

not suffer” (245). On the other hand, those who defend God’s passibility by arguing that God is inherently temporal risk implying that sin, suffering, and evil are constitutive of God (283–96). One might say that the impassibilists are most adept at the left-brain or syllogistic modes of addressing the problem, while the passibilists are most sensitive to the right-brain or metaphoric aspects of the problem and use of language.

These essays reveal some useful ways to help reconcile the two sides, in particular the need to avoid category mistakes. Of particular note is the way Marshall provides an excellent clarification of what can be properly attributed to a person and to a nature (278–83), an important bulwark against a kind of latent Nestorianism that can creep into certain expressions of traditional doctrine (15). Nevertheless, there is one major lacuna. As has been argued elsewhere, God’s simplicity and pure actuality do not entail God’s being unresponsive, as often implied by the language of what Hart calls “Baroque Thomism,” since God is not the same in all possible worlds (see, e.g., Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* [2003], chap. 3.; see Aquinas, *ST 1*, q.25, a.5). There may, for example, be a world in which Hannah did not pray for a child and in which Samuel was not born (see 1 Sam 1:1–2). Yet, apart from a brief section by Jenson (121–26) aimed mainly at overcoming certain inadequate conceptions of God’s eternity, there is little attempt in these essays to address the relationship of time to eternity or to exploit the conceptual resources offered by modal logic in examining possible worlds as opposed to changes over time within one world. This omission is unfortunate, given the obvious problems that result when God’s suffering, responsiveness, and mutability are confused. With this proviso, however, I have no hesitation in recommending this collection for its clarity, insight, and accuracy into one of the most difficult and existentially important of all the great theological problems.

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DOING BETTER: THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ETHICS. By Tad Dunne. Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2010. Pp. x + 295. \$30.

In the large corpus of his writings, Bernard Lonergan regrettably wrote relatively little about ethics. Dunne, a long-time Lonergan scholar, here offers a very suggestive approach to how Lonergan’s work on method in theology might be fruitfully extended into the field of ethics.

The book seeks to expand Lonergan’s invitation “to discover the methods natural to our hearts and minds” into the field of ethics (222). The early chapters accomplish this goal admirably by presenting a series of explanations, imaginative scenarios, and exercises that guide readers toward recognizing within themselves the innate “normative drives” that are the

primordial sources from which we form ethical ideals and principles. For example, D. offers an Advance Medical Directive for signature, and then invites the reader to reflect on the experiences, questions, insights, feelings, and judgments that she or he was actually having while engaging with the exercise. He follows up this exercise with a scenario about a decision that a terminally ill man faces.

These and similar exercises throughout the book are intended to help readers recognize as their own the normative drives (or “exigences”) that underlie and motivate moral reflection and action. D. describes these drives as the “inner demand to know that comes prior to any decision to learn,” the “exigence to improve our lives,” and the desire “to bond with others” (33).

Yet human beings also betray these normative drives, both through their own fault and because of the prejudices inherited from their cultures and traditions. D. also explores how the pervasive effects of these betrayals profoundly complicate the tasks of ethical reflection. Here as in many other places in the book D. offers new words in place of Lonergan’s more technical terminology, with the intention of making the basic ideas more widely accessible.

The title and subtitle communicate an intriguing combination of modesty and boldness. “Doing better” seems a far more modest goal than, say, “doing perfectly.” “Doing better” means “to improve human living” (246), and this is accomplished whenever actions satisfy the normative ethical drives to know, choose, and love. Doing better also means following the example of the “moral universe” that constantly builds upon previously existing events and things through the emergence of ever novel and more complex entities. Human beings participate in this bettering process when the “exigencies of the universe show up in humans” now as conscious exigencies (26).

Yet, D. claims, taking seriously these exigencies for doing better is nevertheless revolutionary. Perhaps the book’s most original feature is its effort to show that the “eight functional specialties” are a natural outgrowth of the activities and underlying normative drives involved each day in our ethical judgment and decision making. D. argues that the most comprehensive self-understanding of these acts reveals that they form eight interrelated groupings. He further shows how this model of self-understanding provides a framework that will greatly facilitate effective and “revolutionary” collaboration on a wide range of ethical problems including health care, international relations, and education. Central to his exposition is the method of “mutual exposure of horizons,” which corresponds to what Lonergan called dialectics. This means entering into dialogue with a perceptiveness and willingness to consider how both the views of others as well as one’s own on an ethical issue are grounded in “fundamental concerns about learning, choosing and loving” (199–200). Through this dialogue of mutual exposure, those fundamental concerns are tested for their compatibility with the

normative drives, and “we can expect some surprises. Those who think they are fully open may discover that they are in fact closed.” Others may find they possess an “unrestricted openness” to questions about what is better and more loving than they had thought (200). Later D. also shows how this approach sheds new light on the meaning of perennial ethical and political categories such as power, authority, autonomy, human rights, and duty.

The book is a very rich exploration of many nuances of Lonergan’s thought transposed into this ethical context. D. offers many keen and original ideas. Especially noteworthy are his attention to the importance of beauty and symbolism in ethical reflection (37–38, 235–36) and his treatment of how the expansion of love transforms moral horizons (133–34).

The book’s structure itself mirrors its subject matter of invitation to mutual exposure of horizons. Its mode is invitational rather than argumentative. Those who might approach this book seeking rigorous arguments to justify D.’s claims will no doubt have some dissatisfactions. But those willing to accept the book’s invitation will learn a great deal.

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THE ORIGINS OF WAR: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE. By Matthew A. Shadle. Washington: Georgetown University, 2011. Pp. viii + 246. \$29.95.

Shadle’s book offers a valuable service for the study of war. His approach concentrates not merely on abstract questions of just-war morality but asks instead where wars come from. He does this through narrative and examining concrete situations, historical and current, in all their dependence on cultural factors in conflicting societies.

Early Christian theories may have been self-serving. They believed wars came from people unlike themselves, with false assumptions stemming from paganism. When, after Constantine, Christians began to war among themselves, their conclusion was simply that the enemies must be bad Christians; good Christians would never war against other Christians.

The watershed comes with Augustine’s recognition that Christians now bear the responsibility to protect society against injustice. What was the Christian to do? Augustine’s conclusion that Christians were responsible to restore justice is inescapable. The means involved use of force, and subsequent just war theory has always struggled with that result—proponents seeking to prevent wars if possible or at least to limit the violence.

Modern theorists of war—realists who see war as inevitable and liberals who believe it can be prevented—have understood war in terms of fixed and static characteristics of states. S. sees the seeds of this understanding in a conceptual divorce of the natural and supernatural, the religious