doctrines calling for combat systems with dual (conventional and nuclear) capability. Klare argues that extensive arms-control measures are necessary in order to prevent the firebreak from becoming a merely symbolic threshold incapable of preventing escalation to catastrophic levels of nuclear exchange. Klare has an unfortunate tendency to reify the firebreak, which is indeed an important notion in our perceptions and communications about the possibilities of nuclear war, but which can have no causal efficacy in bringing about or preventing events. Klare's argument, like O'Brien's, directs our attention to the pressure that technological change puts on our moral and conceptual categories. Like

[121] Ibid. 23.

[122] William V. O'Brien, "Proportion and Discrimination in Nuclear Deterrence and Defense," ibid. 37–52, at 47.

[123] See *The Challenge of Peace*, par. 191.

[124] O'Brien, "Proportion and Discrimination" 52.

[125] Michael Klare, "Conventional Arms, Military Doctrine, and Nuclear War: The Vanishing Firebreak," *Thought* 59 (1984) 53–65, at 54.

the pastoral in its assessment of proposed new weapons systems and unlike O'Brien, his argument tends to accept the view that significant innovations will only make things worse. This writer is inclined to suspect that new weapons systems have a more destabilizing effect on strategic and moral theories than they do on the opposing states. Too much of the debate centers on the properties of new weapons systems, and not enough attention is paid to the political context. Thus it has been true for the last 40 years that a major attack on the central front (i.e., in Germany) by the forces of either side against the other portended very serious trouble for the entire developed world, regardless of the weapons systems that were initially employed. Having said this, I do not wish to suggest that there may not be very negative consequences to the development of certain new weapons systems (such as antisatellite weapons) or to propose that we overlook the costs that are inherent in virtually any significant new weapons system.

The essays I have chosen for discussion from the special issue of *Thought* are primarily concerned about how to make deterrence better in some way or other: more stable, more credible, less expensive and addictive, more intelligible, more morally justifiable. But the issue also contains Cardinal Joseph Bernardin's Fordham address, "A Consistent Ethic of Life," and Susan B. Anthony's treatment of strategies of "spiritual deterrence," which aims at providing the peace movement with a foundation that is spiritual as well as moral and political. Taken together, the essays provide an uneven but stimulating sketch of possibilities after the pastoral.

The *Cross Currents* issue provides a number of pieces that are more in the line of cultural and psychological explorations than variations on the now standard patterns of moral-political arguments about the nuclear impasse. The three most interesting pieces are all written by authors committed to nonviolence, but in different ways they all recognize that the move to a nonviolent world requires more than exhortation and assent. Thus, Hunter Brown is dissatisfied with the activist approach that assumes that "theoretical repulsion would yield actual disarmament."[126] He argues that in the general public there is both an acceptance of violence and a desire for survival, but that violence is rooted in a will to identity which is even deeper than survival. Nuclear weapons, as a symbol of deep inner destructiveness, are "a mirror which reveals us to ourselves."[127] The Christian contribution to the resolution of this problem is to identify "the source of human destructiveness in the prideful,

[126] Hunter Brown, "The Nuclear Mirror and the Will to Identity," *Cross Currents* 33 (1983) 342–56, at 343.

[127] Ibid. 349.

autonomous quest of identity."[128] In fact, he chides the U.S. bishops for the "somewhat subdued elaboration of traditional theological concepts" in the letter.[129] On the other hand, he has a telling observation on the contemporary tendency to equate the prophetic with what provokes a reaction in the media. The effort to understand the nuclear impasse as well as the prior unresolved dispute between pacifists and just-war theorists in psychological and existential terms which is found in Brown's piece moves the argument beyond ordinary moral reasoning and the formation of testable hypotheses about the sources of violence. It is important because the sense that the main public debate, of which the bishops' letter is a very important part, is ultimately inconclusive can lead people in three directions: (1) to withdraw from the debate, (2) to challenge one or more premises of the public debate or of Catholic moral teaching, (3) to search in a larger theological context for a way of reconceiving the problem. Brown's piece is a creditable example of the third move, since he is really trying to think through the relevance of sinful self-assertion to the problem of why people are willing to jeopardize their survival by threatening nuclear war. The danger in this mode of proceeding is that one effectively begs the question and then starts preaching to one's opponents in the debate, rather than offering them arguments and considerations. The advantage is that it directs our attention to basic evaluations of autonomy, risk, commitment, and social bonds which are not adequately captured in traditional formulations of moral principles and rules.

Further moves beyond the standard limits of the nuclear-policy debates and even beyond the disciplinary confines of ethics can be found in two short theological essays published elsewhere. Paul Lakeland of Fairfield University observes in the *Month* that "the once-and-for-allness of nuclear weapons is a matter of considerable moment for religion"[130] and claims that it changes our understanding of God's relation to the universe, making God's primal act of love dependent on human response. He believes that the nuclear impasse requires a change to a process conception of God in which God is present in our power to choose in favor of life and of the powerless rather than as ruler bringing us to the goal of redemption. Monika Hellwig of Georgetown, in a discussion of "Soteriology in the Nuclear Age," points to our need to distinguish sufferings that are conducive to our growth as Christians and those that contradict God's will for humanity. Drawing on the critical resources of liberation theology, she commends the notion of structural sin as an instrument for analyzing "larger human situations such as the present nuclear

[128] Ibid. 348–49. [129] Ibid. 355.

[130] Paul Lakeland, "God in the Nuclear Age," *Month* 17 (1984) 119–23, at 119.

threats—situations which are also widely diffused in their responsibilities and their possible solutions."[131] The positive task confronting us is to understand and overcome the fears that sustain our current nuclear posture and to achieve "reconciliation and justice and community."[132] Hellwig, with her penetrating insistence that we confront both our personal experience and the cry of the world's poor, here seems to be moving us toward both an overall negative judgment of the nuclear impasse and an understanding of it which stresses its social character and the need for a social response. Her language suggests that her policy recommendations would be in the direction of nonviolent resistance, while her argument appeals to liberation theology, which generally accepts some form of just-war theory or an extension of it to justify violent revolution.

A more empirical and less metaphysical approach to popular attitudes to nuclear warfare is taken in Robert Rizzo's essay "The Psychological Illusions of Nuclear Warfare." Rizzo compares suppression of facts about the effects of nuclear weapons to our reluctance to think about death, and notes that as a society we have made some significant progress in our willingness to deal more candidly with these two difficult problems. He observes correctly that "if one traces the development of Catholic moral teaching on war from World War II to the present, one will find that the principles have remained consistent; what has changed are the perception of modern warfare and a willingness to face the implications for morality."[133] What is less clear is how long the public readiness to focus on this difficult issue will continue; it seems implausible to think that awareness of the problem is simply cumulative or that it can be sustained at a high level for indefinite periods of time.

The move to larger perspectives is also present in Beverly Woodward's essay "The Abolition of War," but this time in the form of fundamental restructuring of the political world somewhat on the lines of Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth.* Woodward claims that "all human life is now subject to nation-state politics"[134] and that the net effect of arms-control efforts "has been to channel and in some measure 'legitimize' the arms race rather than to arrest it."[135] The real alternative, in her view, is the development of a peace system comprising six interdependent elements: (1) universal disarmament, including a reduction of internal police forces to low levels; (2) international institutions to adjudicate

[131] Monika Hellwig, "Soteriology in the Nuclear Age," *Thomist* 48 (1984) 634–43, at 641.

[132] Ibid. 642.

[133] Robert Rizzo, "The Psychological Illusions of Nuclear Warfare," *Cross Currents* 33 (1983) 289–301, at 301.

[134] Beverly Woodward, "The Abolition of War," *Cross Currents* 33 (1983) 264–74, at 268.

[135] Ibid. 267.

disputes; (3) unarmed peacemaking forces and a program of nonviolent defense; (4) re-education of the general public; (5) institutions to protect human rights; (6) transformation of the economy away from military production. This is a useful brief crystallization of a growing realization of the systemic connections between the kinds of political organizations that we have and the kinds of conflicts we get into. Without more fundamental and comprehensive changes, a norm of disarmament or nonviolence imposed on nation-states will be isolated and vulnerable, even when it is widely thought to be desirable. If violence and the threat of violence are genuinely functional in preserving the kinds of political units we have against real attacks, then we cannot expect nation-states to renounce the option of violent self-defense. This increased recognition of the systematic connections between economy and military policy, between education and attitudes to violence, between high levels of internal policing (as in the Soviet sphere and various dictatorships in Latin America and the Middle East) and the favored place of the military, is a gain in understanding, provided that these connections are not taken in a simplistic and unilinear fashion. Mrs. Thatcher's Britain wages war against Argentina, has a vocal peace movement and an established church with deep (though not decisive) reservations about British defense policy; so the system does not move in only one direction. Proposing a peace system instead of a war system can raise the debate to utopian levels, but when it is done with some care and rigor, it performs an important service of clarifying the scope and the implications of the alternatives. One of Woodward's most striking observations is that "a capacity for nonviolent struggle is crucial to the establishment of a peace system, since groups must have a way to assert and defend their fundamental rights."[136] This is precisely the point that such modern just-war theorists as Michael Walzer would insist on to argue for the necessity of national defense. The necessity for some co-ordinated social effort to protect human rights against real possibilities of violation is important common ground, even though different solutions to the problem are proposed.

The point that there are crucially important systemic connections among different aspects of a society can lead to two very different sorts of policy agendas. In the first case, it leads to proposals for the fundamental restructuring of society. If the nation-state and its legal and economic systems are inseparably intertwined with modern forms of war, then the good of freeing the world from the evils of modern warfare and from threats and fears of such evils seems to justify radical changes in these systems. This is the route followed by Schell and Woodward, and it leads to a political agenda with important and attractive goals and

[136] Ibid. 274.

great uncertainty about the attainability of the goals and about the possible disruptions which such a radical turn would produce in a society that would probably still remain half-converted, half-doubtful about the new direction. The second possibility is that a realization of the mass of systematic connections makes one sceptical of rapid progress toward a radical transformation of the international order and of national policies. The danger in this route is that effective steps to deal with the dangers of our present situation will not be taken until it is too late. The common factor in both directions is that one gives up the expectation that a pacific world order can be achieved simply by moral exhortations aimed at amputation of the military members.

The three collections of essays that we have been considering give us some idea of the second wave of reactions to the issues raised by the U.S. pastoral letter on war and peace, that is, the wave after the debate over the document itself. Another special issue, which concentrates on theological sources for Christian reflection on this topic, is the July 1984 issue of *Interpretation*, a journal which specializes in biblical theology. There are general survey pieces on war and peace in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament by Paul Hanson and Victor Furnish respectively. Furnish argues that "war and peace conceived as social and political issues were not specifically topics of Jesus' teaching or concerns of his ministry."[137] Furnish's approach stresses the factors which separated the early Christians from the larger political world and which stand in the way of elaborating a biblical social ethic. This issue also contains a compact and illuminating treatment of the major theological positions on war and peace by Lisa Cahill. Her interpretation of the history of Christian thought on this topic stresses the connection between the understanding of the kingdom and the author's position on defense and violence. The kingdom is the primary biblical category that is employed in *The Challenge of Peace*.[138] Cahill finds a general tendency for pacifism to be correlated with an understanding of the kingdom as already present and for just-war theory to be accompanied by a strong sense of the ambiguity of history; but she is careful to respect the diversities of each of the major authors and movements. Thus, while she acknowledges the secularization of just-war theory in the 17th century, she also points out that Grotius, often seen as the father of this process, "affirms both responsible participation by the Christian in every aspect of society and the Christian's special gospel-based obligations."[139] Taken together, the

[137] Victor Paul Furnish, "War and Peace in the New Testament," *Interpretation* 38 (1984) 363–79, at 371.

[138] See *The Challenge of Peace*, pars. 27–55.

[139] Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Nonresistance, Defense, Violence, and the Kingdom in Christian Tradition," *Interpretation* 38 (1984) 380–97, at 395.

three essays by Hanson, Furnish, and Cahill would provide an excellent introduction to the theological sources for an ethics course on war and peace.

A more systematic and methodologically conscious reflection on the history of just-war theory is found in James Turner Johnson's essay on "Historical Tradition and Moral Judgment: The Case of Just War Tradition." Johnson, as always, stresses the historical character of just-war theory; this includes both its development as a response to social, political, and technological changes rather than as a deductive application of general principles, and a view of the just-war tradition as a moral unity which does not require logical consistency but which enables us to make judgments in a way that preserves the continuity of the Christian community. Johnson interprets the just-war tradition as working from our common moral perceptions about evil and thus as more akin to the procedure of the prophets than to the Greco-Roman method of organizing the moral life around the identification and the pursuit of the good.[140]

One unfortunate by-product of the attention given to the U.S. bishops' pastoral and to the pastoral issued by other Catholic hierarchies has been a certain tendency to assume that the only politically significant and intellectually coherent consideration of issues of war and peace within the religion would take place within or in relation to Roman Catholicism. It is true that the Catholic process, because of its novelty and the size and visibility and transnational connections of American Catholicism, gathered an enormous amount of attention. In fact, some of the most helpful and discerning attention has come from Protestants. Two senior Protestant theologians who have drawn much of their inspiration from the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, and who have also been important colleagues for Catholic moralists over recent decades, have published short reflective pieces on the debate after the pastoral. Roger Shinn of New York's Union Theological Seminary offers a characteristically judicious and charitable comparison of the approaches to peacemaking of the U.S. Catholic bishops and the World Council of Churches, which he sees as leading to "a shared dilemma."[141] Both aspire to a world without nuclear weapons, and both are unsure about the steps to get there. With the bishops the dilemma arises over the ambiguous rejection of use and the conditional acceptance of deterrence. With the World Council there is an uneasy dilemma over unilateralist and multilateralist approaches to disarmament. Shinn is particularly impressed by Catholic Church leaders' greater readiness to accept ambiguity in the process of disarma-

[140] James Turner Johnson, "Historical Tradition and Moral Judgment: The Case of Just War Tradition," *Journal of Religion* 64 (1984) 299–316, at 315.

[141] Roger L. Shinn, "Peacemaking by the Churches: Two Processes Compared," *Christianity and Crisis* 44 (1984) 105–11, at 109.

ment and peacemaking. John Coleman Bennett, who was long associated with Union, has written a personal overview which goes back to the Dun commission on nuclear weapons, which was created by the Federal Council of Churches in 1950. His conclusions stress our need to change our view of the Soviet Union, but he does not expect any speedy deliverance from "the present trap of unreliable and morally offensive nuclear deterrence."[142] In effect, he endorses the bishops' insistence on the moral urgency of renewed negotiations with the Russians, but, like many reflective Protestants, he is more willing to use more negative evaluative language about deterrence than the Catholic tradition allows in cases where there is little prospect of disengagement from what is being condemned.

Focusing purely on Catholic documents would also cause us to overlook the interesting debate that goes on within the international Lutheran community, in which Richard Hordern insists on the Christian need to "develop a theological language, faithful both to the Bible and to today's historical realities, which will counter the misleading ideologies promoted by various interests to disguise the facts of nuclear armament."[143] Hordern argues that a Reformation view of original sin requires that "*a priori*, no war can ever be truly 'just.' "[144] This may well be true, but mainly for reasons which ensure that almost any large-scale human undertaking (including arms control) will not be truly just. Hordern is not, however, in favor of unilateral disarmament and he recognizes that historically the failure to deter has given scope to evil. He does provide a good example of the greater tension, the greater sensitivity to evils that have become institutionalized, which marks most Protestant approaches to this problem as well as to social ethics in general. Though it goes counter to the long-standing Catholic rejection of the view that there are situations of moral perplexity which do not allow morally acceptable solution, Hordern's approach may be instructive for those who want both to adhere to the general policy directions of the pastoral and to urge us to be attentive to the enormous risks and evils present in any deterrence policy. A position generally similar to Hordern's is argued by Thomas Lee, who points both to the necessity of violence for the preservation of order and to the disquieting possibility, recognized in Amos and Isaiah, that God may not be fighting on our side.[145]

[142] John C. Bennett, "Nuclear Deterrence Is Itself Vulnerable," *Christianity and Crisis* 44 (1984) 296–301, at 301.

[143] Richard Hordern, "The Gospel of Peace: Theological Reflections on the Nuclear Age," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 39 (1984) 115–26, at 115.

[144] Ibid. 117.

[145] Thomas R. Lee, "Peacemaking in the Nuclear Age: A Biblical Perspective," *Dialog* 23 (1984) 186–90.

Divine activity in war is a central notion for those Protestant speculations on the nuclear problem that see a link between the waging of nuclear war and the coming of the Lord to Armageddon. This theme got considerable public attention during the presidential campaign when President Reagan made some informal remarks about Armageddon. Two critical but astute pieces, which situate Reagan's personal views in relationship to American civil religion and to the evangelical tradition, can be found in *Sojourners*. Jim Wallis points to Reagan's effective rejection of the teaching of the bishops' pastoral and to his tendency to equate spiritual revival and military buildup.[146] Tom Sine argues that after the Civil War evangelical expectations of the coming kingdom changed in focus from ethical renewal to precise prediction. The premillenarian strand in evangelical thinking was pessimistic and fatalistic, expecting things to get progressively worse until the return of Christ and so undercutting the struggle for peace and justice on the earth. Sine objects that this sort of eschatology effectively locks God out of history: "All that God gets to do is to bring down the final curtain at the end of history."[147] As Christians, we should rather be working to carry out God's will for justice on the earth. More scholarly critiques of the appeal to Armageddon are given by Robert Jewett and Paul Hanson in *Quarterly Review*.[148] The introduction of a literalist apocalypticism into the public-policy debate is at variance with both the premises of modern biblical scholarship and the central place accorded to reason by the Catholic tradition in the working out of both social ethics and public policy. But, like the bishops' pastoral itself, it counts as a constitutionally protected exercise of religious freedom. It is unlikely to alter the inner workings of America's national-security apparatus, but it can have a significant impact on parts of public opinion and can be used to negate the effects of the bishops' letter and to provide an alternative religious basis of support for intense forms of militaristic nationalism.

So it seems that we came to the end of this intensely political year with a kind of double dissatisfaction. In the first place, the likelihood of significant change in the nuclear-weapons policies of the superpowers does not seem to be great. Second, there is no manifest resolution of the troubling problem of the moral status of nuclear deterrence. But four directions for the future that are pointed out by essays in the current literature deserve further exploration.

[146] Jim Wallis, "The President's Pulpit: A Look at Ronald Reagan's Theology," *Sojourners* 13, no. 8 (Sept. 1984) 17–21, at 20–21.

[147] Tom Sine, "Bringing Down the Final Curtain," *Sojourners* 13, no. 6 (June-July 1984) 10–14, at 14.

[148] See Robert Jewett, "Coming to Terms with the Doom Boom," *Quarterly Review* 4 (1984) 9–22; Paul Hanson, "The Apocalyptic Consciousness," ibid. 23–39.

The first is the possibility of a technological transformation of the superpower situation of mutual deterrence through the development of defensive capabilities which, if fully effective, would protect the populations of the superpowers both from massive attacks from the other side and from lesser threats from states or terrorist groups that had somehow acquired nuclear weapons. The broad range of possibilities popularly referred to as "Star Wars" raises technical problems about their feasibility and reliability, economic problems about their cost, legal problems about their compatibility with the ABM treaty and other international arms agreements, political problems about their potential for destabilizing the balance between the superpowers, for weakening security links between a protected America and its possibly unprotected major allies, and for making nuclear war more likely precisely because it would become more discriminate and less horrendous. Joseph Martino gives a partial statement of the case for adopting a favorable attitude to the new technologies, arguing on both historical and moral grounds for a counterforce strategy and the benefits of defensive technology.[149] A much more negative view of the key elements in the new technology is taken by Richard Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, and Donald L. Hafner in *Scientific American* for June 1984.[150] This is one of a series of comprehensible articles written by senior scientists for the general public on aspects of nuclear weapons and strategy.[151] The public debate on the new technologies will be determined by technical, economic, and political considerations which do not usually show up in the ethical reflections of theologians, philosophers, political theorists, and church leaders. The main contribution of ethicists will have to do with the logic of the comparative moral judgment between defensive and deterrent approaches to national security.

The second topic that will need further exploration is the connection of the various pastoral letters with political activity, which needs to be understood as more than the application of principles laid down by the bishops as teachers. Bernhard Sutor concludes a subtle comparative study of the political aspects of the various peace documents issued by the Catholic bishops' conferences with a call for closer co-operation between the bishops and the laity who are active in political life. He sees this as essential if the Church is to carry out its mission with regard to

[149] Joseph Martino, " 'Star Wars'—Technology's New Challenge to Moralists," *This World* 9 (fall 1984) 15–29.

[150] Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, and Donald L. Hafner, "Antisatellite Weapons," *Scientific American* 250, no. 6 (June 1984) 45–55.

[151] See also John Steinbruner, "Launch under Attack," ibid. 250, no. 1 (Jan. 1984) 37–47; and Kurt Gottfried, Henry W. Kendall, and John M. Lee, " 'No First Use' of Nuclear Weapons," ibid. 250, no. 3 (March 1984) 33–41.

worldly problems without falling into an erroneous biblical fundamentalism or a politically distorted ideologizing of the mission.[152] The appropriate presentation by a religious body of a moral message with policy implications in such a way that it avoids both political entanglement and political irrelevance is a task that requires both prudential judgment and conceptual analysis along with continuing scrutiny of the ethical principles being invoked in the argument and of the ecclesial implications of the positions and strategies that are being used.

A fine example of this critical scrutiny of relevant ethical principle is Brian Johnstone's treatment of the right and duty of defense as this applies to states. This is, of course, a crucially important notion in *The Challenge of Peace.*[153] Johnstone, a Redemptorist professor of moral theology at the Catholic University of America, reviews the history of this notion from the 16th century down to the pastoral, with particular attention to the teaching of Pius XII that in current circumstances only defensive wars can be justified, and to Heinrich Rommen's treatment of the state as a self-sufficient entity which is not free to surrender the right of defense precisely because its end is temporal. Johnstone offers some useful clarifications on the problem of applying the criterion of proportionality in just-war theory and concludes by questioning the continuing correctness of regarding the right of defense as axiomatic.[154]

Johnstone's colleague at Catholic University, Charles Curran, explores both fundamental notions in ethical methodology and contrasting approaches to ecclesiology in a general piece on Roman Catholic teaching on peace and war in the *Journal of Religious Ethics.*[155] Curran thinks that both a proper understanding of the mediating work of reason in ethics, especially the revisionist teleological approach propounded by Richard McCormick and himself, and a correct understanding of the eschatological tension within which the believing community lives while it strives to transform society, tell against absolute pacifism.[156] On the other hand, Curran's endorsement of pluralism within the Church allows for "a vocation to pacifism within the church, even though the whole

[152] Bernhard Sutor, "Das Politische in den Friedenserklärung in katholischer Bischofskonferenzen: Eine vergleichende Analyse," *Stimmen der Zeit* 202 (1984) 455–74.

[153] *The Challenge of Peace*, pars. 75, 175.

[154] Brian Johnstone, "The Right and Duty of Defense," *Studia moralia* 22 (1984) 63–87.

[155] Charles E. Curran, "Roman Catholic Teaching on Peace and War within a Broader Theological Context," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 123 (1984) 61–81. This same issue also includes a number of historical studies with significant contemporary systematic relevance: James F. Childress, "Moral Discourse about War in the Early Church"; John P. Langan, "The Elements of St. Augustine's Just War Theory"; and James T. Johnson, "Two Kinds of Pacificism: Opposition of the Political Use of Force in the Renaissance-Reformation Period."

[156] Curran, "Roman Catholic Teaching" 68–69, 72–73.

church today cannot be pacifist and pacifism is not necessarily a higher calling."[157] The ethical conflict and the ecclesial complementarity of pacifism and the just-war tradition which Curran and many others propose, but which others such as James Finn treat with suspicion,[158] should be a fruitful theme for reflection in both ethics and ecclesiology.

But while the peace documents of Roman Catholicism and other Christian churches raise theological and moral questions that go far beyond the customary jargon of strategic debate, and while the nuclear impasse can provoke many different kinds of intellectual responses, it is likely that *The Challenge of Peace* will continue for a long while to occupy a central place because of its moderate though admittedly unsatisfactory resolution of the main problems of use and deterrence, but even more because of its approach to systematic unity in its presentation of the problem. Whether that unity establishes a coherent position that can be sustained over time is a question that is raised in particularly acute form by the paper of the political philosopher Susan Moller Okin, "Taking the Bishops Seriously."[159] Okin's interpretation of the pastoral is that "the real message of the bishops' letter—the message inherent in its arguments—is considerably more pacifist than the bishops' rather cautious conclusionary guidance to Catholics would seem to suggest."[160] Her view is that the bishops' conditional acceptance of deterrence is to be explained in political terms. She grasps the importance of the "strict adherence to this moral equivalence of intention and action,"[161] which prevents the bishops from simply rejecting nuclear war and accepting deterrence. She observes that "because of a long tradition in Catholic ethics, the bishops had no choice but to adopt the position that, if it is wrong to do something, it is wrong to intend to do it under any circumstances."[162] Here and throughout her discussion Okin relies on a traditionalist and antirevisionist reading of the basic principle and methods of Roman Catholic moral theology. This is generally justifiable in the exegesis of the bishops' text. But she should notice that the formulation she employs here effectively severs consideration of the circumstances from moral evaluation of the action, a procedure which is certainly not what St. Thomas had in mind when he listed circumstances as one of the determinants of the moral goodness of an action.[163] Her formulation accords with certain stereotypes of Catholic moral teaching that are fostered both by conservative moral theologians and by external critics of the inflexibility of Catholic moral teaching. But she is right in insisting that the U.S.

[157] Ibid. 76.

[158] See n. 106 above.

[159] Susan Moller Okin, "Taking the Bishops Seriously," *World Politics* 36 (1984) 527–54.

[160] Ibid. 528.

[161] Ibid. 530.

[162] Ibid.

[163] See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2, 18, 3.

bishops do not separate use and threat in the fashion of the French bishops and that the logic of the U.S. bishops' position requires them to hold "that the *only* deterrent threats that are morally acceptable to the bishops are threats to use nuclear weapons in circumstances and in ways that would be morally acceptable."[164] She thinks that the pastoral's treatment of limited nuclear war does allow for the possibility of morally acceptable use of nuclear weapons but that this position is incompatible with the argument against first use, which relies on the danger of escalation, which, in her view, is at least as great as in the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons. Her conclusion is that the "centimeter of ambiguity" regarding the use of nuclear weapons is unwarranted.[165]

In criticism of the bishops' teaching of deterrence, Okin maintains that the current U.S. strategic doctrine is a "policy of counterforce targeting, but with massive foreseeable civilian damage"[166] and that such a policy cannot pass the test of proportionality. She believes that this judgment is so clear that "it does not fall within the realm of issues that the individual may decide."[167] More fundamentally, she maintains that the various criteria which the bishops lay down for deterrence policy are not compatible with a counterforce deterrent which meets the just-war tests of discrimination and proportionality. A counterforce strategy, she holds, will actually be destabilitizing and will accelerate the arms race. Her view is that "the bishops' incomplete application of just-war principles, taken together with their a priori rejection of unilateral disarmament, have led them into a practical as well as moral dead end."[168]

This important and powerful article takes us full circle. We are back at the early stage in the formation of the pastoral, when it looked to many observers that the bishops were really adopting a form of nuclear pacifism. If Okin is right, the bishops by refusing to endorse unilateral nuclear disarmament have erred grievously both in their moral arguments and in their pastoral responsibility as moral teachers. Is she right? Answering that question would require a serious scholarly debate. But I would venture to say three things by way of preliminary comment. First, Okin's own approach manifests a resolute deductivism in approaching complex moral questions, which is an admirable attitude in philosophers but is not the preferred method of either political decision makers or ordinary citizens in our culture. It is revealing both that she relies in an uncritical fashion on the testimony of the expert witnesses cited by the bishops on the impossibility of controlling nuclear war and that she wants the Church to teach that Catholic citizens "must conscientiously

[164] Okin, "Taking the Bishops Seriously" 531; italics in original.
[165] Ibid. 536.
[166] Ibid. 537.
[167] Ibid. 539.
[168] Ibid. 554.

object to their country's nuclear policies, by refusing to participate in them or to support them in any way."[169] A deductivist approach to moral decisions may encourage the development of heroic virtue, but it may also be compatible with blindness to important values or reflections that point to contrary conclusions. This possibility is one reason why the bishops have held back from prescribing personal responses for concerned Catholics.

Second—and this is confirming evidence for the first point—Okin fails to advert to the problem of how the right of defense is to be preserved in an effective way after the renunciation of nuclear weapons and how the important values of freedom and justice are to be protected against Soviet threats. The crucial step that is taken in paragraph 175 of *The Challenge of Peace*, when the authority of John Paul II is invoked to justify the conditional acceptance of deterrence, is based on a recognition of what may be lost or at least jeopardized if the goal of avoiding nuclear war and its enormous evils is given a uniquely dominant position. The point is that morally weighty considerations are found on both sides of the balance in this decision. The effort to protect two vitally important and logically distinct goods can give rise to a certain incoherence, an incoherence that looks suspiciously like muddle and weakness if the observer is effectively concerned about only one of the goods at stake.

Third, Okin's method and the features which it shares with the method of the pastoral should lead us back to the continuing debate on moral norms and methods discussed by Richard McCormick in the first section of these "Notes" and in many preceding years. In the meantime, the pastoral stands as a decisive, though incomplete and imperfect, contribution to the moral debate over American strategic policy and over the resort to force for political objectives in a divided and sinful world. In 1983 it was acclaimed and criticized; in 1984 it continues to open up wider vistas and closer readings. It will probably continue to do so for quite a while.

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THE BISHOPS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY

In November 1984 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops' Ad Hoc Committee on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, chaired by Archbishop Rembert Weakland, presented its draft pastoral letter on this topic to the assembled bishops and to the public at large. The Bishops' Conference has designed a process for stimulating discus-

[169] Ibid. 539.