normative drives, and “we can expect some surprises. Those who think they are fully open may discover that they are in fact closed.” Others may find they possess an “unrestricted openness” to questions about what is better and more loving than they had thought (200). Later D. also shows how this approach sheds new light on the meaning of perennial ethical and political categories such as power, authority, autonomy, human rights, and duty.

The book is a very rich exploration of many nuances of Lonergan’s thought transposed into this ethical context. D. offers many keen and original ideas. Especially noteworthy are his attention to the importance of beauty and symbolism in ethical reflection (37–38, 235–36) and his treatment of how the expansion of love transforms moral horizons (133–34).

The book’s structure itself mirrors its subject matter of invitation to mutual exposure of horizons. Its mode is invitational rather than argumentative. Those who might approach this book seeking rigorous arguments to justify D.’s claims will no doubt have some dissatisfactions. But those willing to accept the book’s invitation will learn a great deal.

Boston College PATRICK BYRNE

THE ORIGINS OF WAR: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE. By Matthew A. Shadle. Washington: Georgetown University, 2011. Pp. viii + 246. $29.95.

Shadle’s book offers a valuable service for the study of war. His approach concentrates not merely on abstract questions of just-war morality but asks instead where wars come from. He does this through narrative and examining concrete situations, historical and current, in all their dependence on cultural factors in conflicting societies.

Early Christian theories may have been self-serving. They believed wars came from people unlike themselves, with false assumptions stemming from paganism. When, after Constantine, Christians began to war among themselves, their conclusion was simply that the enemies must be bad Christians; good Christians would never war against other Christians.

The watershed comes with Augustine’s recognition that Christians now bear the responsibility to protect society against injustice. What was the Christian to do? Augustine’s conclusion that Christians were responsible to restore justice is inescapable. The means involved use of force, and subsequent just war theory has always struggled with that result—proponents seeking to prevent wars if possible or at least to limit the violence.

Modern theorists of war—realists who see war as inevitable and liberals who believe it can be prevented—have understood war in terms of fixed and static characteristics of states. S. sees the seeds of this understanding in a conceptual divorce of the natural and supernatural, the religious culture and the secular in medieval and Renaissance times, a divorce accepted in the neoscholastic theologies with their radical dissociation of the natural and the supernatural. For them, states and the international order can fulfill themselves without reference to the grace of God.

In most areas of more recent Catholic theology, even in the understanding of the state, these suppositions no longer hold. S. finds, however, that the reigning Catholic treatments of the origin of war, including those of Jacques Maritain (a great influence on recent popes) and of John Courtney Murray (who influenced current theorists of both Right [e.g., George Weigel] and Left [e.g., Brian Hehir]) have lost earlier Christian insight into the role of religious culture in the causes of war. Seeing either neorealism or neoliberalism as involving static concepts of the action of states, S. finds in constructionist philosophy an opening to restore to this discussion the elements of historicity and an appreciation of the interaction of nature and grace.

Constructionism will not accomplish this by itself, but S. examines in detail the treatment of historicity, nature, and grace by all these Catholic authorities, seeing room in their teaching for recognition of historically determined elements of culture in the inclination of people to war and of the interaction of nature and grace.

S. addresses a large topic, and loose ends remain. Is Christian, even Catholic, faith so essential to a proper understanding of how we come to war that we cannot expect anyone other than Christians to work for war's prevention? If so, that is bad news, as Christians and Muslims will have to come to ways of peace together, or we will have a very miserable 21st century. We will have to find such understandings with others as well, and this can hardly be done without a disposition on our part to seek the elements of faith and good will in others than ourselves. Openness to the convictions of others and some humility with regard to our own ultimate rightness have got to be supposed. David Schindler raises this problem most effectively in his critique of Weigel. S. occasionally hints at looking for this good will on the part of others but generally puts his reliance on Christian principle alone.

And has just war theory brought us to accept war as legitimate? Ever since Augustine acceptance has seemed to characterize Christian thinking. The proportionalist thinking of many Catholic authors pre supposes it. Planning the means to just peace rather than to just war seems, thus far, to be the preoccupation of Protestant more than of Catholic Christians.

These are topics that need to be explored if S.'s valuable contribution is to lead to the important consequences it promises. Study of the origins of war attains meaning when it is a means of preventing war and promoting justice and peace.

Boston College RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J.