

participation of all for the sake of the common good, (2) enjoys the support of the broader population and (3) controls and limits violence in the face of a regime which uses violence with impunity to maintain power” (76). These tests would indeed be helpful in other contexts; in her final chapter on the Arab Spring, S. argues that it was precisely a lack of an appropriate legitimate authority that led to abortive revolutions in Egypt and elsewhere.

S. also proposes a refinement to the criterion of “right intention”: not only is it necessary for a revolutionary to intend a just peace as her goal, but the intracommunal nature of a revolution requires that its proponents go even further, and intend reconciliation the final goal. S.’s chapter on restorative justice after revolution shows how this intention to reconcile with the enemy can be fulfilled *post bellum*.

In addressing proportionality, S.’s focus on nonviolent means comes to the fore again. Reiterating that nonviolent means should be primary, she then argues that “(1) armed resistance should be graduated, beginning with those means that intend to incur no loss of life, (2) opportunity for negotiation should be offered regularly, and (3) armed resistance should escalate to forms that include loss of life only as is necessary to promote negotiation, and to decrease overall violence” (90). As an illustration of the “graduated” use of force, she notes that the South African resistance began by using sabotage before escalating to more lethal tactics. (S. contrasts this with the recent cases of Libya and Syria, where revolutionaries resorted to lethal tactics too quickly.) Perhaps controversially, S. also argues that limited use of armed resistance by a legitimate authority may *reduce* the overall violence of a revolution, because this provides a sign of hope, and assures the majority of the oppressed that they need not take up arms but can instead focus on nonviolent strategies.

S.’s discussion of the “reasonable hope of success” criterion is an interesting one for a theological audience. Drawing on Charles Villa-Vicencio’s work, the Kairos Document and other South African sources, S. shows how both unity and justice on earth should be objects of Christian hope. But she also argues that it is the oppressed who are best positioned to say what is “reasonable” hope and assess the sacrifices that it may require.

Overall, S.’s interweaving of traditional sources with contemporary examples makes for engaging reading that would not be out of reach for advanced undergraduates. A “just revolution” involves complex moral questions and S. is to be commended for approaching them with both nuance and clarity.

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Christian Moral Theology in the Emerging Technoculture: From Posthuman Back to Human. By Brent Waters. Ashgate Science and Religion Series. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014. Pp. 260. \$221.66.

The critical and constructive engagement with, and assessment of today’s technoculture are daunting tasks. A few authors dare this feat, and Waters is one of them.

To his many publications, he adds this very interesting volume. Critics of technological progress, Luddites, and heralds of a return to the good old times when we were not slaves of technology will be disappointed because W. neither advocates for rejecting technological progress, nor for an uncritical retreat in an illusory a-technological past. W.'s rationale is profoundly theological: technology is part of God's creation and of what God's creatures produce. We should discern our attitudes by determining whether and how technology might help humanity to flourish. We should decide whether "to resist, engage, and reorient the direction of the emerging technoculture" (243).

The volume is articulated in three parts. In part 1, W. turns to a few philosophers to analyze today's technoculture. Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger name the will of power and describe how it shaped the historicism and nihilism that dominate modernity.

W. then turns to three philosophical critiques. First, George Grant (1918–1988) defines modernity as an age of darkness, dominated by the cross, with neither resurrection nor redemption. For Grant, the only viable option is to reject modernity. Second, for Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) modernity is afraid of death and fixated on mortality. The production of artifacts reacts to the fear of death and depends on it. Arendt proposes to reorient political life from mortality to natality. Third, for Albert Borgmann (b. 1937) technological devices fill, shape, and improve daily life but also strengthen individualism. Practices aimed at promoting human flourishing are the fitting response.

These philosophical insights, however, leave W. unsatisfied because their constructive component is unsatisfactory. In part 2, he proposes a theological vision characterized by three attitudes—confession, repentance, and amendment—and by the practices that these attitudes shape. Their ultimate goal is flourishing.

First, W. finds insufficient Grant's acknowledgment of modernity as darkness because judgment is lacking. To judge makes one receptive to grace and leads to *confession*, as a possibility for hope. W.'s reply is Christological: Grant's darkness and his exclusive focus on the cross are brightened by the light of the resurrection and redemption.

Second, W. praises Arendt's emphasis on natality in political life, but he finds her proposal ostensibly secular, centered on the pagan *polis*, and grounded in Immanuel Kant's disembodied rationality. He argues for a more explicitly Christian rendering of natality that demands forgiveness, aims at *repentance*, and is opened to the action of grace in the Christian *civitas*. Here, ecclesiology is W.'s theological grounding.

Third, W. further expands Borgmann's emphasis on practices. He stresses how communities can identify and promote practices that resist to and reorient the dependence on technological devices, and aim at promoting a flourishing and a good life. For W., these practices should favor the *amendment* of life and facilitate the reordering of desire. Hence, eschatology is at the forefront.

Furthermore, today's technoculture makes human beings nomadic—that is, autonomous and mobile, situated in a virtually diffused and expanding space, focused on acquiring information, and prone to exchange. To transform and reorient one's life, W. stresses the importance of place—where we are rooted and live—of narration, which

depends on and promotes relationships, and of communication of the goods of creation. In such a way, the nomad becomes a pilgrim who is situated in a place, and who narrates and communicates what has been received and produced. Theologically and ecclesially, place, narration, and communication are expressed respectively in baptism, Eucharist, and Sabbath: baptism is a redemptive immersion in darkness; the Eucharist entails “judgment, confession, contrition, repentance, forgiveness, and amendment of life” (179); and the Sabbath is an experience of receptive leisure. In moral life, the corresponding virtues are faith, hope, and charity.

Finally, in part 3, W. applies his critical analysis and constructive contribution to three areas of moral life—the Internet, politics, and economics—because they shape and maintain today’s technoculture. W. tests his dyadic approach by opposing the nomad—centered on space, information, and exchange—to the pilgrim—who is defined by place, narration, and communication.

This is a demanding but rewarding book. W. is well versed and rooted in the Christian theological tradition and focuses creatively on key theological disciplines (i.e. Christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology), Christian practices (i.e. baptism, Eucharist, and Sabbath), and virtues (i.e., faith, hope, and charity).

I hope W. will keep expanding his theological interlocutors. The contributions of many Catholic colleagues could enrich his emphasis on flourishing and pursuing the good. Theological voices from the global South stress justice; they could integrate the importance that W. assigns to faith, hope, and charity. Prudence too might feature as a guiding virtue. Finally, W.’s theological approach could be tested in bioethics, medical ethics, and the ethics in the academy.

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On Care for our Common Home, Laudato Si’: The Encyclical of Pope Francis on the Environment. By Sean McDonagh, SSC. Ecology and Justice Series. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2016. Pp. xxii + 280. \$20.

For the past several decades, McDonagh has worked to make care for God’s creation more central to the ministry and theology of the church. It is thus fitting that M. has published one of the first extended commentaries on *Laudato Si’* (*LS*).

The book is made up of a Preface and two Parts. Part I, “Catholic Teaching and the Environment,” contains M.’s commentary on *LS*. Part II contains the full text of *LS*. As such, this review examines Part I only.

The organization of the seven chapters in Part I demonstrates M.’s obvious intention that the section be read and used primarily as an educational resource. As the title suggests, the opening chapter provides “Theological and Historical Background on *Laudato Si’*.” Here, M. situates *LS* in the tradition of Catholic ecological theology and ethics with particular attention to Francis’s papal predecessors. In this way, M. helps to dispel the notion that Francis’s ecological vision represents a radical break from traditional Catholic teaching and is dismissible as such.