

BOOK REVIEWS

BACK TO THE BIBLE. By Cuthbert Lattey, S. J. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., 1944. Pp. 128. 5/—.

The praise which in his Foreword to this volume the Archbishop of Liverpool applies to the first part of Father Lattey's work might well be applied to the whole: "Its worth is to be judged not by the length of treatment (though this is not inconsiderable) but by the depths of its content." For Father Lattey sums up in a short space the principal reasons why men distrust or shun the Scriptures, and indicates clearly the false principles that underlie such attitudes, while sketching the positive line to be followed in the study of the Scriptures.

After an introductory chapter the author discusses the presuppositions of the rationalistic and "critical" school. These are based upon an appeal to reason as against the supernatural. Father Lattey shows that the attitude of human reason towards the supernatural depends fundamentally on what that reason can tell us of God; hence reason must have a sound and coherent philosophy before it can hope to approach the supernatural in the Bible objectively. The author then turns to the possibility of revelation, especially of written revelation. Here he contends that the refusal to accept the Scriptures as God's revelation to man is to limit God's power to communicate efficaciously with the mind of man.

The chapters on inspiration and inerrancy give reasoned principles illumined by examples from difficult passages, such as the stories of Jonas and of Josue and the sun, the morality of the patriarchs and of Jephthe's sacrifice of his daughter, etc. Next there is a chapter on the biblical story of the origin of Adam and Eve, followed by a chapter on prehistory—which latter is very good in its indication of how far it may be possible to admit mythological and midrashic literary forms, or even symbolism, in interpreting the first chapters of Genesis. There follow two chapters on the "Documentary Hypothesis" and Wellhausen's historical stages. Here the author does not deny evidence of the use of documents in the composition of the Pentateuch but wisely points out the basic weakness of the modern proponents of the Wellhausen system. He remarks that "Consciously or unconsciously, the critics have hardened their minds against anything but a naturalistic evolution" (p. 57). And on the same page, he rightly expresses a doubt: "The fact remains that the Documentary Hypothesis

EDITOR'S NOTE. Circumstances unfortunately prevented Father John C. Ford, S.J., from preparing his customary annual survey of moral theology. The survey will appear in the March, 1947, issue.

is a very complicated one; indeed, it would be interesting to know what percentage of its professed adherents have really thought it out in all its implications, and have seriously weighed the pros and cons of the case." The discussion of Old Testament questions ends with a chapter on the prophets and prophecy.

The rest of the book (pp. 79-128) is devoted to the New Testament, opening with a chapter on Jesus Christ, in which the evidence for His divinity is weighed in view of modern doubts. Here also a brief word is said on the form-critics. The Synoptic Gospels and John are then discussed. Here again the author enlivens his defense of the traditional stand by interesting illustrations of the mentality and purpose of the Evangelists. The chapter on Paul, which includes a good brief summary of Pauline thought, especially with regard to the much discussed question of the *Parousia*, ends the book.

Throughout, Father Lattey shows due respect for modern non-Catholic scholarship, often quoting verbatim the words of its leaders in England. This is in accordance with the purpose of his book, which is to give the general English reader, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, the fruit of years of scholarly devotion to the Scriptures. The result is a book which, though it does not frighten by its insistence on scholarly apparatus, shows up clearly as the work of a mature Catholic scholar.

Weston College

JAMES E. COLERAN, S. J.

THE PSALTER IN THE WESTMINSTER VERSION OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES. By Cuthbert Lattey, S. J. London: Sands & Co., 1944. Pp. xvi + 281. 10/6.

This book by the noted English Scripture scholar answers a demand for a small, popularly-priced edition of the Psalter in the Westminster Version. For the principles followed in the translation, the reader may consult two of Father Lattey's published works: *The First Book of Psalms* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939) and the lecture on the Psalter printed in *The Old Testament*, the Cambridge Summer School volume for 1938 (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1939).

After a short glossary of terms and abbreviations, Father Lattey discusses briefly the questions of authorship, text, and titles. This Introduction is concise but solid. The translation itself is clear and accurate. There is evident the effort to retain the flavor of poetry—ancient poetry; this explains the occurrence of the archaic forms "dost," "doth," "thou," "ye," etc.; "Jehovah" is also retained in accordance with the general principle which

governs the Old Testament series of the Westminster Version. Perhaps this desire to reflect the poetic form of the original leads to too great a tendency to allow Hebraisms to stand in the English; e.g., "The voice of my supplications" (Ps. 130:2). The author does not hesitate to have recourse to textual emendation, making use of such recent studies as those of Professor Driver. But Father Lattey is judicious; he is far from being attached to every ingenious modern suggestion, as is shown by his silence on such clever suggestions as that of Father Eric Burrows ("pearls set in gold filagree is her raiment") for Psalm 44:14.

A concise, helpful commentary accompanies each Psalm. It is to be hoped that a future edition will correct the many typographical errors which mar this excellent work of an excellent series.

Weston College

JAMES E. COLERAN, S. J.

CHRISTIANITY ACCORDING TO ST. JOHN. By Wilbert Francis Howard, M.A., D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Pp. 226. \$2.75.

Dr. Howard, who is already well known as the author of *The Fourth Gospel in Recent Criticism and Interpretation*, here presents a series of eight lectures given at Oxford on what he terms "Johannine Christianity." Under the pen of a more radical critic, the term might mean almost anything, but for the author, though it is intended to express a special aspect of the common Christianity of the primitive Church, it does not imply any essential divergence from the Christianity of the Synoptics and St. Paul. The source books on which these lectures are based are the Fourth Gospel and the three Johannine Epistles. The Apocalypse, "though originating in the same circle as the Gospel and the Epistles, stands apart"; it does not belong to the Johannine corpus.

The many attempts to trace Johannine Christianity to Greek philosophy, or to Philo, or to Hellenistic mysticism or Mandaean Gnosticism receive little sympathy from the author, though these theories are treated with the conspicuous fairness that characterizes the whole series of lectures. The background of the Johannine teaching is distinctly Jewish, in spite of the many surface resemblances to other sources.

The lectures, though contributing nothing new to the study of Johannine thought, furnish in brief span an excellent survey of very much of the current Johannine literature. All varieties of opinion pass in review; even the most extreme views receive a fair and sympathetic hearing. But when Dr. Howard expresses his own view, he is found invariably on the more conservative side. This is high praise, but it does not mean that his methods of interpretation are those of the Catholic exegete. Here and

there he will admit, without any cogent proof, some editorial tampering with the sacred text, and, it goes without saying, he is never guided by any such objective norm as the *analogia fidei*.

It is to be regretted that Dr. Howard, who has given us in this book such an accurate presentation of so much of Johannine doctrine, apparently made no use of the exegetical work of Catholic scholars. They too have made contributions to the study of the Johannine corpus.

Woodstock College

EDWIN D. SANDERS, S. J.

THE PARABLES OF THE KINGDOM. By Rev. George A. Denzer, S. T. L. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946. Pp. x+185. \$2.00.

This doctorate dissertation is an orderly, logical, clear exposition and defense of a difficult thesis together with explanations of topics allied with the main theme. Father Denzer defends the thesis that Christ spoke in parables not to confound and punish His audience for any incredulity they might have entertained, but mercifully to help His hearers to grasp fundamental concepts about the kingdom of God and to afford them opportunity and inspiration to reflect upon the stories He told and thereby absorb their deeper meaning and the principles they involved.

In chapter one, the author explains what a parable is and notifies his readers precisely what parables he intends to discuss. Since the Jews' difficulty of grasping the meaning of the parables originated from their misconceptions of God's kingdom, Father Denzer reveals in chapter two what those misconceptions were and from what sources they originated. This chapter is exceedingly well done because it logically runs through what Jewish apocryphal literature had to say on his subject.

The third and fourth chapters manifest the merciful and prudent psychological approach which Christ employed in the parables under discussion to wean His hearers from their materialistic concepts of the kingdom to the appreciation of its spiritual nature. These chapters involve an exposé of the mentality of Jewish society's various classes, and consequently make clear the origin and meaning of the many conflicts sustained by Christ at the time He propounded the parables.

In contrast to the mercy theory which the thesis sustains, the author enters upon the justice theory in chapter five. He gives, by copious direct quotations from its defenders, the grounds for this theory; he shows that nearly all must and do mitigate with mercy the punishment idea which they uphold; he is fair and adequate in his treatment of his adversaries.

Chapter six squarely faces the confusing texts of the Synoptics which lie at the base of the justice theory and gives a splendid exegesis of these texts. Now the confusing texts to which the author just referred derive their confusion from a text of Isaias which they quote. Hence in chapter seven Father Denzer gives a solid and complete explanation of Isaias 6: 9-10. He indicates that the confusion arises from our misunderstanding of the Semitic genius of mind expressed in the text, and furthers his argument by showing that the Greek *ἵνα* in the corresponding Septuagint text is attempting to express the consequential notion of the Semites and definitely not a purpose idea. The last chapter is a summary and conclusion.

The author is logical and very clear in his work. The reader is never in a state of doubt regarding the exact phase of the argument being evolved at the moment. At the beginning of each progressive step, Father Denzer indicates with numerals precisely what points he is about to discuss, and at the close of his explanation he summarizes with its conclusions all that he had just explained. In this connection, however, one might offer some criticism of his work. His effort at clarity has led the author into undue repetition, and this fact may leave the impression that he is somewhat inexperienced in handling the matter of a long treatise. However, his style is so direct, his thought so compelling, his logic so thorough that his book is interesting and forceful. It were better perhaps if, to avoid much repetition, fewer passages were quoted from different authors who express the same idea in almost identical words. One might be quoted and only references made to the others.

The book is well edited although a few printing mistakes are noticeable; e.g. "foundemental" (p. 56), and "communum" for "communem" (p. 110).

This work is a valuable contribution to seminarians and priests interested in exegesis of the parables, helpful to those who are struggling with the concepts of the kingdom of God on earth, and an assisting hand to anyone who is confused by the mazes of Old Testament biblical theology. Father Denzer proved his thesis.

West Baden College

EDWARD J. HODOUS, S. J.

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE GOSPELS. By R. V. G. Tasker, B.D. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1944. Pp. x+147. \$1.50.

A series of lectures delivered to those interested in the Scripture course in English secondary schools has been slightly augmented to form this devout, scholarly, and interesting book. Dr. Tasker is Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of London. He is well acquainted

with the tenets both of form-criticism and of the older historico-critical schools, but is concerned mainly with the doctrinal purpose of the Gospels and its influence on their formation.

In an introductory chapter on "The Gospel behind the Gospels," he presents a thoughtful and moderately conservative study of the influences that helped crystallize the oral tradition about Jesus. He notes that early Christians were not so psychologically interested in a complete biography of Jesus as we should be today; His story was first told by the Christian missionaries for apologetic purposes. A picture of this early preaching can be discovered in the Epistles of St. Paul and in the early chapters of Acts: the good news that the Christ had come, as abundantly proved in Jesus' resurrection.

Acts and Paul can only indicate for us the substance and main outline of this earliest preaching: "As to the *form* of the sermon we have really no evidence at all" (p. 7). However, it must have included the story of Jesus' life and many details not essential to the central message, but personally recalled by preachers who had been eye-witnesses. As the preaching developed, two factors gradually influenced the choice of material ultimately to be included in the written Gospels. Opposition by the Jews led to emphasis on the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies, particularly in the account of Jesus' passion. The need of norms in solving concrete moral and dogmatic problems led to the insertion of "pronouncement stories"—short narratives climaxed by one of Jesus' specially memorable sayings. Here Dr. Tasker adopts form-critical theory to a certain extent. He is careful to note, however, that "we have no evidence" that such stories were widely used for such purposes in early Christian preaching, and he warns against forming a judgment as to the historical value of such stories "merely by a consideration of the particular shape or form in which we find them" (p. 12).

The Four Gospels were written "almost certainly between the years A.D. 65-100" (p. 1). They were not written immediately after Jesus' death for three reasons: His story was well known in Palestine, where people had good memories; the testimony of eye-witnesses was more important than written books; the disciples "seem to have been awaiting the return of their Lord from heaven in the near future" (p. 7). Mark was written at Rome about 65; Matthew "perhaps in the eighth decade of the first century"; John "at the close of the first century." All four Gospels were generally acknowledged before the middle of the second century.

In discussing "The Earliest Written Sources," the author considers the motives that may have led to the inclusion of various parts in the "hypo-

thetical document Q," thus giving an interesting form-critical appraisal of the *Sitz im Leben* of Q. He believes that Mark was used almost in its present form by the authors of Matthew and Luke. It reflects Peter's memories of Jesus, and though 16:10-20 is a later addition, the Gospel must have contained some resurrection-narrative originally. There is real unity of theme in Mark, despite its piecemeal structure: Jesus is the Christ. And "the 'Jesus of History' and the 'Christ of Faith' are in the gospel inseparable" (p. 33).

In the author's opinion, St. Matthew did not write the Gospel which bears his name, because an Apostle and eyewitness would not have been so dependent on Mark. The theme of Matthew is clear: Jesus has fulfilled Jewish prophecy. In tracing the theme through the Gospel, Dr. Tasker makes many interesting observations on the "five books of the New Law," i.e., the sections presenting Jesus' teaching and ending with the formula, "And it came to pass that when Jesus had finished these sayings"; on the argument from prophecy as used in Matthew; on the catholic tendency of this Gospel. He believes that much of the matter found only in this Gospel is from an unreliable source.

Though Matthew was the favorite Gospel of the early Church, Dr. Tasker believes that Luke is the most popular today. He ascribes this to the third Gospel's "modern" viewpoint, discerning this in the lack of Jewish traits and the stress on God's kindness rather than on His justice; in its humanitarianism and social attitude; and in its style: "It is a self-conscious literary creation," "intended to be read by literary people of the day" (pp. 57 f.). Dr. Tasker is quite critical of these very traits of Luke which so appeal to the modern mind, detecting in them occasion for a romantic portrait of Jesus which would minimize the tragedy of the passion and the necessity of the atonement. Though he constantly warns that "the Faith of the Christian religion rests on the fourfold gospel and not on any particular one" (p. 51), he mistrusts Luke where it diverges from Mark or Matthew, and feels that in its romanticism and its exaggerated emphasis on asceticism, e.g., on celibacy, it is the least valuable of the Synoptic Gospels for understanding Christianity. Though this Gospel is "the least Pauline of the four in its theological emphases" (p. 69), its author was Luke the physician, companion to St. Paul.

In the Fourth Gospel Dr. Tasker discerns two purposes: to combat Docetism and to bring out the inner theological meaning of all that Jesus said and did—and he traces this theological interpretation even in the chronological setting of the incidents. The author was not the Apostle John but perhaps a disciple from Jerusalem; this would explain the emphasis on that locale. In his Gospel he recorded "only such incidents as he

believed to be historical" (p. 114). In particular, it is erroneous to suppose that Jesus' debates in Jerusalem are solely the product of the Evangelist's imagination: they contain "genuine sayings of Jesus, on which the Evangelist has meditated so long that the fruits of his own meditation are blended with the sayings" (pp. 121 f.). Like the other Gospels, John is "a presentation of the fundamental subject-matter of the gospel of the early Church" (p. 105); all four Gospels blend fact and interpretation; John is simply more concerned with interpretation than the others. The theology of John is implicit in the Synoptics; it is not a "new" theology, exclusively Johannine. Otherwise, "it is difficult to understand not only why it [the Fourth Gospel] could ever have been placed alongside the other three, but why those other three should ever have been written or preserved" (p. 122). Early Christians saw "no fundamental difference" between John and the Synoptics as presentations of Christianity itself.

In regard to the miracles narrated in all four Gospels, Dr. Tasker sees clearly that they "are not wonder stories composed by Christians at a later date" (p. 13), but an essential part of the good news that God had truly intervened in human history. Yet he would make our own perception of the fitness of a miracle to portray the coming of the kingdom a criterion of that miracle's historicity. Concerning the resurrection, he rightly rejects the view that Paul was concerned only with the risen Jesus, and the Gospels only with His earthly life, but he holds that the written stories of the resurrection now in the Gospels grew up later and, being due to different traditions, are naturally inconsistent. "The ultimate evidence" for the resurrection he finds in the faith and changed lives of the earliest believers: which is correct, of course, in the sense that we can understand the stories and be sure of their ultimate validity only in the living Church which believed and taught the resurrection it had witnessed—but not in the sense that these narratives were merely faith-produced. As for the *Parousia*, Dr. Tasker believes that we must not exaggerate the early Christian expectation of its immediacy. He rejects the opinion of the Eschatological school, that Jesus thought of His messianic kingdom as essentially in the future, noting that in this view "the very existence of the Christian religion would be difficult to explain" (p. 87). Those passages in the Gospels, e.g., the thirteenth chapter of Mark, which have been interpreted as indicating belief in an imminent *Parousia*, he solves by the "critical consideration" that Jesus' teaching about His second coming "has probably been overlaid in the Gospels by a good deal of conventional apocalyptic teaching" (p. 86), owing to some Christians who were disappointed in the delay of the Lord's return.

In this study of the Gospels, Dr. Tasker devotes two chapters to the

concept of "The Kingdom of God." In one, he gives a summary description of the messianic hopes of Israel from the evolutionary point of view of current Protestant criticism. In the other, on the Synoptic Gospels, he presents what he considers the heart of the Gospel message, portraying Jesus as offering all men God's rule, which they must accept by absolute faith in His atoning death, while conscious of, and repentant for, their innate sinfulness. He finds in Jesus' ethical teaching the absolute good—something that cannot be fulfilled in this world, but which serves as an ideal and a measure of our sinfulness. There are also two brief appendices to the book. One contrasts the apocrypha and their tendencies with our canonical Gospels. The other stresses the importance of the study of New Testament Greek for a correct religious understanding of books which are both sacred and from an ancient world. Throughout, the style is clear and interesting, the treatment scholarly but popular. No index is given and there are few references.

This book evidences the growing realization among Protestant critics of the significance of the period of oral tradition. Dr. Tasker estimates it as "at least 35 years" and recognizes that "the faith of the earliest Christians was independent [of the Four Gospels]" (p. 1). For Catholic scholars this has long been commonplace: the Church produced the Gospels, not *vice versa*. It is to be hoped that non-Catholic scholars will soon progress to the further realization that it was also the Church which taught these books after they were written. Not only their origin but their meaning is to be studied in the framework of the Christian community; the authentic portrait of Jesus is not dependent on any one Gospel, or even on all four, today any more than it was in the time of the first Christian preaching.

Dr. Tasker favors the "theological-critical" approach to the Gospels, which considers all the material as influenced by Christian doctrine, over the older "historical-critical" approach, which focused on separation of primary from secondary texts. On this point he is very emphatic: "It is then very clear that doctrine is not, as some in our day crudely imagine, a later development of Christianity or an addition to it. Christianity began with doctrine. And there has never been such a thing as undocctrinal Christianity" (p. 5). He manifests a fine intuition of the combination of doctrine and fact to be found in the Gospels; when he fails to maintain this sensitive balance, it is usually historical validity that is sacrificed. Unfortunately, the doctrine that he seeks and finds in the Gospels is sadly incomplete. He admits he has been much influenced by the crisis-school of Evangelical theologians with their re-insistence on justification by faith. It is "the truth of the Gospels" that man "is not justified by works"

(p. 91). Consequently, though he stresses clearly the necessity of supernatural faith in Christ, he seems to find nothing sacramental or ecclesiological or trinitarian in the "purpose of the Gospels." The early Christian message is portrayed as "Believe and repent"—but the Pentecostal "Be baptized" is omitted. In fact, in Matthew 28:19 he sees a liturgical development of Jesus' original words (p. 47). Again, "the tendency to identify the Kingdom of God with the Church, even though it is perhaps present in Matthew's Gospel . . . is misleading" (p. 100). Finally, whether the author himself believes in the strict divinity of Jesus or not—this reviewer could not discern—he fails signally to portray this doctrine as the heart and soul of the early Christian preaching and the gospel message.

Woodstock College

LAURENCE J. MCGINLEY, S. J.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF ST. PETER. The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes and Essays. By Edward Gordon Selwyn, D.D. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1946. Pp. xvi + 517. 25/—.

Students of the New Testament will be pleased with this new commentary on I Peter, another link in that long chain of Macmillan commentaries which began with Lightfoot's *Galatians* in 1865. This new work by Dean Selwyn is quite up to the standard of its illustrious predecessors. It is a major contribution to the exegesis of the Catholic Epistles and to New Testament studies in general.

In four compact chapters of introduction, the author discusses in turn the character and contents of the Epistle, the question of authorship, the occasion and date of the document, and finally its theology and ethics. The commentary proper covers 128 pages of fine print. The remainder of the book (pp. 247–488) is devoted to a series of supplementary discussions: twelve "Additional Notes," two "Essays," and an "Appended Note" by Dr. David Daube on the participle and imperative in I Peter. At the end of the work, six tables of splendid indices are provided.

Dean Selwyn accepts the integrity of I Peter without reserve and firmly defends the thesis of Petrine authorship. Indeed the discussion of the latter question is one of the most interesting features of the book. A rather large part in the composition of I Peter is allotted to Silvanus, the Silas of Acts. "We may be confident," the author states, "that he [Silvanus] would have had his own contribution to make to the substance no less than to the language of the letter, or in other words, that he drafted, or helped to draft, it; and the receptive mind of the Apostle would have welcomed his help" (p. 11). It is the author's view that I Peter was written at Rome (= Babylon

[I Peter 5:13]) in A.D. 63 or in the first half of 64. It was then entrusted to Silvanus, its draftsman, for delivery to the churches listed in 1:1. And Selwyn holds that these churches were "mixed" congregations, having both Jewish and Gentile Christians in their membership. The author surmises, too, that Peter and John had directed the work of founding these same churches of northern Asia Minor; and he holds it as not unlikely that they had been visited by St. Peter.

As to the literary problems of I Peter, the author finds that the Epistle stands in very close relation to I and II Thessalonians, and in even closer relation to Ephesians. Four main sources, he holds, underlie the Epistle—two written and two oral. For in Selwyn's view, many of the parallels between I and II Thessalonians and I Peter, as well as a number of passages in the Synoptics and in other Epistles, are most easily explained on the basis of a common "persecution document." This document would have been a homiletic and hortatory work composed for the use of evangelists in their endeavors to strengthen the faith of infant churches amid the ever growing opposition of unbelievers. A second and more important written source, hortatory in type after the fashion of Jewish *halakhah*, is postulated to account for frequent allusions in I Peter to words of the Master. This source, which the author calls "verba Christi," would have been compiled at Antioch, and was intended also for the use of evangelists in their missionary labors.

The remaining two sources, the one liturgical and the other catechetical, were not put down in writing: indeed "both types of sources were easily memorized and were composed with that end in view" (p. 21). Thus the *περιοχή* of I Peter 2:6-10 is looked upon as referring to part of a hymn; and Psalm 33 (Heb. 34), echoed in I Peter 2:2 and quoted in 3:10-12, may have been used as a hymn for catechumens. In addition to this "liturgical source" there was a "catechetical source," containing a very early baptismal form, a later baptismal form to be dated around A.D. 55, and a fragment on catechumen virtues.

In his preface, Selwyn sets forth his reasons for not providing the commentary with an *apparatus criticus*. Generally speaking, the text explained by the author is that of Souter's *Novum Testamentum Graece* of 1910; but it is rather disconcerting to discover here and there (e.g., 3:18, 4:1, 5:8) that the author favors a reading at variance with the text printed above the commentary. And it is to be regretted that the author has not supplied a running translation, or even paraphrase, to his commentary. His failure to do so seems a distinct loss if we may judge by his many felicitous renderings of the Greek in the body of his notes. A translation facing the Greek text

would have brought into clearer relief the exact views of the author on more than one point.

The commentary proper is always interesting and informative. The illustrations of the text are taken for the most part from literary Greek. As Selwyn says, "It is not without significance that Liddell and Scott's *Greek Lexicon* throws far more light on this Epistle than Moulton and Milligan's *Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*; its affinities, that is to say, are far less with the vernacular of the papyri and the *ostraka* than with literary Greek" (pp. 26 f.). While generally instructive, the commentary—it must be noted—has more than one interpretation that will be found unacceptable; e.g., the interpretation given to the *Descensus ad Inferos* (cf. p. 195 ff.; and Essay I, p. 313 ff.). Again, in the author's treatment of the supposed relation of I Peter to the mystery religions, which is very well handled (cf. Additional Note L, p. 305 ff.), exception may be taken to certain points of detail; e.g., where the author refers in passing to the sacramental character of baptism in Judaism and Christianity (cf. p. 307).

The author, it would appear, is quite unacquainted with modern Catholic commentaries on I Peter. While there is an occasional reference to other Catholic writers (e.g., Cabrol, Chapman, de la Taille, Lebreton, Maritain, Sturzo, Vaccari), I have not noticed any reference to the exegetical work of Camerlynck, Felten, Holzmeister, Hundhausen, or van Kasteren. Indeed, Selwyn's rather restricted "Select Bibliography" (p. xv) is a fair index to his use of, or dependence on, other commentators and writers. Nonetheless, the new commentary is without question a major contribution to biblical studies, and its author is sure to rank with Bigg in this field of New Testament work. Finally, we must congratulate Dean Selwyn that, in the midst of war and strife, he has persevered to the end in his noble undertaking.

Alma College

JOHN T. CURRAN, S.J.

THE COMMENTARY OF LEVI BEN GERSON (GERSONIDES) ON THE BOOK OF JOB. Translated from the Hebrew, with introduction and notes. By Abraham L. Lassen, D.H.L. New York: Block, 1946. Pp. xxi + 266. \$3.00.

The Commentary of Levi ben Gerson is one of the standard rabbinical commentaries on Job and accompanies the text of that Book in most rabbinic editions of the Bible. It is strictly not an exegetical but a philosophical commentary, and the translator has therefore done a service for two classes of potential readers: the exegete and the historian of medieval philosophy. The exegete would not normally expect to find his commentary liberally dosed with discussions bearing on the influence of the planetary spheres, or

on the "active intellect" in the sense of *anima mundi*; through such material he can thread his way only with such guidance as Dr. Lassen offers. The historian of philosophy, on the other hand, would normally find Gersonides' material in Hebrew quite beyond his reach.

This reviewer's interests are primarily exegetical, and these notes deal with that aspect of *The Commentary*. The translation does not show (p. 23) that for Job 4:6 *ralbag* means to equate the Hebrew conjunction with the Arabic particle *fa*, which conveys the idea of consequence, like our "so" or "therefore." *The Commentary* calls attention (pp. 40, 142) to the usage whereby "arrows of *Shaddai*" means "mighty arrows," and thus sheds light on the more usual construction of other biblical books in which the divine name *Elohim* is used for the same purpose. Where the author follows a "scribal correction" against the received text (p. 47), the translator explains the circumstances. Gersonides is not always consistent in his explanations of the text (p. 244, note 71); naturally, this is not always made the subject of a note (cf. 7:1; 10:10; 14:14). The Aristotelian apparatus rarely invades the verbal analysis of the text. In 9:8, where it is used to avoid an anthropomorphic impression, it becomes ludicrous. A note on 9:27, to explain an apparent slip of Gersonides, is inadequate in view of 10:20, where the same matter recurs. The English of the rendering, normally very smooth, suffers a few rare lapses (pp. 112, 174).

Dr. Lassen has much simplified the approach to this *Commentary*, even for those who fulfill the wish expressed by Professor L. Finkelstein in the Foreword, that the rendering be made a means of opening the gates to the original. One may surmise that the terminology of medieval Aristotelianism in Hebrew can hardly be household language for those who have Hebrew as their classic tongue; for the rest of mortals, the translator's aid will be the more needed and the more appreciated.

The Catholic University of America

PATRICK SKEHAN, S.T.D.

DE DEO IN OPERATIONE NATURAE VEL VOLUNTATIS OPERANTE. By E. Iglesias, S. J. Mexico, D. F.: Buena Prensa, 1946. Pp. 405. \$3.00 (\$15.00, Mex.)

This work on the Thomist doctrine, *Deus operatur in omni operatione naturae et voluntatis*, is at once historical, philosophic, theological, and controversial. As a historian, the author argues for a modification and development of Stufler's position. As a philosopher, he advances that the view at which he arrives historically is in itself demonstrable and so should replace other theories current in textbooks. As a theologian, he

contends that his philosophic position is compatible with Catholic and with Thomist doctrine on grace. Finally, the interests and distractions of controversy are everywhere evident in the work and, in my opinion, detract from its value.

To grasp the author's position, it is necessary, even at the cost of considerable space, to find a more general viewpoint than he presents. The fundamental issue is the nature of the reality of efficient causality; that is, what is the reality which, if existent, makes the proposition, "A is the efficient cause of B," true but which, if non-existent, makes it false. There are two answers. One may affirm that the desired necessary and sufficient condition is a causally efficient influence proceeding from A to (the subject of) B. On the other hand, one may consider the foregoing either a mere *modus significandi* or else sheer imagination to affirm that the required necessary and sufficient condition is a real relation of dependence in B with respect to its ground and source, its *id a quo*, A. In this view, the reality of efficient causality is the relativity of the effect *qua* effect; one also may say that it is the relative element in the Aristotelian *actio, actus huius ut ab hoc*; that is, B is an act pertaining to A inasmuch as it is from A.

When one thinks of efficient causality as influx and attempts to analyse the causal series (A is efficient cause of B, and B is efficient cause of C), one may arrive at any of three opinions. First, one may say that in such a causal series there are two and only two instances of influx and so two and only two real instances of efficient causality: from A to B, and from B to C; but there is no third influx from A to C; accordingly, mediate causality is not a true species of causality but merely a name for the combination of two other instances. However, one may dislike this conclusion and desire to make the mediate cause really and truly a cause. Hence, secondly, one may say that in the causal series there are, at least at times, three instances of influx and so three instances of efficient causality: not only from A to B, and from B to C, but also a third from A to C; simultaneously both A and B exert an influx to produce C. Now while this makes A the efficient cause of C not only in name but also in reality, it does so by making A the immediate cause of C; mediate causality is not saved. Hence, thirdly, one may say that there is a real difference between B as effect of A and B as cause of C, and this real difference is what explains the reality of mediate efficient causality; first, an influx from A gives B'; secondly, an influx from A gives B''; thirdly, an influx from B'' gives C. Thus, efficient causality thought of as influx yields three views of the causal series, and one may note that there is some resemblance between these three views and the views respectively of Durandus, Molina, and Bañez. I shall not say that Durandus, Molina, Bañez, or any of their

followers arrived at their positions in the foregoing manner. I am not engaged in history but in listing theoretical possibilities, and merely draw attention to a resemblance among three possibilities and three historical opinions.

As there is an alternative view of efficient causality, so also there is an alternative analysis of the causal series. Distinguish between the series properly so called and the merely accidental series: the latter is illustrated by Abraham begetting Isaac, and Isaac, Jacob, where evidently Abraham does not beget Jacob; the former is illustrated by my moving the keys of my typewriter, and my typewriter typing out these paragraphs, where evidently I am more a cause of the typed paragraphs than the typewriter is. Now in the accidental series there are only two real relations of dependence on an *id a quo*: B depends on A, C depends on B; but the relation of C to A is not of causal dependence but of conditioned to condition. On the other hand, in the proper causal series, there are three real relations of dependence with respect to an *id a quo*: B depends on A, C depends on B, and C depends on A even more than on B. Since there are three real relations of dependence, there are three real instances of efficient causality and, as it appears, the instance of merely mediate causality (which causes such trouble when thinking is in terms of influx) turns out to involve more dependence, and so more causality, than the apparently immediate instance. This leads to an examination of the notion of immediacy. What is it? A first answer is in terms of space and time; but this necessarily is irrelevant for there are causes and effects outside space and time. A second answer is in terms of proximity in the enumeration of terms in the causal series; but terms have their place in the series inasmuch as they are causes of what follows and instruments or means with respect to what precedes; and so we are brought to the etymology; the "immediate" involves a negation of a *medium*, a middle, a middle, a means; and such a negation may be either "not being a means" or "not using a means"; what is not a means may be termed immediate *immediatione virtutis*; what does not use a means may be termed immediate *immediatione suppositi*; the former is what has first place in the proper causal series; the latter pertains in turn to each preceding term in the proper causal series.

Now with this analysis of the causal series, different views may arise when one asks the grounds of affirming that God, any created cause, and the created cause's effect form a proper causal series. Three sets of grounds have been offered; the first regards only immanent acts and so from its lack of universality has fallen into desuetude; the second regards all created causes

and, indeed, as causes; the third is equally universal, for it regards all created causes, but it regards them, not as causes, but as conditioned. An argument for the first view may be put as follows: When I see, I act and so am an efficient cause; but when I see, I add to my own ontological perfection; to enable me to make such an addition, I must receive a physical premotion; and only God can be the cause of such premissions in the general case. The second view proceeds more generally: Only absolute being is the sufficient ground for the production of being; hence, insofar as it produces being, every created cause must be an instrument; further, this instrumentality affects the created cause as cause, for there is a real difference between *potentia agendi* and *ipsum agere*, and that real difference is in the created cause as such; but it cannot be produced by the created cause, for nothing can add to its own perfection; and it must be attributed to God, for it involves the production of being and only God is proportionate to that.

The third view regards the created cause, not as cause, but as conditioned. As in the second view, only infinite being is the proportionate cause of being, of the event as event, of the actual emergence of the effect, of the exercise of efficiency; hence, all finite causes are instruments, naturally proportionate to producing effects as of a given kind, but not naturally proportionate to producing effects as actual occurrences. However, this limitation is operative, not through some entitative and remediable defect in the created cause (for the only remedy would be to make it infinite), but through the manifest fact that finite causes are all conditioned. Since no finite cause can create, it must presuppose the patient on which it acts, suitable relations between itself and its patient, and the non-interference of other causes. Over these conditions the finite cause has no control, for the conditions must be fulfilled before the finite cause can do anything. Next, though the conditions are finite entities and negations of interference, though the conditions of the efficiency of one finite cause may be fulfilled by suitable operations and abstinences on the part of other finite causes, still it remains that all the other finite causes equally are conditioned. Hence, appeal to other finite causes can do no more than move the problem one stage further back; it can do that as often as one pleases; but never can it solve the problem. The only solution is to postulate a master-plan that envisages all finite causes at all instants throughout all time, that so orders all that each in due course has the conditions of its operation fulfilled and so fulfils conditions of the operation of others. But since the only subject of such a master-plan is the divine mind, the principal agent of its execution has to be God. Demonstrably, then, God not only gives being to, and conserves in being, every created

cause, but also He uses the universe of causes as His instruments in applying each cause to its operation and so is the principal cause of each and every event as event. Man proposes, but God disposes.

Such are six views on the issue. I believe that the first three are easily refuted, that the fourth and fifth involve fallacies, that the sixth is demonstrated validly. The troublesome question for anyone who would defend any of the first three views is whether the influx is a reality. If it is not a reality, then efficient causality is not a reality but only a thought or, perhaps more accurately, a bit of imagination. But if the influx is a reality, it would seem that there must be an infinity of influences for each case of efficient causality. For if the influx is a reality, it must be produced itself; that production would involve a further influx, and that influx a further production. One might wish to say, *sistitur in primo*. But why? Either the influx is or it is not really distinct from what it produces. If it is, there is an infinite series. If it is not, then influx is just another name for the effect. At this point, the defender will urge that the influx is indeed a reality, that there are not an infinity of influences for each effect, and the reason is that the influx is a different type of reality from the effect—the type that eliminates the infinite series. But what type is that? I know only one, the real relation. There is no real efficient causality of efficient causality, and so on to infinity, because the reality of efficient causality is the reality of a real relation, and “*relatio relationis est ens rationis*.” It should seem that the first three views, while they differ profoundly on the reality of mediate efficient causality, have in common the source of their differences, namely, a failure to think out what is the reality of efficient causality as such.

The fourth view (the first on the second concept of efficient causality) involves a fallacy. When I see, it is true that I act in the sense that grammatically “I” is subject of a verb in the active voice. But that does not prove that ontologically I am the efficient cause of my own seeing. Nor is it likely that anyone will find a proof that I am. For both Aristotle and Aquinas, external sensation has its efficient cause in the sensible object. Again, for both, “*intelligere est pati*.” Again, for both, “*appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum*,” and in later Thomist doctrine of the will, the act of willing an end is effected *quoad exercitium actus* by God. The fallacy of the fifth position lies in affirming that the real difference between *potentia agendi* and *ipsum agere* is a reality added to the agent as agent; in fact, that reality is the effect, added to the patient as patient (*motus est in mobili, actio est in passo*), and predicated of the agent as agent only by extrinsic denomination; it has to be so, for otherwise either metaphysical laws have

exceptions or else a *motor immobilis* would be a contradiction in terms; nor is it possible to demonstrate that while action as action is predicated of the agent by extrinsic denomination, still created action as created is predicated of the agent by intrinsic denomination; what alone is demonstrable about created action as such is that it is conditioned, and that happens to be the premise of the sixth view.

Now, it is to the sixth view that the author approximates. On that ground he naturally may be assured of my full admiration and esteem. But I have indulged in this long preamble because I cannot give any blanket approbation to the author's position and because I wish to point out just where we differ and where I believe his thought might be improved. His analysis of the nature of efficient causality I find inadequate. Indeed, it seems to me that he compromises between the two alternative notions of the reality of efficient causality, so that lower causes are causes because they exert an influx, whereas higher causes are causes although they do not. What is certain is that repeatedly (pp. 30, 70, 72) he states that whereas the higher cause really is a cause, nevertheless, the *agere in virtute alterius* of the lower involves no activity of the higher, either on the lower as acting, or on its effect.

What can the author mean by *activitas, actio, actio physica*? It should seem that an entity not found in every case of efficient causality has nothing to do with the metaphysical analysis of efficient causality: metaphysical laws have no exceptions. Again, if one takes *actio* as *actus huius ut ab hoc*, then the higher cause certainly does exert *actio* both on the means as means and on the effect, for *actio* is precisely the means as means and the effect as effect. On the other hand, if one takes *actio* in some other sense, the argument already given shows that the notion of efficient causality has not been examined adequately. While the author has gone further than most writers on the subject to untangle the issue, I cannot say that he has gone far enough.

Rightly the author insists on the relevance of final causality with regard to divine operation in the operations of creatures. But I believe that he attributes to God as final cause more than that notion can bear, and again the root difficulty is inadequate analysis. The final cause is the good as cause, the *cuius gratia*: just as efficient causality is a real relation of dependence on an *id a quo*, so final causality is a real relation of dependence on a *cuius gratia*. But there is a catch in the notion of the final cause: an end may be considered in two ways: simply as end, or as apprehended end; the former is the end as in *ordo executionis*; the latter as in *ordo intentionis*; the former is *finis operis* and the latter *finis operantis*, though it is safer to

avoid the last pair of terms since moralists and even metaphysicians are prone to pay those words extra, so that they then mean what one pleases. Now there are two peculiarities of the end as apprehended: first, without it there would be no final causality at all: things do not tend to ends unless an intellect apprehends the ends and directs the things to them; secondly, the end as apprehended is the efficient cause of the act of appetite: *appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum*. Now the author has recognized these peculiarities, but not in the sense that the end as apprehended is properly, not a final, but an efficient cause; on the contrary, he has argued from that fact to the conclusion that final causes generally are movers. Such a generalization is unwarranted, but from it follow two further consequences: first, since the final cause is a mover, yet exerts no *actio physica*, a mover need exert no *actio physica*; this is correct, provided *actio physica* means some imagined and unintelligible influx, but not for the reason assigned; secondly—a graver consequence since it involves a general distortion of the theory of divine operation—as on the plane of pure theory the author injected efficiency into final causality, so on the plane of applied theory he has God as final cause exerting the efficient causality of a mover; in other words, while in fact every finite entity has two real relations of dependence—one on God as *id a quo* and the other on God as *cuius gratia*—the author appeals to God as final cause to fill up lacunae in his theory of God as efficient cause of all events.

So much for the author's general philosophic position. Its main tendency is, I believe, quite correct. But I also believe that it should undergo a very thorough revision before it can be recommended for the role of supplanting theories current in textbooks. I have indicated as well as I could the basic points of disagreement. I pass over all other points on which I also disagree, except one, namely, the summary treatment of the problem of sin. No doubt this problem has not on the sixth theory the acuteness so evident on the second, third, fourth, and fifth. Still, even on the sixth theory, it is a real problem and, so far from solving it, the author does not give evidence of having grasped it.

Let us turn to the historical aspect of the work. Judged by traditional standards of works *ad mentem divi Thomae*, the author is to be credited with an exceptionally sound instinct for history; thus, he refuses to take it for granted that Aquinas carefully studied Suarez or John of St. Thomas; on the contrary, about the first third of his work is devoted to determining the medieval meaning of technical terms and the medieval *status quaestionis*. But while this plan of operations is excellent, its execution, if judged by the absolute criteria of the logic of positive investigation, is extremely

defective. The list of terms examined by the author does not include *actio operatio*, *potentia activa*, *potentia passiva*, *procedere*; yet these terms, because of different strata in his sources and in his own development, are used ambiguously by Aquinas; these ambiguities tend to become systematized confusions in the commentators; and without clearing up the whole matter it is impossible to discuss intelligently either Thomist or Thomistic views on efficient causality. Secondly, the investigation generally is based upon a minimum of texts; now quoting a few passages is only sampling but can yield rough lines for further study; it can substantiate negative conclusions, but cannot establish exact and positive information on what a thinker meant. Logically, the interpretation of a writer is a matter of formulating an hypothesis, working out its presuppositions and its implications, and verifying in the text the presuppositions, the hypothesis itself, and the implications. Deductions of what a writer must have meant are just so much fancy; in reality they are deductions from the hypothesis assumed by the interpreter; and whether that hypothesis is correct can be determined only with probability, a probability that increases only with the extent and the variety of the verification. Now, while Father Iglesias is to be given credit for having derived his ideas from the text of St. Thomas instead of merely using the text as a sort of cement to make a wall of a private heap of stones, it remains that his appetite for positive investigation is never keen, that instead of following out a search for historical fact, he would prefer to anticipate the objections of some not too enlightened controversialist. Accordingly, while I am in whole-hearted agreement with Father Iglesias in his contention that neither Molinism nor Bannezianism is an interpretation of Aquinas, still I find his own views on what Aquinas meant too briefly elaborated and too thinly substantiated to be interesting. For what Aquinas held was not some purely philosophic view: Avicenna had combined Neoplatonist emanationism with Aristotelian cosmic theory; Aquinas modified this mixture to his own purposes. I believe that the essence of Aquinas' position can be given a purely philosophic statement that is strictly demonstrable. But I also believe that it is quite impossible to tell anyone what Aquinas meant while omitting mention of the historical origin and the nature of the blocks which he pieced together. To take a single instance of the result of neglecting the historical background, repeatedly the author informs us that the higher cause was denominated a cause because of its *praestantia ontologica formae*. In fact, higher causes like lower causes are causes if and only if they produce effects; their immanent perfections reveal what they could do but not what they actually do; finally, what lends color to the author's statement is simply that, on

the assumption of Thomist cosmic theory, immanent perfection is at times a *ratio cognoscendi*, though not a *ratio essendi*, of efficient causality; for in that hierarchic universe, God and the *corpus caeleste* respectively have all subordinate beings as their instruments.

Formally theological but materially historical is the discussion of the Suarezian censure that *concursum immediatum* has been the doctrine of all Scholastics with the solitary exception of Durandus. Against this the author rightly points out that a number of early Scholastics would not admit God to be the cause of the sinful act, where the thesis against which they argued was not that God was the immediate cause but simply that God was the cause of all acts. This alone suffices to require a qualification of the Suarezian censure. But the author also claims that the very question of immediate *concursum*, as later understood, was raised for the first time by Scotus or perhaps Giles of Rome. On this point I think further investigation is desirable: even if the general lines of the author's position would remain unaltered, at least more delicately exact history can be attained. The author fails to mention St. Albert's *virtus divina creata* which would seem a promising candidate for the role of immediate *concursum*. He also passes over the fact that Aquinas not only rejected the *virtus divina creata* but moreover took to task some censor who had objected to a theological proposition on the ground that it did not make God a more proximate cause than free will. Rather harshly, though far from unjustly, Aquinas wrote: "Quod vero obiciens calumniatur, quod Deus est magis causa proxima quam liberum arbitrium, omnino frivolum est: est enim Deus causa proxima secundum efficaciam actionis et non secundum ordinem enuntiationis [Parma: *enumerationis*] causarum" (*Declaratio CVIII Dubiorum*, q. 74, Mand. III, 235). It should seem that the frivolity, or to use Aquinas' expression, the utter frivolity, of insisting on unqualified immediacy began earlier than the author suspects. God really, and not in name merely, is the efficient cause of every event; God is the immediate efficient cause in the sense that God never is a means, not in the sense that He can never employ a means. But to my mind, what causes trouble is that immediacy and causality are not conceived but merely imagined; when that occurs, then one will argue that, unless God is the immediate efficient cause of every event, then He is a cause, not really, but only in name; such argument, of course, is frivolous, but at least Aquinas did not think frivolity impossible. Again, when controversialists assume that, if a certain theory of divine operation is not that of Molina or of Bañez, then it must be that of Durandus—Father Iglesias has an appendix on this argument against Father Stuffer—then their attitude is explicable

to me only on the assumption that they wish causality to be an influx they can imagine but no one can conceive. Finally, if I may voice a suspicion or suggest an hypothesis, it is this intrusion of the imagination, before as well as after Aquinas, that underlies what the author argues to be a post-Thomist shift in the *status quaestionis*.

The last third of the work deals mainly with the Thomist theory of grace. It is introduced, not for its own sake, but to buttress the philosophic position. On the whole I think the author would have done better to omit it. He reads the Thomist text objectively enough but not widely enough. He bases himself almost exclusively on the final questions in the *Prima Secundae*, so that he writes without awareness of the great development of Thomist thought on actual grace. Further, he writes with a controversial intent; he wishes to exclude *concursum immediatum*; and with this negative goal dominant, his own positive work suffers as, for the same reason, that of Father Stuffer suffered. Finally, he is unaware of the nature of Thomist theory of the will. Up to the *Pars Prima* inclusively, the will, for Aquinas, was a passive faculty moved by an intellectual apprehension of the good: "appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum." In the *De Malo* and in the *Prima Secundae* the intellectual apprehension of the good is the efficient cause only of the specification of the act; the exercise of the act of willing a means has its efficient cause in the will actuated with respect to an end; the exercise of the act of willing an end has its efficient cause in an external mover who is God. At no time did Aquinas advance or suppose that an immanent act has to be caused efficiently by the faculty in which it occurs though, of course, it is possible to construct arguments to the contrary based upon the equivocation of the terms *actio* and *operatio*, which sometimes mean efficient causality and sometimes simply second act, *ἐνέργεια*. Of all this the author seems unaware. His assumption with regard to immanent acts leads him to exclude a priori that the *voluntas mota et non movens* of *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 111, a. 2, is what it claims to be, a passive act produced in the will by God without any efficiency exerted by the will itself. It is true that in later Thomist doctrine not only is such passivity compatible with freedom, but also that the act of willing an end is not free. None the less, it is a vital, immanent, voluntary act, just as the act of understanding in the *intellectus possibilis* is a vital, immanent, intellectual act, though *intelligere est pati*. Next, the significance of the argument against acts of charity produced in the will without a habit of charity is not that the will must be an efficient cause and God cannot be an immediate efficient cause. God is the external mover who *immediatione virtutis et suppositi* causes all acts of willing an end, whether natural or

supernatural, *quoad exercitium actus*. The significance of the argument on the necessity of a habit of charity is the same as that of the argument on the necessity of an *intellectus possibilis*: for an act to be the act of a subject, the subject must be in potency to the act; else it is not his act. Just as Averroes' man cannot understand without an *intellectus possibilis*, so St. Thomas' man cannot elicit supernatural acts of love without a habit of charity; absence of potency—and in both cases it is passive potency that is absent—means that the subject cannot be actuated in a given way. With these basic differences between the author and myself, it is plain that points of disagreement on his treatment of grace are too numerous to be treated in detail. I wish to say that I think he is right in acknowledging a problem with regard to the gratuitous character of acts preparatory remotely to justification, but his outlined solution in terms of a *forma fluens*, of a habit that is not habitual, neither takes advantage of the indications Aquinas himself gave nor is satisfactory as independent thinking. Again, actual grace after justification is not merely the general theorem of divine operation in the operations of creatures; it includes divine causation of the act of willing the end and so divine control over willing means; and the act of willing the end, as caused gratuitously by God, is supernatural not only extrinsically in virtue of the end envisaged but also intrinsically as the actuation of supernatural habit; finally, since any habit is only a *per se* principle of the occurrence of acts and so of their occurrence only *in maiori parte*, special divine intervention to secure perseverance is an additional need.

The controversial element in the work is pervasive and, to me at least, distracting from better things. It takes a pure form in the systematic refutation of *concursum simultaneum* and *praemotio physica* which the author argues not only to lack intrinsic proof but also to involve contradiction. The precise argument he advances for the latter contention is difficult to evaluate because argument and counter-argument can follow one another indefinitely unless there is a very searching and thorough elaboration of fundamental concepts; as I have already stated, such basic elaboration is lacking. However, the former contention by itself is quite enough, and I believe it to be quite true; no Bannezian has ever demonstrated his position to a Molinist, or Molinist his to a Bannezian; and I agree with Father Iglesias that both are right in finding one or two of the other's arguments fallacious.

To conclude, Father Iglesias has confronted a very large problem courageously. The urgency of confronting it is only going to increase in the future, for today medieval studies are flourishing in a manner unknown in

the past; and this involves, I believe, not only the discredit of baroque procedures but also an unexpectedly quiet funeral for a once celebrated and very passionate debate. Sooner or later there will be an evidently empty place at the philosophic and the theological tables, and Father Iglesias' effort to meet that future contingency is an act of intelligent foresight. However, one has the feeling that he did not quite realize the magnitude of the task he set himself, but was more concerned to surpass the requirements of the average product of the past than to meet the exigencies of the future; that while he regularly comes to grips with the real issues, still he struggles with them rather in the dark. I have given my reasons for not considering the work definitive. I do not believe it should be recommended to minds more inclined to accept than to criticize what they find in print. But, for all that, it possesses the value of calling attention to real issues and of indicating a direction of solution that I believe sound.

Christ the King College, Toronto.

BERNARD LONERGAN, S. J.

DE SACRAMENTIS IN GENERE. By Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1946. Pp. xviii + 595. \$3.75.

Father Doronzo's textbook on the sacraments in general is new especially in the plan he has followed. The author sought to strike a balance between the method which stresses the speculative questions in this discipline, and the method which aims at meeting the apologetical needs of our times by an extensive use of positive theology. His *via media* is based on an acknowledgement of the proportion, not equality, between the two methods, and so, while stressing the speculative, he gives the positive method its due place. Father Doronzo takes St. Thomas as his constant guide, and the *quaestio, videtur quod non*, etc., of the *Summa* reappear in the present book attractively presented as the *status quaestionis, pars negativa, pars affirmativa, conclusio, responsio*. The positive method adorns the *pars negativa* and the *pars affirmativa*; the speculative method enriches the remainder. The division of matter follows the *Summa Theologica*, III, qq. 60-65, with one chapter introduced on the recipient of the sacraments and another on the sacramentals. The author achieves the results he sought and faithfully imitates the model he selected.

This book is a challenge and an answer to those who wish to know whether or not the *Summa Theologica* is a good classroom textbook. It is a challenge because it does not leave the text of St. Thomas untouched (as many would wish); it is an answer because it weds with the text of St. Thomas the many sources of theological development in this discipline since the time of the Angelic Doctor. In truth, a course on the sacraments in general would be

deficient today if it were to use the text of St. Thomas alone as the classroom manual. The reasons are that the theological notes to be assigned to many of the theses are drawn from the Council of Trent and the development in sacramental theology since St. Thomas, and the main adversaries, both in their doctrines and the principles from which their errors proceed, broke on this world long after the writing of the *Summa*. Father Doronzo happily presents all that is lastingly good in St. Thomas and complements the text of the *Summa* with later adversaries and their doctrines, later councils and their definitions, later theologians and their conclusions.

Every professor of sacramental theology will want to have a copy of this book on his desk and several copies in the school library. The work is completely faithful to all the teachings which are generally designated Thomistic in sacramental theology, even when the opinion creates cogent difficulty, v.g., in the explanation of sacramental reviviscence supposing physical instrumental causality. A defect in this book—slight because it occurs in so many text books—is the author's failure to indicate what he means by the various theological notes assigned. For example, to the proposition that *verba* and *res* are the matter and form constituting the sacrament, the author assigns the note, *theologicæ certæ*, and prefixes the word *videtur* (p. 92). Now this causes confusion; for such a proposition cannot be said to be in the same class of theologically certain propositions as, for example, that Father and Son are one spirating principle of the Holy Spirit. There is some disproportion in the amount of space given the various sections. The part devoted to the essence of the sacrament could be profitably abridged in a textbook, and the section on the recipient of the sacraments could be further summarized since the matter is extensively treated in moral theology.

A special word of commendation is extended to the printer for the excellent type used and the extreme readability of the book. There are five splendid indices—biblical, exegetical, Thomistic, onomastic, analytical. The footnote references to outstanding authors on each question bear witness to Father Doronzo's diligence and study. One unhappy expression should, I believe, be corrected, namely: “. . . naturæ humanæ [Christi] habentis hypostasim divinam” (p. 386). Unless I am mistaken, one should not use such an expression. To say that the Word has a human nature and that a human nature is had by the Word is correct; but to say that a human nature has the divine hypostasis, though true with an explanation, is at least *male sonans*. The thoroughness, even exhaustiveness at times, which characterizes Father Doronzo's discussions may make the book a bit difficult as a theological student's textbook, but the same qualities make it the more welcome to a professor of sacramental theology.

PRAXIS MATRIMONIALIS AD USUM PAROCHI ET CONFESSARII. By A. de Smet, S.T.D. Third revised ed. by A. Verhamme, Ph.D. Brugis: Car. Beyaert, 1939. Pp. 180.

Dr. de Smet's *Praxis* is a brief explanation of the canons on matrimony particularly pertinent to the office of parish priest and confessor. It is neither a collection of ready answers nor a catechism of matrimonial legislation. Rather, it approaches the textbook in style, without, however, the definitions, analyses, and academic discussions characteristic of the class manual. For a fuller and more detailed treatment of any particular point mentioned in the text, the priest or student is referred to the author's classic commentary, *De Sponsalibus et Matrimonio*, of which this work may be considered the practical complement.

The purpose of the present volume is to provide, not a substitute for study, but a safe and thorough directive for the parish priest and confessor in the discharge of their respective functions. It will refresh the priest's mind on the laws governing Catholic marriage as well as reduce the number of pastoral mistakes made in this complicated field. The canons treated are those that fall within the sphere of the pastor and confessor. The entire volume is divided into three parts, which in turn naturally follow the subdivisions proper to the Code. First come the norms governing the pre-nuptial investigation and the proof of the parties' freedom to marry. The legal formalities to be observed in the actual celebration of marriage follow next. The third part contains an examination of such post-nuptial problems as the separation *a toro et mensa*, the dissolution of the natural bond and the dispensation *super rato*. The principles governing the use of marriage are presented briefly but adequately. Likewise indicated are the lines of action to be followed by the confessor in dealing with the annoying problem of conjugal onanism.

Three practical appendices follow the three principal parts of the text. The first considers the steps taken to rectify an invalid dispensation. The second points out the duty of the parish priest in regard to the civil prerequisites and especially the civil ceremony. Since this ceremony is not of obligation in the United States, directions on this point will have only an academic interest to American priests. The third appendix consists in a collection of specimens of forms designed to expedite the work of the priest in applying for the various types of matrimonial dispensations.

In his brief but practical treatment of the canons, the author introduces the comparative legislation of the Provincial Councils of Malines and the Statutes of the Diocese of Bruges. While such prescriptions will hold a particular interest for the Belgian clergy, their presence in the text does not impair its general usefulness. Specimens of various forms customarily employed are found in generous number throughout the text as well as in Ap-

pendix III. These specimens include official notifications to be transmitted by one parish priest to another as well as other official documents. While some of these forms as stated are peculiar to the Diocese of Bruges, their directive value is universal.

While the present volume antedates the very important Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments of June 29, 1941, *Sacrosanctum Matrimonii Institutum*, still this document will be the more thoroughly appreciated if studied in conjunction with such a manual as that of Dr. de Smet.

The high standards of pre-war craftsmanship are happily evident in the composition of this volume. Especially is this true of the quality of the type and paper as well as the remarkable freedom from typographical errors.

The matrimonial path is often a rough one, for parish priest and confessor as well as for the parties to a marriage. This rough way will be made comparatively smooth for the priest who masters such a serviceable text as that of *Praxis Matrimonialis*.

Weston College

JAMES E. RISK, S.J.

MEDICAL ETHICS FOR NURSES. By Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A., Ph.D. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Company, 1946. Pp. xv + 356. \$3.00.

A mere survey of the contents of this book will indicate its usefulness as a textbook. Two chapters are devoted to general ethics—a rather brief treatment, but adequate for the purpose. The special topics treated in the other thirteen chapters that make up the body of the book are the following: Christian marriage, with a discussion of contraception and the use of the safe period; abortion, direct and indirect, with an analysis of many pertinent practical problems, especially ectopic gestation; sterilization; assistance at immoral operations; the Christian philosophy of suffering; truthfulness and professional secrecy; baptism, and the last sacraments. In the Appendix, besides treating at length of the care of non-Catholic patients and highly recommending "The Apostolate to Assist Dying non-Catholics," the author includes a statement of the Ten Commandments, an excerpt from the New Testament concerning the reward for caring for Christ's "least brethren," the Pledge of Florence Nightingale, the Oath of Hippocrates, and excerpts from the Moral Code for Catholic Hospitals. At the conclusion of each chapter are many cases to be discussed by students, and a list of helpful and up-to-date references. The book has a Foreword by Monsignor Fulton Sheen and a good index.

Rating Father McFadden's book according to a general impression, the most exacting critic could hardly style it less than excellent. The author

has made a careful selection of material, has arranged it with a fine sense of proportion, has explained it clearly, and has preserved a well-balanced judgment in treating controversial questions.

Even a work of such general excellence as this admits of improvement in certain particulars. Among the possible improvements that occurred to me are the following. The discussion on probabilism (p. 22) struck me as being introduced rather abruptly. In treating the vincibly erroneous conscience (p. 21) and what he calls privative ignorance (pp. 39-40), the author does not make it clear that even in these cases moral responsibility for evil effects presupposes advertence to the possible evil effects. The statement that the Church dissolves a marriage when the Pauline Privilege is applied (p. 54) is hardly accurate. In limiting the meaning of "mutilation" to "immoral mutilation" (p. 216), the author causes confusion; for mutilation, according to its ordinary definition and in keeping with traditional principles, is not necessarily immoral, and the author himself is not consistent with his unusual terminology (p. 237). As I mentioned before, the references are in general very helpful; but I was surprised to find no references to the appendix on medical ethics in the latest edition of Cronin's *Ethics*, Volume II. Also, the cases are stimulating, but if Father McFadden has not prepared a teacher's handbook with answers to these cases, I would suggest that he do so. Some of the proposed cases are extremely difficult; and many a teacher with a heavy schedule might reject this book simply because the cases would bring up problems that he is not prepared to answer.

The foregoing observations indicate some of the possible improvements that occurred to me. I was also impressed by certain points that seemed debatable, especially with regard to sterilization and co-operation. I doubt if it is necessary for a disease of the reproductive organs to be so serious as to endanger life, even to justify the removal of the organs, much less the risk of sterility involved in mild irradiation, as the author seems to imply (p. 223). It seems to me that the avoidance of almost continuous illness and pain is a sufficient moral justification for treatments and operations that might result in sterility. And as for estimating causes that justify occasional material assistance at immoral operations, I would readily agree with the author that this is a difficult matter; but I think that he has kept too much on the side of safety in grading his reasons. The very least reason he proposes is the loss of a week's salary (p. 259).

Another debatable point is the terminology regarding sterilization. Father McFadden seems to hold that direct sterilization is sometimes permissible (p. 250). I have noted this same terminology in other books. Yet I wonder whether it is accurate and whether it would not be better and more

in keeping with the decree of the Holy Office of 1940 to explain all permissible sterilizations as indirect.

St. Mary's College

G. KELLY, S. J.

COUNSELS TO CONFESSORS: A DISCOURSE ADDRESSED TO AN ASSEMBLY OF MISSIONARY PRIESTS. By St. Leonard of Port Maurice. The Newman Bookshop: Westminster Md., 1946. Pp. xii + 86. \$1.50.

This little volume is a reprint of a translation, published in the latter half of the last century, of the *Discorso Mistico e Morale* of St. Leonard of Port Maurice, O. Min. (1676-1751). An exhortatory instruction delivered to a group of priests who were engaged, like the Saint himself, in preaching popular missions, it embraces that part of the modern moral treatise on the sacrament of penance which deals with the duties of confessors. A relatively large portion of the book is devoted to the absolution of recidivists and of penitents who are in occasions of sin. St. Leonard vigorously combats the error of those confessors who would maintain that absolution can always be given to penitents of these classes. He requires that habitual sinners who have shown no amendment whatever after two or three confessions in which they have been given salutary and practical advice by the confessor, should manifest their contrition in some manner that will be more convincing than a mere assertion. However, the signs of true contrition that are acceptable are not, in any rigorous sense, extraordinary. The nature of an occasion of sin is explained particularly well; and it is interesting to note that the Saint considers only that relative occasion a proximate one in which the penitent falls into sin "always or nearly always or at least frequently."

There is nothing to be found here that is not available in any of the ordinary manuals, either excerpted by the authors from the present work, or from the earlier writers on whom St. Leonard depended. It was obviously not his intention to add to the speculation on the problems involved, but to present the common teaching of theologians up to his time. This is done in an interesting, rapid, conversational style.

Woodstock College

THOMAS E. HENNEBERRY, S. J.

JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER. By Emil Brunner. Translated by Mary Hottinger. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. Pp. vi + 304. \$3.00.

In his book, *The State in Catholic Thought*, H. A. Rommen has written: "... the age of controversy between the divided Christian Churches, which somehow presupposes a substantially Christian Society, is definitely gone, and ... we have entered an era of co-operation, against paganizing in-

fluences, between the Churches and all who are of good will. Upon what basis is such a co-operation possible? Upon what basis is it possible especially in the field of socio-economic, political, and international action? Upon such a basis as can be shared by all co-operating members. This basis is the natural law" (p. 215).

Against the realization of this thesis an obstacle is raised in Emil Brunner's *Justice and the Social Order*. For this is a work which would cause division of the common basis. It aims at a sectarian, Protestant explanation of the natural order of justice. "While the Catholic Church, drawing on centuries of tradition, possesses an impressive systematic theory of justice, Protestant Christianity has had none for some three hundred years past." "If this is indeed the case, there is no need to justify the attempt to establish a doctrine of justice on Protestant principles" (p. 1). And again: "In form and substance, the present volume may be taken as a confession of this Protestant faith" (p. 92), i.e., of the Protestant as opposed to medieval Catholic understanding of the meaning of the law of nature.

Fortunately for the cause of Christian co-operation, this principal object of the book is not attained. Rather—and this is contrary to the author's purpose—a thoughtful reader will find here a powerful argument for true Christian unity. For there is no Protestant *system* of mundane justice, nor can there be. As Tawney has well pointed out (*Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, p. 101) the logic of Luther's religious premises "riveted on the social thought of Protestantism a dualism which, as its implications were developed, emptied religion of its social content, and society of its soul." The fundamental principle of justification by faith alone logically voids any attempt to give religious values to social institutions. And this, fundamentally, is the reason why even the most earnest efforts of men like Brunner have been met by an ever-increasing secularization of society in the post-Reformation world.

This is not to say that there is a Catholic *natural* law or a Catholic system of *natural* justice. But the essential unity of truth must inevitably bring it about that the "order of nature" can find a place only in the system which recognizes the harmony of all orders, natural and supernatural, religious and secular, which have come from the one will of God. Natural justice is Catholic only in the sense that in the teaching of the Catholic Church alone has it been able to find shelter and growth.

Evidence of this fact is found in the uneven quality of Brunner's book. Where, forgetful of sectarian prejudices, he has analyzed the "order of creation," the author has freshly and cogently presented the cause of personal freedom in an organically constituted society against the errors of liberalism

and totalitarianism. On the other hand, when his conclusions are linked with specifically Protestant doctrines they lose their logical consistency and convincing power.

To exemplify: According to the Reformers, "secure and clear knowledge of the principles of mundane justice can only be obtained from the knowledge of the Creator and his will as it is revealed to us in Scriptural history and doctrine" (pp. 91-92). Yet the reader is puzzled on finding that this "clear knowledge" is to be discovered neither in the New nor in the Old Testament: "The New Testament contains but scant indication of a Christian doctrine of mundane institutions" (p. 117). And to increase the confusion the author goes on to say that this fact is not in any way surprising, because "firstly, it was to be assumed that the basic facts were familiar to everybody, secondly, the message of Christ and his apostles, and the primitive Christian community, were concerned with greater things than the framing of worldly systems, and thirdly, for the Christian community at its foundation, since it formed a tiny minority in the Roman Empire, and had no voice in its public affairs, the shape of worldly systems was of no immediate interest to them" (p. 118).

As for the Old Testament, we are told that to seek a social ethic here "cannot but give rise to the gravest misgivings." The Ten Commandments themselves, though of "incomparable catechetical importance . . . for the instruction of a Christian congregation," cannot be used as the basis of a doctrine of justice. "Luther's assertion, explicitly repeated by Calvin, that the Old Testament law can have no direct meaning for us as a rule of conduct remains in principle true" (p. 122).

The same logical inconsistency, traceable again to a divided interest in objective justice and sectarian polemic, can be found in more particular details. Throughout the work the author is much exercised to defend personal freedom against the modern menace of the totalitarian state in any of its forms. That defense is found in the order of justice established by the natural law. The rights of men, their personal freedom, are ordained by the law of nature—"cuique suum"—by the divine order of creation. "The idea of justice and the concept of a divine law of justice are one and the same thing" (p. 46). There is a "superhuman, supreme or ultimate tribunal," "a standard which transcends all human laws, contracts, customs and usages, a standard by which all these human standards are measured" (*ibid.*). In the present conflict with the palpable injustice of the totalitarian state, man's only hope is this idea of the law of nature, since by it alone can the rights of man be vindicated. Men have the right "to resist a political power which has degenerated into tyranny" (p. 94).

Yet with dismaying insouciance he destroys this bulwark of liberty with the Reformers' doctrine of the relationship between natural law and the positive law of the state. "If, as was fully the case in the medieval world, the 'law of nature' implies that a law of the state must not be obeyed if it conflicts with the law of nature, and hence is unjust, the law of nature means an intolerable menace to the system of positive law. . . . No state law can tolerate a competition of this kind presented by a second legal system. . . . That is the point at which the Reformers diverged most widely from the view of medieval Catholicism. They took their stand clearly on the side of positive law, only granting to the law of nature the function of a criterion" (p. 93).

The illogical retreat from his original philosophic view of the supremacy of the natural law is a disservice to the cause of justice for which he stands.

Weston College

WILLIAM F. DRUMMOND, S.J.

L'EXÉGÈSE DE S. AUGUSTIN PRÉDICATEUR. By Maurice Pontet. Paris: Aubier, 1944. Pp. 636.

This book is warmly recommended to Scripture scholars. It is, as one may gather from the title, an important chapter in the history of Catholic exegesis. Catholic exegesis has a long history, both before and after St. Augustine. Yet his exegetical methods and principles, no less than his theological doctrines, ruled the West for a thousand years.

Père Pontet, a French preacher of renown, limits his book to St. Augustine "prédicateur." He distinguishes three classes in the exegetical writings of St. Augustine that have come down to us: (a) private notes (e.g., *Adnotationes in Job*), which were not meant to be preached or published; (b) theoretical and practical treatises on exegesis (e.g., *De doctrina christiana*); (c) actual sermons, including the *Enarrationes in Psalmos* and the *Tractatus in Joannem*. It is the last class that the author has chiefly in mind.

In the Introduction (pp. 1-30), Père Pontet gives us a brief but scholarly account of the genuinity, the dates, and the transmission of the sermons, and then outlines the problem he set himself. To St. Augustine, as to the Fathers generally, to preach meant to explain Scripture. How, then, does St. Augustine handle the Scripture text on which his sermon is based? Does he have a general method, and if so, how faithfully does he adhere to it? How much of his method is traditional, and how much his own? Among the thousands of texts interpreted, can we discern leading ideas, lasting discoveries?

Apart from the Introduction, the book consists of three parts: *Milieu et influences* (pp. 35-253), *Principes généraux d'exégèse* (pp. 255-384), *Les*

oeuvres matresses (pp. 387-580). There is no general index, but there are indexes of proper names, of Scripture texts, and of symbols. The bibliography (pp. 611-32), though not complete, is ample and up-to-date. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Pierre de Labriolle, who died in 1940; to H. I. Marrou, who published a work on a kindred subject; and above all to the professors of the scholasticate at Fourvière near Lyons; in fact, the book is the seventh of a series published under the direction of its theological faculty.

I shall not delay on the first part, where the author describes St. Augustine the preacher: his preparation and delivery, his varied audience, his success, etc. Though interesting, inasmuch as they reveal the Saint's holiness, charity, and fascination, yet these pages touch only the psychological background of his exegesis.

The second part outlines the general principles of St. Augustine's exegesis. Scientific exegesis was only then a-borning with St. Jerome at Bethlehem. St. Augustine indeed enunciated many principles of textual, literary, and historical criticism that have stood the test of time; yet he himself often neglected them or at least was not consistent in their application. One principle, by no means proper to St. Augustine, is that Scripture is obscure, a *sacramentum*, a mystery, because it reveals to us God who dwells in light inaccessible. Furthermore, in giving us the Scripture, God wanted us not merely to skim over its pages, but to ponder and meditate, to search for its hidden meaning; if Scripture were easy, it would become trite.

In connection with the obscurity of Scripture, the question is broached whether St. Augustine held a multiplicity of literal senses in Scripture. The author answers in the negative. St. Augustine based his exegesis on this principle, which he learned from St. Ambrose: "Littera occidit, spiritus vivificat" (II Cor. 3:6). Where St. Augustine allows several meanings of the same text, he refers to the spiritual sense: personal applications, possible orthodox interpretations of an obscure text, symbolical or mystical references to other parts of Scripture, to Christ and the Church. It is thus that Scripture becomes "spirit and life" (John 6:63). In overstressing the literal sense and its unicity, we moderns detract from the excellence of Scripture; we lose that wealth of symbolical and allegorical interpretation which characterizes the Augustinian and Thomistic tradition. Is not this also the mind of Leo XIII and Pius XII, both of whom urge Scripture scholars and preachers not to neglect the theological and the spiritual sense?

One supreme rule of Augustinian exegesis is that Scripture is to be explained by itself. Like the Fathers before him generally, St. Augustine sees no need of going outside of Scripture for its interpretation; rather, its various passages, words, names, symbols, figures, etc., are to be compared with one

another as they occur and wherever they occur. After all, the whole of Scripture is God's word, and its books are the only ones that God has given us. With this idea in mind, St. Augustine could dispense with most of the questions treated at length in our modern introductions.

Part of chapter five is devoted to St. Augustine's interpretation of the titles of the Psalms, of proper names, and of numbers (pp. 272-304). To his mind, they are all *sacramenta*, whose hidden meaning will reveal itself only to pious meditation. Each title contains the clue for the right understanding of the Psalm, and both titles and Psalms are the prophetic announcement and spiritual preparation of the Incarnation. The proper names also hide a deeper meaning, but St. Augustine, who knew no Hebrew, had to rely on earlier translations to discover it. His predilection for finding a spiritual sense in every number is well known. All the numbers which St. Augustine explained to his own satisfaction are examined by the author—not always in the same way or with the same application.

It is impossible in a brief review to give an idea of the wealth of information, the thoroughness of discussion, the sureness of touch that characterize the book. Père Pontet sidesteps none of the problems traditionally connected with St. Augustine's exegesis, and exhibits unusual competency in coming to a definite answer.

There are just a few minor points, pertaining to the presentation of the matter, which did not meet with the approval of this reviewer. First, I doubt if there is a single page without at least one misprint. Then, too, more headings and subheadings distributed through the book would be a great help to the reader; since each of the eleven chapters, though preceded by a brief summary, runs to some fifty pages, an occasional break would be a relief. Finally, throughout the book, the footnotes occupy half of each page, sometimes a little less, often more. Though scholars differ in theory and practice on what should go into footnotes, yet it seems to me that too much of the matter has been relegated to that inferior position. Should not the most characteristic sayings couched in St. Augustine's own inimitable Latin have been placed in the text? Nevertheless, I can honestly say: "Tolle, lege."

Weston College

A. C. COTTER, S. J.

AUGUSTINE'S QUEST OF WISDOM: LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE BISHOP OF HIPPO. By Vernon J. Bourke. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1945. Pp. xi + 323. \$3.00.

In the fifteen centuries which have elapsed since the death of St. Augustine, Christian life and institutions have passed through great and convulsive changes. Yet all these centuries have used his writings for

instruction, meditation, and consolation. And neither his influence nor his reputation has diminished. Quite the contrary. Not only is it true, according to a celebrated remark, that Augustine is one of the men who have most honored mankind, but also he is one of the men who will always be most intimately present in the history of Western civilization.

But precisely because Augustine's writings are such a Christian treasure, many have distilled from them an essence which is labeled *Augustinian* or *Augustinianism*. The life of Augustine is generally lost behind our recollections of a doctrinal Augustinian synthesis. It is, of course, the lot of great men not only that they should shape history, but also that history should shape them. And history has shaped Augustine, drawing on him and using him according to the particular urgencies of this or that age. In any case, it remains a fact that the life of Augustine after the writing of the *Confessions* is, for the most part, a story lost in administration and controversy. That is why an account of that life is never out of place—particularly when it is written by a patient student in language which without sacrificing truth to popularization remains quite readable.

Dr. Bourke has observed what seems to me to be one of the important requirements of any biographer of Augustine: to write quietly, almost unobtrusively; he has tried, not to match the intensity and depth of that life with any tricks of rhetoric, but rather to express that life with the subdued undertones of one who hopes to catch its magnificence only from a distance. And, in truth, what can any historian of Augustine do but describe that great lover of God with the embarrassed recognition of all that separates the description from the reality?

The central thread of Dr. Bourke's book is the story of Augustine the lover of divine wisdom. We can follow that story not only across the changing scenes of Augustine's life—Carthage, Rome, Milan, Cassiciacum, Tagaste, Hippo—but also in the unfolding of Augustine's life—from pride to humility, from materialism to truth, from sin to servitude to the liberty of the sons of God—and in Augustine the writer and the controversialist—from the early dialogues in the famous retreat of the year 386, across the controversial treatises of Augustine the Bishop to that last period, called by Dr. Bourke the mature mind of Augustine, represented by the *De Trinitate*, the *De Genesi ad litteram* and the *De civitate Dei*.

No one can pretend that it was an easy task to weave into one story of a little over three hundred pages an account of Augustine's career as an intensely active churchman, a voluminous and indefatigable writer, a Christian thinker of extraordinary complexity. Dr. Bourke might have written a strictly factual biography of Augustine's life as an administrator, or a

literary history of his works, or an examination of his thought. He rather undertook to give a record of the life and thought of Augustine in which we find, sometimes with quite understandable rapidity, sketches of his fundamental ideas and writings as seen against the busy background of his very active career. Everything considered, I believe that Dr. Bourke has achieved a good measure of success in the presence of so imposing an enterprise. He has a substantial acquaintance with the literature of his subject and is in close touch with his sources; he has considerable understanding of, and sympathy for, St. Augustine; his judgments are moderate and balanced. There are, to be sure, minor lapses, which earlier reviewers have already noticed. For my part, I would have wished to see the biography much larger as well as a more substantial doctrinal analysis. But that is to wish, not so much for a bigger or a better book, as for a different book—in fact two different books. Dr. Bourke set himself the task of writing a brief biography of Augustine for a large general audience, not an erudite work for professors.

There would seem to be no need for insisting on the fact that *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom* is a biographical work. Yet, in his recent review of the book (*Speculum*, XXI [1946], pp. 360–61), Mr. Emanuel Chapman insists on being dissatisfied. He agrees that scholarship and good popularization can go hand in hand, but seems to think that, though both are present in Dr. Bourke's book, they do not go together. His reasons are remarkable. He objects to a chronological method of treating Augustine's works in a book which sets out to be a biography. Nor does he like Dr. Bourke's method of summarizing Augustine; he prefers what he calls a dialectical analysis of Augustine's works. Nevertheless, it is a patent fact that chronology and the literary device of summarizing important works are the standard tools of the biographer and the historian. Mr. Chapman forces us to wonder whether he is thinking of an abstraction called Augustinianism or of a man called Augustine.

Now, a review of a book written by Dr. Bourke should not be the occasion for discussing someone else's ideas. Yet it is a fact that Mr. Chapman's complaints raise the whole question as to how a biography of St. Augustine is to be written. This is particularly true when Mr. Chapman argues that Dr. Bourke should have given a philosophical appreciation of Augustinian mysticism. I hope that Mr. Chapman is not serious. There are too many philosophers who try to understand extraphilosophical realities by means of philosophical tools. Whether he knows it or not, Mr. Chapman is complaining that Dr. Bourke did not philosophize the religious texture of Augustine's thought out of existence. In the presence of Augustine, it is

better to be shy with Dr. Bourke than to disfigure life by trying to reproduce it conceptually. Had Mr. Chapman contented himself with saying that, measured by the exalted yardstick of the *Confessions*, any biographer of Augustine is at a distinct disadvantage, he would have had truth on his side, and Dr. Bourke would unquestionably have agreed with him. But the great reality of Augustine's contemplative life cannot be reproduced on any philosophical canvas or by any philosophical tools. If we wish to see the Augustine of history in all his trembling and overpowering love of God, we must look at a man and not at a doctrine; and when we look at the man Augustine, we must see from a distance—the distance which separated Jacob from Rachel.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto

ANTON C. PEGIS

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF HUGH OF SAINT VICTOR. By John P. Kleinz, M.A. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944. Pp. xv + 147. \$2.00.

Until recent times it had become an accepted procedure in historical writing on the twelfth century to describe the School of St. Victor as mystical and then to dismiss it as inimical to rational inquiry and natural science. The admirable researches of European scholars during the last five decades, however, have supplied the corrective. Thus they call for a new appreciation of the nature of Victorine thought and its importance for the history of medieval thought. Father Kleinz's doctoral dissertation may be regarded as a not inconsiderable contribution to this movement of reevaluation. This first adequate account of the theory of knowledge of Hugh of St. Victor is given in seven informative and well-documented chapters. The term "theory of knowledge" is to be taken in its ancient Scholastic meaning rather than in the modern critical sense.

In his introductory approach, Father Kleinz employs the findings of recent research to situate Hugh with regard to the problem of reason and revelation. While not going so far as Kilgenstein and claiming that Hugh reached a complete solution, Father Kleinz regards Hugh's solution of this central problem of Scholasticism as being in essence what St. Thomas developed so accurately and satisfactorily. He further indicates the real influence which this solution exerted on the general movement towards a separate science of philosophy and on the history of Scholastic method.

Hugh of St. Victor is to be seen in his works as the Christian Platonist writing under the inspiration of St. Augustine. He rears his theory of knowledge on the Augustinian hierarchy of being—world, soul, and God. Nevertheless, though body and soul are conceived in the Platonic manner as dis-

parate entities, sense knowledge is analysed and the sense-object studied more in the manner of Aristotle than of Plato. With regard to the greatly agitated question of universals, Hugh seems not to have heeded its crying demand for settlement; yet, to the extent that he did commit himself to a position, it was in the direction of the Aristotelian solution of moderate realism. When he accepts the traditional distinction of intelligence and reason, it is a Platonic *intelligentia* that he would superimpose on a *ratio* which is both Augustinian and Aristotelian in character. Again, whereas his division of philosophy is fundamentally that of Aristotle—theoretical, practical, logical, and mechanical—it is strongly colored with the Augustinian distinction of science and wisdom. Thus is seen the generally eclectic character of Hugh's theory of knowledge.

On the other hand, in his use of the *Lichtmetaphysik* and the theory of illumination, Hugh does not reproduce St. Augustine so much as he anticipates St. Thomas: reason is the natural inner light of the soul, and direct illumination of the intellect is necessary only for mystical knowledge on the plane of contemplation.

At bottom, Hugh's theory of knowledge is that of a follower of Plato and St. Augustine, but in his writings one observes a definite entrance of Aristotelian concepts into medieval philosophy. Father Kleinz clearly indicates the transitional nature of the Victorine's theory of knowledge and exhibits a fine historical sense in laying down the boundaries of his own position as against many extreme opinions relative to Hugh of St. Victor. For this reason, the present work is invaluable as a contribution to a more intensive knowledge of the history of twelfth-century thought. Furthermore, it is quite in the scholarly tradition of Clement Baumker, Martin Grabmann, Ludwig Baur, and other modern Scholastic historians.

Weston College

WILLIAM F. FINNERAN, S. J.

LES ÉTAPES DE RÉDACTION DES EXERCICES DE S. IGNACE. By H. Pinard de la Boullaye, S. J. Paris: Beauchesne et Fils, 1945. Pp. vii + 68. 39 fr.

EXERCICES SPIRITUELS SELON LA MÉTHODE DE S. IGNACE: By H. Pinard de la Boullaye, S. J. Paris: Beauchesne et Fils, 1944. Tome I: LES EXERCICES DE S. IGNACE. Pp. xxviii + 314. 102 frs. Tome II: RETRAITES. Pp. vii + 361. 123 fr.

In his dense brochure on the various stages of the textual evolution of the *Spiritual Exercises*, Père Pinard has faced a problem that only the most penetrating scholarship and patient devotion were equal to. Père Pinard's scholarship is well known, and his filial devotion eases the sometimes arid

reading his pages make, but it must be said that his conclusions will not please all.

The first draft of the *Exercises* had been finished when St. Ignatius left Manresa in February, 1523; the final and definitive redaction was formally approved by Paul III in 1548. Between those two dates there took place a textual evolution that had its roots in St. Ignatius' varied personal experiences, his wider dealings with souls, his illuminations from on high, and his formal theological studies. Can we reconstruct the various stadia of the text from 1523 to 1548?

It is a problem that is not merely antiquarian but practical too, for if we could discern the growth of the text, we would be better able to assess emphases, importance, meaning. But it is no facile problem, Père Pinard confesses, and one feels that he would be content, if not to solve, at least to clarify the problem. According to the author, the reasons for this difficulty are twofold. First, the suppleness or the simplicity of the primitive Manresan redaction of the *Exercises* would permit the subsequent introduction of material which we today judge to be key-pieces in the structure of the *Exercises*. Therefore, the mere fact that a meditation fits tightly into the logical progression of the whole *Exercises* does not prove, by itself alone, that that meditation belongs to the primitive redaction. Secondly, the presence in a given meditation of Scholastic terms, scripture references, and the like, which might argue a provenience from St. Ignatius' academic days, need not prove more than that the phrase itself, not the meditation in which it is inserted, is late in origin.

The critical norms which Père Pinard appeals to in order to arrive at his "conclusions tantôt vraisemblables, tantôt sérieusement probables ou bien proches de la certitude" (p. 3), are the following: St. Ignatius' self-testimony in his *Autobiography*, the evidence of his early companions, the differing psychological complexion of the Saint at the various stages of his life, and a careful scrutiny of the text of the *Exercises* with a comparative study of all the different extant texts and copies. Not all of these criteria admit of easy handling; the last two surely evoke a reserve in the reader.

The crux of the whole problem is this: When St. Ignatius left Manresa in 1523, what was the content of the primitive redaction of the *Exercises* that he took with him? Laynez wrote that at Manresa the *Exercises* were substantially ("cuanto á la sustancia") already in existence. Père Pinard is prepared to admit that the substance of the *Exercises* at Manresa constituted a much more rudimentary spiritual document than would, for instance, Codina, the editor of the *Monumenta* edition of the *Exercises*. Thus,

he defends as later accessions (1528-35), whether in whole or in part, the Foundation, the Three Classes, the Three Degrees of Humility, and the Contemplation on Love. In this matter Leturia ("Génesis de los Ejercicios de s. Ignacio y su influjo en la fundación de la Compañía de Jesús," *AHSI*, X [1941], 16-59) adopts a position that lies rather nearer Pinard than Codina. Yet the evidence at hand does not seem to permit such a confident determination of the Manresan *Exercises* as Pinard makes, and surely Codina's argumentation in favor of the more conservative view is, though doubtless less subtle, impressive. Dudon (*Saint Ignace de Loyola*, Paris, 1934, pp. 277-8) thinks that the elements of evidence are lacking which would permit us to translate Laynez' vague word "substance" into any very detailed notation. When confronted with this solid disclaimer of Dudon's, perhaps some will find Pinard's construction somewhat *livresque*.

Then too, is not the problem complicated by the fact that Ignatius was never an experienced writer, and that therefore the use of internal criticism is made the more treacherous? Finally, it is useful to recall that the *Exercises* are not a book in the routine sense of the word; that they are meant primarily for the director rather than for the exercitant; that they are subject to the constant adaptation of the director; that there is, and always has been, a living oral tradition that has its place in the use and the interpretation of the *Exercises*. These considerations make a difficult problem so much the more difficult.

One who is willing to give this book that patient reading which it deserves and to follow the argument with the *Monumenta* text of the *Exercises* at hand, will find his task most rewarding in a knowledge of the *Exercises* that is the deeper and the surer.

In the volumes entitled *Les Exercices de s. Ignace*, Père Pinard aims to help those retreat directors who face the difficult task of adapting the *Exercises* to classes of exercitants quite unlike the exercitant primarily envisaged by St. Ignatius in his thirty-day retreat. The author is thinking chiefly of exercitants who, like religious, are already living a high and vigorous spiritual life, but who, if confronted with the same truths in the same guise over and over again, may experience a certain tonelessness and ennui. In such cases, what adaptations of the *Exercises* are legitimate and useful? To this end Père Pinard proposes a series of studies calculated to present the master ideas, the key-pieces of the *Exercises*, and to point out the internal logic which links up and gives finality to these master ideas. This manual is meant to equip the retreat master with a sound exegesis of the text of the *Exercises* and thus to enable him, whenever he chooses to depart

from the text itself, to make an adaptation that is both skilful and faithful to the spirit of the original. Thus we have here a study that is neither an interlinear commentary nor yet a mere series of detached essays. The author treats of all the main meditations; and there are shorter notices on the various rules, the two examens, the additions and the annotations, and the six methods of prayer.

From all this plenty we shall select a few points for comment. In the Foundation, Père Pinard's discussion of the end of creation suffers from the same ambiguity which characterizes his article "Création" in the *DTC*. It is true that one can single out formulae which are quite adequate, but it is equally true that other statements on the same matter are less so. Surely it is wrong, and so spiritually prejudicial, to speak of God as the *finis cui* of creation. As Père Pinard says, God creates purely to give and not to get. How then can He be in any sense the end to whom any profit accrues? Indeed, it is God's gifts to us that precisely constitute His glory. But if there is any suggestion that God in creating is seeking some return from His creature, no matter how attenuated that return may be conceived to be, then that is wrong and a disservice to spirituality. Further, it is dubious whether the Foundation is meant to be as sharply focused on practical resolutions as Père Pinard makes it out to be. Can it not be argued that the Foundation is a spiritual document meant primarily to instruct, to inform, to provoke a dynamic act of faith in the divinely constituted order of things, in that great circular movement of all things out from God and back to God, the Alpha and the Omega?

With regard to the meditations on the Kingdom and the Two Standards Père Pinard has muted their apostolic tonality beyond measure. To say that emphasis on the apostolic life in the meditation on the Two Standards is an "à-côté" (p. 160), or that the idea of the apostolate plays only "une part restreinte" (p. 138) in the *Exercices*, is surely equivalent to shifting in some degree the axis of Ignatian spirituality. It is true to say that Ignatius envisaged his exercitant as being free to choose a way of life other than the active apostolate, but it is also true that his ideal exercitant was a gifted man, as yet free to elect a way of life, but a likely candidate for the apostolic life. And surely Ignatius meant to temper all his exercitants with an apostolic spirit, even those who do not elect that way of life. Nadal says that at Manresa God led Ignatius to devote himself wholly to the divine glory and to the good of souls, "quam rem Ignatius duobus exercitiis, regis et vexillorum, maxime intellexit" (cited by A. Codina from an unpublished manuscript in *Beiträge zur Geschichte und zu einzelnen Teilen de Exerzitienbuches* [Rauch, 1925], p. 38). Again, when Père Pinard discusses the reasons

which led St. Ignatius to present Christ under the image of a King, he does not reckon sufficiently with the possibility that the image was chosen precisely because it is an apostolic challenge proffered to those who are willing to share as instruments in the self-annihilating work of realizing the catholicity of Christ's Kingdom.

These strictures must not lead one to believe that the book is unrewarding. It is always easier to rehearse a few defects than to notice the many high merits of a work, and in this instance the merits are many and high. The book is the work of a penetrating and discerning scholar, with wide reading and experience, who is able to present his convictions with force and charm. To all who love the *Exercises* here is a work that will be read with real profit, and if in some instances the reader chooses to part from the author, he will only be confronting the work with that same critical independence that Père Pinard wears so well.

The volume entitled *Retraites* offers some specimens of the adaptation of the *Exercises*.

Weston College

FRANCIS X. LAWLOR, S. J.

THE NEW MODERNISM. By Cornelius Van Til. Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, Philadelphia. Pp. x + 384. \$3.75.

This book enjoys the sub-title, *An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner*. In it Dr. Van Til, Professor of Apologetics, at Westminster Theological Seminary, presents a searching study and an energetic critique of the dialectical theologians. To the extent that one may judge from outside, this work appears to be of capital importance in the movement of the Calvinistic restoration. It is, to be sure, of the strictly confessional type, hardly conducing to the union of Churches fostered by the agency of the World Council of "Ecumenical Fellowship."

Admittedly polemical in tone and method, the book would rally the forces of the Calvinistic persuasion and under its leadership the forces of evangelical Christianity against what is termed the new enemy, the theology of crisis; an enemy the more dangerous because it offers the hand of friendship—a veritable fifth column in orthodox Protestant circles. An exposition of the real nature of the dialectical theology would reveal it as an essentially modern rather than an orthodox theology. A modern theology is to be understood as a theology which "like modern critical and dialectical philosophy seeks to be activist and anti-metaphysical at all costs." An activist theology considers God as wholly absorbed in the activity of His manifestation.

Dr. Van Til chooses to study the dialectical theology in the light of a

broad philosophical background and would make evident to what extent Karl Barth and Emil Brunner have been influenced in the construction of their doctrine of revelation by the modern forms of epistemological theory. His scrutiny of this aspect of modern philosophy as issuing from the criticism of Kant is commendable for an uncommon clarity and interest of presentation. Modern philosophy is to be differentiated from previous philosophy by the measure of consistency with which it has placed the consciousness of man not merely at the center but at the base of all that it affirms of being and knowledge: that only has being, that only is rational, which is dependent on the configurations of the human mind. The thing-in-itself is replaced by the thing as shaped in thought, and truth-in-itself has been supplanted by truth as man regards it. For the author, all post-Kantian philosophy is at bottom phenomenistic and positivistic.

More significant, however, is the author's judgment against modern Protestant theology. Schleiermacher, in his application of the critical principle of Kantianism to theology, reduced all the doctrines of Christianity from constitutive to limiting concepts. Thenceforth, in the history of human error, no greater intellectual chaos is to be encountered than that consequent on the retention of orthodox Christian formulations by a purely positivistic theology. In its turn, the theology of dialecticism, or the theology of crisis, is to be judged in all its basic aspects as a more phenomenistic and a more consistent expression of the critical principle of knowledge. In the writings of Barth and Brunner, the distinctions of Christian teaching are reduced from constitutive to limiting concepts. Thus, to Dr. Van Til, the consequence of this reduction is an enigmatic idealism that binds the terminology of genuine Christian thought to the service of non-Christian concepts.

On the theological side of his analysis of the voluminous output of Barth and Brunner, Dr. Van Til's ultimate point of reference is the doctrine of causal or temporal creation. How this is understood and employed as the principle of his attack is discovered in the statement that "belief in temporal creation is the concomitant of belief in the self-complete ontological trinity. The two stand or fall together" (p. 5). One recognizes here the position of Wyclif, adopted by Luther and Calvin. Whereas the author regards Protestant orthodoxy as alone possessing the true Creator-creature relationship, dialectical theology, in virtue of its rejection of temporal creation, is to be bracketed with modern Protestantism. He would, in addition, situate the Catholic doctrine, and finds it to be inconsistent, inasmuch as it sides with orthodoxy in its doctrine of faith and with modern Protestantism in its doctrine of reason; furthermore, the idea of potentiality in Catholic

Aristotelianism offers a point of contact with the underlying philosophy of dialecticism.

On its philosophical side, *The New Modernism* asserts that the critical principle has been operative in the theology of crisis from the beginning; despite all development and movement during the twenty-five years since the publication of Barth's first *Epistle to the Romans*, the thought of both Barth and Brunner has been consistently informed and controlled by the critical principle under four different aspects. The limiting concept of the criticism of Kant, Overbeck's notion of primal history deriving from Kant, the "individual" in the dialecticism of Kierkegaard, and the idea of "existence" in the existentialism of Martin Heidegger are indicated as the tell-tale marks of the curse of modernity in theology and most especially in the theology of crisis.

In thus directing his attention to these four aspects, Dr. Van Til passes over other important factors in the evolution of the dialectical theology, such as Platonism, Neoplatonism and Origenism in Barth's early period. However, a masterful display of disputation, the limiting concept, and the notion of primal history are indeed to be seen in *The New Modernism*, as exerting now a conspicuous, and again a latent, influence in the Barthian theology. The position of Brunner, in the period following his quarrel with Barth, does not appear to this reviewer susceptible of the same indictment. For, though one cannot as yet discern with any satisfactory clarity their rational grounds, the more recent writings of Emil Brunner are notable for an advocacy of some sort of natural theology and an ethic divorced from criticism.

It must be mentioned, merely by way of parenthesis, that, in his study, Dr. Van Til appears to avail himself of a practice also discernible in the *Institutes* of John Calvin. Where the *Institutes* affirm tenets consistent with Catholic orthodoxy, they follow the Councils and the Fathers or, as the case requires, common sense and experience, while professing sole reliance on the Bible. In a similar way, where *The New Modernism* prepares the epistemological basis for its criticism of the dialectical theology, it depends in fact on the philosophical premises of the moderate realism of Scholasticism and the contemned Aristotle, while indicating the "old metaphysic" of Calvin and the Westminster divines as its real support.

However, as is to be expected of the consistent Calvinist, in stating his ultimate doctrine of reason, the author abandons in mid-route the path of moderate realism to shift to the essential fideism of the "old metaphysic." Thus he would set at the same dead level with the absolute and immanentist autonomy of Kant and Hegel the relative and realist independence of Aristotle and Aquinas. To equate "pure thought," claiming to be the

originative source of the real, and the limited, though real, power allowed the individual created intelligence in the whole Christian tradition, where being holds the primacy over human thought, is to operate in a philosophical vacuum. That Dr. Van Til does scant justice to his own thinking and thus empties the history of philosophy of all significance is evident in his several references to the Catholic doctrine of reason, but more emphatically in his detailed treatment of Kierkegaard. Whatever be the limitations of Kierkegaard's thought, it is poles apart from the modern notion of the autonomous man; indeed, it would appear at moments as too fideist to give proper place to the speculative philosopher. Karl Barth himself revealed his own original misinterpretation of Kierkegaard, when he cast him off as being essentially Catholic.

In the course of his study, the author does not undertake a detailed discussion of Calvin's views, but confines himself to the judgment that any attempt to find similarities between the theology of Calvin and the theology of dialecticism will need to be limited to a similarity of words rather than of meaning. To this judgment one can only refuse assent. For the theology of dialecticism is the classic circle—the closed movement returning upon itself—and its dominant note is Calvin's—the exclusiveness of the glory of God—transcendence forced to paradox. To be sure, no religious system claiming the lineage of historic Christianity should be characterized as dependent on the critical principle for its ultimate metaphysical justification; to assert this gratuitously would be a great impertinence. Yet, with due respect to Dr. Van Til's religious sincerity and manifest scholarship, it is herewith submitted that the Calvinism he would restore appears so constituted in its main tenets as to require the critical philosophy as its rational substructure.

Now, in his appraisal of the theology of dialecticism, the author esteems as an all-determining criterion of orthodoxy "the doctrine of temporal creation as the concomitant of belief in the self-complete ontological trinity." This dogma of Calvinism involves the following concepts in irreducible paradox: necessity against freedom; eternal necessity against temporal production; a self-complete Being against a necessary manifestation of glory extrinsic to It. In view of such antinomies, on what grounds are these concepts constitutive rather than limiting? Is it that the reality is inherently ineffable, whereas the formula represents only knowledge *for us*, only being *for us*? It seems that the truth-in-itself is supplanted completely by truth as man regards it, and, in this instance, because both the absolutely ultimate end of creation and what is corollary to that end are ignored in the system of Calvin.

Granting Dr. Van Til's statement that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was not to be found at the Synod of Dort, one is bound to think that there was present there, with his own idea of what was being *for him* and what was knowledge *for him*, the autonomous man, who was to wait more than one-hundred and sixty years, until 1781, for the epistemological framework of his religious dogmas. Calvin's master-thought, the key-stone in the arch—the doctrine of election, be it supralapsarian or infralapsarian—is conceptually consistent with the whole of his system only through an application of the critical apparatus. In eternity, all effects lie folded up, as it were, in the First Cause; in the temporal process, they issue with inexorable necessity, not as distinct acts of secondary agency, but as mere manifestations of an eternal energy; and in the case of human action, not as in any respect owing to free-will choosing its own course. In this instance, Overbeck's notion of primal history would appear necessary for ultimate consistency of formulation. In accordance with this teaching, to appeal to man's moral sense, to discourse on morality, to expect man to act as a true second cause, is to think in terms of limiting concepts—being for us, knowledge for us. In his own times, Calvin found a way of escape from the moral dilemma inflicted on him by his doctrine of the divine ordination of evil in a distinction of two wills in the divine nature: the one public or apparent, which commanded good and forbade evil, as the Scriptures teach; the other just but secret and unsearchable, predetermining that Adam and all the reprobate should fall into sin and perish. How is the contemporary Calvinist to surmount the paradox, if not in terms of the critical position, the limiting concept?

Hence, at the conclusion of Dr. Van Til's polemic, one is able to discern between the theology of crisis proposed by Barth and Brunner and the theology of Calvin, not basic antitheses, but modal shades of diversity. In the former, a vertiginous complexity of thought dissolves internally into a metaphysical nihilism; in the latter, a crudely constructed system of dogmas shatters under the hammer of reason into miscellaneous metaphysical riddles. For the dialectical theology, the critical philosophy furnishes the ultimate interpretative principle of transcendence; for the theology of Calvin, blind abandonment to a dogmatism constituted fifteen centuries after the close of public revelation becomes the alternative escape from the consequences of the uncompromising formulae of the Reformer. As Calvinism returns to its original dogmatism, it encounters an illogical situation which it can evade only by resorting to the critical philosophy or by declaring itself to be beyond the judgment of reason. It is either immanence, carried to such an extent that man is God, or transcendence,

doomed of its very nature to encounter in solitude the utterly "unknown"; either absorption in God or despair of God.

On the plane of doctrine, this criticism is less than conciliatory; but at the intellectual level, Dr. Van Til would not have it otherwise. By way of completing the outline of his argument for Calvinism, the author considers in several pages the Catholic teaching on the divine transcendence. Beyond the prefatory remark that he confirms his position on the basis of Erich Przywara's *Polarity*, the writer offers no rational ground for the statement that the Catholic doctrine of *analogia entis* combines the pantheistic notion of the identity of God and man with the deistic concept of the absolute separation of man from God. To account for this enigma, this reviewer suggests in the first place that the author confuses St. Thomas' proof for the existence of God and his doctrine of *analogia entis* with Father Przywara's attempt to construct, on the basis of the doctrine of *analogia entis*, a criteriological prolegomenon to a critical metaphysic of the creature. This original and complex theory not only awaits another volume for its complete expression but even in its present stage of development is unacceptable to many of the Catholic philosophers who claim an understanding of its meaning. In any case, the common doctrine of *analogia entis* is in no way prejudiced by Przywara's thought, but is preliminary to it.

In the next place, when Dr. Van Til objects that the doctrine of *analogia entis* "works in practice with an abstract idea of essence and an equally abstract idea of being" (p. 271), he echoes Karl Barth's protest that the God known through the analogy of being would be merely an abstraction. This objection leads one to think that the author does not know the nature of the proof for God's existence proposed by St. Thomas and his commentators or, at least, that he fails to estimate the force of the proof from causality. For, as concrete and real as created things are in their manner of being, just so concrete and real in His mode of being must be the Creator, whose existence is cognized through creatures according to the law of causality.

It is truly remarkable to what extent Dr. Van Til and the dialectical theologians, despite their rejection of the analogy of being, stand in need of it, and how it becomes, as Barth proposes it, an analogy of faith, an analogy resting entirely on belief. So long as the dialectical and Calvinistic theologies continue to discourse most especially of God and His attributes, they must do so in concepts which are presented to them in human language. Yet concepts so derived can be employed about the Divinity, neither with the same meaning, nor in a wholly dissimilar meaning, but only with an analogous signification. Thus, Barth himself confesses that "one is left no other option than ultimate recourse to these ideas" (*Kirchliche Dogmatik*,

II¹, p. 254); but he would free them from the "danger that lurks in the analogy"; hence God allows and commands their employment and communicates the truth to them which is not proper to themselves (*ibid.*).

In striving for a finished analysis of this doctrinal *impasse*, Catholic philosophers and theologians are spared considerable bewilderment once they have recognized the true ground of this Protestant opposition to the doctrine of the natural knowledge of God and the analogy of being. For the point of departure of Barth's assault and of Dr. Van Til's objections to "natural metaphysics of the human mind" is discerned, not in technical difficulties with the demonstration itself, but in their refusal to acknowledge a natural and a supernatural order of being and hence of knowledge. The statement of Father Denifle: "So long as he lived, Luther had no idea of the supernatural" (*Luther und Luthertum*, p. 601), is with equal justice affirmable of Calvin in his *Institutes*. Indeed, Barth epitomizes the attitude of contemporary Reformed theology when he asserts that "the vitality of natural theology is the vitality of man as such" (*Kirchliche Dogmatik*, II¹, p. 185); in Barthian language, this means the vitality of man in darkness and depravity. In his own dogmatic position, Dr. Van Til allows for no possible apodictic demonstration of God's existence; for him, any true Christian apologetic assumes God's existence without rational proof.

The general impression of the whole of this volume is that of an energetic and sincere attempt to organize the forces of evangelical Protestantism once again under the rallying cry, "Sola fides." In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this expression ruptured the unity of the Church in the West and, by reason of the disintegrating factors proper to fideism, failed to bind its own partisans among themselves. Will the many who would hearken to this watchword, now that the circle has gone full turn, have a hope of success in union? Or must it be affirmed with Tertullian, "Schisma... est ipsa unitas"?

Weston College

WILLIAM F. FINNERAN S. J.

CHRISTIANITY RIGHTLY SO CALLED. By Samuel G. Craig. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1946. Pp. viii + 270. \$2.00.

This is a serious, thoughtful attempt to dispel the confusion that exists in the minds of many non-Catholics as to the meaning and essential content of Christianity.

With over two hundred religious bodies in the United States alone, all claiming to be the Church of Christ, with so much talk among Protestant leaders about unions, mergers, and amalgamations of churches, it is not

surprising if the ordinary layman is confused and concludes that the word Christian can stand for diametrically opposed doctrines, that it makes no difference what you believe so long as you call yourself a Christian. It is no answer to tell him, as the GI's were told, that the existence of so many Protestant denominations "makes for variety, but it also makes for vitality. While we Protestants admire the uniformity of the Roman Catholic Church, we believe that this is more than offset by our own freedom. . . . Every Protestant Church organized on a democratic basis can choose its own set of beliefs. This is democracy in religion" (Howard J. Chidley, *Do You Know?* [Boston, 1942], p. 8). What the GI wanted in religion was theology, a religion that speaks with the authority of God. This freedom to choose one's own beliefs produces anarchy, instead of vitality, in religion, as some Protestant divines are beginning to realize. Bernard Iddings Bell, for example, wrote recently: The Episcopal Church "is in a state of what to outsiders must seem continuous bickering. . . . The result is that within what is formally a single church there is disunity so real that schism seems frequently around the corner of next week. . . . *But neither the unchurched nor other Christians can too much fault the Episcopal Church for this sad state of affairs, because the Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, Dutch Reformed, Congregationalists, and the rest are internally in the same situation*" (*Atlantic Monthly*, CLXXVII [Jan. 1946], 56 f).

It was to do something to remedy this situation that *Christianity Rightly So Called* was written. Dr. Craig is of the opinion that it does make a difference what one believes, at least if he wishes to call himself a Christian. There are certain fundamental truths essential to Christianity, to deny which is to rob it of all meaning and authority. In the course of his experience as an editor for more than twenty-five years—first of *The Presbyterian* and later of *Christianity Today*—he became convinced "that nothing is doing more to make matters confused and confusing in the field of religious discussion than the fact that those engaged in it have radically different conceptions of what Christianity is" (p. v). Addressing himself to the man in the pew as well as to the man in the pulpit, in a popular, though none the less scholarly fashion, the author professes to prove, not the truth or value of Christianity, but its specific content or *essential* doctrines, by which it is to be distinguished from its counterfeits. His method is expository, not controversial; his style clear, though somewhat repetitious.

Admitting that there has never been such a multiplicity and diversity of definitions of Christianity as are given today, the author attributes this confusion, not to the Reformation of the sixteenth century, but to naturalism, which, since the eighteenth century, has succeeded in dividing Christians

into two opposing camps, the Liberals and Modernists on the one side, and the Fundamentalists on the other (ch. 1).

Some have tried to bring order out of this chaos by taking the highest common factor of what most Christians believe and labelling this the essence of Christianity. This method is wholly inadequate. It can give us only a minimum, not "normal, representative Christianity." To find out what Christianity is we must go back to what Christ and His apostles taught. However, since "there has been a fundamental type of Christianity that has remained essentially the same . . . there is no good reason why we should not take into consideration not only its primitive form but its whole historical manifestation in determining what Christianity is" (ch. 2).

A study, therefore, of the New Testament and later historical manifestations of Christianity will reveal, the author avers, "without fear of successful contradiction, (1) that Christianity is a religion that ascribes both its origin and its continuance to the (divine) Person known as Jesus Christ, (2) that it presents itself as a redemptive religion in the twofold sense that it offers salvation from both the guilt and the corruption of sin, and (3) that it is a religion that sets before its adherents ethical perfection as their goal" (p. 51). This is the essential content of Christianity. Its key-words are Incarnation, atonement, resurrection, regeneration, sanctification, and good works (ch. 3).

Subsequent chapters merely elaborate this theme in view of opposing conceptions. Christianity is essentially a religion of the supernatural. Naturalists and Rationalists, therefore, cannot claim to be Christian (ch. 4). It is a religion which rests upon facts which must be interpreted, not arbitrarily or by some "religious experience" or "inner light," but according to the interpretation given these facts by the biblical writers themselves (ch. 5). It has both an objective and a subjective aspect; it is dependent upon the Person and work of Jesus Christ, but requires co-operation on the part of man "in what is known as conversion and sanctification issuing in holy living." Liberals and Modernists therefore have no right to call themselves Christians, for they deny, by inference at least, that there is such a thing as objective Christianity. Antinomians also are ruled out because they so accentuate the redemptive work of Christ as to leave nothing for the Christian himself to do (ch. 6). Christianity necessarily involves a Christian code of morality, largely repudiated today because of the earlier rejection of fundamental Christian dogmas (ch. 7). The three concluding chapters are "Christianity and the Bible," "Deformations and Falsifications of Christianity," and "The Truth and Finality of Christianity."

Granting Dr. Craig's thesis that these doctrines are essential to Christianity, we ask ourselves, whom has he succeeded in eliminating from the ranks

of Christians rightly so called? Besides the adherents of Liberalism, Modernism, and Antinomianism, he excludes also those who profess "Rationalism and Mysticism (spelled with capital letters), Unitarianism, Christian Science, Unity and Russellism" (p. 252). That still leaves in the field a great number of Protestant sects, as well as the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Church. How account for the disparity in doctrine which separates these forms of Christianity? Simple, according to our author. Unlike the former which are falsifications, these are but deformations of Christianity. "Few things are more certain than that every confession of Christianity including our own is in some degree a deformed Christianity" (p. 237). Not a very enlightening conclusion, and, despite the author's protestation against doctrinal indifferentism, bound to discourage many from seeking the whole truth. Is this then the unity of faith which Christ prayed for at the Last Supper? Can all these deformations of Christianity constitute the one Body of Christ, the Church? Christ's promise, therefore, "of the Spirit who would guide His disciples into all truth" (p. 45), is still unfulfilled.

It is apparent that Dr. Craig has fallen into the very error which he charged against Harnack (p. 48), that of making his own version of the religion of Christ the touchstone by which to distinguish true from false Christianity. For, though his three fundamental doctrines belong to the essence of Christianity, he has not proven that they constitute its whole essence. Both the New Testament and "subsequent manifestations of Christianity" teach that other doctrines are necessary for salvation, for example, the reception of certain sacraments and belief "in one holy catholic and apostolic Church," which the author himself cites with approval from the Nicene Creed (p. 61). Can any formula of essential Christianity ignore these doctrines?

The least convincing chapter of Dr. Craig's work is "Christianity and the Bible." Admitting that Christianity needs an external authority to justify its objective truth, he finds this authority in the Bible and the Bible alone. The Bible, he asserts, needs no proof of its own infallibility and divine inspiration. Unless we can prove errors in it, we must accept its infallibility. The writers of the Old as well as of the New Testament claim that their writings are inspired. Therefore they must be so. For, "if we reject their *interpretation* of the facts as immediately from God, and so authoritative—as they claim—how shall we be able to trust their statements as to the occurrence of the *facts* themselves?" (p. 225). Christ once said: "If I bear witness concerning myself, my witness is not true" (John 5:31), that is, is insufficient. As for the interpretation of facts, everyday experience teaches us that the

best intentioned people in the world, even the saints themselves, often misconstrue and put a false meaning on clear and obvious facts. Yes, even the Bible needs an external authority to guarantee its inerrancy and inspiration, and that authority can only be an infallible church. Not long ago another Presbyterian minister, Dr. W. E. Orchard, studied this same question and set forth his conclusions in a book entitled *The Necessity for the Church* (Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1940), which we recommend for Dr. Craig's perusal.

Though eminently fair throughout, the book contains a few inaccurate statements of Catholic doctrine (v.g., pp. 129, 160) and an occasional historical exaggeration (v.g., p. 194). On the whole it is a very interesting exposition of the Protestant fundamentalist position, but disappointing, in that it does not go far enough in determining all that Christianity rightly so called must stand for.

St. Mary of the Lake Seminary

LEO A. HOGUE, S.J.

MAJOR TRENDS IN AMERICAN CHURCH HISTORY. By Francis X. Curran, S. J., New York: America Press, 1946. Pp. xviii + 198. \$2.50

This volume is a quest for answers to the questions, why the majority of Americans are no longer Christians, and why the Catholic Church has attained its present prominence. The author finds that the history of religion in this country is largely the story of the reaction of Catholicism and Protestantism to a frontier environment: first, that of the agricultural borderland, and more recently, that of the industrial frontier in our great urban centers. He surveys in turn the origin of the chief types of Protestantism; Spanish and French missionary endeavors in America; the colonial religious background of British America; the impact of frontier conditions on creeds and sects; the cause of the chronic no-popery campaigns; the attitude of the Churches towards the negro; the astounding increase in unbelief; and the present status of Protestantism and Catholicism. He finds Protestantism to be disintegrating at an alarming rate, partly because of the lapse of its adherents into complete disbelief, and partly because of the proliferation of new sects who recruit their members from the ranks of the older sects; to stem this tide, consolidation of the Churches is being attempted, but this results in the abandonment of distinctive dogmatic beliefs; consequently there is no longer a credal basis for membership, and moral principles are sacrificed as well. By contrast, the Catholic Church is in a flourishing stage, as is attested by its varied activities and by the annual gain of converts from Protestantism and unbelief.

In so brief a survey of so vast a subject one should not look for much that

was not known already. The merit of this volume lies in the simple presentation of the salient facts and trends of the history of the Churches in America. Since the author was treating controversial subjects, he was wise in bolstering his statements with copious references and footnotes. The appendix, consisting of a list of extant Protestant sects in America, is particularly useful for reference, and the list of books cited in the text should prove a reliable guide for the reader who wishes to check a statement or pursue further study of the subject.

West Baden College

CHARLES H. METZGER, S. J.

RELIGION IN AMERICA. *American Life and Institutions*, Vol. I, edited by E. A. Benians. By William L. Sperry. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. Pp. xi + 318. \$2.50.

This volume on religion in America is the first of a series on American life and institutions planned by the Cambridge University Press for the English public, and the selection of religion as the subject of the first volume may be taken as an encouraging recognition of its primacy in a nation's institutional life.

It is not an easy task to write on religion in the United States, and Dr. William Sperry, a Congregational minister of Modernist views and, since 1922, Dean of the Harvard Divinity School, was well aware of this from the start. An introductory chapter of negligible generalities is followed by others on Colonial Churches, the cause and consequences of the separation of church and state, the Protestant denominations, Negro Churches, Catholicism, religious education, American theology, church union. A few "second thoughts" conclude the well-written, quite honest, but at times, confusing report. For this is not a religious history of the United States, but a report, with a minimum of historical background, on the current religious scene. It recognizes America's debt to Europe and stresses the polity and problems of the Protestant denominations.

The British public will not be inspired by the report: studied secularity in education; two hundred and fifty-six denominations with little hope and less desire for union; one out of every two Americans outside any church; forty-nine per cent of the Protestant ministers without college and seminary training; important non-sectarian divinity schools preparing ministers for any church and creed. Nothing is said of the content of theology in these seminary courses, and evidently the subject is not of any great concern since the rapid devolution of orthodox Calvinism to Unitarianism and, in turn, to the repudiation of any theistic belief can be viewed in terms of "gains" (pp. 88-90).

Though the Catholic Church is numerically the largest in America and equal to the combined membership of the Baptists, Episcopalians, Methodists, and Presbyterians, the chapter devoted to Catholicism will give the impression that its major contribution to religion in this country is in its being a source of worry, and hence a bond of union, to the Protestant denominations. Dr. Sperry, on the score of impartiality, has condensed Maynard's popular and personal volume, *The Story of American Catholicism*, and has added Protestant reactions to Catholics and the Catholic Church. The major sources of fears are three: the uncritical patriotism of American Catholics (for some unknown reason Leo's *Testem Benevolentiae* is cited as support of the charge); a double political loyalty (no effort is made to dispel the fear); the international commitments of the Church (political freedom, evidently, is more endangered from this quarter than from Communism, for the author regrets that American sympathy for the latter lags behind).

Some forty years ago Barrett Wendell gave what should be a real source of worry for Protestants. Asked by his English friend, Sir Robert White-Thompson, about the Harvard Divinity School, he answered: "Of late years it has called itself non-sectarian; and has developed, or degenerated as you will, into a very unspiritual, useless school of religious history and philosophy." The reviewer thought of that comment frequently while reading this volume on religion in America.

College of the Holy Cross

WM. L. LUCEY, S. J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Aubier, Paris: *Surnaturel*, by Henri de Lubac, S.J. (pp. 498).
 Beauchesne et ses Fils, Paris: *Les enseignements de Jésus-Christ*, by Joseph Bonsirven, S.J. (pp. 236, 120 fr.); *Au souffle de l'esprit créateur*, by Paul Vignon (pp. 202); *Verbum Salutis: XIII; Saini Paul: Première épître aux Corinthiens*, translation and commentary by Joseph Huby, S.J. (pp. 423).
 Catholic University of American Press, Washington: *Ancient Christian Writers: Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch*, trans. by James A. Kleist, S.J. (pp. 162, \$2.50); *Decreta Septem Priorum Sessionum Concilii Tridentini ex Autographo Angeli Massorelli Hic Phototypice Recuso*, edited by Stephanus Kuttner (pp. xiv + 24, \$5.00).
 Catholic University of Louvain: *Een Onbekend Gnostisch Systeem*, by Albert Torhoudt (pp. xiv + 126); *L'Hellenisme de S. Clément de Rome et le Paulinisme*, by Louis Sanders (pp. xxxi + 182).
 Dacre Press, Westminster, England: *The God of the Christians*, by Dom Augustine Morris, O.S.B. (pp. 123, 15/).

- Éditions du Seuil, Paris: *Le fondement théologique des missions*, by Henri de Lubac, S.J. (pp. 109, 50 fr.); *Le mystère du salut des nations*, by Jean Danielou, S.J. (pp. 147).
- Édition Universelle, Brussels: *L'Essor de la littérature latine au siècle XII^e*, by Joseph de Ghellinck, S.J. (2 vols.: pp. viii + 232; pp. 345); *Les exercices pratiques du "Séminaire" en Théologie*, by Joseph de Ghellinck, S.J. (pp. xx + 278); *Patristique et Moyen Âge, Tome I: Les recherches sur les origines du Symbole des Apôtres*, by Joseph de Ghellinck, S.J. (pp. x + 279); *Sous les yeux de l'incroyant*, by Jean Levie, S.J. (pp. 302).
- Harper & Brothers, New York: *The Eternal Gospel*, by Gerald Heard (pp. xii + 234, \$2.00).
- Herder Book Co., St. Louis: *The Love of God*, by Andrew Green, O.S.B. (pp. iii + 225, \$2.50); *The Messiah*, by Josef Pickl (pp. vii + 333, \$4.00); *Slow Dawning*, by Jane Howes (pp. xiv + 268, \$3.00).
- King's Crown Press, New York: *The Common Sense Theology of Bishop White*, by Sidney Temple, Jr. (pp. x + 169, \$2.50).
- Liturgical Conference, Inc., Wilton, Ill.: *Liturgical Week, 1945* (pp. vii + 202).
- Declan X. McMullen Co., New York: *The Darkness Is Passed*, by Thomas H. Moore, S.J. (pp. 176, \$2.00).
- Moody Press, Chicago: *Truth vs. Dogma*, by J. C. Macaulay (pp. 125, \$1.25).
- Newman Bookshop, Westminster, Md.: *The Extraordinary Life of Mary Louise Brault*, by S. S. Bouhier, (pp. xii + 306, \$3.50); *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, by Dom Anscar Vonier, O.S.B. (pp. 269, \$2.50); *The Roman Martyrology*, edited by Raphael Collins (pp. xiv + 352, \$4.00).
- St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson: *The Priest's Way To God*, by Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M. (pp. 447, \$3.00); *Proceedings of Group Meetings and Official Statements on the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine* (pp. 356); *Spirit of Grace*, by Elizabeth Hart (pp. 74).
- Charles Scribner's Sons, New York: *Toward a United Church*, by William Adams Brown (pp. xvi + 264, \$2.50).
- Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York: *A Companion to the Old Testament*, by John E. Steinmueller and K. Sullivan (pp. v + 406).
- Westminster Press, Philadelphia: *The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament*, by Norman H. Snaith (pp. 251, \$2.75); *The Rediscovery of the Old Testament*, by H. H. Rowley (pp. 314, \$3.00).