

NEWMAN'S ESSAY ON DEVELOPMENT IN ITS INTELLECTUAL MILIEU

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AN ESSAY *on the Development of Christian Doctrine* is the central point in Newman's intellectual and religious career.¹ Written in his last days as an Anglican and published immediately after his entrance into the Church, the *Essay on Development* not only stands at the crossroads to mark where Newman's thought turns squarely onto the Catholic highway, but also serves as a meeting point where his earlier historical studies and theological theories converge and reach their fulfillment.² As Newman's studies had matured, the *Essay on Development* had been more and more immanent in his thought: indeed, it was already more than immanent when the sermon entitled "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine" culminated Newman's Oxford preaching in 1843.³

Besides being immanent in his earlier work, the *Essay on Development* is also the point from which grows the work of Newman's later years. Thus, from its middle position in Newman's intellectual history, it faces both ways to give this history a unified significance. This is plain from Newman's habitual way of viewing his own activities. Newman's life work, reduced to its simplest terms, presented itself to his own mind as a struggle against liberalism or the anti-dogmatic principle.⁴ In this struggle the *Essay on Development* occupies the

¹ John Henry Cardinal Newman, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (16th impr.; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920). This is the edition cited throughout the present article under the short title *Essay on Development*. First published in 1845, the book was republished in a revised form in 1878.

² Newman's patristic studies furnish the matter for discussion through the entire book. In his Advertisement to the First Edition (*ibid.*, p. x), Newman apologizes for quoting so often from his own earlier works.

³ John Henry Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford between A. D. 1826 and 1843* (3d. ed.; London, Rivingtons, 1872), pp. 312-51. For a discussion of this sermon, cf. James J. Byrne, "The Notion of Doctrinal Development in the Anglican Writings of J. H. Newman," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, XIV (1937), 230-86.

⁴ Wilfrid Ward, *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913), I, 4-5; cf. Newman's "Biglietto Speech" on the occasion of his elevation to the cardinalate, *ibid.*, II, 460. "The object of the [Oxford] Movement,"

key position. When, for example, toward the close of his life, in a letter to his friend the arch-liberal, arch-positivist William Froude, Newman seeks to define his anti-liberal position, he quotes from the *University Sermons* to represent his early thought, from the *Grammar of Assent*⁶ to represent his late thought, and from the *Essay on Development* to link the early and the late periods.⁶

Newman's thought has an importance beyond that of the thought of an individual man. In *La philosophie de Newman*, M. Jean Guittou has pointed out that Newman, like St. Augustine, perceived that his own personal crisis was the same as that of the entire world.⁷ Father Erich Przywara has made much the same point.⁸ The responsive mind of Newman was certainly one of the most sensitive gauges on which the intellectual movements of the age registered themselves.⁹

Newman writes elsewhere, "was to withstand the Liberalism of the day" (*Apologia pro Vita Sua: The Two Versions of 1864 and 1865 Preceded by Newman's and Kingsley's Pamphlets* [London: Oxford University Press, 1913], p. 202; cf. also pp. 116-17, 164-74). In citing the last mentioned work here and elsewhere throughout the present study, the system of signs used to indicate differences between the 1864 and the 1865 text is disregarded as of no moment for the present purpose.

⁶ *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901; first published in 1870) is an attempt to justify revealed religion epistemologically, as the *Essay on Development* is to justify it historically. The *Grammar of Assent* is the most important work of Newman's latter days. "How many times I have written it," he exclaims to Sister Imelda Poole (Ward, *Life*, II, 266; cf. II, 400, and II, 268, where Newman writes that he felt the *Grammar of Assent* would put a finish to his work).

⁷ Gordon Huntington Harper, *Cardinal Newman and William Froude, F.R.S.: A Correspondence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 200.

⁸ *La philosophie de Newman: Essai sur l'idée de développement* (Paris: Boivin et Cie, 1933), p. XXXIX.

⁹ "St. Augustine and the Modern World," trans. by E. I. Watkin in *A Monument to Saint Augustine* by M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., Maurice Blondel, et al. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1930), p. 279. Cf. Erich Przywara, S.J., *J. H. Kardinal Newman*, in *Christentum: Ein Aufbau*, ed. by Otto Karrer, Bändchen IV, *Einführung in Newmans Wesen und Werk* (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder and Co., 1922), p. 13.

⁹ A comparison with Orestes Brownson offers itself to illustrate Newman's accuracy in registering trends and his quick reaction. We find Brownson vilifying Newman's *Essay on Development*, when it appeared, as "essentially anticatholic and Protestant" and as so opposed to the Church that it was "utterly repugnant to her claims to be the authoritative and infallible Church of God" (quoted in Edmund Darvil Benard, *A Preface to Newman's Theology* [St. Louis: Herder, 1945], p. 97). Brownson had been a Catholic two years when he began his attack on Newman in 1846. Eighteen years later he humbly and honestly admitted that he had finally found asserting themselves in his own life the theological difficulties which had led Newman to write the *Essay on Development* and which now

The interests which always possessed him, he tells us in the *Apologia*, were things which were "in the air."¹⁰ At the Oxford in which his thought matured, the party of which Newman was the "life and soul"¹¹ had an appeal so deep-rooted in the intellectual world of which Oxford was the center that William George Ward's "Credo in Newmanum" became a partisan rallying cry.¹² Indeed, touching the liveliest issues at Oxford at their deepest quick, the interests to which Newman and those around him were dedicated finally split open the University's entire intellectual front.¹³

Newman's thought was radically that of the commonwealth of mind of the England of his day. This is the secret of his appeal at Oxford, of his ability to calculate the effect which his moves would register on the English mind,¹⁴ of his persuasive powers in such a book as *The Present Position of Catholics in England*, of his overwhelming success in pleading his own apparently luckless case before the English people in the *Apologia*. Much as his thought was indebted to patristic sources, it remains true, as Father Przywara has pointed out, that Newman's mind grew to full stature by wrestling with the thought of the contemporary world in which he lived.¹⁵ This was the nineteenth-century world which reached back to the purlieus of the Anglican divines Bull, Taylor, Law, and most of all Butler, and which also was of a piece with the world of Hume and Kant and Hegel.

Another figure who might be singled out besides Newman as thoroughly representative of this world is Coleridge. Indeed, almost no figure is more representative. And Newman's own representative quality is attested to by his immediate response to the earlier writer:

made plain the value of the book. The difficulties "in the air" which Brownson had come upon only years after his conversion had been registered by Newman even before he entered the Church. And yet Brownson was living in a not isolated intellectual world.

¹⁰ P. 175.

¹¹ Ward, *op. cit.*, I, 60; cf. Newman, *Apologia*, p. 160.

¹² Ward, *op. cit.*, I, 60; cf. 63-64.

¹³ Cf. Newman's letter of March 13, 1829, in Ward, *op. cit.*, I, 44-45.

¹⁴ See, for instance, how his prognosis of the effect on the British public if he were to have become a religious helped to keep him from joining a religious institute upon his conversion: Ward, *op. cit.*, I, 169-70. In the event, Newman's instincts for thus preserving in the British public mind his character as preeminently an individual made the *Apologia* the success it was.

¹⁵ "St. Augustine and the Modern World," *A Monument to St. Augustine*, pp. 281-82.

"During this spring [1835] I for the *first time* read parts of Coleridge's works; and I am surprised how much I thought mine, is to be found there."¹⁶

The mind of Newman, so representative of that of his age, had itself an individual history which can be described as an increasingly intimate contact with revelation. Newman writes:

When I was fifteen (in the autumn of 1816), a great change of thought took place in me. I fell under the influences of a definite Creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured. Above and beyond the conversations and sermons of the excellent man, long dead, the Rev. Walter Mayers, of Pembroke College, Oxford, who was the human means of this beginning of divine faith in me, was the effect of the books which he put into my hands, all of the school of Calvin.¹⁷

This initial contact with revelation was strengthened and given shape at Oxford, as Newman, increasingly aware of the issues at stake between revealed, dogmatic religion and liberalism, adhered to the "High Church" party of Keble.¹⁸ His migration from Keble's side to the Catholic position was simply an advance along the same route which he had taken to join Keble. As Newman himself explains, it was none other than Keble who, in his Assize Sermon of 1833 published under the title "National Apostasy," drew the lines of the dogmatic-liberal dispute in such a way as to start the movement which ultimately led Newman into the Church.¹⁹

At the point where this mind, filled with the ways of thinking of its age, arrived at the complete Catholic acceptance of revelation, stands the *Essay on Development*. Hence it is that this great treatise can serve to disclose some of the crucial effects of revelation on the radical intellectual temper of Newman's world—to disclose some of the basic revisions demanded of the mind nurtured in the soil which fostered liberalism and Kantianism and other accompanying phenomena, if this mind was to stand up under the impact of revelation.

¹⁶ John Henry Newman, *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during His Life in the English Church*, ed. by Anne Mozley (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), II, 35, note 1. Cf. *Apologia*, p. 195.

¹⁷ *Apologia*, p. 107.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 117 ff.; Ward, *op. cit.*, I, 42.

¹⁹ *Apologia*, p. 136.

Indeed, Newman himself expressly recognized the treatise to be a record of such revisions.²⁰

Thus, the *Essay on Development* is clearly of some importance as a register of the impact of revelation on Newman's intellectual milieu. The present study undertakes to examine the work as such. This examination cannot be exhaustive. It provides rather a "seed" study, bringing out in connection with Newman's observations on the development of Christian doctrine some hitherto neglected facts which should, as I hope, open the way for still further investigation.

PROGRESS OF NEWMAN'S THOUGHT

To see the *Essay on Development* in context, one must step for a moment into Newman's own mind.

Newman had grown up into Evangelical Protestantism,²¹ which ingenuously scouted questions of development of dogma, assuming that everything it said could be found verbatim in the Scriptures. From this Evangelicalism Newman had been turned, at the sharp point of fact, into the Anglican camp. But here he found that, when put to the test, the Anglican tradition itself fell back to take what was essentially a Protestant stand. For the most part, the primitive Anglicans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had not, indeed, like the Evangelical Protestants, ejected the Roman "corruptions" from their teachings: they had found themselves in dispute with Rome principally on matters of jurisdiction.²² But by his day, as

²⁰ A letter to Mrs. William Froude in June, 1845, shows Newman referring explicitly to the book as a chart of his own intellectual movements: "Did I tell you I was preparing a book of some sort to advertise people how things stood with me?" (Ward, *op. cit.*, I, 86). He closes, or rather breaks off, the book with a quotation pointing the whole to his own life: "Nunc dimittis servum tuum, Domine, secundum verbum tuum in pace: quia viderunt oculi mei salutare tuum" (*Essay on Development*, p. 445; cf. *Apologia*, p. 127; Ward, *op. cit.*, II, 418).

²¹ *Letters and Correspondence*, I, 18-22, 108-11; cf. *Apologia*, pp. 107-8. Newman's "conversion" recounted in these passages was not, however, of the approved Evangelical stamp, and after the publication of the *Apologia* Newman received well-intentioned letters from strangers or anonymous writers "assuring him that he did not yet know what conversion meant, and that the all-important change had still to be wrought in him if he was to be saved" (*Letters and Correspondence*, I, 108).

²² Newman cites an Anglican canon of the year 1603 to make this fact quite explicit (*Apologia*, p. 169; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 170 ff., 179).

Newman discovered to his chagrin, the leaders of the Anglican Church required a Protestant interpretation of the Thirty-Nine Articles²³—an interpretation which the history of these articles plainly showed to be quite unwarranted.²⁴

There were many in the Anglican Church who retained interest in dogma. These were the ones who had given the church its appeal to Newman. But even these were finding in experience, what they may not yet have been aware of in theory, that without a Holy See they had no practicable mechanism to guarantee the validity of any development in doctrine, and that, since the Anglican Church therefore could not speak with confidence of any development now within its own teaching, it had to deny that any development had ever taken place in Christian doctrine. In this sense, when they were put to the test and made to formulate their position, the only tenable refuge for Anglicans came eventually to be in practice quite like that of the Evangelical Protestants.²⁵ Except for those to whom doctrine meant little or nothing—those, for instance, who in the spirit of true dogmatic Whiggery projected the Jerusalem bishopric negotiations so repugnant to Newman and the other defenders of dogma²⁶—Anglicans took the position that the doctrine of the Anglican Church, word for word, corresponded, not precisely to the Gospels (here indeed was a hopeful difference with the Evangelicals) but to the doctrine of the Church of the first centuries.²⁷ This view did not assume that everything was in the Scriptures; it allowed for tradition. But it did assume that the Christianity of the first centuries was static, at least as static as the Anglican doctrine, which had nothing to do now with new definitions of popes or councils. This is the position which Newman found himself taking when he proposed his doctrine of the “Via Media” in expounding the Thirty-Nine Articles.²⁸

But as Newman gained greater familiarity with the Christianity of the early centuries, and particularly as he studied the Monophysite controversies,²⁹ he found many difficulties. They all came to this:

²³ *Apologia*, pp. 184–88.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 179–82.

²⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 168, for Newman’s earlier hopes to the contrary.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 206, 236–41.

²⁷ *Essay on Development*, p. 10 ff.; *Apologia*, p. 180 ff.

²⁸ Cf. *The Via Media of the Anglican Church* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1891), I, 201–9. But cf. also the adumbrations of the notion of development, *ibid.*, I, 53–54.

²⁹ *Apologia*, p. 210 ff.

between the Christianity of the Gospels and the Christianity even of Chalcedon, there were already differences.³⁰ Wherever you found Christianity in the early centuries, you found not a static, but a developing doctrine.³¹ In other words, early Christianity was behaving in a way suspiciously like Rome's way of behaving.³² The Council of Chalcedon, which the Anglicans accepted, was only an earlier Council of Trent, and Trent they did not accept. Newman's personal discovery of the fact of development in the patristic and medieval Church made him a Catholic and gave us as a by-product the *Essay on Development*.

The *Essay on Development* may be summarized as an explanation with illustrations: an explanation of how natural "ideas," to use Newman's own term, grow or develop over a long course of time when they are the possession of many men, with elaborate illustrations of how the apparent doctrinal differences between primitive Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church of the nineteenth century can be explained as the same sort of development. The natural "ideas" to which Newman compares the development of Christianity are such "ideas" as Platonic philosophy, or the doctrine of the divine right of kings, or the duty of benevolent enterprises, or utilitarianism, or the doctrine of the rights of man, or of free trade, or of the anti-social bearings of a priesthood, and so on.³³

How are such "ideas" psychologically constituted? Newman refuses to commit himself on this.³⁴ He merely avails himself of illustrations.³⁵ He notes, for example, among other things, that the English Parliament of 1628-1629 took a series of measures without suggesting that they all flowed from a common source.³⁶ Newman is apparently referring to the passage of the Petition of Right, which provided that there should be no more taxation without the consent of parliament, no more billeting of soldiers in private houses, no more martial law in time of peace, and no more imprisonment without a specified charge. But after twelve years, says Newman, the Long Parliament found itself stripping the monarch of some of his power.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

³¹ *Essay on Development*, pp. 122-34, 135-65.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³⁵ Newman groups these illustrations in certain quite serviceable but otherwise rather mongrel categories as political, logical, historical, ethical, and metaphysical developments; cf. *Essay on Development*, pp. 42-54. ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

The idea of a more limited monarchy now for the first time was explicitly invoked. But this "idea" had been operating for twelve years. This is typical of the illustrations outside Christianity which Newman supplies as parallels to doctrinal development in the Church.

Newman next turns to Christian doctrine and shows that similar phenomena are found there. Thus, on the doctrine of papal supremacy, the clearly developed teaching of the fourth century is an "idea" which had always been working in the ferment of Christian life, but which only now rose to the surface.³⁷ Newman elaborates many other examples of doctrinal development, and in the latter half of the *Essay on Development* simply vindicates various Catholic developments as true developments and not corruptions.

Thus the *Essay on Development* is laid out in this rough plan: There exist on the natural level certain central or root "ideas" which develop; Christianity does likewise; the latter point is confirmed by sundry examples.

How would one state the "leading idea" or the "root idea" of any one of those phenomena just listed above, to which Newman compares Christianity? Newman, as has just been seen, refers to these phenomena themselves as "ideas,"³⁸ and if we follow this practice of his, we would ask the present question this way: How would one state the "leading idea" or the "root idea" of any one of these ideas—Platonic philosophy, the doctrine of the divine right of kings, and so on? That is to say, how would one adequately formulate or conceptualize any of these ideas to which Christianity is compared? How, for instance, would one so formulate or conceptualize what we call Platonism? Is it that a notional world exists *a parte rei*? Or that what is mutable cannot be real or true? Or that the spiritual and the material are completely separated?

These, and any other formulations of Platonism, would each be in Newman's view inadequate. We cannot, he says, "inclose in a formula that intellectual fact, or system of thought, which we call the Platonic philosophy, or that historical phenomenon of doctrine and conduct, which we call the heresy of Montanus or of Manes."³⁹ The adequate "idea" of Platonism is "commensurate with the sum total of its possible aspects, however they may vary in the separate consciousness

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 148 ff.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

of individuals."⁴⁰ There is no "leading idea" separate from this totality. What are called "leading ideas" of Platonism or utilitarianism or of other such things are only partial glimpses, for the idea of Platonism and the ideas of the other similar phenomena which Newman enumerates are like bodily substances which admit "of being walked round, and surveyed on opposite sides, and in different perspectives, and in contrary lights, in evidence of their reality."⁴¹ The one truth which shows up only partially in each one of the partial glimpses is what Newman calls the "idea" in the adequate or complete sense; this is the idea which develops.

Similarly, on the supernatural plane, Newman will not assign the "central idea" of Christianity any more than he will the central idea of Platonism, but he says that for convenience one can take the Incarnation.⁴² God becomes Man. Looked at as both God and Man, then, Christ stands between our Creator and us, and we have the doctrine of mediation and the hierarchy, which is one aspect of Christianity. Or again, the divine has established a special direct contact with our material world; this gives us the sacramental system, another aspect. Or again, there is the doctrine of the kenosis, and we have Christian asceticism. Newman bases these three important aspects of Christianity on the Incarnation. But no one of them, nor even the Incarnation itself, is the "central idea" of Christianity, *the* idea of Christianity.⁴³

In his refusal to say what is the central idea of Christianity Newman assigns his reason, and it is a reason which is connected with the natural "ideas" to which he compares Christianity: any one statement of Christianity would be inadequate because even in the natural order no one statement which man can make will exhaust a truth.⁴⁴ Thus, when the all-important question underlying his book is broached, and Newman asks *what* is developed in Christian doctrine, he handles the question by referring to an analogy between the natural and the supernatural. This fact is of some importance, as we shall see.

NEWMAN AND BISHOP BUTLER

The analogy of which Newman here avails himself has for him a definite context. When Newman was a young man, he had read the

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁴¹ *Loc. cit.*

⁴³ *Loc. cit.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 34.

book by the eighteenth-century Anglican bishop, Joseph Butler, *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*,⁴⁵ which is quoted so often in the *Essay on Development*. Butler's is undoubtedly the most pervasive influence which any one writer ever exercised on Newman, and to Butler he explicitly credits his own awareness of an analogy between the natural and the supernatural—an analogy which, Newman points out, is at the base of what he calls the "sacramental" view of the universe—together with another equally basic principle of his thought, that of probability as a guide of life.⁴⁶ Newman's consuming enthusiasm for the early Fathers was connected with his perception of something like this "sacramental" view of Butler's in the various "economies" or "dispensations" of eternal Truth, of which these Fathers speak.

What principally attracted me in the ante-Nicene period was the great Church of Alexandria . . . Athanasius, the champion of the truth, was Bishop of Alexandria; and in his writings he refers to the great religious names of an earlier

⁴⁵ First published in 1736; the edition cited in the present study is *Bishop Butler's Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, with an analysis, left unfinished, by Robert Emory, D.D., ed. with a life of Bishop Butler by G. R. Crooks (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1894).

⁴⁶ Cf. *Apologia*, p. 113. Newman himself was much more aware of Butler's influence on his thought and life than most commentators on Newman's works or students of his life have been. In speaking of the notions he got from Butler concerning sacramentalism (the analogy between and interrelation of the natural and the supernatural) and concerning probability as a guide of life, Newman calls these the "underlying principles of a great portion of my teaching" (*Apologia*, p. 113). And he seals the importance of Butler's influence by his self-composed epitaph, in which he sums up the whole of his life in terms of the first of these notions which he derived from Butler: *Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem* (Ward, *op. cit.*, II, 537)—that is, the natural world is only an analogous reflection of the full supernatural Truth. Moreover, Butler shows up at every stage of Newman's existence. In 1836, on the death of Hurrell Froude, his closest friend, Newman's first choice as a keepsake was Froude's volume of Butler's *Analogy* (*Apologia*, p. 173). Little wonder that Newman the Anglican should so choose; in a letter to Hawkins he styles Butler "the greatest name in the Anglican Church" (Guitton, *La philosophie de Newman*, p. XXII). The *Essay on Development* in 1845 not only quotes at great length from the *Analogy*, but also uses many of Butler's examples as points of departure for discussion. Butler appears again in 1870 in the all-important *Grammar of Assent*, as well as in many other places in Newman's works. The thought crystallized in Newman's famous statement that ten thousand difficulties do not make one single doubt (*Apologia*, p. 332) is Butler's (*Analogy*, pp. 307-8, and *passim*). Entries under Butler's name in Father Joseph Rickaby's *Index to the Works of John Henry Cardinal Newman* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914), p. 20, are significant so far as they go, but far from complete.

date, to Origen, Dionysius, and others who were the glory of its see, or of its school. The broad philosophy of Clement and Origen carried me away; the philosophy, not the theological doctrine . . . Some portions of their teaching, magnificent in themselves, came like music to my inward ear, as if the response to ideas, which, with little external to encourage them, I had cherished so long. These were based on the mystical or sacramental principle, and spoke of the various Economies or Dispensations of the Eternal. I understood them to mean that the exterior world, physical and historical, was but the outward manifestation to our senses of realities greater than itself. Nature was a parable; Scripture was an allegory; pagan literature, philosophy, and mythology, properly understood, were but a preparation for the Gospel. The Greek poets and sages were in a certain sense prophets; for "thoughts beyond their thought to those high bards were given." There had been a directly divine dispensation granted to the Jews; but there had been in some sense a dispensation carried on in favour of the Gentiles. He who had taken the seed of Jacob for His elect people, had not therefore cast the rest of mankind out of His sight. In the fulness of time both Judaism and Paganism had come to nought; the outward framework, which concealed yet suggested the Living Truth, had never been intended to last, and it was dissolving under the beams of the Sun of Justice which shone behind it and through it. The process of change had been slow; it had been done not rashly, but by rule and measure, "at sundry times and in divers manners," first one disclosure and then another, till the whole evangelical doctrine was brought into full manifestation. And thus room was made for the anticipation of further and deeper disclosures, of truths still under the veil of the letter, and in their season to be revealed. The visible world still remains without its divine interpretation; Holy Church in her sacraments and her hierarchical appointments, will remain, even to the end of the world, only a symbol of those heavenly facts which fill eternity. Her mysteries are but the expressions in human language of truths to which the human mind is unequal. It is evident how much there was in all this in correspondence with the thoughts which had attracted me when I was young, and with the doctrine which I have already connected with the Analogy [by Butler] and the Christian Year [by John Keble].⁴⁷

In his *Analogy*, a famous book in its day, and one whose influence on English thought can still be marked, Butler had set himself against the deists, who claimed to judge revelation by natural reason but *de facto* demanded of revelation what they never found in nature: that it be clear-cut, that it conform to previous expectations, that its choice of means to achieve its ends be just what man would expect on a *prima facie* examination, and so on. Butler's attack on this mentality is simple: examine the real world as it is known from experience,

⁴⁷ *Apologia*, pp. 127-29. Guitton (*op. cit.*, p. 7) remarks on the "economies."

not an imaginary world, and you will find that revelation works just as the real world does.⁴⁸ Both are mysterious, both full of obscurities, both unpredictable and unintelligible except at the expense of great effort—the parallels carry out in many directions and with remarkable detail. Arguing in this fashion, Butler seeks to defend revelation by calling for a revised, more factual view of natural reality. His *Analogy* sets about pointing out details of the faulty view and illustrating how revelation conforms to the real, the true view based on the facts as we have them. The *Analogy* does not concern itself with the particular problems of revelation at all. Indeed, Butler is so eminently concerned with the natural that he tends throughout the treatise to minimize the effect of the revelation of *mysteria stricte dicta*; he does not conceive of revelation as part of an economy of an elevated human nature. His supernaturalism in the *Analogy* appears rather like a naturalism grown somewhat gigantesque.⁴⁹

Equipped with the lesson he had learned as a youth from Butler, that revelation follows nature, Newman became gradually aware, as we have seen, of the problem of doctrinal development. Now that his eyes were opened, he thought: nature develops; why not expect something analogous in revelation? Dogma, although it be revealed, is expressed in terms with natural origins, and so it must partake somewhat of the properties of these terms. Indeed, Butler himself had already touched explicitly, if lightly and briefly, on the question of development.⁵⁰

So much was clear. Then Newman looked back to the minds with

⁴⁸ *Analogy*, pp. 86–88. Cf. the arguments throughout the book. Butler's argument at root was, of course, nothing new, nor had it been new even in the patristic age. It is foreshadowed in our Lord's words when Nicodemus balked at the notion of supernatural regeneration: do not be surprised that you fail to understand the supernatural workings of the Spirit (*spiritus*, pneuma); for you do not understand even the natural operations of the wind (*spiritus*, pneuma). "Non mireris quia dixi tibi: oportet vos nasci denuo. Spiritus ubi vult spirat: et vocem eius audis, sed nescis unde veniat, aut quo vadat: sic est omnis qui natus est ex spiritu. . . Si terrena dixi vobis, et non creditis: quomodo, si dixerio vobis caelestia, credetis?" (John 3:7–8, 12). A similar thought is expressed in the Old Testament passage which rides as an undercurrent through the conversation with Nicodemus: "Quomodo ignoras quae sit via spiritus, et qua ratione compingantur ossa in ventre praegnantis: sic nescis opera Dei, qui fabricator est omnium" (Eccles. 11:5).

⁴⁹ Cf., e.g., Butler's remark that with regard to God's use of means for His ends "the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity" (*Analogy*, p. 238, and *passim*).

⁵⁰ Cf. the passage cited in the *Essay on Development*, p. 47.

which he was going to have to contend and which he knew so well. "Why don't they see this?" he asked himself. One answer was easy: religious prejudice. But this was not the whole answer. There was question not only of anti-Catholic feeling such as Newman was later to try to combat in *The Present Position of Catholics in England*. There was question also of certain intellectual difficulties, and Newman tries to reach them with an argument: the analogy between revelation and nature.

When Newman falls back on the analogy that revelation acts as nature acts, the question can well be asked whether he analyzes his opponents' difficulties exactly as Butler had analyzed his opponents'—whether he decides that Protestant difficulties against Catholic doctrines are based on a faulty view of natural reality. To answer this question we must examine Newman's argument in terms of the general views of natural reality current in his day.

NEWMAN'S DIFFERENCE WITH HIS OPPONENTS

Newman not only exploits in the *Essay on Development* the analogy between the supernatural and the natural, but also utilizes other sorts of analogies to elucidate the nature of development in "ideas" on the natural plane. Of all the means he uses to bring out what occurs in that development of natural ideas to which he compares the development of Christian doctrine, the means which bulks largest in point of space and importance is the analogy with organic life. Once Newman has, in his Introduction, cleared a preliminary gangway through his adversaries for the movement of his own thought, the analogy with organic life comes immediately to the front and, from the first chapter on, remains prominent throughout the book.

Although part of Newman's point in this analogy is that the idea is somehow alive, an "active principle,"⁶¹ this is not all of his point. God is alive, and created pure spirits are alive, and even the concepts in the intellects of pure spirits are alive in the sense that they are self-perfections of living beings. But, for all his characteristic preoccupation with the spiritual world, Newman here is not interested primarily in the sheer kind of aliveness proper to spirits. And he is not interested in aliveness as such—in aliveness as verified both in pure spirits and

⁶¹ *Essay on Development*, p. 36.

in material beings. Rather, he is interested in the aliveness peculiar to material things, the aliveness which means growth, increase, assimilation, gradual self-realization. This is the aliveness which, he maintains, is paralleled in the development of the "idea."

Thus, the idea is "propagated" after the fashion of material living things. Its development is initially described in organic terms as "the germination and maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a large mental field."⁵² This implies two correlates: first, germination and maturation in the individual, and secondly, germination and maturation in the community or aggregate of individuals.

With regard to the first of these correlates, we may note how the active potencies inherent in an animal by reason of its specific form cannot assert themselves in the embryo or in the young animal as fully as they can in the adult. That is to say, the form or soul of an individual organism immediately upon its origin does not endow the organism with the full actuation with which it will have endowed it at maturity (unlike the angelic form, which by the very fact of its presence gives at once all it can naturally give). Similarly, the "idea" does not at once confer upon its individual possessor the full actuation which it will have conferred upon him after the lapse of time.

With regard to the second of the correlates, it is to be noted that just as the (divine) exemplar-form of any one species of material thing is not and cannot be realized in the case of any one individual of the species with that full actuation which the species is able to have (the species *is* itself more fully, that is, the exemplar-form realizes itself the more fully in creation, the more individuals the specific form actuates), so the "idea" realizes itself more fully by asserting itself in many minds. Newman has in view both these aspects of development: the individual and the communal, but more particularly the latter as including and implying the former.⁵³

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 33 ff., 57. Cf. Guitton's discussion of the communal or sociological aspects in the development of what exists in men's intellects (*op. cit.*, pp. 65-119). Needless to say, the possibility of individual development and the possibility of communal development are correlatives; for the same condition of material existence, with its implication of multiplicity on all sides, lies at the base of man's characteristic way of getting at a knowledge of a thing by a succession or multiplication of concepts and judgments and ratiocinations (as against a pure spirit's simpler mode of knowing), and at the base of man's nature, which exists by a succession or multiplication of individuals.

The analogy with organic life runs throughout the *Essay on Development*. Analogously with material things, the "idea" which is capable of developing has in its own way, as we have seen, even something like parts outside of parts—various "aspects" which are explained by Newman as being "mutually connected and growing one out of another."⁵⁴ The question is raised whether in the intellect of the reader the ideas latent in written documents "open out . . . and grow to perfection in the course of time."⁵⁵ They do. Moreover, the idea of Christianity (considered as an "idea" in the natural sense, the supernatural qualities being prescinded from) not only grows "in wisdom and stature," but it even has a nativity, though it be a miraculous one.⁵⁶ Further, even if we were to suppose that revelation were not given to man by stages, so that it thus developed in a way resembling growth, but rather that it came in full maturity from God's hand as plants did in creation (according to Newman's interpretation of Genesis), it would nevertheless, like plants, need propagation; it would have to be conveyed to uninspired minds.⁵⁷

Further elucidations in terms of organic life occur throughout the *Essay on Development*,⁵⁸ and all need not be retailed here. Indeed, Part II of the *Essay on Development*, the entire latter two-thirds of the book, rests as a whole directly on the analogy with organic life. Entitled "Doctrinal Developments Viewed Relatively to Doctrinal Corruptions," it faces squarely the standard Protestant and Anglican charge that Roman Catholicism had corrupted the primitive Faith or the primitive "idea" of Christianity. The very notion of corruption is applicable only to material things, and, as Newman further argues, in the sense in which the term "corruption" is employed in the familiar indictment of Catholicism, it refers to the kind of corruption peculiar to *living* material beings.⁵⁹ In other words, this very indictment is based, unwittingly perhaps, on the analogy between the primitive "idea" of Christianity and a living organism. Newman's refutation of it is based on the implications of the analogy: if a thing corrupts in the way a living material being corrupts, it must have the power of development which is the correlative of corruption in such a being.

By making so much of the analogy with organic life in explaining

⁵⁴ *Essay on Development*, p. 56.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵⁸ Cf., e.g., pp. 65, 68 ff., 186, 199.

⁵⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁵⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁵⁹ *Essay on Development*, pp. 169-71.

the development of an idea, Newman puts into the reader's hands the principal clue to what lies back of his point that no one statement which man can make will exhaust an "idea." For Newman is not saying simply that the idea is alive or that it is material. It acts as only a thing can act which participates in *both* life and matter.

The exact point of the analogy comes clear when we consider in a particular instance the double reference of the analogue of which Newman avails himself: when we consider, for instance the activity of a dog, which is both alive and material, as against, on the one hand, the activity of a pure spirit, which is simply alive, and, on the other hand, the activity of a stone, which is simply material. The dog eats, let us say, a straight beef diet. After a certain period—seven years, so the story goes—he has replaced more or less all his parts. Then he feeds on mutton for seven more years. More replacements. But he is always the same dog. Now pure spirits, which are quite alive, do not do this: they have no material parts to replace. A stone, which is material, does not do this; it cannot impose its own perfections on other things, as the dog can. Only a being which is both material and alive does this.

In Newman's analogy, the dog is the truth, the "idea." The dog exists when this form actuates this matter; but by means of this form the dog can take to itself other material things; it can, given time, actuate whole worlds of provender. The point is that it does not actuate at once everything it can actuate, and it has not exhausted itself completely, asserted itself completely, expressed its full reality, until it has come into contact with all the things it can actuate. That is why one dog eats so much, and why, all the same, when he comes to die, he leaves so much eating still undone.

Similarly, as Newman is pointing out with this analogy, a truth in the human mind does not actuate at once everything that can be actuated by it. At one time the "idea" of Platonic philosophy will be stated in one way: a notional world exists *a parte rei*. At another time, perhaps after some years, the same man will state it another way: nothing which is mutable can be real or true. These both say equivalently the same thing. What, then, is the difference? Only the dog food. In one case, the truth expresses itself in one set of terms, in another in a new set.

Moreover, as dog itself is variously verified, not only in one and the same dog assimilating different foods but also in separate individual dogs, so the "idea" will not only impress itself on various things in a single mind, but between individual minds, especially when separated by periods of centuries, it will impress itself on the varied contents of the knowledge which separate individuals have each been able to amass. Similarly in revelation, taking the Incarnation as the central truth, the "idea" of Christianity, we find that by some men this will be stated: God became man; by others: Christ as God-Man stands between man and God (here is the doctrine of mediation); by others: God has become one of us in the flesh (here is the doctrine of solidarity); and so on.

But how can there be a truth which, when it is stated, fails to come into full view? This is a question which Newman does not ask, but one which lays open the kernel of the whole *Essay on Development*. Is not our knowledge pure form, pure intelligibility? The answer is plain. An angel's is indeed, but a man's is not. This is true of all kinds of human knowledge; but, since a truth is most discernible in the most perfect species of a genus, it is best to illustrate the point with the plenary act of human knowledge, the strange structure called a judgment.

Human beings get at truth by means of judgments, and a judgment, as St. Thomas explains,⁶⁰ considered in its fullness, is not a brace of pure forms buckled together as such. Our concepts are forms, to be sure, but we cannot use them under every aspect purely as forms. To put them to use, we must make of them a judgment, a mechanism in which two concepts are set against one another in a matter-form relation, the subject as matter, as indeterminate, and the predicate as form, as determining. The judgment is a mechanism, a model, which reproduces, dramatizes, acts out, the very structure of the being to which man's gaze is directed.

⁶⁰ *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8: "Praedicatum comparatur ad subjectum ut forma ad materiam; et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter." Cf. also *In I Periherm.*, lects. 5 and 10; and cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 58, a. 2 c; *C. Gent.*, I, 55; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 7 ad 2m; *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1. Cf. Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic*, trans. by Imelda Choquette (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), pp. 90-92, 86-90; and Bernard J. Muller-Thym, "The To Be Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XVI (1940), 230-54.

Now, one cannot introduce anything of the material into intellection without paying the price. Matter is of itself intellectually dark, and because it reproduces a matter-form relation, the judgment bears in itself the marks of materiality and is therefore not entirely intelligible. In other words, any judgment we may utter, any statement we may make, touches being under an unintelligible as well as an intelligible aspect. For instance: "This is a man." This judgment is intelligible primarily in so far as it is informed by the predicate "man." But by virtue of the "this," the subject, we have hold of a thing which has for us an indefinite reserve of intelligibility. It is tall or short, or clothed or naked, and so on; it admits of being fitted with an indefinite number of predicates. And each predicate serves only as one of many possible windows by which we can look into the subject. Each predicate is a relatively clear aperture opening for our intellect into the relatively opaque object. In the foregoing example, the "this" is intellectually opaque, obscure, unsatisfactory. Joined in the judgment with "is man," it takes on a new life; it has been opened up.

Since the subject-predicate structure of the judgment demands only *relative* clarity in the predicate, any concept may serve in either subject or predicate position. But, wherever we may be using any particular concept at the time, our knowing process is inevitably a process of picturing to ourselves a relatively opaque object through a relatively clear window. We are not and cannot be satisfied with anything else. If we are asked what we know concerning man, we never respond with the simple word "man." Such a response would plainly not answer such a question, the reason being that the simple word "man" does not represent anything complete in our knowledge. We must make the concept for which the word stands (and hence, in its own way, the word) either an object with a window opening into it or a window with an object to open into. We say something like either: "This is a man" (here "man" is a window), or: "Man is an erect animal" (here it is an object supplied with the window "is an erect animal"). Only when we do this do we feel that we are saying something. We have to have a clear window and a less clear object. We cannot use just objects or just windows.⁶¹

⁶¹ It is perhaps superfluous to note that although there is a way of using single words to express oneself, as, for instance, a child does when he points to an object and says,

This is only one illustration of the imperfect condition of human knowledge, an illustration concerned with the judgment. But because the judgment is the term of all human knowledge,⁶² and is what we see here—a thing *demanding* relative unintelligibility in its subject with regard to its predicate, demanding a certain *latency* since it is built on a matter-form pattern, because we know always by means of a structure like this—the imperfections of our other cognitional processes follow. Since the other items in man's intellectual processes are ordered to the judgment, ultimately these imperfections are rooted in the nature of the judgment. Because the judgment is what it is, we resort to all the devices peculiar to human intellection—explanation, definition, reasoning processes. These are things which have no place in intellection as such—no place in God's knowing or even in that of the created pure spirits. Because of the latent truth in judgments, we can bring together several judgments in a reasoning process and draw out actually a truth which all of them contained only potentially, a truth suspended in a way between them. In this fashion, the measures taken by Newman's Parliament of 1628–1629 contained the conclusion come to by the Long Parliament twelve years later.⁶³ In this fashion, again, Christian doctrine develops, in that there can be things latent in the primitive deposit of faith which become understood only after the passage of centuries.

To be sure, many of the instances of development adduced by Newman seem further to complicate the issue by the fact that they are concerned not with the development of truths already abstracted from matter, but with a development which takes place by means of, and in, truths at best imperfectly understood, imperfectly abstracted. Such an instance is that of the parliaments just recited here. But this very complication is only further testimony to the component of

"flower," or "dog," such expressions are plainly judgments with the "is" and the subject "this" and "that" or something similar suppressed. However, this mode of utterance is worth noting in that it excellently illustrates the obscure intelligibility of the subject of a proposition as compared with the predicate. The subject is in these cases so slightly abstracted, so weighted toward the material side, that it can easily be established by a gesture of the hand or a glance of the eye, whereas the word uttered, referring as it does to something more abstractly grasped, is automatically understood to be a predicate (unless there is in rare cases some clear sign to the contrary).

⁶² St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 3, resp.: "Verum . . . per prius invenitur in actu intellectus componentis et dividitatis." Cf. *supra*, footnote 60.

⁶³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 9–10.

unintelligibility found in all human intellection and most radically in the term of all human knowledge, the judgment. Newman's inclusion of this complication shows how intently his thought is focused on the component of unintelligibility, that is to say, on the permanent and close juncture between human intellection and the material.

Nil in intellectu (humano) quod non prius aliquomodo in sensibus. The very reasoning process itself has a counterpart in the concrete, sense order. Just as the human concept and the human judgment reflect something there, so too does human ratiocination. The conclusion which might have been reached, had the Parliament of 1628–1629 completely rationalized, or abstracted, the principles underlying its actions, and then proceeded to manipulate these judgments so as to arrive at a conclusion—this very conclusion was realized by manipulating, in an analogous fashion, the concrete practical order of things, the conclusion being formally abstracted only at the end of the process. What an object lesson in the imperfection of human cognition to see the reasoning process, so touted by rationalism, with its roots exposed: the roots are quite firmly intertwined with the unintelligibility of material being. As against intelligence, reason shows up pretty poorly. Man's effort at complete understanding is a process of fractional distillation, and at neither the beginning, the middle, nor the end of the process is the element of matter, the dark, the obscure, entirely removed. These are all items wrapped up in Newman's remarks on development.

From this point on, there opens a large field of questions at the base of Newman's discussion, and it is plain that they are not strictly theological questions, but philosophical questions which open onto theology; for we have before us nothing more or less than the field of major logic. This brings out an important matter. In the *Essay on Development* there is not a word about the special problems which the development of supernatural revelation raises, nothing about the special problems of development in a cognition so especially close to the divine, so especially unified as is supernatural revelation compared with natural cognition, no attempt to explain the relations and differences between the way the human mind holds natural truths and the way it holds supernatural mysteries. There is much about the development of ideas, but not a word about anything distinctive of the development of revelation.

Newman had set out to argue against Evangelical Protestants and Anglicans, both of whom theoretically based their religious views on revelation, but we do not find him joining issue with them primarily on the ground of the content of revelation. We do not find one side maintaining that revelation says this and the other side maintaining that it says that, after the fashion of most parties to disputes over revealed doctrine. It is not a question of what God says, but of what His deposited doctrine does; and Newman urges his case by calling on the opposition to take a fuller view of natural reality. Protestants and Anglicans err by making the deposit of revelation behave in a way in which no possession of the human mind can behave.⁶⁴

Thus, to answer our earlier question, Newman is doing no more than Butler had done in telling his adversaries that they impose on revelation their false notions of natural reality. His discussion is merely more particularized than Butler's. In place of Butler's recommendation of a more adequate general awareness of the "order and course of nature" as a corrective for a general misapprehension of supernatural truth, Newman recommends an awareness of the development of natural "ideas," and in particular an awareness of the material component in human intellection, largely as brought out by the analogy between human intellection and organic life. Our knowledge is both in material being and directed primarily to material being. It is never pure intellection any more than we are ever pure spirits.

The tradition in Newman's world which regarded human intellection as pure intellection is not far to seek. It is that idealism which constitutes a persistent aberration of human thought but which descends to Newman's age proximately through Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel.⁶⁵ The *Essay on Development* is an opposition to this tradition, based on particular grounds—namely, as the facts connected with the history of revelation. The great treatise thus resolves itself into a struggle between the idealist's view of human intellection and an opposed view based, as we believe, on more complete and accurate reporting of facts. This resolution helps place the treatise in Newman's intellectual milieu. For the *Essay on Development*, as we have seen,

⁶⁴ Cf. *Essay on Development*, pp. 33–40, 55 ff.

⁶⁵ For an historical discussion of this idealism, cf. Étienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937); and *id.*, *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1939).

marks a stage in the journey of a highly representative mind coming into fuller and fuller contact with revelation; and the stage it marks is the one at which this mind, accepting revelation now unconditionally, turns to face the forces opposed to revelation. The fact that when it does this it finds itself facing the idealistic tradition identifies this tradition as the great force on which the anti-dogmatism of the day was relying, and establishes the position of the *Essay on Development* in terms of the radical opposition of Christianity to the hostile elements in the nineteenth-century milieu.

MATERIAL BEING AND FIRST PRINCIPLES.

This reduction of the *Essay on Development* to an opposition on particular grounds to the dominant idealistic tradition of Newman's day is corroborated by another crucial item in Newman's thought. It will be remembered that this thought, taken as that whole exhibited throughout all of Newman's important writings, represents the same struggle against anti-dogmatism that is represented in a more particular fashion in the *Essay on Development*.

In all his significant works, as readers of Newman are well aware and as the instances soon to be cited here will show, there is not only a persistent return to first principles as points of departure for reasoning—this might be expected in any thoroughgoing argument—but also a constant agitation of questions concerning the nature of first principles: what first principles are, and how they come to be. Newman evidently felt that there was something about his view of first principles, as against other extant views, which was of basic importance in his whole stand as a champion of dogma and revelation. And, interestingly enough for our present purpose, although all that Newman says about first principles is not entirely clear, it is clear that his view of the nature and origin of first principles is one which brings out to a notable extent the very point which opposed the *Essay on Development* to the prevalent idealism of the world in which it appeared: the necessity of recognizing more adequately the linkage of human intellection with material reality.

First principles—such things as the principle of contradiction, points at which our sciences start—have most often been presented in our day as being, at least in metaphysics, the product either of an

analysis of the (abstracted) subject term or of an analysis of the (abstracted) subject and predicate terms conjointly. Father Peter Hoenen has shown that in St. Thomas, and indeed quite generally among Scholastics until past Cajetan's time, first principles are no such things.⁶⁶ The notion that they are seems to have grown up with the Cartesian mentality. In the traditional Scholastic view, as the physicist in his laboratory proceeds by experiment, by induction, to arrive at truths which serve him as first principles or starting points in his science, so in acquiring all first principles man proceeds by an induction from experience of individual facts. We learn all first principles for all sciences, including the principle of contradiction for metaphysics, from experience. Since these principles involve not only simple apprehensions but the formal juncture which transmutes simple apprehensions into a judgment, we must, relying on the principle *nil in intellectu quod non prius aliquomodo in sensibus*,⁶⁷ somewhere find this juncture represented in material being. In this sense, we must find the whole principle, the whole composite, the principle as a complete judgment, in material being; and we must lift the principle out as a whole, as a composite of subject and predicate, of matter and form. If this process is not legitimate at some point, all composites of matter and form would remain radically quite impervious to our understanding; for the juncture which forms into judgments these first principles by which we understand material (and indirectly other) things, cannot be contained in the simple apprehensions in our intellects, since this juncture is *another* act—the judgment. Hence this juncture, and therefore the principle itself, would have to be simply a construct of our minds. This is the sheerest idealism; the principle of contradiction is here not a principle of being, but a principle of intellection only.

As it is, it is bad enough that the only points at which we can intellectually "crack" concrete material being—which is the only being on which our intellects directly open—are such points as the prin-

⁶⁶ "De origine primorum principiorum scientiae," *Gregorianum*, XIV (1933), 153-84. That Aristotle also had based the discovery of first principles on sense experience is brought out by Father Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, S.J., in "The Discovery of First Principles according to Aristotle," *Modern Schoolman*, XXII (1945), 132-43.

⁶⁷ As M. Gilson points out, this is "la formule si souvent citée mais si rarement acceptée dans toute sa rigueur—il n'y a *rien* dans l'entendement qui n'ait été d'abord dans le sens" (*Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance*, p. 200).

ciple of contradiction or other principles, only a little less abstract than this, in our multitude of sciences. It is bad enough that what we in the strictest sense *understand* about beings, what we find in them intellectually permeable, are such things as the principle of contradiction; that the other things we *know* about being we do not *understand*—do not fully possess intellectually—except insofar as we resolve them in terms of such first principles.⁶⁸ For first principles are in the intellectual order very pellucid, but in the real order very thin. A world reduced to the point where everything is seen simply in terms of the principle of contradiction is a somewhat debilitating prospect. But it would be much worse if this and other principles were manufactured as such solely in the intellect instead of being at least rooted as such, as principles, as judgments, in those real things with which man is faced—concrete, material things—and of being derived by the human intellect out of such things.

In the view of St. Thomas, because they are so derived, the question of first principles is the question not alone of the analysis of abstract concepts but of the eduction or induction of the intelligible from matter. Now, in Newman's express view the question is the same. Newman says explicitly at times that things which he calls first principles are strictly conclusions or abstractions from particular experiences.

Thus Newman explains his position in the *Grammar of Assent*:

And so again, as regards *the first principles* expressed in such propositions as "There is a right and a wrong," "a true and a false," "a just and an unjust," "a beautiful and a deformed;" they are abstractions to which we give a notional assent in consequence of our particular experience of qualities in the concrete, to which we give a real assent. . . .

These so-called first principles, I say, are really *conclusions or abstractions from particular experiences*.⁶⁹

In the same work he speaks of induction in this connection by name:

As to the proposition, that there are things existing external to ourselves, this I do consider a *first principle*, and one of universal reception. It is founded on an in-

⁶⁸ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* II-II, q. 47, a. 6 c; *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 3 ad 3m; etc.

⁶⁹ Pp. 64-65; italics mine. For Newman's distinction between "notional" and "real" apprehension and assent, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 9-12 ff.; and Sylvester P. Juergens, S.M., *Newman on the Psychology of Faith in the Individual* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1928), pp. 19-96.

instinct; I so call it, because the brute creation possesses it. This instinct is directed towards individual phenomena, one by one, and has nothing of the character of a generalization; and, since it exists in brutes, the gift of reason is not a condition of its existence, and it may justly be considered an instinct in man also. What the human mind does is what brutes cannot do, viz. to draw from our ever-recurring experiences of its testimony in particulars a general proposition, and, because this instinct or intuition acts whenever the phenomena of sense present themselves, to lay down in broad terms, *by an inductive process*, the great aphorism, that there is an external world, and that all the phenomena of sense proceed from it.⁷⁰

The sovereignty of law in nature is a first principle learned by experience:

As to causation in the second sense (viz. an ordinary succession of antecedents and consequents, or what is called the Order of Nature), when so explained, it falls under the doctrine of general laws; and of this I proceed to make mention, as *another first principle or notion, derived by us from experience*. . . . By natural law I mean the fact that things happen uniformly according to certain circumstances, and not without them and at random; that is, that they happen in an order. . . . For instance, the motion of a stone falling freely, of a projectile, and of a planet, may be generalized as one and the same property, in each of them, of the particles of matter; and this generalization loses its character of hypothesis and becomes a probability, in proportion as we have reason for thinking on other grounds that the particles of all matter really move and act towards each other in one certain way in relation to space and time, and not in half a dozen ways; that is, that nature acts by uniform laws. And thus we advance to the general notion or first principle of the sovereignty of law throughout the universe.⁷¹

Newman's discussion of first principles, as these are spoken of here, is not technically philosophical or complete, but the origin of some of the things he calls first principles out of material, singular, concrete facts is plainly one of the things which attracts his interest. In places, it is true, he uses the term "first principles" for things to which he apparently—at least on first examination—does not ascribe such an origin.⁷² Moreover, Newman's enumeration of those starting points of reasoning which are reached by the help of induction would not perhaps correspond exactly with St. Thomas' enumeration. But that Newman does assign some such inductively achieved truths as starting points for reasoning is sufficient here; for we are interested only in

⁷⁰ Pp. 61-62; italics mine.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-70; italics mine.

⁷² Cf. *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England* (4th ed.; London: Burns, Oates, and Co., [no date]), p. 287.

showing that his concern with first principles articulates with that concern over the departure of the intellect from the material which characterizes the *Essay on Development*. It is not necessary to elaborate Newman's views in their entirety—if, indeed, they would bear detailed elaboration.

It is significant, however, that, quite in accord with Father Hoenen's report on St. Thomas, Newman goes as far as he does. For in this sense he goes the whole way: refusing to confine the sort of views just cited to the principles of natural sciences, he does not hesitate to base even real metaphysical principles, such as that of causality, on experience. In the long letter mentioned earlier, which terminates his correspondence with William Froude and reviews his own lifelong position, quoting from his *University Sermons*, from the *Grammar of Assent*, and from the *Essay on Development*, Newman insists that his basic philosophical and theological position has always been closer to individual, concrete facts than Froude understands it to be. The principle of causation, in Newman's mind, is not a deduction or an "intuitive" truth unrelated to experience; it is learned from induction. Newman quotes himself: "It is to me a perplexity that grave authors seem to enunciate as an intuitive truth, that everything must have a cause." And again: "The notion of causation is one of the first lessons which we learn from experience."⁷³

His remarks on development and on first principles are not the only evidence of Newman's absorbing interest in the connection of human intellection with material reality. This interest shows in his prepossession with the concrete,⁷⁴ in what has been called by Father Przywara and others his "British realism,"⁷⁵ in his distinction between real and notional apprehension,⁷⁶ in his crying down the universal in favor of the particular,⁷⁷ and in his discussion of an "illative" sense

⁷³ Harper, *Cardinal Newman and William Froude, F.R.S.: A Correspondence*, p. 200.

⁷⁴ "Of these two modes of apprehending proposition, notional and real, real is the stronger; I mean by stronger the more vivid and forcible. It is so to be accounted for the very reason that it is concerned with what is either real or is taken for real; for intellectual ideas cannot compete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts" (*Grammar of Assent*, pp. 11-12).

⁷⁵ "St. Augustine and the Modern World," *A Monument to St. Augustine*, pp. 281-82.

⁷⁶ *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 9-12.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 278-81. Too much should not be made of this—too much has already been made of it—as an "anti-Scholastic" position. A dosing against too impetuous an

or faculty which is concerned with conclusions as they start from a material, singular, basis and terminate in singular, concrete, things.⁷⁸ The bent of mind in evidence here articulates with Newman's interest in the practical,⁷⁹ which has always to do with the singular; and the same bent of mind is not unconnected even with Newman's proclivity for the patristic rhetorical tradition, which has always been so prominent in English thought, as against the Scholastic logical tradition.⁸⁰ For the rhetorical cast of mind is sensitive always to the practical, and hence to the singular, the concrete; so much so that, as has recently been pointed out, this cast of mind was operative to a surprising degree in Francis Bacon's scientific approach, which, with its empiriological bearings, had definite relations with the patristic tradition.⁸¹

enthusiasm for universals had been administered with good results many a time before Newman's day. Aristotle had administered such a dosing to Platonism, and many a medieval Scholastic would have been healthier for a little of the same medicine.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 353 ff.

⁷⁹ His works all show this bent. Of these works the *Grammar of Assent* is the most theoretical, and yet in this work we find: "In this Essay I treat of propositions only in their bearing upon concrete matter" (p. 7). When Newman theorized, it was likely to be about practical things.

⁸⁰ Butler's thinking, which influenced Newman so strongly and which Newman associates with the patristic tradition (*Apologia*, p. 128), is generally recognized as typically and basically ethical and practical. The examples in terms of which Butler argues are quite often not universal, scientific judgments, but prudential judgments terminating in the singular: e.g., the sun will rise tomorrow, it will not appear square, etc. (*Analogy*, pp. 83-86). Although Father Przywara sees Butler as a link connecting Newman with the Scholastic tradition, it is perhaps easier to see him, as Newman himself did (*Apologia*, pp. 127-29), as a link connecting Newman with the rhetorical tradition of the early fathers. This tradition is recognizable not only in Newman's association of Butler's analogies with the patristic "economies," but also in Butler's ethical bias, which preserves his thought from possible embarrassment over the rudimentary condition of his philosophy, and in a tendency to *ad hoc* or even *ad hominem* argumentation rather than to detailed positive explanation. Moreover, while Origen supplies something of the germ of Butler's thesis in the *Analogy* (see *Analogy*, p. 86), Butler, so far as I have observed, makes no reference in the book to any medieval Scholastic writer. Butler's opposition to the monomethodological mind of men like Hume, it might be remarked, seems connected with the strength of the patristic rhetorical tradition in his thought. There are advantages as well as disadvantages in the ascientific attitude which this tradition encourages; for, although the scientific mind does not of itself produce the futile craving for a universal method of procedure valid in all fields of inquiry, it is in the scientific mind that this craving most easily arises as a vice.

⁸¹ This is discussed in an unpublished St. Louis University doctoral dissertation by Maurice B. McNamee, S.J.

THE POSITIVIST MIND AND FIRST PRINCIPLES

Since his great intellectual foe was the anti-dogmatic mind, the mind whose bent is ordinarily diagnosed as "materialistic," it may seem strange that Newman himself should have turned to ways of thinking which so heavily underscore the connections of human intellection with the material world. What is the reason for this strange homeopathy?

The reason must be sought in a deeper understanding of the mind commonly characterized as "materialistic." In the anti-dogmatic (materialist, positivist) scientist of his day, Newman was faced with a type of mind which can be found in every age, but which was in his age particularly common because of the growth of the physical and mathematical sciences. This is basically the type of mind which has disciplined itself so thoroughly in one method of induction that it can brook no other method. The limitation of such a mind lies in its stunted capability of rising from the material to the intelligible.

This difficulty shows up particularly in the matter of first principles. The intellect establishes inductions at various levels of intelligibility in different fashions. The physicist acquires his principles, his starting points for his conclusions, from long laboratory experiments. His principles are manifold: they have not even yet been discovered in their entirety. Because their principles are so manifold, the physical sciences fan out into countless branches and sub-branches: electro-physics, biodynamics, physical chemistry, histology, cytology, and so on. The metaphysician, on the other hand, acquires such principles as the principle of contradiction in a much simpler fashion: the factual basis for the principle of contradiction is to be found on every hand in reality. The factual basis for the principles which govern the deposit and electrical conductivity of thin metallic films at various temperatures is not, on the other hand, to be found except in a very few laboratories. These are typical principles of the sort which concern physicists. For our present purpose, we can pass by the mathematician, who establishes his principles by a still different process, peculiarly his own.

But every type of reasoning has to have some principles; it has to start with some inductions. Even if, as in physics, it starts very often with only hypotheses, mere probabilities, these themselves, insofar

as they are even remotely probable, are incipient inductive processes—processes as yet imperfect, indeed, but processes unmistakably on the road to inductions: not singular facts but incipient ascents out of singular matter, if as yet only tentative ascents.

The way of making inductions varies greatly, and the way is learned in the very making of the induction itself. Just as man becomes aware of himself only as he knows something else, so the intellect here perfects itself by doing. Here is the primary contact of the scientific mind with reality: it learns how to deal with reality by dealing with it. Here is man simply acting according to his intellectual nature. Induction is a knack the mind has, a knack which it cannot fully explain because it lies at the base of explanation.

The trouble comes when the mind gets such a strong feeling for the knack of making certain kinds of induction that it becomes unsatisfied with other kinds. This is the typical state of the positivist mind, which finds itself ill at ease outside the laboratory.⁸² And yet, any laboratory method is *a* method just as much as any other methods are. The physicist has his points of departure just as anyone else has. Currently, it has become fashionable to point out that physics yields no real results from its experiments, that there are no “laws,” only averages and probabilities. But this is only a subterfuge. Even a probability is a result, a law of a sort; it is certainly not a “fact.” What is more, we have here even a predictable subterfuge; physics, being a science closer to matter, less abstract, less intellectually satisfying, is bound to deal in probabilities more than metaphysics does, just as ethics deals more in probabilities, for a similar, although not quite the same, reason.

The disease of the positivist mind is that, while it uses all along a method of rising from the singular fact to the universal—be this only the probable—a method of departing from matter, it tries at the same time to deny that it uses any such method at all, or indeed that

⁸² “The arguments by which the prerogatives of the Blessed Virgin are proved may be scorned as insufficient by mechanicians, but in fact they are beyond their comprehension, and I claim for theologians that equitable concession that they know their own business better than others do which you claim for mechanical philosophers. *Cuique in arte sua credendum*. . . I have long thought your great men in science to be open to the charge of superciliousness, and I will never indulge them in it” (Letter of Newman to William Froude in Harper, *Cardinal Newman and William Froude, F.R.S.: A Correspondence*, p. 206).

any such method is ever necessary. This denial, of course, effectively scotches any attempt to use other methods. If the positivist physicist can say he considers only facts—which is sheer self-deception—he can very well ridicule the metaphysician. For the metaphysician plainly gets away from facts. Since he deals with the more abstract, it is harder for him to pretend that he does not get away from them. The trouble is that the positivist physicist gets away from facts, too. And so does the mathematician, more evidently even than the physicist. The ridicule is all based on a hoax.

But Newman was faced with it. His long-drawn-out struggle can be viewed in close focus within the correspondence between himself and William Froude. Froude, who developed from a young Oxford mathematician whose papers were a little beyond the depths of the junior dons into the great pioneer in the science of hydrodynamics, can stand as a type of the nineteenth-century mind which Newman was trying to bring to an "enlargement of vision." From Newman's entrance into the Church in 1845 until Froude died in 1879, still not won to the Faith, the correspondence went on. Froude is uniformly the physicist insisting on his science's findings, his science's inductions, and the manner in which these are continually kept close to fact.⁸³

In Newman's highly significant final letter, already cited, the rough draft of which lay unfinished when news came of Froude's death, the cardinal-elect patiently and discerningly insists that this kind of discussion does not find the point at issue:

My first and lasting impression is that in first principles we agree together more than you allow; and this is a difficulty in my meeting you, that I am not sure you know what I hold and what I don't; otherwise why should [you] insist so strongly on points which I maintain as strongly as you?

Thus you insist very strongly on knowledge mainly depending upon the experience of facts, as if I denied it; whereas, as a general truth and when experience is attainable, I hold it more fully than you. I say "more fully," because, whereas you hold that "to *select*, square, and to fit together materials which experience has supplied is the very function of the intellect," I should [not] allow the intellect to select, but only to estimate them.⁸⁴

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 200. The bracketed material is supplied by Dr. Harper; Newman's letter never got beyond rough draft.

Newman's analysis is here wonderfully penetrating. The positivist does not take *all* the facts; he selects only some. And his selection is determined, consciously or not, by the goal he has set for himself, which is a limited goal.

Froude had made the typical mistake here. He had mistaken *a* use of facts for *the* use of facts; he had the knack of using them as the physicist does. And because it was a knack, because this knack, nothing else than a way of making an induction, was so basic a process, so elemental an item in the life of the intellect, that it could not very well be described in terms more elemental than itself, he took it for granted that it went with the facts themselves and that his particular method must always accompany the use of facts. In doing this, he, consciously or not, discards whole worlds of reality which do not fit in with his method. When he saw Newman employing another method, he took it for granted that Newman was denying to facts the kind of primacy which they should enjoy.

But Newman was, as he himself explains, only denying that facts were synonymous with Froude's method of using them. For the hydrodynamics engineer was *using* facts as truly as anyone else. He had set himself toward a goal, and he was scraping together the facts which would get him to it. This is a valid procedure for science—indeed, the only procedure possible. The scientist must know in advance whether he is gathering facts for biological or chemical or physical purposes. A random agglomeration of objectives will get him nowhere. This means that there must be selection of facts. Newman was only saying that when we are seeking to present a complete overview of reality, we have no warrant for arbitrary selection: "I should not allow the intellect to select, but only to estimate them." Although Froude's habitual exploitation of facts for the ends of physical science was a particular use determined by a particular objective, he should have seen that, with other objectives in mind, one could make facts yield additional truths.

It is quite accurate to diagnose a mind like Froude's as materialistic, if this is understood to mean that such a mind habitually restricts its operations to the levels of physical and mathematical abstractions, which lie closer to matter than the level of metaphysical science, and

and that such a mind is violently constraining itself to avoid even that elementary metaphysical abstraction which is a normal activity of every healthy human intellect. But it is an inaccurate diagnosis leading to a fatal prescription to maintain that such a "materialistic" mind pays too close attention to material being and makes too little of the powers of man's mind. The result of this diagnosis is to insist that the materialist put aside material being and devote himself to higher things.

This is fatal because it presupposes that man's intellectual life is divorced completely from the material. As a matter of fact, it is not, although it is quite true that intellection as such is characteristic of the spiritual component of man. One cannot put aside material reality and hope to gather understanding of the powers of one's own intellect. To suppose that this is possible is to spread between intellect and matter the chaos which can never in any manner be traversed, and thus to make more plausible than ever the materialist's self-satisfaction over his own state of mind. If the disjunction between the spiritual and the material is a complete dichotomy, it is impossible to move from material facts into the spiritual or to use the spiritual to evaluate the material world. You begin in either one place or the other, and there is no crossing. The materialist is thus convinced more than ever that his materialistic world is self-contained. There may be another, he will say, but he is satisfied with his own world and will stay there.

Such diagnoses as this have been attempted by well-meaning Catholics. In effect, they have only succeeded in reducing the opposition between materialism and the Church to the opposition between materialism and idealism. The Catholic cause in the modern world thus tends to become one with the cause of minor logic: save the syllogism and you save all. Nothing could be more confusing than this misleading relic of eighteenth-century rationalism. Newman was aware of its existence and of its dangers: "Non in dialectica," he liked to quote from St. Ambrose, "complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum."⁸⁵

The diagnosis which Newman's procedure implies is more discerning and promising. The materialist is not at fault for paying too close

⁸⁵ *Apologia*, p. 264. Newman also uses this quotation as the title-page motto for his *Grammar of Assent*.

attention to material things. He pays too restricted an attention to them. He does not notice the half of what is in them. He finds in them answers to his questions, but he fails to notice the other questions which material things raise. Since the human intellect begins with the material world, from which it gets all the knowledge that it naturally acquires, the natural cure for the positivist or materialist mind is for it to examine material things more closely. The materialist's world—the material world as the materialist explains it—is not self-contained at all; for the very reality to which his explanations refer raises questions, as it provides answers, at a level beyond that of physics and mathematics.

Only if the materialist can be brought to return out of his physics and his mathematics to the realm of real and unselected fact, is there much hope for him. For here in the concrete world is where the types of thinking which he affects to despise also begin: with the *fact* of a one manifest in a many, with the *fact* of a being and a non-being, with the *fact* of a good and an evil. The materialist needs practice in attempting new kinds of inductions which are based on new kinds of intuitions. Thus he needs to be brought back to the point at which the intelligible rises out of the material, not that he may remain at the material level but that he may employ material reality as a springboard and leap to a higher plane than the one on which he habitually moves. There is no other springboard of which the natural powers of the human mind can avail themselves. Man must begin from singular facts if he is to rise by his intellect to the level of abstraction where he can see the force of the rational proofs for God's existence. Even if he has well in hand the sciences built on mathematical abstraction, they will themselves do him little good. He must go back to the facts again if he would rise to another level. The facts are the springboard. He must return to them if he would rise.

Its practice of performing only certain types of induction not only conditions the positivist mind against metaphysics and the approach to God by natural reason, but also in a peculiar fashion conditions it against those movements by which it should come, under grace, to the possession of supernatural truth. The rule that man's intellect must start from material reality and proceed by inductions, if it is to possess truth, is applicable not only to the natural sciences, but also, in a

limited and special way, to the supernatural possession of truth by the light of faith. The rule applies in this sense: the establishing of the existence of revelation, which is the ordinary preamble by which the adult mind approaches under the influence of the Holy Spirit to the act of faith, in many ways does not so much resemble a process of ratiocination—a movement which is initiated and carried through at one abstract level—as it does an induction, a movement initiated on the concrete plane.

This is, of course, not to say that the establishing of the existence of revelation is not reasonable; rather the contrary. It would be reasonable even were the parallel with induction much closer than it really is; for induction is eminently reasonable. Without induction no reasoning is possible, and it is the start of the ratiocinative process. Moreover, we know that the act of faith is an intellectual assent, and that among the steps which precede the assent of faith there are intellectual processes. But of all the things which the intellect does, ratiocination is the least perfect, and, it must be said, the least characteristic of intellect as intellect. God and the angels do not reason. A reasoned conclusion has no certainty of its own apart from that of its premises. And its premises are ultimately based on the simple intuition which is the proper work of intellect as intellect. For man, this simple intuition is best represented in the inductive process. It is hardly necessary to note that in comparing the *praeambula fidei* to an induction, we are not comparing them to a *congeries probabilium*; for an induction is not such a *congeries* but an operation of the intellect which intuits a universal concept or a universal judgment because the sense faculties have provided it with sufficiently numerous instances to make possible the intuition of a universal.

The parallel between the inductive process and the steps which, under grace, precede the act of faith (in the adult convert) is of course not exact. Unlike a real induction, this process leads to a singular: "God has revealed." But it does suggest an induction in that it is a process leading to a higher level of intelligibility: beyond this preliminary term, which asserts, "God has revealed," lies Truth at a higher level than man could otherwise reach. And if all the understanding and science which man has naturally is based on induction, on ascent out of singular material things, what is more likely than that

in His providence, when He comes to give a higher understanding to man, God should go about it by a process which in some way parallels the natural? This is the ordinary order of divine providence which we have learned to expect.

And thus we find that, as in a real induction, the mind being brought to the assent of faith travels a road where, at least frequently, it considers separate instances of things attesting to revelation. The steps which it takes involve the balancing and sifting of a complex of evidence, the educing of a truth from a body of separate concrete facts, each one of which, somewhat as in an induction, reflects light on the other.

This loose but informative parallel works out, for instance, in the matter of the use of human testimony, which is certainly a quite characteristic item in the *praeambula fidei*. Human testimony, as St. Thomas points out,⁸⁶ does not of itself lead directly to certitude. But human testimony comes to us in the form of various facts, various instances of people testifying. If we can gather enough of these facts, enough separate instances of persons testifying, enough instances of their testifying to something without collusion, so that their statements are independent of one another and are really different testimonies, there comes a time, often very shortly, when the accumulation of individual facts will enable us to arrive at certain truth. The number of individual facts (individual testimonies, or even a single instance of testimony combined with other individual facts) will vary with different matters; more complex matter will require more separate evidence to control the coefficient of error. A simple physical fact like the Resurrection or certain other miracles will not require so much.

This process is, of course, unlike a strict induction in that it arrives at a truth from a consideration of singular instances which are operating already at an intelligible and not merely at a sense level; but it is also like a real induction in that it operates by a consideration of singular instances which, in the economy of divine providence, are ordered

⁸⁶ *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 70, a. 2 ad 1m; "Quantacumque multitudo testium determinaretur, posset quandoque testimonium esse iniquum, cum scriptum sit Ex. xxiii, vers. 2: *Non sequeris turbam ad faciendum malum. Nec tamen quia non potest in talibus infallibilis certitudo haberi, debet negligi certitudo quae probabiliter haberi potest per duos, vel per tres testes, ut dictum est.*"

to intellection at a higher level of intelligibility than that of the singular instances themselves—namely, to supernaturally revealed truth. It must be said that the parallel with induction is deficient, too, in that when the supernatural possession of truth comes, it is simply given by God directly and not gathered as the natural fruit of this quasi-inductive process.

Still the parallel carries out in the fashion explained; moreover, it is informative because in an induction it is rather useless to speculate on how best to get results without trying really to work with the matter at hand. It would have been quite foolish for Froude to have attempted to detail the methods of arriving at the laws of hydrodynamics independently of any attempt to work out the laws by experiment with the material in which they operate, and neither he nor any other scientist would even consider attempting such a thing. Rather, they work with their experiments, trying various hypotheses until they finally have an accumulation of material worked up into such order that they can equivalently *see* the law operating. After this they write a report on their methods. But many of the methods are not reported on, because they did not work.

This kind of procedure is characteristic not of reasoning but of inductive processes. And the mind coming, under the workings of grace, to the knowledge of revelation should be in a state somewhat similar to that of the mind making an induction. It cannot lay down the conditions on which it will receive revelation, any more than Froude could lay down the conditions on which he would arrive at the laws of hydrodynamics.⁸⁷ The mind must hunt for indications which will give it clues to how to understand a given bit of evidence, and how to conduct its very investigation. It can write its report after it achieves its goal, not before. We must, therefore, under grace, acquire the familiarity with the things of God which will enable us to work out the methods of dealing with them. Newman was acutely aware of this fact, and this is why he insists explicitly on interior preparation.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ "Men are too well inclined to sit at home, instead of stirring themselves to inquire whether a revelation has been given; they expect its evidences to come to them without their trouble; they act, not as suppliants, but as judges" (*Grammar of Assent*, p. 425).

⁸⁸ "You do not meditate, and therefore you are not impressed" (*Parochial and Plain Sermons* [London: Rivingtons, 1875], VI, 41; cf. these sermons *passim* and also *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 414-15, 117-18).

Newman's interiority, his "ontologism," lies within this frame. There is hardly much room for "interior preparation" in the manipulation of a syllogism, which proceeds the same way in the science of biology as it does in geometry or anywhere else. But there is great need of interior preparation in the intellectual management of concrete facts. Thinking in this vein, Newman makes the point that the man who has more facts on hand to lead him to suspect the likelihood and the nature of revelation can recognize revelation, when it takes place, more readily than the man who has never even begun to look for indications of what revelation, if it takes place, might turn out to be.⁸⁹ A parallel with the laboratory offers itself again: the technician who already has a fund of probable knowledge concerning a chemical can come to a certain and full knowledge of its reactions with the same experiments and exactly the same results which leave the novice, who has had no probable knowledge whatsoever, only uncertain and bewildered.

Newman's interiority here is, of course, complicated by the fact that some of the evidence for the likelihood, and even for the probable nature, of revelation is to be gathered from the problems which one experiences in one's own interior moral life.⁹⁰

In the last analysis, the difficulty of the positivist mind, in so far as we can regard this difficulty while prescinding from the question of grace, is resolvable in terms of the origin of first principles. The fact that the positivist mind, in conditioning itself to certain ways of rising out of the material, has also conditioned itself against other ways, means that it has artificially stunted its operations by restricting the first principles with which it operates. Man should not so fall in love with his limited achievements as to think that there are no others. The condition in which the positivist mind here finds itself stands in the way of its acceptance of dogma or supernatural mystery, and it stands in the way even if the two preliminary hurdles—proof from reason of the existence of God and proof of revelation—are somehow cleared;

⁸⁹ Cf. *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 422-23, 425-26. "Those who know nothing of the wounds of the soul, are not led to deal with the question, or to consider its circumstances; but when our attention is roused, then the more steadily we dwell upon it, the more probable does it seem that a revelation has been or will be given to us" (*Ibid.*, p. 423).

⁹⁰ That is, from the knowledge "of our own extreme misery and need" (*Grammar of Assent*, p. 423; cf. pp. 423-25).

for the dogmas of faith are first principles. They are first principles in the sense that they are not proved or provable in themselves, although they are indeed incontestable, arrived at legitimately—the process of getting at them can be justified—and in the sense that they do not depend on other truths but other truths on them. They differ from other first principles in the sense that they are not educed from material things but simply *per se* supplied us by God. This is to say that, unlike other first principles, they are not understandable, but are mysteries.

As the positivist mind has the knack, the “feel,” for only certain kinds of induction, so it has the “feel” for only certain kinds of first principles. The more resilient mentality can rebound from its impact with reality to the various levels of being, and, while it cannot achieve of its own power the mysteries of faith, still it is used to a variety of levels, and it is thus not so surprised, not so ill at ease, at the possibility of a still higher level than those to which it naturally attains. The positivist mind is more unsettled by such a possibility; for it seeks to restrict the levels of abstraction. If it is thereby antagonistic to the first principles of metaphysics, it is not strange that it will a fortiori be antagonistic to the first principles of a still higher knowledge, or that, if it admits the truths of revelation, it will deny them the character of first principles and will seek to kill off the science of theology because theology insists on taking them as such.⁹¹

It becomes evident at this point that his insistence on the value of a liberal education is integral to Newman’s opposition to the anti-dogmatic mind of his age.⁹² For by a general enlargement of mind, by a familiarity with principles educed at various levels from matter—a familiarity which is acquired by allowing the mind to range at large over the entire field of being—man is saved from the cramping which pinches the positivist outlook on life. It is not necessary to comment on the fact that Newman’s view here coincides with the practical policy, learned by experience, which governs the view of the Church and which has kept the ideal of a liberal education, *ceteris paribus*, so much more alive among Catholics than among others in the modern world. We find a source of melancholy in the fact that the pursuit of

⁹¹ Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I, q. 1, a 2 c.

⁹² Cf. *The Idea of a University* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), pp. 124–25.

exact and accurate knowledge through the mathematical and physical sciences wreaks havoc, *per accidens* but so regularly, in the individual mind. But we must face the facts. In this life even the pursuit of truth needs positive controls to be free of vices.

NEWMAN AND HEGEL

Finally, the conclusion that the *Essay on Development* is a particular manifestation of Newman's more radical opposition to the anti-Christian elements of his age is confirmed by a juxtaposition of the *Essay on Development* with the work of Hegel. A comparison between Newman and Hegel is too tempting an enterprise not to have been undertaken already,⁹³ and here we need only consider the comparison under one important aspect. This will throw some light on the meaning of the fact that Newman's most significant break with his milieu occurred in connection with a question of development.

No one was more intimately permeated with the idealistic temper of the world which Newman knew than Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel found himself the custodian of substantially the same view of reality which Newman encountered in his Protestant friends, the custodian of that Idea which had been the great depository of European thought ever since Descartes.⁹⁴ Hegel felt the movements of that Idea as it was brought into contact with the particular questions rising to the surface of the intellectual ferment in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century world. And, strangely enough, as he anxiously watched the legacy he was guarding, the Idea bequeathed to him by Descartes, Kant, and Schelling, at the very beginning of his career Hegel came to the conclusion that the weakness of this Idea was precisely its want of a mechanism of development. He says so explicitly in the first pages of *The Phenomenology of Mind*,⁹⁵ and, true to this

⁹³ By Guitton, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92, 141 ff., and *passim*; by Przywara in "St. Augustine and the Modern World," *A Monument to St. Augustine*, pp. 283-86.

⁹⁴ Cf. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* and *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance*.

⁹⁵ Of the Idea of Schelling and his school Hegel says: "The Idea, which by itself is no doubt the truth, really never gets any farther than just where it began, as long as the development of it consists in nothing else than such a repetition of the same formula" (*The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. by J. B. Baillie [2d ed. rev.; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1931], p. 78; cf. pp. 67-130).

prognosis set down in the book which was to be the preface to his entire work, Hegel's whole philosophy of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is an effort to remedy this defect.

Thus Hegel, who died fourteen years before the *Essay on Development* came into being, diagnoses as the weakness of the idealistic tradition the very point at which Newman in the *Essay on Development* makes his decisive break with the current of thought which he found prevalent in his world. We have Newman's exhaustive account of his own thought in the *Apologia*, as well as the thought itself directly displayed in his voluminous works; and it is clear that he owes little if anything of his own impressions directly to Hegel.⁹⁶ The fact that nevertheless in the *Essay on Development* he finds and exploits in his enemy's lines the same weakness which had given Hegel so much concern confirms the conclusion that the *Essay on Development* is basically directed against the same elemental turns of thought which lay at the base of the idealistic tradition guarded by Hegel.

If at first sight this analysis seems discredited by the fact that with the positivists, who were not idealists but materialists, Newman's differences seem as radical as with the idealists themselves, the discrediting is only apparent; for at root the idealist and the materialist make the same error. They try to reduce to simplicity what is not simple: a world, and a corresponding mode of cognizing, which is radically bipolar. The idealist seeks to establish a simplicity by making everything Form, Mind, the Idea. The materialist seeks to establish simplicity by making everything Matter. In either event, the point at which human intellection departs from the material (insofar as it can) is the crucial point; for it is the point at which the

⁹⁶ Could Newman have derived from Hegel through Möhler, who is mentioned in the *Essay on Development*, p. 29? M. A. Minon in "L'Attitude de Jean-Adam Möhler (1796-1838) dans la question du développement du dogme," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, XVI (1939), 365, points out that "Möhler voit en Hegel un panthéiste qui divinise l'esprit humain et ne laisse, par ailleurs, aucune place à l'immortalité personnelle. Toutefois, il n'y a pas que du mal chez Hegel. Möhler trouve que la conception hégélienne de l'histoire, de l'esprit absolu se matérialisant, se réalisant et prenant peu à peu conscience de lui-même, est une idée féconde." But the same author who discovers this relation between Möhler and Hegel discovers also that Newman does not find his inspiration in Möhler, whose notions on development are quite inferior to Newman's (*ibid.*, pp. 377-78). The same conclusion is reached by Henry Tristram in "J. A. Moehler et J. H. Newman: La pensée allemande et la renaissance catholique en Angleterre," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XXVII (1938), 184-204.

division underlying a dualistic world leaps most readily to the eye. Here the roads divide. The idealist goes his way saying that there is nothing but Mind; the positivist goes his, insisting that there is plainly no Mind but only Matter. And at the same point of the departure of the intelligible from the material, the realist—who earns his name primarily by facing facts—retains his self-possession and his humility under the stress of the intellectual concupiscence which seeks the questionable satisfaction of simplification even where simplification is impossible. He observes that if there are two basic components of the world, the best thing to do is to admit it.

Newman in effect does just this. And in putting his finger on the point where the intelligible emerges from the material, he finds the radical difference which divides both the idealist and the positivist from himself. If the idealist and the positivist are also opposed to one another, the opposition is of relatively little moment. They are agreed on a basic point, which is that there is only one component of reality. This seems to be the only point of genuine concern to either; for the idealist and the materialist or positivist grow up side by side, and they have always got along together pretty well.

CONCLUSION

Thus the *Essay on Development*, studied in its larger historical and philosophical setting, reveals these general facts. First, the book itself is for the most part a particular manifestation of Newman's radical opposition to the anti-Christian elements of his age, an opposition which is one facet of the whole Church's general opposition to the same elements. Secondly, Newman's stand in the *Essay on Development* is at root a demand for a view of reality which takes better account of the material component in human intellection. In this sense, the *Essay on Development* shows how Newman's religious struggle with his age and his philosophical struggle with it are one and the same thing. For, although it is carried on in theological territory, the dispute which the *Essay on Development* signalizes is conducted as a philosophical rather than as a theological dispute, as an attack on an error which is not primarily theological,⁹⁷ but which runs through

⁹⁷ Cf. Byrne, "The Notion of Doctrinal Development in the Anglican Writings of J. H. Newman," *Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses*, XIV (1937), 285, where it is noted that Newman's "ideas" (of Christianity, etc.), at least in his Anglican writings, are not

any monistic—idealistic or materialistic—explanation of reality, an error brought to bay by Newman at the point where the intelligible rises out of the material.

That this is the point to which Newman's argument comes in the *Essay on Development* is confirmed by several characteristic features of Newman's thought, viewed not only as it stands in this book, but as a whole. To turn to such larger features of his thought is legitimate because this thought forms a well-defined unity, which is consistent with itself and to which the *Essay on Development* makes an important contribution. In the light of this fact, once we have identified an argument as basic in the *Essay on Development*, it will strengthen our identification to find the argument in evidence elsewhere in Newman's works. The argument which we have identified is in constant evidence.

Viewing Newman's thought as a whole, we find three important characteristics: (1) he persistently demanded a reconsideration of the nature of first principles; (2) he differed violently with the positivist tradition; and (3) he broke most decisively with the entire intellectual tradition in which he had operated, over a question of development. All these facts reveal the same opposition which the analysis here proposed finds at the root of the argument of the *Essay on Development*—an opposition to a faulty reporting of the origins of human intellection out of material being. First, quite as St. Thomas Aquinas had done before him, Newman reduces the question of first principles directly to a question of the origin of the intelligible out of material being. Secondly, his persistent opposition to the positivist-materialist mind manifests itself as a quarrel over first principles, and thus as a quarrel over the origin of the intelligible out of the material. And thirdly, the very fact that the *Essay on Development* stands where it does in Newman's own intellectual odyssey—the very fact that at the point at which he parted definitively with a whole mode of thought characteristic of his age, there stands a dispute over the question of *development*—reveals again the same disagreement over the question of the connection between the intelligible and the material. For a dispute over the question of development had become highly significant in the nineteenth-century intellectual world. No less a personage

"objects of faith." The whole question of natural and supernatural is simply by-passed by Newman in the *Essay on Development*; see p. 35, where, in effect, he enters his disclaimer.

than Hegel had pointed out how awkward a business it was to have both the Idea⁹⁸ handed down from Schelling and development at the same time. In defending the sort of development which he defended Newman in effect came to blows with the idealistic tradition. And the idealistic tradition is defined by its peculiar notions concerning the intelligible and matter. This last is the same quarrel over again.

In the present study, only the broad outlines of an interpretation have been attempted, with sufficient detail from Newman to substantiate the outline so far as it goes. This procedure has seemed justified prior to a handling of details, as a method of avoiding endless quibbles. Despite the eulogies of his clear style, Newman's thought, to one pursuing it closely, seems often to defy his powers of expression, so that it is difficult, if not at times impossible, to pull together everything that he says on any one subject into an absolutely satisfying whole. To examine the details of Newman's relation to Butler (an extremely important consideration) and the details of Newman's and Butler's analogies between the natural and the supernatural in connection with St. Thomas or with the "economies" of the Greek Fathers; to take up everything that Newman says about development and about first principles and to integrate it all with those things discussed here; to detail the relationship, here only roughly sketched, between Newman's thought and Hegel's—whether such studies may prove worth while is matter for further investigation.

⁹⁸ Newman's persistent use of the term "idea" (in all sorts of senses) is to some extent, perhaps, Hegelian—the mark which the world he lived in and struggled against left on his mind.