

“platforms” that are not exclusively religious and that can be shared beyond religious membership.

Being both a physician and a Roman Catholic theological ethicist, I find V.’s rendering of the role of religious beliefs in medical ethics quite puzzling. He argues that religion should not contribute to contemporary medical ethics; accordingly he does not mention conscience or moral discernment, two key foundations of medical ethics with distinctive religious roots. Nor does he mention casuistry, a method by which medical ethicists have often made judgments; casuistry also has religious roots in Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. Yet these are methods frequently used to arrive at moral decisions. Consideration of them could have helped V. achieve his goal of articulating a “common morality” and identifying grounds for ethical “convergence” within pluralistic societies (chaps. 6–7).

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AN ARGUMENT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF CIVIC INEQUALITY. By Emily R. Gill. Religion and Politics Series. Washington: Georgetown, 2012. Pp x + 276. \$29.95.

Political science professor Emily Gill raises important questions for Catholics who struggle with the question of how to respond to the growing movement to legalize same-sex marriage. The book could not be more timely, as the US Supreme Court decisions in June to overturn the Defense of Marriage Act and to decline to interfere with California’s same-sex marriage laws have opened the door for greater public recognition of same-sex couples. Comments by Pope Francis in an interview with reporters in July also raise questions about how central the fight against same-sex marriage will be in his papacy. In this context, many Catholics will want to consider carefully G.’s claim that treating citizens equally means granting access to civil marriage to all couples, regardless of gender or sexual orientation.

Catholic arguments against same-sex marriage are best summarized in the 2003 document of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons, signed by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger: (a) The church’s teaching about marriage is “evident to right reason” (2). (b) “Homosexual unions” are not “in any way similar or even remotely analogous” to heterosexual marriage” (4). (c) The redefinition of marriage would harm the common good and is not justified on grounds of nondiscrimination or autonomy (8). (d) Same-sex unions are not of interest to the state because they do not “ensure the succession of generations” (9).

G.'s examination of same-sex marriage through the lens of the religion clauses of the First Amendment raises questions about all these points. For G., marriage is an institution that has changed and developed over time, about which we have ongoing arguments (14–25). Its core is intimate relationship, and this is what all couples who want to marry seek. Sexual orientation, like religion, is an essential part of human identity that shapes how one approaches the good of intimate relationship. Thus “denial of marriage to same-sex couples is equivalent to a denial of their free exercise of religion” (3). If the state limits civil marriage to heterosexual couples, it effectively establishes a sectarian religious view (110). Unless same-sex couples have the same right to marry as heterosexual couples, their autonomy is violated (239).

G. recognizes that no solution, including hers, is completely neutral. While advocates of same-sex marriage believe their rights are being violated when marriage is denied them, opponents claim their rights are violated when same-sex marriage is thrust upon them (35). Whatever the state does makes a statement. Given the impossibility of neutrality and the difficulty of showing the harm same-sex marriage would impose, G. claims that the law should teach equality by ratifying the right to civil marriage for all who desire it (41). In doing so, the state would not endorse same-sex marriage but would include it in a range of legitimate possibilities (49). This recognition of diverse options for marriage is parallel to the state's recognition of a diversity of religions. Thus, just as disestablishment of sectarian religion opens space for a diversity of religions, “disestablishment [of a sectarian view of marriage] opens space for people to be heterosexual, gay, lesbian, bisexual, or asexual if that is their orientation, without being disadvantaged in the context of the dominant consensus” (60).

Critics will take issue with G.'s attempt to equate the right to marry with religious liberty. The analogy between sexual orientation is imperfect and there are good reasons for the state to treat religion differently from other beliefs. Establishing a particular view of marriage as normative is not quite the same as establishing a particular religion. Moreover, G.'s choice to ground approval of same-sex marriage in autonomy (106), places her to the left even of marriage-equality advocates who uphold the universal value of marriage (76–86). G.'s account of public life would benefit from dialogue with theologians like Cathleen Kaveny (*Law's Virtues: Fostering Autonomy and Solidarity in American Solidarity* [2012]) who are more willing to imagine how a pluralistic society can uphold common values.

Still, G.'s provocative argument should be thoughtfully considered by Catholics who care deeply about autonomy and solidarity. G. argues persuasively that the pursuit of intimate life lies at the heart of personal identity and at least bears a strong resemblance to religious belief. She makes it very difficult to maintain that the state has no interest in ensuring

that all citizens have the right to act on their most deeply held beliefs. Her technical book is not directed to a broad audience, and it does not directly engage the complex theological questions surrounding same-sex unions, but its claims about the political question of access to marriage deserve a broad hearing.

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CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON SPORTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO MODERN TIMES.
By Patrick Kelly, S.J. New York: Paulist, 2012. Pp. x + 212. \$19.95.

Kelly has broken fresh ground in Catholic theology and its positive embrace of every dimension of creation and human activity. Drawing on his expertise in spirituality and sport, K. has delved into the history of sport from the medieval era into the contemporary scene.

Retrieving images of sport in medieval manuscripts, from artwork in stained glass windows, and from notable theologians, K. debunks the earlier critique, often offered by Protestant historians, that Catholics somehow developed a fear and hatred of the human body. He lays out a highly positive theological anthropology of how Catholics reveled in sport and play as a natural dimension of their faith. That practice continued with many of the Renaissance humanists and the Jesuits especially, both of whom incorporated sports into their systems of education as a vital dimension of the education of the whole person (37–39).

In fact, as K. describes in helpful, insightful detail, Catholic theology has strongly criticized sects (68–93), such as the gnostics, Manicheans, and Cathars, who in one way or another denied the body or saw it as a dire impediment to spiritual well-being. These heretical sects were driven by the need to escape the material world in favor of pure spirit. But for authentic Catholic theology, there is nothing bad or evil per se in the material. In fact, the resurrection of Christ—whole and entire, human and divine—necessitates materiality. All this seems rather pedestrian until one encounters the Protestant era and some of the extremes of Puritanism.

For Puritans, play was the devil’s workshop, and Catholics were particularly suspect because they reveled in festivals and feast days to the scandal of their Calvinist neighbors. K. contests the historical narrative developed by D. Stanley Eitzen and George Sage about the relationship between sport and religion. These authors, K. observes, claim that early Christianity constructed an asceticism based on the belief that evil exists in the body. They even assert that “the Reformation brought to an end the vicelike grip that Roman Catholicism had on the minds and habits of the people of Europe and England” (63).

K. demonstrates convincingly that these and other authors “tend to seize on some of the more rigorous statements of Early Christians regarding the