

T.'s legitimate prioritization of constitutive-expressive language leaves him suspicious of pre-linguistic "enframing" theories of cognitional activity (33–34) that constrain language to the description of prior interior states of consciousness. One wonders if this suspicion could be eased and a path to further clarification opened by supplanting Cartesian influenced correspondence theories of truth verification with approaches that recognize the reciprocal, proportionate relation between ideas and their expression in language. To paraphrase Thomas Aquinas, we understand not by ideas but in ideas; specific acts of understanding which T. and his modern interlocutors would contend are formed and assessed most fully in intersubjective discourse.

T.'s discussion of the figuring of felt intuitions, lived enactment and artistic portrayal of meaning, linguistic and other forms of symbolic expression, and the reflective control of meaning afforded by theoretic hermeneutical argument points his readers towards just such a progressive and interactive assessment of human expression and its accounts of truth, goodness, and beauty. He appropriately draws his reader's critical attention to the contested values and differential power relations constituted and reinforced by the register (linguistic tone) and implied social footing of discourse. T. presents a cogent account of how constitutive-expressive meaning precedes, accompanies and surpasses the designative-instrumental function of language.

By attending to the integral dynamics of the production and control of human meaning, T. promotes the direct role of human agency in assessing the legitimacy of social orders and norms over indirect approaches such as etiology and other types of mythology. He prefers to highlight the internal responsibility of the meaning-maker over the external accountability (or control) mediated by reified, mythic accounts. While T. makes an invaluable contribution to understanding the social dimensions of agency and discourse, the reader wonders if there must likewise be a social dimension to a proportionate control of meaning that escapes the internal–external binary. Perhaps T. will return in his forthcoming volume to explore further how mythology might be understood as serving the requirements of social agency and the liminal promise of yet fuller human meaning.

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Tradition and Church Reform: Perspective on Catholic Moral Teaching. By Charles E. Curran. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2016. Pp. viii + 294. \$32.

The Catholic Church's tradition and history of moral teaching is long, complicated, and sometimes controversial. In this volume, Charles Curran manages to succinctly present an in-depth look at the history of the Catholic moral tradition, current issues of Catholic moral theology, and directions for the future of moral theology. As a collection of articles and essays previously presented or published elsewhere, single chapters can be read alone but work best as a whole. Taken together, these chapters represent a culmination of C.'s long career and significant contributions to the field of Catholic ethics.

Broken into three parts—Social Perspectives, Bioethical and Sexual Perspectives, and Reform at Vatican II and Afterward—C.'s work moves smoothly between description and prescription as he offers a very well researched look into the development of Catholic Social Teaching and biological and sexual ethics, while also noting where these traditions fall short and where they could improve in the future. In particular, part 1, the longest and perhaps best section of the book, begins with C.'s recognition that the Catholic Church has always been concerned with this world and how people can flourish in the here and now. This concern is grounded in the doctrine of creation that insists that God's creation is good. Of course, how humans best flourish and the role that societies and governments should have in human flourishing is not always clear, but Catholic social teaching has consistently focused on issues of life, justice, and the common good.

In this presentation of the church's tradition of social teaching, C. is not offering anything radically new, but his work still makes an important contribution to the theological conversation. The thoroughness with which C. walks the reader through the church's teachings is admirable, as he notes the church's historically tenuous relationship with human rights and particularly religious freedom, the disagreements that the Catholic Church had with Protestant churches over the role and function of the government, and the church's ongoing dialogue with nonbelievers. Although C. rightly includes a chapter on racial justice and white privilege in this section, he interestingly also includes a chapter on black Protestant theologian, J. Deotis Roberts, noting that "no real dialogue of Catholics with J. Deotis Roberts's theological writings has taken place."

Parts 2 and 3 build on part 1, applying the Catholic moral tradition to biological and sexual ethics and addressing how the Second Vatican Council brought the moral tradition into the twentieth century. C.'s treatment of bioethical and sexual perspectives is, again, thoughtful and very well researched. Most interesting was C.'s presentation of the church's centuries-long history of bioethics, a relationship that often gets overlooked in contemporary discussions. At the same time, this section lacks detailed discussion on some of the most pressing and controversial issues in regard to biological and sexual ethics—stem cell research, *in vitro* fertilization, and genetic engineering. C. admits that he chose to focus on other ethical issues early in his career, an admission that may account for his extended treatment of *Humanae Vitae* and the long-term effects this document has had on lay Catholics. C.'s conflicts with the Vatican over the use of artificial contraceptives are well known. But since, as C. recognizes, many, if not most, married American Catholics have, in good conscience, chosen to use artificial contraception, an analysis of issues that are not so clearly determined would have been helpful.

C. closes out his work with a reminder that the Catholic Church is ultimately a pilgrim church, always developing, always growing. He lifts up Pope John XXIII and Catholic moral theologian Bernard Häring as models for church reform. C. insists that when John XXIII called the Second Vatican Council he did not know what kind of reform was needed or what direction the council would take. His true vision lay in his ability to be open to the movements of the Holy Spirit and to listen and learn from

those around him. C. commends Häring for his brave “insistence on the need for the virtue of loving criticism within the church” (239). This final section also speaks to the crucial reforms Vatican II made in moral theology, moving away from legalistic moral manuals to a moral theology more attuned to the realities of human life and calls for a reform of the sacrament of reconciliation in order to bring God’s mercy and forgiveness back to the forefront of Christian life.

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Just Revolution: A Christian Ethic of Political Resistance and Social Transformation. By Anna Floerke Scheid. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2015. Pp. xvi + 171. \$80.

Since the end of the Cold War, the majority of deaths in warfare have occurred in intrastate, rather than interstate conflicts. Yet ethical analysis of war has tended to neglect questions about intrastate conflict in favor of addressing interstate conflict, nuclear warfare, or transnational terrorism. Scheid’s book addresses this lacuna very adeptly, by analyzing the ethical issues that arise when oppressed groups seek to transform their governments.

Building upon Hannah Arendt’s definition of revolution as an effort to seek “a complete change in society” (x), S. begins by reminding her readers that revolutions need not involve violence. One of the great strengths of this book is that it seriously weighs the ethical issues involved *both* in revolutions that are primarily nonviolent as well as those that resort to the use of force. Her primary case study—the South African transition from apartheid—allows her to show the importance of tactics such as mobilizing mass participation in nonviolent direct action, advocating for democracy and human rights, and building international cooperation. “In revolutionary situations,” she writes, “the broad array of nonviolent practices of just peacemaking theory become the primary way that most individuals resist the regime . . . [A]rmed strategies are secondary, acting only to supplement the practices of just peacemaking so as to force negotiation toward social transformation” (102); this accords well with recent research, such as that by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, who demonstrate that primarily nonviolent political movements are more often successful than violent ones, due to their ability to engage the general population in participation.

However, S. does not rule out the possibility that the use of violent force by revolutionaries may be morally justified. She draws on the just war tradition, including Augustine, Aquinas, and Suarez, offering exceptionally clear and helpful explanations of their arguments and how they arise from each one’s theological perspectives. But the most interesting and creative portion of the book is found in her examination of how traditional just war theory might need to be refined for modern revolutions.

The just war criterion of legitimate authority is perhaps the most challenging one for would-be revolutionaries to meet. Noting that in South Africa, the African National Congress enjoyed a high level of legitimacy, S. asks how that came to be. She offers three reasons: “Legitimate authority (1) encourages the already emerging political