the Lutheran theology of grace tended to suggest that since salvation is freely given, repentance is secondary. From that moral position it is possible to slide into a theology that assumes that people are good because God loves them, and so repentance is unnecessary.

Luther himself saw things very differently and argued that "the world and the masses are and always will be un-Christian, even if they are all baptized and Christians in name" (81). Therefore he believed that the call to repentance needed to be built into the very structure of worship, if Christians in name were to become Christians in fact.

Chapter 3 on the Lutheran tradition traces the decline of private confession through theological debate and pastoral practice, the end result being similar to what is found in Catholicism today: many go to communion, few go to confession. As indicated at the beginning, S. sees this as a problem to be resolved by reintroducing a theology of repentance into Christian worship: not by resorting to fire and brimstone sermons, but by building the call for repentance into the structure of the liturgy itself. It is legitimate to ask, however, whether such a liturgical change is enough to solve the problem. The *Didache* and the *Apostolic Tradition* demanded that people's lives be different after joining the Christian community. How might churches make similar demands today and thus avoid being institutions full of baptized non-Christians?

Bellarmine University, Louisville JOSEPH MARTOS

DOES GOD ROLL DICE?: DIVINE PROVIDENCE FOR A WORLD IN THE MAKING. By Joseph A. Bracken, S.J. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 2012. Pp. xvi + 196. $24.95.

Models and paradigms shape how we understand and inhabit the world. In this volume Bracken argues for the descriptive salience of Whitehead's process thought, augmented by contemporary systems theory and trinitarian theology. The book is nuanced, logical, and theologically suggestive; it augments B.'s previous publications in theology and science. It has three parts: Philosophical Cosmology/Natural Theology from an Evolutionary Perspective (chaps. 1–4); Systems Thinking in the Social Sciences (chaps. 5–8); and Christian Doctrinal Questions (chaps. 9–12). Throughout, B. engages key postulates and interlocutors in ways that reflect a voracious and rigorous intellectual commitment. The project is one of retrieval, revision, and recommendation.

In the introduction, B. lays his divine-action cards on the table, noting, "God does roll dice in the sense of creating a world with an ever-present principle of spontaneity or creativity" (a claim embellished in chap. 2). Here B. cites—albeit only as a long footnote—his 1996 exchange with Elizabeth Johnson in *Theological Studies* regarding what metaphysical

account may best "give a qualified yes to that question" (xv). Divine action is explored further in chapter 4, "Rethinking Primary and Secondary Causality," where B. critically engages Denis Edwards's recent work. Throughout, B.'s own modified Whiteheadean stance remains intact.

Overall, however, this book is less a direct exposition of divine action in a swerving, evolving world than it is a logical meditation on a prior question: What is the best available model for describing complex, evolutionary reality? B. proposes that, given our increasingly detailed knowledge about the law-like, dynamic processes that both constitute and shepherd cosmological and biological existence, traditional approaches—namely, Platonic ontology and Aristotelian substance metaphysics—fail to describe sufficiently the structure of reality. Instead, B. postulates that Whitehead's approach "makes better sense" for describing the relationship between "the One and the Many": "a Whitehead[ean] society as an enduring structured field of activity for its constituent actual entities is able to offer a philosophical explanation for the fact of ongoing evolution within the cosmic process. Change takes place in an orderly manner, but things do not remain the same over time" (86; see also 52). The claim is well argued, although there are serious implications for the doctrine of God that could bear further explication. For B., the (trinitarian) "divine matrix" is "the ontological ground of existence and activity for all other entities in the world" (24). Simultaneously, "what we [humans] say and do has an impact on the divine persons both in their relations to one another and in their relations to us as their creatures" (12). The trinitarian language is helpful. But if God is modeled as ontologically receptive process, is God's ontology as ultimate ground (and not just as immanent or economic Trinity) also open-ended? If so, do seismic shifts result?

B. emphasizes instead the project of compatibilism. His postulates are steeped in the language game of Whitehead's process thought, and Parts 1 and 2 are helpful guides for some of those thickets. Readers already familiar with Whitehead and process theorists, as well as with more recent thinkers like Stuart Kauffman and Niklas Luhmann (to name but a few), will find rich and constructive intellectual conversations across continents and decades. Because of the specificity of these conversations, it is questionable whether the book is appropriate as a general interest text for the thoughtful nonspecialist (as indicated in the introduction). It will most benefit those who are already familiar with topics and theorists under consideration.

Still, specialists and nonspecialists alike will find much of interest when B. considers concrete applications of his proposal. Two chapters are especially noteworthy, demonstrating B.'s deep philosophical concern with the regnant model of relationship between the One and the Many, as well as its potential impacts for institutions and collectivities. Chapter 8 discusses democratic process and political life, and chapter 12 explores ecclesial

implications. The most provocative proposals in this vein emerge when, for example, B. suggests that authoritarian institutional arrangements—notably, the papacy—may need to be reconsidered under a neo-Whiteheadean/Christian synthesis model of reality. For B., it would stand to reason that "the pope would serve as the principle of coherence and order for the universal church but would not have the unilateral legislative power of the office of the papacy as it has developed from medieval times until the present day" (172). B. also finds this approach promising for interreligious dialogue. It may even offer "an effective remedy for the exaggerated emphasis on the individual . . . within Western civilization" (182).

For B., what is at stake is not just the veracity of language games but the complex, interdependent processes by which we cocreate reality. His process-oriented approach does not always resonate with aspects of classical theism; but that, perhaps, is precisely the point. "Given the complexity of modern life," B. writes, "there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the never-ending tension between unity and plurality, identity and difference" (176)—and, one might add, constancy and change.

Fordham University, New York CHRISTIANA Z. PEPPARD

PSYCHOLOGY AND CATHOLICISM: CONTESTED BOUNDARIES. By Robert Kugelmann. New York: Cambridge University, 2011. Pp. ix + 490. $125.

Even in their own lifetimes, it had been said of the James brothers, that William was a psychologist who wrote like a novelist, and Henry was a novelist who wrote like a psychologist. In this historical study, professor of psychology Kugelmann combines three gifts: writing like a psychologist, novelist, and historian, he details the twists and turns in the often-conflictual tale of two traditions that strive to understand and guide the human "soul," a term that itself is contested.

K. contributes to the ongoing, cross-disciplinary dialogues between various sciences and religion. He cites the trail-blazing book of C. Kevin Gillespie, *Psychology and American Catholicism: From Confession to Therapy?* (2001) that "pioneered this field after it lay fallow for decades" (viii). K.'s scope is broader, however, in that it delves deeply into European psychologies as well as Continental Catholic theological and spiritual movements. Nevertheless, K.'s focus is precise without being narrow: he starts with the origin of empirical/experimental psychology in the studies of perception by Wilhelm Wundt in his psychophysical laboratory of the University of Leipzig in 1879, when "psychology migrated from her ancient homeland among the philosophers into the camp of the scientists" (William J. Sneck, "Happy Birthday, Psychology," *America* 139.8 [September 23, 1978] 177). K.'s terminus ad quem coincides with