

historiography of R. scholarship, the commentary on the *Sentences* per se (including attribution, structure, and dating), and the manuscript tradition. In particular, Fiorentino's discussion of the commentary on the *Sentences* itself and the manuscript tradition is well done, providing an overview of the commentary as well as detailed information regarding the manuscripts in question. The volume also includes a helpful index of ancient and modern authors (*index nominum*, 379–82) but no index of concepts or themes.

Because of the somewhat unique manuscript tradition (with only a single manuscript extant for the majority of the present work, Florence, D IV 95), Fiorentino helpfully includes a table in the introduction that presents the divergences between Florence D IV 94 and Padoue 1580 with respect to question 2 of the prologue (51–58). This is an elegant solution to the problem, given that there are numerous differences that are easily presented in table format given, and the fact that Padoue 1580 records only a small section of the text. If Padoue 1580 preserved more of the text, this solution would have been cumbersome. But, as is, the reader can easily consult the significant additions and variations recorded in Padoue 1580. Further, with respect to the second question of the prologue, Fiorentino also presents the reader with the disagreements between his own transcription of the two manuscripts and the edition completed previously by Stephen Brown.

The work is a welcome addition to the ever-increasing number of critical editions of commentaries on Peter Lombard. The present edition of R. will facilitate further study into the first few decades of English Scholastic thought at the University of Oxford. In particular, the sources and parallel texts Fiorentino documents in his footnotes will be a great service to the field. One can only hope that Fiorentino will continue his work on this massive commentary, which, if completed, will probably occupy another four or five volumes.

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THE CASE OF GALILEO: A CLOSED QUESTION? By Annibale Fantoli. Translated from the Italian by George V. Coyne, S.J. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2012. Pp. xii + 272. \$28.

In 1979 Pope John Paul II established a commission to reexamine the Galileo affair. This is the starting point and in many ways the end point of this study. Fantoli, already well-published on Galileo (1564–1642), traces both the complexities of Galileo's dealings with and condemnation by the Catholic Church of his day, and the successes and failures of more recent papal efforts to finally move beyond what for most people today remains a notorious case of religion attempting to stifle scientific progress.

F. highlights very well the ways early 17th-century resistance to Copernicanism or to a heliocentric understanding of the universe was grounded above all in veneration of some ancient texts viewed as authoritative if not altogether definitive. These were certain works of Aristotle and certain verses in the Bible. Central to the debate was the question of which mattered more: antiquity's time-honored texts or new knowledge made available through empirical methods dependent on new technologies such as the telescope? In the early 1600s, was the Renaissance veneration of ancient texts ready to make way for the scientific revolution and its experimental and observational way of proceeding?

The Jesuit role in Galileo's travails, F. shows, was a quite varied one, depending on which Jesuit one is talking about, and at which stage of events. At one end of the spectrum of attitudes toward Galileo was Christopher Clavius, S.J. (1537–1612), mathematician and chief architect of the Gregorian calendar, who was a friend and supporter of Galileo. At the opposite end of the spectrum were several very conservative Jesuits eager to uphold traditional cosmological views. Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, S.J. (1542–1621), seems to have fallen somewhere in the middle, though he played a central role in notifying Galileo of the 1616 decision of Pope Paul V, published by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, stating that heliocentrism is contrary to Scripture and therefore must not be defended or held, though it could continue to be discussed as “a purely mathematical hypothesis” (138).

F. shows Pope Urban VIII (reign 1623–1644) to have been somewhat skeptical about the possibility of human science ever deciphering how the universe worked. Yet Urban was initially quite favorable to Galileo, even if he eventually turned against him when the latter went beyond a mere hypothesis in support of a Copernican view of the universe. F. shows clearly how Galileo's 1632 *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* was perceived by many in Rome not only to flout the restriction regarding a mathematical hypothesis but also to mock the pope. In this dialogue of three individuals, Simplicius, the spokesman for a traditional Aristotelian-Ptolemaic view, was portrayed as a kind of simpleton “who believes blindly in a natural philosophy no longer supportable” (152) and advances the weakest of arguments. Urban VIII judged Galileo to have both broken his promises and, worse, used Simplicius as a thinly veiled stand-in for Urban himself. Urban deeply resented what he saw as personal betrayal by a recipient of papal patronage—indeed not only a betrayal but also “an infraction against the fundamental rule of patronage and it would never be pardoned” (198). Thus the pope became an implacable opponent of Galileo, and soon the wheels were set in motion for his trial before the Roman Inquisition. Galileo's condemnation may thus have resulted as much or more from papal pique as from any

defense of the authority of antiquity in matters cosmological, or from any conflict between science and religion.

F. demonstrates that despite the many cardinals and various papal bureaucrats and other persons involved in the Galileo case, Paul V and Urban VIII bear personal responsibility for its outcome in 1616 and in 1633 respectively. But F. also argues that John Paul II's desire to acknowledge that Galileo's condemnation was a mistake, and thus in some sense close the case, was frustrated by other Vatican authorities who made a muddle of the honesty and clarity the pope desired. Cardinal Paul Poupard, on F.'s account, seems to have played a major role in such a muddling. Though books on the Galileo case are extraordinarily abundant, this volume merits attention both by historians and by anyone concerned with how papal bureaucracy may be functional and/or dysfunctional.

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JEWISH MESSIANIC THOUGHT IN AN AGE OF DESPAIR. By Kenneth Seeskin. New York: Cambridge University, 2012. Pp. ix + 222. \$100.

Seeskin's primary source is Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, around which his other interlocutors elaborate in their fashion, absorbing and critiquing German Enlightenment philosophy. Other main authors considered in detail are Maimonides, Hermann Cohen, Emil Fackenheim, Steven Schwarzschild, and Franz Rosenzweig, with interspersed critical notes on Gershom Scholem, Emmanuel Levinas, and Walter Benjamin. S. places Kant's ethics and Hegel's historiography at the center, from which he argues for his own rational, ethical, and demythologized messianism.

At the outset S. presents the contemporary picture as that of despair: the horrors of the 20th century loom in the background, the present state of Israel is in constant threat, and the diaspora continues. In an acknowledgement of the unity of the three monotheistic faiths, S. argues that each believes in a better future for humanity based on a messianism. S. wishes to clarify two questions: Is this messianic better future based on wishful thinking that is bolstered by mythology? And is this future ethical and rational? Following Kant, S. sides with the rational approach to a messianic future, with anything else being a fantastical and mythological error.

S. describes five ways of conceptualizing the idea of the messiah, each with its own merits and drawbacks: "1. inflate the idea of the Messiah, 2. deflate it, 3. marginalize it, 4. internalize it, or 5. defer it" (19). S. focuses first on Maimonides's deflation of the messianic event as purely rational, presaging Kant's rationalization of religion. Second, the internalizing of