essential element of the book. Perhaps it would have been better to devote an entire chapter to the potential impact of gratitude on the professions rather than to treat it intermittently throughout the book. Similarly, the breadth of topics that W. addresses is impressive, but it is not always clear how they fit a study of gratitude. This might be especially true of his argument for the value of a liberal education for anyone entering a profession. A reader may heartily agree, but also be baffled as to how it advances the book's central claims about gratitude. And yet, other subjects W. explores, perhaps especially beauty, are so intriguing that one wishes they could have been treated more fully.

These criticisms are minor. W. provides a thorough and convincing argument for why what might at first seem like a lesser virtue is truly essential for shaping a way of life that is both genuinely good and fulfilling precisely because it continually reaches beyond itself. That alone might make gratitude especially pertinent for our times.

Paul J. Wadell
St. Norbert College, De Pere, WI

Commonwealth and Covenant: Economics, Politics, and Theologies of Relationality. By Marcia Pally. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016. Pp. viii + 419. $50.

Pally combines the rival notions of separability and situatedness in a theology of relationality under the rubric of "separability-amid-situatedness," namely, preservation of the ontological integrity of the individual human person within an antecedent all-encompassing social context. Thereby one avoids extreme separability (rugged individualism) and extreme situatedness (totalitarian control of the structures of society). Her book is divided into two parts. In part 1, she develops her *ontology* of separability-amid-situatedness by reviewing the writings first of philosophers, political scientists, and economists who are known for their emphasis on separability but always within a pre-given social context: for example, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith. Then she reviews the writings of other thinkers who focus on situatedness but still try to preserve separability or personal freedom: for example, French structuralists like Émile Durkheim and post-structuralists like Michel Foucault, contemporary thinkers like Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre.

Then in a much longer part 2, P. reviews various *theologies* of relationality. She identifies the notion of *imago Dei* as best exemplified in "the capacity for responsible relationships" (161) and freedom of conscience (170–74), both exemplified in early American Protestantism (175–81). She reviews the notion of covenant in the Hebrew Bible and notes with Jewish commentators that covenant with God necessarily implies covenant with other human beings and non-human creation (182–213). Likewise, she reviews the development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in the hands of the Cappadocian Fathers with their emphasis on *perichoresis* as the link between the distinct divine persons (218) and in the modern trinitarian theologies of Pannenberg, Rahner, Moltmann, Boff, and Gunton (215–32). She then

develops her own covenantal theology based on the premise that God seeks covenant with human beings and thus creates them in the image of a covenantal God (238). God's covenantal gift to us is Jesus as the embodiment of relationality between God and the world of creation (239). Our covenantal relation with God and one another is sustained by divine grace despite frequent lapses on our part. The crucifixion of Jesus is God's special gift of grace to us, showing us how to be gift for and with each other even in moments of pain and guilt (282). Thus redemption is basically God giving us the capacity to forgive one another. Celebration of the Eucharist is "*koinonia*, church community as a network of relations in relation with God" (298). Personal belief and ethical action mutually reinforce one another (308). Human freedom of choice is not absolute but "teleological," that is, always situated in a social context that demands ethical responsibility to one's neighbor and a more inclusive common good (311). In the conclusion to her book, P. first reviewed how over-emphasis on either situatedness or separability led to the demise of many small covenantal communities in the United States. Yet, if the right balance between situatedness and separability were maintained, even a strong market-oriented capitalist economy could be the means to the greater well-being of all parties and to an ever-expanding sense of the common good.

Granted the very impressive scope and depth of her research on the topic, I would argue that P.'s analysis of relationality overlooks a key point. Individual entities always enter into relationships with other individual entities within a preexisting social context (situatedness). Ontologically, therefore, that overall social context is only modified, but never fully constituted, by individual entities in setting up a particular set of relations among themselves. Hence, relationality is in the first place a corporate reality even though it is also the ongoing result of the interrelated activity of two or more individual entities. For example, within the classical understanding of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the divine persons as "subsistent relations" constitute the corporate reality of a permanent divine community. Their unity as one God is then really not the reality of a transcendent individual entity with individual relations to all the finite creatures of this world (38). Rather, it is the reality of a transcendent corporate entity, a community, whose primordial members (the divine persons) in turn preside over a corporately organized world of creation. The true *imago Dei* then is not the individual self as distinct from others and yet open to association with others in various forms of community. Rather, the *imago Dei* is a corporate reality, a community in the finite likeness of the Trinity, that is, a permanent relationship of free and responsible persons both to one another and to the world of creation. But, if this be true, what we mean by the analogy of being dramatically changes. To be is to exist in the first place as a member of a preexisting community rather than as an individual entity that is capable of entering into community with other entities. This argument should only reinforce P.'s appeal for a greater sense of the common good in contemporary society.

Joseph A. Bracken, SJ
Xavier University, Cincinnati