

THE HEART IN RAHNER'S PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM

ANDREW TALLON

Marquette University, Milwaukee

KARL RAHNER has said that "We certainly must not presuppose that man in all the dimensions of his existence is no more profound than he appears to be in the shallowest head and the most superficial heart."¹ Just what does Rahner mean by head and heart, and what place and value does heart talk have in scholarly writing, especially in the most profound dimensions of existence, the ethical and mystical? Let me start by briefly sketching what may be an unfamiliar theory of the heart, drawn from an interpretation of Aquinas's concept of affective connaturality, one made possible by a reading of Paul Ricoeur. This sketch will serve as background for an introduction to Rahner's theory of heart.

My method in this study will be first to show that the best approach to a critical understanding of heart, philosophically and theologically aware, is through the concept of affective intentionality. Second, in order to explain this "third" intentionality (besides the usual cognitive and volitional intentionalities) the most illuminating idea is that of connaturality. And third, to make sense of connaturality, the concept of habit as virtue is most helpful. The resulting theory might best be called Rahner's concept of the heart-mind, i.e. of spirit (*Geist*) warmed by the affectivity of embodiment. As a guiding thread, then, one need only keep in mind that the best way to understand a critical meaning of heart is through three concepts: affective intentionality, affective connaturality, and habit as virtue, in the following way.

Besides the consciousness of discursive reason and deliberative will there is the affective consciousness of feelings and moods. Affective consciousness (heart) is phenomenologically irreducible to cognitive or volitional consciousness (head), but are head and heart metaphysically irreducible? Might they be distinct but not separate? Might there be an underlying unity of head and heart, a developmental continuum from a primitive and ordinary Heart I through the labor of reason and free will (Head) to a Heart II, where knowing in one's heart and loving spontaneously without need of recourse to will acts are recognized as higher human achievements, e.g. as shown by Carol Gilligan's re-

¹ Karl Rahner, "The Theological Dimension of the Question of Man," in *Theological Investigations* 17, trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Crossroad, 1981) 53-70, at 67.

search on moral development and by the discussion of Mary Belenky and others?² Paradoxically, might this developmental continuum be toward a more spiritual mode of operation precisely to the degree that it is more affective? This is exactly what Aquinas teaches in his doctrine of affective connaturality in matters ethical and mystical.

But what is the best way to understand connaturality itself? Consistent with the thesis of heart as a higher developmental actualization of the soul (considering the human soul, from the standpoint of an anthropology "from above," as the most finite of spirits), the most powerful concept for explaining how connaturality works is that of habit (as second nature, grounding a process of connaturalization). In what follows I suggest several approaches to this trio of key terms (affective intentionality, affective connaturality, and habit as virtue), which together equal a phenomenology and metaphysics of heart. Especially important is Paul Ricoeur's contribution, because his presentation of the Platonic (and Augustinian) tripartite soul allows an interpretation that is compatible with the two-part (i.e. intellect and will) Aristotelian-Thomist soul, and not by the medieval method of reducing affectivity to a function of volition, but by showing how affection is coextensive with all of consciousness—the meaning of feeling and mood being analogous to different states and levels of consciousness from the lowest to the highest. Ricoeur does this without ever losing contact with our concrete experience and language as we speak of the feelings in our hearts and sometimes mean the heat of physical passion—the mind warmed by the blood—while at other times the heart's desire means the eros of mystical ecstasy.

Because Rahner comes in at the end of a long philosophical and biblical history of "heart talk," understanding his difficult and only partially explicit contribution to that conversation requires the following brief propaedeutic.

RAHNER'S THEORY OF HEART

We often say in ordinary language, "My head tells me one thing and my heart says something else." We commonly distinguish between, on the one hand, knowing by thought, discursive reasoning, concepts, judgments, and, on the other, knowing in our hearts (i.e. intuitively, immediately, affectively, nonconceptually, connaturally—the woman's intuition and the man's gut reaction). We also sometimes distinguish between love that flows spontaneously and effortlessly from our hearts, and deliberative "love" that resides in a choice, a will-act.³ My


² Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ., 1982); Mary Field Belenky et al., *Women's Ways of Knowing* (New York: Basic, 1986) esp. chaps. 6–7.

³ See Ferdinand Alquié, *La conscience affective* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978) esp. 46.

thesis is that head and heart, distinct but not separate, name degrees on a developmental continuum; they really are levels of operation of finite spirit.

Head-heart experience received early description in Plato's tripartite soul, where *thumos* (the heart) is a third force besides the *bios-epithumia* of physical passion (life force that has become conscious) and the *logos-eros* (mind and will, knowing and loving desire). Augustine continued this Platonic division of three kinds of consciousness (and

implicitly, of intentionality), viz. affective, cognitional, and volitional. Strasser attempted to do justice both to Plato and to Aristotelian-Thomism,⁴ and Ricoeur followed him in part, presenting the heart as a mediation of bios into logos through a thumos that operates through pathos: bios → thumos → logos. Heart is symbolic of a union-in-tension of and between bios, with its desire (epithumia) for pleasure—the partial (and “lower,” physical) human good—and logos, with its desire (eros) for happiness—the total (and “higher,” spiritual) human good; Plato calls the mix of bios-epithumia and logos-eros the thumos (in German, *Gemüt*, heart, related to *Mut*, akin to the Dutch *gemoed*, heart, and to the English mood).⁵ A diagram might help us visualize what Ricoeur says in the following text.



⁴ Stephan Strasser, *Phenomenology of Feeling: An Essay on the Phenomena of the Heart* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ., 1977, trans. of *Das Gemüt* [Utrecht, 1956] with an excellent introduction by Robert E. Wood).

⁵ Strasser's *Das Gemüt* was a major influence on Ricoeur, the original of whose *Fallible Man* dates from 1960.

Here we encounter Plato's valuable idea on the thumos, the median function par excellence in the human soul. The thumos is the living transition from bios (life) to logos. At one and the same time, it separates and unites vital affectivity or desire (epithumia) and the spiritual affectivity that the *Symposium* calls eros. In the *Republic*, Plato says that the thumos sometimes battles on the side of reason, in the form of energy and courage; sometimes it enters the service of desire as an enterprising power, as irritation and anger. Can a modern theory of feeling come back to that intuition of Plato?

If that is possible, the third step of an anthropology of fallibility is the "heart," the Gemüt, feeling. In advancing step by step from consciousness in general to self-consciousness and then to feeling, or in other words, from the theoretical to the practical to the affective, philosophical anthropology would progress toward a point which is at once more inward and more fragile. . . . The "heart," the restless heart, would be the fragile moment par excellence. All the disproportions that we have seen culminate in the disproportion of happiness and character would be interiorized in the heart. But the question is whether a philosophy of the "heart" is possible? It must be a philosophy which is not a relapse into the *pathétique*, but which is brought to the level of reason. . . .⁶

Closer analysis shows that this phenomenology needs nuancing. There is only an apparent threesome, and a metaphysical interpretation, such as Aquinas's development of Aristotle's soul with its two highest operations of knowledge (perfect as wisdom) and love (perfect as *agape, caritas*), more correctly represents the experience of persons who are maturing in life and making progress toward a more conscious personal interiority and spirituality. This more perfect actualization of the self shows itself in two realms, the ethical and the mystical, with two domains of intersubjectivity, our relations with human and divine others. And these are the two realms of the heart par excellence, for it only serves to trivialize the idea of the heart to force it to apply primarily to the banal and infrapersonal when by heart we more properly mean apprehension of values connatural to us as persons, precisely as finite spirits.⁷

CONTINUUM OF THE ETHICAL AND THE MYSTICAL

To prepare to discuss the mystical we must first speak of the ethical. In fact Aquinas's core text on the doctrine of affective connaturality (*Summa theologiae* 2-2, q. 45, a. 2), which is his explanation of how the heart works, derives from and applies to these two domains exactly, as his two examples in the text show. Aquinas clearly shows a

⁶ Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles Kelbley (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1965) 123-24.

⁷ See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) 30-41. See also his *Philosophy of God and Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973).

continuity between them, in such a way that there is an interpersonal a priori governing our relations to persons: our opening up ethically to the finitely spiritual human persons in our "horizontal" transcendence out from and beyond ourselves is based on two "vertical" horizons, one up from and down into the unconscious depths of embodiment (the passion of earthly roots), and one from the other limit of consciousness in a transcendence toward the horizon of infinite or absolute personness, the divine.⁸

The ethical synecdochically means the whole world of relations between human persons. Aquinas implies that one who is good knows the morally good deed not primarily by having a Ph.D. in philosophy or by knowing the ethics textbook word for word, but by a felt resonance between his being (or nature, whence the word connaturality) and the act to be done. So also the saint knows God not by possessing an S.T.D. but through her holiness, her attunement with the divine (the *res divinae*), the sacred, the holy.

The point to emphasize is this: Aquinas presents this way of affective connaturality as the normal (albeit ideal) way of the good person or saint, not the exceptional way.⁹ He implies that just as adult ethical responsibility is a developmental achievement, so also heart arises as the soul's highest spiritual actualization in ethical decision making and mystical discernment. Thus it becomes clear that correct understanding of how affective connaturality works lies in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of virtue as good habit. Why is this so, and why is it primal to a critical spirituality of the heart? De Finances answers thus:

⁸ "In the nature of things, these primal experiences always arise where the movement of transcendence allows the finite character of the specific object as such to be experienced. . . . By a specific object we mean here in the first place the other, finite and immediate 'Thou'—the people with whom we share and experience the world, not simply the environment" (Rahner, *Theological Investigations* 17.236 with note 6).

⁹ *Pace* Jacques Maritain, otherwise one of the best guides to an understanding of connaturality in Aquinas. The two main sources for Maritain's use of affective connaturality are his *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (New York: Pantheon, 1953) and his *The Range of Reason* (New York: Scribner, 1952). Two good general treatments of connatural knowledge are Barry Miller, *The Range of Intellect* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1961) and Helen Virginia Keane, "Knowledge by Connaturality in St. Thomas Aquinas" (Ph.D. diss., Marquette Univ., 1966). Maritain's interpretation of Aquinas is influenced by John of St. Thomas; Maritain quotes John with approval especially with reference to the relation of the gifts of the Spirit (which are habits, virtues) to the actualization of the finite soul in the direction of its more perfect operation as spirit, which means, as I

But to know means more than simple [acts of] knowledge. Knowledge can be momentary, occasional, transitory: it is an act. For knowledge really to remedy my limitation and let me conquer the alterity of the object more completely, it must fix itself in me: acting must sediment in being [must settle or sink roots into my being]. In other words, knowing must become a habitus. For habitus is a sort of middle term between being and acting, an acting stabilized in being, a being in tension toward acting and bearing the structure of that action in its being. Fixed in habitus, the act loses its alterity in relation to the subject in losing its casual character. Insofar as I do not have the habitus or habit, the success of my deed . . . remains chancy, depending on the other: there has to be a conjunction of several elements, of which the knot is outside me. Habitus puts this knot in my hands. If it is perfect, there is no need of effort, as though to capture an elusive prey in flight. The act is in me and I can at will make it happen [literally: I can deploy it into actuality]. . . . Knowing is a habitus: it is knowledge that has passed into the structure of the spirit.¹⁰

As de Finance says, the subject is more actualized to the extent that habit bears the other inward to the center of the subject, constituting an interiority out of which the self can act.¹¹ No mysterious *tertium quid*, affective connaturality is the result of virtue; virtue operative in the ethical and mystical is exactly what connaturality is and how it works. The ethically good person can do good without too great a dependence on the external stimulus of the other's need or beauty, or, to put this another way, can respond with greater initiative and sensitivity—with more autonomous responsibility—no matter what the state of the other. Habit installs between being and doing; it perfects the agent in the direction of action, by actualizing the agent's "faculties" of knowing and love to an ease and spontaneity of acting along with a more natural, i.e. connatural, attunement of the agent, through those more actualized operations, to the ethical and mystical good: one becomes co-naturalized to co-responding good. One grows into this condition over time. All the headwork of study, deliberation, and discipline serves to transform these powers, to change Heart I through Head into Heart II, which is second nature, i.e. first nature as informed, transformed, and actualized by virtue (or deformed by vice). Habit "remedies finitude" by making us more highly actualized (although still finite) spirits as we asymptotically approximate the angelic mode of operation without ever attaining it.

The head's role, then, in the ethical and mystical, is to become the heart. Von Hildebrand offers an analogous analysis in terms of inten-

¹⁰ Joseph de Finance, *L'affrontement de l'autre: Essai sur l'altérité* (Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1973) 97 (my translation and brackets).

¹¹ As Lonergan puts it, one becomes a principle of good, not accidentally or by hit or miss, but dependably, reliably, thanks to virtue (*Method* 35).

tionality in his *Ethics*, where he distinguishes the four moments of the preintentional, intentional, postintentional, and metaintentional, where the metaintentional becomes a new preintentional. The preintentional is one's nature as predisposed to being affected; this disposition (like Marcel's *disponibilité* and Levinas's *proximité*), or predisposition, is one's affectability, one's sensitivity, availability, and vulnerability to being affected. We change our affectability by choosing how we allow ourselves to be exposed to and touched by (rather than hardened against) values that call forth our deep spiritual core and make us more able to respond. Since the very essence of feeling is to be an affective intentionality, feeling has a dual structure: it is both an affection and an intention, i.e. a being affected (an inward movement, an interior resonance) and an intending the other (an outward streaming, going to the other who affects me). This dual structure of affection and intention is the nature of feeling as both one's own subjectivity as a self and one's most intimate union with the other, a closer bond with the other than conceptual knowledge or free volition.¹² This affective response comes from the heart in the sense of the deepest center of the self; it is the sense of the self; one is a subject (as *finite spirit*) first and foremost as subject to others in the vulnerability of embodiment, subject to embrace or violent assault, and also as an intention that (as *finite spirit*) has a horizon so totally out of reach that the ethical and mystical primacy of the other is the ground of our bliss. The affectivity of human spirituality is the other side of the coin of the spirituality of all conscious affectivity.

We have been discussing Aquinas's first or ethical half of interpersonal affectivity as a preamble to the mystical, his second domain of affective connaturality. In the realm of the mystical we will have to acknowledge a new element at work. But in the ethical we already had indeed a movement outward toward the other, and at a deeper, metaphysical level of analysis we begin to recognize the ethical-mystical continuum.¹³ The heart is described not only as able to reach back into

¹² Ricoeur also emphasizes that feeling unites what thought divides: "The universal function of feeling is to bind together. It connects what knowledge divides; it binds me to things, to beings, to being. Whereas the whole movement of objectification tends to set a world over against me, feeling unites the intentionality that throws me out of myself, to the affection through which I feel myself existing (*Fallible Man* 200).

¹³ To anticipate Rahner a bit, let me quote John McDermott, a good guide to Rousselot. Note how connaturality grounds the human-divine, ethical-mystical continuum: "Contrary to the dominant Thomism of his day Rousselot conceived the intellect primarily as a dynamic power oriented to the fullness of being, to God Himself, beyond all conceptual abstractions. . . . By orienting the intellectual affirmation to God Rousselot understood the intellect primarily not as a passive receptor of abstracted forms but as a dynamism toward the True as its Good. Thereby he overturned the basis of the traditional distinc-

the depths of life and passion (vital force, bios), a vertical rooting down into the earth of embodiment, but as phenomenologically a duality, i.e. both soul as form of the body (*forma corporis*) and soul as spiritual eros for the infinite (*capax Dei*); its two vertical movements of bios-epithumia "down" and "back" and logos-eros "up" and "out" result in the horizontal, "ex-istential" relation to human others in the ethical as always experienced against both of these two vertical grounds (or horizons). Human spirituality is not only always embodied but also open to and "grounded" in the absolute. This point, along with the head-heart continuum, is the main thesis of this article.

RAHNER AND THE MYSTICAL

Besides his more direct writing on the theme of the heart,¹⁴ Rahner's theology is characterized by a general theory of the mystical horizon of our concrete experience of God. Mystical life is the life of the spirit; the

tion between intellect and will in terms of their formal objects, the true and the good. Knowing and loving henceforth influence each other intimately. Here Roussetot revived and expanded the traditional Scholastic notion of connatural, or sympathetic, knowledge, i.e. knowledge by means of tendency. Whereas most earlier Thomists usually appealed to this connaturality to explain the 'instinctive' reaction of a moral person to various suggestions, enabling him to judge them immediately in terms of tendencies inculcated by the practice of virtue without need of recourse to reflective, rational arguments subsuming the particular case under general principles, by joining love and knowledge Roussetot conceived knowledge as a tendency toward its goal and effectively rendered man connatural with that goal, specifically the First Truth, God Himself, and with all that led to that goal. Thus, besides a new way of knowing that transcended concepts, a certain community of natures between the knowing subject and the object of knowing was established as the basis of man's spiritual life" (from the Introduction by John M. McDermott, S.J., to Pierre Roussetot, S.J., *The Eyes of Faith*, [New York: Fordham Univ., 1990] 16–17). Of course, along with the continuum must be preserved the gratuity of God's self-communication, grace; but the concrete effect of grace (*sanans et elevans*) is to connaturalize us to God, healing concupiscence and elevating finite nature through gifts of the Spirit that modify our souls' capacities as do virtues (*habitus* as remedy for finitude). "By defining the intellect in terms of its final object, God, Roussetot recalled St. Thomas' paradoxical doctrine about the 'natural desire for the beatific vision.' For no concept, only God known in Himself, can satisfy the soul's innate longing for truth. Lest the natural-supernatural distinction be lost, however, during his lifetime Roussetot developed various justifications of its validity. In 1910 he conceived the soul's dynamism as naturally oriented to God, but, due to the wounds of Original Sin in the perceiving subject, incapable of attaining that supernatural end. Grace's infusion then overcomes the debilitating, frustrating effects of sin and restores nature to itself" (*ibid.* 17–18).

¹⁴ See Michael J. Walsh, *The Heart of Christ in the Writings of Karl Rahner: An Investigation of Its Christological Foundation as an Example of the Relation between Theology and Spirituality* (Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1977); Annice Callahan, R.S.C.J., *Karl Rahner's Spirituality of the Pierced Heart* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985) esp. 43–53.

life of the spirit consists of prayer and action in reciprocal causation. Besides private and liturgical prayer time, there are times of decision and action in all realms of life that require discernment of spirits. And just as one should interpret Aquinas's key text on affective connaturality as addressing the two most important realms of human existence, the ethical and the mystical, so one should consistently interpret the mystical according to the (admittedly pragmatic) simplification that graced human existence is exercised in practice in two domains, the vocative of direct prayer as the "first" way of relating with God, the "second" being the discernment of spirits as consciously and responsibly bringing the rest of life into free relation to the God addressed by prayer. Love of God and love of neighbor are traditional ways of saying the same thing. The former makes the latter possible; the latter is a sign of the former.¹⁵ The most perfect ethical action comes from discernment based on mystical attunement. The continuum of the ethical and mystical is again confirmed when the mystical as prayer becomes practical by flowing "backward" as discernment.¹⁶ Jesuit "*mystique du service*" implies that mystical grace is for the practical action that discernment addresses. And yet the mystical can fail to make an ethical difference if there is no change of heart; this could not be true were the ethical and mystical but operations of head and heart as separate

¹⁵ Poulain says that more is required for the full and technical definition of a mystic than an ethically upright life as confirmation of claims of mystical experience; see Auguste Poulain, S.J., *The Graces of Interior Prayer. A Treatise on Mystical Theology*, trans. Leonora L. Yorke Smith (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1950). A very loose sense of mystic is also available, namely one who experiences God as ground of knowing and love, especially of persons, a sense Evelyn Underhill also admits (see her *Mysticism* [New York: Dutton, 1961, 12th ed.] 176 ff.). The strict sense, which is Poulain's, is of someone who has been given the specific gift of God's direct felt presence (Poulain 64 ff.). In his introduction to the 10th ed. J. H. Bainvel gives an interesting discussion of connaturality in relation both to the ethical and to the mystical, with reference also to the gifts of the spirit (lvi–lviii). The essence of true mysticism includes the affective as passive, and is not reducible to a prayer of the heart or affective prayer that results from one's autonomous reason and will. Ignatius referred to a "consolation without previous cause," and Rahner discusses this in *Dynamic Element*, as we will see. Harvey D. Egan, S.J. devotes a major part of his dissertation to this experience, frequently emphasizing its affective nature and offering connaturality as its metaphysical explanation; see his *The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon* (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1976). He also defines the mystical in his *Christian Mysticism: The Future of a Tradition* (New York: Pueblo, 1984) 1–29.

¹⁶ On the continuity of the ethical and mystical, see Harvey Egan, *Christian Mysticism* esp. 1–29; "The Mysticism of Everyday Life," *Studies in Formative Spirituality* 10 (1989) 7–29; "The Devout Christian of the Future Will . . . Be a 'Mystic': Mysticism and Karl Rahner's Theology," *Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J.*, ed. William J. Kelly, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ., 1980) 139–58; *The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon*.

faculties rather than degrees of actualization of one continuum. Affective connaturality applies to both the ethical and mystical because of their deeper unity, which we are trying to discover.

Confirmation that we are on the right track can be seen in Rahner's saying that it is "possible for grace to be without fruit in the person for whom it is intended, through his own resistance."¹⁷ Through an uncooperative freedom we can remain unaffected. A major reason we are given to pray is to become someone whom God can affect.¹⁸ "Being-affected" is a necessary condition for any affective response, and love is above all essentially an affective response.¹⁹ Being-affected by God is grace, and grace is a gift affecting the human person by actualizing the person's nature. The gifts *gratis data* are habits; habits as virtues perfect the nature by improving performance of the acts of knowing and loving. They do this by intervening between being and doing, and thereby perfecting a being for action. Now none of this is new, but it is important to make the connection: what we have been reviewing here is the structure of affective connaturality, which is the essential "mechanism" of the personal a priori of intersubjectivity. The "proper objects" of persons viewed not from below but from above (i.e. when seen from the spiritual pole of vertical transcendence [logos-eros] rather than from the physical [bios-epithumia]) are persons; Aquinas

¹⁷ Karl Rahner, *The Dynamic Element in the Church* (New York: Herder, 1964) 81.

¹⁸ Prayer is the forge of religious affections. This is Don E. Saliers's point in speaking of prayer as shaping emotion, as the language of the heart (*The Soul in Paraphrase: Prayer and the Religious Affections* [New York: Seabury, 1980] 36–47). Change of heart can happen because not only do we work upon ourselves in attuning our dispositions but we also address God in the vocative, which is a specifically open relation to dialogue with the other who is explicitly taken to be free, able to take initiative with oneself and, in the case of God, able to change our hearts for us in a way beyond our power (Psalm 51). The best analysis of the vocative as essential to the interpersonal, both human and divine, is Maurice Nédoncelle, *God's Encounter with Man: A Contemporary Approach to Prayer*, trans. A. Manson (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964). There he distinguishes the declarative of cognition (stating facts), from the imperative of volition (giving orders that presume the nonfreedom of the other), from the vocative, which relates to the other as able to say No. Old English "prithes" ("I pray thee"), like "please," relates to the French *je t'en prie* (from *prier*, to pray) and the German *bitte* (akin to *bitten*, *bieten*, and *beten*, also words related to prayer). Prayer (like the "please") is a vocative that touches and respects the other as a center of freedom before whom one opens oneself as able to be affected.

¹⁹ See Jules Toner's excellent analysis of love as affective response distinct from volition (*The Experience of Love* [Washington: Corpus, 1968] esp. 87–109). Toner's use of connaturality is essential. To review a psychologist's way of distinguishing the will from the affective core of love, see the masterful study by James Hillman, *Emotion: A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and Their Meanings for Therapy* (Evanston: Northwestern Univ., 1961) esp. 243–89.

made the finite material particular the proper object of human cognition on the basis of an anthropology from below, following Aristotle the biologist; it was not meant to be definitive of graced human nature, a nature connaturalized (the Fathers say divinized, as God's adopted children) to the supernatural.²⁰

Let us call the knowing that the human person receives from openness to the spiritual horizon "real," in contrast with the "notional" derived from discursive reason. As Bouillard says:

Blondel's essential preoccupation was to analyze and validate "real" knowledge, that concrete and unitive knowledge whose final, though gratuitous, term is mystical experience. In *Le procès de l'intelligence* (1921), he established the distinction and solidarity between "notional" and "real" knowledge. The former, the work of discursive reason, builds a world of representations and "lives by mimicking or similitude." Real knowledge or knowledge by action presents us with being itself to the extent it is singular and unique; it is intuitive and unitive. It is for this type of knowing that the word "intelligence" must be reserved; one cannot exalt intelligence or understanding without bringing it to the fore. To describe its manner of operation, Blondel has recourse, not to Augustine, not to Newman, but paradoxically to a philosopher who is regarded as the typical intellectualist, St. Thomas. Père Rousset's thesis, published in 1908, having revealed a knowledge by affinity or connaturality in Thomism, now stimulates Blondel to use these notions to analyze "real" knowledge. . . . *Le problème de la mystique* (1925) should be read as a prolongation of *Le procès de l'intelligence*. The author maintains that philosophy can and should contribute to the study of this question of mysticism. Having been severely criticized for his conception of unitive knowledge, he

²⁰ "If then in St. Thomas' intellectualism every spiritual creature is by its very nature an 'obediential potency' for the Beatific Vision, it follows that in St. Thomas' metaphysics of knowledge the dynamism of every finite intellect is ordered by its nature to a real grasp of the full range of being" (Gerald A. McCool, S. J., *From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism* [New York: Fordham Univ., 1989] 42). "Rationalism understands the intellect to be the faculty of discursive knowledge. The value of the intellect [for rationalism] is derived from the immediate evidence of its clear and distinct ideas and the necessity of its discursive reasoning. For Thomas, on the contrary, the value of the intellect is derived from the intuitive grasp of God as its concrete end. The nature and value of the intellect are determined not by the discursive operations of the human intellect in this life but by the concrete supernatural goal of every created spirit. There St. Thomas' intellectualism can be summed up in the formula: *the intelligence is essentially the sense of the real, but it is the sense of the real only because it is the sense of the divine*. That conception of the nature and value of the intellect, Rousset was convinced, dominates the entire synthesis of St. Thomas' theology. It determines his metaphysics of the intellect in all its modes of operation. It is the leitmotif that brings its distinctive unity to St. Thomas' whole system, joining his philosophy to his theology in an indissoluble synthesis" (ibid. 49-50; my brackets).

here defends it and shows that it allows us to situate philosophically mystical experience. While the latter is, of course, a gratuitous gift, it does find its point of attachment in the human spirit, which is concrete knowledge.²¹

The natural development of the ethical (the core of a person-centered philosophy) is the mystical (the core of a Person-centered theology). The crucial point is this: affective connaturality is the normal (natural *qua* connatural to finite spirit) way the good person, the saint (in the noncanonized sense of someone in the "state of grace"), exists and acts as an embodied spirit, more highly actualized by virtues (some of them gifts of the Spirit), affectable and affected by God and then responding. Connatural knowing and loving are not the exceptions, the backup system, as it were, for when discursive, conceptual knowledge and deliberative freedom fail (ethics "strictly by the book" or religion "by the numbers"), but just the opposite: it is when discernment of spirits by affective connaturality in one's personal situation fails (when you just "don't have it in you") that you then must fall back by default on reasoning discursively from general principles. As Rahner says:

[A] person has to reckon, as a practical possibility of experience, that God may communicate his will to him. And the content of this will is not simply what can be known by the rational reflection of a believing mind employing general maxims of reason and faith on the one hand and their application to a definite situation that has been analyzed in a similar discursively rational way, on the other. That does not mean that the contrary of this kind of knowledge . . . is "feeling," "instinct" or something similar, contrary to or apart from the intellect. It is, rather, a thoroughly intellectual operation of the "intellect," in the metaphysical, scholastic sense of the word, in which it is capable of apprehending values. Only it is not cognition of the rationally discursive and conceptually expressible kind but an intellectual knowledge which is ultimately grounded in the simple presence to itself of the intrinsically intelligible subject. . . .²²

This is a crucial text. While Lonergan attributes value apprehension to feeling, here is Rahner attributing value apprehension to intellect (distinguished from reason); in the Middle Ages the common tendency was to attach feeling to will, as embodied appetite.²³ Feeling, intellect, will: is this merely confusion or is it an opportunity for insight? How does the intellect or will or anything become affective? In two ways: the soul as *anima corporis* sinks into its roots in instinct and embod-

²¹ Henri Bouillard, *Blondel and Christianity*, trans. James M. Somerville (Washington: Corpus, 1969) 34-35.

²² *Dynamic Element* 94-95; note 9 included in text.

²³ See M.-D. Chenu, O.P., "Les catégories affectives dans la langue de l'école" (*Le Coeur [Les Études Carmélitaines]* Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950) 123-28.

iment, and as spirit it ascends beyond the complexity of discursive reason and deliberative volition in interpersonal relations where connaturality based on virtue leads to a simplification, healing, elevation, and improvement of our operations of knowing and loving. This second way is not feeling in a "lower" sentimental sense but experience as felt harmony or resonance in one's spiritual being.²⁴ Note that Rahner is not at all denying that discernment is by affective connaturality (we will see in a moment that he says that is just what it is), but rather is affirming a spiritual affectivity, a metaphysics of the embodied spirit that is Aristotelian-Thomist rather than Platonic-Augustinian in that it understands heart to mean ratio qua perfected into intellectus (and also, by synecdoche, into will: "intellectual being," by usage, includes both logos and eros) rather than a separate third part of the soul that could be metaphysically construed as "contrary to or apart from the intellect" (despite the convenience of so describing the soul as tripartite phenomenologically). Heart is perfected "intellect"—and this is the point—and that perfecting transforms ratio into intellectus by asymptotically overcoming the finitude of our knowing and loving through the habitude of virtue, partly of our own doing (the ethical) and partly of God's doing (the mystical, through grace, operative as virtue, through the gifts of the Spirit), in both cases connaturalizing us to the human and divine good (respectively); the experienced effect of this perfecting of "intellect" is that discursive ratio and deliberative voluntas give way to the affective responses described, e.g., in a consecrated phrase, as "consolation without previous cause." Rahner is denying that feelings of the epithumia-bios sort equal in value for discernment those of the logos-eros sort; i.e. feelings coming not so much from the rooting back of the spirit-soul into embodiment (finite spirit as finite) do not equal in value the affections that come from transcendence toward the vertical horizon of human bliss and peace, the very same peace that discernment feels in temporal praxis (finite spirit as spirit), without denying that we are both, but especially without denying the reality of spiritual affection. Rahner would be making a categorical blunder to attribute value-apprehension to intellect were he not understanding feeling of the higher spiritual sort as a linear continuous development of ratio → intellectus → cor affectus: the highest actualization of intellectus is by affective connaturality, where intellectus (taken synecdochically for the whole incarnate person) operates with the (almost angelic) intuitive knowing and spontaneous love we associate with the heart.

²⁴ See Miller, *Range of Intellect*, on connaturality as the resonance of one's being rather than one's knowing with the object.

Anyone familiar with Rahner's metaphysics of finite spirit finds this perfectly consistent. It is a misunderstanding to accuse Rahner of having "no developed theory of human affectivity."²⁵ Correctly understood, Rahner will be seen to hold the same position on the metaphysical essence of the spirit-soul as Rousselot, his major guide, who interprets Aquinas's hierarchy of spirit as meaning that the more perfectly actualized human soul (lowest in the hierarchy of spirits that includes angels and God) through affective connaturality performs quasi-intuitively²⁶ and with the spontaneity of virtue; in its most perfect operations of knowing and loving, ratio becomes intellectus. Intellec-

²⁵ See, e.g., the otherwise helpful presentation by William C. Spohn, S. J., "The Reasoning Heart: An American Approach to Christian Discernment," *TS* 44 (1983) 30–52. Spohn states that "Rahner has not given sufficient attention to the role of religious symbols and affectivity in guiding sound discernment. This article will argue that a more adequate account of Christian discernment may be derived from American theologians, particularly Jonathan Edwards and H. Richard Niebuhr" (32). And later: "Karl Rahner's account of discernment discounts any role for a distinctive set of affections. . . . Rahner has no developed theory of human affectivity. Because the core of the person is self-defining freedom before God, felt dispositions are only the raw material on which freedom operates. Their moral significance arises only when they are caught up in the movement of human transcendence; he does not discuss their positive role in disposing the moral agent to evaluate and act" (47). Later in the article Spohn allows connaturality as an interpretation of Edwards's theory of religious affections: "Edwards recognizes how dispositions guide moral intuition, the knowledge by 'connaturality' familiar to Catholic moral theology" (51), but he discounts Rahner's: "Rahner also uses affectivity as a criterion for discernment but makes it only formally dependent upon biblical narrative" (51, note 46). Spohn misrepresents Rahner, and in a way Rahner foresaw, viz. by not recognizing that an operational analysis will not play off head and heart this way; Rahner is correct in understanding the spiritual affectivity of discernment of spirits through consolation without previous cause as a higher perfection of the "intellect" (and freedom) understood not at all as a (literal) "faculty," but as a habit of knowing (and, with synecdoche, of loving, the two together cooperating in discernment); as a habit rather than a faculty, intellectus is a higher perfection in knowing than ratio, and characteristic of this knowing is the connatural spontaneity and nonconceptuality of feeling. When Spohn complains that Rahner makes emotion derivative of freedom rather than (I can only suppose) an independent source of discernment (perhaps as holy affections, in the best sense), he shows he has not taken Rahner's metaphysics of finite spirit at full strength. In the following discussion I hope to show how Rahner does, in fact, have a better understanding of human affectivity than either of us thought. Hearts do not reason, unless we say, with Lonergan (*Method* 37–38), that the heart's "reasons" are feelings. Heart does not mean a separate "faculty" with separate religious affections, but rather the highest operations of intellectus (i.e. the person) precisely as *beyond* discursive reasoning and deliberative will, i.e. knowing and loving by affective connaturality made possible by virtue (esp. the virtues of faith, love, and hope). But perhaps we agree at bottom if what Spohn means by a 'reasoning heart' is a discernment by feeling based on but transcending reason, a 'reason that feels' taken as a 'heart that reasons.'

²⁶ I say quasi-intuitive because, as Rousselot at first cautiously explained in *Intellectualism*, affective connaturality is not fully intuitive (and Rahner follows him in denying

tus is ratio perfected by habit; intellectus is not the name of a new faculty, as though we had two different cognitive powers, but a habit of understanding.²⁷ The human soul, when more perfectly actualized by good habits (and, we hope, graced by the virtues that are gifts of the Spirit), approximates asymptotically the intuitive knowing and spontaneous love of the angels.

intellectual intuition to the finite human spirit); affective connaturality operates by something like "rapid inference," i.e. by improving our operative potencies by habit as virtue. Affective connaturality is not full angelic intuition but our best asymptotic approximation of it, and virtue is its metaphysical basis. McCool says: "When he dealt with 'connatural knowledge' in *L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas*, Rousselot described it as a very rapid inference about the specification of an act from the greater or lesser facility experienced in its exercise. Far from being inferior, however, to the more formalized inferences of scientific deduction, 'connatural knowledge' is superior to them. Scientific deduction, St. Thomas said, belongs to discursive ratio. Connatural knowledge, on the contrary, is a form of the higher type of knowledge, intuitive intellectus. Intellectus is more to be prized than science: est enim aliquid scientia melius, scilicet intellectus. . . . In his later articles Rousselot no longer treated 'connatural knowledge' as a form of inference. Nevertheless he made a great deal of its other characteristics, ontological likeness or similarity between knower and known, and the 'sympathy' or love of the knower for the object which springs from likeness" (McCool, *From Unity to Pluralism* 64).

²⁷ Péghaire is very clear and convincing on this distinction between intellect and reason (Julien Péghaire, *Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* [Paris: J. Vrin/Ottawa: Institut d'Études Médiévales, 1936]). I owe some details of interpretation to him, although my first exposure to the idea was Rousselot's *Intellectualism*. A challenging contemporary interpretation of this rich theme is Thomas Sheehan's *Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio Univ., 1987). I differ with Sheehan on one important point. With Rahner I take faith and hope seriously as among the very virtues we have been talking about, i.e. as developmentally higher human achievements than discursive cognition and deliberative volition in the interpersonal realms of the ethical and mystical, just as self-transcending agape is developmentally higher than eros. On this see Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of Saint Thomas," *TS* 20 (1959) 1–39, 198–230, 343–95, esp. 353–63. A developmental approach attributes adult faith, love, and hope to the heart, not to the head, where head means discursive reason and deliberative will; faith is always beyond reason, nor can assent default to the influence of will. The review of Sheehan's book by William V. Dych, S.J. (*International Philosophical Quarterly* 29 [1989] 487–89) is unfortunately mostly negative. Both Dych and Sheehan are right in some sense. At least because Rahner's philosophy is based on Aquinas's theologically conditioned metaphysics, Dych is correct that Rahner cannot be judged as a philosopher alone, despite *Geist in Welt's* having been a dissertation in philosophy; of course, from then on Rahner wrote presuming that he would be read as a theologian. Sheehan errs in limiting his study of Rahner to his "philosophical works" and then criticizing Rahner for not limiting himself to philosophical method and evidence. But Sheehan is correct in saying that there is in Rahner an implicit faith. The reconciliation of Dych and Sheehan lies in recognizing that for Rahner faith (as well as love and hope) is a higher achievement than reason, akin to the idea that act is to virtue as feeling is to mood (horizon, attunement).

WHY ALWAYS RECOURSE TO AFFECTIVE CONNATURALITY?

The formal and technical meaning of the heart is phenomenologically described and metaphysically interpreted as the one same spiritual soul graced by virtue and thus responding in the mode of affective connaturality. Why call this heart, and why associate necessarily this adjective "affective"? Sometimes Rahner makes apparently disparaging remarks about feeling and emotion,²⁸ which can be misleading. A phenomenological analysis of affective intentionality, such as Ricoeur's in *Fallible Man*, shows that at the spiritual level, i.e. when the finite spirit opens out upon the ungraspable horizon of all being, beauty, truth, and goodness, "whom some call God," that appetite is profoundly experienced as both bios-epithumia and logos-eros all at once mediated by thumos. We have already seen the dual structure of affective intentionality. Rahner is here speaking of this mixed experience, but with emphasis on the higher pole, the felt resonance of the spiritual soul with its connatural, personal a priori good, a response to be sought and valued more than concepts and deliberation. But the reason to call this affective goes deeper.

The main idea of connaturality is, after all, that through habit *qua* virtue one becomes co-natural to co-responding values, almost as though an elicited appetite takes on something of the immediacy and spontaneity of natural appetite. This connatural value-response is a quasi-natural appetite (quasi because only partly acquired and partly freed from elicitation) and is more spontaneous than elicited appetite or rapid inference, without being as perfect as we take angelic intuition to be in this analogy of hierarchy of spirits. Values are apprehended in feelings, and these feelings are the heart's "reasons."²⁹ Mod-

²⁸ See, e.g., *Dynamic Element* 19, 94.

²⁹ "Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments in value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings . . . Apprehensions of value occur in a . . . category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, or noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so endowed that we . . . respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility of the actuality of moral self-transcendence" (Lonergan, *Method* 37-38). "First, then, there is a knowledge born of love. Of it Pascal spoke when he remarked that the heart has reasons which reason does not know. Here by reason I would understand the compound of the activities on the first three levels of cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding and of judging. By the heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values . . . Finally, by the heart I understand the subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love. The meaning, then, of Pascal's remark would be that, besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person

ified "faculties" perform with the quasi-intuitiveness and spontaneity of affective responses; i.e., affective connaturality operates more through a felt resonance and experienced harmony³⁰ of the corresponding value with one's nature (as modified, more highly actualized by virtue) or being than with one's knowing.³¹ Thus Rahner says:

That is why the knowledge of these interior movements . . . is much more important . . . than the knowledge of the exercitant's "own thoughts," i.e. his deliberate reflections. . . . Consequently Ignatius is less concerned . . . with what commended itself by clarity and depth of insight than with what brought consolation and desolation.³²

Feelings at this level of the *logos-eros* of heart are our apprehension of values corresponding to our spiritual nature (and *eros* becomes *agape* with graced spirit, as Crowe would say). Thus religious or spiritual feelings are not some kind of distinctive, let alone separate, set of affections but a particular level of operation of the one, same spirit-soul as actualized by virtue, with connaturality understood in terms of the structure of habit. While descriptively convenient it is metaphysically incorrect to set up the heart as a separate "faculty" somehow distinct or separate as a source of knowing and love. In more closely examining Rahner's "intellectualism," in the good sense of this term, I

in love" (ibid. 115). Heart corresponds to the highest level of Lonergan's structure of consciousness, a structure in which development is more than implicit.

³⁰ "While we oppose ourselves to objects by means of the representation, feeling attests our coaptation, our elective harmonies and disharmonies with realities whose affective image we carry in ourselves in the form of 'good' and 'bad.' The Scholastics had an excellent word to express this mutual coaptation of man to goods that suit him and to bads that do not suit him. They spoke of a bond of connaturality between my being and other beings. This bond of connaturality is silently effected in our tendential life; we feel it in a conscious and sensory way in all our affections. . . . Now, since the whole of our language has been worked out in the dimension of objectivity, in which the subject and object are distinct and opposed, feeling can only be described paradoxically as the unity of an intention and an affection, of intention toward the world and an affection of the self. This paradox, however, is only that sign pointing toward the mystery of feeling, namely, the undivided connection of my existence with beings and being through desire and love" (Ricoeur, *Fallible Man* 133-34).

³¹ Sartre makes affective intentionality surer than knowledge in intersubjective relations, a human faith higher than reason; this is not a child's untested and naive credulity but an adult's faith, forced by praxis beyond speculative escape into solipsism: "If we are to refute solipsism, then my relation to the other is first and fundamentally a relation of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge" (Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes [New York: Washington Square, 1953] 329). This original being-with precedes any representational intentionality. "Heidegger's being-with . . . is not *knowledge*" (ibid. 332).

³² *Dynamic Element* 108.

realize that his theory of the affections is far more powerful than I suspected when I first criticized it. Rather than a narrow meaning of feeling, one that I might characterize as leaning more toward the lower bios-epithumia part of thumos, which is what he rejects in those texts critical of feeling, Rahner has a wider sense of feeling than particular emotions; he means feeling more as "moods" consonant with fundamental options and as the highest achievement of the human spirit attuned to God—with a *Stimmung* akin to Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit* and *Angst* as attunement with Being,³³ made positive (and named faith and hope) in the spirit's experience of the graced horizon of the logos-eros part of thumos. As there are higher feelings, there are higher moods. These higher moods are feelings that have become habits, i.e. virtues; they have sunk their roots deep into the structure of the spirit. And we may interpret Ignatius's own deep peace in this way. It is not a passing peace, a fleeting feeling, but a deep and abiding affective state, a mood in this best and highest sense of the *Mut* as *Gemüt*, the heart's attunement as affectively connaturalized to God. How else can we explain the powerful depth of the saint's saying that he could pray for fifteen minutes and reconcile himself to the dissolution of the whole Society of Jesus? It seems to be part of Rahner's understanding to recognize that such "moods" are feelings that have become virtues, and such a higher spiritual understanding of mood fits well with the idea of peace as gift of the Spirit, changing the very horizon of consciousness. Thus Rahner can say of one who prays:

Consequently in every case he will probably make his decisions through a fundamental global awareness of himself actually present and making itself

³³ Rahner would concur with Ricoeur in his agreement with Heidegger that "moods" alone can manifest the coincidence of the transcendent, in accordance with intellectual determinations, and the inward, in accordance with the order of existential movement. The height of the feeling of belonging to being ought to be the feeling in which what is most detached from our vital depth—what is absolute, in the strong sense of the word—becomes the heart of our heart" (*Fallible Man* 160). And so Rahner would approve of Ricoeur's concluding with more hope than Heidegger: "If being is that which beings are not, anguish [Angst] is the feeling par excellence of ontological difference. But Joy attests that we have a part of us linked to this very lack of being in beings. That is why Spiritual Joy, the Intellectual Love and the Beatitude, spoken of by Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Bergson, designate, under different names and in different philosophic contexts, the affective 'mood' worthy of being called ontological. Anguish is only its underside of absence and distance" (ibid. 161). Rahner's article on Heidegger clearly showed his theological option; where Heidegger makes nothingness the horizon of finite, temporal being, Rahner makes it Being. See Karl Rahner, S.J., "Introduction to the Concept of Existential Philosophy in Heidegger," *Philosophy Today* 13 (1969) 126–37; my trans. of "Introduction au concept de philosophie existentielle chez Heidegger," *Recherches de sciences religieuses* 30 (1940) 152–71.

felt in him during this space of time, and through a feeling of the harmony or disharmony of the object of choice with this fundamental feeling he has about himself. He will not only nor ultimately make his decision by a rational analysis but by whether he feels that something "suits him" or not. And this feeling will be judged by whether the matter pleases, delights, brings peace and satisfaction.³⁴

If Rahner has not within a few pages contradicted himself about the value and meaning of feeling, then by heart he must mean not a separable "faculty" in competition with the head but the same spirit-soul actualized to higher operations of knowledge and love by virtue ethically acquired and/or mystically given as gift, as grace;³⁵ this spiritual affectivity is the soul as divinized, connaturalized to God. In other words, Rahner means that the graced soul can experience this lift in its being-affected individually and personally, not merely generally or universally, because, as the idea of spiritual hierarchy says, to be a spirit is to know and love by affective intentionality, affective connaturality, quasi-intuitively and spontaneously, by the befittingness and suitability felt as consolation and peace (or their opposites) that bless (or curse) consciousness affectively. There can be no quibble about the affectivity of this experience and yet this is said of the soul as it becomes not less but more spiritual, more like the angels. Thus, not the passions, emotions, and feelings of the rooting back into bios is meant by the heart in its ethical-mystical discernment (except as always part

³⁴ *Dynamic Element* 166. Otto-Friedrich Bollnow has a similar positive reading of how feelings as moods affect horizons; see his *Das Wesen der Stimmungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1943; 2d ed., rev. and enlarged, 1949); French trans. by Lydia and Raymond Savioz: *Les tonalités affectives: Essai d'anthropologie philosophique* (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1953).

³⁵ Compare the theological notion of grace as remedy for concupiscence (*gratia sanans* as well as *elevans*). In a striking text, Lonergan's operational concept of the heart is very close to the thesis presented here. Insofar as the theological idea of grace is based, at least in part, on the metaphysics of habit as modification of the soul's operative powers, the gifts of the Spirit become virtues as just such habits gratuitously given to transform the soul. "God, the angels, and humans are all proportionate to the true and the good, for all are rational beings. But in God this proportion is such that divine operations cannot be defective; in the angels it implies only that for the most part operations will not fail; while in us humans it gives a mere possibility with no guarantee of success, so that for the most part we do what is wrong. Nevertheless, give us the virtues and in place of the statistical law governing humanity one will have an approximation to the statistical law governing the angels. Endowed with the virtues one becomes a 'perfected agent' (an *agens perfectum*) and, for the most part, one does what is right; thus a will adorned with the virtue of justice performs just deeds with the spontaneity and the regularity with which fire moves upwards" (Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. J. Patout Burns [New York: Herder and Herder, 1971] 44-45).

of the flesh and blood embodiment and permanently incarnate nature of the soul as *forma corporis*), but rather by heart is meant more, in the intersubjective domain of the mystical, namely, its vertical kinesis for the absolute by which the soul reveals that it is spirit.³⁶

It is in this sense that Rahner means that grace is conscious.³⁷ Rahner makes explicit recourse to the doctrine of the gifts of the Spirit,³⁸ and these gifts are habits, the virtues that perfect ratio toward intellectus. Thus besides the nonconceptual experience of God as horizon³⁹ there is very extensive treatment of the affective experience of God in the "consolation without previous cause"⁴⁰ which constitutes the rest of the book. Thus the concept of heart as perfected intellectus (always understood synecdochically for the whole person in a Rousselot-inspired Rahnerian Thomism) is really the major point of *Dynamic Element*, for it is the most important explanation of how and whence there is a dynamic element, i.e. an affective connaturalization for and by the Absolute.

THE SPIRITUAL MEANING OF FEELINGS

Now it remains to ask how heart (intellectus taken synecdochically for the soul at its highest dynamic state of actualization) is experienced in itself as distinct from ratio (soul at the lower state, not operating through affective connaturality, i.e. without benefit of virtue, whether natural [ethical] or supernatural [mystical], through the gifts of the Spirit). Rahner has already made it abundantly clear, as any student of his knows, that the horizon of infinity is never given objectively, i.e. as an object, but always nonobjectively. *Dynamic Element* repeats this familiar doctrine, traceable to *Spirit in the World*, and so often that I need not cite chapter and verse here. But what is new in *Dynamic Element* is the idea that our experience of the term of the transcendence that takes us toward that horizon on the occasion of a finite object can become more and more intuitive, because this higher heart-knowledge is the quasi-intuition of connatural knowledge; it never succeeds in becoming a full intuition; that is proper to the angels, who are higher than human finite spirituality on the hierarchy of spirits. But something new happens when the horizon, while not objectified, begins to take over consciousness. As Rahner says:

It is evident, therefore, that the awareness of this supernatural transcendence, with God as the pure and unlimited term of its endless dynamism, can grow, become more pure and unmixed. The conceptual object which in normal acts is

³⁶ *Dynamic Element* 123.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 124.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 132-70.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.* 124-31.

a condition of awareness of this transcendence can also become more transparent, can almost entirely disappear, remain itself unheeded, so that the dynamism itself alone becomes more and more the essential.⁴¹

My point here is to affirm the developmental continuity of one same spiritual dynamism against a doctrine that would make heart something separate, almost an "affective sense," reminiscent of "moral sense" theories of certain older English ethicists, because making it something separate sets up fruitless expectations of the heart as "somehow" a separate organ that could "somehow," if only we knew how and had the right method or technique (e.g. the magic dream of some psychotherapy), lead us by privileged access where reason never treads.⁴² If heart is what "intellect" (by metonymy the person) becomes at its ethical and mystical point of highest actualization, then it is not a new or separate faculty of the soul; and if this be intellectualism, then Rahner can no more escape the name than Rousselot or Aquinas, which would not dissuade some critics from resting their case, of course. They would have to be wary, nonetheless, of confusing symbol and reality, favoring metaphor over a metaphysics that draws strength from simplicity and power from parsimony.

All that has been said is, of course, not meant merely of an intellectual phenomenon but as freedom and love. But conversely the "consolation" in it is not merely an added concomitant feeling, supplementary to this experience of the free transcendence of the whole mind and spirit. This latter is the consolation, because it is freedom itself and the positive taking possession of the spirit raised by grace to the supernatural in its pure being as such a spirit. That is by definition consolation. For that reason Ignatius can speak at this point . . . of peace, joy, tranquillity, as signs of the good spirit without falling under suspicion of a dubious spiritual hedonism.⁴³

No clearer affirmation of the spirituality of affectivity (and thus of the continuity of reason-intellect-heart) could be made. It takes nothing away from a doctrine of the humanity of Christ, as that is affirmed in the mystery of the Sacred Heart, to recognize that affectivity is not reducible to materiality, physical or corporeal existence, or sensible life alone, but is essentially spiritual. Embodied because finite we feel our finitude as we do because although affectivity is spiritual, our spirituality is that of the least and lowest spirits, with the result that

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 145. Abhishiktananda (Henri Le Saux, O.S.B.) describes this same experience in terms of yoga; see his *Prayer* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967) 75-77.

⁴² Pascal is usually read in this way, i.e. with head and heart as separate, as shown by their being sometimes in conflict; but that is a false reading, as Guardini shows later; the apparent conflict derives from incomplete development.

⁴³ *Dynamic Element* 150.

we never fully transcend the need of mediation through otherness, the first otherness of embodiment (cognition as *conversio ad phantasmata*, and volition in value-perception and consequent motivation) and the second otherness of intersubjectivity. Thus the affectivity of feeling does not mean denial of its spirituality, which would destroy the continuity of heart with head which is the thesis of this article. Von Hildebrand helps make this point: "Hand in hand with the denial of the spirituality of affectivity goes the thesis that affectivity essentially presupposes the body and is linked to it in a completely different way than is an act of knowledge or of willing. However, this thesis is by no means evident, nor has it been ever really proven."⁴⁴ And here he offers at least a suggestion of how a phenomenology of affectivity must reveal its spiritual essence in our human experience:

In fact, this prejudice flows again from the mistake of using the lowest type of affective experience as the pattern for affectivity as such. In reality there are several types of feeling which essentially presuppose the body, but this does not apply at all to the higher types of affectivity. A headache or the pain felt when one is wounded are bodily feeling in the strict sense of the word. In these cases the feelings are clearly voices of the body, dealing with body, and mostly located in the body. Yet certain affective experiences, which in themselves differ radically from the above mentioned bodily feelings, can also depend upon the body. States of depression, bad humor, or unrest are indeed not bodily experiences, but they are linked to the body in manifold ways. Even though their nature does not make them a voice of the body, they still may be caused by mere physiological processes. The above is not the case with affective value responses. A value-responding joy, or love, or veneration presupposes the body not a whit more than acts of will or of knowledge. There is, of course, the general mysterious relation between the soul and body, but acts of will and of intellect are no more exempt of this mysterious relation than are affective responses.⁴⁵

There are, then, different levels of consciousness and forms of intentionality that vary with degrees of embodiment of finite spirit depending upon the materialization needed for the kind of intentionality involved.

It is time . . . to realize that affectivity and spirituality are not incompatible to do justice in an unprejudiced analysis to the nature of these fully affective and highly spiritual experiences. If one examines the nature of an affective value

⁴⁴ Dietrich von Hildebrand, "Phenomenology of Value in a Christian Philosophy," in *Christian Philosophy and Religious Renewal*, ed. George F. McLean (Washington: Catholic Univ. of America, 1966) 3-19, at 15.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 15.

response . . . one must see that this response of one's heart has the same meaningful response character as a response of one's intellect.⁴⁶

Although von Hildebrand never expressed his phenomenological triad of intellect, will, and heart as the metaphysical dyad of heart as perfected "head," i.e. as most highly actualized reason and will, Rahner would still agree with the intent of such a position, fearing neither to emasculate humanity by emphasizing the spiritual nor somehow to threaten divine or angelic spirituality by making the spiritual affective. Only a false restriction of the thumos-heart to the bios-epithumia aspect is afraid to affirm affectivity of spirit, whereas a correct understanding is of affectivity as the perfection of spirit, as shown in the place affective connaturality holds for Aquinas, viz. as the norm, not the exception, of the good person in ethical discernment and the saint in mystical affection. This is very clear in Rahner's important discussion of connaturality.⁴⁷

Furthermore, anyone must ask, when confronted with Ignatius's appeal to affectivity to decide an issue that reasoning cannot settle, how he could possibly recommend such a recourse unless the affective response came primarily not from a lower, visceral place in us (the bios-epithumia heart) but rather from a place that is even higher and by that very fact closer to the center, nearer to the core and heart of the spirit-soul. Egan quotes Fessard to this effect:

At this critical stage, after having recognized both the power and the limitations of the intellect as the criterion of perfection, Ignatius appeals to an affective criterion to decide the issue. He hardly wishes to abandon or suppress the intellectual criterion, but "to unite it so intimately with the affective that their interaction habitually and quasi-instinctively results in a superior and . . . connatural affectivity."⁴⁸

Egan clearly holds that it is precisely this superior affective connaturality that is the link between the intellectual and the affective criteria.⁴⁹ For the experience of this connaturality Ignatius uses the word *sentido*:

For Ignatius, *sentido* almost always means felt-knowledge, personal knowledge, connatural knowledge, a knowledge flowing from love and the heart, a

⁴⁶ Ibid. 14.

⁴⁷ E.g. *Dynamic Element* 161 ff.

⁴⁸ Gaston Fessard, *Dialectique des Exercices Spirituels de Saint Ignace de Loyola*, 2 vols. (Paris: 1956 and 1966) 1.295; cited in Egan, *The Spiritual Exercises* 13.

⁴⁹ Egan speaks of "linking of the affective and the intellectual criteria . . . in terms of a mystical connaturality" (ibid. 13), allowing inference of the continuum of head and heart.

non-conceptual, non-verbal, mystical knowledge often described as a "tasting" or a "savoring." Ignatius himself admits . . . that "there could be matters that could be better felt than put into words."⁵⁰

Pascal is normally interpreted as opposing reason and heart as though they were separate faculties, but Guardini interprets Pascal as concurring in understanding the heart as perfection of reason.

What is the heart in the Pascalian sense? One thing above all: It is not the expression of the emotional in opposition to the logical, not feeling in opposition to the intellect, not "soul" in opposition to "mind" [*Geist*, spirit]. "Coeur" is itself mind [*Geist*]: a manifestation of the mind [*Geist*]. The act of the heart is an act productive for knowledge. Certain objects only become given in the act of the heart. But they do not remain there in a-rational intuition, but are accessible to intellectual and rational penetration.

We are here before a basic human structure. . . . The phenomenon depends on the interrelationship between knowledge and will, apprehension of truth and love—objectively expressed, between essence and value. "Value" is the character of preciousness of things: that which makes them worthy of being. To it corresponds the experience of value: that specific, irreducible sensibility, the vibration of the mind at the contact of value. But not of the theoretical mind [*Geist*], of the reason, but of the mind [*Geist*] which appreciates and values, that is, of the heart. "Heart" is the mind [*Geist*], so far as it gets into proximity of the blood, into the feeling, living fibre of the body—yet without becoming torpid. Heart is the mind rendered ardent and sensitive by the blood, but which at the same time ascends into the clarity of contemplation, the distinctness of form, the precision of judgment. Heart is the organ of love—of that love from which arose Platonic philosophy, and then, newly fructified by Christian faith, the *Divine Comedy*. This love implies, namely, the relationship of the center of man's desires and feelings to the idea; the movement from the blood to the mind, from the presence of the body to the eternity of the mind. It is what is experienced in the heart.⁵¹

Here we find this better meaning of heart as doubly vertical: the fiery passion of incarnate soul and the spiritual mysticism of absolute desire. Thus for Guardini's Pascal, heart is the soul warmed by the heat of the blood to rise above and even out of itself in mystical contemplation. Because of this continual rather nonoppositional relation of head and heart, when Pascal says in Fragment 278, "*C'est le coeur qui sent Dieu, et non la raison*" ("It is the heart that senses [experiences, feels] God, and not reason"), he does not mean a separate faculty

⁵⁰ Ibid. 49.

⁵¹ Romano Guardini, *Pascal for Our Time*, trans. Brian Thompson (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966) 131–32; my brackets taken from the original *Christliches Bewusstsein: Versuche über Pascal*, 2d ed. (München: Kösel [Hochland Bücherei] 1950) 186–87.

but that reason transformed is heart, reason graced by the gifts (virtues) of the Spirit, especially faith, love, and hope, the same virtues that flourish first in our human interpersonal relations and only then deserve to be called the "theological virtues."⁵² Thus Pascal also says in the same Fragment, "*Voilà ce que c'est que la foi, Dieu sensible au coeur, non à la raison*" ("This is what faith is, God able to be felt [experienced] by the heart, not by reason").⁵³ This means that if we remain chained to discursive reason God cannot touch us. Quietism took this to mean a premature active emptying of the mind, and some Zen makes the same forced march on heaven, which can end in a false dark night. Pascal reported his own mystical experience as a fire that drew him above, heart born of spirit at its highest; that is the key to his otherwise puzzling *netteté d'esprit* and *esprit de finesse*, otherwise so intellectualistic sounding:

Let us listen to the following phrases from the "Discours": "*La netteté d'esprit cause aussi la netteté de la passion; c'est pourquoi un esprit grand et net aime avec ardeur, et il voit distinctement ce qu'il aime.*" . . . "neatness" is here a value of a superior order . . . "and it causes also the neatness of passion; that is why a great and neat mind loves with ardor, and sees distinctly what it loves." And further: "In proportion as one has more mind [Geist], the passions are greater; for since the passions are but sentiments and ideas"—note the unusualness of this association, as of the following—"which belong exclusively to the mind [Geist], although they are occasioned by the body, it is clear that they are nothing but the mind [Geist] itself, and that they thus employ all its capacity. I am only speaking of the burning passions [*des passions de feu*]; for as far as the others are concerned, they often mingle together, and cause a very inconvenient confusion; but this is never so in those which have mind [Geist]." . . . Pascal affirms the spiritual nature of higher feelings and their proper attribution to heart as higher than abstract, logical, geometrical reason.⁵⁴

⁵² See my "Religious Belief and the Emotional Life: Faith, Love, and Hope in the Heart Tradition," in *The Life of Religion: Philosophy and the Nature of Religious Belief*, ed. S. Harrison and R. Taylor (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986) 17–38.

⁵³ My translations. See Blaise Pascal, *Pensées. Provincial Letters* (New York: Random House [Modern Library], 1941; *Pensées* trans. W. F. Trotter) 95.

⁵⁴ Guardini continues: "The heart responds to value. Value is being's inner movement of meaning. Value is the self-justification of what is, that it is worthy of its existence. This *dynamis* summons the movement of the heart, love. Thus the '*coeur*,' for Pascal, is the organ which grasps the value of being. . . . But the heart grasps especially the value of that which is living, and particularly that of man. Finally, and in a definitive way, the heart is the organ for grasping that value which only manifests itself from above, from revelation: that of the holiness of God, which brings man his fulfillment and his salvation. But in order not to slip into something merely emotional, let us now listen to Pascal's most astounding statements. '*Coeur*' is the organ of the '*esprit de finesse*.' 'There are two kinds of minds: the one, geometrical'—that is, abstractly logical—'the other

Mind (Geist, spirit) employed at its fullest capacity, is heart. McCool's treatment of Rousselot also confirms this interpretation of the affective as spiritual perfection:

Modern philosophers confused St. Thomas' intellectualism with rationalism. . . . St. Thomas' intellectualism, Rousselot maintained, was a doctrine that "puts the whole value, the whole intensity, the very essence of the good, which is identical with being, in an act of the intelligence." But the intelligence to which he referred is not the discursive reason on which the rationalist ideal of knowledge is modeled.⁵⁵

Thomas therefore was fundamentally opposed to the rationalist position that intellection is a univocal perfection and that "ideas are equal in every mind." His metaphysics of participation and existence, and the analogy of knowledge which it demands, made it clear to him that concentration on intelligence in its lowest and least developed form, discursive reason, must limit our understanding of its nature and distort our conception of its proper function. Accurate and comprehensive understanding of intelligence as an analogous perfection can come only from a reflection on its higher and more developed forms. For that reason a careful study of St. Thomas' angelology is required for the proper understanding of his intellectualism.⁵⁶

Discursive human ratio endeavors, through the multiplicity of its concepts and judgments, to construct a synthesis of the universe that can substitute for the unification of the world by the single intuition of angelic intellectus. Discursive ratio, with its incurable multiplicity, is due to the sense that man, as a form immersed in matter, shares with the brutes immediately below him in the hierarchy of being. Intuitive intellectus, through which man grasps his conscious operations in direct reflection and sees the truth of the first principles by immediate insight, is the higher function of the intellect that man shares with the angels immediately above him. In accordance with the rule of *continuatio* in Neoplatonic participation metaphysics, ratio "touches" intellectus immediately above it and touches the sense immediately below it. It is the medium that links intellectus to the sense in man.⁵⁷

This rule of *continuatio* obtains at every level of body-soul composition, including the head-heart distinction. That McCool is aware that we do not enjoy full possession of intellectus, as the prior text may seem to suggest, is shown by his saying that ratio is a "drive" to intellectus (ratio must "become" intellectus):

which one can call "*de finesse*." The first has views which are slow, hard and inflexible; but the second has a flexibility of thought which it applies at the same time to the . . . lovable. . . ." (*Pascal for Our Time* 130-31). Deeken's interpretation of Scheler offers a corroborative theory. See Alfons Deeken, S.J., *Process and Permanence in Ethics: Max Scheler's Moral Philosophy* (New York: Paulist, 1974) 30-44 and 177-98.

⁵⁵ McCool, *From Unity to Pluralism* 48.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 50.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 53.

Ratio, the distinctive form that characterizes man as the lowest of the spiritual creatures, is a drive to intellectus, the intuitive intelligence that man shares with the angels. Its discursive unification of the world through science, art, history and the symbol is an effort to "mime" the insight into the real which, in comprehension of the whole and penetration into the singular, intellectus alone can furnish. That is why St. Thomas, as an intellectualist, held discursive knowledge in low esteem.⁵⁸

We do participate in intellectus, but at its very lowest degree, which is where and when we operate at our highest level of performance, namely, (1) as persons, specifically in our contacts with other persons, both in the mystical relations of love of God and the ethical relations of love of neighbor, the two great commandments of human life (the same two realms addressed by Aquinas in his main text on affective connaturality), and (2) within these two highest realms of human knowledge and love, when those activities have become most perfected by habit, most actualized by virtue (including the gifts [virtues] of the Spirit), brought closest to the intuitiveness and spontaneity that we experience in affective connaturality.

CONCLUSION

Approached from below we could say that ratio is the "faculty" and intellectus is its highest operational level of perfection because intellectus is the habit not only of first principles but also of all the inter-subjective virtues, like faith, love, and hope, that constitute what we could call the personal a priori of human existence. Thus, again seen from below, since ratio names the "faculty" and intellectus names its highest state of operation, this does not mean a separate, new "faculty," except in the loose (descriptive) sense that we could mean when saying that it is as though it were a new faculty because it operates at such a higher level. Ratio adorned with virtue "becomes" intellectus. Approached from above, on the other hand, we could say that intellectus is the ("divine") faculty and ratio is its lowliest, most finite (human) level of existence and performance, a discursive reason, so lowly, in fact, that it must make use of sensation as its only genuine intuition. Cognition's need for *conversio ad phantasma* and volition's need for feeling are constant reminders of finitude.⁵⁹

In conclusion let me repeat that it is essential to my thesis to bind habit to affective connaturality. The general theory of habit formation

⁵⁸ Ibid. 53-54.

⁵⁹ See my "Affectivity in Ethics: Lonergan, Rahner, and Others in the Heart Tradition," in *Religion and Economic Ethics*, ed. Joseph F. Gower (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990) 87-122.

finds a particular specification in the Thomist doctrine of affective connaturality. McCool gives an excellent summary of Rousselot's interpretation of connaturality.⁶⁰ He shows, more implicitly than explicitly, that it is habit that makes connatural knowledge connatural. For Rousselot, and for Rahner following Rousselot's Thomist interpretation, affective connaturality is a higher substitute than the other substitutes, viz. than the concepts, judgments, and deliberative will-acts associated with discursive ratio and deliberative volition, in fact the highest substitute to which we attain by most closely resembling the intuitive knowing and spontaneous love that we express in the language of the heart. In its simple metaphysical structure, habit is a habitus, a "having" between being and doing, i.e. between nature and action, where nature is the being considered as source of actions. As McCool says:

The virtuous man can judge correctly, St. Thomas believed, because his acquisitions of a virtue make his soul "like" it. "Assimilated" to a particular virtue in their being, the soul's cognitive and affective powers are "connatural" to it in their habitual tendencies. A "natural sympathy" toward the virtue he possesses affects the mind and will of the virtuous man. As Rousselot put it . . . his faculties of knowledge and love "vibrate" in harmony with it. Since "like is known by like," the interior assimilation of his nature to chastity enables the habitually chaste man to "enter into" the nature of cases related to it and to judge correctly concerning them. The unchaste man, whose nature has no "likeness" to chastity and who therefore has no "sympathy" for it, cannot.⁶¹

"Rapid inference," apparently, never meant rapid discursive reason but was Rousselot's way of trying to account for and name a quasi-intuitive or nearly intellectual way of knowing, a way of affinity, of similarity, of congeniality born of love. He knew it was based on habit's actualizing ratio to a higher level, approaching the mode of operation of intellectus. Eventually he recognized what the full effect of habit as virtue really is, viz. our closest approximation of intellectus. And this is clearly what Rahner learned from him in his own reading of Aquinas. And thus the explanation of affective connaturality is virtue. This explains Rousselot's evolution from rapid inference to sympathy, namely, the mystical half, the high end, if you will, of affective connaturality, especially as that involved the virtues that are gifts of the Spirit, and shows the source of Rahner's metaphysical anthropology.

Again we see the remarkable continuity of Aquinas's metaphysics of spirit, from the most finite up to the least. Heart is the name for the least finite, i.e. intellect at its most perfect and powerful. Perfect spirit

⁶⁰ *From Unity to Pluralism* 63-68.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 63.

is and acts as heart, i.e. through sympathy. Affective connaturality is nothing else than the effect of virtue; it is another name for knowing in the heart. Its love is not just any feelings, therefore, but those of intellectus (logos-eros) joined with thumos (no doubt always with echoes of bios-epithumia).⁶² The same continuatio that grounds our replacing a phenomenological multiplicity of "faculties" with a unity based on an intentional and operational analysis, so that ratio and intellectus (including will) are not separate faculties of a naive realism, also grounds our Rahnerian understanding of heart not as a separate faculty (granted the phenomenological convenience of continuing to speak of them as such) but as finite spirit brought to its fullest actualization.

⁶² But in a different relation, namely, as quasi-material, not final cause. There are more aspects of Roussetot's position on the higher operations of intellectus that shed light on Rahner's meaning of heart, but another article would have to be devoted just to Roussetot to present them adequately; see McCool, *From Unity to Pluralism* 66-88.