

articulation” (87), whereby they adapt their faith in ways that maintain its resonance and plausibility amidst a religiously pluralistic context. Such people face challenges, of course. And J. does well in discussing the challenges that emerge from both social changes (e.g., the dissolution of tightly bound religious enclaves) and cultural changes (e.g., hegemonic values related to individualism).

My single caveat here, however, is that J. portrays these (and other) challenges as being considerably less challenging than they really are, often concluding his complex discussions with assertions that are too simple. For instance, he discusses the shortcomings of individualism and rationalist approaches to morality with respect to their prospects for undergirding a just social order. Counterpoised with this, though, is his assertion, “The Christian belief in a God who loves human beings unconditionally certainly has the potential to liberate our own capacity to love unconditionally” (129). This may be true, but simply asserting it gives short shrift to the reality that, for many nonbelievers, the cultural frameworks underwritten by individualism and rationalism are often deemed to be credible substitutes for religious convictions and reliable guides in attempting to live ethical and socially responsible lives. In other words, J. sees in religious faith a source of deep experiences of interpersonal connection (as well as of human dignity, spirituality, and transcendence). But, despite his aforementioned wariness about overconfident religious claims, he still tends to downplay the possibility that alternative cultural narratives and tropes can engender similar experiences and sensibilities among the nonreligious. We are learning more about the effectiveness of these alternatives from recent empirical studies of atheists, agnostics, and the ever-increasing religious “nones.” As this research is conducted more broadly, one hopes it will also be done with the depth and nuance that J. displays in this excellent book.

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Shadows of Doubt: Language and Truth in Post-Reformation Catholic Culture. By Stefania Tutino. New York: Oxford University, 2014. Pp. xiv + 278. \$74.

This dense but fascinating work argues that post-Reformation Catholicism helped create not only modernity but postmodernity as well. And by postmodernity Tutino means above all doubt about accessibility, knowledge of, or expression of, truths or the Truth. She explores these doubts and epistemological anxieties through case studies of the works of several intellectual figures from the two centuries or so after the Council of Trent. Most of these figures are Jesuits or ex-Jesuits (such as Jesuits Pedro Juan Perpiñán, Famiano Strada, Francisco Suárez, Leonardo Lessius; and ex-Jesuits Agostino Mascardi and Paolo Beni).

T. carefully examines both well-known, well-published authors such as Suárez and Lessius and more obscure authors like Mascardi and Beni, whose work may remain in manuscript form or in little-known published editions. T. shows Mascardi to have

foreshadowed Paul Ricoeur by several centuries through his sophisticated analysis of narrative and emplotment as the way historians save the past from obscurity and yet remain without certitude about a past that is at least partly lost to the present. Mascardi expressed the “epistemological and existential anxiety of humans insofar as they simultaneously exist in time and are devoured by it” (73). In Beni, T. finds an early modern voice that challenged a hermeneutic of ecclesiastical history as a story of undoubted, unchanging continuity, and pointed instead to post-Reformation culture as a “mix of certainty and uncertainty, truth and verisimilar, facts and interpretations” (99).

T. masterfully explores the concept of the oath as a not-so-successful means of guaranteeing the truth of spoken or written language; she shows clearly how Suárez and Lessius dissected the gaps between the words of an oath and the variable intentions of those swearing it.

This well-researched study could benefit from some additions, perhaps another chapter or two. T. speaks often of “post-Reformation Catholic culture,” thus implying that Catholicism in the early modern period is to be understood as in relation (hostile or otherwise) to the Protestant Reformation. But most scholars today speak of early modern Catholicism as a kind of world church in the making, in which interaction with cultures around the world altered Catholicism as Catholic missionaries sought to spread the gospel. The kinds of doubts about truth claims T. wishes to highlight were abundant in post-Columbus Catholic culture, and the Jesuits play a central role here too, from the mid-1500s onward. Thus, it seems imperative to complement her research with questions about language and truth that emerged from, for example, attempts to express Christian doctrines in the languages of North American natives. (See the many volumes of *Jesuit Relations* written in 17th-century Canada.) And something should be added on Jesuits such as Mateo Ricci in China—a favorite topic among scholars in recent years. Jesuit creation of dictionaries for various languages and the intellectual difficulties involved in such work should be examined as well. Could Christian theology be expressed in the native languages of Asia and the Americas? Or was such theology inextricably tied to classical culture and the Greek and Latin languages? Was “universal” truth “particular” after all?

The Council of Trent has often been presented as condemning in no uncertain terms Protestant teaching. Yet the “canons” of Trent name no Protestants whatsoever, and the council’s formula of *si quis dixerit . . . anathema sit* (if anyone were to say . . . let him be anathema) left room for doubt as to whether anyone actually held the opinions being condemned. Also, Trent refrained from issuing a decree on papal authority, even though rejection of that authority was the one thing all Protestants could agree on. Trent was cautious, above all, and it was reluctant to say too much, or anything at all, in areas where the bishops themselves were in disagreement—and there were plenty of such areas. Doubts and disagreements abounded at Trent. This, too, should be part of T.’s book.

I mention these matters because I believe that T.’s overall argument is quite convincing, and that her work merits more than a nod by scholars and students. T.’s argument could be strengthened with some additions and with more attention to the fact

that most of her authors were Jesuits for at least part of their adult lives. What was/is it about the Society of Jesus that favors honest doubts over dubious certitudes?

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Der Jansenismus—eine “katholische Häresie”? Das Ringen um Gnade, Rechtfertigung und die Autorität Augustins in der frühen Neuzeit. Edited by Dominik Burkard and Tanja Thanner. Münster: Aschendorff, 2014. Pp. viii + 464. €56.

This collection of 18 essays belongs to a revival of scholarly interest in Jansenism gathering momentum in recent years after a heyday of publications in the 1960s and 1970s. The essays began as papers given at a symposium in Würzburg in 2011 that queried Jansenism as a “Catholic heresy.” The published format evinces several deficiencies. The brief two-page preface is inadequate on several counts. It makes no effort to explain the oxymoronic concept of a “Catholic heresy,” to point out the significance of the essays, or to argue for their cohesion. The volume’s title alone asserts cohesion, but the contents do not deliver. Not all essays do or can weave together Jansenism as a Catholic heresy, grace and justification, and Augustine’s authority.

The first four essays provide historical background to the Jansenist controversy: the development of Augustine’s thinking on freedom and grace until the composition of the *Confessions* (Cornelius Petrus Mayer), Luther’s reading of Augustine (Otto Hermann Pesch), Calvin’s convergences with and divergences from Augustine (Karin Schreiber), and the *De auxiliis* controversy: the vexatious quarrel between Dominicans and Jesuits in the late 16th and early 17th centuries on the relationship between divine grace and human free will (Karlheinz Ruhstorfer).

The authority of Thomas Aquinas is more prominent than that of Augustine in Ruhstorfer’s brief but helpful analysis. This is even more the case in Sylvio Hermann De Franceschi’s essay on the contest between Dominican Thomists and Jesuit Molinists. Presenting themselves as defenders of Tridentine orthodoxy, the latter branded the former as Calvinist, and consequently Jansenist, sympathizers. If anything, Thomism was a candidate to be a “Catholic heresy” among the anti-Thomist Molinists.

Only at the end of the volume do readers encounter an engagement with Jansenism as a heresy. And the verdict is that it was no such thing. Catherine Maire, an established authority on Jansenism and French political culture, calls Jansenism “a curious, dogmatically empty heresy” (375). In her essay on *Unigenitus* (1713), the papal bull that condemned 101 propositions taken from the Jansenist theologian Pasquier Quesnel (1634–1719), Maire maintains that Jansenism was condemned on account of its association with Gallicanism. Jan Roegiers addresses the collection’s theme at the outset of his essay on the political dimensions of Jansenism and anti-Jansenism. He begins with Jean Carreyre’s definition from 1924 in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*—“a unique heresy that always wanted to remain within the Church despite repeated condemnations by the Holy See”—and rehearses other scholarly appraisals that are