

BOOK REVIEWS

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY. By M. Searle Bates. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. \$3.50

The second part of Professor Bates's book has the title, "The Problems of Religious Liberty in History." This subject matter is almost limitless in its extent, and enormously complex in its details. One would maintain that it is simply impossible to compress into a hundred and fifty pages an outline of the development of tolerance even within the limits of Western culture; nevertheless, Professor Bates has undertaken to trace the development in all lands and within all cultures. The historical problems involved are so thorny that it would take a lifetime to obtain first-hand knowledge of them; and in dealing with them one would have to take sides in disputes that have gone on for centuries. All that a single author could hope to do would be to cite the results of previous investigations, where they exist. Unfortunately, such a procedure runs the risk of giving a distorted view.

Despite industry and a large fund of good will, Professor Bates has by no means been able to surmount the difficulties inherent in his task. At every turn his erudition appears excessively thin; for instance, in quoting from Innocent III the phrase, "Petro non solum universam ecclesiam [*sic*] sed reliquit saeculam gubernationem [*sic*]" (p. 141), he refers to an article by David S. Schaff, wherein the quotation appears in a more intelligible form indeed, but without any reference.

The sketch of early Christian times is so brief—six pages, not unencumbered with other matters—as to be quite without value, except perhaps for certain phrases culled from former studies. The medieval period receives very inadequate treatment. And the meager space given to the complex problems of the Thirty Years War does not allow even for the presentation of the issues; this section, however, is based on a reputable study. For this superficiality the author is not to be blamed; he had to compress everything almost to the vanishing point.

The author is better informed about Protestant grievances than about the corresponding Catholic ones; hence it is not easy for him to be impartial. However, he has been generous in showing the faults on both sides. For example, he points out that the rise of Protestantism, far from signaling the advent of religious liberty, was accompanied by an unprecedented outburst of intolerance and cruelty. Among other fierce statements, he quotes Luther's call to his followers "to wash our hands in their [Catholic] blood." He admits the extreme tardiness of the Scandinavian countries in granting religious liberty. He concedes that the New England Puritans

merit blame for their hypocritical intolerance, and deserve the shame of being the only group in America who legally executed a man for his religious belief. Despite these and many other loyalties to historical fact, the ordinary reader will interpret this section as a veiled indictment of Catholic "intolerance." Even an open indictment would not have been surprising, since the author frankly takes a Protestant stand. But indictments require greater factual accuracy than is evident in these pages.

A few instances of lapses may be pointed out. The sketchy treatment of St. Augustine's theory of tolerance leaves a completely wrong impression as to St. Augustine's real position. The author gives no consideration to the fact that the crimes of the Donatists, against which St. Augustine reluctantly invoked secular aid, were far from being merely crimes of opinion, or even matters that concerned only "religion"; the Donatists, especially their strong-arm men, the ferocious Circumcellions, were real desperadoes. Furthermore, the author has not taken into account St. Augustine's own awareness of the extremes of intolerance to which his arguments, if unwarrantedly pushed, might lead, nor his explicit repudiation of these extremes. So many men have written unscientifically and unfairly on St. Augustine's views in this matter, that Professor Bates is perhaps not to be blamed, except for having made an unfortunate choice of guides.¹

The author brushes aside as unconvincing the statement that the heretics assailed by the medieval Inquisition were political and social revolutionaries. This, however, was exactly the case, as a better acquaintance with the literature on the subject would reveal. For instance, Professor Austin P. Evans of Columbia University, who is surely not an apologist for the cruelties of the Inquisition, writes: "In certain of their tenets all of the popular [medieval] heresies were antisocial. The argument that marriage was nothing more than legalized prostitution, the insistence on absolute poverty and *per contra* the recognition of the validity of usury, the opposition to oaths, the claim that the killing either of man or animal was under no circumstances permissible, and the refusal to admit the competence of one man to judge another—such teaching would be held to undermine the vigor of ordered society in our own as well as in an earlier age."²

In the matter of the Inquisition, Professor Bates's reliance on Vacandard is uncritical. It is also too selective; Catholic writers need not be considered reliable only in those passages in which they criticize the practice of their

¹ On this problem, see my article, "The Problem of Persecution in the Early Church," *THEOLOGICAL STUDIES*, V (1944), 332 ff.

² Austin P. Evans, "Social Aspects of Medieval Heresy," in *Persecution and Liberty: Essays in honor of George Lincoln Burr* (New York, 1931), p. 97.

Church. There are further instances of lack of balance; for instance, Professor Bates calls the Bull, *Ad Extirpanda*, a "prime charter of savagery" (p. 144); later on, the Puritans of New England are condemned indeed for putting to death "heretics and dissenters as such" (p. 181), but in the context it is implied that "knowledge of the European and British backgrounds of the early modern period" might put their actions "in modified light" (pp. 180, 181). Perhaps knowledge of the century of the Bull, *Ad Extirpanda*, might put it, too, in a modified light.

Professor Bates is very gentle with Queen Elizabeth. He says that "a thorough student finds that Catholics were not troubled for religious practices and that there was no intent to blot out Catholicism from England" (p. 175), until the excommunication of the Queen by Pius V. Who this "thorough student" is, the author does not reveal. It has, indeed, been frequently asserted that up to 1570 Elizabeth was kind to Catholics; but this is quite false. A war of extermination began in 1559 with the systematic and ruthless enforcement of the Act of Supremacy and the Act of Uniformity. Heavy fines were levied from the beginning; imprisonment was common. After 1570, crueler measures were adopted, but they represented no real change in policy. The fanaticism was the same from the beginning to the end—a fanaticism of which the inhuman monster Richard Topcliffe was perhaps the best symbol.³

In the absence of a critical biography of Oliver Cromwell, it would probably be better not to insist, as Professor Bates does, on the tolerance of the sanguinary executioner of Drogheda and Wexford. It is, of course, well known that Cromwell justified the butchery by charging that the Irish had massacred the English to whom Irish lands had been assigned; but, as has been pointed out, none of the Irish who rebelled in 1641 were in Drogheda or Wexford.⁴

As conclusive evidence of some of his gravest charges against the Catholic Church, Professor Bates quotes "the renowned Roman Catholic scholar who from his professor's chair organized the *Cambridge Modern History*" (p. 161). It is indeed a fact that Lord Acton was a renowned professor and that he lived and died a Catholic; but that fact gives no true idea of the man. Acton was a disciple of Doellinger, the great German historian, whose opposition to the Vatican Council eventually led him out of the Church. Doellinger had all of Acton's sympathy in the opposition to the definition of papal infallibility. In fact, Acton was despatched to Rome at the time

³ Cf. the articles by Leo Hicks, *The Month*, CXLVII (1926), 289-304, 401-13.

⁴ Cf. R. Dunlop, *Cambridge Modern History*, IV, 532: "Not one man of the garrison had in all likelihood been concerned in the 'massacre.'"

of the Council and took a leading part in the struggle of which the Council was the center. (He also rendered himself not a little ridiculous by assuming various disguises, in the strange thought that he was in danger of assassination.) At the time, and often thereafter, he uttered charges against the papacy that are hardly surpassed by the denunciations of Luther and Calvin. Some of Acton's views were published, and he is said to have altered them in later life; others were made in his correspondence, especially that with Gladstone's daughter, and in conversation; these were apparently never documented, and never disowned, except implicitly. Professor Bates repeats some of the latter charges; for example, that Pius V approved the plot to murder Queen Elizabeth. The fact is that there is no evidence whatever to show that the Ridolfi plot, as communicated to Pius V, included any scheme for murder.⁵ In his bitterness against Rome, Acton jumped to that conclusion, as he did to others equally fantastic. In fine, the case of Lord Acton offers striking proof that in a question of this nature it is not enough simply to repeat what others have said, no matter what party they may belong to. We have here an outstanding illustration of Professor Bates's frequent failure to assess the value of his own authorities.

In a summary of the recent controversy about the influence of Cardinal Bellarmine on American political theory and practice, Professor Bates finds it impossible "to follow Gaillard Hunt in arguing that Jefferson took some of his characteristic wording [for the Declaration of Independence] from Bellarmine" (p. 212). Admittedly, Hunt was ill-advised in claiming that the influence of the Catholic tradition on early American political thought was exerted, in a specific sense, through Bellarmine. He based his claim on the discovery in Jefferson's library of Robert Filmer's attack on Bellarmine as a formidable opponent of the absolutism of kings. In the same book, Filmer gives a handy resumé of Bellarmine's political doctrine, many of whose phrases seem to be re-echoed by the Declaration of Independence. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true that Jefferson could have found, and actually did find, the principles of the Declaration in other sources more familiar to him, particularly in the writings of John Locke. However, even in this case it should not be forgotten that Locke's *Civil Government* was a restatement of the fundamental tradition of political

⁵ Cf. *The Tablet* (London), CVI (1905), 89 f. The October and November issues of the *Tablet* for 1906 contain an interesting correspondence on the Catholicism of Lord Acton. In the *Dublin Review*, CXCIV (1934), 187, W. L. Blennerhassett writes: "He [Acton] allowed himself to be carried away by bitterness of feeling and used expressions far too forcible. This is true, even though he subsequently modified his earlier conclusions. Besides, as Doellinger persistently contended, Acton would not make due allowance for the influence of men on the spirit of their time."

civilization of the Middle Ages.⁶ Bellarmine and his contemporaries invoked that tradition to stem the tide of absolutism in its rise; Jefferson borrowed the arguments from Locke and used them against absolutism in its decline.

When dealing with the papal *Index of Forbidden Books*, Professor Bates seems to be unaware of similar Protestant measures; for example, Calvin proscribed the use of any Catholic book whatsoever. Indeed, most of the Roman regulations in this regard, undertaken to protect the integrity of Catholic faith, are posterior to, and seem mild in comparison with, those imposed by Geneva. Marriage with Catholics was unconditionally forbidden; Calvinists were not to touch anything which was in any way connected with the Catholic cult; and hatred of the Mass was a first principle to which students were obliged by oath.⁷

It would be ungenerous to enlarge further on the mistakes into which Professor Bates has been led by the necessity, under which he labored, of quickly trusting other men's statements. The few instances here adduced simply illustrate the fact that this section is for the most part based on the conclusions of others, hardly any of which escape the need for verification. To a Catholic reader the paragraphs devoted to Orthodox, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese religious history seem to be far more impartial than those concerned with Western Christianity. At that, it might well be that adherents of those cults would find their treatment to have been even more inadequate.

Lord Acton, whom Professor Bates seems greatly to admire, spent his life working on a *History of Liberty*, which never appeared. He planned to begin with the ancient world and to carry the story down to his own day; he intended to consult original sources, study the men who fought for liberty and the institutions which secured it, and take notice of all that had been written on the subject. It has been said that he would have needed the combined intellects of Julius Caesar and Napoleon and the total lifetimes of the patriarchs for his adopted task. Professor Bates's scope was not so vast; he does not pretend to deal with the whole field of liberty. His commission was to satisfy the need for a concise historical treatment of the particular problem of religious liberty. At that, no small portion of the difficulties that defeated Lord Acton confronted him. His success and failure in overcoming them will be variously judged; but his

⁶ Cf. A. J. Carlyle, *Political Liberty: A History of the Conception in the Middle Ages and Modern Times* (Oxford, 1941), p. 133.

⁷ Cf. F. W. Kampschulte, *Johann Calvin, Seine Kirche und sein Staat in Genf* (Leipzig, 1899), II, 290, 407, 430, 453, 462.

courage in facing them, insofar as they were known to him, stands out of question. Moreover, his book as a whole should impress the reader with one important lesson—that, to use Toynbee's phrase, the "intelligible field" of the history of religious liberty has expanded steadily through the modern era, until today it embraces the whole world. Religious liberty can no longer be understood in terms of one religion or one continent or one culture. If only for its impressive illustration of this fact, Professor Bates's book is useful, despite the defects which its competent and objective author has been unable to avoid.

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I have been asked to comment on the middle section of Dr. Bates's work; in general, it deals with the theory of religious liberty—what it is, and what are its grounds.

The task of giving fair criticism is difficult. This part of the book is even less well organized than the preceding historical parts, as has been admitted even by critics to whom Protestant modes of thought are more native and congenial than they possibly could be to a Scholastic theologian. Moreover, it is clear that the author moves far more hesitantly in the field of theory than he does in that of historical fact. Finally, in this section he was under special handicaps; for Protestant theories of religious liberty are at best inadequate and ill-defined, and rest on no formed intellectual tradition. It is not surprising that Dr. Bates has failed to give these theories that organized form and that undergirding of principle that would enable a critic to cope with them in orderly fashion.

Hence one is at a loss to know how and where to take hold of this exposition. It begins with some superficial general considerations on liberty and conscience, then takes up the relations of Church and State, and moves on to religious liberty in education, in society, and in and between churches as such; at the end of this chapter it is expected that we should know what religious liberty is. The next chapter takes up the grounds of religious liberty; it discusses natural law and natural rights, religious liberty and the interests of the organized community, relevant ethical, philosophical, and theological doctrine; and it concludes with an exposition of the position of the Roman Catholic Church. The pattern of the whole section is not at all evident; for one thing, it is disconcerting to see the essence of religious liberty discussed before its grounds are set forth.

At all events, it should be fair to begin with a question of method, which is always primary in matters of scholarship. Actually, the absence of a

clearly defined method—a major defect of the whole book—shows up most clearly in this section. The method is neither speculative nor historical. The section is not an ordered argument, setting forth the author's own theory of religious liberty, nor is it a systematic, critical summary of other peoples' theories. It is both, and neither.

It was, of course, the author's deliberate intention to let as many people as possible speak through him, while at the same time he himself threaded an argument through the whole. But the net result is highly confusing. At times, analyses are well initiated, only to dissolve in desultory and fragmentary citations of opinions, which destroy whatever consecutiveness of argument there may be. Again, one rarely knows whether, or how far, the author is in agreement with the views he cites, with the result that one continually has to guess at the boundaries and content of his own thought. In brief, this section, like the rest of the book, will be a gold mine for the harried and hurried lecturer or journalist, who will be rapidly able to prove anything (or nothing) from its materials. But the serious scholar will get little help.

The book has, indeed, been called scholarly—a qualification that must have surprised its author, who is himself a genuine scholar, and doubtless unhappy over having turned out an unscholarly book. Perhaps "encyclopedic" would be a more accurate qualification. The whole field is covered; nearly everyone who has written around the subject is quoted; a wide range of problems is raised. However, none of the field is covered adequately; the quotations are given at second- and third-hand; and most of the problems are superficially conceived. In saying this, I disavow any reflection on Dr. Bates himself, as a scholar. He undertook an impossible task, and engaged himself to do it in an impossibly short time. What is still more handicapping, he was obliged, in the theoretical section of the book, to move in a field that is not his own. To remove any personal direction from my criticism, I shall hereafter refer, not to the author but to the book (to be cited as "*RL*").

The initially faulty thing about this theoretical section is the place in which it is found; it begins on page 294. In the preceding pages, all sorts of historical situations have been described and judged, and lists of things have been drawn up that religious liberty demands—all before the book gets to the question of what religious liberty is. Yet this question is, in all logic, the prior one. It is postponed in favor of the customary Protestant empirical approach. No one, of course, denies that historical experience has had great influence in developing and modifying (and killing) various theories of religious liberty. That having been said, it remains true that religious liberty is *per prius* a theoretical problem, to be answered by an

analysis, not of social situations in their concreteness, but of religious, philosophical, and political concepts in their full abstractness. Secondly, no one has the right of historical judgment in such a complicated field, until he has battled his way through the theories that were the main reasons for the complications, and until he has clearly formulated his own position.

It would, of course, be tolerable if *RL*'s sociologism were purely such; but it is not. The analyses are constantly slanted, and interspersed with judgments of value predicated on a set of assumptions which the reader is left to figure out for himself. Although the method of the book is stated to be "essentially inductive" (p. ix) the conclusions are really in hand before the induction starts—an implicit tribute to the primacy of theory. It would have been more scientific if the tribute had been explicit—if, that is, the inevitable had been accepted, and a statement first given of a theory of religious liberty, together with its demonstration.

An inversion of right method already appears in the opening sections of the book. It begins with a survey of the contemporary scene, and suggests the general judgment that the cause of religious liberty is rather badly off in it. The scene then shifts backward to history, and the course of history is described, with the implicit thesis that mankind has been slowly ascending toward religious liberty, with a pace notably accelerated after the Protestant Reformation had finally freed the spirit of man. However, at the end of this second section we are left blankly confronting the important question: Why, after all this laborious upward movement, did things in the twentieth century suddenly take a turn for the worse?

Of the historical survey, this is said: "Let it be related to the problems of the contemporary world surveyed in the preceding chapter, where old compulsions and denials of opportunity are viewed beside fresh reversals or interruptions of the difficult effort of man to find freedom of spirit" (p. 293). Let it be related, indeed. But it is the task of the philosopher and historian so to relate it; and *RL* does not even attempt the task. In particular, there is no willingness to face the highly important problem of how far nineteenth-century Liberalism was responsible, through its own prolongation or through its provocation of reaction, for the creation of that set of conditions in our own world which resulted in those "reversals" and "interruptions" of man's supposedly inevitable progress toward freedom of spirit. . . There is, too, the allied question of how far this Liberalism was the secular expression of the Protestant spirit, in such wise that this latter must bear some share of responsibility for the checks inflicted on the cause that it claims as its own. Admittedly, these are difficult questions, but they cannot be avoided.

There is a more fundamental problem which *RL* hardly touches, although

it affects the initial conception of the whole problem of religious liberty. In effect, the book asks one question: How shall religion be made free in society? But this is too simple a *Problematik*. It does not include the more important question: How shall society itself be made religious? It has been hammered into us of late, by events more powerfully than by words, that genuine freedom is a function of religion, that society will remain free only when it is structured according to the demands of the religious conscience, and that a secularized society is the matrix in which are inevitably formed all kinds of dynamisms that are hostile to human freedom. Hence these two questions taken together—religious freedom in society, and religion itself in society—give us the true *Problematik*.

RL does, indeed, show some limited awareness of this fact. There is revealed some slight insight into the fact that "freedom of religion" as conceived in the thought-world of secularist Liberalism was, in its tendency and in the indifferentist philosophy that inspired it, a contributing factor in the secularization of society that is the source of so many of our contemporary ills, among them certain denials of religious liberty. However, if I may say so without seeming sharp, the book is too Protestant to deal vigorously with this fact. It strongly condemns the enemies of religious liberty (among them, of course, the Catholic Church). But it shows little awareness of the fact that religious liberty has some very false friends, one of whom surely is the religious and social philosophy of Liberalism. In this regard, *RL* is disappointing.

A word might be said here about *RL*'s general attitude toward the Catholic Church. The book may not be accused of animus; there is a loyal effort to be fair even to what is not well understood. The difficulty is that the whole book labors under the limitations imposed by its own viewpoint, and especially by the position adopted on a fundamental point of religious philosophy. Actually, the book's religious philosophy could be summed up in one tenet, that is constantly reiterated: religion is essentially "voluntary"; its greatest enemy is "compulsion." In its generality, of course, this tenet is a truism, not questioned by anybody. However, the tendency of the whole book is to identify "authority" with "compulsion," in such wise that the essentially "voluntary" character of religion necessarily excludes the existence of any spiritual authority (in Church or State) higher than the individual conscience, external to it, and able to bind it. In other words, authority is innately (and not merely by abuse) destructive of liberty. (Obviously, this thesis, so dear to the Liberals, is never stated so baldly; but it seems to me that I found it in the tendency of the book's whole thought; and in such a book no theses are baldly stated.) The climate of

opinion of the whole book is determined by this antinomy put between liberty (and conscience) and authority. Cognate with it are the oppositions persistently suggested as existing between the free fellowship of individuals and the externally structured religious community, between "religious interests" and "institutional interests," between "spiritual" life and "ecclesiastical" life, between dogma and personal conviction, etc.

Obviously, in the climate of opinion thus established there could be little sympathy for Catholic thought, which is accustomed to indulge in no such dialectic of oppositions. And a mind accustomed to move in such a climate of opinion could not but view the "authoritarian" Church as intrinsically the enemy of "liberty." Actually, in the minds of many, *RL* will lend much color to the current assumption, based on faulty philosophical thinking and a superficial reading of history, that active persecution is in the very logic of a religion of dogma and authority. That such an assumption could arise (and be sustained by this book) is but another testimony to the continuing failure of Protestant thought to develop any genuine philosophy of authority in its relations to freedom. This failure is bad enough; what is worse is the persistent Protestant habit of viewing authority as it concretely exists in the Catholic Church (wherein it is perfectly reconciled with all that freedom can ask) through the distorting glass of Protestant philosophy (through which authority appears as irreconcilable with freedom.) *RL* proves again, if it needed to be proved, that the major religious controversies of today are not pitched on the plane of the Christian revelation as such, but on the plane of the philosophy of religion.

RL's very brief discussion of the concept of "liberty" and of "conscience" is too superficial to merit comment; its general quality may fairly be gauged from the apparent approval given to Ruggiero's remarkable dictum: "The eternal glory of Kant is to have demonstrated that obedience to the moral law is freedom" (p. 296).

But the section on Church and State is quite interesting, chiefly by reason of its weakness. As a matter of fact, in the ecclesiology maintained by *RL* the problem of Church and State does not arise. The book conceives Christianity to have been originally a sort of "spiritual movement," without social form. Only later did it begin to develop "in small voluntary groups" (p. 283), by a process of free association between likeminded men, undertaken for reasons that are not well specified, but which seem to be related to the general necessity of cohesiveness, if Christianity was to be a "power" in the world and against the world. The "churches," therefore, in their institutional form are of purely human origin; they are "gathered" entities, whose social form is of the purely human order. They are somehow vehicles

of "religion"; but the only element of divinity in them is their "religion," not their "institutional" character. This latter has no directly spiritual significance, which is possessed solely by the invisible, free fellowship. In fact, the institution imposes itself on the fellowship not merely as an alien element but as a positive threat. It threatens the voluntary character of the fellowship itself, by its concern for its own cohesiveness, which tends to coerce its members into a dreaded "uniformity." It likewise threatens other voluntary bodies, by seeking to impose itself on them. Actually, church "organization" as such is, directly or indirectly, for purposes of power; and therein lies its intrinsic danger. For power tends to coerce; and therefore the "institution" tends to become the instrument of coercion and the enemy of "religion," which is essentially "voluntary."

This, of course, is the familiar Liberal Protestant concept of Christian origins and of the nature of the Church, in a form whose extremism accentuates its superficiality. My single point is that in this ecclesiology the problem of Church and State does not arise. If the churches in their institutional form and with their institutional "authority" (whatever it may be) are all of purely human origin, formed by a process of voluntary association, they can have no other position within the organized social community than that of corporations of private law. And all such corporations necessarily possess a completely equal juridical status. To ask whether one of them should be juridically privileged above others would be as silly as to ask whether General Motors should be in law more privileged than the Ford Motor Company.

In this ecclesiology, the only conceivable alternative would be the Erastian national church. Its theory supposes (rightly enough, in the framework of Liberal Protestant ecclesiology) that the only external spiritual authority resides in the secular prince, who is therefore charged not only with the good of the temporal community but also with that of the church. He assumes the headship of the church and directly spiritual jurisdiction, thus identifying church and State in his own person. He makes the church but another aspect of the State, and therefore erects it to the status of a corporation of public law, as the State itself is.

Neither of these two arrangements creates any real problem of Church and State. Actually, the real problem exists only in the Catholic hypothesis, that the Church is a society in its own right, existing *jure divino*, with its own unity, structure, and government—none of which elements are of human creation, but are "given," as the Church herself is "given," not "gathered." Then the problem arises of establishing right juridical relationships between these two independent societies, each of which has its own proper

sovereignty, to be exercised in distinct fields, determined by law, natural and revealed. This fact—that the problem of Church and State is theological, and at the same time political, in the terms of its statement—does not, of course, emerge in *RL*. Or rather, in a sense, it does. In the sense, namely, the *RL* “solves” the problem in terms of an ecclesiology which abolishes it. The unscientific thing is that this ecclesiology is assumed, not proved; and, what is worse, it operates as a hidden principle of solution.

Characteristically, an empirical approach to the problem is taken, in a chapter entitled, “The Movement of History Critically Viewed.” This chapter is, to speak kindly, lamentable. For one thing, it gives no idea at all of the movement of history, or of the five or six eras that may be distinguished in it, or of the theological and political ideas that determined the movement from one phase to another. Secondly, the criticism is faltering (as a consequence, I should say, of the book’s fundamental honesty). On the one hand, “separation of Church and State” is favored (without ever being carefully defined; as in most Protestant writing, the phrase serves as a slogan to cover a whole religious and social philosophy). On the other hand, it is frankly admitted that “separation in much concrete experience is the concomitant, almost the equivalent, of the secularization of the community which is *the* contemporary demon for so many Christian and other religious leaders of our time” (p. 312).

Finally, the whole case falls rather flat when an attempt is made to argue for “separation,” not on experiential, but on theoretical, grounds. The whole case is really made in one sentence: “The argument for separation is soundly based in the voluntary and spiritual character of religion, by contrast with the coercive and secular nature of the State, even though contact between the two is both necessary and desirable” (p. 313). This is indeed a remarkable “argument.” If it proves anything, it proves that the Church is of the spiritual order and the State of the temporal order. In other words, Church and State are distinct social entities, with distinct characters and ends. As the following sentence rightly, if somewhat superfluously, adds: “The differentiation of function requires differentiation of organization.” In effect, therefore, *RL* is saying that an argument which establishes the distinction of Church and State also proves the case for their “separation.”

This, to a Catholic, is wholly unintelligible. Catholic thought starts from the fact that there is a differentiation in organization between Church and State; they are distinct societies. But this fact does not solve the problem of whether there should be “union” or “separation” between them; on the contrary, it creates the problem. We begin where *RL* apparently leaves off. Actually, the use of this “argument” by *RL* confirms my impression that

when Protestant thinkers discuss "union" or "separation" of Church and State they are inevitably thinking in Erastian terms. If *RL*'s section on the movement of history critically viewed had been better done, it would have revealed the resolute opposition of the Catholic Church to every form of Erastianism.

However, in its very weakness this section is interesting. As is customary, the Catholic Church is reproached with her supposed unwillingness "to grant the principle of separation" (p. 472). Yet, curiously enough, when an attempt is made to prove the "principle" of separation, the result is failure. Or rather, the proof establishes simply that "separation" can only be a pragmatic principle, a policy, a prudential arrangement designed to secure the best possible ensemble of religious and social values, or, in other words, a legitimate piece of expediency. Which, of course, is exactly the view that the Catholic Church takes of it; the Church has always granted that "separation" is this kind of "principle"—a principle of the pragmatic order.

RL favors "separation" on such grounds as these: that "clericalism" gives rise to "anticlericalism," that the Church is better off under a regime of "separation," that "union" means the subservience of the Church and hypocrisy on the part of citizens, that privilege brings resentments and strife, that, in a word, "separation" is "the policy of freedom and internal peace" (p. 314). But these are all arguments from expediency, that tend to favor "separation" as the better ecclesiastical and social policy. None of them establish "separation" as a speculative principle, a dictate rooted in the nature of things and imposed by the intrinsic character of Church and State. Curiously enough, the best possible Protestant case for "separation" is made in a citation from the National Christian Council of India:

Where several religious communities exist together in a single state, that state can prosper only when such liberty is granted to each community that it can live at peace with its neighbors and in loyalty to the state. Toleration is the method by which unity can be preserved in spite of religious differences. Where a different policy is pursued, loyal cooperation can hardly be expected by the state from those to whom it denies the right to practice their own religion (p. 398).

What is chiefly curious about this paragraph is that it might well have been written by Leo XIII himself. It is a remarkably exact statement of the Catholic position: "separation" is a pragmatic measure of high practical value in a mixed religious context, as a means of insuring social unity and co-operation toward the common good. That is what "separation," in principle, is—nothing else. And in this sense we freely grant "the principle of separation." What we refuse to grant—but what we are usually asked

to grant when this whole question comes up—is the historical validity of Liberal Protestant ecclesiology. In other words, we refuse to grant that the Catholic Church developed as a voluntary religious body, formed simply by a process of free association, on human impulse, with the result that its juridical status within any organized community can only be that of a corporation of private law, equal in every respect to all other such corporations, and superior to none of them.

I regret being persistently unfavorable in criticism, but I cannot help remarking how unsatisfactory is *RL*'s discussion of the grounds of religious liberty in natural law and natural rights (a discussion which is most unaccountably separated from a section on "Religious Liberty in Terms of Ethics and Philosophy," as if they were not related). Protestant thought today is being drawn to the topic of natural law; but it still handles the concept with considerable uneasiness, caused probably by the strongly intellectualist character of this doctrine. At all events, *RL* quite misses a most important application of the doctrine in the matter of religious liberty—I mean the manner in which this doctrine affords the foundation of a political philosophy wherein the State emerges in fully rational form, with its relative sovereignty and independence of the Church established, and the nature, function, and limitations of political authority exactly defined. The development of this political philosophy—the concept of the "natural-law State"—was of decisive importance in giving a correct status to the age-old problem of the relations between the spiritual and temporal orders, and dismissing from Catholic tradition the theocratic and curialist elements that had obtained an unwarranted but explicable place. Here and there *RL* is willing to give some measure of guarded tribute to the services of the Church in resisting the overweening claims of the State. But there is, so far as I can see, nowhere an awareness that this resistance was fundamentally inspired by what the natural law teaches with regard to the limits of political authority. There is, in fact, a faint suggestion that this resistance was simply the product of a conflict of rival authoritarianisms, each pretending to be everywhere absolute. In the same connection it may be said that there is no awareness of the fact that the Church's opposition to Liberalism in its political expression was not an opposition to the "modern liberties" as such, but to the political philosophy on which they were predicated, and especially to the Hegelian concept of the State, wherein the "religious neutrality" of government was simply the consequence of the essentially amoral character of the State itself, as a suprapersonal entity, natively "atheist."

I must also point out a disastrous confusion that appears in the pages

devoted to religious liberty in its relation to the interests of the organized community. The confusion is between two questions which ought to be kept carefully distinct. The first is this: Is religious diversity within the community a good desirable in itself, as a thing divinely willed? The second question is this: Given the fact of religious diversity, is it a better thing for society to assure, by constitutional provisions, full equality for the diverse beliefs and forms of unbelief? These are distinct questions, to be solved by distinct principles. The first question is a matter of religious belief, to be solved by an appeal to the will of God. The second question is a matter of religio-social policy, to be solved by an appeal to the common good, made in the light of ethical principles.

A rather cognate confusion also appears. It is argued that religious unity is no longer conceived as necessary for political unity. This is admittedly true, and is substantiated sufficiently by political experience. But then the argument is prolonged: since religious unity is no longer necessary for political unity, therefore it is no longer necessary at all. Here again there is a confusion between a theological question and a political and cultural one. Finally, there is a third confusion of a similar nature. It is argued that diversification within a culture contributes to, and is necessary for, the vitality of the culture; a "monolithic" culture, as it is called, risks stagnation. Rightly understood, this may be granted. But this argument, too, is prolonged: since cultural diversity is a good thing in itself, and a source of cultural vitality, so also religious diversity is in itself desirable, as a source of vitality in religion; in order to have genuine religion on a high level in a community one must have a lot of contradictory "religions" competing on equal terms in a free field. (This argument is a considerable part of *RL's* case for the right of free missionary activity.) The theoretical fallacy in the argument is evident; it equates the order of human culture with the order of divine truth, as contained in religion. The practical fallacy is no less obvious from sheer experience; on the theory that "the more religions, the more religion," the United States should be the most religious country on earth; few will be prepared to say that it is.

I mention these issues because they are real issues, and because a sound theory of religious liberty must deal with them firmly, and in their distinctness. I do not see that *RL* so deals with them.

A major effort of the whole work is to "base religious liberty in religion itself" (too simple a *Problematik*, again). For the out-and-out religious Liberal, who is at least a relativist, if not a complete skeptic in the field of religious truth, this is quite easy. But for the sincere Protestant who still maintains some conception of the absoluteness of religious conviction and

the objectivity of religious truth, the task is more difficult. He is continually brought up against what Newman long ago pointed out to be the perennial problem of the Liberal: "How shall I so maintain that I am right, as not to imply that you, who contradict me, are wrong?" Or, in a somewhat different statement: "If I am not 'free' to deny the validity of my personal religious convictions, how are you 'free' to deny their validity?" In either statement, of course, the problem is a false one; but the Liberal is nonetheless stuck with it.

The customary answer (represented, with wonted vagueness, in *RL*) is in terms of what is called "humility." One puts forth one's "truth" as truth, indeed, but with the recognition that the human mind is finite, subject to error, limited in its grasp on truth, and therefore obliged to be, in effect, both categorical and tentative. Not being a Protestant, I quite fail to understand this concept of "humility" (which is the antithesis, of course, of my Roman "pride"). Moreover, fully admitting the notion (classic since St. Augustine) of the influence of moral dispositions on one's perception of the truth, I do not see how the intellectual issue of truth *vs.* error can be legitimately turned into the moral issue of pride *vs.* humility. At best, this "solution" is a *deus ex machina*, summoned to rescue the sorely tried Liberal. And at all events it involves the inadmissible fallacy of playing intelligence off against virtue. When I say, for instance, that there are definitely seven sacraments, and definitely not three, I am either correct or mistaken in my assertion. My moral virtue in making the assertion does not come into question. To ask me to be properly "humble," and to assert that there are seven sacraments only in such a way as to leave the door open to the possibility that someone else may be quite right in asserting that there are only three, is to ask me to prostitute not only my intelligence but his.

I should like to be able to comment at some length on *RL*'s exposition of the position of the Catholic Church on religious liberty; but space forbids. It has been called the fairest exposition of Catholic doctrine ever written by a Protestant. So it probably is. But it is still far from being a good exposition. For one thing, it is not strictly an exposition; for there is continual editorializing and a certain amount of polemic, of the kind that does not meet assertions head-on, but outflanks them by adjectival qualification of the unconscionable authority with which they are made, or of the implications that they supposedly carry. Moreover, the basis of the exposition is narrow—Moulart (as mediated by the *Information Bulletin* of the Federal Council), Vermeersch, and Pohle's article in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*; thereafter Leo XIII is tackled with much good will but no great insight (papal encyclicals are difficult enough for the ordinary Catholic; it is not surprising

that Protestants should stumble around in them rather uncomprehendingly—as uncomprehendingly, doubtless, as I myself have stumbled around in *RL*).

For one not versed in the Scholastic tradition in philosophy and theology it is not easy to write an exposition of the Catholic doctrine on religious liberty. Actually, there is little formal literature on the subject. The Catholic position must be constructed from the immense literature on ethics (the concepts of liberty, conscience, law, etc.), the theology of the Church, the relations between Church and State, and political philosophy. Almost all this literature is in Latin. Given this fact, the shortcomings of *RL*'s exposition may be readily understood.

However, the major difficulty is the one already mentioned: Catholic doctrine viewed through the medium of Protestant philosophy inevitably appears distorted. Take this statement: "The binding authority of the Church over the consciences and the minds of believers tends to make religious liberty a freedom of the Pope and the hierarchy, not of the Catholic layman" (p. 473). Behind this remark seem to lie two assumptions, which, put in their fully clarified form, are the following: first, the authority of the Church is an arbitrary power, in whose exercise, therefore, Pope and bishops are entirely "free"; secondly, being subject to this authority (i.e., power), the layman is, by that very fact, not "free." Again appears the familiar antinomy between authority and freedom. Actually, the remark cited grossly misrepresents the whole situation. That it should have been sincerely made illustrates once again the contemporary basis of controversy—not the authority of Pope or bishops (as of old), but the very nature of authority itself.

I greatly fear that what the ordinary Protestant reader will take away from this whole exposition of Roman Catholic doctrine will be (1) a general idea that this doctrine is highly complicated, and (2) the notion that, when all the complications are dismissed, this doctrine is at heart a "crude opportunism: union [between Church and State] when Catholics can gain power, prestige, and financial aid thereby; separation when Catholics are not dominant" (p. 464). The background of this latter notion will be the feeling that, although many Catholic laymen are decent enough fellows of a fairly tolerant spirit, the Catholic Church, in its institutional aspect, is simply a mighty power-organization, whose inner dynamism is toward totalitarian control over the whole temporal order, to the inevitable destruction of religious liberty.

Obviously, *RL* does not deliberately go out to build up this idea, which forms the current "line" of Protestant propaganda. It is too honest and sincere a book. However, it will contribute to the building up of the idea,

because its essential defect is the same crudeness in philosophical thought that is the support of the idea. Perhaps this would be the fairest judgment on the book as a whole: it is very honest, but crude.

New York City

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.

THE PSALMS (The American Edition of *Liber Psalmorum cum Canticis Breviarii Romani*). Cura Professorum Pontificii Instituti Biblici. New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1945. Pp. xxxi + 348. \$2.50

Benziger Brothers has done American priests and seminarians a real service by providing them with this phototypic edition of the new translation of the Psalms and the Canticles of the Breviary. The work published in Rome would otherwise have been unobtainable in this country in any quantity for too long a time.

The reason for the new translation is given in the Preface. It was ordered by the Holy Father "pro suo erga sacerdotes studio et amore." Plan and principles may be gathered from remarks in both the Preface and the *Prolegomena*. The book aims at presenting in one small volume a clear and accurate translation with only such commentary as is deemed essential.

The authors succeeded admirably in their purpose. The manifold obscurities that the Vulgate Psalter inherited from the Septuagint have disappeared. The difficulties arising from the "vulgar" Latin usages have also been removed by resorting to a Latinity which satisfies classical norms while retaining the simplicity of expression and vocabulary that are familiar from ecclesiastical Latin at its best. Thus the "vulgar" *abusio* gives way to *contemptus*, *assumptio* to *protectio*, *confiteri* to *laudare*, *celebrare* or *gratias agere*.

The Hebrew original is adhered to, so far as it can be determined. Only when doubt arises from the ancient texts and versions do the authors resort to textual emendation and conjecture. This loyalty to the Hebrew does not prevent the authors from avoiding the Semitisms of the Vulgate. Wise exception is made, however, with regard to words and expressions which have become common in ecclesiastical usage, and which, though not found in classical Latin, or found there in a different sense, are not out of harmony with it. Wise also was the retention of words and phrases that have a peculiar meaning in the Hebrew idiom, but which can be understood without too great difficulty. For in these words and phrases are found qualities of the Psalms whereby, as religious and Hebrew poetry, they differ from the poetry of the Latins, Greeks, and moderns.

The reasons for this last exception might well be pondered by other translators of the Scriptures; for they bring out a fact overlooked by some. It does not seem to be doing full justice to the ancient authors when one turns

their words to make them speak just as if one modern English-speaker (which one?) were addressing another (which one?). Still less is justice done if the modern translator thinks he can satisfy the mind of the ancient author with a translation so completely self-explanatory that no exegetical notes are needed. Especially is this true of translations directed at the mythical "man-in-the-street" (again, which one?). Such translations must eventually either be paraphrase, or suffer the charge that they present that meaning of the passage which the translator prefers, leaving the reader with the impression that that is the only possible meaning. And at the same time they leave the reader with the impression that the ancient literature has no peculiar thought or word idioms of its own. From St. Peter's reference to certain parts of Scripture, especially of Paul's writings, we may conclude that Greek readers did not always find the Sacred Writings *in contemporary Greek* so self-explanatory. The new translation of the Psalter, then, is to be praised in that it strives to do justice to the thought and language idioms of the original authors of the Psalms.

The retention—or when necessary, the restoration—of the Hebrew spirit is most evident in those passages where God is called the rock, the fortification, the citadel, the shield, etc., of the Psalmists. So in Psalm 61:8, God is now called "petra roboris mei," not "Deus auxilii mei"; and in Psalm 30:4, we have "Nam tu es petra mea et arx mea," not "Quoniam fortitudo mea et refugium meum es tu." Similarly, in Psalm 83:12, "Nam sol et clipeus est Dominus Deus" has replaced "Quoniam misericordiam et veritatem diligit Deus." On the same principle such expressions as "walk before God," "God of justice," "bulls of Bashan," "horn" (for strength), are kept when the idea underlying them can be readily understood, at least with the help of a brief note.

On the other hand, when the strict literal rendering of the Hebrew caused the Vulgate to be obscure—if not inaccurate—the translators naturally were faithful to the Latin idiom. Thus the tenses of the verb are freely corrected throughout to bring out their real meaning in the Latin. In Psalm 6:7, for example, instead of:

*"Laboravi in gemitu meo,
lavabo per singulas noctes lectum meum,
lacrymis meis stratum meum rigabo";*

we now have:

*"Defessus sum gemitu meo,
fletu per singulas noctes rigo lectum meum,
lacrimis meis stratum meum perfundo."*

Likewise, the peculiar conditional construction of the Hebrew formula for oaths is now made at home in the Latin idiom. In Psalm 131:3, for one example, we find no longer:

*“Si introiero in tabernaculum domus meae,
si ascendero in lectum strati mei,
si dederō somnum. . . .”*

The idea is now intelligible with the simple:

*“Non intrabo in habitaculum domus meae,
non ascendam in stratum lecti mei,
non concedam somnum oculis meis. . . .”*

And along the same lines the new translation pays more attention to the modal shadings underlying the Hebrew verb forms, as in Psalm 94:7-8, where the Vulgate: “Hodie si vocem ejus audieritis, nolite obdurare corda vestra” becomes “Utinam hodie vocem ejus audiat: ‘Nolite obdurare corda vestra.’”

The translators unhesitatingly follow the Hebrew also where the Vulgate’s obscurities are clearly due to the Septuagint’s previous faulty reading of the Hebrew text. In Psalm 59:10, Moab has ceased to be “olla spei meae”—something desirable—and has become “pelvis lotionis meae”—a thing of contempt. The “filii excussorum” of Psalm 126:4 are now more appropriately “filii juventutis”, who are soon grown up to be to their aging father “sagittae in manu bellatoris”. In Psalm 103:17, the “herodii domus” which was “dux eorum”—mysterious enough—has become “ciconiae domus sunt abietes”.

Proper names, too, have been restored where they were incorrectly translated as common nouns, as in Psalm 94:8, where Meriba and Massa appear instead of “irritatio” and “tentatio”. They were places where Israel rebelled against God, as verse 9 declares. These restorations remove mystifying phrases like “convallē tabernaculorum” in Psalm 59:8, which now appears as the valley of Succoth.

Conversely, where the Vulgate followed the Septuagint in mistakenly using a proper name to translate a common noun, the translators have restored the proper word. So, among the wonders of Exodus described in Psalm 73 the Psalmist recalls how God dried up “fluvios copiosos”, not rivers of *Eihān*.

With even greater justice, the translators have corrected obscurities and inaccuracies which are due to corrupted readings in the Septuagint itself. In Psalm 61:5, the baffling “pretium meum cogitaverunt repellere, cucurri

in siti”—a line, by the way, which is obscure by reason both of original Septuagint mistranslation, which brought us *cucurri*, and of inner Septuagint corruption, which brought us *in siti*—is now clear and agreeable to context:

“Profecto e loco meo excelso moliantur me pellere,
delectantur *mendacio*.”

The Septuagint translators here mistook the Hebrew word for “they delight in” for the similar form of the word “they ran” (ἔδραμον), which the Vulgate in turn took as first person singular. But the Septuagint translators probably originally followed this word with the correct word ψεύδει (falsehood), which a copyist of the Greek mistook for δίψει (thirst).

But there are many obscurities in the Septuagint and Vulgate which result from the obscurity or corruption of the Hebrew text itself, as is evidenced by the vacillations of the ancient texts and versions. Here the authors do not hesitate to provide us with a translation which supposes emendation of the Hebrew according to solid principles of textual criticism. Interesting examples are Psalm 2:11 and Psalm 109:3. In the former the variant translations and the doubtful Hebrew “kiss the son” have yielded:

“Servite Domino in timore et exultate ei;
cum tremore *praestate obsequium illi*. . . .”

This translation requires the correction of the Aramaic *bar* (son) to *b^rag-la(y)u* (his feet), supposing several plausible stages in the corruption of the original text. The *translation* here, in any case, satisfies the idea found in the most ancient versions and is the one to be supposed in the context. By similar plausible, though not final, emendation of the Hebrew text the authors arrive at a translation of Psalm 109:3 which keeps close enough to the Hebrew and the ancient versions:

“Tecum principatus die ortus tui in splendore sanctitatis:
Ante luciferum, tamquam rorem, genui te.”

The Graecisms that resulted from St. Jerome’s too literal translation of the Septuagint have also disappeared. Thus the “ex hoc nunc” of Psalm 112:2 is now “*et nunc et usque in aeternum*.” And in Psalm 4:9, “In pace *in idipsum* dormiam et requiescam” is now “In pace, *simul ac* decubui, obdormisco.” And word forms like “supersperavi” have become simple Latin (“spero”).

Finally, as we said above, the Vulgate Psalter is frequently difficult for modern readers because of expressions peculiar to the “vulgar” Latin of St. Jerome’s day. Such expressions have now disappeared, making way for

more readily intelligible Latin. Thus, in Psalm 54:8, "Ecce *elongavi* [intransitive!] *fugiens*" has become, in more familiar idiom, "Ecce *longe discederem*. And Psalm 51:7 now reads "[Deus] *extrahet* te de tentorio," instead of "[Deus] *emigravit* [transitive!] te de tabernaculo tuo."

It has been possible to give here only a few examples of how carefully and thoroughly the new translation was made. As for the literary merits—the rhythm, style, etc.—of the new work, one has but to read at random to see that much has been gained for modern readers.

The translation represents four years of painstaking labor on the part of the Professors of the Pontifical Biblical Institute. Three of them have for years given proof to biblical scholars of their competence in this matter. By their writings Fathers Bea, Zorrell, and Vaccari have shown their wide knowledge of the Old Testament, and of the Psalms in particular. The new translation is a monument to their labors and a credit to the Church. All priests and students of the Psalms can be grateful to them, but they should be especially grateful to the Holy Father for initiating, encouraging, and finally blessing the work with an approving *Motu Proprio*. In this Pius XII has once again shown his love both for his priests and for the Scripture.

Rumor has reached this reviewer that the *editio typica* contains some changes from the text as published in the Biblical Institute Edition. There was time to check only the Sunday Psalms before this review was submitted. There no change was noticed. In any case not many or great changes would be necessary.

One misprint was noticed in the exegetical notes. On page 84 the reference should be to verse 14, not 16.

Again Benziger Brothers are to be congratulated for the speedy way in which they provided Americans with the new translation in a pleasing format and at a reasonable price. Having seen proofs of the Benziger editions of the *editio typica* and of the English-Latin version, the writer of this review feels sure that they too will meet with a grateful acceptance on the part of all those interested in the Psalms.

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JAMES E. COLERAN, S.J.

THE CHRISTIAN SACRIFICE. By Canon Eugene Masure. Translated by Dom Illtyd Trethowan. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1944. Pp. 288.

Although *Le sacrifice du Chef* appeared in 1932, the present English version is of recent date. Having selected for his primary theme the sacrificial character of the Mass, the author logically sets out with a study of the nature

of sacrifice, to which engrossing, yet controverted, problem he devotes some sixty pages. Masure adopts a style that is literary rather than scientific, and, unfortunately, appears reluctant to circumscribe his thought in exact definitions and in theological terminology. Sacrifice is frequently confused with its effects; at one moment sacrificial oblation and immolation are represented as identical, at another, as really distinct. Side by side with splendid pieces of writing and with superb exposition of the spiritual import of sacrifice, are numerous tedious repetitions where we would expect a well-rounded development of the thought, and a lack of definiteness as well as evidences of the very superficiality censured in others. In consequence, to evaluate the writer's position becomes very difficult, if not at times impossible. Eventually, combining extracts from St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and interposing in brackets his own interpretations, our author offers the following definition of sacrifice: "A sensible sign (or rite) in which under the symbols (or species) of a victim, man, to pay his dues to God and so to realize his end, bears witness that he renounces sin which is his evil (immolation), and that he turns to God who is his good (oblation), hoping that the divine acceptance, sanctifying his offering, will win for him the heavenly alliance at which he aims and that the victim will bring him by communion the guarantee of it" (p. 78).

The second section takes up Christ's sacrifice. The lengthy digression of sixty pages on the Incarnation seems out of place and weakens the unity of the design. The residue of the division is splendid.

With the first two sections as a background, in the third and final part the author advances to his fundamental topic. It may be well to formulate his teaching in his own words:

The Church then must make expression of her inward religion . . . by means of an object belonging to her, and this must become the sacrifice of Christ, with the original sign as a permanent connecting link, for us to have the sacrifice of Christ beneath the sign of the Church's sacrifice. . . . If the Church's victim, acted upon by her, becomes the very victim of Calvary . . . we shall have beneath a sacramental sign the very reality of Christ's sacrifice (p. 238).

The mass is an unbloody sacrifice, not because it is a mere oblation of a victim previously offered, not because it is sufficient for Christ in heaven to offer Himself without further bloodshedding, but because it is the sacrament or sign, and so the unbloody rite which represents the bloody sacrifice and enables us to share in it (p. 261).

It [the Mass] takes hold of it [the sacrifice of redemption], possesses the sacrifice; . . . the victim already exists, but yet we have to make it ours; . . . by a liturgical action, it [the Church] finds the means to have the victim. If, on the other

hand, it [the Church] were content with having, like the tabernacle with the Blessed Sacrament reserved, it would be no longer a true sacrifice. On the other hand, it [the Church] has not invented a sacrifice, for this already exists. . . . But it can do a liturgical action so that it may have, and then it is a sacrifice and the Cross's sacrifice (p. 284).

The mass is the very sacrifice of the Cross under sensible signs, which are convenient because representative. Then we return to the great stream of our tradition: a reality beneath a sign (p. 255).

The mass is a sacrifice because it is the efficacious sign of the Cross's sacrifice (p. 240).

Similar defective explanations might readily be multiplied. Integrated, they appear to amount to this: the Mass is a true sacrifice; a sacrifice is a sign, and because of Christ's institution, the Mass is an efficacious, a practical sign. The double consecration represents the separation of Christ's body and blood, represents the sacrifice on Calvary. In consequence, it effects it, give it to us, enables us to have the whole Christ, His sacrifice included.

Truly the double consecration places on our altar the whole Christ in the semblance of death, and to that extent it is certainly a practical sign. But that is not sufficient to allow us to say that the Mass is a sacrifice, since, as our author acknowledges, in the tabernacle we might have this and still there would be no sacrifice. Why not? There must be a liturgical action, rejoins Masure. But the problem before the theologian presents itself, just there, namely, how does the liturgical action of the Church effect that the Mass is a real sacrifice, not a mere representation or hollow commemoration of Calvary. Sometimes Masure seems to concede that Christ in heaven remains a real victim, a passive sacrifice, and if so, and if the Church's liturgical action is a priestly oblation, he would subscribe to the thesis of De la Taille. Apparently, however, he disagrees with him, though willing to go some distance with him. Does our author assent to Billot's doctrine? To some degree, but not completely. Claiming to reestablish the eucharistic tradition up to the sixteenth century, and labeling it the Augustino-Thomist teaching, Masure's contention is unsupported by the necessary documentation, and it falls short of a real solution.

Woodstock College

D. J. M. CALLAHAN, S.J.

FINITE AND INFINITE. By Austin Farrer. Dacre Press, Westminster. Pp. xii + 300. 20/- net.

I find it most difficult to render an adequate account of this book. In the first place, like so many modern works in philosophy, it is very difficult

to read. One cannot sit down to it with the quiet confidence that a few hours in the company of the author will provide a decent grasp of his doctrine. Instead, there is a peculiar hypnotic effect which arises, I suspect, from an incongruous mixture of the scientific terms of philosophy with personal and poetic language, a technical intensity of the imagination, if you can combine the terms. After a series of frustrations you begin to lose hope of ever getting to know what the author means, although you are convinced it is of tremendous consequence.

And yet this work, particularly, is important as a sign of a movement back to a lost tradition—a movement which, by the very nature of its starting-point, must be confused in its beginnings. It would not be very gallant, therefore, for those of us who have been spared the anguish of spiritual starvation, to look down with disdain on such painful searchings as the present book records. Yet it would be unfitting, and, in a sense even contemptuous, to ignore the shortcomings of such an effort when it is published as a philosophical essay.

The difficulty, as I have suggested, is in knowing what Mr. Farrer means to say. When I found myself unable to ascertain it from continuous reading, I began to look for certain keys to his position, or perhaps I should say, to what would appear to be his position if he were to make it entirely articulate. (Actually I get the impression that Mr. Farrer does not want to close too many doors at this time; maybe that accounts in some measure for the experience of giddiness.) This is the best I can do, then, by way of cooperating with what I am certain is a most profound effort to satisfy that desire for intelligibility which moves the intellect enlightened by faith. If, perchance, the passages I have selected do not manifest Mr. Farrer's position adequately, they will at least furnish an opportunity for the public discussion and clarification of points which he doubtless would admit to be crucial to his position. And I am certain that he will be more interested in such discussion of his work than he would be in a less tentative evaluation.

Here is a statement of the intention underlying the work; it is taken from the preface.

"Anyone who wishes to introduce the name of God into a philosophical treatise is confronted with the awkward choice between speculation and ecclesiasticism. As to the former, surely no one desires a further addition to the private theologies of individual philosophers. . . . Yet if. . . we recognise that theologies are not made by philosophers but by men with a different gift, we seem condemned to a servile ecclesiasticism. . . . Our conclusions will all be given before we start, and we shall be simply finding exterior reasons for religious faith.

"We have, then, to be ready to draw the ancient line between rational and revealed theology, though not necessarily in the ancient place, nor with the ancient optimism about the strength of demonstration in the rational branch. . . .

"In adopting this attitude towards philosophy, we are intervening whether we wish it or no in the unhappy debate between the Thomists and the Modern Theologians. The Thomists possess the true principles for the solution of the problems of rational theology and above all the problem of analogical argument and analogical predication. But by their rigid Aristotelianism and their insistence on the possibility of inescapable demonstration they make themselves vile in modern eyes. . . . There is nothing for it [modern inspiration] but to re-state the doctrine of Analogy of Being in a credible form, and this is our endeavour here."

Mr. Farrer thus sees the central problem, and I think, rightly, as one concerning terms—specifically, analogical terms. And given the admittedly infinite interval between God and creature, it seems evident enough that the community of terms as they describe God and creature both must be analogical, as Mr. Farrer maintains. Any other position would make God's existence only apparently demonstrable by reducing Him to the status of a creature. But why, then, "by their rigid Aristotelianism [do] they make themselves vile in modern eyes"? Are "modern eyes" a measure, and if so, why? And is Mr. Farrer's quarrel with the contemporary followers of St. Thomas, or with St. Thomas himself? Does he think the Angelic Doctor must be "adapted" for modern students? It appears that the truth, for our author, is somewhere between St. Thomas and the moderns. He says in the introduction to the present book: ". . . it is equally absurd to say that we can make the old grounds cogent. An 'inescapable demonstration' *must* be a fallacy. For if a proof of this kind could be produced it would have been produced. Anselm thought he had produced it, so perhaps did St. Thomas; but Gaunilo and Kant and Russell are not convinced, and they are as good men to follow an argument as any others."

What, then, are the "true principles for the solution of the problems of rational theology and above all the problem of analogical predication" which the followers of St. Thomas possess, according to Mr. Farrer? Here is his definition of analogy:

Analogy is a relation between objects, capable of being classed as a species of 'likeness'. We may say of it, as of likeness in general, that it is not a real relation, but *ordo rationis cum fundamento in rebus*. No one can suppose that the mere fact of resembling B is an actual ingredient in the existence of A, nor a condition nor an effect of that existence. If the mind finds the same character in two things,

then it does find it, and it is in both places. But the mind itself is the place of comparison; comparability is not a real character in anything. Similarity by itself is not a real structural characteristic of the world, even though apart from it the structural character which the world has would not be possible. Cause and effect is a real structural order, and without similarity—like cause, like effect—it cannot operate (p. 88).

This much is apparent without further reflection: St. Thomas would not recognize this definition as manifesting his conception of analogy, and for the very reason that moderns refuse to accept St. Thomas—viz., because of his insistence on literal terms even in the analogical order where the modern finds everywhere a “symbol.” I do not think it helps to soften this difference with such rhetoric as “rigid Aristotelianism,” because the difference with St. Thomas remains nonetheless, and manifestly, even in Mr. Farrer’s own position. Either there is a real similitude of things, both in the predicamental and in the analogical order, or the similitude is a product of human reason. If the latter, then it is, in Thomistic terms, “an order which the mind makes,” i.e., it is formally logical. It makes no difference in this respect, moreover, whether or not we add the qualification, *cum fundamento in re*. For terms which are unquestionably of second intention, whose only objective existence is in the mind, also have a *fundamentum in re*, e.g., “genus,” “species,” etc.

It follows, then, from Mr. Farrer’s principle, that there would be no real community of nature between the creature and God, and therefore no possible middle term through which the mind could move from the world of sense to the Creator. We are not surprised, therefore, to find Mr. Farrer denying the possibility of a rational demonstration of God’s existence:

If we wish to enlarge the vision of these persons [who espouse some form of ‘crypto-theism’], we shall do ill to throw a formulated theology at their heads, set out according to the *ordo essendi*; we had much better start from their scraps of crypto-theism and show how these can only be upheld in a full theistic position, and how the denial of such a position removes them wholly. Such a proceeding is what one finds in almost every proof of God known to history, and we call it dialectical reasoning. For example, the premise of St. Thomas’s *Via Prima* is not ‘constat quaedam moveri in hoc mundo’ but is the habit men have of reading into the system of events an absolute agency which can find its ultimate agent in God alone. If we start by assuming Causality with so very large a C, it can be shown that finite causes can be no more than the instruments or prolongations of it. We are free, then, after appreciating his demonstration, to accept the whole scheme, or to reject it, including our original scrap of crypto-theism. If we accept it, it will not be simply for the sake of maintaining with logical justification our previous habit but because from that as starting-point our vision has (so we imagine at least) been enlarged (p. 10).

It is hardly necessary to justify the observation that this, emphatically, is not St. Thomas's conception of his proofs. Mr. Farrer should, I think, be censured for presenting it as such, even with the qualification that the "re-statement makes it acceptable to the moderns." They, evidently, in their rejection of St. Thomas, understand him as he wished to be understood; and it is a questionable service to him and to the tradition he represents, to make him acceptable by such distortions. But let us examine why it is that someone so eager to give his rational assent to the existence of God as Mr. Farrer evidently is should have so many misgivings. What is the source of the patently powerful authority of the "modern mind"? Assuredly it is not the metaphysical authority of Kant whose spirit stalks through the pages of this book as it does through the metaphysical speculations of the amateurs of the laboratory. Why are men willing to give up, so universally, the desire of their heart and the manifest implications of common sense? For we must not forget that man, being rational by nature, can espouse what is false only under the appearance of the truth, that he can give up what is less manifest only by the testimony, real or apparent, of what is more manifest. He is, therefore, convinced that there is something more manifest which makes the existence of God impossible to demonstrate. This reason, then, cannot be anything abstruse or remote from sense, at least as it is made to appear.

There is only one possible answer: the apparent authority of science which proves its objectivity by its control of nature, and which succeeds in its control, so we are told, in proportion as it departs from those premises of common sense on which the whole philosophy of Aristotle and of St. Thomas rests. This is the real reason why Mr. Farrer, like Mr. Mortimer Adler and others who are sympathetic to St. Thomas, is persuaded that the rigorous doctrine of scientific demonstration handed down by Aristotle and accepted in its entirety by St. Thomas, must be rejected. They do not see that with it we should reject the whole metaphysics on which it is founded. Therefore, Thomists who would object to what Mr. Farrer has said in this book should accept the obligation, as St. Thomas would have them accept it, of squaring modern scientific method—since it is an unquestionable instrument in the discovery of truth—with metaphysical principles on which, not only the teaching of St. Thomas, but the very doctrine of the Church, must rest.

This does not imply, as it might appear, any servile solicitude on the part of philosophy or theology for experimental science. The very contrary, because we are so irrefutably persuaded—by the light of natural reason in philosophy, by the light of revelation in theology—that we have the obligation to manifest this light, for ourselves and for others, wherever there is

darkness. And again, it should not be thought, as I fear Mr. Farrer is inclined to think, that, because we are persuaded of God's existence before examining the particular merits of the case for science, we have, so to speak, loaded the dice in favor of God, and consequently find only what we have introduced into the evidence. Even on the surface as much could be said of those who interpret scientific evidence with an a priori conviction that God must *not* be found.

But what we need is a re-examination of scientific method, as rigorous and objective in its way as the method of the laboratory. Among other things, this precludes an arbitrary and simplist assumption that the method of attaining objectivity in the material order is the method by which it must be attained in every order. What I mean, is made clear, by opposition, in the following statement of P. W. Bridgman in *The Logic of Modern Physics*—a statement which I would dismiss as incompetent and altogether absurd:

I believe that many of the questions asked about social and philosophical subjects will be found to be meaningless when examined from the point of view of operations. It would doubtless conduce greatly to clarity of thought if the operational mode of thinking were adopted in all fields of inquiry as well as in the physical. Just as in the physical domain, so in other domains, one is making a significant statement about his subject in stating that a certain question is meaningless (i.e. a non-operational question).

According to this statement, in other words, Professor Bridgman would generalize the operational method of the laboratory to all fields of investigation. From such statements as this and countless others by competent experimental scientists, it should be clear by now that the "pointer-readers," as Eddington calls them, do better than they understand. Thus, we might ask Professor Bridgman to verify the above statement operationally. As Aristotle has said, it is not the business of the specialist to examine the essence of his subject, but to assume it and make demonstrations from the assumption, as, e.g., it is not for the mathematician to investigate what number is—although today they tell us not only what number is, but everything else. Again, it was Aristotle who said that the philosopher should know all things, but not as the specialist. Particularly, the philosopher should be conversant with the metaphysical accounts of science, since it is through them that men are led to their ultimate understanding, or misunderstanding, as this is founded on the immediate testimony of sense. The immediate problem, then, is not to make empirical science the occasion for apologetics—not, at least, as apologetics is so often understood, as something extrinsic to the correct understanding of things. The problem is

rather to acquire a precise grasp of the nature of science—as a demonstrative science, indeed, such as Aristotle described it, yet assimilating to itself, with due subordination, the discoveries of recent times. Until they have done this, and with such power of truth that the very scientists will come to school to St. Thomas, it would be better for so-called Thomists not to be disdainful of such attempts at synthesis as Mr. Farrer's, or of the "perversity" of the "modern mind." For if it is true that the children of this age have forgotten the old things, it is, I think, equally true, that we custodians of the old things have grown contemptuous—and, paradoxically, too respectful thereby—of the new. Our Lord has said in the very context of His own instruction to the disciples: "Therefore every scribe instructed in the kingdom of heaven is like to a man that is a householder, who bringeth forth out of his treasure new things and old." We should observe that He says "new" before "old," to show, it would seem, that He is not pleased when we "light a candle and put it under a bushel." Mr. Farrer's pathetic submission to the illegitimate authority of a false doctrine of science is testimony to the charge that we have hidden the light that was given us. If that is so, it is time for us to examine, not only our faith in St. Thomas, but in his Teacher. It is with a note of triumph—the more impressive when we recall the extraordinary sobriety and restraint of St. Thomas's habitual expression—that he terminates his commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle. From a consideration of the nature of motion, its principles and causes, the "Philosopher" has ascended to the necessary existence of a first mover who is God. St. Thomas writes: "Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem communem de rebus naturalibus, in primo principio totius naturae, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Amen." Knowing his sanctity, we may be certain that this is the delight of a child of God in the manifestation

piete and detailed treatment than is usually given in the works of modern writers. He looks for a Ballerini-Palmieri among post-code authors, a Cappello of the principles and precepts. In the work begun by Fr. Rodrigo, whose second tome, *De Legibus*, has reached the United States, a very complete moral theology is promised by the detailed treatment he has given to the moral questions of law. This book contains about four times as much matter on law as is found in Ballerini-Palmieri, and about eight times as much as in Noldin. The first tome, which apparently has not yet reached this country, dealt with the morality of human acts; the third intends to treat of sin and delinquency. If the same proportion is continued in later tomes, moralists will have a work of eight or ten volumes thoroughly covering their field.

The present tome treats of law and follows in the footsteps of Suarez, the *Doctor Eximius* of law, but is not a slavish imitation of his work. It uses the traditional outline of moralists.

place; and he discusses the differences between the obligations of the Latin and the Oriental stranger. He gives three pages to questions about dispensing non-residents, and a page to their subjection to local customs.

In a work of this kind, the reader will hardly expect to find any new doctrines, but the author sometimes makes modifications of his own in various theories and solutions of controversial questions, as he does in discussing the nature of purely penal law, and the obligation of the rules of religious institutes when these rules do not bind under pain of sin.

Moralists who treat of law ordinarily deny to the subject the right to sit in judgment on the legislator in doubts about the need or utility of his laws, and state that in doubt about the object of legislation presumption favors the legislator. But the legislator also has a conscience which needs guiding principles, and this presumption in his favor does not create a privilege of arbitrary decision in doubt about the validity of his proposed laws. Is he free to choose the decree that will be less probably effective for the common good; or in doubtful matters must he rather choose the course which is safer for the public welfare? In an extensive work like the one under review, the reader might expect to find some specific treatment of the obligations of the legislator as well as of the subject. But in this book, the legislator will find his obligations stated only implicitly, in the general principles of the nature and properties of law. This, however, is a defect common to practically all moralists, for they touch the obligations of the legislator only briefly and in passing, if at all.

Fr. Rodrigo's book has a table of contents which is a detailed analysis of the book. There is a ten-page bibliography, a complete alphabetical index, an index of citations, and an index of canons of the code of canon law. It is a readable book, although the Latin occasionally becomes somewhat condensed and obscure.

Alma College

H. R. WERTS, S.J.

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION. Edited by Vergilius Ferm. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945. Pp. xix + 844. \$10.00.

The title originally planned for this work was "Dictionary of Theology." It soon became evident, however, that many of the articles would not fit well under this designation. Even the present title does not indicate the broad scope of the volume. Besides articles on numerous phases of theology, religion, philosophy, and history, there are many entries dealing with sociology, psychology, ethics, and literature—all having some bearing on the general subject of religion.

In an effort to make the work authoritative, Dr. Ferm decided, when undertaking the editorship of the volume four years ago, to invite scholars of all varieties of religious belief to contribute articles. The response was generous; the contributors number almost one hundred and ninety. As is rightly to be expected of a project planned under Protestant auspices, most of the contributors belong to Protestant religious bodies. The Jewish faith is well represented, and some eighteen or twenty Catholics have supplied articles. The underlying idea was that Catholic doctrines were to be proposed by Catholic scholars, denominational views by representatives of the various denominations, Jewish concepts and schools of thought by Jewish writers, historical trends and personalities by historians, sociological movements by sociologists, and so on.

Under Dr. Ferm's kindly and skillful guidance, as readers will be gratified to discover, intolerance, narrow partisanship, and ill-will have been unable to make an appearance. At most there is an indirect trace of animus here and there, but it is mild compared to what it would have been in such a work even a generation ago. The contributors have honestly endeavored to adhere to objectivity. Historical presentation has ruled out most of the tartness and uncharitableness that polemical treatment might have uncovered.

In a work confined to a single volume that nevertheless aims at comprehensiveness, the articles are necessarily short. Many of them are brief paragraphs devoted to defining a term or identifying a personage. Subjects which, in the editor's opinion, are of greater importance doctrinally or historically, have been allotted more generous space.

Catholics will be disappointed to find that few of the longer doctrinal articles pertaining to the essence of their faith have been written by Catholic scholars. They will disagree in whole or at least in part with the views set forth in the articles on God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, Christ the living, sin, original sin, eschatology, faith, grace, atonement in Christianity, baptism, the fall of man, angels, biblical theology, and a host of other subjects. Practically all the entries dealing, under various headings, with Sacred Scripture, the separate books of the Bible, the authorship of these books, and their nature, have their ultimate inspiration in the German rationalist criticism of the last century. The writers on scriptural topics seem unacquainted with the researches of such scholars as De Grandmaison, M.-J. Lagrange, and Prat. The intellectual background of the majority of the contributors is largely German and British; French and Belgian scholarship seem relatively neglected.

Some omissions and over-simplifications may occasion surprise. The central truth of Christianity, the Incarnation of the Son of God, is not the

subject of a separate article; four lines dispose of the matter in an article on mythical incarnations. The short notice on the hypostatic union is utterly inadequate for a doctrine of such basic moment. The terms "person" and "nature," so extremely important in the development of Christian theology, are not dealt with even in brief definitions. There is no entry on the Mystical Body, fundamental though that doctrine is for truly Christian living. The paragraphs on sacrifice contain no hint of the numerous and exhaustive treatises on that topic in recent theological literature. In the article on Monophysitism no distinction is made between real and purely nominal Monophysitism, although the latter has been far more important historically. The sweeping assertion in the article on redemption, that "Patristic theology regarded it [the ransom] as paid to the devil who held man captive," has been utterly disproved long ago.

Such criticism should not obscure the fact that many of the subjects are admirably treated. A few random examples may be listed. The article on purgatory reflects the changing Protestant view. The series on various aspects of Judaism is an authoritative account. The calmly written articles on Protestantism and the Reformation, by Protestant scholars, will probably meet with the approval of all. A good historical survey is given of the soul as conceived in different philosophies. The exposition of Hegelianism is very carefully and clearly worked out. Several topics not always accorded fair discussion have been turned over to Catholic writers; among them are the Inquisition, the Pope, the Jesuits, and the Roman Catholic Church. The article on the Mass is exceptionally well done.

The book as a whole cannot be recommended for general Catholic use. It should, however, prove valuable for Catholic professors of theology and teachers of religion. Perhaps no volume in existence can equal its comprehensive and authoritative survey of contemporary theological thought in America. For gaining a sympathetic insight into Lutheranism, Methodism, Presbyterianism, Israel, and many other religions, churches, and sects, no procedure can take the place of clear, dispassionate accounts written by scholars whose intellectual allegiance gives them a first-hand acquaintance with such systems and movements. The long articles on Buddhist terminology, Chinese terminology, Hindu terminology and Hinduism, Japanese religions and terminology, and Shinto religions and theology, are adequate and convenient summaries of information not readily available to non-specialists in those fields. A feature of the volume is the thorough but succinct data it presents on established lectureships in theology and religion.

All of the many thousands of articles are initialed. A key to contributors' initials and an alphabetical list giving the contributors' present posi-

tions facilitate instant identification. The volume is excellently bound. The print, though small, is clear and legible. Cross-references greatly increase the book's value.

St. Mary's College

CYRIL VOLLERT, S.J.

EASTERN CATHOLIC WORSHIP. By Donald Attwater. New York: The Devin Adair Company, 1945. Pp. 224. \$2.50.

Mr. Attwater and his publishers have filled a want by supplying, in one handy volume, translations of eight Eastern Catholic liturgies, together with a brief introduction "About Eastern Public Worship in General," and a translation of the Roman Mass. The author himself indicates the various services the book can render, and states simply and honestly its limitations: the former are considerable, the latter do not prevent the scholar or teacher from welcoming a very useful addition to his library.

The expressed wish of recent Popes, that Latin Catholics take an understanding interest in the liturgy of their Eastern brethren, can in many American cities be realized by one who, provided with the present book, assists at the celebration of the divine Mysteries. He will have before him a simple and clear outline of the ceremonies, with about as much of the text as he will find time to read. For his private devotion, too, the Latin Catholic will find a wealth of prayers, the relative novelty of which should prove stimulating.

The liturgies translated are the Byzantine, Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopic, Syrian, Maronite, Chaldean, and Malabarese. Only in the case of the Byzantine was the translation made from the original language; the others were translated with the aid of existing versions in French, Italian, Latin, English, and Dutch. Furthermore, an eclectic attitude was taken with respect to the various forms in which certain of the liturgies are actually celebrated: these differences are of secondary importance.

The Eastern liturgy is usually set down in several books, one of which offers the "Ordo Communis" for a given rite. To this order is joined an Anaphora, corresponding to the Preface and Canon of the Latin Mass; and most of the rites possess several Anaphorae. In each case, Mr. Attwater chose for his translation the "ordinary" (most frequently used) Anaphora. In general, the Anaphorae chosen correspond to those given, but according to the use of the dissident Churches, in Brightman's *Eastern Liturgies*, which are taken as the basis of Hanssens' instructive tables in his *Institutiones Liturgicae de Ritibus Orientalibus*. For the Catholic Syrians, the Anaphora translated as ordinary is that of St. John the Evangelist, whereas the 1922 *editio typica* of the *Liber ordinis missae secundum consuetudinem*

ecclesiae apostolicae Antiochiensis Syrorum gives the Anaphora of St. James as the ordinary one (Hanssens, *op. cit.*, III, 570).

Woodstock College

NEIL J. TWOMBLY, S.J.

THE ATTITUDE TOWARD LABOR IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY AND ANCIENT CULTURE. By Arthur T. Geoghegan. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1945. Pp. xxviii + 250. \$3.00.

This book searches out and presents the attitude of the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Jews toward labor, and by contrast that of the Christians of the first five centuries. Copious footnotes and an impressive bibliography, as well as the general form and content, point to the care and effort which have gone into the preparation of the manuscript. As a systematic study, the text should rank as a worthy contribution to the social sciences. However, the title should not be taken as any indication that the treatise is merely a storehouse for historical data.

The contents are informative and challenging reading for all who are really concerned over the present status of industrial relations. Properly enough, the author does not depart from the scientific development of his subject to indulge in general recommendations for the cure of the economic ills of the world. At the same time his work portrays the true function of labor and demonstrates the power of justice and charity as a means of providing a nobler motive for industrial life. Attitudes on such subjects have more than passing significance today. There appears to be current need for recognition of the fact that the labor problem is something more than an economic issue. While of considerable importance, the gaining of livelihood or profits is not the sole end of work or business. There are other ethical and social obligations to be considered, and a correlation of rights and duties promises to be in the interest of industrial stability.

Divided into two parts, the study develops separately the attitude towards labor before the time of Christ and that which existed among the Christians of the first five or six centuries. The attitudes during both periods are related fairly and with scientific care. The style is interesting, and there is sufficient continuity of theme and narrative to stimulate interest and add to ease of reading.

The author traces the developing status of the worker from a condition of slavery and base servility to that of a free agent who imparts his dignity as a person to the labor which he performs. An interesting feature is the account of the function of the ancient guilds and the religious character of many of their practices. While such practices under the Greeks and Romans were

pagan in concept, and even if the ancient guilds did not correspond to the modern trade union in an economic sense, still it may be observed not only that certain ethical concepts of labor obtained in ancient times but also that even then workers combined and associated themselves together for matters of mutual aid and protection. In Judaism, there appears to have been a greater appreciation of the moral worth and value of labor than in the Greco-Roman world. Moreover, craftsmen under Judaism are again found to be organized into professional guilds. This in itself would seem to demonstrate that it is futile to oppose the principle of organization and that labor and industry might well devote themselves to finding further ways of making it function for the common good.

In developing the attitude toward labor in early Christianity, the author portrays the new value placed upon labor as the activity of a moral agent. Labor acquires a new meaning, which is not subordinated to the economic ends which it serves. The payment of wages becomes a matter of justice and the standard of fraternal charity positive and self-sacrificing. Labor is seen to have both personal and social characteristics, and obligations devolve upon the employer and the community. The esteem for labor displayed by the early monks and hermits, who regarded work as prayer, affords an avenue of consolation and pride for every worker, no matter how menial his chores.

In addition to providing a good socio-ethical text, the book is deserving practical reading for all who wish to broaden their perspective in the field of industrial relations.

Philadelphia

J. CHARLES SHORT

THE HEART OF MAN. By Gerald Vann, O.P. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Inc., 1945. Pp. 182. \$2.00.

Father Vann is rightly concerned at the fact that so many presumably sincere and apparently intelligent people are unaware of fundamentals. They are busy, but about the wrong things. They seek solutions to their problems, but in the wrong places. In a word, they do not seem to know what they are supposed to be and do. This new book is an attempt to offer a plan of life to such people. The author draws his material from the standard Christian philosophical, psychological, and religious heritage, arranges it into a tightly organized unity, and presents it in smoothly flowing, non-technical language. The result is a work on the popular level that should be a definite contribution toward furthering co-operation among men of good will.

Man, every human being, says Father Vann, must achieve wholeness,

integrity of *being*. His destiny is an ever-increasing oneness with supreme Reality, a complete integration into and with the entire hierarchy of being. The first half of the book, entitled "Man the Lover," is devoted to that idea, and its corollary that integrity means bringing the human personality to maturity on its levels of reason, feeling, sensation, and intuition, while preserving the docility of the child toward God. The second half is entitled "Man the Maker" and, as the name implies, explains that true human completeness must find expression in activity and productivity in keeping with man's variously functioning personality. Father Vann discusses this desired productivity with reference to art, the family, the world, and the Church, and under these headings contrives to touch upon practically every possibility for human activity. Until the last chapter, there has been no explicit mention of the Catholic Church. The author apparently hopes that his sympathetic, common sense treatment of other subjects will render the reader at least passively receptive to a Catholic's presentation of what is dearest to him.

It is worthy of remark that Father Vann looks with high favor on the psychological approach of Carl Gustav Jung. There is a growing awareness among Catholic scholars of the need carefully to sift the theories of modern psychologists and to determine their elements of compatibility with religion and morality. Father Moore, O.P., and Father Witcutt have recently written favorably of Jung, and Father Vann evidently wishes to join his voice to theirs when he says: "To be acquainted with traditional Christian theology and then to read the works of Jung is to be startled at every turn by the way in which the two dovetail or run parallel. The hunger for the infinite which alone can fill the human heart, the longing for spiritual rebirth, the felt need for the healing and turning to good of the 'dark shadow' within the self, the need of integration, of being made whole—all these things are both psychological fact and religious truth; psychology, therefore, confirming belief in religious doctrine, and religion fulfilling the needs and desires which psychology empirically reveals" (p. 13).

In conclusion, it seems to this reviewer that the book's main defect is a psychological one. The food for the mind is abundant and of high quality. The style, sentence by sentence or paragraph by paragraph, is flawless. But after several pages, the style grows monotonous, and the almost total lack of concrete examples leaves the tiring reason without the support of the imagination. And the general reader, for whom this book is intended, can hardly be expected to persevere in reading unrelieved abstract exposition.

A HISTORY OF UNITARIANISM: SOCINIANISM AND ITS ANTECEDENTS. By Earl Morse Wilbur. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pp. ix + 617. \$6.00.

Historians of the Protestant Revolt are inclined to devote most of their attention to the then three major divisions of Protestantism. This tendency is, of course, warranted by the history of the times. Nevertheless, in the light of the development of Protestantism in the past two centuries, it may be regretted that more attention is not paid to two streams, small at their sources, but now large, and tending to merge and engulf all Protestantism, if they have not already done so. These streams have had various names and varying histories. The first bases religion on personal experience; it has been called Anabaptism, Pietism, Evangelicalism. The second stresses the role of human reason; it may be named Unitarianism, Liberalism, Modernism.

The initial volume, therefore, of a work which the author calls the first history of Unitarianism merits the attention of church historians. Dr. Wilbur states that he wishes "to present not so much the history of a particular sect or form of Christian *doctrine*, as to consider broadly the development of a movement fundamentally characterized instead by its steadfast and increasing devotion to these three leading *principles*: first, complete mental freedom in religion rather than bondage to creeds or confessions; second, the unrestricted use of reason in religion, rather than reliance upon external authority or past tradition; third, generous tolerance of differing religious views and usages. . ." (p. 5; the italics are the author's).

The author has set himself an unreal task. The primary defect is logical, in that he arbitrarily divides a single principle into three. Granted his first principle, tolerance is not a principle, but a practical application of freedom. There is but a verbal difference between the author's first and second principles. For how does "complete mental freedom" differ from "the unrestricted use of reason"? What are these "creeds and confessions" save the formularies of "external authority or past tradition"?

The author's confused thinking is reflected in his work. The work, moreover, does not substantiate his thesis. While it may be a commonplace for a modern Unitarian to appeal to reason as the touchstone of all religious truth, the author cannot find a clear enunciation of this principle until after the collapse of Polish Unitarianism, and then only in the writings of one man (p. 572). Nor do many of the men whose lives he depicts manifest a steadfast devotion to principles they had not formulated.

As an attempt to read into the past a thesis not justified by the facts, the book cannot but fail. As a study of individual radicals in early Protestant-

ism, it is quite valuable. It contains an extended and scholarly account of Servetus and his works. It is largely concerned with the radical Protestants springing from Italian Humanism, notably from the circle of Juan de Valdes at Naples. (In this connection one notices, with some surprise, that the author makes no mention of Pastor's monumental work.) The major part of the volume is given to the story of the rise, progress, and collapse of Polish Unitarianism, with the major emphasis on the lives and actions of its leading figures.

It is regrettable that the book lacks a proper bibliography. But a study of the footnotes indicates some lacunae, even on the general history of the Protestant Revolt. The major works, for example, of the Protestant authors Lindsay, Smith, and most germane to his subject, Newman, are not cited; Catholic authors are generally ignored.

While on matters directly touching his subject the author's treatment is generally careful, his handling of other points is frequently questionable. He assumes as proved the Modernist account of the early evolution of the dogma of the Trinity (pp. 8-11). He speaks of the "emancipation of the minds of men from the long slavery of the Middle Ages" (p. 7). One cannot but wonder at his statement that "at the beginning of the sixteenth century in the Church at large Christian thought had been for more than a thousand years practically stagnant. . ." (p.12). Theologians as well as historians would be interested in his proofs that, together with other Scholastics, Duns Scotus ". . . frankly admitted that in this doctrine [of the Trinity] we really have three Gods. . ." (p.62). One wonders why he greatly exaggerates the numbers of the victims of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew (p.363), and of the Jews expelled from Spain (p.53). In the first instance he offers no authority; for the second he might have consulted authorities more credible than the history (published in 1839) which he cites. His unqualified statement that "the reading of the Bible was forbidden at Toulouse" (p.53) is something less than just. Careless assertions, of which the instances cited are only a few examples, cannot but reflect on the whole work. It is to be hoped that the subsequent volumes of this history will not be marked by like defects.

Weston College

FRANCIS X. CURRAN, S.J.

THE PRIEST OF THE FATHERS. By Edward L. Heston, C.S.C. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1945. Pp. 171. \$2.50.

As a worthy companion to his Superior's *The Priest in the Epistles of St. Paul*, Father Heston, the secretary to the Apostolic Delegate, presents this collection of patristic thoughts on the priesthood. In tapping this source of

information and inspiration, the author shows incidentally how much fruit a priest who is not a professional patrologist can derive from the pages of Migne. While the book is not scholarly in the strict sense, the two hundred quotations are very useful. They are woven into a series of chapters that will be of value to any priest or seminarian as a check-up on his ideals, as retreat reading, or as source material for occasional sermons to the laity and conferences for the clergy.

In the three sections, the priesthood is studied in turn as it is related to God, to the people, and to the priest himself. The first part is mainly dogmatic, the other two parts, which form the bulk of the book, are pastoral and ascetical in tone.

All the more famous Latin Fathers have supplied material for Father Heston's chapters; in addition, he draws from Columbanus, Alcuin, Bernard, Bede the Venerable, and Thomas Aquinas, evidently employing the term "Father" in an extended sense. As we might expect, the *Liber Regulae Pastoralis* of Gregory the Great is the source of more than a fifth of all the quotations in the book. Except for two short passages from Ignatius of Antioch, the Greek writers are represented only by Chrysostom, who is quoted at least as often as Gregory the Great. Perhaps some day Father Heston will reveal to us the sacerdotal teaching of the other Greek Fathers, particularly of the three Cappadocians.

In accord with his purpose, the author has relegated his notes to the rear of the volume; scholars may captiously object. His references are uniformly to Migne as the most accessible source, and can readily be used by anyone who would desire to read more along similar lines. The useful index seems carefully prepared, though Alcuin (p. 22) and Polycarp (p. 18) are omitted; and Ignatius of Smyrna should be Ignatius of Antioch.

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