

# THE CONCEPT OF *VERBUM* IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

## III. PROCESSION AND RELATED NOTIONS

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JUST as a modern exact science is generically mathematics and only specifically mechanics or physics or chemistry so also the Thomist analysis of the *verbum* or inner word is generically metaphysics and only specifically psychology. Two articles have been devoted to the psychological side of the issue before us.<sup>1</sup> Attention must now be turned to the metaphysics, for the matters of fact that have been assembled in preceding articles find their systematic formulation and structural interrelation in terms of potency, habit, operation, action, passion, object, species.

Since in general it will be possible to assume that the reader is familiar with Thomist metaphysics, our concern in these pages will be with matters of detail. On its objective side the problem arises from the insufficient generality of Aristotelian analyses and from the concomitance in Aquinas of different terminologies which, unless distinguished carefully, yield a crop of pseudo-metaphysical issues. Perhaps the subjective side of the problem will offer greater real difficulty. For in Aquinas psychology and metaphysics as applied to psychology are so intimately related that any distortion of the one can be had only by a compensating distortion of the other. If then I have been correct in affirming a disregarded wealth in Thomist rational psychology,<sup>2</sup> I now must argue for a simplification and clarification of metaphysics as applied to psychology. In the long run, I believe, simplicity and clarity must win out. In the short run there can hardly fail to occur not only the normal human resistance to change, which is a healthy

<sup>1</sup> Cf. THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, VII (1946) 349-92; VIII (1947), 35-79.

<sup>2</sup> I find that similar views are advanced by P. Petrus Hoenen, *La théorie du jugement d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Analecta Gregoriana, XXXIX (Rome, 1946), ser. phil. sect. A, n. 3; this work is a brilliant complement to P. Hoenen's articles in *Gregorianum* already cited (THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, VII [1946], 373, note 125). As I was indebted to the articles, so my own work is now supported by the book. Enter on the other side of the ledger, Matthew J. O'Connell, "St. Thomas and the *Verbum*: An Interpretation," *Modern Schoolman*, XXIV (1947), 224-34.

conservative force, but also the difficulty of assimilating what has been long overlooked, of grasping its significance, of assessing exactly its import and implications. However, with such subjective difficulty I cannot deal here, except by the indirect method of setting forth, as accurately as I can, the historical evidence on an historical question.

#### PROCESSION

In the work on the *Sentences* two types of procession are distinguished: the first is local movement, properly the local movement of an animal; the second, which alone is considered relevant to the divine processions, is described as "eductio principiatu a suo principio,"<sup>3</sup> and equivalently as "exitus causati a causa."<sup>4</sup> In the *De Veritate* thought is somewhat more refined. The distinction is drawn between "processio operationis," the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected, and "processio operati," the emergence of one thing from another. Next, it is argued that, since in God there is no capacity to be perfected, there can be in God no possibility of a "processio operationis," such as the procession of the act of understanding from the intellect or the procession of the act of love from the will. Accordingly, created analogy to the divine processions has to be sought in instances of "processio operati," such as the procession of the inner word in the intellect.<sup>5</sup>

One may find a parallel distinction to the above in the *Contra Gentiles* where it is remarked that the origin of the divine Word is not of act from potency but "sicut oritur actus ex actu."<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, a new approach is to be recognized in the *De Potentia*. Procession, it is said, primarily denotes a local movement from a starting point, through intermediate positions taken in their proper order, towards a goal. But this primary meaning is to be generalized until procession refers to "omne illud in quo est aliquis ordo unius ex alio vel post aliud." After a variety of examples of this generalized meaning, attention concentrates on the "duplex actio."<sup>7</sup> The *Summa* proceeds more peremptorily to the same conclusion: all procession is

<sup>3</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1 sol.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 3 ad 2m; cf. *ibid.*, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>5</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m.

<sup>6</sup> *C. Gent.*, IV, 14, §3. N.B. I shall count paragraphs in the Leonine manual edition.

<sup>7</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1 c.

according to some action,<sup>8</sup> and as there are actions that go forth into external matter, so also there are actions that remain in the agent.

Is there any notable significance to be attached to the foregoing variations? I do not think so. In all cases the same term is reached, namely, opposed relations of origin. In earlier works they are reached more directly; for Aquinas there does not shrink from using such terms as "causatum" and "operatum." In later works deference is paid to the usage of Latin Fathers and theologians who rarely or never apply the name "cause" to the divine processions,<sup>9</sup> while the required relations of origin are obtained by recalling the Aristotelian doctrine that relations are founded on actions,<sup>10</sup> or by stating that "actio secundum primam nominis impositionem importat originem motus,"<sup>11</sup> where perhaps only excessive subtlety could distinguish between "origo motus" and the Aristotelian definition of efficient cause, "a quo est principium motus."<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, what the *De Veritate* obtains by denying "processio operationis" in God, namely, the absence of real relations between intellect and the act of understanding, between will and the act of willing, the *Summa* attains by a different route. It conveniently overlooks the definition of potency as "principium actionis" to consider only "principium agendi in aliud";<sup>13</sup> and it insists on the identity of divine intellect with what is understood, of divine will with what is willed.<sup>14</sup>

However, it has been advanced that in one respect the position of the *De Veritate* later underwent change, namely, in its negation of a "processio operati" within the will.<sup>15</sup> The passage that has so exercised Thomistic writers<sup>16</sup> reads as follows: "et ideo voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipsa quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per

<sup>8</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 1 c.

<sup>9</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1 ad 8m; *ibid.*, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1m.

<sup>10</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 1 c.; *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 28, a. 4 c.

<sup>11</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2m.

<sup>12</sup> *In II Phys.*, lect. 5, §7.

<sup>13</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 4, ad 1m; cf. *ibid.*, q. 25, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 28, a. 4, ad 1m; cf. *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 11m.

<sup>15</sup> See T. L. Penido, "Gloses sur la procession d'amour," *Ephem. Theol. Lovan.*, XIV (1937), 38.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 37-48; see also R. Morency, "L'activité affective selon Jean de S. Thomas," *Laval phil. et théol.*, II (1946), 143-74.

modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae.”<sup>17</sup> Now this passage gives rise to difficulty only inasmuch as one may assume that there should be a parallel between intellect and will, that as the inner word proceeds from the act of understanding, so within the will some distinct term proceeds from the act of love. This assumption would seem to be quite justified in interpreting the trinitarian writings of Henry of Ghent<sup>18</sup> or of Scotus.<sup>19</sup> But if one is to interpret Aquinas in the context of what he himself wrote, then the assumption in question is extremely doubtful. Not only does the passage in the *De Veritate* explicitly deny such a parallelism of intellect and will, but Thomist trinitarian theory has no exigence for it. On the contrary, it seems a plain matter of fact that for Aquinas the second procession grounding real relations is not the procession of the act of love from the will, nor the procession of something else from the act of love within the will, but the procession in the will of the act of love from the inner word in the intellect.<sup>20</sup> Advertence to this repeatedly affirmed dependence of

<sup>17</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m. The “nisi” is not found in the printed editions but cf. I. Chevalier, *Div. Thom. Plac.*, 1938, 63–69; T. L. Penido, *Ephem. Theol. Lovan.*, XV (1938), 339; also *Bull. Thom.*, 1937, 138; *Angelicum* 1938, 422.

<sup>18</sup> His views are summarized by Scotus, *In I Sent.* (*Op. Ox.*), d. 2, q. 7, n. 13 (ed. Vives, VIII, 535 f.). P. Häring, P.S.M., has examined the microfilm copy of Henry of Ghent at the Medieval Institute, Toronto, and has assured me that Scotus gives a satisfactory account of Henry’s views.

<sup>19</sup> See P. Raymond, “Duns Scot,” *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, IV, 1882.

<sup>20</sup> A detailed discussion cannot be undertaken here. See *In I Sent.*, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m: “. . . a Verbo procedit Spiritus sanctus sicut a verbo mentali amor”; *ibid.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 c: “. . . quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum: scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spirat amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet . . . aut non placet”; cf. *In III de An.*, lect. 4, §634 f. *C. Gent.*, IV, 24, §12: “Nam amor procedit a verbo: eo quod nihil amare possumus nisi verbo cordis illud concipiamus.” *Ibid.*, IV, 19, §8: “Quod autem aliquid sit in voluntate ut amatum in amante, ordinem quemdam habet ad conceptionem quod ab intellectu concipitur . . . non enim amaretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo cognosceretur.” *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m (2ae ser.): “. . . nihil enim potest amari cuius verbum in intellectu non praeconciatur; et sic oportet quod ille qui procedit per modum voluntatis sit ab eo qui procedit per modum intellectus, et per consequens distinguatur ab eo.” Cf. *ibid.*, q. 10, a. 2 c; ad 2m; ad 7m; a. 4 c; a. 5 c: “Non enim potest esse nec intelligi quod amor sit alicuius duplex non est intellectus praeconceptum: unde quilibet amor est ab aliquo verbo, loquendo de amore in intellectuali natura.” *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m: “. . . de ratione amoris est quod non procedat nisi a conceptione intellectus;” *ibid.*, q. 36, a. 2 c: “Necesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat: non enim aliquid amamus, nisi secundum quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secun-

love on inner word puts an end, very simply and very clearly, I think, to an exceptional amount of labored interpretation.

### *Actus Perfecti*

Excessive attention to the metaphysical framework with insufficient attention to the psychological content of the Thomist concept of *verbum* has led to a good deal of obscure profundity on the meaning of Aquinas' *actus perfecti*. It is necessary for us to set forth the evidence on the meaning of the phrase and, in doing so, it will be well to begin from Aristotle, first because it is only a translation of Aristotle's *ἐνέργεια τοῦ τετελεσμένου*,<sup>21</sup> and secondly, because Aquinas, when first he uses it,<sup>22</sup> takes it for granted that the reader knows his Aristotle and so knows what it means. Our account of Aristotle may be divided into three parts: general contrasts between operation (*ἐνέργεια*) and movement (*κίνησις*); the analysis of movement in the *Physics*; and the recurring embarrassment in the *De Anima* occasioned by the specialization of terms in the *Physics*.

In the *Ethics* there is considered a Platonist argument to the effect that pleasure is not the good because pleasure is a movement and so incomplete, while the good must be complete and perfect. It is met with the observation that all movements have velocities, that pleasure has no velocity, and so pleasure cannot be a movement nor be incomplete.<sup>23</sup> On a later page the incompleteness of movement and the

dum hoc manifestum est quod Spiritus sanctus procedat a Filio." *Comp. theol.*, cap. 49: "... Similiter etiam id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod amatur actu. Quod autem aliquid actu amatur, procedit et ex virtute amativa amantis, et ex bono amabili actu intellecto. Hoc igitur quod est esse amatum in amante, ex duobus procedit, scilicet ex principio amativo, et ex intelligibili apprehenso, quod est verbum conceptum de amabili." *De Rationibus Fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum*, cap. 4: "Manifestum est autem, quod nihil amare possumus intelligibili et sancto amore, nisi quod actu per intellectum concipimus. Conceptio autem intellectus est verbum, unde oportet quod amor a verbo oriatur. Verbum autem Dei dicimus esse Filium, ex quo patet Spiritum sanctum esse a Filio..." In the *De Potentia* the procession of love from word is well integrated into general trinitarian theory; this cannot be said of the *Sentences*, as appears from *In I Sent.*, d. 10, q. 1, a. 5 c; d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m; ad 3m; a. 3, ad 3m; d. 13, q. 1, a. 2 sol; a. 3, ad 4m.

<sup>21</sup> *De An.*, III, 7, 431a, 5 ff.

<sup>22</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m. The correct reference in this text probably is not to *Eth.*, V, but to *Eth.*, X.

<sup>23</sup> *Eth.*, X, 3, 1173a, 29 ff; lect. 3 "non bene."

completeness of operation are described at greater length. A movement becomes in time; one part succeeds another; and a whole is to be had only in the whole of the time. On the other hand, an operation such as seeing or pleasure, does not become in time but rather endures through time; at once it is all that it is to be; at each instant it is completely itself. In a movement one may assign instants in which what now is, is not what later will be. In an operation there is no assignable instant in which what is occurring stands in need of something further that later will make it specifically complete.<sup>24</sup>

A similar general contrast occurs in the *Metaphysics*. There is a difference between action (*πρᾶξις*) distinct from its end and action coincident with its end. One cannot at once be walking a given distance and have walked it, be being cured and have been cured, be learning something and have learned it. But at once one is seeing and has seen, one is understanding and has understood, one is alive and has been alive, one is happy and has been happy. In the former instances there is a difference between action and end, and we have either what is not properly action or, at best, incomplete action—such are movements. In the latter instances action and end are coincident—such are operations.<sup>25</sup>

The characteristics of movement, described in the *Ethics* and the *Metaphysics*, are submitted to analysis in the *Physics*. The nature of movement is difficult to grasp because it is a reality that, as reality, is incomplete and so involves the indeterminate.<sup>26</sup> Still, movement may be defined as the act of what is in potency inasmuch as it is in potency, or as the act of the movable just as movable.<sup>27</sup> Again, one may say that what is about to be moved is in potency to two acts: one of these is complete and so admits categorial specification; but this act is the term of another which is incomplete and so does not admit categorial specification; movement is the latter, incomplete act.<sup>28</sup> Since this definition does not presuppose the concept of time, it is employed in

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 4, 1174a, 14—b 9; lect. 5.

<sup>25</sup> *Met.*, θ, 6, 1048b, 18—34; on the authenticity of the passage, cf. Ross, *Metaphysics*, II, 253. Apparently Aquinas did not know it and does not comment on it; but the ideas were familiar to him.

<sup>26</sup> *Phys.*, III, 2, 201b, 24 ff.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 1, 201a, 10 ff.

<sup>28</sup> *In III Phys.*, lect. 2, §5; cf. §3.

defining time.<sup>29</sup> Next it is shown that the incomplete act, movement, can occur in only three categories, namely, place, sensible quality, and physical size.<sup>30</sup> It is insisted that movement can be had only in a corporeal, quantitative, indefinitely divisible subject.<sup>31</sup> From the indefinite divisibility of distance and time it is concluded that in a local movement not only is there a *moveri* prior to every assignable *motum esse* but also there is an assignable *motum esse* prior to every assignable *moveri*,<sup>32</sup> thus analysis pushes to the limit the descriptive contrast between the specific completeness of operation and the specific incompleteness, the categorial indeterminacy, of movement.<sup>33</sup> But just how the demonstrable paradox of local movement was to be extended to alteration, growth, generation, and illumination, was for the commentators an obscure and disputed point.<sup>34</sup>

As the *Physics* analyzes movement, so one might expect the *De Anima* to analyze operation. But if that expectation is verified substantially,<sup>35</sup> there is a far more conspicuous embarrassment caused by the specialization of terms in the *Physics*. For in the *De Anima*, despite the alleged wealth of the Greek language, Aristotle needed such words as *κίνησις*, *ἀλλοίωσις*, *πάθησις*, in a fresh set of meanings; but instead of working out the new meanings systematically, he was content, in general, to trust his reader's intelligence and, occasionally, to add an incidental warning or outburst. Three examples of this may be noted. First, there is the remark that, because movement (*κίνησις*) is an act (*ἐνέργεια*) even though it is an incomplete one, we may take it that undergoing change (*πάσχειν*) and being moved (*κινεῖσθαι*) and

<sup>29</sup> *In IV Phys.*, lect. 16–22.

<sup>30</sup> *In V Phys.*, lect. 2–4; cf. VIII, lect. 4–6.

<sup>31</sup> *In VI Phys.*, lect. 5 & 12.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, lect. 8, §5.

<sup>33</sup> That movement does not square with the categories of thought, is accepted by Aristotle as well as by Bergson; because Bergson conceives the real as the empirically experienced, he concludes that the categories of thought fall short of the reality of movement; because Aristotle conceives the real as being, convertible with the true, he concludes that the reality of movement falls short of the reality corresponding to the categories of thought.

<sup>34</sup> *In VI Phys.*, lect. 5, §§11–16; lect. 8, §15.

<sup>35</sup> Movement supposes matter: *In II Met.*, lect. 4, §328; VIII, lect. 1, §1686; XII, lect. 2, §2436. Sensation is without matter: *De An.*, II, 12, 424a, 18; III, 8, 432a, 10. Movement is incomplete and of the incompleting, sensation is of the completed: *De An.*, II, 5, 417a, 16; III, 7, 431a, 6.

operating (*ἐνεργεῖν*) are all the same thing.<sup>36</sup> Again, there is the explanation that the phrase, undergoing change (*πάσχειν*), is not univocal: when the scientist's science becomes actual thought, the becoming is not an alteration or, if it is, then it is alteration of a distinct genus.<sup>37</sup> In similar vein the third book of the *De Anima* contains the statement to which Aquinas regularly referred<sup>38</sup> when contrasting *actus perfecti* and *actus imperfecti*: the movement of a sense is movement of a distinct species; for movement has been defined as the operation or act (*ἐνέργεια*) of the incomplete, but operation simply so called is of the completed.<sup>39</sup>

The substance of what Aquinas meant by *actus perfecti* and *actus imperfecti* is contained in the foregoing account of Aristotle. He referred to this contrast variously as a difference between *operatio* and *motus*,<sup>40</sup> or as a twofold *operatio*,<sup>41</sup> or finally as a twofold *motus*.<sup>42</sup> *Actus imperfecti* was explained by noting that what is moved is in potency, that what is in potency is imperfect, and so that movement is the act of the imperfect.<sup>43</sup> Both early and late works testify to a full awareness that movement is intrinsically temporal and specifically incomplete.<sup>44</sup> In contrast the *actus perfecti* is defined as "actus existentis in actu,"<sup>45</sup> and even as "actus existentis in actu secundum quod huiusmodi";<sup>46</sup> it is specifically complete, an "operatio consequens formam,"<sup>47</sup> the "operatio

<sup>36</sup> *De An.*, II, 5, 417a, 14 ff; lect. 10, §356.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 417b, 2-7 (cf. 14); lect. 11, §369 ff.

<sup>38</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 37, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1m; *In IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, sol 3, ad 1m; *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1 c; *C. Gent.*, II, 82, §17; *De Div. Nomin.*, IV, lect. 7; *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, §7; *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 179, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 180, a. 6 c.

<sup>39</sup> *De An.*, III, 7, 431a, 5 ff; lect. 12, §766.

<sup>40</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; d. 37, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1m; II, d. 11, q. 2, a. 1 sol; d. 15, q. 3, a. 2 sol; III, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 15, ad 3m; *In III de An.*, lect. 12, §766.

<sup>41</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 14, ad 12m.

<sup>42</sup> *In IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, sol. 3, ad 1m; *De Div. Nom.*, IV, lect. 7; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 31, a. 2, ad 1m; III, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m; cf. I, q. 18, a. 1 c; q. 53, a. 1, ad 2m; q. 58, a. 1, ad 1m.

<sup>43</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; *In III de An.*, lect. 12, §766.

<sup>44</sup> *In X Eth.*, lect. 5 "videtur enim"; *In IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, sol 3, ad 1m; d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, sol 3; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 14, ad 12m; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 31, a. 2, ad 1m.

<sup>45</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 18, a. 3, ad 1m; I-II, q. 31, a. 2, ad 1m; III, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>46</sup> *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 1, ob. 2a; cf. "actus perfecti in quantum huiusmodi" (*ibid.*, III, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2).

<sup>47</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2.



sensus iam facti in actu per suam speciem,"<sup>48</sup> without need or anticipation of any ulterior complement to be itself,<sup>49</sup> and intrinsically outside time.<sup>50</sup>

What, I may be asked, does this all amount to? In current terminology, then, it is a brilliant and penetrating negation of essentialism. There are elements in reality that correspond to what we know by defining; they are called essences; but they are not the whole of reality. There are also elements of reality that are less than essences, that are, as it were, essences-on-the-way; they are movements, acts that actualize incompletely, acts intrinsically in anticipation of completion and so intrinsically in time. But there also are elements of reality that are over and above essence; sight is an essence, but seeing is more than that essence; still, seeing is not a further essence, for seeing and sight have the same definition, which they share as act and potency; this more-than-essence is act, act of what already is completely in possession of essence, act that does not need or anticipate something further to become what it is to be, act that intrinsically stands outside time.

Such is the substance of what Aquinas meant by *actus perfecti* and *actus imperfecti*. But there are also accidental variations; for, so far was Aquinas from the stereotyped terminology that sometimes is attributed to him, that he could write "sapientis enim est de nominibus non curare."<sup>51</sup> A first variation is had inasmuch as the term "operatio" is suggestive of efficient causality; hence the contrast between operation and movement is taken as ground for denying that divine activity presupposes an uncreated matter.<sup>52</sup> A second variation arises by a natural transition from the imperfection of the material continuum with its indefinite divisibility to the imperfection of anything that has not, as yet, attained its end; in this transferred sense the *Sentences* speak of an *actus imperfecti*,<sup>53</sup> where also one may read the more cautious statement that the act of hope is "quasi quidam motus" and

<sup>48</sup> *In III de An.*, lect. 12, §766.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. footnote 44 with exception of I-II, q. 31, a. 2, ad 1m.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. footnote 44.

<sup>51</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 c. He is explaining the sense in which one might say that angels are composed of matter and form.

<sup>52</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m; cf. d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m, which solves the same problem differently.

<sup>53</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, a. 1 c.

“sicut actus imperfecti.”<sup>54</sup> A third variation arises from the fact that what exists in act is a ground of efficient causality; thus, an angel moves locally by an application of his virtue to a continuous series of places; this local movement is described as “motus existentis in actu.”<sup>55</sup> I believe that only poor judgment would desire to take such instances as these, not as incidental variations, but as key passages to the meaning of the repeated statement that sensation, understanding, and willing are *actus perfecti*.

### *Pati*

There is no difficulty in thinking of movement in the strict sense of *actus imperfecti* as a *pati*. But there appears to be enormous difficulty in thinking of movement in the broad sense, which includes the *actus perfecti*, as a *pati*. Since that difficulty necessarily tends to the substitution of what someone else thinks for what Aquinas said, we must endeavor to surmount it at once. We begin from the variety of meanings of the term, *pati*, in Aquinas' source.

In the *Ethics* Aristotle recognizes in the soul three things: potencies, habits, and πάθη. The last are illustrated by desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, friendliness, hate, longing, rivalry, pity, and in general the feelings accompanied by pleasure or pain.<sup>56</sup> Secondly, in a logical context Aristotle will speak of ἴδια πάθη which are attributes or properties, even of ideal numbers.<sup>57</sup> Thirdly, and this is the fundamental usage, πάθος is connected with the species of movement called alteration. In general, alteration is defined as change of quality,<sup>58</sup> but the quality subject to such change is restricted to the *sensibilia per se et propria* such as the white and black, the heavy and light, the hot and cold, the hard and soft, and so forth.<sup>59</sup> Πάθη are such qualities as such;

<sup>54</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, sol 2 c. Cf. the use of “existentis in potentia in quantum huiusmodi” in *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 3 c.

<sup>55</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 53, a. 1, ad 3m; ad 2m. On angelic local movement: *ibid.*, aa. 1-3; *In I Sent.*, d. 37, q. 4, aa. 1-3; *Quodlib.* I, a. 9; IX, a. 9; XI, a. 4.

<sup>56</sup> *Eth.*, II, 4, 1105b, 20 ff.

<sup>57</sup> E.g., *Met.*, Γ, 2, 1004b, 6, 10.

<sup>58</sup> *Phys.*, V, 2, 226a, 26; lect. 4, §2. Cf. *Met.*, Γ, 1022b, 15; 1069b, 12; 1088a, 32; but the apparent circle in defining (cf. Ross on 1022b, 15) is solved by appeal to the *sensibilia propria*.

<sup>59</sup> *In VII Phys.*, lect. 4, §2; lect. 5 & 6; *In I de Gen. et Corr.*, lect. 10, §2, §7.

they are also the process of change of such qualities; especially, they are such change when it is for the worse.<sup>60</sup> Fourthly, in close connection with the foregoing there is the account of the affective qualities in the *Categories*,<sup>61</sup> though the feelings of the *Ethics* are also relevant here.<sup>62</sup> Fifthly, with reference to any movement in the strict sense Aristotle distinguishes the passive process (*πάθησις*) and the received term (*πάθος*) of the incomplete act, and these he maintains to be really identical with the production (*ποίησις*) and the effected term (*ποίημα*) respectively of the same incomplete act.<sup>63</sup> Sixthly, in an extended sense already noted, *πάσχειν* is employed to denote sensation which is an act of the completed;<sup>64</sup> it is to be observed that the theorem of the identity of action and passion is extended to this usage on the ground that without such an identity it would be necessary for every mover to be moved.<sup>65</sup>

The complexity of Aristotelian usage pours into the writings of Aquinas. In the *Sentences* some nine meanings of *pati* are distinguished; the basic meaning is considered to be "alteration for the worse," and other meanings are allowed greater or less propriety according to their approximation to what is considered basic.<sup>66</sup> In later works this jungle growth is cut through with a distinction between *pati proprie* and *pati communiter*.<sup>67</sup> To *pati proprie* is assigned the province of Aristotelian physics and, as well, the linguistic associations of *pati* with suffering and of *passio* with human passions. On the other hand, *pati communiter* is a purely metaphysical idea; it is somewhat less general than "being an effect," for it presupposes a subject; it is described as *recipere*, as something found in every creature, as something following necessarily from the potentiality involved in every creature.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>60</sup> *Met.*, Δ, 21, 1022b, 15 ff; V, lect. 20, §1065 ff; note definition of predicament.

<sup>61</sup> *Cat.*, 8, 8b, 28–10a, 10.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 9b, 27 ff.

<sup>63</sup> *Phys.*, III, 3, 202a, 23 ff. Aquinas had only two terms to correspond to Aristotle's four.

<sup>64</sup> *De An.*, II, 5, 416b, 33; 417a, 14; 417b 2; cf. III, 5, 430a, 10 ff.

<sup>65</sup> *De An.*, III, 2, 426a, 4 ff; lect. 2, §592; cf. II, 2, 414a, 11; lect. 4, §272; *De Unit. Int.*, III (ed. Keeler, §74); hence *De An.*, III, 430a, 3, 20; 431a, 1; 431b, 17 & 22. The application of "actio in passio" to knowledge becomes complicated with the doctrine of *species*; cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 2 c; q. 87, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>66</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 1 & 2.

<sup>67</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 26, a. 1 c; *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 2 c; I-II, q. 22, a. 1 c.

<sup>68</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 26, a. 1 c.

However, there seems to be a concentration on the moment of reception,<sup>69</sup> and it is pointed out that, since this *pati* involves no diminution of the recipient, it might be better named a *perfecti*.<sup>70</sup>

The question before us is whether operation or action as *actus perfecti* can be called a *pati* in the sense of a received perfection. The difficulty here, in so far as I have been able to grasp it, lies in distinguishing between the grammatical subject of a transitive verb in the active voice and, on the other hand, the ontological subject of the exercise of efficient causality. When it is true that "I see," it is also true that "I" is the grammatical subject of a transitive verb in the active voice. But it is mere confusion to conclude immediately that "I" also denotes the ontological subject of the exercise of efficient causality. Further, it may or may not be true that one must conclude mediately from the transitive verb to the efficient cause; with such abstract questions I am not concerned. But it is false to suppose that either Aristotle or Aquinas acknowledged or drew such a conclusion. I quote:

Videbatur enim repugnare, quod sentire dicitur in actu, eo quod dictum est, quod sentire est quoddam pati et moveri. Esse enim in actu videtur magis pertinere ad agere. Et ideo ad hoc exponendum dicit [Aristoteles], quod ita dicimus sentire in actu, ac si dicamus, quod pati et moveri sint quoddam agere, idest quoddam esse in actu. Nam motus est quidam actus, sed imperfectus, ut dictum est in tertio Physicorum. Est enim actus existentis in potentia, scilicet mobilis. Sicut igitur motus est actus, ita moveri et sentire est quoddam agere, vel esse secundum actum.<sup>71</sup>

The question is, how can one speak of sensing in act, when one has maintained that sensing is a matter of undergoing change and being moved? For sensing in act seems to be just the opposite of being changed and being moved, namely, acting. The answer is that there is an acting which is simply being in act, and simply being in act is not opposed to being changed and being moved. On the contrary, movement itself is defined as an act. If there is no difficulty about defining movement as an act, though it is an imperfect one, there is no difficulty in saying that the *pati* of sensation is an act and in that sense an acting.

<sup>69</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 2 c.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 22, a. 1 c. Also of interest are: *In III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1 sol.; IV, d. 44, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3; *De Ver.*, q. 26, aa. 2 & 3; *Sum. Theol.*, III, q. 15, a. 4 c; *In I de An.*, lect. 10, §157-62; II, lect. 10, §350; lect. 11, §365-72; lect. 12, §382; III, lect. 7, §676; §687 f.; lect. 9, §720 & 722; lect. 12 §765 f.

<sup>71</sup> *In II de An.*, lect. 10, §356.

Next, one may ask whether this Aristotelian view-point is to be found in Aquinas' independent writings. Let us begin by noting two senses of the term "operatio." In many contexts it denotes the exercise of efficient causality, for example, "Deus operatur in omni operante." But such usage certainly is not exclusive and, I believe, it is not the most fundamental. For *operatio* also means simply "being in act," as does the etymologically parallel *ἐνέργεια*; and in this sense it is a perfection which, in a creature, is received and so is a *pasi* or a *passio* of the operating subject. Thus, Aquinas spoke of an "operatio non activa sed receptiva."<sup>72</sup> He urged that the fact that sense had an operation did not make sense an active potency; for all powers of the soul have operations but most of them are passive potencies.<sup>73</sup> He pointed out that nature provides suitable principles for operations; when the operation is an action, the principle is an active potency; and when the operation consists in a passion, the principle is a passive potency.<sup>74</sup> He distinguished the operation of a mover, such as heating or cutting, the operation of what is moved, such as being heated or being cut, and the operation of what exists in act without tending to effect change.<sup>75</sup> He defined potency as just the principle of operation, whether that be action or passion.<sup>76</sup> Finally, so familiar to Aquinas was the notion of operation as passive, as something to be predicated not of the mover but of the moved, that in speaking of operative grace he found it necessary to explain that in this instance operation was to be attributed to the mover because it was the operation of an effect: "operatio enim alicuius effectus attribuitur non mobili sed moventi."<sup>77</sup> That explanation would seem to be rather superfluous today when people think it a contradiction in terms to speak of the operating subject as being moved.

What is true of *operatio*, also is true of *actio*. In an early period these terms are contrasted,<sup>78</sup> but later they are juxtaposed in opposition to

<sup>72</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 15, q. 5, a. 3, ad 4m.

<sup>73</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13m; q. 26, a. 3, ad 4m; cf. *De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 3, ad 5m.

<sup>74</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 76, §15.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 22, §2.

<sup>76</sup> *Q. D. de An.*, a. 12 c.

<sup>77</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 111, a. 2 c.

<sup>78</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 6 c.

*factio*,<sup>79</sup> and such equivalence subsequently seems to be maintained. Frequently enough, then, *actio* means the exercise of efficient causality. But this meaning is not the only meaning. It also means simply *actus*. It is *actio* in the sense of *actus* that is the actuality of virtue, as being is the actuality of substance.<sup>80</sup> It is *actio* in the sense of *actus* that is the complement of potency and stands to potency as second act to first.<sup>81</sup> It is *actio* in the sense of *actus* that pertains either to an active potency or to a passive potency.<sup>82</sup> It is *actio* in the sense of *actus* that makes it possible to define passion as the *actio* of alterable quality,<sup>83</sup> and as the *actio* of the patient.<sup>84</sup> Finally, the action that goes forth into external matter would seem to have a prescriptive claim to denoting the exercise of efficient causality; but in an earlier work one may read that transient action is the act and perfection of the patient;<sup>85</sup> and in later works one may read that transient action is the action and perfection of the patient,<sup>86</sup> and the action and perfection of the transformed matter.<sup>87</sup> Presumably, passive potencies and patients and transformed matter have an *actio* not in the sense that they are exercising efficient causality but in the sense that they are in act.

To conclude, the influence of Aristotle did lead Aquinas to use *operatio* and *actio* in the sense of act or of being in act; and in that sense there is no absurdity—on the contrary, there is a necessity—in saying that such act in a creature is a *pati communiter*. However, before making any applications to the act, the action, the operation of understanding, it will be necessary to consider the notion of active potency.

<sup>79</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 1, §4.

<sup>80</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 54, a. 1 c.

<sup>81</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 9, §3. It may be objected that shortly in §5 Aquinas mentions *actio* as predicament. But this does not show that it is not an *actus* that is the complement of potency and stands to potency as second act to first. It may show, perhaps, that *actio* in the sense of act and *actio* in the sense of exercising efficient causality were not, at least on the verbal level, very sharply differentiated by Aquinas. But that happens to be what we are proving. Elsewhere we have discussed “*actio in agente*” and “*actio in passo*”: see THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, III (1942), 375–81.

<sup>82</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, F, q. 77, a. 3 c.

<sup>83</sup> *In V Met.*, lect. 20, §1066.

<sup>84</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 4, ob. 5a.

<sup>85</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 15 c.

<sup>86</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I–II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3m; *In IX Met.*, lect. 8, §1864.

<sup>87</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I–II, q. 31, a. 5 c.

*Potentia Activa*

The ambiguity we have just noted in connection with *operatio* and *actio* becomes clear and systematic when we turn to the parallel ambiguity of the term "potentia activa." P. Stufler has remarked that, while early works make the *forma gravitatis* an active principle, later works make the same form with the same functions in the context of the same theory a passive principle.<sup>88</sup> The shift observed by P. Stufler is but a particular case in a far more fundamental ambiguity. For in the writings of Aquinas there are two distinct definitions of *potentia activa*. There is an Aristotelian definition, "principium transmutationis in aliud in quantum aliud," which attains a certain dominance in later works. There is what may be called, though with diffidence, an Avicennist definition, "principium operationis" or "principium actionis," which is dominant in earlier works and far from disappearing in later ones. Since these definitions are not equivalent, it will be convenient to translate *potentia activa*, used in an Aristotelian sense, by "efficient potency," with the corresponding *potentia passiva* translated by "receptive potency"; further, it will be convenient to translate *potentia activa*, used in the Avicennist sense, by "active potency," with the corresponding *potentia passiva* translated by "passive potency." Finally, there is to be noted a "principium effectus," which is concomitant with Avicennist active potency, is distinguished from it, and amounts to a generalization of Aristotelian efficient potency. These distinctions have now to be verified.

In his account of relations in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle recognized three types of ground, namely, quantity, action and passion, measure and measured. The second type included a sub-division according to potency and act. What can heat and what can be heated are related according to efficient and receptive potency; what is heating or cutting and what is being heated or being cut are related according to (efficient and receptive) act.<sup>89</sup> This passage is noteworthy in two respects.

<sup>88</sup> J. Stufler, *Gott, der erste Bewegter aller Dinge*, (Innsbruck 1936), p. 34. Form is an active principle: *In III Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6m; d. 22, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 1; IV, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3; *De Ver.*, q. 12, a. 3 c; *C. Gent.*, III, 23, §9; *De Pot.*, q. 5, a. 5 c. Form is passive principle: *In II Phys.*, lect. 1, § 4; VIII, lect. 8, §7; *In V Met.*, lect. 14, §955; *In I de Caelo et Mundo*, lect. 3, §4; *Sum. Theol.*, III, q. 32, a. 4 c. The early active principle is a *principium motus* but not a *motor*: *In II Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3 c; *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 3 c; a. 5, ad 8m; *C. Gent.*, III, 23, §§4, 7, 8.

<sup>89</sup> *Met.*, Δ, 15, 1021a, 14 ff; V, lect. 17, § 1023 ff.

First, it speaks not merely of *δύναμις* but of *δύναμις ποιητική και παθητική*. Secondly, it makes quite clear the relational element in the Aristotelian concept of efficient potency and receptive potency: efficient potency is not conceived apart from a corresponding receptive potency; and receptive potency is not conceived apart from a corresponding efficient potency; to have either, one must have both.

More explicit definitions respect this viewpoint. Efficient potency was defined as the principle of movement or of change in the other or, if in self, then in self as other.<sup>90</sup> Receptive potency was defined as the principle of movement or of change by the other or, if by self, then by self as other.<sup>91</sup> Clearly these definitions presuppose an objective duality; they do not exclude the occurrence of both efficient and receptive potency in the same subject, provided that subject has two parts, one to move and the other to be moved; but they do exclude the one subject as one from being either efficient or receptive.

Complementary to these concepts of efficient and receptive potency, which necessarily involve some "other," was the concept of nature. Nature was the "principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens."<sup>92</sup> Nature is not the thing but a principle in it; it is the matter of the thing, or its form, and its form rather than its matter.<sup>93</sup> But above all, from our viewpoint, nature is a principle in the thing of movement in the thing; it is "principium motus in eo in quo est motus." It follows that nature is neither efficient potency nor receptive potency. It is not efficient potency; for that is the principle of movement, not in self as self, but in the other or in self as other. It is not receptive potency; for that is the principle of movement, not in self as self, but by the other or by self as other. To this differentiation Aristotle adverted more than once. The doctor that cures himself is mentioned, from opposite viewpoints, in both the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*.<sup>94</sup> The *De Caelo* contrasts potency and nature.<sup>95</sup> The ninth book of the *Metaphysics*, after defining efficient

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 1019a, 15 ff; lect. 14, § 955; *Θ*, 1, 1046a, 9 ff; IX, lect. 1, 1776 f.

<sup>91</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>92</sup> *Phys.*, II, 1, 192b, 24 ff; lect. 1, §5.

<sup>93</sup> *In II Phys.*, lect. 2.

<sup>94</sup> *Phys.*, II, 1, 192b, 23; *Met.*, Δ, 12, 1019a, 17.

<sup>95</sup> *De Caelo et Mundo* III, 2, 301b, 17 f.



and receptive potency, goes on to employ the term "potency" in a still broader sense to include nature as well.<sup>96</sup>

In his *Metaphysics* Avicenna distinguished a large number of meanings of what was translated by *potentia* but would seem better rendered by "power." They may be indicated as follows: (1) power, as an intensive form of strength, the opposite of weakness, the source of mighty actions within the genus of movement; (2) power as ease of performance with some immunity from suffering; (3) power simply as a notable immunity from suffering without an implication of performance; (4) power as complete immunity from suffering; (5) strength as capacity to act, though without action, on the ground that it is "principium effectus"; (6) any disposition of a subject that is a "principium variationis ab illo in aliud in quantum illud est aliud"; from the context this is clearly the Aristotelian efficient potency; (7) the possibility of receiving; the perfection of this possibility is named "*actus*," though it is said to be not an *actus* but a *passio* or else an *acquisitio essendi*; (8) various modal variations of the foregoing and, as well, power in the sense of mathematical exponent; (9) the divisions of passive potency, i.e., the possibility of receiving, into perfect and imperfect, proximate and remote; (10) the principle of action. This last is propounded separately in the form of a theorem. Provided the action of a body is neither violent nor *per accidens*, then it must be ascribed to a potency in the body; this is clear when the action is due to will and choice; it is no less true when the action is due to some other body or to some separate substance; for there must be in the thing some property that accounts for the action, else the action will be either accidental or violent.<sup>97</sup>

In the *Sentences* there is a discussion of the potency of God. Aquinas begins by referring to Avicenna: the name "potentia" initially referred to powerful men and then was transferred to natural things; it means not only power to act but also immunity from suffering; on both counts it is to be attributed to God in a supreme degree.<sup>98</sup> The first solution specifies more precisely the initial meaning of potency as

<sup>96</sup> *Met.*, θ, 8, 1049b, 5 ff; 9 lect. 7, §1844 f.

<sup>97</sup> Avicenna, *Metaphysica vel Philosophia Prima*, (Opera [Venice, 1508] fol. 84<sup>v</sup>—85<sup>v</sup>). I am indebted to Fr. Francis Firth, C.S.B., for a copy of these pages from the photostat reproduction of this edition in the library of the Medieval Institute, Toronto.

<sup>98</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1 sol.

“principium actionis”; opposed to this active potency which has its complement in operation or action, there is a passive potency which receives action.<sup>99</sup> The second solution repeats that potency is the principle of action and of acting; any such principle is termed “potency”; even the divine essence, inasmuch as it is principle of operation, involves a potency, though not a potency distinct from the essence.<sup>100</sup> The fourth solution identifies divine essence, existence, and operation; it then points out that, just as the divine essence is taken as a “principium essendi,” so divine potency is taken as “principium operandi et praeter hoc ut principium operati.”<sup>101</sup> The fifth solution admits the real identity of divine potency and divine operation but denies eternal operation to involve eternal effects.<sup>102</sup> We may observe at once that such contrasts between divine operation or action and, on the other hand, its *operatum*, effect, or term, are quite common. To confine our illustration to the *Sentences*, we find that the operation is necessary but the effects contingent;<sup>103</sup> the operation is eternal but the effects temporal;<sup>104</sup> the operation is one but the effects are many;<sup>105</sup> the operation has no ulterior end but the effects have;<sup>106</sup> that omnipotence, which is the active potency of God, regards both operation and effects but, in the latter case, regards only creatures;<sup>107</sup> that God rests by a cessation, not of his operation, but of fresh effects.<sup>108</sup>

It is now necessary to turn to the third objection and solution which were omitted above. The objection stems from the fifth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; it argues that potency is either active or passive; that divine potency cannot be passive, for God cannot suffer change; nor can it be active for, according to Aristotle, that is the principle of change in the other as other, but divine activity does not presuppose any “other.”<sup>109</sup> This lack of generality in the Aristotelian

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 1m.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2m; cf. a. 2 sol.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 4m.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 5m.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 43, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, ad 4m; d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m; d. 35, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3m.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 2 sol.

<sup>106</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4m.

<sup>107</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m.

<sup>108</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 15, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3m; a. 2 sol.

<sup>109</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ob. 3a.

concept of efficient potency had given rise to difficulty on a previous occasion. Then Aquinas had met the problem by admitting that divine potency was neither active nor passive and by claiming that it was *superactiva*, i.e., not by way of movement but by way of operation.<sup>110</sup> Now, however, he prefers to generalize the Aristotelian definition and, incidentally, to modify it into conformity with his own terminological preference: "potentia activa est principium operationis in aliud sicut in effectum productum, non sicut in materiam transmutatam."<sup>111</sup>

The nature of divine potency was examined again in the opening article of the *De Potentia*. The Aristotelian definition of efficient potency appears in the third objection and in the fifteenth; but it has no influence either on the body of the article or on the solutions. The body of the article begins by pointing out that there are two distinct types of act—a first act which is form, and a second act which is operation. Corresponding to these two types of act, there are two types of potency—passive potency is the potency to receive form; active potency is the "principium operationis" or, without apparent difference, the "principium actionis."<sup>112</sup> In the context there is no mention of Avicenna, but a rather close parallel may be found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* where the analogy of act is explained. Aristotle remarked that when A is in B as C is in D, the proportion is that of matter to essence (*ὄσσια*), but when E is to F as G is to H, the proportion is that of potency to movement.<sup>113</sup> This gives a twofold potency and a twofold act, and it does so without any mention of the "other"; on both counts it resembles the analysis of the *De Potentia*.

As in the *Sentences*, so here active potency, besides being "principium

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>112</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 1 c.

<sup>113</sup> *Met.*, Θ, 6, 1048b, 6-9. Aquinas' illustration is of sight in the eyes and of seeing, to sight (*In IX Met.*, lect. 5, §1828 f.). Compare the standard Aristotelian contrast of the learner to science and of the scientist to consideration: *Phys.*, VIII, 4, 255a, 30-b, 31 (VIII, lect. 8); *De An.*, II, 1, 412a, 10, 22 ff. (II, lect. 1, §216; lect. 2, §239); *De An.*, II, 5, 417a, 21—418a, 6 (II, lect. 11 & 12). The parallel in artefacts is of raw materials to product, and of product to use (*In II Phys.*, lect. 4, §8), e.g. of materials to motorcar, and of car in garage to car on the road. However, the division of *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 1 c, is not purely Aristotelian; cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m.

operationis vel actionis," also is "principium effectus."<sup>114</sup> But it is far clearer in the *De Potentia* than in *Sentences* that active potency is "principium effectus" only by an accidental concomitance; one could have inferred as much from the earlier work; but one has only to read if one is to learn it from the latter. I quote:

Potentia autem, licet sit principium quandoque et actionis et eius quod est per actionem productum; tamen unum accidit ei, alterum vero competit ei per se: non enim potentia activa semper, per suam actionem, aliquam rem producit quae sit terminus actionis, cum sint multae operationes quae non habent aliquid operatum, ut Philosophus dicit; semper enim potentia est actionis vel operationis principium.<sup>115</sup>

It would have been impossible to make the foregoing assertion of Aristotle's efficient potency; that, by definition, is principle of movement or change in the other, and so *per se* it looks towards an effect even though it may not actually produce one. But the active potency, with which Aquinas is dealing, is primarily principle of operation or action; such operation or action may involve an ulterior effect, as is the case when action goes forth into external matter; on the other hand, it may not involve anything over and above itself, as is the case when actions remain in the agent.<sup>116</sup> Thus, active potency in the *De Potentia* is at once both Aristotle's natural potency to an act in the subject and Aristotle's efficient potency of a change in the other; spontaneously this ambivalence leads to Aquinas' repeated distinction of two kinds of action.

The *Contra Gentiles* introduces us to a reversal of roles. Hitherto we have noticed Aristotelian definitions only in objections. But now we find *potentia activa* defined not as principle of action but as "principium agendi in aliud secundum quod est aliud."<sup>117</sup> Further, we read that potency in God is not a principle of action but a principle of a product, because the very definition of active potency involves a relation to some "other."<sup>118</sup> It would seem to be a recognition of this

<sup>114</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; cf. *supra*, footnotes 101-108; also *C. Gent.*, II, 10; and *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 25, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>115</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 2, a. 2 c.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. *C. Gent.*, II, 30, §§12, 13, and *infra* on *duplex actio*.

<sup>117</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 7, §2.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 10, §1.

relational element that underlies the statement, "sicut potentia passiva sequitur ens in potentia, ita potentia activa sequitur ens in actu";<sup>119</sup> for, while Aristotle's natural potency, like the active and passive potency of the *De Potentia*, pertains to the thing considered in itself, Aristotle's efficient and receptive potencies pertain to the thing considered, not merely in itself, but also in its relation to the "other" or to self as other; accordingly, it is not the *ens actu* but follows from it.

The treatment of divine active potency in the *Summa* maintains this reversal of roles. The Aristotelian definitions of efficient and of receptive potency are the basis of argument in the body of the article.<sup>120</sup> On the other hand, the Avicennist definition of principle of operation occurs only in the third objection.<sup>121</sup>

As when the waters of two rivers join to flow along side by side, so the two sets of definitions persist in the writings of Aquinas. He uses whichever suits his immediate purpose and, as is the way with intelligent men, he does not allow a common name for different things to confuse his thinking. However, open conflict between the two systems does break out at least once, and naturally enough this occurs in commenting the Aristotelian definition of efficient potency, namely, "principium motus vel mutationis in alio in quantum est aliud." Aquinas points out that in the thing that is changed there are two principles of movement—its matter and also the formal principle on which movement follows. Neither of these principles is *potentia activa*, for whatever is moved is moved by the other, and nothing moves itself unless it has two parts, one moving and the other moved; accordingly, in so far as potency is a principle of movement in what is moved, it pertains to *potentia passiva* rather than *potentia activa*.<sup>122</sup> This passage

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 7, §3. Cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 25, a. 1, ad 1m: "potentia activa non dividitur contra actum sed fundatur in eo"; a relation is suggested by "fundatur" even more than by "sequitur."

<sup>120</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 25, a. 1 c.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, ob. 3a.

<sup>122</sup> *In V Met.*, lect. 14, §955. Note that the shift is only terminological: what before was called active, here is called passive; but what before was called active, then was not intended to mean efficient; and the present use of "passive" does not deny natural potency but only efficient potency. Early writings explicitly distinguish between *principium operationis vel actionis* and *principium operati vel effectus* (cf. footnotes 101–108, 115); similarly they distinguish between *principium motus* and the *movens* or *motor* (cf. footnote 88).

brings into the open the latent ambiguity with which we have been dealing. But the tension is not maintained, for when later in the same work Aquinas has to characterize the potency of sight to seeing, he does not say that this potency is active and he does not say that it is passive; he introduces the terms, *potentia motiva* and *potentia operativa*,<sup>123</sup> it is a neat verbal solution to a merely verbal difficulty, and it must have pleased him; for we find *potentia operativa* employed in the *Prima Pars*<sup>124</sup> and in the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*.<sup>125</sup>

### *Duplex Actio*

Frequently Aquinas distinguished two types of *actio*, one which remains in its subject, another which goes forth into external matter to effect its transformation. This distinction has led subsequent writers to make metaphysical ultimates of what they term immanent and transient action and, as not rarely happens, such speculative constructions are a barrier rather than a help to a grasp of St. Thomas' thought, for they give an air of finality and completeness to what, in point of fact, contained not a little of the incidental and was not complete.

Aquinas alleges two different sources in Aristotle for his *duplex actio*. Contrasts between *actio* and *factio*, and so between *agere* and *facere*, *activum* and *factivum*, *agibile* and *factibile* stem from Aristotle's *Ethics*.<sup>126</sup> In the relevant passage Aristotle was distinguishing art, science, prudence, wisdom, and intellect; three of these, science, wisdom, and intellect, regard the necessary; the other pair, art and prudence, regard the contingent; the distinction between them is set forth by a parallel distinction between production (*ποίησις*) and moral conduct (*πρᾶξις*).<sup>127</sup> Now in medieval Latin both *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις* might be rendered by *actio*, and in such cases Aquinas' distinction was between the *actio* of moral conduct, which is a perfection of the agent, and the *actio*, more properly *factio*, which transforms external matter.

<sup>123</sup> *In IX Met.*, lect. 5, §1829. Cf. ἀρχὴ κωητικὴ (*Met.*, 1049b, 9); contrast κωητικόν (*Phys.*, 202a, 13).

<sup>124</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 54, a. 3 c.

<sup>125</sup> *De Sp. Cr.*, a. 11 c.

<sup>126</sup> *In II Sent.*, d. 12; III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1, ad 4m; III, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1; III, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1 sol.; *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 1 c.

<sup>127</sup> *Eth.*, VI, 3, 1139b, 14 ff; cf. 1140a, 1 ff; 1140 b, 2 ff; *In VI Eth.*, lect. 3 (ed. Vives, XXV, 491); cf. lect. 2 (488a); lect. 4 (494a).

A corollary may be noted. When Aquinas restricts *actio* to beings that have dominion over their acts, *actio* has at least an association with moral conduct. "Bruta aguntur et non agunt," because St. John Damascene said so;<sup>128</sup> but also because Aristotle remarked that sense is not a principle of moral conduct, since brutes have senses yet have no part in moral conduct.<sup>129</sup> The "non agunt" does not mean that brutes do not act in the sense of "aliquam actionem exercere," which may mean simply being in act;<sup>130</sup> it does not even deny that brutes move themselves locally inasmuch as one part in act moves another part in potency.

Evidently this source in the *Ethics* lacks generality.<sup>131</sup> But the other source in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* is so general that it deals not with action but with act. The problem under discussion is the essential priority of act over potency, because act is the end of potency, the end is a cause, and a cause is prior.<sup>132</sup> The point was evident in cases in which only potency and act existed; but when besides potency and act there was also an ulterior product, the apparent difficulty was met by noting that then the act was in the thing produced and that it emerged simultaneously with the product.<sup>133</sup> There followed the familiar corollary on the twofold subject of the act (*ἐνέργεια*).<sup>134</sup>

The medieval translator laid no stress on *actio*: the *ἐνέργεια* that is in the agent was translated by *actio*; the one that is in the product was translated by *actus*.<sup>135</sup> The opposite usage may be found in the *Prima Pars*.<sup>136</sup> General Thomist usage is variable. In the *Sentences* and in the *De Veritate* an attempt is made to reserve *operatio* for the act that remains and *actio* for the act that goes forth.<sup>137</sup> In the *Contra Gentiles factio* is proposed for the act that goes forth and *operatio* or even *actio* for the act that remains.<sup>138</sup> In the *De Potentia*, the *Contra Gentiles*, and the *Prima Pars*, the distinction is drawn with respect to a *duplex*

<sup>128</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 9, ad 4m.

<sup>129</sup> *Eth.*, VI, 2, 1139a, 19; referred to in *De Unione Verbi*. a. 5 c. Cf. *C. Gent.*, III, c. 111; c. 112, §1; *In II Phys.*, lect., 10 §4.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. *supra*, footnotes 128 and 71.

<sup>131</sup> The contrast really is threefold: speculative, active, and productive. *Met.*, E, 1, 1025b, 19–26; VI, lect. 1, §1152; IX, lect. 2, §1788; XI, lect. 7, §2253.

<sup>132</sup> *Met.*, Θ, 8, 1050a, 3 ff.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, lines 23 ff.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, lines 30–37.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. text to *In IX Met.*, lect. 8 (ed. Cathala) and as quoted by Aquinas, *De Unif. Intel.*, III (ed. Keeler, §71).

<sup>136</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 87, a. 3 c.

<sup>137</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 6 c.

<sup>138</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 1, §5.

*operatio*.<sup>139</sup> However, it is *duplex actio* that is regular in the *Prima Pars*.<sup>140</sup> Still, in the *De Potentia* mention was made of a *duplex actus secundus*,<sup>141</sup> and this viewpoint returns in the *Prima Secundae*,<sup>142</sup> where also one may find an identification of the act that goes forth with the *actio in passo* of the *Physics*.<sup>143</sup> As a final observation, one may note that Aquinas did not keep his two sources distinct; in both the *Contra Gentiles* and the *Prima Secundae* he refers to the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* and proceeds to speak of *factio*, a term that implicitly is present in the *Metaphysics* but explicitly only in the *Ethics*.<sup>144</sup>

This fluidity of terminology is not surprising unless one indulges in an anachronistic projection of present usage upon the past. On the other hand, the meaning of these passages and their significance are quite clear. There is an act that remains in the agent and is the perfection of the agent; there is another act that goes forth into external matter and effects a change of it. The pair spontaneously come together in thought—grammatically, because both are expressed by transitive verbs in the active voice, historically, because both proceed from the “*principium actionis*” that was Aquinas’ initial definition of active potency. Even though later Aquinas did manifest a preference for a different definition of *potentia activa*, there was a deeper root in Aristotle himself to keep the two types of act associated; for it is a form that is the principle both of the act remaining in the agent and of the act that goes forth. In the *Physics* it was pointed out that the mover possesses a form which is principle of movement; for it is a man in act that makes a man out of what is a man only in potency.<sup>145</sup> In his *Sentences* Aquinas refers to this passage and applies it both to transient and to immanent acts: “*causa autem actionis est species, ut dicitur in III Phys., quia unumquodque agit ratione formae alicuius quam habet . . . sicut ignis qui desiccatur et calefacit per caliditatem et siccitatem, et homo audit et videt per auditum et visum.*”<sup>146</sup> Even in

<sup>139</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1 c; q. 9, a. 9, ad 4m; *C. Gent.*, II, 1, §3; *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 2 c; cf. I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3m.

<sup>140</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 18, a. 3, ad 1m; q. 23, a. 2, ad 1m; q. 27, a. 1 c; a. 3 c; a. 5 c; q. 28, a. 4 c; q. 54, a. 1, ad 3m; a. 2 c; q. 56, a. 1 c; q. 85, a. 2 c. Also *In I Sent.*, d. 40 q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 6 c; q. 14, a. 3 c; *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 15 c; q. 8, a. 1 c; *C. Gent.*, II, 23, §5; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3m; *De Unit. Intel.*, III (ed. Keeler, §71).

<sup>141</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 5 a. 5, ad 14m.

<sup>142</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, p. 57, a. 4 c; q. 74, a. 1 c; cf. q. 31, a. 5 c.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 74, a. 1 c.

<sup>144</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 1, §3; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 4 c.

<sup>145</sup> *Phys.*, III, 2 202a, 9; lect. 4, §6.

<sup>146</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1 c.



his latest works Aquinas will speak of active potency as pertaining to things because of their forms,<sup>147</sup> and will explain differences of efficacy because of differences in the perfection of forms; thus, fire heats and illuminates; what is so heated or illuminated can do the same but only in a less degree, while merely intentional forms cannot have natural effects.<sup>148</sup> But form is not only the ground of efficiency but also the principle of operation: "propria forma uniuscuiusque faciens ipsum esse in actu, est principium operationis propriae ipsius."<sup>149</sup> Such operation is the end of the operator and more perfect than his form;<sup>150</sup> it is what is last and most perfect in each thing, and so it is compared to form as act to potency, as second act to first act.<sup>151</sup>

But however germane to Aquinas' thought as it actually developed, *duplex actio* is not a capsule of metaphysical ultimates. The act that goes forth into external matter corresponds to the predicament of action as defined in the *Sentences*: "actio secundum quod est praedicamentum dicit aliquid fluens ab agente et cum motu."<sup>152</sup> But later Aquinas wrote that there are two actions, one that involves movement (in the sense of incomplete act), and another that does not, as when God causes grace in the soul. On the latter he remarked, "Quod quidem difficile est ad intelligendum non valentibus abstrahere considerationem suam ab actionibus quae sunt cum motu."<sup>153</sup> This tart observation would seem to be relevant to the passage in the *Commentary on the Physics* where, after explaining Aristotle's concept of action and passion,<sup>154</sup> he goes on to give his own quite different and quite universal

<sup>147</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, III, q. 13, a. 1 c.; *In III Phys.*, lect. 4, §6; VIII, lect. 21, §9.

<sup>148</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 5, a. 6, ad 2m; cf. *In II de An.*, lect. 14, §425.

<sup>149</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 179, a. 1, ad 1m.

<sup>150</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 5, a. 5, ad 14m: "... obiectio illa procedit de actu secundo, qui est operatio manens in operante, qui est finis operantis, et per consequens excellentior quam forma operantis."

<sup>151</sup> *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3, a. 2 sol: "Ultimum autem et perfectissimum quod est in unoquoque est sua operatio; unde omnis forma inherens comparatur ad operationem quodammodo ut potentia ad actum; propter quod forma dicitur actus primus ut scientia; et operatio, actus secundus, ut considerare, ut patet in II de Anima." Cf. also *In I Sent.*, q. 35, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m; *De Malo* q. 1, a. 5 c; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2; q. 49, a. 3, ad 1m; III, q. 9, a. 1 c; a. 4 c. Cf. *supra*, footnote 113.

<sup>152</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3m.

<sup>153</sup> *Quodlib. IV*, a. 9 c; cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2m.

<sup>154</sup> *In III Phys.*, lect. 5, §13.

definitions of the predicament of action and passion.<sup>155</sup> As causal efficiency does not require external matter and movement, so also it need not go forth: there is a "processio operati" of the inner word within the intellect.<sup>156</sup> On the other hand, *actio* that remains in the agent does not involve efficient causality inasmuch as it proceeds from form, *species*, or informed potency; for that procession is not "processio operati" but "processio operationis";<sup>157</sup> as we have just seen, operation is more perfect than form, and only an instrument is less perfect than its effect. The idea that efficient causality occurs in this type of *actio* has, I fear, little more basis than a failure to distinguish between the two different ways in which Aquinas defined his *potentia activa*.

### *Species, Intelligere*

The Latin term, *species*, translates Aristotle's term, *εἶδος*, and shares its ambiguity. It may mean a form and then it includes neither common nor individual matter; and it may mean an universal and then it includes common but not individual matter.<sup>158</sup> In cognitional contexts *species* occurs in both senses: "similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit";<sup>159</sup> "intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi."<sup>160</sup> The former *species* is a form; the latter is an universal. To determine in which sense the term "species" is employed is not always as easy as in the above cases. However, our criteria may be extended: a form is known only by metaphysical analysis; but the universal enters into the knowledge of everyone. To the objection that intellect does not abstract *species* because, according to Aristotle, intellect knows *species* in the phantasm, Aquinas answered:

Dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatis, in quantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in

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<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, §15: "Sic igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est praedicamentum passionis, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente: secundum autem quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum actionis, nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est."

<sup>156</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.* For parallels to this distinction, Cf. *supra*, footnotes 101-108, 114, and 115.

<sup>158</sup> *In VII Met.*, lect. 9, §1473.

<sup>159</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 2 c.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 1, ad 2m.

phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.<sup>161</sup>

The generality of this statement, the fact that universals are being considered, the fact that the *species* are known in the phantasm, all favor taking *species* in the sense of an universal. On the other hand, to the objection that names signify things known and that, according to Aristotle, names are signs of the passions of the soul so that the things known are passions of the soul, Aquinas answered:

. . . Et utraque haec operatio [i.e. of external sense and of imagination] coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis, secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles, sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus.<sup>162</sup>

Here we have metaphysical analysis revealing the passion of the possible intellect being informed by *species* and its activity in forming definitions and judgments; *species* means form, and though the universal is referred to as the "ratio quam significat nomen," it is not here called a *species*.

Our present purpose is to discuss the relation between *species* as form and the act, *intelligere*. Our view is that this relation is expressed by Aquinas in two different manners—one according to what we have ventured to name the Avicennist definition of active potency, the other according to the Aristotelian concept of form as natural potency.

First, then, just as the *De Potentia* conceives active potency as the principle of operation or action which takes place in virtue of form,<sup>163</sup> so one may read that (intellect actuated by) *species* is the "principium actus intelligendi,"<sup>164</sup> the "principium actionis,"<sup>165</sup> the "principium formale actionis,"<sup>166</sup> the "principium formale quo intellectus intelli-

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 5m.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 3m.

<sup>163</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 1 c.

<sup>164</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 2 c.

<sup>165</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 1 c; q. 9, a. 5 c; *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 5, ad 3m.

<sup>166</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 46, §2; cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 56, a. 1 c; q. 85, a. 2 c; note the introduction of "principium formale," *In V Met.*, lect. 14, §955; *In II Phys.*, lect. 1, §4, where it is opposed to "potentia activa." On the other hand, the "principium formale" of act in the other, of heating in the heated, of specification of the act of will by the intellect, would

git."<sup>167</sup> Again, just as the *De Potentia* conceives passive potency as potency to the reception of form,<sup>168</sup> and contrasts this passive potency with the active potency to operation and action, so one may read a parallel contrast between the reception of *species*, which is named a *passio*, and the subsequent *operatio*, which is an *actus perfecti*.<sup>169</sup> Thirdly, just as the *De Potentia* distinguishes between "principium actionis" and "principium effectus,"<sup>170</sup> and again between action and the term of action,<sup>171</sup> so there is a contrast between the form which is the principle of the act of understanding and the thought-out form of a house which is the term of the act of understanding and, as it were, its effect;<sup>172</sup> similarly contrasted are the *species* which is the form that actuates the intellect and is its principle of action, the action of the intellect, and the inner word which is term to the action and, as it were, something constituted by it.<sup>173</sup> Finally, while we have seen that the terms, *operatio* and *actio*, sometimes mean simply act or being in act and sometimes mean the exercise of efficient causality, we now find that the precision of trinitarian theory led Aquinas to distinguish exactly between these two meanings with regard to the operation or action of intellect; when that operation is meant in the sense of act, it is termed *intelligere*; but when by operation is meant that one act is grounding another, it is termed *dicere*.<sup>174</sup>

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correspond not to Aristotle's natural potency but to his efficient potency; cf. *Sum. Theol.* I-II, q. 9, a. 1 c; the distinction between exercise and specification is parallel to the distinction between applying agent and form in I, q. 105, a. 5 c; this triple distinction of end<sup>3</sup> applying agent, and form surpasses the twofold distinction of I, q. 82, a. 4 c; *C. Gent.*, I, 72, §7; III, 88, §5; which derives from *In XII Met.*, lect. 7, §2519 f. "Finis operantis" is somehow efficient: *In Lib. de Causis*, lect. 1. Cf. *infra*, footnote 209.

<sup>167</sup> *De Sp. Cr.*, a. 9, ad 6m.

<sup>168</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 1 c; cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4m; d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m.

<sup>169</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m. Though doubt is cast upon the authenticity of this part of the response (see ed. Mandonnet, I, 943), other passages are sufficiently similar, though perhaps not quite so explicit.

<sup>170</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 2 c. Cited *supra*, footnote 115.

<sup>172</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 2 c. The term, "form", is applied to the inner word here, not as form that is principle of the act of understanding, but as form that is principle of the artefact; cf. *Quodlib. V*, a. 9 c., and "idea operati," *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 15, a. 2 c.

<sup>173</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 1 c; cf. q. 9, a. 5 c.

<sup>174</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4m: "... dicere autem nihil est aliud quam ex se emittere verbum"; cf. *ibid.*, ad 5m; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9, ad 8m (ser. lae); *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3m; *ibid.*, ad 2m.

So much for a sketch of one scheme of metaphysical analysis applied by Aquinas to intellect. For it is only to be expected that there should be in his writings some evidence of another scheme of analysis that stands in more immediate conformity with Aristotelian thought. The most impressive example of such conformity occurs in the following incidental statement.

... forma recepta in aliquo non movet illud in quo recipitur; sed ipsum habere talem formam, est ipsum motum esse; sed movetur ab exteriori agente; sicut corpus quod calefit per ignem, non movetur a calore recepto, sed ab igne. Ita intellectus non movetur a specie iam recepta, vel a vero quod consequitur ipsam speciem; sed ab aliqua re exteriori quae imprimit in intellectum, sicut est intellectus agens, vel phantasia, vel aliquid huiusmodi.<sup>176</sup>

It may not be out of place to note how exactly this fits in both with general doctrine and with intellectual theory. It is in accord with the general doctrine that the efficient cause not merely produces the form but also produces the movement consequent to the form,<sup>176</sup> that what produces the *species* should also produce the consequent *intelligere*. It is in accord with the general doctrine that form is less perfect than operation,<sup>177</sup> and so not its proportionate cause, that the *species* should not move intellect to the act, *intelligere*. It is in accord with the general doctrine, "quidquid movetur ab alio movetur,"<sup>178</sup> that intellect actuated by *species* should not produce its act of understanding, just as the will actuated by a habit does not produce its act of willing the end; on the other hand, just as will actually willing the end moves itself to willing the means,<sup>179</sup> so intellect actually understanding is able to utter, constitute, produce its inner word of definition or judgment. Further, the passage before us accords with specific intellectual doctrines. It makes it quite clear why the procession of the act of understanding is only a "processio operationis," while the procession of the act of defining or of judging is a "processio operati."<sup>180</sup> It is quite in

<sup>176</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 8m.

<sup>176</sup> *C. Gent.*, IV, 56, §4; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 23, a. 4 c; q. 26, a. 2 c. Cf. any account of the theorem "generans movet gravia et levia quoad locum."

<sup>177</sup> Cf. *supra*, footnotes 150 & 151.

<sup>178</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3m; and *passim*.

<sup>179</sup> *De Malo* q. 6, a. 1 c; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 3 c. This is a "processio operati" within the will but it is not relevant to trinitarian theory.

<sup>180</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m.

harmony with the statement, "sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem,"<sup>181</sup> for no form is efficient cause of its *esse* and similarly *species* is not the efficient cause of *intelligere*. Again, it harmonizes with the parallel statement that "... intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu, sicut esse ad ens in actu";<sup>182</sup> for the *ens in actu* is not the efficient cause of its *esse*. Finally, of course, there is no opposition between this scheme of analysis and the preceding; when (intellect actuated by) *species* is said to be the principle of action or the principle of operation, it is not said to be the principle of an effect; as we have seen, these two are repeatedly distinguished by St. Thomas.

#### OBJECT

The importance of recognizing the Aristotelian, as well as the Avicennist, scheme of analysis becomes fully apparent, however, only when one turns to the Thomist theory of the object. For this theory is Aristotelian. After defining soul generically, Aristotle had raised the problem of differentiating between the souls of plants, animals, and men.<sup>183</sup> The distinction of these essences, he maintained, depended on the distinction of their respective potencies; the distinction of the potencies depended on the distinction of their acts; the distinction of the acts depended on the distinction of their objects.<sup>184</sup> This series of dependences provided Aquinas with his method to determine the nature of the human soul.<sup>185</sup>

The precise relation between object and act was described by Aquinas in terms of efficient causality. There were two opposite cases. On the one hand, the potency in question may be receptive, and then the object produces the act. On the other hand, the potency in question may be efficient, and then the act produces the object as its term. Since the former of these alternatives has been forced into oblivion by neglect of the Aristotelian scheme of analysis with a consequent misinterpretation of the implications of the Avicennist scheme, I had best quote.

<sup>181</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 4 c.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2m.

<sup>183</sup> *De An.*, II, 3, 414b, 32 ff; lect. 6, §299.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 4, 415a, 14-22; lect. 6, §§304-306.

<sup>185</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3m; *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 87, a. 3 c.

Omnis enim animae operatio, vel est actus potentiae activae, vel passivae. Obiecta quidem potentiarum passivarum comparantur ad operationes earum ut activa, quia reducunt potentias in actum, sicut visibile visum, et omne sensibile sensum. Obiecta vero potentiarum activarum comparantur ad operationes ipsarum ut fines. Obiecta enim potentiarum activarum sunt operata ipsarum.<sup>186</sup>

... non enim distinguitur potentia activa a passiva ex hoc quod habet operationem: quia, cum cuiuslibet potentiae animae tam activae quam passivae sit operatio aliqua, quaelibet potentia animae esset activa. Cognoscitur autem eorum distinctio per comparationem potentiae ad obiectum. Si enim obiectum se habeat ad potentiam ut patiens et transmutatum, sic erit potentia activa; si autem e converso se habet ut agens et movens, sic erit potentia passiva. . . .<sup>187</sup>

Actus autem ex obiectis speciem habent: nam si sint actus passivarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt activa; si autem sunt activarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt ut fines.<sup>188</sup>

Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens; color enim in quantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis; sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti.<sup>189</sup>

Equipped only with the Avicennist scheme of analysis, an interpreter will "explain" these passages right up to the point where he debates whether Aquinas conceived the operation of sensation to terminate immanently at some *species sensibilis expressa* or else, without any such immanent product, to terminate with magnificent realism at the present external real thing. No doubt such a debate must arise if the object is always a term. No doubt the object must always be a term, if the

<sup>186</sup> *In II de An.*, lect. 6, §305.

<sup>187</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13m; cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 3m.

<sup>188</sup> *Q. D. de An.*, a. 13 c.

<sup>189</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 77, a. 3 c. Observe that these definitions of "object" do not contain the word, "attingere," which is as much in need of definition as is "object." They are in terms of the elementary concepts, active and passive potency, agent, effect, and end. Since receptive potency can be actuated only by agents of a given kind and since limited efficient potency can produce effects only of a given kind, there is a "ratio formalis obiecti" (*Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 3 c), an "obiectum. . . sub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum" (*ibid.*, a. 7 c), a "propria ratio obiecti" (*ibid.*, q. 45, a. 4, ad 1m), a "ratio obiecti quam per se respicit . . . potentia . . ." (*ibid.*, q. 77, a. 3, ad 4m; cf. ad 2m), a "communis ratio obiecti" (*ibid.*, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1m) which defines the specific function relating object, act, and potency or habit. Detailed application of this analysis is made to the external senses: *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 3 c & ad 2m; *In II de An.*, lect. 13, §394. Though Aquinas employs the term, "object," in a general and metaphysically defined sense, I am not aware of any instance of "object" being employed in a cognitional context and not meaning "known object."

potency can be passive only with respect to the reception of *species*, for then the active object can be active and so can be object only with respect to the *species* and not with respect to the subsequent act, action, or operation. No doubt, finally, one arrives at these conclusions when one proceeds in the light of general principles formulated by attending only to the Avicennist scheme of analysis. But I would submit that taking into consideration the Aristotelian scheme of analysis, one can omit such explanation and accept what Aquinas wrote as a satisfactory account of what Aquinas thought.

In the passages quoted Aquinas states that the object of the passive potency is active, not with respect to the *species* alone, but with respect to the act, the action, the operation of the potency. The coherence of this position with general Thomist doctrine has engaged us through considerations of *actus perfecti*, *pati*, *potentia activa*, and *duplex actio*. We may perhaps be permitted, after this somewhat lengthy preamble, to point out that Aquinas as a matter of fact actually does say that *sentire* is a *pati* and that *intelligere* is a *pati*, and then to present our daring hypothesis that perhaps Aquinas meant what he said. In the following passages the reader will note that Aquinas is speaking not of some prior condition of sensation but of sensation itself and that Aquinas does not say that sensation has a prior condition or cause in some change but that it consists in a change and is completed in a change. I quote:

... sentire consistit in moveri et pati.<sup>190</sup> ... sentire consistit in quodam alterari et pati.<sup>191</sup> ... cognitio sensus perficitur in hoc ipso quod sensus a sensibili movetur.<sup>192</sup> Anima igitur sensitiva non se habet in sentiendo sicut movens et agens, sed sicut id quo patiens patitur.<sup>193</sup> ... si vero operatio illa consistit in passione, adest ei principium passivum, sicut patet de principiis sensitivis in animalibus.<sup>194</sup> ... sensum affici est ipsum eius sentire.<sup>195</sup> ... sentire perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum.<sup>196</sup> ... duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili.<sup>197</sup> ... cognitio sensus exterioris perficitur per solam immutationem sensus a sensibili.<sup>198</sup>

With regard to external sense it would seem that the object is active, not merely inasmuch as it causes the *species*, but also inasmuch as it causes the act, action, operation of the sensitive potency.

<sup>190</sup> *In II de An.*, lect. 10, §350.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, lect. 13, §393.

<sup>192</sup> *In IV Sent.*, d. 50, q. 1, a. 4 sol.

<sup>193</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 57, §8.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 76, §15.

<sup>195</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1m.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 27, a. 5 c.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m.

<sup>198</sup> *Quodlib.* V, a. 9, ad 2m.



Aquinas had the habit of quoting Aristotle to the effect that "intelligere est quoddam pati." In the *Sentences*, discussing the mutability proper to creatures, he concludes that creatures are mutable both inasmuch as they can lose what they possess and inasmuch as they can acquire what they do not possess; the latter is a true mutability, though in a broad sense, as when all reception is said to be a *pati* and *moveri*, for example, "intelligere quoddam pati est."<sup>199</sup> Again, discussing the meanings of *pati*, he urges that there is no *pati proprie* in the intellect because it is immaterial, but still there is there an element of passion inasmuch as there is reception; and that is the meaning of "intelligere est pati quoddam."<sup>200</sup> Again, meeting the objection that the divine essence cannot be the object of created knowledge because the judged is to the judge as passive, he answered that on the contrary the sensible and intelligible objects are to sense and intellect as agent inasmuch as *sentire* and *intelligere* are a *pati quoddam*.<sup>201</sup> Arguing against Averroes, he made an antithesis of *agere* and *pati* and then urged, "Posse autem intelligere est posse pati: cum 'intelligere quoddam pati sit.'"<sup>202</sup> Proving that the possible intellect was a passive potency, he concluded, "Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia passiva."<sup>203</sup> In these passages it is quite clear that Aquinas said that the act of understanding itself, *intelligere*, was a *pati*. Such statements fit in perfectly with the general doctrine of agent object and passive potency; they fit in perfectly with the general Aristotelian scheme of analysis that distinguishes neatly between nature, which is a principle of movement in the thing moved, and efficient potency, which is a principle of movement in the other or, if in self, then in self as other; nor is there any incompatibility between them and the Avicennist scheme of analysis except the merely apparent incompatibility that arises from the blunder of confusing what Aquinas distinguished—active potency as the principle of an operation and active potency as the principle of an effect.

<sup>199</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 c. Cf. *De An.*, III, 4, 429a, 13–15 (lect. 7, §675 f.); 429b, 22–25 (lect. 9, §720, 722).

<sup>200</sup> *In III Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2.

<sup>202</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 60, §8.

<sup>201</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 14m.

<sup>203</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 2 c.

But this, the reader will perhaps say, is all impossible. I am afraid I have not here the space to discuss abstract impossibilities. I am concerned with matters of fact, with what Aquinas said; and lest there be any misapprehension about Aquinas' ideas on the *actio manens in agente*, I proceed to observe that not only *sentire* and *intelligere* but also *velle* can be a *pati*. For with respect to the interior act of the will, the grace of God is operative and the will of man is "mota et non movens."<sup>204</sup> Though not stated so explicitly, the same is true with respect to the act of willing the end as conceived in the *De Malo* and the *Prima Secundae*; for in these works the will moves itself only inasmuch as it is in act with respect to the end, but to that act it is moved by an external principle, God.<sup>205</sup> Finally, what is true of these later works with respect to willing the end, is true more generally in earlier works in which there appears no mention of self-movement in the will.<sup>206</sup>

## NATURE AND EFFICIENCY

It has been seen that one of the difficulties Aquinas had in accepting Aristotle's definition of efficient potency was its lack of generality: it presupposed some "other" to receive the effect. The same difficulty, in a more acute form, arose with Aristotle's concept of an efficient cause; in its general formulation it was "unde principium motus";<sup>207</sup> but in the concrete it is moving, a matter of pushing, pulling, twirling, or carrying;<sup>208</sup> it is making, a matter of one contrary prevailing over its opposite—heat over cold, the wet over the dry, or vice versa;<sup>209</sup> it is generation, which is the term of such alterations, and the *generans* is

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 111, a. 2 c. In a book review I wrote for THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, VII (1946), 611, on the eighth line from the bottom of the page, for "compatible" read "incompatible." By "later Thomist doctrine" (*ibid.*) is meant, not later Thomistic doctrine, but the later doctrine of St. Thomas.

<sup>205</sup> *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1 c; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, aa. 3, 4, 6.

<sup>206</sup> Cf. THEOLOGICAL STUDIES III (1942), 534 f.

<sup>207</sup> *Phys.*, II, 3, 194b, 29 ff (lect. 5, §7); *Met.*, A, 3, 983a, 30; 984a, 27; Δ, 2, 1013a, 29 ff. (V, lect. 2, § 765 ff.); cf. Δ, 4, 1070b, 22 & 28 (XII, lect. 4, §2468 ff.).

<sup>208</sup> *Phys.*, VII, 2, 243a, 16 ff. (lect. 3, §4 ff.); cf. push and pull of heart in *In III de An.*, lect. 15, §834.

<sup>209</sup> *De Gen. et Corr.*, I, 7, 323b, 17—324a, 24. Aquinas' commentary does not go beyond chapter 5. However, this is the principal source of the idea of causality as the victory of the agent over the patient; e.g. *C. Gent.*, II, 30, §13. It also is the context of the statement that the end is only metaphorically *ποιητικόν* (324b, 15).

the *per se* mover of the heavy and light,<sup>210</sup> just as the counsellor was of the actions of anyone following his advice.<sup>211</sup> It is in the light of such conceptions that one can understand why Aquinas considered only one of his five ways of proving God's existence to be an argument from the efficient cause.<sup>212</sup>

Aristotelian influence gave formal causality a preponderant role. A cause is that on which the being of something else follows. Absolutely, the form is the cause, for it is the *causa essendi*. In considering the *immobilia*, only formal causality is relevant. But insofar as things become, three other causes are to be taken into account, the matter, the agent which reduces potency to act, and the end to which the action of the agent tends.<sup>213</sup> It is this viewpoint that explains such statements as that form gives being, simply to substance, qualifiedly to accident,<sup>214</sup> that form keeps things in being,<sup>215</sup> that form has two effects with *esse* as its first effect and operation as its second effect.<sup>216</sup> It is in this sense of formal cause and formal effect that one has to understand the statement in the *De Veritate*: action and passion are confined to the production and reception of *species*; the act of understanding follows upon that action or passion as effect follows cause.<sup>217</sup>

A more complex problem arises from the proof that potency is distinct from substance. In the *Sentences* it is argued that a proper and immediate effect must be proportionate to its cause; therefore, since operation is an accident, potency must also be an accident.<sup>218</sup> Are cause and effect formal or efficient? In favor of the latter view is the fact that a response speaks of "forma accidentalis . . . per quam producitur operatio."<sup>219</sup> On the other hand, one may insist on the preposition "per" and add that Aquinas shortly affirms "quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur."<sup>220</sup> But that is not all. In the *Summa* and in the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, the potency to an accidental operation must itself be an accident because of the very Aristotelian

<sup>210</sup> *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 8.

<sup>212</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 3 c, Secunda via. . .

<sup>213</sup> *In II Phys.*, lect. 10, §15.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 59, a. 2. c; q. 9, a. 2. c.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1m; I-II, q. 111, a. 2c.

<sup>218</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 sol.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3m. Cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 4m.

<sup>220</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3m.

<sup>211</sup> *In II Phys.*, lect. 5, §5.

<sup>214</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 76, a. 5 c.

<sup>217</sup> *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 6c.

rule<sup>221</sup> that "proprius actus fit in propria potentia."<sup>222</sup> There is, then, some evolution or at least clarification of thought. None the less, one can read in the *Summa* that the substance is productive of its proper accidents.<sup>223</sup> Does this *productivum* mean efficient causality? Hardly, for in answering the objection, "quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur," Aquinas stated that the emanation of proper accidents from substance was not a transmutation—the term regularly employed in translating Aristotle's definition of efficient potency—but a natural resultance.<sup>224</sup> To attempt to determine to just what extent the doctrine of the *Summa* revises the doctrine of the *Sentences* and, again, to what extent differences are merely verbal, is too nice a question to be undertaken here.

The *De Virtutibus* commonly is considered to pertain to the second Paris period, but it has been noted to contain views not found outside the *Sentences*.<sup>225</sup> It affirms that subject is to accident as cause to effect, because the subject is the *per se* principle of the accidents.<sup>226</sup> This is quite compatible with natural resultance. But it also states that habits are the *causae effectivae* of acts, and the context parallels this relation with that of medicine to its effect, health.<sup>227</sup> The passage is more than reminiscent of the statement in the *Sentences* that operation is produced through accidental form; but really it can hardly mean anything very different from the statement of the *Prima Secundae* that habit is a *principium operationis*.<sup>228</sup>

It probably will occur to the reader that Aquinas would not have used the terms "cause" and "effect," "productive" and "effective," if he had not meant something very much like efficient causality. That is quite true. The difference between the efficient potency and the natural potency, if I may use that term, is not that the former is ontologically perfect while the latter is not; it is not that the former

<sup>221</sup> *De An.*, II, 2, 414a, 25 (lect. 4, §277); cf. II, lect. 11, §366; lect. 19, §483 ff.

<sup>222</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 54, a. 3 c; q. 77, a. 1 c; q. 79, a. 1 c; *De Sp. Cr.*, a. 11 c. An intermediate position is given in *Quodlib. X*, a. 5, and perhaps also in *Q. D. de An.*, a. 12 c.

<sup>223</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 77, a. 6 c. <sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3m.

<sup>225</sup> See de Guibert, *Les doublets de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 108, on *De Caritate*, a. 2, ad 17m; also Simonin, "Du problème de l'amour," *Arch. d'hist. litt. doct. M. A.*, VI (1931), 179, on *De Spe*, a. 3, and on *De Caritate*, a. 3.

<sup>226</sup> *De Virt in Comm.*, a. 3 c.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, a. 12, ad 5m; cf. a. 1, ad 14m.

<sup>228</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 49, a. 3, ad 1m.

is a principle while the latter is not; it is not that the former is a principle of movement, in all or any of the senses of the word, movement, while the latter is not. The one difference is that efficient potency is a principle of movement in the other or in self as other, while natural potency is a principle of movement in the selfsame.<sup>229</sup>

That the greater ontological perfection and the greater contribution to the effect can pertain to the recipient is clear enough from sensation; for sensation is what it is because it is immaterial, and it is immaterial because of the mode of reception of the patient.<sup>230</sup> Hence, in dealing with an Augustinian text that contained the Augustinian view of the activity of soul, Aquinas can concede that the *species sensibilis* as sensed is not due to the object but to the virtue of soul.<sup>231</sup> With regard to intellect, unambiguous illustrations are hard to find because man possesses not only an *intellectus possibilis* but also an *intellectus agens*. On the other hand, as soon as the theory of God moving the will to the act of willing the end was proposed, Aquinas immediately perceived a difficulty; that difficulty to a modern Scholastic would be in all probability that man must be the efficient cause of his own operation, action, act, willing; but to Aquinas the difficulty was that the act must be not violent but natural; he noticed it both in the *De Malo* and in the *Prima Secundae*, and his answers run as follows:

... voluntas aliquid confert cum a Deo movetur; ipsa enim est quae operatur sed mota a Deo; et ideo motus eius quamvis sit ab extrinseco sicut a primo principio non tamen est violentus.<sup>232</sup>

... hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti, quod principium sit extra, sed oportet addere quod nullam conferat vim patiens. Quod non contingit dum voluntas ab exteriori movetur; nam ipsa est quae vult, ab alio tamen mota.<sup>233</sup>

Now what does the patient, the will moved by God, when it is moved by God, while it is moved by God, confer or contribute? It operates. It wills. In this case the operation is an *operatio receptiva*, just as *sentire* is a *pati* of sense and just as *intelligere* is a *pati* of the possible intellect. The will operates inasmuch as it is the will that is actuated.

<sup>229</sup> *Met.*, Θ, 8, 1049b, 5–10 (IX, lect. 7, §1844 f).

<sup>230</sup> *In II de An.*, lect. 24, §§ 551–54.

<sup>231</sup> *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 12, ad 2m.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 4m.

<sup>233</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 4, ad 2m; cf. ad 1m, 3m; cf. also q. 6, aa. 4 & 5 (esp. a. 4, ad 2m).

The will contributes inasmuch as an act received in the will has to be a "willing," not because it is act, nor merely because of the extrinsic mover, but proximately because act is limited by the potency in which it is received.

It is the reality of such and similar contributions that underlies the conception of *potentia activa* as principle of action and as formal principle of action; as well, it underlies the usage of cause and effect, productive and effective, that we have noted. Just as form is principle of action and formal principle of action, so too we may read that the substance or subject with respect to its accidents is a "causa . . . quodammodo activa" and a "principium activum."<sup>284</sup> Just as the principle of action or operation is distinguished from the principle of an effect, so too the activity of the subject with respect to the emanation of its accidents is not efficiency but natural resultance.<sup>285</sup> To complete the parallel, one need only add that the necessity of action proceeding from form is like the necessity of accidents proceeding from substance.<sup>286</sup> But the necessity of an accident that emanates from substance does not make superfluous an efficient cause to produce the accident: there cannot be a creature without the dependence named "creatio passiva";<sup>287</sup> but that relation is "quoddam . . . concreatum."<sup>288</sup> In like manner the necessity of an operation or action emanating from form, from its active principle, from its formal principle, from active potency, does not dispense with the necessity of an efficient potency.

#### CONCLUSIONS

First, there seem to be no notable variations in the concept of procession and, in particular, there seems no reason for supposing that the doctrine of *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m was retracted or revised later: the act of love with respect to an end is, as proceeding from the will, "processio operationis," but as proceeding from the inner word, "processio operati." Second, the *actio manens in agente* is act and perfection; as act, it admits no further description; for description is of

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*, I, q. 77, a. 6, ad 2m.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3m. Cf. *De An.*, II, 4, 415b, 8-28 (lect. 7, §§319-23). See J. de Finance, *Être et Agir* (Paris 1945), p. 212.

<sup>286</sup> *C. Gent.*, II, 30, §12.

<sup>287</sup> *Quodlib.* VII, a. 10, ad 4m.

<sup>288</sup> *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2m.

limitation, and limitation is due not to act but to potency; but as act of someone, it has the characteristic of being an ulterior actuation of what already is completed and perfected by the specific essence of the act; it is act beyond essence and so is contrasted with the act of the incomplete, which is act as process towards essence. Incidentally, it was Scotus who affirmed immanent action to lie in the first species of the predicament, quality.<sup>239</sup> I have not noticed such a statement in Aquinas, but I suggest that it would be Thomistic to affirm that, as *esse* is substantial, so immanent act is qualitative;<sup>240</sup> for the essence that *esse* actuates is substance and the essence that immanent act actuates is a quality. Thirdly, among the various meanings of *passio*, *pāti*, many are opposed to immanent act; but *pāti* in the metaphysical sense of receiving is opposed only to the exercise of efficient causality in an equally strict metaphysical sense; hence *pāti* is not incompatible with immanent act or with *actio* or *operatio* in the sense of immanent act; on the contrary, inasmuch as immanent act is a perfection received in a creature, necessarily it is a *pāti*. Fourthly, a distinction is necessary between efficient potency, principle of act in the other or in self as other, and natural potency, principle of act in the selfsame; the active and passive potencies of *De Potentia* q. 1, a. 1 and the active and passive principles of *Contra Gentiles* III, 23 are sub-divisions of natural potency and so both are receptive potencies and principles, hence the apparent paradox that an active potency or principle is also receptive. This paradox is only apparent: what is opposed to receptive potency is efficient potency and not some sub-division of natural potency. On the other hand, the appearances are impressive: just as Aristotle was handicapped in writing his *De Anima* by the technical elaborations of his *Physics*, so Aquinas was handicapped both by Aristotle's lack of generality in conceiving the efficient cause and by the initial strong influence of Avicenna; for him to clarify the notion of *potentia activa* by appealing to the notion of causal efficiency was impossible, for the latter notion was just as much in need of clarification; hence only indirectly can we observe differences that are crucial, inasmuch as "principium motus" and even "principium activum motus" is not the "movens" or the "motor"; inasmuch as "principium

<sup>239</sup> Scotus, *In I Sent.* (*Op. Ox.*), d. 3, q. 6 (ed. Vives, IX, 304 ff).

<sup>240</sup> Cf. footnotes 181 and 182.

operationis vel actionis" does not mean the same thing as "principium effectus, operati, termini producti" and does not even necessarily imply it; inasmuch as form is cause of *esse* and operation; inasmuch as subject is cause, active principle, somehow active cause, and productive of accidents which none the less emanate by a natural resultance. Fifthly, the foregoing clarification of Thomist usage and principles is of paramount importance in grasping Thomist metaphysics as applied to psychology; a failure to distinguish between efficient and natural potency results in a negation of the division of objects into agent and terminal, and the elimination of the agent object provides a metaphysical scheme into which Thomist psychology does not fit; further, natural potency which, though receptive, none the less makes a most significant contribution to its act, tends to disappear to be replaced by efficient forms and habits in need of a divine *praemotio physica* which, I have argued elsewhere,<sup>241</sup> cannot be said to be a doctrine stated or implied by Aquinas; and incidentally, we may ask whether this neglect of natural potency has not some bearing on unsatisfactory conceptions of obediential potency.

The coherence of present conclusions with the psychological data already assembled may be noted briefly. The distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect is a distinction between an efficient potency that produces and a natural potency that receives. The distinction between the possible intellect of one that is learning and the possible intellect of one in possession of a science is a distinction between the *De Potentia's* passive potency to the reception of form and its active potency to the exercise of operation in virtue of form. The distinction between *intelligere* and *dicere* is a distinction between the two meanings of action, operation: *intelligere* is action in the sense of act; *dicere* is action in the sense of operating an effect. The distinction between agent object and terminal object is to be applied twice. On the level of intellectual apprehension the agent object is the *quidditas rei materialis*, not τὸ τί ἐστίν but τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, known in and through a phantasm illuminated by agent intellect; this agent object is the *objectum proprium intellectus humani*; it is the object of insight. Corresponding to this agent object there is the terminal object of the inner word; this is the concept, and the first of concepts

<sup>241</sup> THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, III (1942), 375-402, 533-78.



is *ens*, the *objectum commune intellectus*. Again, on the level of judgment the agent object is the objective evidence provided by sense and/or empirical consciousness, ordered conceptually and logically in a *reductio ad principia*, and moving to the critical act of understanding. Corresponding to this agent object, there is the other terminal object, the inner word of judgment, the *verum*, in and through which is known the final object, the *ens reale*.

Here, as is apparent, metaphysics and psychology go hand in hand, and the metaphysical analysis is but the more general form of the psychological analysis. Souls are distinguished by their potencies, potencies by their acts, acts by their objects. The final object of intellect is the real; the real is known through an immanent object produced by intellect, the true; the true supposes a more elementary immanent object also produced by the intellect, the definition. This production is not merely utterance, *dicere*, but the utterance of intelligence in act, or rationally conscious disregard of the irrelevant, of critical evaluation of all that is relevant, of *intelligere*. This *intelligere* can be what it is only if there are objects to move it as well as the objects that it produces: the *intelligere* that expresses itself in judgment is moved by the relevant evidence; the *intelligere* that expresses itself in definition is moved by illuminated phantasm. But evidence as relevant and phantasm as illuminated are not mere sensible data; hence besides the sensitive potencies and the possible intellect there is needed an agent intellect. Finally, as the contrast between the labor of study and the ease of subsequent mastery manifests, there are forms or habits to be developed in the possible intellect—understanding for the grasp of principles, science for the grasp of implications, wisdom for right judgment on the validity both of principles and of conclusions; they come to us through acts of understanding; they stand to acts of understanding as first act to second; and like the second acts, they are produced by agent objects which themselves are instruments of agent intellect.

(To be continued)