

Aristotle's more elitist emphasis on the relatively few people who are really capable of living a virtuous life.

Toward the end of chapter 5, F. provides a welcome development of his analysis by turning to the role of religion in moving individuals to a virtuous life. The Jewish doctrine of *yetzer ha-ra*, for instance, "the evil inclination to which all human beings are believed to be subject" (240), leads to the doctrine of repentance (*teshuva*) that opens up the possibility of reform of life. F.'s example of Alcoholics Anonymous—he treats it in a Catholic context—provides another practical application of the Augustinian theory of universal privation and the need for grace to attain liberation of the will.

F. pivots between two interpretations of Augustine and Aristotle: one sees them interested primarily in personal reform and development; the other finds in them a promotion of personal responsibility for the evils that happen in the world. The emphasis on personal responsibility for the evils of the world takes F. into territory that seems more to express his own aim in writing than the explicit teachings of Augustine and Aristotle. To his credit, F. anticipates this critique (235) and attempts to answer it, not entirely convincingly, in my opinion.

F. concludes by bringing us back to what has been the aim of his exploration throughout, that we attend more to what we can do about evil than to understanding it in a detached and theoretical way.

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In Defence of War. By Nigel Biggar. Oxford: Oxford University, 2013.
Pp. xii + 361. \$55.

This is a significant book. It provides a defense and clarification of just war theory within the Christian tradition through a series of extended engagements with Christian and secular critics of that theory. Biggar makes a clear and important case, and does so with impressive learning and literary style.

The volume opens with a closely argued case against three pacifist critics of the just war tradition—Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder, Richard Hays. B.'s formidable rebuttals of these three accounts of Christian pacifism will be hard to ignore. After exposing the flaws he sees in the three critics, B. presents a proper Christian rendering of the just war tradition.

Chapters 2 and 3 are central to B.'s desire to reconstruct just war thinking in a way consonant with Christian morality. B. endorses Augustine's views that war has a retributive purpose, that Christians can qualify violence by love, and that love properly includes elements of anger and retribution. He also examines the principle of double effect and provides his own interpretation that is largely consonant with Thomas Aquinas, although B. adds refinements where he finds Aquinas's language ambiguous. B. is a close reader of texts and a skillful wordsmith. He makes a strong case for the appropriate role of resentment and retribution in a theory of justice that

seeks not vengeance but reconciliation and a more just order of peace. Using diaries and other genres of war literature, he makes a viable case that front-line soldiers need not hate the enemy even when employing deadly violence. Indeed, he argues that Augustine was right about love being active in the making of war. His treatment of Aquinas and double effect relies heavily on a distinction between “intent” as “choose and want as a goal” versus “intent” as “choose and accept with reluctance” (94–95).

A long chapter on the Battle of the Somme and the idea of proportionality seems to be something of a digression from the book’s central intent. B. draws several lessons from his study of the Somme, none of which has significant impact on the brief he makes for a particular Christian theory of just war. He does make two disputable claims: (1) battles and wars of attrition are “not necessarily disproportionate” (147), and (2) “a certain kind of callousness is a military virtue” (148). I did not find these claims entirely persuasive, but B.’s overall project does not rise or fall with either point.

With the final three chapters B. shifts his focus, moving to address secular theorists who maintain that just-war theory is flawed—thinkers like David Rodin and Michael Walzer, along with a range of international legal scholars. Basically, B. maintains that the critics do not delegitimize a just-war theory that he finds consistent with the classical Christian understanding of it. This last point is crucial, as B. is concerned to retrieve the just-war argument as treated in the writings of Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Vitoria, and Suárez.

As with the chapter on the Somme, B. gets down to specifics and argues particular cases of whether actual wars are just. His aim is to illustrate how just-war theory interacts with the complex political and military judgments that leaders of state must make in deciding to go to war. He examines both the intervention in Kosovo and the 2003 Iraqi war to illustrate his approach to *ad bellum* issues. The first case analyzes the legal and moral basis for humanitarian intervention. B. trenchantly examines the difference between just war as found in international law and his presentation of a Christian treatment. Regarding Iraq, B. defends the morality of the war in light of his emphasis on the role of retribution in justifying war and the horrible record of the Hussein regime. Although I did not find B.’s argument fully persuasive, its presentation is lucid and thorough.

The volume would not work well as a textbook; in its reasoning and sophistication, it is not aimed at an undergraduate population, and it is not adequately comprehensive in the range of topics treated. What B. has provided is a scholarly work that probes, tests, and confronts a variety of arguments against the idea of just war in the Christian tradition. Many will disagree with B., but it would be astounding if his ideas did not force some rethinking and revision in the minds of readers. This is as intellectually satisfying a book on the morality of warfare as is available today.

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