

“For in him the whole fullness of Deity dwells bodily”: The Trinitarian Depths of the Incarnation

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Abstract

This article explores further implications of Lonergan’s four-point hypothesis, linking the trinitarian relations with four created participations in the divine nature, this time in the area of Christology. These include a much richer trinitarian account of the Incarnation, with a deeper pneumatological dimension emerging. It offers a brief comparison of this approach with three other approaches which similarly seek to provide a richer trinitarian account of Christology, from Christopher Schwöbel, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and David Coffey.

Keywords

Hans Urs von Balthasar, David Coffey, four-point hypothesis, Incarnation, Bernard Lonergan, Christopher Schwöbel, Trinity

That there is a close connection between Christology and trinitarian belief is hardly news. When we consider the unfolding of christological and trinitarian doctrine in the early centuries of the church we find that the initial step at Nicea (325 CE) is the clarification of the divine status of the *Logos/Son*. This affirmation occurs within an overall movement from the economic focus of the New Testament to the more immanent concerns of the debates leading up to the council. The council brings these two aspects together with its conjunction of both immanent elements (“begotten not made . . . God from God . . . consubstantial with the Father”) and

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economic elements (“for us and our salvation”), affirming the identity of the one Son in both immanent and economic aspects. The logic of this conjunction then finds explication in the doctrine of Chalcedon (451 CE) through the use of the categories of person and nature. The one (Person) Son exists in two natures: a divine nature (“God from God”) and a human nature (“for us and our salvation”). The early church is driven to its trinitarian formulations at Nicea in order to give a coherent account of the economic work of Jesus Christ. To do this it must provide a new understanding of God as immanent Trinity. Once this new understanding is in place, it provides a framework for a better understanding of the relationship between apparently divergent claims in relation to Jesus’s divinity and his humanity.¹

All this discussion is, however, at the level of doctrine, of teaching what is the case: there are three persons in the one divine nature; one of these persons, the *Logos/Son*, exists in two natures, one divine and one human, unmixed, unconfused, indivisible and inseparable. One can go so far with such formulations, using them as a set of grammatical rules such as the rule of Athanasius or the *communicatio idiomata* about what can and cannot be said about God and Jesus.² Still such a set of rules falls far short of some insight into the internal coherence of what is being stated. How might we unpack the trinitarian depths of the Incarnation, revealing all that is implied within the basic framework of Christian teaching? Or in Lonergan’s terms, how should we move from doctrines to systematics, from judgment of what is so to the proper theological understanding of the mysteries of faith?³ For example, the whole doctrinal formulation of Christology neglects any particular place of the Holy Spirit in the Incarnation. Really all that is required is a divine binity, rather than the Trinity of Christian faith.⁴ This neglect of the Spirit in Christology has been a common complaint among modern authors.⁵

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1. As Schwöbel notes, “The fact that the clarification of trinitarian logic of the Christian understanding of God preceded the attempt at defining the boundaries of orthodox Christology should be seen as an important hint that elucidation of the doctrine of Christ necessarily presupposes the trinitarian understanding of God as its basis.” Christopher Schwöbel, “Christological and Trinitarian Thought,” in *Trinitarian Theology Today*, ed. Christopher Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) 113–46 at 121.
 2. There is some point to Lindbeck’s claim that doctrines act as a form of Christian grammar. See George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984). However, this is no reason to conclude as Lindbeck does that there are no ontological claims being made in these doctrines.
 3. On the distinction between doctrines and systematics see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972).
 4. In fact Larry Hurtado refers to the binitarian structure of early Christian worship. See Larry W. Hurtado, “The Binitarian Shape of Early Christian Worship,” in *The Jewish Roots of Christological Monotheism*, ed. Carey C. Newman, James R. Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis (Leiden: Brill, 1999) 187–213.
 5. G. W. H. Lampe, *God as Spirit*, The Bampton Lectures (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977); Paul W. Newman, *A Spirit Christology: Recovering the Biblical Paradigm of Christian Faith* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987); Roger Haight, “The Case for Spirit Christology,” *Theological Studies* 53 (1992) 257–87, doi:10.1177/004056399205300204;

The main claim of this present article is that Lonergan's four-point hypothesis provides a framework for developing a new perspective on Christology, taking as its starting motif the claim of the author of Colossians, "For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily" (Col 2:9 ESV, used throughout; see also Col 1:19).⁶ The aim will be to provide a fully trinitarian account of how the fullness of deity dwells in the human being, Jesus of Nazareth. However, before arguing the case, I shall consider some of the current proposals for providing a more thorough going trinitarian Christology, as found in the writings of Christopher Schwöbel, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and David Coffey. These examples will serve as a suitable basis for comparison with the proposal developed herein.

Three Accounts of a Trinitarian Christology

Of the three authors considered here, each presents a quite different response to the question of integrating christological and trinitarian themes. In fact each does so in ways which push the envelope of traditional positions on either Christology or trinitarian theology (or both). Nonetheless they highlight points of tension and lacuna in the classical approach that the proposal below based on Lonergan's four-point hypothesis does to some extent address.

Christopher Schwöbel—Christology in a State of Crisis

In his programmatic 1995 essay "Christology and Trinitarian Thought," Schwöbel spells out his analysis of and remedy for what he identifies as a "state of crisis" in modern Christology.⁷ This crisis has been engendered by various tensions within the classical account of Chalcedon as it encounters the emergence of historical consciousness. These include tensions between high and low approaches; between the contingency of historical events and the necessity of divine existence; between an ontological and a soteriological focus, leading to a "picture of disintegration."⁸ At the root of this crisis lies the lack of connection between Christology and the Trinity: "the crisis in modern Christology is due to the neglect of the trinitarian logic of the Christian understanding of God and its implications for the Christian understanding of what it means to be human."⁹ This trinitarian logic "takes shape in the New Testament in a number of related developments and

Roger Haight, *Jesus, Symbol of God* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999); Thomas G. Weinandy, *The Father's Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995); Ralph Del Colle, *Christ and the Spirit: Spirit-Christology in Trinitarian Perspective* (New York: Oxford University, 1994). This list is meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive.

6. The text itself does not seem to have played much of a role in Christology. Aquinas only mentions it and the companion verse 1:19 a handful of times in the *Summa Theologiae*. I am unaware of any extended treatment of it as a christological/trinitarian motif.
7. Schwöbel, "Christological and Trinitarian Thought" 113.
8. *Ibid.* 119.
9. *Ibid.* 120. Karl Rahner has made similar complaints of the disconnection between Christology and Trinity: "Nowadays, when we speak of God's incarnation, the philosophical and religious emphasis lies only on the fact that 'God' became man, that 'one' of the

is expressed in a pluriform variety of different modes of expression.”¹⁰ Still, far from offering a scriptural proof for belief in the Trinity, “we detect in the expressions of Christian practice in worship, proclamation, reflection and action an underlying proto-trinitarian depth structure” from which Christian identity and faith take shape.¹¹

In his attempt to reconnect Christology with the Trinity, Schwöbel turns to the thought of the Cappadocian fathers, as mediated by the work of John Zizioulas.¹² This turn is said to overcome the one-sided emphasis on a substance-metaphysics as found in Augustine’s trinitarian work, through a focus on personhood as inherently interpersonal: “To talk of the God Christians worship means to talk of the Father, the Son and the Spirit in their personal particularity which is identified precisely by their free relations to one another.”¹³ The Augustinian approach, however, separates out the treatment of the one divine substance (*De Deo Uno*) from the theology of the Trinity (*De Deo Trino*): “the separation of the dogmatic treatment of God and the divine attributes from the doctrine of the Trinity and the interpretation of the unity of God’s trinitarian agency *ad extra* as uniformity, which excludes functional differentiation.”¹⁴ The christological question becomes then not one of how we can understand the *Logos* as incarnate, but how God can be incarnate. Isolated from trinitarian logic, “the christological problems become almost intractable.”¹⁵

In the place of this intractable endpoint, Schwöbel proposes an understanding of Christology that takes as its starting point the interpersonal understanding of person drawn from trinitarian theology. As he explains,

Doing Christology within the framework of the trinitarian logic of Christian faith requires a paradigm shift from natures to persons. This implies that the question of the divinity of Christ should not be interpreted in terms of the possession of the divine nature, but should

persons of the divine persons (of the Trinity) took on flesh . . . the Christian’s idea of the incarnation would not have to change at all if there were no Trinity.” Karl Rahner, *The Trinity*, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad, 1997) 11.

10. Schwöbel, “Christological and Trinitarian Thought” 126.

11. *Ibid.* 127.

12. In particular he cites the programmatic work, John Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary, 1985).

13. Schwöbel, “Christological and Trinitarian Thought” 131.

14. *Ibid.* 136. Modern commentators would find the opposition of so-called Western and Eastern approaches to the Trinity to be overdrawn. The thesis of de Régnon that “Western trinitarian theology begins with (in the sense of ‘presumes’ and ‘is ultimately concerned with’) divine unity (i.e. the essence) while Eastern Trinitarian theology begins with divine diversity (i.e. the persons)” is now largely rejected. See Michael René Barnes, “Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity,” in *The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity*, ed. Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (New York: Oxford University, 1999) 145–76 at 152; Michael René Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” *Augustinian Studies* 26 (1995) 51–79, doi:10.5840/augstudies199526213; Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2004) 302–4.

15. Schwöbel, “Christological and Trinitarian Thought” 136.

primarily be seen in terms of his relations as the Son to the Father as it is mediated through the Spirit.¹⁶

However, this also requires abandoning the “rigid distinction” between immanent processions and economic missions, eliminating the notions of relations as originating relations and “seeing them as mutual and reciprocal relations, though of course not as symmetrical relations.”¹⁷

This shift to a metaphysic of relations reframes the Chalcedonian definition to one of the one person, Jesus Christ, whose existence is defined in term of two sets of relations, one set to the Father and Spirit, the other by the web of human relations he enters in human history, “the new humanity of the second Adam, in whom the created destiny of human being to be in relation to God is actualized.”¹⁸

Identity descriptions as attempts to answer the question “Who is this?” have in contrast to classifications statements which answer the question “What is it?” always taken a narrative form. The christological question, “Who is Jesus Christ?” is therefore not answered by abstract metaphysical statements, but by telling the story of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ as the one to whom God the Father relates through the Spirit as the Son and relations to God the Father in the Spirit.¹⁹

Hans Urs von Balthasar—Trinity and the Paschal Mystery

Balthasar’s work in relation to the links between Christology and the Trinity are *sui generis*, shaped as they are by his unique account of the events of Holy Saturday as a divine drama encompassing Father, Son, and Spirit. In operation here is an application of the Rahnerian axiom—the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity and vice versa—to seek to relate the specific elements of the economic events of Jesus’s passion, death, descent, and resurrection to the immanent life of the Trinity.²⁰ The trinitarian speculation he thus develops involves a significant rewriting of traditional theological themes, locating both creation and sin within the “distance” between the Father and Son, a distance which is traversed by the Spirit who is the bond that maintains the unity of Father and Son.²¹ Every element of the mission of the incarnate Son must find

16. Ibid. 139.

17. Ibid. 140. This is quite a vague statement. Why “of course” and what is meant by “symmetrical relations” are not explained.

18. Ibid. 141.

19. Ibid. 143.

20. In relation to Rahner’s axiom see Rahner, *The Trinity* 21–24. For critiques of the axiom see Dennis W. Jowers, “A Test of Karl Rahner’s Axiom, ‘the Economic Trinity Is the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa,’” *Thomist* 70 (2006) 421–55; Neil Ormerod, “Wrestling with Rahner on the Trinity,” *Irish Theological Quarterly* 68 (2003) 213–27, doi:10.1177/002114000306800302.

21. Alyssa Lyra Pitstick, *Light in Darkness: Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ’s Descent into Hell* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007) 119–29. On 128–29, Pitstick quotes Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Action*, trans. Graham Harrison,

some corresponding element in the dynamics of the immanent Trinity. So the death of the Son becomes a model of the “super-death” within the Trinity;²² the *kenosis* of the Son is matched by a “super-kenosis” within the Trinity,²³ and so on. Even the temporal elements are matched by a “super-time” within the Trinity.²⁴

The starting point for his theology is his understanding of the persons of the Trinity and the way in which their relationships ground the possibility of creation. He views the trinitarian processions in terms of the categories of “separation and union”:

That God (as Father) can so give away his divinity that God (as Son), does not merely receive it as something borrowed, but possesses it in the equality of essence, expresses such an unimaginable and unsurpassable “separation” of God from Godself that every other separation (made possible by it!), even the most dark and bitter, can only occur within the first “separation.”²⁵

Balthasar speaks of this separation as an “eternal super-Kenosis” which “makes himself ‘destitute’ of all that he is and can be so as to bring forth a consubstantial divinity, the Son.”²⁶ The “separation” between Father and Son creates the “space” for all the contingencies of human freedom, so that the drama of the world becomes a “play within the play” of the larger divine drama: “We are saying that the ‘emptying’ of the Father’s heart in the begetting of the Son includes and surpasses every possible drama between God and the world, because a world can only have its place within the difference between the Father and the Son which is held open and bridged over by the Spirit.”²⁷ As an example of the crossover between the immanent and economic Trinity, Balthasar seeks to express links between the immanent and economic experiences of the Son and Father and Spirit, so that the Son’s experience of opposition in the God-forsakenness of death and descent is a function or modality of the Son’s loving relationship to the Father and Spirit. The economic drama thus becomes grounded in an immanent drama of the self-yielding surrender of divine being.

One significant feature of Balthasar’s theology is his redefinition of the notion of person in terms of mission. It is only in the address of God which “shows him the purpose of his existence” that is, imparts a mission, that the conscious subject becomes

TD 4 (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1994) 362: “The Son’s eternal, holy distance from the Father, in the Spirit, forms the basis on which the unholy distance of the world’s sin can be transposed into it, can be transcended and overcome by it.”

22. Pitstick, *Light in Darkness* 124–25.

23. *Ibid.* 128.

24. See Anne Hunt, *The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery: A Development in Recent Catholic Theology* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1997) 62–63. Pitstick excludes discussion of this topic as beyond the scope of her work. Pitstick, *Light in Darkness* 263.

25. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theodramatik III* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1980) 302, quoted in Hunt, *The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery* 60.

26. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter*, trans. Aidan Nichols (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990) viii, quoted in Hunt, *The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery* 60.

27. Balthasar, *Theodramatik III*, quoted in Hunt, *The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery* 60.

a “person.” In this sense Balthasar maintains a perfect identity between the person of Jesus as Son and his mission: “The point of identity is his mission from God (*missio*), which is identical with the Person *in* God and *as* God (*processio*).”²⁸

There are many things that could be drawn from Balthasar’s work in this regard, far more than I can address here, but I want to focus on the ways in which the issues of creation, person, and mission are interrelated in his account. Creation is possible in the “space” created by the procession of the Son, expressed metaphorically in terms of distance. That same procession grounds the mission which establishes Jesus as Son, so that the “person” is the “mission.”

David Coffey—Jesus Anointed by the Spirit

David Coffey presents us with another set of issues, this time focusing specifically on the question of the relationship between Jesus and the Spirit. Coffey is concerned to do justice to the theme of the anointing of Jesus by the Holy Spirit. Drawing on the biblical theme of anointing (specific New Testament texts which attest to the role of the Spirit in the life and mission of Jesus), various patristic texts, and the theologies of Jesus’s anointing in the work of Matthias Scheeben and Heribert Mühlen, Coffey argues that the more traditional Thomistic account of the anointing that Jesus anoints his own humanity with the Holy Spirit does not adequately deal with the reality involved. To deal more adequately with the theme of the anointing, he suggested an alternate model of the Trinity, which he calls the “bestowal model.”²⁹

While the Thomistic account of the anointing draws on the interplay of processions and missions, Coffey proposes a model of the Trinity based on a model of mutual love, wherein the Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and Son. The Father then bestows the Spirit in love on the Son, who then returns the same Spirit back as love of the Father. This allows for an account of the anointing of Jesus as his anointing by the Father with the Spirit. Jesus’s returning love of the Father (and humanity, drawing on Rahner’s argument that love of God is love of neighbor), then completes the trinitarian cycle, returning the Spirit as love to the Father.³⁰ In the foreground

28. Ibid. 67. Of course it would be very easy to misread this as saying that without the mission of Jesus there would be no Second Person of the Trinity, or that Jesus is the only person when he receives his mission, e.g. the baptism (an Adoptionist reading).

29. David Coffey, *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit* (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1979). This position is further developed in a number of papers including “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit in Christ,” *Theological Studies* 45 (1984) 466–80, doi:10.1177/004056398404500303; “A Proper Mission of the Holy Spirit,” *Theological Studies* 47 (1986) 227–50, doi:10.1177/004056398604700202; “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” *Theological Studies* 51 (1990) 193–229, doi:10.1177/004056398604700202; “The Theandric Nature of Christ,” *Theological Studies* 60 (1999) 405–31, doi:10.1177/004056399906000301.

30. Coffey, *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit* 11–32. Also Coffey, “The ‘Incarnation’ of the Holy Spirit”: “If Jesus is brought into being as the divine Son in humanity through the Father’s radical bestowal of love on him, which love is the Holy Spirit, and if the response

here again is Rahner's axiom on the identity of the immanent and economic Trinity. The immanent model of bestowal is revealed by, and provides the metaphysical grounding for, the economic relationships between Father, Son, and Spirit in the earthly mission of Jesus.

There are significant gains in this approach according to Coffey. First and foremost it fully implicates the Spirit in the mission of Jesus; Jesus is the anointed one (Christ) on whom the Spirit is given and remains from his very conception. This anointing is a constitutive element in Jesus's sonship, to such an extent that Coffey speaks of an "incarnation" of the Holy Spirit in Jesus.³¹ This is not to deny that Jesus's personal identity is that of the *Logos*, the Second Person of the Trinity. However, the Spirit is ever present in that identity, giving the Incarnation greater trinitarian depth. The other major gain is to unify the theology of grace, so that the grace of Christ is the very same grace given to all the saints. In both cases it is the gift of the Holy Spirit. This is Coffey's response to the criticism of the Catholic theology of grace leveled by Karl Barth, that it separates out the grace of Christ from that of ordinary believers.³²

Again as with my comments in relation to Balthasar's theology, there is much more that could be said in relation to Coffey's theology. What I want to highlight is the aspect present in each of these three theologians. Each is concerned with a representation of the relationship between Christology and trinitarian theology in ways which require adjustments of the more traditional approach found in the Western tradition. Schwöbel requires a rejection of the "rigid distinction" between immanent processions and economic missions, eliminating the notions of relations as originating relations; Balthasar introduces "super"-spatiotemporal language and the notion of *kenosis* into the immanent Trinity; Coffey supplements the notions of processions and missions with the bestowal model of mutual love, to strengthen the role of the Spirit in the Incarnation. In addition, each of these authors highlights difficulties and concerns, and make contributions toward resolution of these, in their attempts to more closely align Christology and trinitarian theology. In turning now to Lonergan's four-point hypothesis and its christological implications, I would like to suggest that these implications go some way to meeting the difficulties and concerns raised, but do so within a relatively straightforward extension of the classical approach of processions and missions.

of Jesus is a love for the Father which ultimately is a return of this same Spirit, then in the immanent Trinity itself the Holy Spirit exists as the mutual love of the Father and the Son" (479–80).

31. The use of scare quotes is Coffey's, not mine. See "The 'Incarnation' of the Holy Spirit."
 32. "Many will be cognizant of K. Barth's searing critique of Catholic theology of grace . . . it must be admitted that it is basically justified, since even the best Catholic theology has not succeeded in overcoming the dichotomy between men and Christ which there remains affirmed. The best this theology can do is to say that the principal grace of Christ, the 'grace of union,' is the divine Son, while the principal grace of men is the Holy Spirit." Coffey, *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit* 1.

The Four-Point Hypothesis

Both Robert Doran and I have written extensively on the nature and significance of Lonergan's four-point hypothesis.³³ Lonergan's proposal appears in initial form in his early writings on grace, as notes prepared for his students, while its final form took shape in his writings, again as notes for his students on the Trinity, while teaching in Rome. As I have indicated in various places, the basic logic of his proposal finds its antecedents in the work of Augustine in his *De Trinitate*, and in Aquinas's analysis in his *Summa Theologiae* of the relationship between the divine processions and the divine missions in the created order. Lonergan takes the logic of the approach of Augustine and Aquinas and applies it not just to the two trinitarian processions, but to the four trinitarian relations: paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. This shift allows him to accommodate a richer account of how the trinitarian God can relate to the created order.

Schematically we can argue, following Lonergan, that the two processions stand to the two missions of Son and Spirit, as the four trinitarian relations stand to four created participations in the divine nature. Just as the two processions provide us with two communications of the divine nature in the created order (Incarnation and sanctifying grace), so the four trinitarian relations provide us with four created participations in the divine nature. Lonergan identifies these four created participations in the divine nature as follows: created participation in the trinitarian relation of paternity gives us the Incarnation, or more precisely the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation; filiation gives us the light of glory; active spiration gives us sanctifying grace; and passive spiration gives us the habit of charity. Two of these, Incarnation and sanctifying grace, are already present in the schema present in Aquinas. The additional two, the light of glory and the habit of charity, present us with a trinitarian enrichment of the tradition.

Further, the transition from procession to mission is through a created or "temporal" term to the procession. As Aquinas notes,

33. Robert Doran, "Addressing the Four-Point Hypothesis," *Theological Studies* 68 (2007) 674–82, doi: 10.1177/004056390706800310; Doran, *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions*, vol. 1, *Missions and Processions* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2012); Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2006); Doran, "Imitating the Divine Relations: A Theological Contribution to Mimetic Theory," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 23 (2005) 149–86; Neil Ormerod, "Two Points or Four? Rahner and Lonergan on Trinity, Incarnation, Grace, and Beatific Vision," *Theological Studies* 68 (2007) 661–73, doi:10.1177/004056390706800309; Ormerod, "The Four-Point Hypothesis: Transpositions and Complications," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 77 (2012) 127–40, doi:10.1177/0021140011434372; Ormerod, "The Grace–Nature Distinction and the Construction of a Systematic Theology," *Theological Studies* 75 (2014) 515–36, doi:10.1177/0040563914538718; Ormerod, "Addendum on the Grace–Nature Distinction," *Theological Studies* 75 (2014) 890–98, doi:10.1177/0040563914551494; Ormerod, "The Metaphysics of Holiness: Created Participation in the Divine Nature," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 79 (2014) 68–82, doi:10.1177/0021140013509438; Ormerod, "Operative and Cooperative Grace and the Question of Justification by Faith: A Contemporary Transposition," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 80 (2015) 248–58, doi: 10.1177/0021140015583251.

Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but *also determines the temporal term of the procession*. Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, *not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal*.³⁴

The created term in some sense imitates the term of the procession, to provide a “double term” to the procession. Thus through this temporal/created term we can truly say that Jesus *is* the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity; and similarly that the Holy Spirit truly dwells in the hearts of believers through sanctifying grace. Similarly in relation to the four-point hypothesis Lonergan argues, “But since these four eminent graces are intimately connected with the divine life, it seems appropriate to say that they imitate the divine essence considered as really identical with one or other real trinitarian relation.”³⁵ The eminent graces in some sense imitate the terms of the divine relations, so that once more we can truly posit the divine persons as present in a distinctively trinitarian fashion in the created order.

I have argued elsewhere that this structure can be used to develop a number of theological themes such as the grace–nature debate,³⁶ types of holiness,³⁷ and more recently ecclesiology.³⁸ In particular I have argued that the hypothesis provides a resolution to traditional difficulties that arise in the multiple disputes over questions of grace and nature.³⁹ The question is commonly posed: Do we have a natural and/or a supernatural end and how might they be related to one another? The four-point hypothesis suggests that such a question is not well posed. The end in all cases is God. The question should not be about the end, but our relation to the end which is either natural (creature to Creator) or supernatural (via a created participation in the internal relatedness of God). As I argued previously, grace (and the supernatural generally) does not establish a new end to human nature, but it does establish a new relation to that end.⁴⁰

A Trinitarian Christology

Elsewhere I have noted that one of the curious features of Lonergan’s four-point hypothesis is that all four created participations in the divine nature can be thought of

34. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 2, ad 3 (emphasis added).

35. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Early Latin Theology*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011) 633.

36. Ormerod, “The Grace–Nature Distinction and the Construction of a Systematic Theology.”

37. Ormerod, “The Metaphysics of Holiness.”

38. Ormerod, “A (Non-*Communio*) Trinitarian Ecclesiology: Grounded in Grace, Lived in Faith, Hope, and Charity,” *Theological Studies* 76 (2015) 448–67, doi:10.1177/0040563915593470.

39. Ormerod, “Addendum on the Grace–Nature Distinction.”

40. *Ibid.* In the essay, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Mission and the Spirit,” in *A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Paulist, 1985) 23–34, Lonergan defines finality in the following terms: “By ‘finality’ I would name not

as present in the human being, Jesus of Nazareth.⁴¹ This observation brings us to the overriding motif of this present article, that “in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily” (Col 2:9). Jesus is not simply the manifestation of the person of the *Logos/Son* of God, but the whole Trinity is present in human history through him. The mode of that presence for each of the persons is distinct and is manifest in different aspects of the person and mission of Jesus. Lonergan’s proposal would have each of the four trinitarian relations correlated with four created participations of the divine nature: paternity with the secondary act of existence in the Incarnation; filiation with the light of glory; active spiration with sanctifying grace; and passive spiration with the habit of charity. What I shall now explore is how each of these elements is present in the human being Jesus of Nazareth.

Jesus as the Second Person of the Trinity

The traditional teaching of Chalcedon affirms one person in two distinct natures, divine and human. A logical clarification of the teaching affirms what is implicit in Chalcedon, that the one person is divine, the Second Person of the Trinity. As a consequence, while Jesus of Nazareth is a human being, he is not a human person, but a divine person. The term used for the union of a divine person with a human nature is then a “hypostatic” union. The issue is to provide a theological account of this union. As a hypostatic union it concerns personal identity, so that while *what* Jesus is remains fully human, *who* he is, his personal identity, is the Second Person of the Trinity.

What then is the cause of this union? Lonergan’s own thought on this issue underwent development. In his earlier writings on grace he identified the “grace of union” as the principle of the hypostatic union: “The grace of union is that finite entity received in the humanity of Christ so that it exists through the personal act of existence of the divine Word . . . Thus the grace of union imitates and participates in a finite way the divine paternity.”⁴² By the time of his christological writing, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, he had shifted to a different possibility. In the major section entitled, “On the Ontological Constitution of Christ,” Lonergan explores the variety of theological opinions that have been put forward in relation to the hypostatic union and its relationship to the divine essence.⁴³ In a final subsection entitled “Deducing the Composite from the Principle of Composition,” Lonergan spells out in detail his own resolution of the question. In doing so the elements of contingent predication, constitutive principle, and trinitarian relations are fully exploited:

the end itself but relation to the end” (24). He also provides there succinct accounts of absolute, horizontal, and vertical finalities.

41. “Two Points or Four?” 671; “A (Non-*Communio*) Trinitarian Ecclesiology” 464. See also J. Michael Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1995) 50.

42. Lonergan, *Early Latin Theology* 631–33.

43. Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2002) 107–55.

In the first place, then, the constitutive reason or cause of the hypostatic union does not tell us why the Son is a person, or why he is God, or why he is man, but why it is the same one who is God and who is man. For the Son is a person through a subsistent relation; the Son is God through the divine essence; the Son is man through a human essence; but it is through the constitutive reason or cause of the hypostatic union that the same one who is God is also man.⁴⁴

Given the Son has his own act of existence, which is the divine essence, to be “really and truly human” he will do so “by his own proper act of existence.” However, the truth of the Incarnation “demands not only a constitutive cause, which is the infinite act of existence of the Word, but also the production of an extrinsic term as the condition in the real order” for the contingent truth of the Incarnation to be realized.⁴⁵ This contingent term Lonergan will identify with a secondary act of existence which is to be distinguished from the grace of union:

The infinite act of existence of the Word, therefore, is the sole cause of the hypostatic union; on the other hand, the secondary act of existence, as it is not that which links and unites, neither is it that by which the link and unifier links and unites. We must conclude, then, that the secondary act of existence is in no way a linking and uniting intermediary. But inasmuch as the conjoining person constitutes himself contingently as man through the infinite act of existence, that secondary act follows by way of a simply posterior term . . . because this secondary act of existence is absolutely supernatural, it is also grace. However, it is not the grace of union as though constituting that union. The grace of union constituting the union is the sole constitutive cause of the union that is the infinite act of existence of the Word. Nevertheless, this secondary act of existence can be said to be the grace of union inasmuch as it is required by and consequent upon the constitutive cause of the union.⁴⁶

This is the position that Lonergan holds in his four-point hypothesis. In evoking the “secondary act of existence” of the *Logos* in relation to the Incarnation, Lonergan is following a suggestion found in the writings of Aquinas.⁴⁷

44. Ibid. 135.

45. Ibid. 139.

46. Ibid. 149. As noted by James Reichmann, M. De la Taille comes to a similar conclusion: “Consequently, if we are asked how many existences there are in Christ, we shall have to reply, one or two, according to the sense of the inquiry. *One, if there is question of the Act by which the natures exist, two, if there is question of the actuations, because the actuation of the human nature is temporal and created while the actuation of the Word, who is Himself the Act, is uncreated and eternal.* This is why St. Thomas, in the *Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word*, held two existences, whereas in the *Summa* he admits only one existence. III, q. 17, a. 2.” Emphasis added by Reichmann. Quoted in James B. Reichmann, “Aquinas, Scotus, and the Christological Mystery: Why Christ Is Not a Human Person,” *Thomist* 71 (2007) 451–74 at 472. Lonergan, however, does not adopt the solution of “created actuation,” which he considered to be based on a fallacy. See Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution* 57.

47. “But, there is also another being of this suppositum, not insofar as it is eternal, but insofar as it became a man in time. That being, even if it is not an accidental being, because man is not accidentally predicated of the Son of God, as was said above—nevertheless, it is

In summary then we can argue that we can truly say the human being, Jesus of Nazareth, is the Second Person of the Trinity (*who* he is, not *what* he is) because his “act of being/existence” is a created participation in the divine relation of paternity. This account immediately places the Incarnation within a trinitarian framework, relating Jesus’s act of existence to the inner trinitarian relation of paternity, which relation is the Father. Put more simply, Jesus’s relation to the Father defines his personal identity as Son.

There remains a question of how we might transpose this highly metaphysical account into categories more expressive of modern concerns. Doran has noted the difficulty of providing an account based on categories drawn from interiority, since we have no direct access to the data of Jesus’s human consciousness.⁴⁸ One approach might be to use Lonergan’s category of “incarnate meaning,” “the meaning of a person, of his way of life, of his words, or of his deeds. It may be his meaning for just one other person, or for a small group, or for a whole national, or social, or cultural, or religious tradition.”⁴⁹ Balthasar develops a similar category, the “life-form”: “What is a person without a life-form, that is to say, without a form which he has chosen for his life, a form into which and through which to pour out his life, so that his life becomes the soul of the form and the form becomes the expression of his soul?”⁵⁰ Both these categories seek to express something of the concrete meaning of a human life in its totality, that is, its concrete existence or act of being. The incarnate meaning of Jesus, his life-form, is that of the divine *Logos*.⁵¹

Jesus and the Beatific Vision

While there is a long-standing tradition that Jesus enjoyed the beatific vision from the first moments of his conscious existence,⁵² this position has come under increasing

not the principle being of its suppositum, but [its] secondary [being] [*non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium*].” Thomas Aquinas, *Concerning the Union of the Word Incarnate* a4, ed. and trans. Jason Lewis Andrew West (The Aquinas Translation Project, DeSales University, n.d.), http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/De_Unione/De_Unione4.html. Lonergan notes that overall Aquinas affirms only “a single act of existence in Christ” (*The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ* 121) but further notes that “one cannot attribute an equal role in the hypostatic union to the infinite act of existence and to the external term [i.e. the secondary act]” and that “the infinite act of existence is the sole reason and constitutive cause of this union” (147). Later he will argue that Christ is “in one way both ontologically and psychologically one and in another way [is] both ontologically and psychologically two” (221).

48. Doran, *Missions and Processions*.

49. Lonergan, *Method* 73.

50. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics*, vol. 1, *Seeing the Form*, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1983) 24.

51. Schwöbel also notes that questions of personal identity have a “narrative form.” See Schwöbel, “Christological and Trinitarian Thought” 143.

52. See for example, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 7, a. 3. While not necessarily accepting that Jesus enjoyed the beatific vision, Thomas Weinandy notes that there is a “venerable, and to some extent magisterial, tradition” affirming its existence in the human consciousness

pressure more recently, largely as a result of the popularity of kenotic approaches to the Incarnation. While one may question some of the assumptions behind these approaches, Lonergan's four-point proposal provides a framework for understanding why one may want to maintain the traditional position on Jesus's beatific vision, while also providing a clearer account of what such a beatific vision might and might not consist. Here again we find helpful a distinction between doctrine and systematics. Whether or not Jesus actually enjoyed such a vision is a matter of fact, of judgment, either ecclesial or theological.⁵³ How such a vision might arise and how we might understand it fall properly into the arena of systematics.

Once we place this question within the framework of the four-point hypothesis, the inner connection between the Incarnation and the beatific vision becomes more transparent. If the Incarnation arises as the term of the relation of paternity, the light of glory arises as the term of the relation of filiation. These two relations, paternity and filiation, are just different aspects of the one procession of the Son from the Father. Inasmuch as Jesus's identity arises as the term of the relation to paternity, so that he is the Second Person of the Trinity, his identity as Son implies a relation to the Father, that of filiation. The linkage of the two relations implies a necessary relation between Jesus's personal identity and his experience of the light of glory. Still this is a conditional necessity. Inasmuch as the incarnate Son can be understood (hypothetically) in terms of a participation in the divine relation to paternity, then his relation to the Father in terms of filiation and consequent experience of the light of glory could be understood to necessarily arise from his personal identity as Son. The four-point hypothesis provides a nexus between the two affirmations. The beatific vision of Jesus is then not just fitting or appropriate, but a consequence of his identity as Son.⁵⁴

As with the question of how we might transpose the notion of the secondary act of existence into more contemporary terms, there is also the question of how we might transpose the notion of Jesus's experience of the light of glory into our present context. Throughout his own efforts at transposition Lonergan maintains a fairly traditional stance that the *kenosis* of Christ consists in the addition of his human nature, not in any "switching off" of his divine nature. Jesus's *kenosis* "consists in a certain acquisition, in that he who is God has also become human in the true and proper sense."⁵⁵ He labored to bring this traditional belief into the categories drawn from his cognitional theory, highlighting the distinction between consciousness and knowledge, and between ineffable supernatural knowledge, effable supernatural knowledge, and effable natural knowledge, while giving an account of how each of these may be manifest in the life

of Jesus. See Thomas Weinandy, "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate Son," *Thomist* 70 (2006) 605–15 at 605.

53. Lonergan distinguishes between ecclesial and theological doctrines in Lonergan, *Method* 295–98.

54. The logic is not reversible. One could enjoy the beatific vision, but not be the Son, though one would in some sense participate in the divine Sonship.

55. Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution* 223.

of Jesus.⁵⁶ The shift here from the language of “vision” to “knowledge” is significant because Lonergan rejects “picture thinking” that would seek to conceive of the beatific vision along the lines of Jesus “seeing” everything there is to be seen. Rosenberg helpfully suggests analogies drawn from mystical and prophetic experience. Those who emerge from such experiences find it difficult to put their “knowledge” into words, even though the experience itself may be the basis of profound personal transformation.⁵⁷

One shift that may be helpful here can be found in Lonergan’s later attempts to reformulate the psychological analogy for the Trinity. In his essay “Christology Today” Lonergan posits as the starting point for the analogy, not his previous intellectualist position of God as an unrestricted act of understanding, but a “starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love.” This starting point is then identified with the Father: “in the New Testament named *ho theos*, who is identified with agape (1 John 4:8, 16).”⁵⁸ Rather than an overwhelming light of unrestricted insight being the foundation of Jesus’s beatific knowing, we might rather posit the all-embracing warmth of unoriginated love, a love that is the source of, and lies at the heart of, all being. Jesus’s knowledge is then more existential than intellectual, closer to a form of connatural knowledge found in the virtuous than direct insights into the nature of reality. This in fact seems to be the approach adopted by the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* which speaks of Jesus’s knowledge: “Such is first of all the case with the intimate and immediate knowledge that the Son of God made man has of his Father.” It is exemplified in the “divine penetration he had into the secret thoughts of human hearts.”⁵⁹

Whether we conceive of Jesus’s beatific vision in intellectualist or more existential terms, what is significant is that in either case such knowing is not conceptual, but preconceptual and ineffable. In order to express the content of this knowledge Jesus must draw upon his human experience, gained in the normal human way (effable natural knowledge, gained through experience, understanding, and judgment), in order to be able to express it in language proper to its communication.⁶⁰ Without such natural knowledge Jesus would be mute in relation to his beatific knowledge.⁶¹

56. See Randall S. Rosenberg, “Christ’s Human Knowledge: A Conversation with Lonergan and Balthasar,” *Theological Studies* 71 (2010) 817–45, doi:10.1177/004056391007100403, for an excellent treatment of these issues. For Lonergan’s own work see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnato*, 3rd ed. (Rome: Gregorian University, 1964), which recently appeared as vol. 8 in the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, and *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution*.

57. Rosenberg, “Christ’s Human Knowledge: A Conversation with Lonergan and Balthasar” 843–44.

58. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. F. Crowe (New York: Paulist, 1985) 74–99 at 93.

59. *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 473, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P1J.HTM.

60. Aquinas notes succinctly that without natural effable knowledge, Christ’s soul “would have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men.” Further he “would have had an intellectual soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it.” *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 9, a. 1.

61. Again Aquinas notes, “if there had been no other knowledge [apart from beatific knowledge] in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing” *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 9, a. 1 ad 1.

These two elements, the participation in paternity (Incarnation) and filiation (light of glory), together give us the notion of Jesus as the fullness of revelation. As the Incarnation of the divine *Logos*, Jesus is the full utterance of the Father into human history. He fully expresses the Father's will for the salvation of humanity, spoken to us. As the bearer of the light of glory, Jesus knows (beatifically) that will for salvation, and through his human experiences gained in a fully human way, he is able to speak that will to us all through his disciples. He is both the mediator and content of revelation. As the inner Word, the *Logos* is spoken, but as incarnate, the *Logos* both speaks (mediator) and is spoken (content).

Jesus as God's Anointed: Jesus and the Holy Spirit

As I noted in my opening comments of this article, any number of authors have suggested a lacuna in classical Christology because of the absence of a pneumatological dimension to the subject. The classical work by James Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit*, brought out the full range of biblical texts available to highlight the involvement of the Spirit in the mission of Jesus and the early church.⁶² Still Dunn and others dealing with this topic were primarily exegetes, not systematic theologians. At a more systematic level, Coffey, Weinandy, and Haight each develop a more pneumatological account of Christology, though in order to bring this dimension more fully into view, they do so on the back of a significant modification of traditional trinitarian theology.⁶³ Most radically Haight seems to collapse classical trinitarian notions of persons and processions into the philosophical categories of transcendence and immanence.⁶⁴ The Holy Spirit is then a symbol of divine immanence, and Jesus can be thought of as much as the one in whom the Spirit was fully present, as in the more traditional categories of *Logos* Christology.

On the other hand, the position of Aquinas cannot be said to be fulsome on the theme. While in the christological questions of *Summa Theologiae* III he refers to the scriptural text of the Annunciation in various ways, the closest he comes to the type of concern raised by modern authors is in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 7, a. 13, where he raises the question whether habitual grace in Christ's human nature is prior to the grace of union.⁶⁵ Answering in the negative, he notes,

62. James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975).

63. In various ways Coffey and Weinandy seek to implicate the Spirit in the procession of the Son, on the basis of the Spirit's role in the mission of Jesus. See Coffey, *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit*; Weinandy, *The Father's Spirit of Sonship*.

64. Haight, "The Case for Spirit Christology"; Haight, *Jesus, Symbol of God*.

65. In more contemporary idiom we might ask whether Jesus is the Incarnation of the Son because he is full of grace, or whether he is full of grace because he is the incarnation of the Son. Aquinas opts for the latter. To adopt the former is to run the risk of a "degree Christology" as suggested by Molnar. Paul D. Molnar, "Deus Trinitas: Some Dogmatic Implications of David Coffey's Biblical Approach to the Trinity," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 67 (2002) 33–54 at 35–36, doi:10.1177/002114000206700104.

But the principle of habitual grace, which is given with charity, is the Holy Ghost, Who is said to be sent inasmuch as He dwells in the mind by charity. Now the mission of the Son is prior, in the order of nature, to the mission of the Holy Ghost, even as in the order of nature the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, and love from wisdom. Hence the personal union, according to which the mission of the Son took place, is prior in the order of nature to habitual grace, according to which the mission of the Holy Ghost takes place.

This stance does place Jesus's relationship to the Spirit within a trinitarian framework and it can provide a stepping stone for placing this issue within the framework of the four-point hypothesis.

We have already identified the ways in which Jesus participates in the created terms of the relations of paternity and filiation. These two trinitarian relations together constitute the relation of active spiration whose term is the Holy Spirit. So one would expect the created participation of active spiration would also be present within Jesus. Together the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit into the human consciousness of Jesus. Further, drawing from the psychological analogy, the Spirit proceeds as originated love, "and since this Love is altogether special, by it the Father and Son love the just . . . [and] since an appropriate external term necessarily follows this special love . . . there is also *gratia gratum faciens*, grace that renders one pleasing to God."⁶⁶ In this context Lonergan is referring to the general case of sanctifying grace to the sinner made just, but in the case of Jesus this *gratia gratum faciens* flows from his identity as Son to his human nature. Through this grace Jesus experienced himself as the beloved of God, a reality expressed in the baptism (Mark 1:11 and parallels) and transfiguration narratives (Mark 9:2–8 and parallels) of the New Testament: "This is my beloved Son, listen to him." He is the one on whom the Spirit descends and remains (John 1:32) because of his identity as Son, an identity given in the Incarnation. This can properly be called an anointing because it makes the human being Jesus holy in the same way that other sainted men and women are holy, through the indwelling of the Spirit.

It could be asked whether this experience is any different from the beatific vision, especially where we might reconceive of that vision more in terms of an experience of divine love than of blinding insight. Here an analogy I have drawn elsewhere might be of assistance. If some entrance into the experience of the beatific vision may be gained through reference to the experience of mystics (for example, John of the Cross), then similarly entrance into the experience of divine favor might be found in those saints whose lives are grounded in divine delight (for example, Thérèse of Lisieux).⁶⁷ That one person may have both sets of experiences and yet they be distinct is not inconceivable.⁶⁸

66. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto 2007) 475.

67. Ormerod, "The Metaphysics of Holiness."

68. This requires more work and is beyond the scope of the present article. It might require a focus on the light of glory more as "that by which" Jesus "sees" the world, with loving, compassionate, and merciful eyes, as a transformation of his human subjectivity, whereas the experience of sanctifying grace remains one of being the object of divine love, as it is for us. I acknowledge the assistance of Jeremy Wilkins of the Lonergan Research Institute for this suggestion.

Jesus and the Kingdom—Reframing the Habit of Charity

There still remains the fourth created participation in the divine nature, what Lonergan refers to as the “habit of charity.” Following on our previous arguments, if the Spirit is present as a created term of active spiration from the Father and Son, there is also present the reverse relation of passive spiration, whose term is the Father and Son as a single principle. This common work of the Father and the Son is evident in a number of Johannine passages, for example: “Jesus said to them, ‘My food is to do the will of him who sent me and to accomplish his work’” (John 4:34; see also 5:17, 20, 36; 9:4; 10:32, 37; 17:4). Just as partaking in the relation of active spiration is to have one’s heart flooded by the Holy Spirit, partaking in the relation of passive spiration is to engage in the common work of the Father and Son, which has traditionally been identified as the habit of charity, the habitual orientation to enacting God’s love in the world. Today we might equally call it “working for the Kingdom of God.”⁶⁹

This reframing of the habit of charity in terms of working for the kingdom also provides a trinitarian account of this work as sharing in the common work of the Father and Son. Empowered by the Spirit given him without reserve, Jesus undertakes his common work with the Father of proclaiming and enacting the kingdom of God. Concretely in a world where the powers of sin and darkness hold sway this work is a struggle against evil:

The Kingdom is the concern of everyone: individuals, society, and the world. Working for the Kingdom means acknowledging and promoting God’s activity, which is present in human history and transforms it. *Building the Kingdom means working for liberation from evil in all its forms.* In a word, the Kingdom of God is the manifestation and the realization of God’s plan of salvation in all its fullness.⁷⁰

The enactment of this struggle in Jesus’s mission is through what Lonergan calls the “Law of the Cross.”⁷¹ Evil is overcome not through violence or force, but through redemptive suffering, turning the other cheek, forgiving one’s enemies, and returning blessings for curses. Through this the meaninglessness of evil becomes the opportunity for the creation of redemptive meaning and the suffering involved becomes the suffering of giving birth to that meaning.

These two aspects, sanctifying grace and the habit of charity present in Jesus as the term of the relations of active and passive spiration, are central to Jesus’s soteriological

69. There is of course now extensive literature on the notion of the kingdom of God, scriptural, missiological, and theological.

70. John Paul II, *Redemptoris Missio* (July 12, 1990) 15 (emphasis added), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio.html. See also David Bosch, *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1991) who notes that Jesus’s preaching of and action towards the kingdom launches “an all-out attack on evil in all its manifestations” (32).

71. For an account of the “Law of the Cross” as articulated in Lonergan, *De Verbo Incarnato*, see Doran, *Missions and Processions* 231–40.

role. Salvation is brought about through Jesus's realization of the kingdom in his own mission, a life given over to doing the Father's work (habit of charity), even to the point of his own death. But this work would be an act of self-negation, even self-hatred, were it not grounded in the absolute assurance of divine love poured into the heart of Jesus (sanctifying grace). This takes us into the heart of the paschal mystery.

Through these four aspects—the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation, the light of glory, sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity—we can truly say that “in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily.” Each of the trinitarian relations is manifest in the life and mission of Jesus, revealer and savior. Moreover, each of the subsequent three participations flows from the very first aspect, Jesus's participation in paternity. It is because Jesus is the Word of the Father spoken into human history as *Logos* incarnate that he enjoys the light of glory, that the Spirit descends on him and remains, and that he is empowered to give himself over to the work of building the kingdom of God. He is also the type and exemplar of all grace for us. We share in his mission and are saved through the gift of sanctifying grace made active in charity; in faith we are joined with Jesus as adopted sons and daughters of the Father; in hope we long to share in the final gift of glory that Jesus has as true and perfect Son.

Brief Comparison and Contrast

I now bring the results of this into a brief dialogue with the three positions outlined in the earlier part of this article. I would argue that introducing the four-point hypothesis into Christology achieves many of the goals Schwöbel seeks to achieve. It provides a fully trinitarian account of Christology, but does so without following Schwöbel's program which would abandon the “rigid distinction” between immanent processions and economic missions, eliminating the notions of relations as originating relations and “seeing them as mutual and reciprocal relations, though of course not as symmetrical relations.”⁷² In fact if anything, the approach above gives this traditional account new life by extending the logic of processions and missions to the trinitarian relations and created participations in the divine life and maintaining the notion of relations of origin. It does, however, include the reciprocal relations of filiation and passive spiration, which are not relations of origin (paternity and active spiration), but their obverse. The addition of these two relations brings out a much stronger trinitarian account of Christology, as Schwöbel desires.

Here the account above has affinities with that of Balthasar, with its strong nexus between the divine processions and missions. However, Balthasar reads back from this nexus between processions and missions to attempt a trinitarian account of creation in terms of the “distance” between Father and Son. The account above, on the other hand, reads forward from a classical account of the relationship between Creator and creation in terms of contingent predication, to propose an analogous understanding of the way in which the processions, and more broadly the trinitarian relations, may relate to the created order through the same logic of contingent predication. This avoids any

72. Schwöbel, “Christological and Trinitarian Thought” 140.

suggestion of mutability in God, something which many commentators have identified as a concern in the work of Balthasar.⁷³

Finally, Coffey rightly asks for a fuller account of the pneumatological dimension of Christology. In order to achieve this, he proposes an alternate model of the Trinity to the classic account of processions and so develops his own account of bestowal or mutual love. This has the advantage of identifying two movements of love, from the Father to the human Jesus and the returning love of Jesus to the Father, as economic aspects corresponding to immanent aspects of the bestowal model. One of the advantages of the four-point hypothesis in this setting, over the more traditional account of processions and missions, is that it helps us identify a very similar structure to that proposed by Coffey, through the relations of active and passive spiration and their created participations in sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. Nonetheless, it does so within a very traditional theological framework, without requiring the development of an alternate trinitarian model.

Conclusion

We began by noting the strong connection between Christology and Trinity in the history of dogmatic development, yet the relatively weak connection that some have suggested exists within theological accounts of Christology. While various proposals have been suggested for overcoming this problem, the present proposal stands in more direct continuity with the Western tradition, extending the notions of trinitarian processions and missions to that of the trinitarian relations and participations of the divine nature. I have argued that this expansion of the tradition position allows for many of the more recent concerns to be constructively addressed. This again demonstrates the utility of Lonergan's four-point hypothesis in advancing a range of issues in systematic theology.

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73. Gerard F. O'Hanlon, *The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs Von Balthasar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990); Guy Mansini, "Balthasar and the Theodramatic Enrichment of the Trinity," *Thomist* 64 (2000) 499–519.