

acting is not rightly conceived as *conformity* inasmuch as conformity implies some subjection of one thing to another (e.g., action to nature). But God is simple and thus possesses no parts that can be subjected to other parts. Moreover, God is not well behaved or poorly behaved because, as pure act, God simply is not behaved at all! This undoubtedly is one of D.'s most profound contributions to the modern discussion of God and evil.

One deficiency in D.'s treatment is the absence of any sustained discussion of God's *plan* or *purpose* with respect to evil as historical event. One would have expected D. to discuss this in his section on divine providence (81–84), but he does not. In fact, it is surprising that he makes no reference to Aquinas's exposition of Job, since the Angelic Doctor there explicitly states that his purpose is to discuss human affairs as ruled by divine providence, especially affairs dominated by evil.

D.'s volume does not intend to dissolve the reality of evil or the challenges it poses. Rather, it aims to set forth, through Aquinas, an alternative to the popular theodist approach that treats evil as a moral problem for God. Why God created a world with evil when G. could just as well have created one without it is a great mystery, but it is not a problem for God. This classical position is too often neglected by modern Christians, and we can be grateful to D. for helping rehabilitate a focus on God's transcendence in the discussion about evil.

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HABERMAS AND THEOLOGY. By Maureen Junker-Kenny. Philosophy and Theology. New York: T. & T. Clark International, 2011. Pp. x + 213. \$80; \$24.95.

For most of his life, in pre-Dawkins, postwar Europe, Jürgen Habermas was perhaps as famous for his atheism as for his philosophy. Since passing the age of 70 in 1999, he has paid more attention to religion and now admits that in some forms it is socially useful—albeit for people other than himself. Why the writings of a person with such a distant understanding of the contours of faith would be at all relevant to theology, therefore, requires considerable explanation.

This is amply provided in the latest offering from Continuum's Philosophy and Theology series, where, in an astonishingly concise yet full account, Junker-Kenny spells out just how much Western theology in the last 50 years has in fact owed to Habermas (and, surprisingly, vice-versa).

Inheritor of the critical traditions and historical materialist commitments of the Frankfurt School, Habermas in his many and varied inquiries has consistently sought to understand power, so as to champion both equality

and diversity. In his identification of intersubjectivity (and not the individual) as the primary unit of social analysis, his insistence on communicative rationality as a route to more fair (and less patrician) human rights, and his championing of grass-roots activities as the antidote to capitalism's colonization of the lifeworld, Habermas offers Christian theology vocabulary to help it address issues of injustice, science, and identity in the modern world.

J.-K.'s work is organized in three parts. Part 1 describes how Habermas's early mature work was received and reacted to by theologians such as Jürgen Moltmann, Helmut Peukert, and Johannes Baptist Metz, and it argues that the questions they raised were "reflected in [Habermas's] move away from an account of reason fulfilled in secularization, to a second phase of separate continued existences of both reason and religion" (5).

Through a marvelous account drawing on contemporary systematics, pastoral care, theories of religious education, and theological ethics, J.-K. not only narrates the history of theology's early engagement with Habermas, but also teases out a recurring stumbling block in the philosopher's typology of private/public, wherein key Christian themes are repeatedly—and mistakenly, she believes—consigned to the "private" realm. Habermas's theory of action, for example, "ignored the type of innovative action which theology takes as central for enabling relationships of mutuality and for renewing worn foundations of intersubjectivity—forgiveness, perseverance after disappointment, generosity in renouncing to an equal share, and outreach toward the enemy" (36). J.-K. shows how, by classifying such actions as private, Habermas relegates to the existential realm aspects of human flourishing that are, on the contrary, "questions to the foundation of ethics" (36).

Part 2 traces a "paradigm change" in Habermas's work from the philosophy of consciousness to language theory, and examines the consequences for theology of his decision "to tie reflexivity to language" (40). It proceeds with an accent on ethics, particularly regarding the retention of universals and the locating of morality in discourse.

But in addition to a careful, accessible development of the main characters in the plot that is the death of metaphysics, or at least of instrumental rationality, J.-K. also plays out the subplot of the academic tussle between those with atheistic and theological commitments respectively: who owns the ground whereon one can speak in a philosophically informed way about a thing called religion? Assessing the differences between Dieter Henrich, Michael Theunissen, and Herbert Schnädelbach, J.-K. shows that "there is no direct link between defending metaphysics and supporting religion" (65).

Part 3 builds on this conclusion by taking Habermas's work since 2000—in particular its use of the concept of creation, its ascription of a role for

religion in democracies, and its stated *telos* of “translation”—as “open invitations for theological questioning” (131). Here, as throughout the book, I struggled slightly to distinguish J.-K.’s description of Habermas’s view of “religion” with the potential usefulness of his philosophy to “theology.” Theologians very often are not particularly concerned with “religion,” at least as Habermas conceives of it. Certainly when one considers many ordinary practices—such as grace before a meal, the placing of flowers at a shrine, or prayers at the bedside of the sick—the theistic, Enlightenment categorization of what is supposedly going on by naming these acts “religion” seems a far cry from the varied understandings of the self, God, and community that usually concern the theologian in these activities.

That said, J.-K.’s steering throughout the book cambers to the study of ethics and perhaps in such an account “religion” aligns itself more comfortably with the subject of “theology.” Certainly her conclusion to this extraordinarily clear presentation of some extraordinarily complicated debates is persuasive by the time we reach it: “In the alternative between basing one’s theory either on the power analyses of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Nietzsche, or on those of philosophies of recognition, [Habermas] has made the case for reason in its communicative, identity-building capacities” (162).

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ATHEN UND JERUSALEM: DIE PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK AM CHRISTENTUM IN ANTIKE UND NEUZEIT. By Winfried Schröder. *Questiones und Gestalten der Philosophie* 16. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011. Pp. 291. €68.

Schröder, a well-known German historian of philosophy, investigates the reception history of the ancient critics of Christianity in early modernity, and thus contributes to the ongoing debate about the so called “synthesis” of Greek philosophy and Christian doctrine. For S. such a synthesis never happened. He believes that Christianity rejected ancient philosophy too harshly and never honestly engaged with its criticism. Indeed, until this study appeared, hardly anybody had paid much attention to the question of whether the arguments of Celsus, Porphyrius, and Julian had an afterlife in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, whether these were greatly improved, and especially whether the fundamental criticisms of Christianity had changed in modern discourse.

Despite their distaste for ancient Platonism, many freethinkers like Anthony Collins (1676–1729) and Hermann S. Reimarus (1694–1768) used the best arguments from antiquity in their attacks on Sacred Scripture (71–85). The hottest topics of dispute were, however, the nature of faith