

Facing the World: A Theological and Biographical Inquiry

Theological Studies
2014, Vol. 75(1) 23–33
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sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0040563914520919
tsj.sagepub.com


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Abstract

This article is a revised and expanded version of the talk given by Johann Baptist Metz after being awarded the Salzburg University Week Theology Prize (2007). It offers a picture of the new political theology, of how he seeks to describe and construe a theology “facing the world.” He begins by acknowledging his debt to Karl Rahner, then discusses how confrontations with various “worlds”—World War II, Auschwitz, the world church, and globalization—brought him to construct theological categories and strategies.

Keywords

political theology, compassion, Auschwitz, *memoria passionis*, fundamental theology, suffering of others, suffering, remembrance, facing the world

Translator’s Introduction

The article translated below links the biography and theology of Johann Baptist Metz, and also brings into focus his challenge to our cosseted theological conversations.* Metz insists that we

* The text was published as “‘Mit dem Gesicht zur Welt’: Eine theologisch-biographische Auskunft,” in *Politische Theologie—gegengelesen*, Jahrbuch Politische Theologie 5, ed. Jürgen Manemann and Bernd Wachter (Münster: Lit, 2008) 1–10.

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have a duty as theologians to face into the storms of our broken world. More than that, he insists that in the cries of the suffering we have an additional source of intellectual criteria for theological reasoning; the cries interrupt the closed flow of ideas and systematic argument. In other words, Metz proposes that the *logos* of theology move beyond a theoretical mediation of religion and human experience toward a ground in critical and reflective praxis, that is, in thoughtful and transformative action.

Metz's theology is a practical fundamental theology of the world, a political theology that values not fixed systems of theory but concrete narratives of human suffering. It calls not for a better theory to mediate human and religious experience but for a transformative praxis. These are among the parameters for his theological thinking. But he does not tell us what to decide, which ethic or economics to hold, but simply that our theological reasoning must also attend to the reality of human suffering. In other words, theological reasoning presumes an a priori of human suffering to be redeemed; the touchstone for theological analysis and construction today is a *memoria passionis*, an engaged compassion.

In recent years the notion of political theology has expanded to include any reflection on the relationship between religion and culture. But for Metz, as well as for his Protestant colleagues Jürgen Moltmann and Dorothee Sölle who also developed a political theology, the notion has always meant much more than that. It is first and foremost a theology—a fundamental theology, to be precise; thus it must include an assertion of the parameters and questions for fruitful theological inquiry.

Metz began to formulate his “new political theology” in the years after Vatican II. His concern was with questions necessary to the foundation of any theological formulations. As a fundamental theologian he addresses the questions that constitute and justify a theological calculus, but he also insists that Christian theology must have a structure that is both mystical and political, modeled after the mind and action of Jesus Christ: it must connect with both our religious experience and concrete social settings. Jesus insisted—in line with his Jewish tradition—that love of God and love of neighbor reflect each other. So Metz insists that a Christian political theology must ask questions about human dignity and suffering in any and all situations and theories. Who is hurt? Who will suffer? Who will be invisible?

We live in times of radical pluralism and globalization—and of forgetfulness. A cultural amnesia lets us lose track of the human person in the practice of science, technology, economics, communications, politics—and even in terrible suffering. Theologians need to face the world, to remember the suffering of others, to hear their cries and respond by shaping a concrete praxis that pulls us toward the future that God has promised. The memory that Metz calls for includes not only critical grief and active compassion but also a hope that connects us all.

What is going on with this new political theology today? Attempts to develop the notions of the political and of praxis continue. Recent works look to Jürgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl, and Cornel West for philosophical grounding. Other contributions focus on new applications of political theology's perspective: in ecology, human rights, feminism, biblical hermeneutics, liturgy, Ignatian and Franciscan spiritualities, and the world's religions. The most recent issue of *Jahrbuch Politische Theologie*, the major journal for the new political theology, includes an article by Metz on the church in society with reactions not only from political theologians but also from thinkers such as Rowan Williams and Graham Ward. An ongoing international seminar for the new generation of political theologians has begun meeting in Hannover, Germany. In December 2013 Heythrop College, University of London, awarded Metz a

doctorate *honoris causa* and on the occasion held a conference entitled “A Poor Church for the Poor.”

Paradoxically at a time when we have never known more about our globe or shared more information, we live in a riven, disconnected world. Diversity ends in mere juxtaposition of “others” or even in the domination over those who differ. In our science, our economics, our communications industry the human person tends to disappear from consideration or evaporate into an abstraction. While theology is sometimes dismissed as a mere relic of the past, in fact it has never been more needed.

The new political theology tries to break the spell of this cultural amnesia, and it does so not for the sake of theology but for the sake of humanity itself.

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Facing the World: A Theological and Biographical Inquiry

My theological biography is inscribed with one name above all: Karl Rahner, my teacher and friend. Through him I entered the weave of the Catholic theological tradition. When Rahner died in 1984, he was considered by many to be the most significant and influential Catholic theologian of his time and a tremendous inspiration and challenge for his church. If Catholic theology today sees more and sees differently than he did, this is so largely on his account. With his “anthropological turn” in talking about God, he led theology into a critical and productive discussion with the spirit of modernity as hardly any one before him had.

Rahner is a classic of modern critical theology, which means he is someone from whom one can still learn even if one has already begun to question and disagree with him. I know whereof I speak. I began questioning and arguing about his view of the philosophical grounding for this “anthropological turn” in Christian talk about God. This turn cannot, in my opinion, be carried out purely in light of the preconditions of consciousness, namely, the transcendental. Rather it must from the very beginning proceed with a view to the human person in history and society; it must be dialectical. That is why I have spoken of “political theology” as an approach to fundamental theology.

Forty years ago I published a book called *Theology of the World*.¹ It was in its inception completely imbued with Rahner’s universalist pathos in speaking about God. Rahner fought against the danger—as do I—of an ecclesiological encryption of

1. See Johann Baptist Metz, *Theology of the World* (New York: Seabury, 1973). The chapters were previously published from 1962 to 1968.

God-talk. For him—as for me—the God of the Bible and tradition was not just a church issue but a human issue.²

So, what was the view of “the world” in this “theology of the world,” which already in that early book was represented as the search for a political theology of the relationship of the church and the world? Even then it was not about the world or humankind in their abstract, quasi-ahistorical universality, but rather about the world in its concrete historical singularity, about the world in its public historical situation as it breaks into the supposedly self-contained world of private faith and tests its hope (see 1 Pt 3:15). “Deprivatization” of the language of faith was the early catchphrase for this attempt at a new political theology.³ I want to theologially and biographically⁴ elaborate a few of those experiences of interruption upon which and for which this theology “facing the world” seeks to establish itself as a theological part of the church’s store-room of memories. And so these sketches have a systematic rather than a genealogical intent.

The World of War: World War II

Too many dying, too many young men dead for one 16-year-old pressed into the military at the end of this war. This biographical background, with which I have burdened my students and which I have publicly discussed in detail, still sets the tone for my theological work. In my theology, for example, present danger plays a central role. This theology does not want to let go of the apocalyptic metaphors of its religious tradition; it mistrusts most of all a flattened out eschatology devoid of all dangers. In this theology biblical apocalyptic is not at its core nurtured by any frivolous or zealous fantasy of destruction, but rather by a perception of the world that peels back the cover and reveals, unadorned and without illusion, what really is happening, what really is the case. Thus this theology works against the constant tendency of all religious world-views to mythically or metaphysically camouflage the horrific disasters in the world and also works against a speculative retouching and an idealistic smoothing out of the actual course of history in order finally to make the victims invisible and their screams

2. Johann Baptist Metz, “Natürliche Gotteskompetenz? Karl Rahners Ringen um die theologische Ehre des Menschen,” in *Memoria passionis: Ein provozierendes Gedächtnis in pluralistischer Gesellschaft* (Freiburg: Herder, 2007) 108–22.

3. For a historical clarification of this concept see, e.g., my explanation under “Zweierlei Politische Theologie,” in *Memoria passionis* 252–57.

4. Theology cannot be correctly understood without biography. This marks it off from religious studies and from the philosophy of religion. The theological point is not the biographical dissemination of a personal life story, but rather is the overcoming of today’s heightened dualism between the story of faith and life story, between creed and experience. See, e.g., my reflections in the section “Theology as Biography?,” in Johann Baptist Metz, *Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology*, trans. J. Matthew Ashley (New York: Crossroad, 2007) 198–297. This text goes back to my *Laudatio* on the occasion of Karl Rahner’s seventieth birthday; it was first published under the title “Karl Rahner—ein theologisches Leben: Theologie als mystische Biographie eines Christenmenschen,” *Stimmen der Zeit* 192 (1974) 305–14.

inaudible. But to talk about the God of the biblical tradition means to give a memory to those cries and to give time its temporality, its limit.⁵

Let me add this clarification in more academic language: through the years an increasing sensitivity to theodicy runs through my theological work, that is, there is a growing awareness that to speak of the God of the biblical traditions is to speak in the face of the abysmal history of suffering in the world—in God’s world. How can one, in the face of this history of suffering, blithely ask only about one’s own salvation? Early on I recognized that whoever talks of God the way Jesus does accepts the violation of preconceived religious certainty by the horrendous tragedy of others. At the root of Christian theology there always lies a matter of justice, the question of justice for those who suffer, of unjust and innocent suffering. *Deus caritas est—Deus iustitia est*. For this reason Christianity is committed not to a faceless, quasi-innocent inner piety, but to a face-seeking “mysticism with eyes open”—which I will discuss later. The biblical monotheistic talk of God can only be universal, can only be meaningful, for all humankind, if it awakens our sensitivity and responsibility to the suffering of others, as Jesus’ apocalyptic parable of the Last Judgment (Mt 25:31–46) makes clear.

Thus in the end I have sought to expand the notion of *memoria passionis*, originally reserved only for Christology within systematic theology, to Christian speech about God overall. In this *memoria passionis*, remembrance of the God of the Bible and church tradition opens itself up to the passion and suffering of humankind, and thereby for that one greatest story, the sole grand narrative that still remains for us after the Enlightenment critique of religion and ideology, after Marxism, and after Nietzsche and the postmodern fragmentation of history: reading the world as in fact the history of human suffering.

The World “After Auschwitz”

I must admit it was not theology but the today-much-maligned atmosphere of 1968 that dispossessed me of an all-too-glib theological discourse about a general historicity of the Christian faith and that forced the *logos* of theology to confront concrete history itself, that public history that bears so catastrophic a name as Auschwitz.

Auschwitz: Has this name become indispensable in theological discussion about God? Or have we once again made this place into no place at all—with the help of a faceless, idealist history empty of a humanity that clothes itself in great apathy in the face of the catastrophes and disasters in this history? But are not we Christians pointed toward that very history by the canon of our faith and our liturgy, by the center of our Creed—“suffered under Pontius Pilate,” “on the night on which he was betrayed”—toward that history in which there is crucifixion, torture, mourning, love, and hatred? And no ahistorical myth, no Platonic ideal of God, no gnostic doctrine of salvation with its dualistic talk of history without salvation and salvation without history, no

5. On this see the section on cultural amnesia in *Memoria passionis* 123–57.

abstract talk of the historicity of our existence can restore to us the innocence we have lost in that history.

Certainly for many, also for many Christians, Auschwitz has long ago sunk beneath the horizon of their memory. We have scarcely connected the present crises of humanity and Auschwitz: for instance, the growing deafness vis-à-vis universal and high expectations and judgments, the postmodern compartmentalization, the decline of solidarity, the growing refusal even to include moral perspectives in the notion of a human being, and so on. But are not all of these symptoms a vote of no confidence in humankind? Therefore the question after Auschwitz is not only, Where was God in Auschwitz? but also, Where was humankind in Auschwitz? Looking at the victim forces us also to look at the perpetrator and at the abysmal image of the human being emerging here. In this situation after Auschwitz, I was especially troubled by the despair of those who have survived this catastrophe: so much silent unhappiness, so many suicides! Many have perished out of despair for humanity. Auschwitz has profoundly lowered the metaphysical boundary of shame between human beings. Only the forgetful can survive this—or those who have already successfully forgotten that they have forgotten something. But they too do not escape: One cannot willfully sin even in the name of humanity without betraying the distinction between good and bad.

What would happen if one day people could only defend themselves against misfortune and immorality in the world by using the weapon of forgetfulness? What would happen if one day human beings could only build their happiness on a lack of compassion that forgets the victims, on a culture of amnesia in which supposedly time heals all wounds? What then would nurture the revolt against the senselessness of unjust and innocent suffering in the world? What then would inspire attention to the suffering of others and to the vision of a new, more profound justice? What would then remain if such a cultural amnesia were to come to pass among humankind? What then? A humanity that is “beyond good and evil”? What would happen if the public use of reason no longer provoked the interruption of a rationality guided by forgetfulness? If our modern rationality would no longer permit a categorical imperative that demands of us action that permanently bans the repetition of a catastrophe such as Auschwitz?

The World of the World Church

The first years of my theological post at the University of Münster fell during the time of the Second Vatican Council. Until then in theology “the world” was formulated and discussed, if at all, in mostly Eurocentric terms. But at the council the church presented itself for the first time not only dogmatically and intentionally but empirically and in fact as a world church. The non-European world made its first entry into the concrete worldview of the church and her theology. But the world this world church engages is first and foremost a social world torn apart by suffering, and it is a culturally polycentric world. As such, this world becomes a challenge to the universalism of the biblically grounded way of speaking about God. This is yet to be discussed in detail. For now only the following points can be made. Through countless public debates about God and the world, especially through the Christian–Marxist dialogue

in what was called the *Paulus-Gesellschaft* (brought to an abrupt end by the 1968 Russian invasion of Prague), I was sensitized to a new world situation. I understood the debate with Marxism primarily as a discussion about the socially critical dramatization of the theodicy issue. I did not want to save politics and political culture—as any sort of pragmatism recommends—from the gaze of theodicy. Of course I also wanted to bring into the discussion a position other than that of Marxism: I wanted always and unconditionally to ask about the suffering of others, the suffering even of the enemy, and to ask about the sufferings of the dead, to which no impassioned struggle of the living can reconcile us. This mix of politics and theodicy had and has a high price: it subjects this political theology again and again to mockery by every political pragmatist and political utopian, outside and inside Christianity. But how does one ultimately rescue political life from pure political Darwinism without the viewpoint of theodicy? These discussions in any case have sharpened the focus of the world church on the world it encounters.

In this world of the world church, there is a history of suffering in society, the suffering of the poor, the oppressed, and the wretched. And there is also a cultural history of suffering in that world, the suffering of otherness and of endangered dignity. The conditions experienced in such a world that directly contradict the gospel—such as degradation, exploitation, racism—demand the formulation of the biblical word of God as dangerous memory, in categories of resistance and liberating transformation. For Christians this transformation, which in Latin American theology is called liberation, entails recognizing the capacity for guilt in all acting subjects. Such a theory of action does not lead ineluctably to a paralysis of the will to change things and so to the stabilization and legitimation of unjust conditions and structures. It wants only to remove this determination to transform the world as a basis for the hatred and violence of terrorism.⁶

The World in the Storms of Globalization

Whoever understands theology as I do, as speaking of God while facing the world, cannot ignore the challenges of the contemporary processes of globalization. And this globalization is a matter not just of the markets and technology, but also of religions and worldviews. The contemporary world of globalization is in any case also the world of an accelerating and inescapably cross-pollinating pluralism of religious and cultural worlds. So tolerance, dialogue, and discourse are usually recommended. These are certainly important. But are there not also limits to tolerance as well as criteria for

6. On the relationship of political theology to Latin American liberation theology, see my *Zum Begriff der neuen Politischen Theologie: 1967–1997* (Mainz: Grünewalt, 1997) 209–10, and *Memoria passionis* 255. On the debate with my Marxist dialogue partners in the Paulus-Gesellschaft, on the significance of my personal engagement with Ernst Bloch and with the Frankfurt School, above all with Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, for my construction of the intelligible and practical basis for a new political theology, see my “Wie ich mich geändert habe,” in *Zum Begriff* 207–211. See also my *Unterbrechungen: Theologisch-politische Perspektiven und Profile* (Gütersloh: Gütersloh Verlagshaus, 1982).

dialogue? Are there not in the end mistaken developments, “derailments” (J. Habermas), in a sense “pathologies” (J. Ratzinger) in the area of cultures and religions that need to be resisted, that need to be corrected? Are all religions, as we like to assume these days, really the same? Are they the same in regard to the understanding and praxis of religious freedom, in regard to positive and negative religious freedom—freedom for religion and freedom from religion?

Taking such questions into account is not a matter of theologically denying or discarding pluralism but of seeking to engage it in a way that is open and reasonable to all. In this irrevocably acknowledged diversity of religions and worldviews, is there, however, a criterion for understanding and living together that applies to everyone and is therefore universal and capable of truth? In the end, these questions are not only about the pluralism of religions but also increasingly about the pluralism of forms of life, whether characterized as religious or strictly secular. To this end, I have tentatively suggested a global program for Christianity under the heading of *compassion*—which I understand not as a somewhat vague empathy, not as an inconsequential pity, not as a philanthropic sentiment, but as a participatory awareness of the strangers’ suffering, as an active remembrancing (*Eingedenken*) of the suffering other.⁷ Here I can only mention the biblical background. It is important on the one hand that talk of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who is also the God of Jesus, not be misunderstood as an expression of some sort of abstract, metahistorical monotheism. God-talk is sensitive to suffering at its core. For that reason, in the religious dialogue with Islam, the justifiable link to common biblical roots for talking about God should not lead us to ask about the profound differences in the understanding of Holy Scripture and of monotheism. The understanding of biblical monotheism as fundamentally talk about God that is sensitive to suffering has a reflexive character: it comes from a hermeneutical culture interacting with the Bible as God’s word. Can and might there be in Islam—at least at this point—such a hermeneutical approach in engaging the Qur’an?

On the other hand, it is important for the New Testament background of compassion that the messianic Jesus looked first not to the sin, but to the suffering of others.⁸ This fundamental sensitivity for others’ suffering is exactly what characterized

7. For the structural difference between this compassion and the theme of empathy in Eastern traditions, especially Buddhism, see my more detailed observations in “Weltprogramm des Christentums im Pluralismus der Religionen und Kulturen: Compassion,” *Memoria passionis* 158–84; also 105–7. On the relationship of compassion to the *logos* of Christian theology and its practical foundation, see in addition the remarks that follow these sections, especially 215–57.

8. This reference is not meant to play the sensitivity to suffering demanded by Christianity off against its basic sensitivity to sin. Here it is asked with a corrective intent whether the equally fundamental sensitivity to suffering in Christianity has not been overshadowed by the necessary, but one-sided, emphasis on sensitivity to sin against ourselves and above all against others and against the world. On the fundamental question of the extent to which the theological turn in Christianity has given rise to a tendency to ignore the question of those who suffer with its related theme of theodicy and to formulate Christology exclusively as soteriology, see *Memoria passionis* 50–62 and 163–66.

Jesus' new way of life. It has nothing to do with self-pity, nothing to do with a depressive cult of suffering. It is rather the completely unsentimental expression of love, the love that Jesus meant when he spoke—completely in line with his Jewish heritage—of the inseparable unity of love of God and love of neighbor: it is the passion for God as the passion for involvement, as the mysticism of compassion. A Christianity that holds on to its roots in the face of the new dramatic pluralism of religions and cultures is ever and again about this union. In my view this passion for involvement may be considered the dowry of Christianity, its world program for the age of globalization.

Since this world program seeks to speak to and invite all human beings, religious as well as secular, I have to at least mention the concept of reason in this theology that suggests such a world program. Reason in this theology is not seen as morally indifferent. Remembrance of others' suffering is intrinsic to reason and guarantees its human character. Hence this *logos* contradicts a rationality that is tied primarily to safeguarding its universal validity and efficacy above or outside the concrete historical and moral world. In such talk about the human, any sense of connection between historical origin and normative validity falls out of the picture. This disconnect touches on a central problem of modern rationality and its anthropology.

In no way do I now want to join those who claim to have overcome the Enlightenment without having passed through it. Where modern reasoning tries, in the name of the Enlightenment, to completely distance itself from the historical dialectic between remembering and forgetting, where it actually abandons the "dialectic of the Enlightenment" for the benefit of purely rational discourse, it inevitably grounds the process of enlightenment in forgetfulness and thereby stabilizes the prevailing cultural amnesia with its extremely feeble awareness of what is missing.⁹

In the present dispute over the "human experiment," modern rationality can ensure its humane character over against the increasing dominance of technical rationality only by talking about the human being within a memory-laden semantic, a memory already embedded in our human language itself—and so based not simply on a natural development, but rather on a historical background. The human being—as known and entrusted to us until now—is more than its own experiment: it is also—and fundamentally—its own memory. Human beings are a result not only of their genes but also of their histories. If they want to understand who they are, humans need not only to experiment with themselves but also to allow themselves to be told something. For that reason, the distinction suggested here between technical and anamnestic reason is important not only for theology but also for anthropology; and in any case it is important if the human being is to be and to remain more than a bit of nature in a last unfinished experiment in biotechnology or neurotechnology.

I return to *compassion*. *Compassion* is not only for our private lives but also for our public, political lives. It sends us to the front of today's political, social, and cultural

9. For general remarks on the dialectical character of anamnestic reason see *Memoria Passionis* 215–57.

conflicts. At least the spirit of compassion holds out an offer of peace for our globalized world. Only this sort of “suffering with” breaks the power of, for example, that basic enmity that dominates the Near East. Only if some ethic of compassion breaks into political conflicts, only if the memory of the suffering of one’s own people is also bound up with a willingness not to forget the suffering of others, even the suffering of former enemies, and to take into account this history of the other’s suffering in future negotiations, will there be new paths to peace.

In the end what really does prevent our globalized world from imploding into uncontrolled religious and cultural wars: here Christianity—there Islam, here the West—there the Arab world? What is there in this era of globalization that can hold our world together in peace? It is the proposition that human beings are fundamentally equal, that the strongest of assumptions about humanity has a biblical foundation. Expressed in the moral language adopted by Christianity and proclaimed by the message of the inseparable unity of love of God and love of neighbor, of a passion for God and a passion for compassion, it goes something like this: There is no suffering in the world that does not concern us. This principle of the fundamental equality of all human beings entails the recognition of an authority that is open to and reasonable for all people: the authority of those who suffer, of the victims of unjust and innocent suffering, an authority that, prior to any consent or agreement, places a claim on all human beings—yes, on *all* people, whether religious or secular—and therefore cannot be relativized or avoided by any humane culture that insists on the equality of all humans, or by any religion, not even by the church. For this reason also the recognition of this authority would be the criterion by which to orient religious and cultural discourse in a globalized context. Finally it would be the basis of an ethic of peace for a truly pluralistic world. In any case, a European politics and ultimately a global politics that knows itself to be bound to this biblical heritage of compassion would be something other than the agent of the market and technology and their supposedly practical constraints in the era of globalization.

Conclusion

These are a few sketches from my many years of theological work. Over the course of time I have increasingly moved away from talking about God and his Christ in a way that is subjectless and historically untethered. Thus, for me, theology has become more bound to the world and in this sense more political. With this willingness to risk engaging history, the history of the suffering of humankind forces its way into theological discourse about the salvation history of humankind. Theology expresses itself not only in singing, but also in crying out. Certainly Christians are mystics but, in distinction to the mysticism of the Far East, Christians are mystics with open eyes, mystics of a compassion, of a willingness to suffer with others, which has become an important watchword for the praxis of the discipleship of Jesus, a praxis without which Christian theology cannot remain true to its *logos*. This mysticism of compassion is no faceless

mysticism of suffering as in the main forms of Eastern mysticism.¹⁰ Rather, it is much more a face-seeking mysticism. It leads us to encounter the face of the suffering other. This defining experience is not just secular, but an earthly glimpse of the closeness of God in his Christ: “‘Lord, when did we see you suffering?’ And he answered them: ‘Truly, I say to you, whatever you have done for one of these little ones, you have done for me. Whatever you have not done for these little ones, you have not done for me!’” (Mt 25). So I hope that in these sketches I have not been talking about “my” theology, but simply about a piece of theology from the storeroom of Christian memory.

Author and Translator biographies

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10. In this Eastern mysticism of suffering, it is the experience of the opposition between the self (the “I”) and the world that generates suffering and that needs to be overcome. The “I” of human beings needs to be seen through as an “illusion” (Nietzsche: “as a projection”) and at the end of a long process should dissolve into the faceless unity and harmony of the universe. To the extent that this “I” has a mystical character, the basis for the experience of compassion is absent. What the New Testament calls “dying to oneself” begins with our relativizing our own preconceived wishes and interests in the readiness to allow ourselves to be interrupted by the suffering of others. One thinks of the well-known parable of the “merciful Samaritan” with which Jesus has captured not only the remembrance of Christianity but also the remembrance of humanity.