

BOOK REVIEWS

WE STAND WITH CHRIST. By Joseph Clifford Fenton, S.T.D. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1943. Pp. x + 463. \$3.75.

A Catholic University professor here offers an essay in Catholic apologetics. Voluminous and solid, the work develops along the lines familiar to seminarians who have emerged from the palestra of Scholastic philosophy and are undergoing specialized training for the more serious jousts of dogmatic theology. Only over the bridge of revelation may one pass from the fields of reason and philosophy to the fairer regions of faith and theology; so the author rightly devotes his whole labor to the construction of this bridge. His blueprint is the admirable *Constitutio Dogmatica de Fide Catholica* of the Vatican Council, to which he makes apposite reference as he builds up his argument, though of course he does not make the logical slip of adducing the Church's authority as an apologetic proof.

The point of view, therefore, is that of the scientific apologete expounding from the professor's chair the reasonableness of faith. The author does strive to transcend the classroom and to reach an audience of Catholic layfolk and non-Catholics, but it is a question whether this be really feasible. For the apologetic panoply which rolls off the mills of the Church's theologates is ponderous armament indeed, excellently adapted to crack the defense lines of Rationalism and Immanentism. In the work of conversion, however, and even in the pastoral work of strengthening the faith of believers, apologetic art rather than apologetic science directs the tactics. Given, of course, that the Church's apologete be both orthodox and scientific, he will contact the human mind and heart effectively through writing that is occasional rather than formal. A remark of the revered Father Ledochowski seems relevant. He deprecated to the reviewer the ambition to write a text-book on apologetics, affirming that the times called for high-class monographs on specific questions.

In explaining the genuine concept of revelation (Chaps. II and III), the book neatly differentiates the natural mode of cognition from the supernatural. Instead of presuming as proved in theodicy God's existence and the divine attributes chiefly manifested in the process of revelation, the author chooses to present proofs for all these in condensed form. To the reader who has not his Scholastic philosophy at his finger-tips, we fear that the condensed proofs will be less than satisfying. It would be more to the point if the space given to such proofs were allocated to a more precise elucidation of just how God speaks to man—a difficulty from psychology which always looms large before students of revelation. Only a brief para-

graph (p. 33) is devoted to it, nor does the paragraph say more than that God can produce the "voces," "phantasmata," and "species intelligibiles." Apart from this omission, the treatment of the possibility of revelation is adequate. The pages (53-63) on the manifold advantages conferred on man through the divine pedagogy of revelation are really eloquent.

After clearly showing the need for miraculous signs if we are to have any certainty that God has spoken, Chap. VI discusses miracle and its relations to revelation. On one point we must respectfully and, we hope, not moved by mere personal opinionativeness, differ with Dr. Fenton. He would have God as the physical cause of all miracles. Possibly He is such, but proof is desired. In view of the superior intelligence of pure spirits and of their independence of time and space, it must be conceded that they can produce effects in the world which are properly called miraculous. There is no question here of the angels changing the physical laws, but only of applying physical forces in a way impossible to man. To be sure, the angels would not so work without the permission or command of God. And why may not God use the instrumentality of His angels, "to whom He has given man in charge," even in so important an affair as the working of miracles to prove a divine revelation? Dr. Fenton does, in fact, concede: "It is possible for a created spirit to perform works which could not be duplicated by the natural power of any man whatsoever." He means here (pp. 77-79) the works of evil spirits, for the detection of which he gives criteria. But, again, why pass over in silence the potencies of good spirits? The author probably has in mind what St. Thomas says (*De Pot.*, q. 6, a. 2; *C. Gent.*, III, 101, 102) on God as the sole author of miracles. However, in Chap. 103 of the *Contra Gentiles* St. Thomas speaks clearly of the power of the angels to produce in nature effects impossible to man, though he denies to such effects the technical term of miracle.

"In the act of faith the fact of divine revelation is at once the thing which we believe and the motive or reason which specifies the act" (p. 89). The reviewer does not know on what grounds this is asserted to be the doctrine of St. Thomas: Suarez is rather the one who sponsored it. To the mind of the reviewer the doctrine in itself is impossible because of the logical and psychological difficulties involved, but the tempting challenge to controversy on the point must be declined. Another matter which follows close after (Chap. VII) demands criticism. Dr. Fenton finds fault with the division of apologetics into the *demonstratio christiana* and the *demonstratio catholica*. Let us hear his reasons: "As a matter of fact a man would form an inadequate notion of the workings of apologetics if he were to think of it as ordered, even in one integral part, to establish the rational credibility of a body of teaching which had been brought forward centuries ago but

which, as far as the proofs of credibility themselves are concerned, has no direct bearing on the conditions and the men of our own times. For, according to this division of special apologetics into a Christian and a Catholic demonstration, the latter would merely indicate that the teaching of Christ is now entrusted to an infallible agency which Christ Himself founded and which He wished all men to join. It happens that this conclusion belongs to the treatise on the Church rather than to the process of apologetics itself. Apologetics is meant to lead to a demonstration of credibility, and the proof that the Catholic Church is the true Church is by no means identical with the process of showing that the doctrine which it presents is actually credible as divine revelation" (p. 95).

It is not true that the classical *demonstratio christiana* establishes the credibility of a teaching of the years 30–34, but which has no direct bearing on conditions and men of 1943. For, firstly, Christ claimed (and proved the claim) that He taught all men of all future ages. Secondly, by thus accrediting Himself as the Way, the Truth, and the Life, He directly bound men of whatever century to faith in the many specific doctrines which He explicitly enunciated in the Gospels. In brief, the *demonstratio christiana*, arguing from reason and history, establishes as its ultimate conclusion the first principle of supernatural certitude, sc., the infallible words of an accredited divine ambassador. Access is thus opened to the raw materials from which the act of faith is produced, sc., the authority of God revealing and certain truths which He has enunciated.

It seems wholly chimerical to speak of a demonstration that "the doctrine which the Church presents is actually credible as divine revelation" without a formal and intricate *demonstratio catholica*. This doctrine of the Church, we take it, is expressed by the Vatican Council as follows: "Porro fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur et ab Ecclesia sive solemnii iudicio sive ordinario et universali magisterio tanquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur" (*DB*, 1792). Will the seeker after truth, desiring to "stand with Christ," be capable of comparing the thesaurus of the Church's teaching with what he knows of Christ's teaching and pronouncing with conviction that they are the same? No; nor will he arrive at this conviction till it has been proved to him that the Christ whom he would follow speaks to him through the Church. And this is nothing short of the *demonstratio catholica* of classical apologetics. In Chaps. X–XII Dr. Fenton juxtaposes "The Doctrinal Content in the Message of Jesus" with certain cardinal Catholic dogmas, purposing to show their easily recognizable coincidence. Respectfully we submit that the procedure furnishes the strongest possible argument against his theory of dispensing with the formal *demonstratio*

catholica. The comparison, at best, is only partial. Furthermore, as one reads the Scripture passages adduced for comparison with Church dogmas, one is haunted by the refrain: "Mater Ecclesia, cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione Scripturarum sanctarum." Often the doctrines which Dr. Fenton notes in Scripture passages are clearly there only in the light of the Church's interpretation. In conclusion, the apologetic short-cut which by-passes the treatise *De Ecclesia* can lead only into a forest of uncertainties. Apologetic art rightly endeavors from the beginning to remove prejudice against the Church by such comparisons as Dr. Fenton proposes, but that art will never win to Catholic faith save by a formal proof that Christ wills all men to submit to His Church and seek the milk of doctrine from her.

In Chap. VIII the historicity of the Gospels is neatly vindicated. The author nods over the *Muratorian Fragment*, noticing there only St. John's Gospel, overlooking the well-known: "tertio evangelii librum secundo lucan." He avoids the difficulty of the Irenaeian chronology by translating the knotty sentence: "Matthew also composed a written gospel among the Hebrews, in their own tongue, while at Rome Peter and Paul preached and laid the foundation of the Church" (*Adversus Haereses*, III, 1). It will be well to quote the Greek original: 'Ο μὲν δὴ Ματθαῖος ἐν τοῖς Ἑβραίοις τῇ ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ αὐτῶν καὶ γραφὴν ἐξήνεγκεν εὐαγγελίου, τοῦ Πέτρου καὶ τοῦ Παύλου ἐν ῥώμῃ εὐαγγελιζομένων καὶ θεμελιούντων τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. Dr. Fenton's rendition of καὶ by "also" is unusual, commentators commonly taking it to mean "and" or "moreover," supposing some lost phrase, such as "first preached," or "having first preached," to have preceded. "Also" clearly implies that something is added to a thought left unfinished in a previous sentence, but we find no such unfinished thought. However, our chief objection is to the two preterits "preached" and "laid" as renditions of the two genitives absolute. Grammatically speaking, we would expect the action expressed in the present participle to be contemporaneous with that expressed in the main verb; but this is not an absolute rule of Greek syntax and cannot be urged as an apodictic argument that St. Irenaeus makes the writing of the Aramaic Matthew contemporaneous with the Petrine and Pauline apostolate at Rome. But, leaving absolute grammatical possibilities aside, if we do not take St. Irenaeus to signify contemporaneous action, we must suppose that he throws in the phrase about the Apostles' preaching as something quite irrelevant to his theme, which latter is nothing else than a detailing of the chronological sequence of the four Gospels. For these reasons commentators generally translate: "while . . . were preaching and were laying," frankly admitting that in this detail St. Irenaeus followed a false tradition. The same interpretation is implied

in the response of the Biblical Commission on June 19th, 1911(*DB*, 2150).

No exception can be taken to the exposition of the claims which Jesus made for Himself (Chap. IX) and of His right to be believed merely because of His holiness and His wisdom (Chap. XIV). The chapter (XIII) on "Apostolic Witnesses" suffers from a recurrence of the author's allergy to a formal *demonstratio catholica*. There follow in order the great traditional proofs on which the whole structure of Christian apologetics rests—Christ's miracles, His resurrection, the proof from the prophecies, that from the moral miracle of the Church. The miracles are examined, not with all the scientific apparatus which Felder and Grandmaison bring to bear, but quite adequately for a cogent and popularly geared proof. The reviewer read the chapter on the resurrection during the Paschal season and found it convincing and pleasing. In treating the Messianic prophecies the author paints a good impressionistic canvas, but a close student of the subject will miss precise exegesis of the Old Testament texts. Chap. XVIII, "The Church as a Motive of Credibility," is unexceptionable. The book concludes with a chapter summing up the argument and with a brief appendix on the history of apologetics.

St. Mary's College

GEORGE C. RING, S.J.

THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES. By Oswald T. Allis. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1943. Pp. xii + 319. \$3.00.

Higher Criticism—the word "hypercriticism" would be more accurate—has undertaken the impossible task of proving that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses, as is commonly believed and taught by both Jewish and Christian tradition, as well as by diverse authors of different periods and opposed and various religious beliefs. According to these hypercritics, the analysis of the five Books of Moses reveals the presence of conflicting documents, more or less happily compiled and revised in the course of time by successive editors, so much so that the definitive literary form in which the Pentateuch now appears should be considered post-Mosaic and even postponed to the period of the Jewish exile in Babylon, a millenium after the death of Moses. It goes without saying that the historical value of the Mosaic narrative is, in that hypothesis, simply discarded!

Proposed with an apparently solid, modern, scientific, critical apparatus by renowned scholars like Graf, Welhausen, Driver, and Pfeiffer, this strange documentary hypothesis has been accepted upon their authority and without careful investigation, not only by critics of most of the independent schools, but unfortunately also by some Christians, laymen and clerics alike. They thought, with firm conviction, that we could no longer maintain the

Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, now that science had radically upset the traditional opinion. "The documentary hypothesis is the last work of science," we were triumphantly told twenty years ago in a public discussion on this vital religious subject. "Well," we answered, "if the documentary hypothesis is the last word of science, then science is the last word in inconsistency, in fantasticalness, in imaginative creativeness, and jaundiced preconceptions."

The documentary hypothesis has again and again been scientifically refuted, but though grievously wounded, it has always managed to recover. But in this work it has been given the death-blow by a scholar whose competence to discuss this problem the critics themselves can hardly dispute. A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania (A.B.), the Princeton Theological Seminary (B.D.), and the University of Berlin (Ph.D.), a Doctor in Divinity of Hampden Sydney College, professor in the Department of Semitic Philology at Princeton Theological Seminary, Editor of the *Princeton Theological Review* and Associate Editor of the *Evangelical Quarterly* (Edinburgh), author of many articles for the religious press, most of which have dealt with problems of the Old Testament, Dr. Allis is endowed with the specific requirements and training necessary to issue a statement of high scientific value. We can give full credit to the testimony of such a scholar.

In his book Dr. Allis re-examines, one after the other, all the critical and textual arguments of the Welhausen School against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch: variations in the divine names, variations in diction and style, variations in viewpoint and subject matter, alleged doublets, supposed continuity and extent of the conflicting documents. He reviews also the historical and archeological strata on which the hypothesis is based, namely, the religion of Israel in the preprophetic period, prophetic religion and the reform of Josiah, priestly religion in the post-Exilic period. He re-establishes finally the full authority and authorship of the Pentateuch (with the help of archeology) and shows that the fundamental and abiding issue of the problem of the five Books of Moses is not so much the repudiation of Moses as the author of the collection, as it is the question of the repudiation of Christ himself as Redeemer of Mankind.

To give a full account of Dr. Allis's demonstration is beyond the scope of this review. It is also, we must confess, beyond our power. This book has to be read from the first page to the last (and this was our good fortune) to understand the solidity and force of the arguments. The author examines thoroughly and most accurately the documentary hypothesis in all its particular aspects. He omits nothing as to persons, times, places, circumstances, etc. Every statement of the Welhausen school is rigorously

and scientifically checked. If a really adequate synopsis of the demonstration is beyond our power, we think it proper to note at least the general conclusions that a reader will draw from Dr. Allis's re-examination of the Mosaic problem.

The first conclusion that naturally imposes itself from the first chapter to the last is the inconceivable inconsistency of the critics. Logic seems to be entirely unknown to them. Dr. Allis mercilessly shows them their conflicting assertions. With the relentless marshalling of evidence he points out the vicious circles in their arguments, their frequent *petitio principii*, their diplomatic omissions, their arbitrary and despotic mutilations of the sacred text, their substitution of subjective feelings and imaginary concepts for evidence and common sense.

Another conclusion no less apparent in Dr. Allis's demonstration is the false foundation on which the whole documentary hypothesis rests, namely, naturalistic evolution and the negation of the supernatural. For the hypercritics there exists no God, no creation, no supernatural being's intervention in human history; sin, redemption, the Messiah, the Incarnation are not verified by historical records. This preconceived principle is the light with which the hypercritics re-examine, not only the five Books of Moses, but also the other books of Sacred Scripture. History is no longer considered in the light of documentary evidence. Even if it is based on innumerable and absolutely unassailable arguments, it has no value and merits no confidence; it has no claim on our credence once it contradicts the principles of naturalistic evolution. Facts are not seen as they are, but as they are imagined to be.

One more conclusion (and this a most consoling one for those who, years ago, had to fight heavy tanks with old rifles) the documentary hypothesis is now beaten at its own game—scientific warfare. The hypercritics have to choose now between science and their preconceptions. They, who have been so fond of archeology, sacred and profane, are now judged by archeology itself and found wanting. This science gives ample proof of God's redemptive dealings with mankind and especially with Israel. Science is now on our side, prejudice alone on theirs. The book of Dr. Allis is particularly well fortified on this part of the front.

The fundamental issue in the problem of the Pentateuch is clearly exposed for the reader by Dr. Allis: If we reject the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, we have to reject Christ himself, because Christ emphatically said of Moses: "He wrote of me, if ye believe not his writings, how can ye believe my words." And the hypercritic denies the Mosaic authorship only because he denies Christ's divinity and redemption.

Needless to say, Dr. Allis has successfully achieved his aim: to convince earnest Bible students, ministers and laymen alike, that the vitally important question of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is not one which they must leave to experts and specialists, but one which they are quite competent to investigate for themselves since they are really in a position to do this work. We close our remarks with the conclusion so successfully demonstrated in Dr. Allis's masterly work: the Graf-Welhausen-Driver-Pfeiffer post-Mosaic documentary scheme cannot be revised, it must be abandoned and buried. *Non ad corrigendum, sed ad sepeliendum.*

University Seminary, Ottawa

DONAT POULET, O.M.I.

THE SCHOOL OF REPENTANCE. By John A. Kane. Paterson, N. J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1943. Pp. 152. \$1.25.

This work, by the author who has already published *The School of Mary* and *The School of Love*, will hardly teach the theologian anything of a scientific nature, but it is apt to increase in his soul one of the most precious of moral dispositions, that is, a profound and persistent sense of sin and sorrow for it. In this respect it reminds one of Faber's "abiding sorrow for sin." "Penitence is born of a consciousness of sin, and a consciousness of sin deepens with the passing of life." A whole chapter, the second, is devoted to driving home the idea that "God's mercy" is "the motive of perennial penitence." As one grows in the knowledge and love of God, or in the realization of what sin means, one's repentance becomes more and more heartfelt, and "paradoxical as it may seem, the penitential spirit is more fully developed in the saint than in the sinner." In dealing with confession, the author gives a popular proof of the divine origin of auricular confession. Perhaps some of the most striking pages in the book emphasize the fact that Christ Himself, in taking upon Himself our sins and in acknowledging Himself the representative of sin-laden mankind, is an excellent model for the penitent confessing his sins. Positive progress in virtue should be the absorbing aim of frequent confession. When sorrow for sin is genuine, it naturally issues in an eagerness to seize all opportunities to make adequate satisfaction. Some of these opportunities and various forms which the compensation may take are indicated. The final chapter, on amendment, illustrates the progressive effects of sincere and thorough repentance. In fine, *The School of Repentance* is intended for him who would rather feel compunction than know how to define it. For this purpose it is to be recommended.

St. Mary's College

A. G. Ellard, S.J.

MORALITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER. By Rev. Ludwig Ruland, D.D. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1942. Pp. ix + 280. \$2.50.

This volume is an English adaptation, by the Rev. T. A. Rattler, O.S.A., edited by the Rev. Newton Thompson, S.T.D., of the third volume of Ruland's *Pastoral Theology*. Dr. Ruland is the professor of moral and pastoral theology in the University of Würzburg.

When I first saw the title of this book I hoped that it would be a discussion of the moral aspects of those problems which have come to be known in recent years as matters of "social justice." But the volume gives practically nothing more than a treatment of the traditional matters of a man's dealings with his neighbor. So I think that the book has a misleading title.

The book is a compendium, a manual, a handbook; I am against the publication of them. It may be that such works are needed, but in my opinion we have already had enough of them. Compendia can not give complete enough discussions of moral principles and problems. Their net result is unsatisfactory. I do not mean that every section of such a work is unsatisfactory, but the general result is. Again, subordinate principles which are still broad enough to cover a wide set of problems, are apodictically stated without any attempted proof. For example, on page 262 of this work, it is said that "Close and necessary participation, except under the compulsion of very grave fear or though complete ignorance is always formal. . . ." That statement is not true. For, if the cooperator's close and necessary participation is in itself a good or indifferent act, and if in accordance with the principle of the double effect he secures a proportionate good which justifies him in permitting the evil, he may licitly act. And it is not difficult to find situations in which the conditions are verified.

But I do not see any point in indicating what I think are the merits or demerits of the different sections of the book. For the fundamental difficulty would be left untouched—a compendium can not give a complete and satisfactory discussion of moral matters.

St. Louis University

J. E. CANTWELL, S.J.

THE EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS IN CHURCH LAW. By Joseph D. O'Brien, S.J., S.T.D., J.C.D. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1943. Pp. xvii + 307. \$4.50.

Father O'Brien's book is a scholarly and practical exposition of the exemption of religious in canon law. The fundamental concepts of jurisdiction and exemption from the jurisdiction of local Ordinaries, together with other

essential general principles, are first adequately and clearly explained. The author then, taking the division of persons, places, and things, elaborates the principal part of his work, i.e., the application in detail of exemption. This section is characterized by a most commendable thoroughness, as Father O'Brien has endeavored to cover every possible application of exemption. Under each heading, the author shows the positive extent of exemption and its limitations. The last section of the book contains an exposition of the principle of the limitation of exemption and an enumeration of the actual cases of such limitation.

The scholarly character of the work is most gratifying, particularly in a part of ecclesiastical science that is at times burdened with inadequate or merely repetitious books. Father O'Brien avoids no question or problem of exemption. His opinions are founded solidly on canonical principles of interpretation, and his apt use of the sources of canon law avoids the two extremes of neglect and idle erudition. The author has employed his evident familiarity with ancient and modern authors not merely to compile an array of opinions, but to correlate and to advance his subject. The work thus constitutes a distinct contribution to canonical science, and the professional canonist will find it of far more universal value than an occasional book of reference on a particular canonical subject.

Father O'Brien maintains throughout the book a simple and clear style of expression, is attentive to the necessity of definitions, and has defined canonical terms in a manner that can be grasped by those who have had no prolonged training or experience in canon law. The book will accordingly be of timely assistance to those who are not canonists, such as superiors of exempt religious institutes, but who are occasionally confronted with problems concerning exemption.

A calm historical introduction, summarizing the problems and controversies of the past and tracing their causes, might have increased the impression of the importance of the subject, but this could readily have carried the author beyond the length of the work he had projected.

Woodstock College

JOSEPH F. GALLEN, S.J.

THOMISTIC PRINCIPLES IN A CATHOLIC SCHOOL. By Theodore Brauer, Ph.D., and Others. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1943. Pp. x + 321. \$2.50.

Readers may be deceived by the title of this volume. The purpose of the book, in the words of the preface, is "to show that at least the Catholic college, by seasonably using St. Thomas' doctrine, should be able to prepare

and utilize a common basis not only of discussion, but likewise of instruction, training and education up from the simpler to the highest subject." But a theoretic discussion of this proposition is confined to the first chapter, "St. Thomas and The Curriculum." The rest of the work is a symposium of articles prepared by several professors of the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul practically demonstrating this idea of Thomistic integration.

Teacher and student alike will find matter for meditation in the excellent chapter, "St. Thomas on Study." Intellectual discipline and intellectual humility are the roads to wisdom which St. Thomas points out to the student.

After this second chapter the book can be divided quite naturally into two main divisions. The first section is composed of several discussions of a general character covering St. Thomas' doctrine on the nature of philosophy, knowledge, metaphysics, and the all-important subject of teleology. The second part contains a more specialized study of the Saint's teaching in the fields of economic and political thought. The unity of social philosophy appears in the synthesis of the key notions of personality and the common good which these studies present.

Several points in this work will evoke discussion. One statement in the third chapter, "Religion and the Research of First Principles," needs explanation: "The theologian's method is deductive, from God to creatures; the philosopher's method is inductive, from creatures to God" (p. 60). The use of the terms "deductive" and "inductive" is not clear. Especially is this so in the light of an admission of the following chapter: "There is no denying the fact that in Thomism" [and the author has restricted the word Thomism to the philosophical doctrines of St. Thomas] there is a preponderance of the deductive method. . . ." (pp. 105-106).

The chapter on "Thomism and Modern Philosophy," excellent in itself, loses much power in view of the purpose of the whole book, by being too far removed from the text of St. Thomas. The chapter will enhance the reader's interest in the works of Maritain, as the author hopes. However, it seems that in an exposition of "St. Thomas' orderly mind, his clarity of statement, his power of synthesis, his catholicity of interests and his depth of thought" (p. 7), it is not the "abbreviation of Maritain's considerations" which is "regrettable" (p. 74) but the paucity of citations from the Saint himself.

Weston College.

WILLIAM F. DRUMMOND, S.J.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTICES

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THE VOWS. By Msgr. Charles Gay. Third Edition. Westminster, Md.: Newman Book Shop, 1942. Pp. 276. \$2.50.

THE PATH OF HUMILITY. By the Author of *Spiritual Progress*, etc. Westminster, Md.: Newman Book Shop, 1942. Pp. 292. \$2.00.

PRAYER. By Thomas Verner Moore, O.S.B. Westminster, Md.: Newman Book Shop, 1943. Pp. 219. \$1.75.

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM: ON THE PRIESTHOOD. Translated by Patrick Boyle, C. M. Westminster, Md.: Newman Book Shop, 1943. Pp. 176. \$1.25.

THE LIFE OF ST. TERESA OF JESUS. Translated by David Lewis; edited by B. Zimmerman, O.C.D. Fifth Edition. Westminster, Md.: Newman Book Shop, 1943. Pp. 516. \$3.75.

Students of theology are in debt to the Newman Book Shop for its enterprise in reprinting a number of manuals and texts no longer available in the United States. The same laudable enterprise has gone into the reprinting of these ascetical works. The latter two are classic sources of spirituality; the others are works of enduring value. All deserve a wide circulation.

The general warmth of Monseigneur Gay's writings, and their quality of expansiveness have won for them a distinguished place in ascetic literature. This book is a translation of three chapters from his larger work, *De la vie et des vertus chrétiennes* (2 vol., 1874). With the Venerable Libermann, Gay headed the revival of the great seventeenth-century French School; many contemporary readers will find themselves in sympathy with his thought.

The second book, by an anonymous Jesuit, is chiefly notable for the penetrating thoroughness with which it pursues a psychological study of the virtue of humility. The material is cast in the form of meditations. As an aid to self-study they will be useful. One slip in doctrine should be noted: "without special graces, to which we have no real claim, we could not resist certain temptations" (p. 78; cf. p. 79 f.). There may be ambiguity in the term "real claim"; at any rate, one who is a child of God by grace is assured of God's paternal providence, both external and internal, in virtue of which he will be empowered to overcome in any conflict; it remains for him to correspond with God's initiatives.

Dom Thomas Verner Moore's book, first published in 1930, has a special pertinence for the laity, but religious will likewise find it valuable. The discussion of vocal prayer, meditation (especially in the Benedictine tradition), affective prayer, and contemplation is characterized by much spiritual insight, solid practical wisdom, and clarity of style.

The last two books need no recommendation. David Lewis' translation of St. Teresa's *Life* is well known; and Fr. Boyle has done the *De Sacerdotio* into pleasing English.

J. C. M.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR:

I have been following with a great deal of interest the excellent series of thoughtful articles on intercredal co-operation which have been appearing in *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES*. Particularly interesting, since they touched my own special field, were the two articles in your current (June, 1943) issue which discussed joint action for social ends. These contributions, written with moderation and scholarly reserve, shed light rather than heat on a somewhat vexed issue—for which fact your readers must be grateful. However, since some of the conclusions reached in these articles seem questionable to me, I am going to ask your leave to offer a few comments.

It may help clear understanding to list first of all a number of points on which I unhesitatingly agree with Father Parsons and Father Murray: (1) The Holy See desires *some* sort of co-operation toward social goals between Catholics and non-Catholics. (2) This co-operation must at most supplement, and not supplant, our purely Catholic social action. (3) There is a sphere of action, broadly social in nature, in which intercredal co-operation offers no special difficulty. This field may be roughly described as political, civic, and economic. Thus Catholics may freely co-operate with non-Catholics in arranging a Fourth of July celebration, in favoring or opposing proportional representation, or in organizing a new insurance company. Our peculiarly American type of labor movement belongs in this category; scarcely anyone would question the right of Catholics to participate. The same, I should say, applies to the so-called "vocational groups" contemplated in the *Quadragesimo Anno*. In all such political, civic, and economic activities it is in general licit for Catholics to take part along with non-Catholics. While it is licit, it may sometimes not be expedient under particular circumstances. The famous *Non expedit* of Pope Leo XIII will illustrate the point.

My difference of opinion with Father Parsons and Father Murray begins to be significant when we turn from these purely political, civic, and economic activities to others which by their very nature touch directly on fundamental moral and religious principles. Social action of this latter sort deals with issues which cannot even be discussed in any intelligent and thorough fashion without getting down to the most basic facts of religion and morality. Here belong divorce, "birth control" (curious misnomer), Communism, Fascism, the ethics of war, fundamental race relations. Here too belongs the labor question as a whole which, as papal texts have more than once made clear, is primarily moral and religious and not primarily economic. Here, finally, belongs the European type of labor organization which is vastly more ideological, vastly less purely economic, than its American homologue.

It is most important to realize that the issues mentioned in the last paragraph are such by their very nature that Catholics and non-Catholics can never completely agree on them. Of course, they may agree now and then on some immediate practical program for dealing with these issues, but they can never agree

on the basic reasons for their attitudes. Thus, for example, a few old-line Protestants might agree with Catholics in condemning divorce, but they could never accept the full Catholic reason for doing so. They could hardly accept our doctrine on the sacramental character of matrimony and the divinely conferred legislative authority of the Church in the matter.

It must be clear from these considerations that intercredal co-operation on certain issues must be limited, not by any Catholic narrow-mindedness, but by the very nature of the case. Co-operation in practice implies agreement on principles. In purely economic matters Catholics and non-Catholics may cooperate quite freely because their economic principles may be quite the same. But on an issue such as the social question, which is primarily moral and religious and not primarily economic, their co-operation cannot but be limited because of religious differences. There are, then, two types of intercredal co-operation. Co-operation on political, civic, and economic issues offers little difficulty. Co-operation on broader issues directly connected with basic moral and religious principles is something else again. Here there are definite limits. What are they?

A distinction will be helpful in answering this question. Among the very many possible types of co-operation let us distinguish two principal ones and call them *conjoint* co-operation and *parallel* co-operation respectively. Conjoint co-operation would imply that Catholics and non-Catholics would adopt both a form of joint organization and a platform of common social principles as a basis for their united action. The joint organization might be very loose, Catholics and non-Catholics having their distinct associations linked by some sort of federation, or it might be very close with both groups united into a single society. Parallel co-operation would imply that Catholics and non-Catholics would work toward the same immediate objectives in their own separate organizations. Parallel co-operation can be very real and very effective if the leaders of the Catholic and non-Catholic groups respectively have frequent conferences and informal "gentlemen's agreements," and work with mutually sympathetic helpfulness. Parallel co-operation can be as effective as the action of two allied nations waging a war together against a common enemy.

The point at issue, then, seems to be this: Father Parsons and Father Murray, if I understand them correctly, believe in conjoint co-operation even on issues which touch rather directly on basic moral and religious principles, while I must conclude that on such issues, aside from rare and extraordinary occasions, parallel co-operation represents the proper course. The evidence which Father Parsons and Father Murray offer for their view from the papal texts may be reduced to two heads, first, a group of scattered texts from recent statements, and secondly, the Encyclical *Singulari Quadam* which stands by itself.

In reading over the texts other than the *Singulari Quadam* I am very forcibly struck by one fact. They very distinctly fail to specify the form of co-operation recommended. They *may* be interpreted as conjoint co-operation, but there is nothing to show that they *must* be. Without the slightest violence either to the

text or the context they may be perfectly well interpreted as referring to parallel co-operation. For the exact point now at issue they would seem to prove absolutely nothing at all.

Therefore, when Father Parsons, after quoting one such document, goes on to speak of "the necessary body of co-operators," "this body," "the bond uniting the members" (p. 178), it seems to me that he is going beyond his data if he has in mind an *organized* body of intercredal co-operators. Nor can I agree with Father Murray's assertion that "the fact that the co-operation must be organized results from the whole description given by the Holy See of the work to be done" (p. 262). If he is referring to co-operation within the proposed vocational groups, then the point is irrelevant here. These groups are purely economic. Co-operation within them offers no more difficulty than co-operation now within the C.I.O. or a trade association. But if he is referring to conjoint co-operation on social issues involving moral and religious principles, then he comes dangerously close to begging the whole question. For it is by no means evident that the ends mentioned by the Holy Father cannot be attained by parallel co-operation. Indeed, my whole point is that they can be, and that the Holy See desires them to be, so attained.

We turn now to the *Singulari Quadam*. It is unnecessary to discuss its background since Father Murray has already done so with admirable clarity. The question at issue was the legitimacy and expediency of the Christian Trade Unions, which exemplified conjoint co-operation. The papal decision was *tolerari posse et permitti*. What can be concluded from this? From this toleration and permission conceded to conjoint intercredal co-operation on this one occasion can we conclude that the Holy See favors the arrangement as a more or less general policy? An examination of the document itself would seem to prove very, very emphatically that this is not the case.

First of all, the Holy See granted toleration and permission "in view of the peculiar situation of the Church in Germany" (*respicientes peculiarem rei catholicae rationem in Germania*). These words would seem to imply a very distinct warning against any attempt to generalize this permission and toleration and apply them elsewhere. It was an unusual privilege conceded to German Catholics this one time on account of a peculiar combination of circumstances.

Secondly, the Pope made it clear that the arrangement was far from ideal. What he really wanted was a completely Catholic organization and this would naturally leave room only for parallel co-operation. He stated this preference in the *Singulari Quadam* itself and he stated it elsewhere. For example, he authorized Cardinal Merry del Val to write the Baronessa de Montenach to praise the Associazione Cattolica delle Opere di Protezione della Giovane for its "carattere di aperta confessionalità."¹ Indeed, the enormous emphasis placed by successive Popes on the importance of Catholic Action, contrasting with the mere toleration

¹ AAS, IV (1912), 462.

and permission once conceded to an interconfessional organization, reveals the mind of the Holy See in the clearest and most unmistakable manner.

The *Singulari Quadam*, finally, shows very clearly that the Holy Father considered the German experiment a dangerous one; for the permission was granted on the condition: "si cautiones adhibeantur idoneae ad declinanda pericula, quae in eius generis consociationibus inesse diximus." He commanded the German bishops to watch the movement carefully and went to the quite unusual length of prescribing that Catholic members of the mixed groups must also join the Catholic *Arbeitervereine* at the same time in order to guard their faith. What were these dangers which caused the Pope such uneasiness? He is quite explicit: "Nisi enim mature excitentur ad vigilandum, patet periculum in eis esse, ne paulatim et quasi imprudenter in vago quodam nec definito genere christianae religionis acquiescant quae interconfessionalis dici solet."

There are a good many papal documents which emphasize this danger of interconfessionalism as a result of conjoint co-operation in social ventures. Let us cite some of them. First, there are three letters which Cardinal Merry del Val wrote to various Catholic leaders in the Pope's name. To Bishop Bougoüin he spoke with disfavor of "a sort of confessional neutrality which sometimes insinuates itself into so-called Catholic movements to the apparent end that the maximum possible number of members may be admitted with the minimum possible number of supernatural conditions."² He praised M. Durand's movement for "resolutely turning its back on the pernicious principle of religious neutrality and taking on a precisely and accurately Catholic character."³ Finally, Count de Mun is commended for the thoroughly Catholic character of his work contrasting with other movements in which charity "evaporates into a vague fraternity."⁴

Above all, there is the letter *Notre Charge* which Pope Pius wrote to the hierarchy of France about the movement called the *Sillon*. The Holy Father made various criticisms against the group but the chief one seems to be that from being Catholic it had become intercredal and thus (as is inevitable in intercredal movements) it was unable to bring to bear on social questions the integral doctrine of the Church. "Behold an interconfessional association founded by Catholics to work for the reform of civilization, a work which is in the first place religious; for there is no true civilization without moral civilization and there is no true moral civilization without the true religion."⁵ Here the Holy Father put his finger unerringly on a weakness of conjoint intercredal co-operation which no amount of argument can explain away. Social reform is absolutely meaningless without moral principles and moral principles will be partial, vague, and unsatisfactory unless they are the principles of—not some vague interconfessional code, but (in Pope Pius' words) of "the true religion." I find it hard to square the papal attitude with Father Murray's proposal for "a common ground" or "a common affirmation" which is

² *AAS*, IV (1912), 715.

⁴ *AAS*, V (1913), 18.

³ *AAS*, II (1910), 311.

⁵ *AAS*, II (1910), 625.

to be "the basis of a socio-religious unity" (p. 274). I think I appreciate the full force of Father Murray's argument. The truths which Protestants can accept along with us as "a common ground" are nevertheless still truths. In themselves they are no less true because they are not *all* the truth. There is force in this line of reasoning. Doubtless the leaders of the *Sillon* would have argued in the same way; yet their position was not approved by the Holy See. The catch, I suppose, is that half the truth can sometimes be as misleading as a positive error. Society is so bewilderingly complex that even to begin to see our way we need to mobilize every iota of truth at our disposal. An intercredal movement which uses only part of God's truth is basically unsatisfactory. A Catholic who agrees to discuss social questions with Protestants on the basis of "a common ground" tacitly agrees to keep in the background a part of his integral Catholic doctrine. Pope Pius put the difficulty neatly and not without a certain delicate irony: "What is to be thought of the Catholic who on entering his study club checks his Catholicism at the door so as not to startle his comrades?"⁶

Except in one very exceptional instance the Holy See has consistently disapproved conjoint intercredal co-operation for social goals. Therefore we are forced to conclude that the co-operation which the Pope wants is parallel co-operation. And why not? The latter variety preserves the purity of integral Catholic social doctrine and there is no reason why it need be inefficient. Indeed, it is the very sort of co-operation for social goals which we are used to in a democracy. Whenever an important measure comes before Congress it is quite usual to find half a dozen independent organizations co-operating to advocate or oppose it. Would these be necessarily more efficient if they fused themselves into a single super-organization? I am not sure they would. Up to a certain point the larger an organization is, the more effective it is. Beyond that point it becomes unwieldy. Catholics in the United States are a minority, but not a tiny minority. There are enough of us to make our influence on society felt if our organizations co-operate intelligently with non-Catholic groups through parallel co-operation.

From Father Parsons and Father Murray I get the impression that they feel that Catholics in the United States have been ineffective in social matters because we have been too little co-operative with non-Catholics. Strangely enough, my own view is precisely the opposite. We have been ineffective because we have been too uncritically co-operative. We have been so feverishly anxious to co-operate with liberals and all sorts of people that we have kept our distinctively Catholic social doctrine in the background. To the general public we have not emphasized our faith in supernatural means, in all that is distinctively Catholic in the Encyclicals. Our Catholic social doctrine, as presented by many of our leaders, must appear to outsiders as a sort of expurgated liberalism.

This is the wrong policy. What we need to do is to become more aggressively Catholic, not less so. Without any dilution of our doctrine, without any apology

⁶ *AAS*, II (1910), 626.

for the hard sayings in our social doctrine, let us exhibit the full beauty of our teaching to our non-Catholic brethren. Once our doctrine has been presented fully—not apologetically, not partially, but fully—they will rally to our side. Then there will be real co-operation. After all, if you will reread the texts quoted by Father Parsons you will see that what the Holy See asks for is not that Catholics should co-operate with non-Catholics, but rather *vice versa*, that non-Catholics should co-operate with us. That seems to me to be a pretty good idea!

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TO THE EDITOR:

I hope I may take advantage of the fact that I get an advance look at the material you publish? My immediate wish is to thank Dr. Furfey for the measure of agreement he gives to some views expressed by myself. His disagreements, so courteously phrased, are likewise valuable. These few comments are ventured with a view, not to controversy, but to the clarification of my own position.

First, I must clarify my assertion that an immediately necessary, though not in itself adequate solution for today's spiritual crisis in the temporal order lies in a common agreement on certain principles that would form the basis of a religio-social unity. Not only do I think that this idea can be squared with papal teaching; I am also convinced that it is an important part of the papal teaching today. As such I proposed it, though without chapter and verse. Assuredly, I was not thinking of common agreement on the partial, vague, and unsatisfactory principles of some interconfessional code. (Interesting how, when co-operation is mentioned, the idea of vague interconfessional codes, sentimental fraternity, etc., comes to mind. Is it that, as Dr. Furfey implies, so many of our concepts are taken uncritically from our milieu? Yet there is, I think, a Catholic concept of co-operation, to be derived from our own sources. It has nothing to do with confessional neutrality, nor is it apt to encourage that conformism on the part of Catholics with prevalent ideas of which, as Dr. Furfey rightly suggests, we have had too much.) As a matter of fact, I was thinking of the four sets of five points which Pius XII has proposed for "the order and pacification of human society," in his successive Christmas allocutions. I was thinking, too, of the large section of the *Summi Pontificatus* in which the disorders of our times are analyzed in terms of the natural law.

I think that these sets of points were explicitly proposed for common agreement, and that we were commissioned to seek agreement on them by their intelligent and patient explanation. It has often been noted that none of these points derives explicitly from divine revelation as such; they are all of what we call the natural order. Obviously, in proposing them for common agreement, our Holy Father was not

tacitly consenting to keep in the background any portion of Catholic truth; nor in issuing a call to unity of action on the basis of them was he discounting the primary value of Catholic Action. His position is wholly affirmative: "Today the common good of mankind and the natural bases of human society are imperilled; to meet the peril, a common agreement in a spirit of truth, justice, and love is imperative; on these points there can and should be agreement; were they made directive of thought and creative of social institutions, human society would be essentially conformed to the standards of divine law in its regard; much more would remain to be done, but something essential at the moment would have been done." It was this wholly affirmative, forward-looking, non-exclusive point of view that I was attempting to adopt.

A second comment concerns the *Singulari Quadam*. My examination of the document had one major purpose—to discern the underlying principle that motivated the *tolerari posse et permitti* given to Catholic co-operation with Protestants in the labor field, in spite of the dangers and imperfections in the procedure. I considered that I found this principle in the papal concern for the common good. This principle permits generalization—otherwise, as Dr. Furfey rightly says, illegitimate—from the *Singulari Quadam*. My argument did not move from a case to a case, but from a particular solution to a principle of solution, which might be applicable to other cases. As a matter of fact, the same principle has been applied to our contemporary case—we have been told that the common good of humanity is menaced on a greater scale than ever before. And a necessary counter-measure has been pointed out—a union of all religious forces in social action for the common good. (I thought I had made clear that this union would supplement and be subordinate to an intensification of Catholic prayer, study, and organized action. So far from inhibiting, it would stimulate the latter, as its premise and inspiration.)

Admittedly, this union would have its dangers, and it would not be an adequate or ideal agency of social salvation, especially in the family field, wherein, as a matter of fact, we think and work rather alone. Nevertheless, when these facts have been admitted, the issue is not exhausted. One must, I think, avoid a certain *simplisme* in argument, caused by a too exclusive pre-adhesion to certain values, which are primary indeed, but not all-embracing. One hears the enthymeme: "Co-operation is a danger to Catholic faith; therefore let us have none of it." But, first, the antecedent is vague, till the meaning of co-operation is exactly defined; and secondly, the consequent hardly follows. The so-called Catholic Liberals once argued: "The union of Church and State has always been a danger to the spiritual independence of the Church; therefore let us have no more of it." But that dialectic was rejected as too simple.

These last remarks, of course, are not pertinent to the discussion between Dr. Furfey and myself. At that, I do think that his allegation of the incident of *Le Sillon* was too briefly done to furnish a basis for fair argument. The inter-credalism of the movement in its latter phase was indeed condemned. But again, one may not argue from case to case. It is most important to study the theory

behind the intercredalism. (Incidentally, the mode of argument of the *Sillon's* later leaders was very muddy and arrogant; I should not like to think that mine had any resemblance to it.) Actually, the primary reason for the condemnation, developed at much greater length in *Notre Charge*, was the false social theory into which the movement had slid: it "based its city on a theory contrary to Catholic truth, and falsified the essential and fundamental notions which govern social relations in the whole of human society" (*AAS*, II, 1910, 615). And its radical error was "a false idea of human dignity" (p. 620). Furthermore, the intercredal policy of the movement was a development subsequent to, and indeed consequent on, its inner degeneration. It had fashioned its erroneous concept of what it called "democracy," and it had cut itself off from ecclesiastical obedience before it sought membership outside the Church. These facts are important, I think, in estimating the full contemporary pertinence of *Notre Charge*. It cannot be too much emphasized that there are various kinds of co-operation, and that judgment on any one of them must be passed according to its supporting theory—that is the decisive factor.

I shall not comment on Dr. Furfey's central contention—that the papal documents are to be understood as calling for "parallel co-operation"—because I do not fully grasp it. The concept of parallel co-operation is difficult. At first sight, it seems to be a contradiction *in adiecto*. "Co-operation," Dr. Furfey rightly says, "implies in practice agreement on principles." Yet it would seem that his parallel co-operation implies no such agreement, in any conscious or deliberate sense. At most, it would seem to imply some apparently casual coincidence of practical programs. For my part, I do not think that this would do justice to the papal idea. The Holy See speaks (for example, in the *Sermon Laetitiae*) of a "union of thought and policy" between Catholics and non-Catholics—a union that will be "salutary," that is, so real as to be socially effective. It does not, of course, specify the organizational form of the union, since so much depends on local circumstances. (Incidentally, in the United States I do not think a single organization with general mixed membership would be practicable or advisable; our people are not educated up to that. Formal contacts would have to be made by a committee of leaders, whose membership would have to be—unfortunately—largely clerical.) But the Holy See, as I understand its position, does require that the union be deliberately constituted, as the result of formally sought and consciously arrived at agreement on principles—the principles, I mean, of the natural law in their social application. The concept of parallel co-operation would hardly permit an essential part of the papal program, namely, a respectful but vigorous educative action on the thought, attitudes, sympathies, etc. of our separated brethren, with a view to persuading them that our social doctrine and program does appeal to the collective conscience of mankind, and can command their honest assent. This is the imperative thing. How much common action would thereafter ensue is a matter for prudent judgment.

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