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Chapter 4 further develops the internal articulation of acts into their constituents, drawing on Aristotle's analysis, in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.1 and *Eudemian Ethics* II.9, of how different types of ignorance render or do not render an act involuntary. These constituents include the agent, what the agent is doing, what the act is about (the "intelligible matter" of the act), the instrument that the agent uses, the end for which the agent acts (more about this in chapters 5 and 6), and the manner in which the agent acts.

Chapter 5 investigates Aristotle's use of the distinction between what is *kath' hauto* or *per se* and what is *kata sumbebêkos* or *per accidens*. This investigation clarifies Aristotle's understanding of the end of an act and of the intelligibility of the practical realm generally. Consideration of the correspondence or lack of correspondence between what agents contribute to their acts and the genuine good, the end of human nature, takes us into ethical analysis proper.

Chapter 6 considers the knowledge that agents have of what they are bringing about as they are bringing it about. It studies the intellectual virtue of *phronêsis*, which is responsible for gathering together all practical activities in an orderly way. The latter part of this chapter discusses how pleasure corrupts *phronêsis* by drawing a person's attention away from understanding and appreciating reasonable activity and leading a person to pursue pleasure for its own sake, not as a part of natural human practices.

The discussion of *phronêsis* continues in chapter 7. In a careful examination of *Eudemian Ethics* VIII.1, F. argues that people with *phronêsis* are so thoroughly committed to the pursuit of the good that they cannot choose to misuse their *phronêsis*. In this practical sense, they are bound by the principle of noncontradiction.

Chapter 8 highlights a variety of character types that fall short of *phronêsis*. In each case, the problem is a lack of unity, an internal contradiction, a failure of agents to organize their lives in the reasonable and consistent manner of the *phronimos*. This chapter draws on *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.4 and *Eudemian Ethics* VII.6.

This book will be of interest to students of Aristotle for its examination of how ethics is knowledge without being science, its nuanced appreciation of how Aristotle's logic, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics* are relevant to ethics, and especially its use of the *Eudemian Ethics* to refine and extend positions taken in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This study of Aristotle is also relevant to larger concerns about the type of knowledge that we can and should expect from ethical theory and, by extension, from moral theology.

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Postmodern Apologetics? Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy. By Christina M. Gschwandtner. Perspectives in Continental Philosophy. Edited by John D. Caputo. New York: Fordham University, 2013. Pp. xxvi + 352. $72; $27.

Perhaps the most significant part of the title of Gschwandtner's excellent survey is the question mark after the word "apologetics." Despite the subtitle, G. makes it

clear from the start that none of the authors she treats actually makes an "argument" in the traditional sense for either God or Christ. The reader also realizes quickly that "in contemporary philosophy" here means "in continental philosophy," as the series title indicates. Moreover, "continental" means almost exclusively French; and "philosophy" means predominantly thought located within the French "phenomenological turn."

Within these limits, G. has produced a fine introduction to contemporary French philosophers' contribution to religious questions. The book provides a masterfully lucid and succinct exposition of major themes from a number of thinkers. It begins by locating the background remotely in Martin Heidegger, then more proximately in Emmanuel Lévinas, Jacques Derrida, and Paul Ricoeur. It proceeds to the current generation of Jean-Luc Marion and some lesser-known figures: Michel Henry, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-Yves Lacoste, and Emmanuel Falque. The final section of the book deals with studies and appropriations of their thought by three America-based scholars.

G. characterizes these philosophers as "postmodern" because of their rejection of metanarratives, their espousal of shifting positions, and above all their dependence on Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. This influence is in some ways decisive, but varies in degree. Some critics take exception to, for example, Heidegger's strict separation of philosophy from theology; and they all expand the idea of "phenomenology" considerably beyond Husserl's meaning. Although they disagree on significant points, they are in accord in accepting Heidegger's criticism of the "ontotheological" structure of metaphysics, and therefore renounce any effort at either apologetics or "natural theology" in the traditional sense. In particular they reject the effort to demonstrate the existence of God or in any way to make an "object" of the divine. God is, as Marion insists, beyond "being." Nevertheless, some maintain that the ontotheological critique does not touch certain metaphysical thinkers in the Christian tradition (e.g., the Church Fathers, Augustine, and even Aquinas). Obviously, scholars who think that Heidegger's critique was based on a misreading of much of the Western metaphysical tradition, or who think that the "God beyond being" was already implied in a correct understanding of the "analogy of being," may find the thought of these postmodern followers of Heidegger to be unnecessarily self-limiting.

Instead of engaging in any sort of metaphysical argumentation, these philosophers attempt to describe "phenomenologically" the (Christian) life of faith as it is lived. G. argues, although sometimes rather tentatively, that this constitutes a kind of apologetics. By showing that religious experiences can be examined and described as "phenomena," according to G., these postmoderns show the coherence and meaningfulness and hence the "validity" of such experiences. But despite her own contentions, G. wonders (rightly) whether this process really constitutes a defense of faith, even one aimed at strengthening the conviction of the believer—a fortiori one seeking to answer the questions of those caught in doubt or trying to meet the objections of the unbeliever.

G.'s unraveling of the sometimes-complex thought of these authors might provoke the reader to raise a number of questions. Has this sort of Christian phenomenology,

by restricting itself to a description of the "meaningfulness" of a faith, effectively accepted defeat in the realm of critical thinking? Of course, a lived interpretation of existence constitutes "experience" on a certain level, but it does not guarantee the reality of what the experience presupposes or implies. "Experience" in this sense can be illusory, ideologically constructed, or both. What answer can be given by phenomenology to the plurality of "meaningful" and "valid" faiths that are at odds with one another? Could not this kind of phenomenological justification apply to any coherent way of life or system of belief, including that of the atheist? In the absence of a vigorous philosophical engagement with fundamental theological and scientific questions, is the believer left with no option but a kind of "Wittgensteinean fideism" or—perhaps more appropriately in this context—an attachment to the "beauty" of Christianity, à la Chateaubriand? And does this perceived beauty in turn depend on the projection of some ideal form of Christian faith, ignoring its actual internal plurality?

To G.'s credit, her presentation of these philosophers, while constantly sympathetic, does not overlook their inconsistencies or their mutual disagreements; nor does it attempt to disguise the limitations of the phenomenological project itself. The clarity and focus of her presentation make this book a valuable resource for graduate students in theology and philosophy.

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