independent of God; in other words, even if God did not exist, a triangle would still be a triangle. Descartes famously rejects this idea and holds that mathematical truths depend on God. M. nicely shows how, precisely for this reason, Descartes needs God as a warrant for the certitude of human knowledge, whereas for Scotus the certitude is based on the intrinsic natures of the things known (119–33).

Hubertus Busche discusses Leibniz's well-known relation to Scotus and Scotism in his theory of individuation (159–68), where Leibniz rejects Scotus, and in his theory of possible worlds, which is based on Scotus's innovations (168–70).

An intriguing paper by Yves-Jean Harder concerns Kant's metaphysics vs. Scotus's. While continuity is often stressed between Scotus and Kant, because Scotus developed the conception of metaphysics as a science of the transcendentals, Harder argues for discontinuity. For Scotus, metaphysics as a transcendental science comprises both creatures and God. It is ontotheology, because knowledge of God presupposes knowledge of being qua being. Since Kant's critique of reason eliminates God from the domain of the knowable, for him metaphysics is no longer ontotheology. According to Harder, it is not even ontology, because his metaphysics does not proceed from "being" to its special parts (psychology, cosmology, theology), but rather each special part has a transcendent idea of its own, independently from "being" (175–93).

My selective summaries do not do justice to the book as a whole, which I found very informative and engaging. In addition to the essays mentioned, the volume contains papers on Bergson, Heidegger, Blumenberg, Arendt, on some nineteenth- and twentieth-century Scotists, and on analytic philosophy, as well as on specific arguments (e.g., concerning indivisibles in mathematics and incompatibilism in the contemporary free-will debate). The book documents, albeit selectively, Scotus's huge impact on later thinkers, especially concerning his theory of the univocity of being (and its implications for metaphysics) and his account of what the possibles are.

Tobias Hoffmann
The Catholic University of America, Washington DC

Leibniz, God, and Necessity. By Michael V. Griffin. New York: Cambridge University, 2013. Pp. xi + 195. $90.

Leibniz once claimed that human reason continuously finds itself lost within two great labyrinths: one is the problem of the *composition of the continuum* (how certain events or states of affairs relate to past events or states of affairs), which vexes only philosophers; the second is the problem of the relation between *freedom and necessity*, which vexes everyone. Griffin's book examines certain problems in Leibniz that relate to his discussions of the second "labyrinth," specifically issues of God's freedom. Leibniz argues that God both does what he does *necessarily* and is *free* to do what he does. As is expected, such a thesis would lead to numerous tensions, and G. notes them while offering an interpretation of Leibniz that dissolves them.

For G., Leibniz is committed to certain doctrines that give rise to the following dilemma for divine freedom: God is a necessary being and necessarily does the best; creating this world is best; so God necessarily creates only this world. But this cannot be right for both philosophical and theological reasons, both of which would have been compelling to Leibniz. On the one hand, he maintained that there are an infinite number of possible worlds that God could have created. On the other hand, he maintained, in accordance with traditional orthodoxy, that God was free in his act of creation. G. understands this, and accordingly argues that the tension here is only apparent. G. wants to preserve Leibniz as a kind of *necessitarian*, that is, the one who holds that everything that is actual is metaphysically necessary (67). So G.'s task is to show how Leibniz can maintain other elements of his philosophy (particularly divine freedom) within the framework of necessitarianism.

G.'s thesis is not a popular one, so the first three chapters establish his necessitarian reading of Leibniz. Chapter 1 shows how Leibniz formulated his version of the ontological argument and traces certain key features of this formulation back to Descartes's ontological argument. Unlike Descartes, who assumes the possibility of the God-concept in his argument, Leibniz *proves* that the attributes involved in the concept of a necessary being are consistent with one another (40). Chapter 2 details how the movement from possibility to actuality in the ontological argument works. G. argues that God contains within himself the explanation for his own existence. So if God is possible, then he must actually exist, because God contains the reason for his existence within himself (42, 56). Chapter 3 shows that because God cannot fail to will whatever is best, then only one thing is possible, namely whatever is best. Thus, because God's will is configured in such a way that it cannot fail to actualize maximal goodness, God is bound by necessity to will whatever he does.

The rest of the book attempts to reread certain elements of Leibniz's philosophy within this necessitarian framework. Chapter 4 shows that Leibniz made a crucial distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility. While there are a number of logically possible worlds (with a possible world defined as a maximal set of substances that could coexist were they to be actualized together), all but one are metaphysically impossible, because all but one are incompatible with God's necessary choice to create maximal goodness (108). Thus G. claims that Leibniz thought that God did create this world necessarily (i.e., the decision was metaphysically necessary), though God did have alternative possibilities at the level of logical possibility, thus preserving the freedom of God's decision to create.

Chapters 5 to 7 take up the issue of creaturely freedom. Leibniz embraced the notion that God knows what any creature would do in any set of circumstances in which that creature could be created. Since this strong view of divine providence seems to jeopardize freedom, G. tries to show that these theses are compatible. He rehearses the Scholastic debate between Dominicans and Jesuits over the nature of God's foreknowledge. His explication of Leibniz's view makes Leibniz out to be a *via media* between the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century views of the Dominicans and Jesuits on divine providence: God's knowledge of conditional future contingent truths

depends partly on his understanding of creaturely essences (roughly the Jesuit view) and partly on his possible decrees (roughly the Dominican view).

The book is written for professional historians of early modern philosophy (those with expertise in textual difficulties that are the subjects of interpretive disputes). It will daunt nonspecialists. Certain topics might be of interest to a broader audience, particularly those studying the application of modal metaphysics to topics in philosophy of religion. A treatment of these broader issues that is more suited to a general audience can be found in chapters 2, 4, and 5 of Nicholas Jolley's *Leibniz* (2005).

G.'s book does have some significant additional shortcomings: (1) G. draws most of his material from early manuscripts (pre-1690s) and does not account for the fact that Leibniz repeatedly (and self-consciously) changed his mind about these issues on freedom and necessity. (2) He mentions very little of the scholarly work written after 1999, and one would have hoped for a little more "peer interaction" in a book written for specialists. (3) The philosophical argumentation in some places is not worked out with sufficient care—for instance, the discussion of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. And (4), the book lacks a clear structure. While the book sets forth an interesting attempt to reconcile various tensions within Leibniz's thought, alternatives are not explored with the depth expected in a monograph.

Samuel Murray
Saint Louis University