

THE INDWELLING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT ACCORDING TO M. J. SCHEEBEN

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THE introduction of the Aristotelian metaphysic into thirteenth-century Catholic theology was a revolutionary movement. Whether or not it is true that Aristotelianism is related to Catholic theology as nature to super-nature,¹ it was certainly with the adoption of that philosophical system that for the first time ground was cleared for a distinction between the natural and supernatural orders. Nevertheless, for all its exactness, the very rigor, perhaps, of the new terminology presented obstacles to the adequate expression of supernatural truths; for example, the word *forma* was used by the Scholastics almost exclusively in the sense of *forma inhaerens*. Yet, as Thomasinus has proved,² it had often been used by the Fathers to describe the indwelling of the divine Persons in the soul—where certainly there is no question of *forma inhaerens*. As Galtier has said,³ it would be presumptuous to suppose that the categories and causes of the philosophical system are absolutely exhaustive and descriptive of all reality.

The invasion of Aristotelianism was at least partially responsible for the reluctance of theologians to allow the Holy Spirit any formal causality in sanctification. Though the fact of the indwelling is admitted by all medieval theologians, yet St. Thomas alone speaks clearly of the type of causality to be avoided in describing it: “. . . non autem in ratione formae inhaerentis.”⁴ Moreover, opposition to Peter Lombard—whom St. Thomas soundly refuted for maintaining no distinction between the Holy Spirit and charity—kept theologians far from attributing formal causality to the uncreated grace of the Trinity.⁵

¹ C. M. Schmaus, “Die Stellung Scheebens in der Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts,” *Matthias Joseph Scheeben, der Erneuerer katholischer Glaubenswissenschaft* (Mainz: Grünewald, 1935), p. 32 f. This work will be referred to hereafter as *Erneuerer*.

² *Dogmata Theologica: De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*, III, c. 17. For examples of the word *forma* in the Fathers, cf. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 26 (PG, XXXII, 180), and Petavius, *Opus de Theologicis Dogmatibus: De Trinitate* (Venetiis, 1745), V, c. 5, n. 14.

³ *L'Habitation en nous des trois Personnes* (Paris, 1928), p. 218.

⁴ *In I Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 5 sol.

⁵ Cf. Scheeben, *Dogmatik*, III, n. 836; St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1 sol.

When, years later, the Fathers at Trent defined that created grace is the sole formal cause of justification, many theologians considered the matter closed. In fact, Ripalda branded Lessius' contrary opinion as close to the heresy of Luther.⁶ Few theologians today, however, stand with Ripalda.⁷ Outside the orthodox faith, Luther, Baius, Jansenius, and the Quietists—however different their doctrines—all held one thing in common: that there was an infinite gulf between God and the soul.⁸ Any doctrine, then, which espoused an intimate and formal union between them, could, with such errors abroad in Europe, expect but a hostile reception.

These are some of the external reasons why theologians raised such an outcry when Petavius published the first three volumes of *Theologica Dogmata* in 1644.⁹ The main intrinsic reasons why his doctrine was rejected and buried in oblivion until it was resuscitated a hundred years ago by Passaglia and Schrader, were his teaching of the exclu-

⁶ *De Ente Supernaturali*, VI, disp. 132, n. 127; *ibid.*, n. 94 f.

⁷ Cf. Franzelin, *Tractatus de Deo Trino* (ed. 3a; Romae, 1881), thes. 43, p. 636; Lange, *De Gratia* (Freiburg i. Br., 1929), n. 455; Pesch, *Praelectiones Dogmaticae* (ed. 4a; Freiburg i. Br., 1914), II, n. 677; Galtier, *De SS. Trinitate* (Paris, 1933), n. 413. At the very time when Th. Granderath was inveighing against the theory of Lessius, Kleutgen himself (*Die Theologie der Vorzeit*, II, 379 ff.) refuted Ripalda.

⁸ Cf. E. Mersch, *Le Corps mystique du Christ* (Paris, 1936), II, 255 ff, 319 ff. While the Nominalists held God and man to be two extremes in the same genus (*Ens perfectissimum: ens imperfectissimum*), St. Thomas went outside the series of created beings to find God. Through the analogy of proper proportionality, God is seen to be all-perfect; yet man, in his own sphere, is also "perfect." Luther, consciously or otherwise, followed the Nominalists. Hence, the idea of man as *ens imperfectissimum* in the ontological order had its equivalent in the moral order in man's inability to do aught but sin. In this connection, cf. Mersch, *loc. cit.*; M. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris, 1931), pp. 40, 93 ff.

⁹ For an excellent survey of Petavius, cf. J. Turmel, "Quelques hommes éminents de l'église de France," *Revue du clergé*, XXIX (1902), 161–80, 372–88; cf. J. C. Chatelain, *Le Père Denis Petau d'Orléans* (Paris, 1884); C. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus* (Paris, 1895), IV, 1726–51. For Petavius' doctrine on the indwelling, cf. *De Trinitate*, VIII, c. 4 ff.

¹⁰ Cf. A. Eröss, "Die persönliche Verbindung mit der Dreifaltigkeit: Die Lehre über die Einwohnung des Hl. Geistes bei M. J. Scheeben," *Scholastik*, XI (1936), 382. Th. de Régnon (*Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité* [Paris, 1892], IV, 527) and J. Mahé ("La sanctification d'après s. Cyrille d'Alexandrie," *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, X [1909], 471 ff.) show that substantial union, as the ordinary meaning of *ἕνωσις οὐσιώδης*, was alien to Cyril's thought and that, while he spoke of a presence that was *οὐσιώδης*, he did not speak of a union that would be an *ἕνωσις οὐσιώδης*. Hence, the rejection of Petavius by the generality of theologians.

sively proper union with the Holy Spirit, and his leap from the fact of the substantial presence to substantial union.¹⁰ However, as Galtier points out,¹¹ to admit the substantial indwelling is not the same as to admit Petavius' theory; for Petavius holds an exclusively proper union—a theory to be rejected indeed. Nevertheless, the fact of the substantial union remains and calls for a solution.

With Vasquez' dynamic theory of the indwelling,¹² with Suarez' so-called "friendship" theory,¹³ and with the experimental-knowledge solution of John of St. Thomas,¹⁴ Scheeben was quite familiar; and of these men, Suarez exerted a particularly profound influence upon him. Among others, Lessius, Thomassinus, and Cornelius à Lapide were his masters in many points. A cardinal point in Scheeben's doctrine was Lessius' distinction between grace as a bare physical entity and as a divinely constituted bond between God and the soul.¹⁵ He adopted bodily the contention of Thomassinus that, according to the Fathers, formal sanctification is wrought, not only by the created element, but also by uncreated grace,¹⁶ as well as the affirmation that the Holy Spirit as the bond of union between the Father and the Son, is also the point of entrance for the soul to a share in the inner trinitarian life and the point of exit for trinitarian life *ad extra*.¹⁷ But of all the Scholastics, à Lapide, perhaps, influenced Scheeben most. Though not a dogmatic theologian, à Lapide had distinguished clearly between accidental sanctification and that "substantial" sanctification which is effected through the indwelling Trinity; of the former sanctification, created grace, and of the latter, the Holy Spirit (by appropriation) is the formal cause.¹⁸

¹¹ *L'Habitation*, p. 22.

¹² *Commentaria ac Disputationes in S. Thomae Summam Theol.* (Lugduni, 1620), In Im, disp. 30, c. 3.

¹³ *De Trinitate*, XII, c. 5; *De Gratia*, VII, c. 11.

¹⁴ *Cursus Theologicus* (Paris, 1886), In I. q. 43, disp. 17, a. 3, n. 4 ff.

¹⁵ *Opuscula: De Summo Bono*, II, disp. 1, n. 4; cf. *ibid.*: *De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis*, XII, c. 11 and appendix.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, VI, c. 10 ff.; cf. St. Augustine, *Epist.* 232 (*PL*, XXXII, 1028).

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁸ For the best exposition of à Lapide's doctrine, cf. his *Commentaria in Scripturam Sacram* on Osee 1:10 and II Peter 1:4; cf. also his commentary on John 14:23; Acts 2:3; Rom. 5:5; 8:15.

THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF SCHEEBEN

In 1852, when Scheeben began his studies at Rome at the age of seventeen, Passaglia and Schrader were still teaching, and both held the exclusively proper union with the Holy Spirit.¹⁹ By 1857 Franzelin and Cercià had succeeded to their posts. As Cercià did not stress the union of the soul with the Holy Spirit, it was Franzelin who exercised the greatest influence upon Scheeben.²⁰

Another important part in Scheeben's theological formation was played by Kleutgen.²¹ He it was, as Grabmann shows,²² who brought to the German theological consciousness the old Scholastic doctrine regarding the essence and worth of the supernatural. Scheeben, in his first dogmatic work, *Natur und Gnade*, had utterly rejected Petavius, and attention was called to this fact in a review.²³ Kleutgen, eager to see the twenty-six-year-old scholar develop the doctrine of the inhabitation further, wrote him an encouraging letter, which spurred him to further research. In *Die Herrlichkeiten der göttlichen Gnade* Scheeben thought that he had at last satisfied Kleutgen. But this was not the case. Finally, with the publication of *Die Mysterien des Christentums*, in 1865, he was sure that now even Kleutgen must rest content.²⁴

Scheeben's definitive position was reached by an extensive and profound study of the Greek Fathers.²⁵ He had also steeped himself in the writings of the great Scholastics,²⁶ and was very keen on "understanding St. Thomas through St. Thomas."²⁷

¹⁹ Cf. H. Schauff, "Die Lehre von der Einwohnung des Hl. Geistes bei Karl Passaglia und Klemens Schrader," *Matthias Joseph Scheeben* (Rome, 1935), pp. 35 ff.

²⁰ Cf. Eröss, "Die Herrlichkeiten der göttlichen Gnade," *ibid.*, p. 94; cf. Cercià, *De Gratia Christi* (Paris, 1879), III, 25; M. Grabmann, "Scheebens theologisches Lebenswerk," Introduction to *Natur und Gnade* (Munich, 1922), p. 8. Franzelin devotes seven theses (42-48) to this subject.

²¹ Schmaus, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40; cf. F. König, "De M. J. Scheeben," *Matthias Joseph Scheeben*, p. 7.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

²³ The review appeared in *Tübingen Quartalschrift*, XLIV (1862), 3-49.

²⁴ Cf. Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 374.

²⁵ Cf. Scheeben, "Die Controverse über die Formalursache der Kindschaft Gottes," *Der Katholik*, LXIV (1884, I), 20.

²⁶ Cf. *Dogmatik*, III, n. 791, for a sample list of readings from the great Scholastics.

²⁷ G. Fritz, "Scheeben," *DTC*, XIV, 1272; cf. A. du Pont, "La théologie catholique en Allemagne," *Rev. des sc. ecclés.*, XXXVII (1878), 71 f.; Grabmann, "Matthias Joseph

One noted writer, while claiming that Scheeben was a theologian "chez qui la science du dogme parle allemand et parle catholique,"²⁸ and while acknowledging the uncommon depth, the fresh outlook, and the vast erudition of the Cologne professor, yet maintains that he had some opinions that were "subtiles et hasardées."²⁹ Unquestionably, his opponents will stoutly maintain that among these subtle and venturesome opinions is to be ranked his doctrine on the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit.

That the inhabitation is a live issue in modern scientific Catholic theology is to be expected. For, as Scheeben maintains,³⁰ the purpose of the Incarnation, the revelation of the Trinity, and the whole of our Christian economy look to union with the three divine Persons as to their final goal.

In his doctrine on this subject Scheeben has been called an extremist, one who does violence to solidly established metaphysical principles, to Scripture, and to the Fathers. Yet, a not uncritical scholar writes of him: "Utinam omnibus adesset iste sensus vere catholicus."³¹ Another critic admires his patristic learning and his great respect for traditional doctrine.³² Perhaps some of the opposition arises because, to understand him, "une grande application d'esprit, une étude persévérante" are required.³³ Whatever one may think of his doctrine, he is called by Grabmann the greatest dogmatic theologian of the nineteenth century and may not be passed over lightly.³⁴

Scheeben Asuffassung vom Wesen und Wert der theologischen Wissenschaft," *Erneuerer*, p. 61.

²⁸ J. Bellamy, *La théologie catholique au XIX^e siècle* (2e éd.; Paris, 1904), pp. 169, XXXI.

²⁹ *Loc. cit.*

³⁰ *Die Herrlichkeiten der göttlichen Gnade* (Freiburg i. Br., 1885), I, 86 (cf. St. Augustine: "Deus factus est homo, ut homo fieret Deus" [*Sermo*, 13 de tempore]); *Mysterien*, p. 136; *Dogmatik*, II, n. 1089 f. The statement of Lebreton (*Histoire du dogme de la Trinité*, II, 340) is interesting: "Dans les textes dont nous disposons, ces relations du Fils et de l'Esprit ne se manifestent à nous que dans la sanctification des Chrétiens." Cf. F. Prat, *La théologie de s. Paul*, (14e éd.; Paris, 1929), II, 157 ff.

³¹ L. Janssens, *Summa Theologica* (Rome, 1919), III, n. 2. Relying on over eighteen centuries of Catholic thought, Scheeben was almost impervious to the rationalistic tendencies of the age: "Er ist immer immun gegen den Einfluss des Zeitgeistes" (F. X. Münch, "Zur Einführung," *Erneuerer*, p. 11).

³² R. M. Martin in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, VI (1912), 830.

³³ Du Pont, *art. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

³⁴ "Scheeben ist der grösster Dogmatiker des 19. Jahrhunderts" (*Erneuerer*, p. 59).

SCHEEBEN AND HIS CRITICS

Among Scheeben's critics, some reject his doctrine on the inhabitation because on a priori grounds they believe that no middle position is possible between Petavius' theory and the theory of pure appropriation.³⁵ Others do so because of a remark made by Hurter in an unguarded moment, which links Scheeben with Petavius, Thomassinus, à Lapide, Passaglia, Schrader, Matignon, and Borgianelli, as holding the Petavian theory.³⁶ Hurter says merely that Jovene cites these theologians in support of his (Jovene's) own theory. In our opinion, Hurter was too thorough a scholar to believe that à Lapide, for instance, held the same doctrine as Petavius; for à Lapide says: "Nota hic gratiam et adoptionem, eiusque operationes et effectus, licet communes sint SS. Trinitati, appropriari tamen Spiritui Sancto. . . ."³⁷ One who writes thus cannot be classed with Petavius. Among the theologians who base their rejection of Scheeben on Hurter's remark are Lercher,³⁸ Beraza,³⁹ and Pohle-Gierens.⁴⁰

Again, Hervé speaks as if Scheeben did not hold that with respect to the *term*, inhabitation does belong to the three Persons.⁴¹ Boyer states that according to Scheeben, "a proper and more immediate possession must be attributed to the third Person."⁴² Lange, usually reliable, says that Scheeben looks upon the inhabitation as a gift almost independent of grace.⁴³

A writer who exerts a wide influence over present day theological thought upon the inhabitation of uncreated grace in the justified soul is Père Galtier, S.J. He considers that Scheeben, in opposition to Petavius, who taught a "special union," holds the doctrine of a "special giving" of the Holy Spirit to the just soul.⁴⁴ With Eröss,⁴⁵ we do not believe Scheeben held this, but that Petavius held both.

Again, Galtier finds it strange that "a special aptitude for being

³⁵ Cf. Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 386.

³⁶ *Theologiae Dogmaticae Compendium* (Oeniponte, 1893), III, n. 201.

³⁷ In his commentary on Rom. 8: 15.

³⁸ *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae* (ed. 2a; Innsbruck, 1934), III, n. 629.

³⁹ *Tractatus de Gratia Christi* (ed. 2a; Bilbao, 1929), p. 1780.

⁴⁰ Cf. Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 394 note.

⁴¹ *Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae* (Paris, 1929), III, n. 55 *nota*.

⁴² *Tractatus de Gratia Divina* (Romae, 1938), p. 190.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, n. 444.

⁴⁴ *L'Habitation*, p. 97 ff.

⁴⁵ *Art. cit.*, p. 375.

given to us" should be recognized in the Holy Spirit.⁴⁶ Yet Franzelin, a firm believer in pure appropriation, held this very same opinion.⁴⁷ Furthermore, in bringing forth against Scheeben one of his most unfavorable statements,⁴⁸ Galtier mistranslates him.^{48a} And it is largely upon this particular citation that Galtier's refutation of Scheeben rests.

To Scheeben's so-called "moral" union, moreover, Galtier gives a juridical meaning, and therefore necessarily relegates it to an act of the will, which must, obviously, be common in every respect to all three Persons.⁴⁹

At the risk of appearing to belabor one man, we point out the following—seemingly erroneous—reasoning in Galtier's refutation of Scheeben. From the fact that the Son willed the Incarnation equally with the Father and Holy Spirit, Galtier concludes that the Father and the Son could not give us the Holy Spirit without at the same time giving us Themselves.⁵⁰ The conclusion is false; for it would follow only that the Father and the Son could not give us the Holy Spirit without the Holy Spirit's also giving us Himself; not, however, that Father and Son would necessarily have to give us Themselves.

Our last point is the crux of the whole problem: Is the mode of the inhabitation under every respect the same, or is it in some way different for each divine Person? Galtier maintains that de Régnon's—and also Scheeben's—error lies in concluding from the fact of each Person's coming "into" the soul with His special, hypostatic character, that each exercises a special influence in the just soul. "Influence," to Galtier, can only mean efficient causality, an action.⁵¹ And, since all

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, thes. 43, p. 636; thes. 46, p. 648; thes. 47, p. 653.

⁴⁸ *Mysterien*, p. 158. Scheeben's original reads: "... so dass die übrigen göttlichen Personen jenes Wesen in dieser bestimmten Beziehung nicht unmittelbar, sondern nur in ihm besitzen. . . ."

^{48a} *Op. cit.*, p. 101 ff. Galtier translates thus: "Les autres Personnes n'auraient point avec cet être cette même relation et ne le posséderaient pas immédiatement (comme lui); elles ne posséderaient qu'en lui. . . ." (p. 104; italics ours). But Scheeben had said, "in dieser bestimmten Beziehung," i.e., "in [or under] this definite relation [or aspect]." It should be obvious that this adverbial phrase ought not to be translated as the object of a verb. Scheeben's meaning will be shown later in this article.

⁴⁹ *L'Habitation*, p. 106 ff.; cf. *id.*, *De SS. Trinitate*, n. 431, where Galtier says that this moral union "consists in an act of the will"—a thought quite alien to Scheeben.

⁵⁰ *L'Habitation*, p. 116.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123: "Qui dit influence, en effet, dit *action* au dehors ou ne dit rien" (italics ours).

actions *ad extra* are common in every respect to the entire Trinity, the mode of inhabitation is also common in every respect.

Galtier overlooks the fact that, whereas, for example, the divine processions do not enter formally into creation (they are rather presupposed), on the contrary, under the form of quasi-formal causality, they and their eternal products can at least be conceived as entering formally into the grace-life. This will be an "influence," a formal communication of the divine being (of course, in a finite manner, from the side of the recipient soul); but it will not be an action. It will be a union, a *tractio* of the just soul into trinitarian life. Although it is indeed presupposed, efficient causality, an "action," formally has nothing to do with such an "influence" of the divine Persons; for efficient causality does not enter formally into any union.

But, apart from the question whether this influence be efficient or formal causality, Galtier's metaphysical position will not allow him to admit any proper influence of a divine Person in the just soul; for this would be, for him, an *opus ad extra*. Hence, even in the Incarnation, he denies that the Word, precisely as distinct from Father and Holy Spirit, communicates anything intrinsically to His sacred humanity. This is but a like example of the *extrinsécisme* of Galtier. Though, indeed, he holds that the divine Persons exercise some kind of formal causality, yet he cannot do so logically. For, if formal causality means anything, it surely means intrinsic causality—giving being intrinsically to the subject which receives the actuation from the act. Hence, we hold with Lange that Galtier, despite verbal protestations to the contrary, simply develops the position held by Vasquez.⁵²

Just as in Galtier's metaphysics of the hypostatic union there is extreme difficulty in finding a sufficient reason for the humanity's terminating at the Person of the Word and at Him alone, so, too, in his metaphysics of the inhabitation there is extreme difficulty in finding a truly sufficient reason for our possessing intrinsically the three distinct Persons. Like many others, he seemingly forgets that all the newness of the inhabitation is in the just soul, in which, therefore, there must be something which accounts for the presence of three distinct Persons, whereas in the unjustified soul there is but one God.

⁵² *Op. cit.*, n. 453 nota.

We have dwelt at length upon Galtier's position because in many circles his work on the inhabitation is looked upon as definitive.⁵³ Without wishing to detract in the least from his contribution, nevertheless, with d'Alès,⁵⁴ we believe that the problem is far from being completely solved.

Though we do not follow Scheeben in everything, still, in setting forth his doctrine, we are not discussing a theory which it would be rash for a theologian to hold.⁵⁵ Theologians who have really read and understood Scheeben have attested to his orthodoxy. Perhaps, then, it was not without reason that Scheeben himself took for his motto the saying of St. Jerome: "Doceo quod didici, non a me ipso pessimo praeceptore, sed ab illustribus ecclesiae viris."⁵⁶

SCHEEBEN'S DOCTRINE ON THE TRINITY

Christianity, Scheeben tells us,⁵⁷ is built on mysteries; it deals with the inner life of God made manifest to men. As the very name indicates, Christianity is founded on the Trinity; for its Originator is the God-Man, the Word made Flesh. And just as the one God is the summit of purely philosophical speculation, so, too, the triune God is the proper height to which the science of theology must ascend. Around the Trinity all revolves; from It are to flow all Christian mysteries of faith.⁵⁸ Especially is this true of the mystery of grace, through which we are introduced into, and made sharers of, trinitarian life.

As the Nicene Creed suggests, the substratum of the Trinity of Persons in God is the unity of essence: "Credo in unum Deum." In the midst of trinitarian life there reigns absolute unity; for the divine

⁵³ Cf. e.g., E. Measure, "La révélation du mystère de la Sainte Trinité et de l'habitation du Saint-Esprit dans nos âmes," *Revue apologetique*, XLVII (1928), p. 165.

⁵⁴ In his review of Galtier's *L'Habitation*, P. d'Alès concludes thus: "Le dernier mot est-il dit sur les relations de l'âme juste avec les trois personnes divines? Nous ne le croyons pas" (*RSR*, XVIII [1928], 525).

⁵⁵ B. Froget, *De l'habitation du Saint-Esprit dans les âmes justes* (4e éd.; Paris, 1900) and E. Hugon, *Le mystère de la très sainte Trinité* (5e éd.; Paris, 1925), p. 283. It is true that Froget and Hugon are speaking only of the Petavian theory. But since, unfortunately and erroneously, Scheeben has been classed with Petavius, the same censure would logically be applied to him.

⁵⁶ Cf. the title page of Scheeben's *Natur und Gnade*.

⁵⁷ *Mysterien*, p. 1 ff.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 123; cf. *Natur und Gnade*, p. 329 ff.

nature is one in all three Persons, and these same three Persons are one God—*una quaedam summa res*—with the essence from which They are not really distinct. As Scheeben well puts it, the passing over of the essence from one Person to another brings no division or separability; rather, the essence can pass over from one Person to another only through the latter Person's entering into relation with the communicating Person. One Person cannot proceed from another without being bound to the other in unity of essence.⁵⁹

Again, the first principle in the Trinity, the first possessor of the divine essence is one; and the difference of Persons proceeds precisely from this one Person. This difference but accentuates the unity of essence. For the Persons can be distinct only in that They are one in essence; for the distinction is had only by the communication of the one, indivisible, and absolutely equal essence which all three Persons possess in Their own relative manner.⁶⁰ In the striking language of Nicholas of Cusa, "the plurality of these three realities is a plurality which is unity; and their unity is a unity which is plurality."

The origin of Person from Person in the Trinity is an inner origin; i.e., the Persons proceeding do not leave Their principle but remain intimately united with Him. Each Person possesses the divine essence only to be communicated to another or as possessed by way of communication. Hence, in a real sense, each becomes the central and focal point of the entire Trinity. A cardinal point in Scheeben's theory of the inhabitation is that each Person is distinguished only in the manner in which He possesses the one, common, divine essence. And this He possesses in Himself and for Himself, but only insofar as He, at the same time, possesses it from or for another Person—from others from whom He receives, or for others to whom He gives, this same divine nature.⁶¹

Scheeben's view of the Trinity was based upon the conception of the Greek Fathers. It is hardly sufficient merely to state—as some authors do⁶² and there let the matter rest—that the Greek Fathers considered the divine Persons *in recto* and the essence *in obliquo*,

⁵⁹ *Mysterien*, p. 109 f.; cf. *Dogmatik*, II, n. 844.

⁶⁰ *Dogmatik*, II, n. 706 f.; cf. Cusa, *La vision de Dieu*, traduit par R. Vansteenbergh (Louvain, 1925), p. 79. St. Thomas has the same doctrine in *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 7, c, et ad lm.

⁶¹ *Mysterien*, p. 75.

⁶² E.g., Pesch, *op. cit.*, II, n. 511.

whereas the Latins considered the Trinity in the reverse order. Since Scheeben himself claims that upon the different ways of conceiving the Trinity depends largely the emphasis of the Greek personal concept of the indwelling and especially the personal role of the Holy Spirit,⁶³ the following aspect of the Greek trinitarian conception should be pointed out.

The Greek idea of the trinitarian processions took on a horizontal aspect, so to speak. Scheeben says that this idea, as opposed to the Latin point of view, may be called an organic view of the Trinity. The two productions of generation and passive spiration take on the appearance of a continuous movement in a direct, lateral line. The second procession proceeds from the first and is united with it in an intimate, essential, and living cohesion. The result is that not only does the second procession presuppose the first, but the first also virtually contains the second, strives towards it, and in it finds completion.

In fact, Scheeben holds, the Greek Fathers considered the trinitarian productions as a movement by which the divinity passes from Father to Son, from Son to Holy Spirit, and thus, as it were, passes through the Son. Hence, to clarify their thought, they made use of such analogies from organic nature as show the production of one thing through another—those of the root, the trunk, and the flower; of the spring, the stream, and the river; of the light, the brilliance, and the resultant rays. The procession of the Holy Spirit was looked upon as taking place through the intermediary of the Son. For this reason, the Holy Spirit is looked upon as the complement of the Trinity, as it were, the boundary, the limit, the conclusion of trinitarian life.⁶⁴ And, as the Son is the “intermediary” for the procession of the Holy Spirit, in analogous fashion, the Holy Spirit will be the “intermediary” for the indwelling of the Son and the Father in the just soul.

THE REVELATION OF THE BLESSED TRINITY

While it is true that the Creed begins: “Credo in unum Deum,” yet, as E. Masure brings out,⁶⁵ in the New Dispensation our knowledge of the one God is gained through the three divine Persons, especially

⁶³ *Dogmatik*, II, n. 685.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 877 ff.

⁶⁵ *Art. cit.*, pp. 165–66.

through the Son, who, by revealing Himself to men, reveals His Father and Their common Spirit of Love.

Any study, then, of the inhabitation of uncreated grace within the soul must consider the external revelation of the Trinity. For Scheeben, there are two ways in which the Trinity reveals Itself to men: (1) by subjective and logical revelation, made by the revelation through the Son and Holy Spirit to the Apostles, (2) objective and real revelation, made by the fact that the three divine Persons, with Their mutual distinctions, actually enter into the world of creatures.⁶⁶

As Scheeben explains,⁶⁷ the Trinity of Persons as such cannot proceed formally *ad extra* in virtue of Its activity and efficient causality; for in this case it is the one, not formally the triune, God who produces the effect. It is Scheeben's intent, not to contradict St. Thomas, who holds that in creation the order of the processions is maintained,⁶⁸ but to contend (like St. Thomas) that the Trinity does not create formally as distinct Persons. An external manifestation of the Persons as such can take place only when each reveals *ad extra* something (not through efficient causality) which is in some way proper to Him alone.

If outward works are ascribed to individual Persons, this can be only by appropriation—by ascribing to an individual Person an effect common to the entire Trinity, on account of a resemblance between the effect and the hypostatic character of the divine Person in question. Such appropriations are helpful in bringing out more clearly the logical and subjective revelation of the Trinity had by faith alone. However, real revelation, by the actual entrance of the Trinity as such into the outer world, is not had by mere efficient causality and its accompanying appropriation.⁶⁹

According to Scheeben, the trinitarian relations can be manifested *ad extra* in two ways: (1) through extension and continuation (“durch Ausdehnung und Fortführung”) and (2) through imitation and repro-

⁶⁶ *Mysterien*, p. 128; Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 371.

⁶⁷ *Dogmatik*, II, n. 1039; *Mysterien*, p. 124; cf. Petavius, *op. cit.*, VIII, c. 5, n. 16.

⁶⁸ *In I Sent.*, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2 sol.; d. 13, q. 1, a. 1; cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I q. 45, a. 6c. Cf. Th. Granderath, “Zur Controverse über den Formalgrund der Gotteskindschaft,” *ZKT*, VII (1883), 509; *id.*, “Philosophisch-theologische Erwägungen über den Formalgrund der Gotteskindschaft,” *ibid.*, p. 627.

⁶⁹ *Dogmatik*, II, n. 1065; *Mysterien*, p. 128.

duction ("durch Nachahmung und Reproduction") of the divine, inner, trinitarian relations. The first ("durch Ausdehnung und Fortführung") takes place when a divine Person as such, in His proper personal character, goes forth from God, and, in this going forth, preserves that same relation to the other Persons, or, so to speak, takes with Him *ad extra* what He had in the interior of the Godhead.

The second type of real or objective revelation ("durch Nachahmung und Reproduction") occurs when God establishes a creature in a relation to Himself similar to that which the divine Persons have to one another, so that the inner trinitarian processions and their products are imitated in the creature, and there, so to speak, continued in miniature and finite facsimile.⁷⁰

The essence of trinitarian life consists in a twofold communication and threefold possession of the one divine essence. In order, then, that a true externalization of these may take place, a communication of the divine essence must be established in the soul. The creature will thus be made to share in the natural generation of the Word and in the love of the Holy Spirit. And all this will be by an imitated similarity in the soul.⁷¹

This was discussed by Scheeben even in his earliest works.⁷² In our regeneration, he saw the "imitation" (*Nachahmung*) of God; he visualized the divine processions as its ideal. The "copying" (*Nachbildung*) of God is in our divine knowledge and love. Even here the Person of the Holy Spirit stands forth prominently. But—and this is to be borne in mind—there is question here only of appropriation; for the Holy Spirit is but a representative of the copied excellence of God, which is included in His personal property as in its model.

Though Scheeben maintains with St. Thomas that our generation unto adopted sonship is modelled upon the natural generation of the Son of God, he nevertheless holds with the same Angelic Doctor that, in a real sense, the relation of the Holy Spirit enters more immediately into our regeneration than does the relation of the Son. For the com-

⁷⁰ *Dogmatik*, II, n. 1057; *Mysterien*, p. 138.

⁷¹ *Dogmatik*, II, n. 654 ff.; *Mysterien*, p. 131.

⁷² "Die übernatürliche Geheimnisse des Christentums," *Der Katholik*, XLI (1861, I), 269; *Die Herrlichkeiten*, II, 97; cf. Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 383.

munication of the divine nature takes place by way of love, not, as in the case of the natural Son of God, by natural generation.⁷³

And, while it be true that without the first procession the second is unthinkable, still, in a measure, the second contains the first and affords the motive for the imitation *ad extra* of the natural generation of the Son. In this light, the procession of the Holy Spirit becomes, so to speak, the conductor for the passing over of the relation of generation *ad extra* ("der Conductor für die Ueberleitung des ersten nach Aussen in die Creatur"). This is true, Scheeben holds, because the communication of the divine nature from Father through Son by way of generation can find the way open for communication to creatures only in the further communication of the nature to the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, then, as the result of the unity of Father and Son, appears as the intermediary effecting the union of God with creature, which union is an imitation of this relation.⁷⁴ We shall see later how Scheeben understands this much controverted word, "intermediary" (*Vermittler*), as applied to the Holy Spirit.

Scheeben holds, then, that our grace-life is modelled upon the eternal, divine relations; yet this divine exemplary Cause is not a remote cause; rather, the Trinity Itself inserts, so to speak, Its very roots into the just soul and there accomplishes this sublime work of exemplarism. Moreover, wonderful as this is, the Scriptures and Fathers use expressions which beyond doubt express much more than a simple imitation based on the divine exemplar; these sources speak of an actual coming of the three, distinct, divine Persons into the soul. To grasp this, one must consider Scheeben's doctrine of the divine missions because of which the second and third Persons of the Trinity dwell in the soul along with the Father who sends Them.

THE DIVINE MISSIONS AND SANCTIFICATION

Scheeben remarks that according to all theologians, the missions *ad extra* of the two divine Persons are a temporal externalization of

⁷³ *Mysterien*, p. 136; cf. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3m; *De Ver.*, q. 27, a. 1 c. With regard to our divine adoption, cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theol.*, II, pars 1, inquis. 4, tr. 3, q. 3, tit. 1, c. 3, a. 1 (ed. Quaracchi, 1930; II, n. 509); St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 29; *Breviloquium*, V, c. 1.

⁷⁴ "Und so erscheint der hl. Geist, wie als des Resultat der Einheit von Vater und Sohn, so als die Vermittler des diesem Verhältnisse nachgebildeten Einheit Gottes mit der Creatur" (*Mysterien*, p. 138).

the eternal processions and their products from within the Trinity to the world of souls. The importance of an understanding of the divine missions can hardly be exaggerated. Lange⁷⁵ and Franzelin,⁷⁶ for example, teach that the role of uncreated grace is most important in justification. And uncreated grace is received precisely through the missions.

With St. Thomas,⁷⁷ all theologians teach that a divine mission includes two elements: the divine procession itself, and an effect in a rational creature according to which the divine Person is said to be sent, and which gives rise to a new relation to God. It will depend upon the nature of the effect whether it may be said that the Person in question, i.e., in His divine and proper hypostatic character, is introduced and introduces Himself into the creature as a Person proceeding from, and distinct from, the other divine Person or Persons who send Him. Scheeben maintains that, if efficient causality only is involved in the origin of this new effect, the Person sent is sent, not properly, but only by appropriation.

This new mode of presence must be owing to a change in the creature, for no change can take place in God.⁷⁸ Since in works of pure efficient causality the divine Persons produce the effect as one indistinct principle, efficient causality cannot give rise to a mission properly so called. For, according to Scheeben, a true mission means that the divine Person comes precisely as distinct from the Sender. The product of the activity which effects the mission is the introduction, the entrance into the soul, of the distinct Person who is sent; it is that *being of the sent Person in the creature* ("Göttlichen-sein")—such a being as is in some way not common with the Sender, but proper to the Person sent.⁷⁹ This effect will be, not a mere created effect detached from the Person, so to speak, as a gift derived from Him, but a flowing forth of trinitarian life itself, as it were, in its original trinitarian channel.⁸⁰

This aspect of mission, though its metaphysical analysis is not developed by Scheeben, may be conceived as the created passive reception

⁷⁵ *Op. cit.*, n. 455; cf. Pesch, *op. cit.*, II, n. 676; V, n. 342.

⁷⁶ *Op. cit.*, thes. 43, p. 636.

⁷⁷ *In I Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1.

⁷⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 14 ff.; *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 43; *C. Gent.*, IV, 17-23; *De Ver.*, q. 27; *De Pot.*, q. 10; *Quodl.*, XI, q. 1.

⁷⁹ *Mysterien*, p. 143 ff.; *Dogmatik*, II, nn. 1059, 1065 ff.

⁸⁰ *Mysterien*, p. 143 ff.

into the creature of a distinct, divine Person, like the passive reception of the expressing seal in plastic wax. But not from an inanimate seal does this created assimilation of the soul come, Scheeben tells us,⁸¹ but it is the result of a living process. For by this passive reception of the divine Persons into the soul, we are initiated into the very life of God. To repeat: the material seal, after making its impression, can be thought of as being removed from immediate contact with the object it impresses; but the divine Seal of the Persons cannot be thus considered. For the impressed likeness on the soul has reality only from, and in, the divine Persons who impress this seal by substantial contact and by a permanent impressing communication of Their being. For all its feebleness, the only comparison would be that of a seal impressed in a fluid or plastic substance: the impression lasts while the seal is actually impressed; with its removal, all influence on the liquid body utterly ceases.⁸²

Scheeben maintains that the two aspects of the divine missions—assimilation through grace to, and actual presence of, distinct, divine Persons—are only logically distinct. They combine to form component parts of the one complete mission. The assimilation, i.e., the created imitation of the eternal relations, is possible only through union with the three divine Persons, and leads to it.⁸³ The Holy Spirit is sent by Father and Son, and through Him we are immediately united with Them.

UNCREATED GRACE AND OUR SANCTIFICATION

Not all theologians will admit that the indwelling can in some way be proper to the Holy Spirit. For instance, Joret observed that in the indwelling the divine Persons keep their own proper relations by which they are distinguished one from another. All the newness of the indwelling, all the change, is on the side of the creature. We attain union with the Holy Ghost as He has existed from all eternity with the relations which distinguish Him from the other Persons. But it is useless to seek the slightest nuance by which the manner of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit would be different from that of the other

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁸² Cf. de Régnon, *op. cit.*, IV, 484; *Mysterien*, pp. 149–50.

⁸³ *Mysterien*, p. 171 f.

two Persons.⁸⁴ Joret, like Galtier whom he follows, fears that to admit any difference in the mode of indwelling would be to go against the solidly established principle, "Omnia ad extra sunt communia toti Trinitati," and would result in an exclusively proper union with the Holy Spirit.⁸⁵

Before giving in some detail Scheeben's doctrine on the role of uncreated grace in sanctification, let it be clearly noted that Scheeben does not hold, as Petavius did, a union with the Holy Spirit that would be proper to Him alone. Even Galtier concedes that Scheeben holds that the just soul is united with both the Holy Spirit and the Son, and that by a direct union.⁸⁶

THE WESTERN OR SCHOLASTIC VIEW

Without distinguishing between the more common theories, Scheeben simply groups the Western or Latin-Scholastic conception of uncreated grace under two forms. According to the first, God produces in the justified soul a more perfect imitation of His nature than elsewhere in the universe, and must, in virtue of a title connected with this production, draw near to, and remain with, the creature. Clearly this is a combination of the theories of Suarez and Vasquez. It involves merely efficient exemplary causality, and attributes the resultant indwelling to the Holy Spirit through pure appropriation.

The second form of the Western conception asserts that God through grace enables the soul to know and love Him as He is in Himself. Scheeben holds that, underlying both these conceptions, there is not only the concept of an in-working and offering of Himself on the part of God, but also a cohesion of God with the creature. This cohesion is effected by God's gracious giving of Himself through the title contained in created grace. This union is appropriated to the Holy Spirit and is, in complicated Scheebenesque, "a true living-in-one-another of two friends."⁸⁷

⁸⁴ "Les missions divines," *Vie spirituelle*, XXVI (1931), 117 ff.

⁸⁵ An interesting treatment of *opera ad extra* will be found in E. Mersch, "Filii in Filio," *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LXV (1938), 551-92, 681-702, 809-30; cf. F. M. Catherinet, "La Sainte Trinité et notre filiation adoptive," *Vie spirituelle*, XXXIX (1934), 113-28; and *L'Ami du clergé*, XLIX (1932), 294-300.

⁸⁶ *De SS. Trinitate*, n. 417; cf. *Mysterien*, pp. 154, 156; *Dogmatik*, III, n. 859.

⁸⁷ ". . . das von der freundschaftlichen Liebe erstrebte Ineinanderleben der Freunde" (*Dogmatik*, III, n. 825).

In both these conceptions of uncreated grace, the common element is that only efficient exemplary causality is attributed through pure appropriation to the Holy Spirit. It is only created grace inherent in the soul which exercises any formal causality. This was the opinion Scheeben himself held up to 1863, the year he began *Mysterien*. He insists, however, that the fact that Western theologians emphasized the created element in sanctification does not mean that they utterly neglected the grace of the indwelling Trinity; it was precisely because of the difference in thought on the Trinity that the difference in Greek and Latin conceptions of the indwelling appears. And, just as neither doctrine of the Trinity contradicts the other, so, too, neither doctrine on the inhabitation contradicts the other.⁸⁸

THE GREEK CONCEPT

As Scheeben points out,⁸⁹ the Council of Nicaea, in defining the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, used a term (*ὁμοούσιος*: consubstantial) which, among men, designates merely specific unity of substance between father and son. Hence the Arians argued that, although there was specific similarity among the divine Persons, there were, for all that, really three numerically distinct natures.

This gave the Greek Fathers an occasion for showing the similarities and differences of divine and human generation. In the latter, where only a part of the substance of the father—and that a material part—passes over to the son, there is, indeed, specific similarity, but only logical or specific union. In divine generation, on the contrary, the entire, numerically identical substance passes over from Father to Son, the sole difference being that the Father does not possess this substance by way of communication, while the Son does. In both human and divine generation the notion of communication of substance and life from father to son is quite essential.

The resultant unity between Father and Son in God was, for the Greeks, not simply a unity of resemblance or of relationship, as in human persons, but rather a unity of cohesion and inseparability, analogous to that existing among the different parts of a single organic being, such as the body, the arms, and the fingers; and all this with the

⁸⁸ Cf. *supra*, footnote 63, and *ibid.*, n. 860.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, II, n. 685.

most perfect safeguarding of the divine unity.⁹⁰ Hence, the idea of compenetration or organic union of the two Persons in one substance, not of two Persons in two substances—however much specific similarity these substances might enjoy—is essential to the Greek notion of the Father and the Son and of the filiation of the Word of God.

ADOPTIVE SONSHIP AND THE DIVINE FILIATION

Following St. Thomas, all theologians will allow that our adoptive filiation is modelled after the natural filiation of the Son of God. On the one hand, Western theologians deny any formal role to the uncreated grace; the Greeks, on the contrary—because they stressed the element *de principio conjuncto* in the classic definition of generation—saw in our supernatural generation a real, though finite and created, communication of the very substance of God, in such wise that this created communication had its roots, not in the soul, but in the triune God from whom it flowed.⁹¹

Hence the created element has its greatest worth and efficacy precisely as the means of our union with God. For only through this union can the absolutely supernatural character of grace and the idea of a true regeneration unto sonship be established.

This type of “substantial union” between God and the soul—in opposition to substantial or essential unions which proceed naturally from the substance or essence of a being and unite with another substance to form one new composite being—Scheeben calls a moral union. However, he does not mean a merely moral union, such as exists between friends or members of a corporate body and is based on merely external relations or similarity of sentiment. The grace-union is based on something intrinsic to each term of the union—the divine nature: in the divine Persons by way of identity; in the human soul by way of a gracious, gratuitous communication through a created similitude.

Briefly, this union through grace is not *natürlich* (natural, flowing from nature, unto *one* new nature), but *natürhaft* (between natures);

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, III, nn. 843 f., 1028 f.; cf. Thomassinus, *De Trin.*, c. 26.

⁹¹ St. Thomas (*Sum. Theol.*, III, q. 23, a. 3 c) gives the analogy between human and divine adoption; cf. Scheeben, *Natur und Gnade*, p. 130 ff.; à Lapide’s commentary on Osee 1:10; J. Bellamy, “Adoption surnaturelle,” *DTC*, I, 425–37, in which an extensive bibliography is available.

the union is not *wesentlich* (essential, springing from the essence of the being, and resulting in *one* new composite essence), but *wesenhaft* (a union of essences, though not *in unam essentiam vel substantiam*).

This substantial cohesion, insofar as it consists in this, that the substance of one being at least partially belongs to the other being, is called a communion, or community, of substance (*Gemeinschaft der Substanz*), the *κοινωνία* (*communio, participatio*) of the Greeks. Perhaps more accurately, it may be called a *Mitbesitz, μεροχῆ, co-possession*. This will be the co-possession (in a finite, created, and moral manner, in virtue of the created similitude which gives the title *de congruo* to the uncreated grace of the Persons) of the first being (God) by the second being of the union (justified man).⁹²

It will be a moral union, because it is a union of self-existing, independent, spiritual beings, from which one simple being cannot actually spring.⁹³ The inhabitation will involve at the same time a "mutual *habere*," ("wechselseitige *habere* oder Angehören") hence a relation of one substance to the other, whereby the one belongs to the other as dedicated and consecrated to it, i.e., complementing and sanctifying it. This "mutual *habere*," means that the two substances (God and the justified soul) morally constitute and belong to one organic whole.⁹⁴

For Scheeben, therefore, our regeneration as adopted children of God is essentially a generation from God. In material generation there are two phases: (1) the organization of an organic being from the substance of the parents; (2) the infusion of life. The communication of the paternal semen and the union with the maternal ovum all are preparatory. True generation, as such, consists formally in the begetting of a living being of the same species as the parents.⁹⁵ In our generation from God, there is a communication to our souls of the very substance of God; the *semen Dei* of divine life is infused into our souls.

Our divine adoption, then, as modelled after the natural generation

⁹² *Dogmatik*, III, n. 841 ff.

⁹³ *Loc. cit.* Cf. *Natur und Gnade*, p. 145, for Scheeben's concept of a moral union; then contrast the interpretation of Galtier (*L'Habitation*, p. 106 ff.; *De SS. Trinitate*, n. 431), who holds that by "moral" union Scheeben intends that the Holy Spirit exercises a juridical control over the soul by a proper "act of the will."

⁹⁴ *Dogmatik*, III, n. 841 ff.

⁹⁵ *Loc. cit.*; cf. *ibid.*, II, n. 988 ff.; and "Die Controverse, etc.," *Der Katholik*, LXIII (1883, I), 151 ff.

of the Word, takes on the quality of an ingeneration, i.e., a penetration, an insertion of the *semen divinum* into an already existing human soul. But the divine substance, as in the divine generation of the Word, enters "into" the soul, not as a part separated from God, the generating principle, but, while being communicated to the soul through continuous generation, remains absolutely whole, undivided, and proper to God alone.⁹⁶

However, the divine substance, especially on account of its spiritual essence or as a *semen spirituale*, cannot enter into the just soul as a material constituent part. Furthermore, in its communication to the creature, it must remain entirely unchanged. Again, unlike the case of material generation, the co-possession of the divine substance establishes not merely a substantial cohesion between God and the soul but also a substantial likeness of the generated soul with God, its divine Generator. The divine substance constitutes the very essence of eternal generation; but in the generation of adopted children of God, this divine substance, like a life-giving principle and form, is impressed upon and, as it were, breathed into, an existent subject essentially distinct from the divine substance.⁹⁷

To sum up Scheeben's doctrine on our adoptive sonship: The concept of adoptive filiation has these two elements: (1) the begetting of a nature similar to God, our adopting Father; and (2) substantial cohesion with God our Father. Both elements are necessary if our divine adoption is to conform to its model, the natural filiation of the Word. In His sonship, besides similarity to the Father through identity of essence, the element of substantial cohesion enters; there is unity of dignity, life, and love with the Father, not just a resemblance to Him; there is perfect substantial cohesion with the Father. In our sonship, the created accident of grace cannot provide substantial cohesion and the threefold unity of dignity, life, and love; hence the element of substantial cohesion with God must enter in.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ For a development of this idea and an explanation of scriptural texts, cf. *Dogmatik*, III, n. 666 ff.; cf. *Der Katholik*, LXIII (1883, II), 567. The words of St. Thomas are interesting: ". . . considerandum est quomodo illi qui spiritu Dei aguntur, sunt filii Dei. Et hoc est manifestum ex similitudine filiorum carnalium, qui per semen carnale a patre procedentes generantur. Semen autem spirituale a Patre procedens, est Spiritus Sanctus. Et ideo per hoc semen aliqui homines in filios Dei generantur" (*In Rom. VIII*, lect. 1).

⁹⁷ *Dogmatik*, III, n. 844.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 832 ff.

FORMAL CASUALITY: SCHEEBEN VERSUS GRANDERATH

Granderath, who held that generation involved only the production of a similar nature in the son, denied any kind of formal causality to uncreated grace. He maintained that either created grace, as the sole formal cause, gives us perfect adoption, the Holy Spirit merely giving permanence to this state and conferring a new favor that has nothing to do with adoption, and hence not entering into the concept of adoption as a constitutive element (with such an opinion Granderath finds no fault); or else created grace gives an inferior, and uncreated grace a higher, adoption (this opinion Granderath rejects⁹⁹).

Scheeben merely replied that he held neither opinion, though there was some truth in each.¹⁰⁰ Granderath's dilemma would be legitimate, provided that the concept of generation, as that of man, were absolute and indivisible. For Scheeben, generation is a relative and analogous term that allows for greater or less fullness of meaning. As indicated above, it signifies a relation of communion in being and life with God, which is bestowed upon the creature as an imitation and sharing of the same relation in which the natural Son of God stands to God. And all elements which actually determine the perfection of this imitated and participated relation are, not just extrinsically, but also intrinsically, constitutive elements of the full concept of divine adoptive filiation as it actually exists, and without them, the actual relation of adoptive filiation can be conceived or can exist either not at all, or at least not in its presupposed ideal fullness.¹⁰¹

Scheeben held that our divine sonship could be considered in its absolutely essential element or in its further integral and more perfect form. Of the first, the formal cause is created grace; of the second, the quasi-formal cause is the uncreated grace of the indwelling Trinity and proximately the Holy Spirit. Granderath, on the contrary, held that in no sense of the word may the Holy Spirit be called the formal cause of our divine adoption; for this would be against a conclusion following necessarily from Trent.¹⁰² Scheeben pointed out that Trent

⁹⁹ Granderath's articles may be found in *ZKT*, V (1881), 283-319; VII (1883), 491-540, 593-638; VIII (1884), 545-79. With regard to the present subject, cf. especially VII (1883), 506 ff.

¹⁰⁰ *Der Katholik*, LXIII (1883, II), 567.

¹⁰¹ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁰² *ZKT*, V (1881), 298 ff.

merely intended to define that man was justified by an inner renovation, leaving open the question, whether grace is merited *de condigno* of itself, and whether created grace is the sole formal cause, as considered either in its absolutely naked entity, or rather as a bond of union with uncreated grace.¹⁰³

In Scheeben's words, our divine sonship can be conceived in a more complete or less complete sense ("in einem volleren und weniger vollen Sinne"), or—and this is perhaps more intelligible—in an ideal fullness or in a more elementary form ("in idealer Fülle und in einer elementaren Form"). In essential and elementary adoption, the Holy Spirit exercises no formal causality whatsoever. But, if this adoptive sonship be considered in the plenitude of its possible perfection, then the indwelling Holy Spirit enters in as the highest and noblest stage in this full concept of sonship ("das höchste und edelste Moment in dem vollen Begriffe der Kindschaft").¹⁰⁴ For, to repeat, in our divine adoption, besides the analogous similarity (wrought through created grace), there is also substantial cohesion with God (effected by uncreated grace—or by created grace, but only under its relative and essentially unitive aspect as a bond of union between the soul and God).

The idea that there are two stages of adoption is not peculiar to Scheeben. Ripalda himself holds a twofold filiation—one essential and received through created grace, the other in its integral and most complete form received through the divine will.¹⁰⁵ And with Cornelius à Lapide, Scheeben¹⁰⁶ held *verbatim*, though the former held out for appropriation, while Scheeben considered mere appropriation as insufficient. But, from this one must not conclude that Scheeben held, with Petavius, an exclusively proper union with the Holy Spirit.

¹⁰³ *Der Katholik*, LXIII (1883, I), 155. "At Trent there was never any question of putting an end to the free discussion of points and positions on which Catholics disagreed. In general, the decrees of the Council present a pointed answer to the accusations of the Protestants and a clear formulation of Catholic teaching without touching in any way the theories defended in the various Catholic schools since the twelfth century" (E. A. Ryan, "The Importance of the Council of Trent," *American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXI [1944], 423).

¹⁰⁴ *Der Katholik*, LXIII (1883, II), 562.

¹⁰⁶ *Op. cit.*, VI, d. 132, n. 143.

¹⁰⁵ *Loc. cit.*

UNION WITH GOD THROUGH THE HOLY SPIRIT

Arguing from the fact that each divine Person possesses the divine nature in a special manner determined by His hypostatic character, Scheeben concluded that it is also possible for a divine Person to take possession of a creature in such wise that only in and through Him the other divine Persons would possess and inhabit this creature. This happened in the Incarnation. From this Scheeben argues that it would be possible for the Holy Spirit to possess a creature through a less perfect and moral possession—through an *ένωσις σχετική* in contrast to a *φυσική και ύποστατική*, i.e., *εις ύπόστασιν μίαν*,—so that only in and through Him would the Son and Father possess and dwell within the creature.¹⁰⁷ The surface meaning of this statement out of context might be that Scheeben, like Petavius, taught an exclusively proper indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

In another passage, however, Scheeben maintains that the Holy Spirit appears simply as one sent before, the forerunner (*Vorläuferin*) of those who send Him, as the first to enter into us, without properly effecting, through a special function, the union with the other Persons and without standing forth as their intermediary with the human soul, to which they are united.¹⁰⁸ And elsewhere he says that there can be no question of a moral union which would be just as exclusively attributed to the Holy Spirit as the hypostatic union in Christ is to the Son.¹⁰⁹ From such passages it should be obvious that Scheeben does not hold the theory which would make the inhabitation exclusively proper to the Holy Spirit.

According to F. Prat,¹¹⁰ the appropriation theory of the indwelling—and, indeed, it is only one theory—does not square with the Scriptures and the Fathers. They rather hold that, whereas the inner trinitarian processions do not change, nevertheless, the creature enters into union with the distinct Persons in the inverted order of the processions. That is to say, the Holy Spirit, given by Father and Son and giving Himself, is the first to enter into contact with the just soul. This is, of course, a priority of reason and nature, not of time; but it is a priority with a real foundation.

¹⁰⁷ *Mysterien*, p. 158.

¹⁰⁹ *Dogmatik*, III, n. 859.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

¹¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, II, 351 f.

Like Prat, Scheeben looks upon the Holy Spirit as the first to be united with the soul, preserving always, of course, the proper meaning of "first." With regard to the inhabitation and the resultant union, the name Holy Spirit *in concreto* signifies the substance of God, but as it is in the third Person. In Him, as the substantial Breath of Father and Son, we have the substantial outflowing of the spiritual, living nature of both Persons. Hence, Scheeben maintains, the Greeks saw in Him the divine substance as a spiritual, life-giving *semen divinum*, or vehicle for the generation of adopted children of God.¹¹¹ In another passage,¹¹² he says that the procession of the Holy Spirit becomes, so to speak, the conductor for the passing over of the relation of filiation *ad extra* to creatures; and that this is true because only in the further communication of the divine nature to the Holy Spirit, can the way be opened for its communication to creatures. Being the substantial bond of union between the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit appears as Their intermediary in Their union with the just soul.

SPECIAL ROLE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

The Greeks, Scheeben says, considered the Holy Spirit as the terminus (*σφραγίς*),¹¹³ the crowning and the flower of the Trinity; the Latins considered Him as the bond which unites the Persons among

¹¹¹ *Dogmatik*, III, n. 856. Cf. St. Thomas, *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9 c, et ad 14m-15m.

¹¹² *Mysterien*, p. 137: "Der zweite, die innern Prozesse und Mittheilungen abschliessende Prozess ist gleichsam der Conductor für die Überleitung des ersten nach Aussen in die Creatur."

¹¹³ *Dogmatik*, II, n. 941. Note the statement of Joret: "Cet Esprit-Saint, point d'aboutissement de toute la vie intime de Dieu, nous apparaît comme le point de jaillissement de toute sa vie en notre âme, comme la source et gage de tous les biens surnaturels qui vont nous enrichir" (*art. cit.*). Cf. St. Thomas' words: "Filius et Spiritus sanctus dicuntur flores deigenae divinitatis, id est paternae, prout uterque a Patre est. Sed quantum ad hoc quod Spiritus sanctus a Filio est, potest dici Filius esse radix et Spiritus sanctus flos. . . ." (*De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 4 ad 1m; cf. *ibid.*, ad 10m).

Concerning the role of the Holy Spirit in our sanctification, the following observation of K. Rahner is worthy of notice. "P. Gächter hat vielmehr in ausgezeichneter Weise gezeigt, dass der religiöse *πνεῦμα*-Begriff bei Paulus eine einheitliche Grösse ist, in der trinitarische persönliche Gottesgeist das zentrale Element ist, und alle anderen Abschattungen dieses Begriffs aus diesem Grundelement abzuleiten sind" ("Zur Begrifflichkeit der ungeschaffenen Gnade," *ZKT*, LXIII [1939], 138). Cf. E. Weigl, *Die Heilslehre des hl. Cyrill von Alexandrien* (Mainz, 1905), p. 190; Mahé, *art. cit.*, p. 478; Gaume, *Traité du Saint-Esprit* (Paris, 1865); Prat, *op. cit.*, II, 351 ff.; Janssens, "Notre filiation divine d'après s. Cyrille d'Alexandrie," *Eph. Theol. Lov.*, XV (1938), 233-78.

themselves. And the more Scheeben studied the Greek view of the divine processions as an organic movement in a direct line, the more he became convinced that the Holy Spirit exercised more than merely exemplary efficient causality in our sanctification. Eröss indicates that he began to see in the justified soul a formal relation that looks to the Holy Spirit as a *causa formaliter efficiens* of our holiness. Our new share in the trinitarian life is not simply an "imitation and reproduction" (*Nachahmung und Reproduktion*) of the inner life of the Godhead, but a "continuation and extension" (*Fortführung und Ausdehnung*) of the eternal processions and relations.¹¹⁴

Two passages from St. Cyril of Alexandria will perhaps offer the best *mise au point* of Scheeben's position. In the first, he says that the Son, as the true expression of the Father, is the one who perfectly expresses the likeness of the Father; and it is according to the Spirit (*πρὸς ὃ*), the pure and natural likeness of the Son, that we are fashioned unto holiness: through Him we are made sons like unto the Son; through Him Christ is formed in us—not through the mere instrumentality of grace, but through the bestowal of the Spirit by way of participation. According to the second passage, we are made unto the image of God through sanctification; now, if this were accomplished through created grace, we should be the image rather of grace than of God. Again, the Holy Spirit does not, like a painter, merely fashion the divine essence in our souls, as something existing quite distinct from Himself. Indeed, it is not thus that the Spirit leads us to God; but, since He is God and proceeds from God, He is invisibly impressed, as a seal in wax, upon the hearts of those who receive Him, and He molds our nature through the communication and likeness of Himself.¹¹⁵

From such passages as these Scheeben takes his lead. Since our generation takes place, not according to nature, but through love, it is in the Holy Spirit—the conclusion of the inner divine processions—that our generation appears as a communication *ad extra*, and as a communication through love. In the Holy Spirit the Latins saw only the representative of God's subjective readiness for a gracious communica-

¹¹⁴ *Mysterien*, p. 125; *Der Katholik*, LXIV (1884, I), 56; cf. Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 383 f. For Scheeben's earlier doctrine, cf. *Natur und Gnade*, pp. 203 f., 206; *Der Katholik*, LXIV (1884, I), 19 f.

¹¹⁵ *De SS. Trinitate*, dial. 7 (*PG*, LXXV, 1090, 1087).

tion of a share in the divine nature. But the Greeks, according to Scheeben, envisaged in Him rather the objective communicability *ad extra* of God's very substance. Hence they looked upon Him as entering formally into our sanctification;¹¹⁶ He is the substantial expression (*εἰκῶν*) of the divinity of the Son, or the *forma Dei* and *similitudo Patris* (*μορφή, εἰκῶν, ὁμοίωσις*), a substantial form and likeness of God through the co-possession of which, according to Romans 8:29, we become of like nature (*σύμμορφοι*) with the Son of God, built into Him; and He, according to Galatians 4:14, built into us.¹¹⁷

According to the Greeks, so Scheeben maintains, the Spirit effects our communion with the Son principally in that He inserts Himself, or rather the Son of God inserts Him as the substantial image (*εἰκῶν*) of the divinity into the justified soul. In the Holy Spirit, then, the divinity itself, as substantial seal and anointing, informs the creature in a certain manner; in Him also the newly adopted children of God possess in common with the natural Son the *signaculum similitudinis cum Patre*, or the likeness of God par excellence.¹¹⁸

THE UNION THROUGH THE SPIRIT

In brief, Scheeben holds that our union with the entire Trinity takes place in the following manner. Through our incorporation with Christ, the Son, together with the Father, breathes forth the Holy Spirit into the justified soul. Our union, only so far as the order of the indwelling goes, i.e., only according to the reversed order of the divine Persons, is with the Holy Spirit first. Our union with Son and Father is effected, not through mere concomitance or circumincession, but immediately, yet through and in the Holy Spirit, by a union which is, so to speak, *natura prior* with the Spirit. Finally, each of the Persons is united with the soul according to the manner in which He possesses the common divine essence.

Weigl, in his fine work on St. Cyril's doctrine of sanctification, denies the theory of an indwelling proper only to the Holy Spirit and favors a theory of appropriation, but maintains that the Holy Spirit, being the terminus of the divine life-processions of the Trinity, and the expression of the divine nature, is also the Person who effects the entrance of

¹¹⁶ *Dogmatik*, III, n. 857.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 858.

¹¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*

the Godhead into the just soul.¹¹⁹ Franzelin himself vigorously combats Passaglia's theory; refusing to concede that the Holy Spirit is united with the soul in any manner proper to Himself alone and not altogether common to the other two Persons,¹²⁰ he does admit that the Spirit, in virtue of His hypostatic character, is properly a *donum hypostaticum*, a *vis sanctificatrix*, *caritas relativa*, and that as such He is "exemplar, cuius characteri personali sanctificati per gratiam expressius assimilantur quam characteri Patris et Verbi"; furthermore, the charity which is in us is the common effect of the whole Trinity; "tamen quadam speciali ratione dicitur in nobis per Spiritum Sanctum."¹²¹ These are the words of St. Thomas.

Accordingly, Scheeben, for his part, insists that the Holy Spirit is not a strict intermediary, but rather a forerunner (*Vorläuferin*) of the Son and Father, in the union through grace. For, according to the Fathers, to the outward movement of the divine Persons there corresponds a movement in the opposite direction: the Holy Spirit, breathed forth by Father and Son, leads us back through the Son to the Father who is the ultimate principle towards whom we tend.¹²² This is the doctrine of St. Thomas.

When, therefore, Scheeben says that the just soul is united with the Son and the Father "through" the Holy Spirit, he does not mean—any more than does St. Thomas—that the Spirit is an instrumental medium; he speaks merely of the order of the indwelling of the Trinity, and not of the trinitarian processions themselves: before Father and Son can be united with the soul, the Holy Spirit must be breathed forth; as such, He is the terminus (*Abschluss*) or boundary of the Trinity (*die Grenzscheide der hl. Dreifaltigkeit*).¹²³ In Him, therefore, Scheeben, with the Greek Fathers, sees the point of exit for trinitarian life *ad extra* as well as the point of entrance for just souls into trinitarian life itself. As the Holy Spirit is the bond between Father and

¹¹⁹ *Loc. cit.*

¹²⁰ *Op. cit.*, thes. 46, pp. 647-49; cf. Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 391, note 2.

¹²¹ *Op. cit.*, thes. 47, p. 651 ff.; cf. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 17, p. 1, q. 1; St. Thomas, *Comp. Theol.*, c. 9; *C. Gent.*, IV, 21.

¹²² *Mysterien*, p. 17; *Der Katholik*, LXIV (1884, I), 55 f. In this connection, cf. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2 sol.; *C. Gent.*, IV, 21; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9, ad 14m-15m. For St. Thomas' doctrine on the meaning of the word *per* as applied to a divine Person, cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8 ad 4m; Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 390.

¹²³ *Die Herrlichkeiten*, p. 96; cf. Weigl, *op. cit.*, p. 190; Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 389.

Son, so, too, specifically in the Person of the Holy Spirit, shall we be united with Father and Son;¹²⁴ for the communication of the divine life to the soul is to be considered as an extension and setting forth of the communication of the life which, in God, passes over from Father to Son. This divine life-power flows and culminates in the Holy Spirit; and hence its communication is to be considered as a communication of the Spirit of the same divine life.¹²⁵

THE "PERSONAL" UNION WITH THE DIVINE PERSONS

Opponents of Scheeben generally present the following dilemma: The union between the just soul and the Holy Spirit is an *unio propria*, i.e., a personal, and therefore, a hypostatic union; or *non propria*, and, hence, one in which the mode of union is absolutely equal and common to all three Persons.¹²⁶ Granderath also denied that from a divine Person as such a human person can acquire any new perfection or being; hence the following additional dilemma: We are united either with the divine Persons as such or with the divine essence. The first alternative is impossible, unless we lose our human personality. Therefore, the second alone remains and, as a result, our union with each of the Persons is exactly the same as our union with all three divine Persons.¹²⁷

But Scheeben considered the divine being which is united with us as containing both nature and Person—the nature precisely as subsisting under a relative determination in the individual Person; the Person as a distinct Possessor of the divine nature; in short, the Person must be considered in the concrete (*in sensu specificativo*), and not merely in the abstract (*in sensu reduplicativo*). In other words, each Person will be united with the soul as He has existed from all eternity, i.e., as a distinct, divine Person.¹²⁸ De Régnon, who holds a similar theory,

¹²⁴ *Der Katholik*, LXIV (1884, I), 56; cf. *Mysterien*, p. 158 ff.

¹²⁵ *Mysterien*, pp. 376, 378.

¹²⁶ Cf. Galtier, *L'Habitation*, p. 54 f., 98 f.; Joret, *art. cit.*, p. 126 f.; Franzelin, *op. cit.*, thes. 45, p. 642 f.; Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 393.

¹²⁷ "Eine Person kann etwas wegen eines Aktes, der auf eine andere Person geht oder wegen einer Relation, die sie zu einer andern Person hat, aber nie und nimmer formell durch eine andere Person als solche" (*ZKT*, VII [1883], 629). Cf. *ibid.*, VIII (1884), 557 f.; Galtier (*L'Habitation*, p. 149) puts this idea in practically identical words.

¹²⁸ "Aldann aber kann und muss das mit uns vereinigte göttliche 'Wesen' Natur und Person in sich begreifen, so dass die Natur eben als in der Person subsistierend, die Person

points out that one must be very cautious in describing this union as a kind of hypostatic union between the soul and the divine Persons; for the word "hypostatic" has become sacred in Christian terminology as applicable exclusively to the hypostatic union of the humanity of Christ with the Person of the Word.¹²⁹

To what extent this union is personal, Scheeben explains in *Dogmatik*.¹³⁰ It is truly personal because the Holy Spirit is united with the soul as a distinct Person—but not to the exclusion of the Father and the Son. It is not such a personal—much less, hypostatic—union as would terminate *in unam Personam* at the Holy Spirit. It is a moral union, not in a juridical sense (by which the Holy Spirit would possess the soul by an exclusive act of the will), but a real union between two complete, independent Persons, fully constituted in their own right. It is, in the language of Schrader,¹³¹ a union *κατὰ σχέσηιν* or *κατὰ θέσιν* in contradistinction to the hypostatic union in Christ, which is *καθ' ὑπόστασιν*. The term "personal union", then, must be qualified so that only a moral unity (*ἔνωσις σχετική*) and not a physical and hypostatic unity (into one hypostasis or person: *φυσική καὶ ὑποστατική* i.e., *εἰς ὑπόστασιν μίαν*) may be understood.¹³² As the Holy Spirit is, through His very origin, proper to the Father and the Son as to Persons distinct from Himself, so in analogous fashion, He will be proper to the just man as to a person quite distinct from Himself. However, in the Godhead there is perfect unity among different Persons; but the union through grace will be only moral. In a sense, one may say, with Eröss,¹³³ of the union: as unity, it is moral, but as participation, it is physical.

When Scheeben ascribes to the Holy Spirit a special role in the

aber als die Natur in sich einschliessend—und mithin als Person nicht *reduplicative* sondern bloss *specificative*—aufgefasst wird" (*Der Katholik*, LXIV [1884, I], 38). In regard to this most essential concept in the doctrine of Scheeben, cf. *Dogmatik*, II, n. 910; St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 29, a. 3 c.

¹²⁹ *Op. cit.*, IV, 531.

¹³⁰ III, nn. 858–59.

¹³¹ *De Triplici Ordine* (Paris, 1878), p. 224, note 2; Cf. Weigl, *op. cit.*, pp. 196–201; Petavius, *op. cit.*, VIII, c. 7, n. 13 f.

¹³² *Mysterien*, p. 158; *Dogmatik*, III, n. 842.

¹³³ ". . . kurz könnte man sagen: diese persönliche Verbindung sei als Einheit eine moralische, als Teilnahme (*participatio*) eine physische" (*art. cit.*, p. 385, note 1).

inhabitation,¹³⁴ he wishes merely to insist on the fact that the Holy Spirit, as the forerunner of the divine Persons, is the vehicle and conductor by whom the other two Persons enter into union with the soul—yet without acting as strict intermediary or exercising any special function other than that of simply being what He is, the third Person of the Blessed Trinity, the Breath of love by which Father and Son are mutually united in love with each other and with the just soul.¹³⁵

Through the communication, by way of finite participation, of the divine substance as it exists relatively in the Person of the Holy Spirit, there is impressed upon the soul an image of the Son, whose perfect and unmixed image the Spirit actually is, as St. Cyril says. Hence there is the same immediate moral union also between the soul and the Son. Consequently, the union in grace is not exclusively with the Holy Spirit, as is the hypostatic union with the Person of the Word.¹³⁶

This important statement explains how Scheeben must be understood when he says in *Mysterien*¹³⁷ that in the grace-union, in a way analogous to the hypostatic union, the other divine Persons would possess the just soul, under that definite aspect, not immediately, but only in the Holy Spirit, as is the case with the humanity of the Word.

This is an example of that exaggerated language into which he not infrequently lapses.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, here he corrects his exaggeration, saying that, not only on account of unity of substance and essence (as in the hypostatic union), but also on account of His relation to the other Persons, the Holy Spirit possesses this human temple not without Them but only for Them.¹³⁹ The Holy Spirit Himself possesses the divine essence immediately by identity with His own Person, yet,

¹³⁴ Nieremberg, who held the theory of appropriation, has an interesting passage: “. . . la persona del Espíritu Santo entra, y habita el alma, complaciéndose allí con presencia particular. Por lo cual dicen algunos teólogos que el justo participa de dos maneras la naturaleza divina. La una accidentalmente, por razón de la gracia. La otra sustancialmente, por el mismo Dios y naturaleza divina que el Espíritu Santo *tiene en sí*” (Italics ours; *A precio y estima de la divina gracia* [Madrid, 1877], p. 155). The passage is cited from Eröss, *art. cit.*, p. 386.

¹³⁵ Cf. Cercia, *De SS. Trinitatis Mysterio* (Naples, 1880), p. 216.

¹³⁶ *Dogmatik*, III, n. 859.

¹³⁷ P. 158.

¹³⁸ Cf. M. Cordovani, O.P., “Per la vitalità della teologia cattolica,” *L'Osservatore Romano* (22 marzo, 1940), p. 3.

¹³⁹ *Mysterien*, p. 158.

under another aspect, does not possess the divine essence "immediately," but only through Father and Son; in an analogous manner, the Father and the Son are united immediately with the just soul by direct union; but inasmuch as this union takes place through the mediation of the Holy Spirit as the last Person of the Trinity, They are not united "immediately." By way of corroboration, Scheeben in some places attributes the union under different aspects both to Holy Spirit and to the Son—to the Holy Spirit, if the union be conceived according to the analogy of body and soul; to the Son, if it be conceived according to the analogy of member and Head.¹⁴⁰

CREATED AND UNCREATED GRACE

From Scheeben's insistence on the pre-eminence of the role of uncreated grace, it might seem that created grace is superfluous. But this is not so. For, like St. Thomas,¹⁴¹ Scheeben holds that the Holy Spirit could not make the soul His living temple unless there were some intrinsic, inherent form by which the soul is made intrinsically, supernaturally alive and similar in glory and holiness to the divine Guest. Moreover, for the reception of this Guest, the soul requires an inner physical disposition, a positive receptibility, in order that its union may be a worthy one and according to nature, a physical union rather than a merely moral one based only on external relations. This disposition will be, as it were, a bond between the soul and the Holy Spirit.¹⁴²

Created grace, far from being superfluous, is necessary. For it must, in order to effect a union of substance and substance—and not merely of power and power—between regenerated man and God, affect the very substance of the soul intrinsically, assimilate it to the substantial quality of the Holy Spirit, and, as a participation of the divine nature in the creature, establish the equivalent of the natural unity of body and soul.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ *Dogmatik*, III, n. 862.

¹⁴¹ *In I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1 *contra*.

¹⁴² ". . . muss im empfangenden Subjekte etwas Reales und Physisches vorhanden sein, was als ein den Zusammenhang mit dem hl. Geiste vermittelndes Band angesehen werden kann" (*Dogmatik*, III, n. 876).

¹⁴³ *Loc. cit.*; cf. *ibid.*, n. 831. It should be clear how misleading is the contention of Lange (*op. cit.*, n. 444) that Scheeben looked upon the inhabitation as "donum fere independents a gratia creata."

Again, created grace is not prevented from being a true cause of our holiness either by the fact that, together with it, uncreated grace is a formal cause of justification, or by the fact that it is, from one viewpoint, an ornament of the soul, and from another viewpoint, a disposition for, and bond of union with, uncreated grace. Neither is it reduced to exercising the sole function of disposing the soul for union, or to playing a part similar to that of the organization of the body with respect to the soul, or to that of faith—in the Reformers' view—as a medium for the imputation of Christ's merits.

Created grace is a true formal cause of our sanctification and does all that a created accident can do. If, then, Scheeben allows also to uncreated grace a formal role in justification, this is not to supply for any defects in the created element; for there are none. But the purpose of uncreated grace, the new element, is to introduce the soul to a new and higher phase of justification, namely, that which no created accident can offer—substantial communion with God.¹⁴⁴ In a word, the role of uncreated grace is to complete abundantly and super-abundantly the adoption that is had essentially through created grace.¹⁴⁵ Created grace alone founds a right to the heavenly inheritance which is only merit *de congruo*; but true merit *de condigno*—founded on the same nature in both testator and heir, and not merely on a promise—is had only through uncreated grace.¹⁴⁶

From what has been said, Scheeben concludes that created and uncreated grace are, each in its own way, formal causes of our justification and sanctification. The presence of two formal causes working together in establishing the state of grace does not vitiate its inner unity. For, as charity and grace work together in forming one organic whole, so do created and uncreated grace. And as charity is the final and proximate disposition for the infusion of grace, so created grace is the final and proximate disposition for the inhabitation.

¹⁴⁴ *Der Katholik*, LXIII (1883, I), 569. Thomassinus says: "Nam creata qualitas quantalibet exaggeretur, creata nihilo secius est, eaque doni praestantioris naturae copiam adipiscemur; sed creatae tamen, non increatae, non divinae naturae consortes effimur" (*De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*, VI, c. 10, n. 6).

¹⁴⁵ *Dogmatik*, 111, n. 879; *Der Katholik*, LXIII (1883, 1), 570.

¹⁴⁶ *Der Katholik*, LXIV (1884, II), 469 f.; *ibid.*, LXII (1883, II), 565; *Dogmatik*, III, n. 880.

Another point of interest is whether Scheeben holds created or uncreated grace to be first (*natura prior*). From some of Scheeben's terminology, especially from the word "prepares" (*zubereitet*) as applied to the role of created grace in conditioning the soul for the inhabitation of the Trinity, it might well seem that he holds created grace to be anterior to uncreated grace. Such a solution would be an oversimplification and an inaccuracy.

According to Verrièle, in the theory which emphasized efficient causality, grace would be logically prior to the union which it produces; whereas in those theories which stress quasi-formal causality, the union is a whole of which the created gift is only one partial element, not anterior to, but simultaneous with, uncreated grace.¹⁴⁷ This is a very good dichotomy; but it is too clear cut, and the alternatives are mutually exclusive. J. C. Martínez Gómez develops at length the thesis that uncreated grace precedes with a priority of nature the created grace, which is but the radiation of the resplendent uncreated gift of the Blessed Trinity.¹⁴⁸

St. Thomas (who, in this point at least, we believe is followed by Scheeben) holds that there is a mutual, or twofold priority, conditioned by the point of view one takes. If sanctifying grace is looked upon as the impression in our souls of the three Persons, then They, the uncreated grace, are prior to created grace. Under this aspect, created grace is but the created, concave side, so to speak, of the uncreated, convex divine seal. But, if one looks at grace as a disposition by which we are united to the divine Persons, then it is prior to the union. In a word, regarded as the imprint in the soul from the divine *sigillatio*, as a ray of the quality of the divine nature which is poured into the soul and coheres with its divine principle as does the ray of light with the sun, created grace is not prior to, but simultaneous with, or consequent upon, the advent of the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, regarded as an absolute, created accident and only as it affects the soul, entirely apart from its essentially unitive quality, or regarded

¹⁴⁷ *Le surnaturel en nous et le péché originel* (Paris, 1932), p. 72 f.

¹⁴⁸ "La relación de la inhabitación del Espíritu Santo y los dones creados de la justificación," *Estudios Eclesiásticos*, XIV (1935), 20-50. To prove his point, the author quotes at some length from Scheeben.

as a disposition for the union, created grace may be said to be *natura prior* to the union with the divine Persons.¹⁴⁹

Finally, Scheeben, following Suarez, maintains that created grace assures possession of uncreated grace not *de condigno*, but only *de congruo*. Though it be true that created grace establishes such a physical relation of the soul to God that the giving of uncreated grace finds in the recipient an inner point of connection (*Anknüpfungspunkt*), nevertheless, the two graces are not metaphysically inseparable.¹⁵⁰ However, since the possession of one *naturally* includes the possession of the other, either may be designated as the adequate formal cause of the state of grace. In Scheeben's words, this adequate cause will be, on the one hand, the Holy Spirit as *inhabitans et unitus per gratiam*, and, on the other, the created grace as *informans animam et uniens Spiritum Sanctum cum anima*.¹⁵¹

As brought out in *Mysterien*,¹⁵¹ the holiness of the soul is like the twofold holiness of a church. First hallowed by the bishop's seal and consecration, the church receives an additional holiness with the entrance of the Blessed Sacrament. Similarly, to the essential and *in se* perfect holiness which the soul has through created grace the advent of uncreated grace adds a super-fullness of sanctity which can be had only through substantial cohesion with God. Scheeben, therefore, looks upon our new supernatural life as an organic structure of varied, yet most closely unified, elements. In the natural man we have the obediencial potency by which a door is open for a divine insertion of new life; in created grace we have a true image of trinitarian life itself; finally, there is the uncreated grace of the three divine Persons to whom the soul is morally united.

SUMMARY

1) This union is not a union exclusively proper to the Holy Spirit, in the sense that Son and Father would be united with the soul only through circumincession.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. St. Thomas' statements: ". . . in quantum ipsae personae divinae quadam sui sigillatione in animabus nostris relinquunt quaedam dona. . ." (*In I Sent.*, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m); "Sed e contrario videtur quod dona per prius. Quia dona ipsius disponunt nos ad hoc quod ipsum habeamus. Dispositio autem prior est eo ad quod disponit. Ergo, etc." (*ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiu. 2). Cf. *Dogmatik*, III, nn. 867, 876.

¹⁵⁰ *Dogmatik*, III, n. 881.

¹⁵¹ P. 179.

2) The union is proper: the soul is united with the Holy Spirit (and with Son and Father) as a distinct Person.

3) The union is not a personal union *in unam personam*.

4) The union might be called "personal": the three distinct Persons are united with the human person; but because the term "personal union" suggests the hypostatic union, the term "personal conjunction" or "cohesion" is preferable.

5) The union is moral, not because it is based on merely external relations, but because it is a union between moral beings, i.e., independent, self-existent persons.

6) The union may be called substantial cohesion or conjunction (the term "substantial union" should be sedulously avoided), because there is an application of the divine substance (as existing in a three-fold relatively different manner in three distinct Persons) to the human substance (as possessed by a human person).

7) The union is not substantial cohesion *in unam substantiam*, but through the moral union between two substances, there is a certain mutual *habere* (*Angehörigkeit*) between the beings united.

8) The Holy Spirit is not a strict intermediary; the only priority regards the order of the indwelling.

9) The new moral being resulting is an organic structure, the *nova creatura* composed of a natural human person, created grace, and the uncreated trinitarian grace of the divine Persons.

10) Created grace and uncreated grace are both necessary, both formal causes working together, each in its own sphere.

11) Created grace does not require *de condigno* the indwelling, i.e., the two are metaphysically separable.

CONCLUSION

Our sole purpose in this paper has been to present accurately Scheeben's doctrine on the role of uncreated grace in our sanctification. Any private speculation which might divert us from that primary purpose has been deliberately avoided. We do believe, nevertheless, that one of the most damning errors in Scheeben is his allowing the metaphysical separability of created and uncreated grace, i.e., the possibility of created grace without the accompanying inhabitation of the Blessed Trinity. Another error is his allowing that the union

is a moral union and, consequently, that the sanctity resulting from uncreated grace is merely moral, i.e., external sanctity.

In a future article, it may be possible to offer a critique of Scheeben's entire position and then to propose, according to Père de la Taille's principles on the supernatural, a possible solution for the engaging problem of the inhabitation.