welcomed into the embrace of trinitarian love. In a salient chapter on iconography, the authors remind the reader that the disabled are iconic figures with the capacity to reveal the divine to all of humanity: "All of creation participates in the radical effect of Christ's embodiment and therefore all bodies, in their limitless variety, are equally valuable icons of God. Accommodation of each other's physicality is the vehicle through which we take part in divinization. Our humanity/divinity deepens and flourishes in human encounter, which flows in the Trinitarian paradigm of self through other" (111).

The authors provide a timely and significant contribution to the fields of practical theology and disability studies, and issue a clarion call to Christian communities to become places of sanctuary for the disabled and their families.

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Action and Character according to Aristotle: The Logic of the Moral Life. By Kevin L. Flannery, S.J. Washington: Catholic University of America, 2013. Pp. xxxii + 314. $59.95.

This book is first and foremost a contribution to the study of Aristotle's understanding of action and of his ethical theory. Discussion of the nature and internal structure of human acts in chapters 1–4 paves the way for discussion in chapters 5–8 of how acts and character types are to be evaluated.

The thesis of chapter 1 is that the subject matter of ethics is singular human acts. While singular acts are not subject to the laws of Aristotelian syllogistic (and the so-called practical syllogism is not strictly speaking an Aristotelian syllogism), they are subject to logical principles and especially to the principle of noncontradiction. Thus, while ethics is not and cannot be a fully developed Aristotelian science, we can know a great deal about behavior and can organize this knowledge and speak intelligently with one another about the acts that we and others perform. In this sense we have knowledge of the practical realm.

Chapter 2 shows that human acts have the structure that Aristotle in the *Physics* recognizes in what he calls movements: they have a starting point and an end point. This is not to say that all human acts are movements, or that they all involve physical movements, only that their structure corresponds to the structure of a physical movement. Because of this structure, human acts have an intelligibility that goes beyond their agents' acts of the will.

Chapter 3 points out that, besides having the "whence and whither" structure of movements, human acts also involve a number of factors. While these factors have traditionally been called the circumstances of human acts, F. argues that they are better called "constituents." To articulate them, he draws on Aristotle's analysis in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.1 and *Eudemian Ethics* II.6–9 of how force can interfere with voluntariness.

Chapter 4 further develops the internal articulation of acts into their constituents, drawing on Aristotle's analysis, in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.1 and *Eudemian Ethics* II.9, of how different types of ignorance render or do not render an act involuntary. These constituents include the agent, what the agent is doing, what the act is about (the "intelligible matter" of the act), the instrument that the agent uses, the end for which the agent acts (more about this in chapters 5 and 6), and the manner in which the agent acts.

Chapter 5 investigates Aristotle's use of the distinction between what is *kath' hauto* or *per se* and what is *kata sumbebêkos* or *per accidens*. This investigation clarifies Aristotle's understanding of the end of an act and of the intelligibility of the practical realm generally. Consideration of the correspondence or lack of correspondence between what agents contribute to their acts and the genuine good, the end of human nature, takes us into ethical analysis proper.

Chapter 6 considers the knowledge that agents have of what they are bringing about as they are bringing it about. It studies the intellectual virtue of *phronêsis*, which is responsible for gathering together all practical activities in an orderly way. The latter part of this chapter discusses how pleasure corrupts *phronêsis* by drawing a person's attention away from understanding and appreciating reasonable activity and leading a person to pursue pleasure for its own sake, not as a part of natural human practices.

The discussion of *phronêsis* continues in chapter 7. In a careful examination of *Eudemian Ethics* VIII.1, F. argues that people with *phronêsis* are so thoroughly committed to the pursuit of the good that they cannot choose to misuse their *phronêsis*. In this practical sense, they are bound by the principle of noncontradiction.

Chapter 8 highlights a variety of character types that fall short of *phronêsis*. In each case, the problem is a lack of unity, an internal contradiction, a failure of agents to organize their lives in the reasonable and consistent manner of the *phronimos*. This chapter draws on *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.4 and *Eudemian Ethics* VII.6.

This book will be of interest to students of Aristotle for its examination of how ethics is knowledge without being science, its nuanced appreciation of how Aristotle's logic, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics* are relevant to ethics, and especially its use of the *Eudemian Ethics* to refine and extend positions taken in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This study of Aristotle is also relevant to larger concerns about the type of knowledge that we can and should expect from ethical theory and, by extension, from moral theology.

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Postmodern Apologetics? Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy. By Christina M. Gschwandtner. Perspectives in Continental Philosophy. Edited by John D. Caputo. New York: Fordham University, 2013. Pp. xxvi + 352. $72; $27.

Perhaps the most significant part of the title of Gschwandtner's excellent survey is the question mark after the word "apologetics." Despite the subtitle, G. makes it