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The Sixtieth Anniversary of King's "I Have a Dream" Speech

The Cross and/as Civil Resistance

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Abstract

We need a nonviolent soteriology that honors scriptural and theological traditions about enemy-love, suffering, sacrifice, and satisfaction *and* refuses to further harm victims of violence and oppression. Martin Luther King Jr.'s nonviolence and Bernard Lonergan's way of understanding Christ's satisfaction by analogy with the sacrament of reconciliation disclose one way suffering can be redemptive: When nonviolent activists "present their very bodies," they expose the violence latent in unjust situations. Similarly, when Christ presents his body, he exposes the violence at the heart of sin. Like Christ, activists "become sin" (1 Cor 5:21)—not because they take responsibility for the sin, but because sin becomes visible in the wounds it leaves on innocent bodies. Once visible, healing can begin. Further, both men argue for a proper unfolding of the extension of love to enemies, lest victims be further harmed and injustice ignored.

Keywords

Thomas Aquinas, civil resistance, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Bernard Lonergan, nonviolence, penal substitution, Sacrament of Reconciliation, satisfaction, soteriology

Introduction: Martin Luther King Jr. and Bernard Lonergan—A Nonviolent Soteriology

During a sermon on Matthew 5:43–45, Martin Luther King Jr. considers critical responses to Jesus's command to love one's enemy, from Friedrich Nietzsche's

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incisive observations about Christian morality and *ressentiment* to civil rights activists insisting on more "practical" revolutionary methods. For King, the love commanded is not sentimental but understanding, redemptive, creative benevolence for all people.[1] He writes:

> This command of Jesus challenges us with new urgency. . . . Far from being the pious injunction of a Utopian dreamer, the command to love one's enemy is an absolute necessity for our survival. Love even for enemies is the key to the solution of the problems of our world. Jesus is not an impractical idealist: he is the practical realist. I am certain Jesus understood the difficulty inherent in the act of loving one's enemy. . . . Yet he meant every word of [this command]. Our responsibility as Christians is to discover the meaning of this command and seek passionately to live it out in our daily lives.[2]

Bernard Lonergan also turned to this Matthean passage in his thesis on the Law of the Cross in which he proposes that rather than do away with evil through power, God converts those same evils into a supreme good.[3] Indeed, Lonergan's answer to the question as to why God became human underscores the centrality of loving enemies to the divine response to the human problem of evil: "The Son of God became man *for the orderly communication of God's friendship to his enemies*."[4] In addition to the divine reasons for the incarnation, Christ, in his humanity, is obedient to the command to love one's enemies. With this command, Christ also teaches us the wisdom and justice of the Law of the Cross.[5] Like Robert Doran, I believe Lonergan's Law of the Cross is essentially nonviolent and that when attempting to understand the mystery of redemption, the area to be explored is the refinement of feelings.[6] Active nonviolence enriches Doran's integration of Lonergan's soteriology and René Girard's disclosure of the scapegoat mechanism. I bring King and Lonergan together because we need a nonviolent soteriology that honors scriptural and theological traditions about

1. Martin Luther King Jr., "Love, Law, and Civil Disobedience (1961)," in *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.*, ed. James Melvin Washington (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986), 43–53 at 47.
2. Martin Luther King Jr., "Loving Your Enemies," in *The Radical King*, ed. and intro. Cornel West (Boston: Beacon Press, 2015), 55–64 at 55–56.
3. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Redemption*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran, H. Daniel Monsour, and Jeremy D. Wilkins, Collected Works 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 197, 455.
4. Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 631 (emphasis in original). God never becomes our enemy, for God never ceases to love us. Rather, we turn ourselves into God's enemies and God becomes human to turn us from hostility to friendship. See Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 637.
5. Lonergan also cites Mark 8:34; 10:42–45; and John 15:12–13 as examples of Christ teaching about the Cross. See Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 535, 455.
6. See Robert Doran, "The Nonviolent Cross: Lonergan and Girard on Redemption," *Theological Studies* 70, no. 1 (2010): 46–61, https://doi.org/10.1177/004056391007100104; Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, Collected Works 14 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 297–98; Robert M. Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 23.

suffering, sacrifice, and satisfaction *and* refuses to further harm victims of violence and oppression—a genuine nonviolent soteriology does not serve oppressive ideologies. Lonergan's thesis on Christ's satisfaction resonates with King's understanding of the dramatic meanings nonviolent activism conveys. In fact, his thesis even illuminates a sacramental dimension at work in active nonviolence's social mediation of what Thomas Aquinas calls "the reconciliation of friendship"—the fruits of the sacrament of reconciliation.[7] King's nonviolence gives concrete expression to Lonergan's soteriological theses and helps illuminate why Christ gave his life. That is, King's practice of nonviolence and his theoretical accounts of nonviolence illuminate one way in which Christ's death was "for us and for our salvation."[8]

Putting King and Lonergan in conversation is especially important for refining how we *feel* about the command to love our enemies—the suffering we risk causing ourselves in so loving—so that we may responsibly live this command. For King, practices of self-purification, which were necessary preparatory exercises for participating in nonviolent direct action, included interior work on the *feelings* activists had about themselves (e.g., "nobodiness"),[9] their unjust situation (e.g., powerlessness), and their enemies (e.g., resentment, hatred).[10] Lonergan understands Christ's vicarious satisfaction according to what he calls the "sacramental analogy," that is, an analogy with the sacrament of reconciliation wherein there is a similarity between the penitent and Christ. In particular, this analogy emphasizes the similarity between how the penitent feels about his sins and how Christ felt about our sins.[11] Together, King and Lonergan

7. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers Edition, 1947), III.90.2 co (hereafter cited as *ST*).
8. Nicene Creed. Even with the affinities between King's and Lonergan's accounts of the transformation of evil into good, King's theology and nonviolence focuses on human cooperation with redemption while Lonergan's "Law of the Cross" focuses on an explanation of Christ's salvific work.
9. Martin Luther King Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," in West, *The Radical King*, 127–46 at 132.
10. See King, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," 129; Patrick H. Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace: Authenticity in Feelings and Personal Relations," *Divyadaan* 16, no. 2 (2005): 145–76 at 14. Establishing King's commitment to self-purification is connected to work done establishing King as a spiritual guide and prophet. See Lewis V. Baldwin and Victor Anderson, eds., *Revives My Soul Again: The Spirituality of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2018). See also James H. Cone, "The Theology of Martin Luther King Jr.," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 40, no. 4 (1986): 21–39 at 35–36.
11. While Christ's feelings do not need refinement, his salvific work sets the conditions for the refinement of our feelings so we may cooperate with redemption, which includes in turn setting the conditions for our so-called enemies to refine their feelings. Our feelings need refinement, whether we are the victims of sin (for example, to work through feelings of inferiority or resentment) or its perpetrators (for example, to work through feelings of superiority or resentment). For how self-purification and nonviolence help both victims and perpetrators attune their feelings to Christ's, see Jennifer Kendall Sanders, "Attuning Our Feelings to Christ's: Nonviolence and/as Unrestricted Mutual Self-Mediation," 50th Annual Lonergan Workshop, Boston College (Chestnut Hill, June 2023) (unpublished conference paper).

make it clear that love of enemies cannot be separated from true judgments and refined feelings about the sins our enemies commit—sins are detestable and provoke sorrow.[12] A nonviolent soteriology maintains that the cross is both an act of solidarity with the offended *and* an offer of solidarity to offenders[13] that attunes peoples' feelings to God's unrestricted and unconditional love[14] and mediates this love into human history.

Before continuing, it is worth noting that King, Aquinas, and Lonergan all include the language and notion of friendship in their discussions of justice. Their primary source is Scripture (for example, Jn 15:13). For King, in its pursuit of justice, nonviolence seeks to win friendship and understanding.[15] For Aquinas and Lonergan, friendship is at the heart of redemption and the way in which God establishes justice (restoring order by healing and elevating interpersonal relationships; the justice of the cross is the reconciliation of friendship).[16] Similarly, each speaks of God's love (*agape*/charity) in terms of friendship. Aquinas and Lonergan understand charity by way of an analogy with Aristotelian friendships of virtue (charity is friendship with God) and use it as a technical category.[17] Two essential features of this friendship are relevant: each

12. Detestation is a deliberate hatred of evil that presupposes a judgment of value about evil, wherein one's feelings and intelligence are both at work. See Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 79. See also Charles Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction: A Perhaps Permanently Valid Contribution," *Method: Journal in Lonergan Studies* 10, no. 1 (1992): 51–76 at 63, https://doi.org/10.5840/method19921018. Sorrow "presupposes charity for God, detestation for sin, and the fact of sin against God; hence charity makes one sorrow for an offense against God as one would sorrow over an evil present to oneself, or over one's own evil." Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 81–83.
13. I am inspired by Hefling's suggestion that "the cross is God's act—and an offer—of solidarity"; Charles Hefling, "Why the Cross? God's At-one-ment with Humanity," *Christian Century* (Spring 2013): 24–27 at 26–27, https://www.christiancentury.org/article/2013–02/why-cross. M. Shawn Copeland's work on King and solidarity, along with Byrne's work on religious conversion and *ressentiment*, has also influenced my thought. See especially M. Shawn Copeland, "'All Flesh Shall See It Together': Grace, Friendship, and Hope," in *Grace and Friendship: Theological Essays in Honor of Fred Lawrence from His Grateful Students*, ed. M. Shawn Copeland and Jeremy D. Wilkins (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2016), 49–66; and "The Watchmen and the Witnesses: Thomas Merton, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Exercise of the Prophetic," *The Merton Annual* 30 (2017): 156–70, http://merton.org/ITMS/Annual/30/Copeland156–170.pdf; Patrick H. Byrne, "*Ressentiment* and the Preferential Option for the Poor," *Theological Studies* 54, no. 2 (1993): 213–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/004056399305400202.
14. A "feeling horizon" is "the assembled, interrelated, totality of feelings as experienced by an individual subject"; Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace," 169.
15. See King, "Loving Your Enemies," 58.
16. See, for example, Aquinas, *ST* III.46.3; 48.2; 84.5, ad. 2; Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 489, 631–42; Ligita Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross? Divine Friendship and the Power of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 228–30.
17. See Frederick G. Lawrence, "Grace and Friendship: Postmodern Political Theology and God as Conversational," in *Fragility of Consciousness: Faith, Reason, and the Human Good*, ed. Randall S. Rosenberg and Kevin M. Vander Schel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 353–83 at 353–54.

friend is loved for her own sake and the two become one.[18] This friendship requires mutual love and benevolence, which are based on communication—that is, *communis facere* ("making in common") or sharing something in common.[19] When addressing the objection that charity cannot be friendship because friendship requires mutuality while charity asks us to love even our enemies, Aquinas uses the principle of diffusion (a friend loves her friend's friends) to argue that we love even our enemies in God and for God's sake.[20] The mutuality that obtains when I love my enemies through supernatural friendship is not ordinary mutuality but mutuality mediated by God. Accordingly, we can have friendship for those who as yet hate us ("friends-in-the-making"),[21] and this friendship can initiate friendship in the other for us, bringing about mutuality as we ordinarily think of it—and this mutuality makes justice among us possible. Further, on account of becoming one through friendship, friends experience one another's suffering as if it is their own and they can act on one another's behalf.[22] It is primarily because charity (supernatural friendship) enables love of enemies and vicarious action that I maintain the use of "friendship."

Criticisms of Enemy-Love and Redemptive Suffering

Some of King's contemporaries such as John Killens and Stokely Carmichael criticized him for linking the well-being of the oppressed and the oppressor, observable in passages like the following: "Since the white man's personality is greatly distorted by segregation, and his soul is greatly scarred, he needs the love of the Negro. The Negro must love the white man, because the white man needs his love to remove his tensions, insecurities, and fears."[23] Such statements seem to place a disproportionate and unjust burden on oppressed peoples. Some womanist theologians have been especially critical of King's view of redemptive suffering because "it makes victims the servants of the evildoer's salvation."[24] Other criticisms confuse nonviolence with passivism, and

18. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8–9, esp. 1170b, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 150; Aquinas *ST* I-II.28.1–2.
19. See Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross?*, 71n33, 232–37; see also Aquinas, *ST* II-II.23.1. God shares divine beatitude and nature with us.
20. See Aquinas, *ST* II-II.23.3, obj. 2 and ad. 2; 25.6, 8–9; Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 635.
21. Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross?*, 236.
22. See, for example, Aquinas, *ST* I-II.28.1–2; *Summa contra gentiles*, trans. Vernon Bourke (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 3.158.7 (hereafter cited as *SCG*).
23. Martin Luther King Jr., "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," in West, *The Radical King*, 39–54 at 52. For King's contemporaries, see Gary Commins, "Is Suffering Redemptive? Historical and Theological Reflections on Martin Luther King Jr.," *Sewanee Theological Review* 51, no. 1 (2007): 61–80.
24. See Karen V. Guth, "Reconstructing Nonviolence: The Political Theology of Martin Luther King Jr. after Feminism and Womanism," *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 32, no. 1 (2012): 75–92 at 78, https://doi.org/10.1353/sce.2012.0018. She is referring to Delores S. Williams, Joanne Carlson Brown, and Rebecca Parker. Other womanist theologians such as M. Shawn Copeland, JoAnne Marie Terrell, and Karen Baker-Fletcher, however, find ongoing value in King's understanding of love and suffering.

so reject it as submission to evil.[25] These criticisms are valuable and necessary insofar as they resist further victimization and oppression. At the same time, nonviolence makes it possible to love one's enemies in a way that is liberative and just.

Responding to these critiques includes appreciating King's understanding of the orderly unfolding of nonviolence, which simultaneously sheds light on Lonergan's argument that God became human to communicate (express and share) divine friendship to God's enemies in an orderly fashion. That is, there is a proper order to how nonviolence and this communication proceed. I suggest that King's approach to nonviolence, inspired by Gandhi, begins first with the transformation of the oppressed from victim to activist through a recovery of their felt-sense of their own dignity, proceeds with the transformation of the oppressor from impenitent perpetrator to penitent through the offer of dignity extended by the activist, and culminates in what King calls the Beloved Community.[26] We can observe this order in the following: "The nonviolent approach does not immediately change the heart of the oppressor. It *first* does something to the hearts and souls of those committed to it. It gives them new self-respect; it calls up resources of strength and courage that they did not know they had. *Finally*, it reaches the opponent and so stirs his conscience that reconciliation becomes a reality."[27] It is on account of this orderly communication that nonviolence, enemy-love, and redemptive suffering are acts of solidarity with the offended and offers of solidarity to the offender.

First, what King says about enemy-love cannot be understood apart from his work as a pastor to help Black people feel their own "somebodiness."[28] In the segregated South, Black people were devalued as persons. This devaluation was not only levied by whites against Blacks, nor was it only embedded in prevailing social, political, and cultural patterns.[29] It also infected Black peoples' valuation of themselves, which King called "a degenerating sense of 'nobodiness'."[30] Ultimately, people overcome this degradation by accepting God's judgment of value about them as persons. The importance of personally encountering God's dignifying love is evidenced by the role of Black churches in the civil rights movement and by Black Christian faith during slavery.[31] King reflects on the importance of this encounter during slavery: "Our mothers and fathers knew that it was God that would bring them over. . . . Our mothers and

25. King, "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," 45–46.
26. King's understanding of dignity flows from his personalism and his Christian belief that every human person is created in the image of God.
27. Martin Luther King Jr., "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence (1960)," in Washington, *A Testament of Hope*, 35–40 at 39 (emphasis added).
28. Martin Luther King Jr., "What Is Your Life's Blueprint?," in West, *The Radical King*, 65–70 at 65.
29. See Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace," 149.
30. King, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," 132.
31. See Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace," 150. This valuation of their own dignity can itself be understood as a resistance to the evil of slavery. See Howard Thurman, *Deep River and The Negro Spiritual Speaks of Life and Death* (Richmond: Friends United, 1975), 39–40, cited in Copeland, "'All Flesh Shall See It Together,'" 53n17.

fathers were able to get over the dark days of slavery and the dark days of segregation because religion gave them something within. It was the only way that they were able to live with that system."[32] This transformation from a felt-sense of nobodiness to one of somebodiness is the condition of the possibility of responsible enemy-love. Further, with this self-valuation comes the felt-sense of security in the universe. Nonviolent resistance is "based on the conviction that the universe is on the side of justice. . . . This faith is another reason why the nonviolent resister can accept suffering without retaliation."[33] Belief in a personal God is essential for this faith: "I am convinced that the universe is under the control of a loving purpose and that in the struggle for righteousness man has cosmic companionship."[34]

In nonviolence, this divine affirmation of one's dignity is also accompanied by what I call the "Gandhian insight." Gene Sharp argues that Gandhi discovered that all power depends on our cooperation with it—and we do not have to cooperate.[35] This foundational nonviolent insight about our ability to withdraw our cooperation from unjust systems of power is empowering, and this empowerment is dignifying. It is operative in civil resistance methods such as noncooperation and civil disobedience, which refuse to cooperate with evil. Similarly, the practice of nonviolence helps restore activists' felt-sense of dignity. King highlights the phenomenon of this restoration during the civil rights movement:

> Ten years ago, Negroes seemed almost invisible to the larger society, and the facts of their harsh lives were unknown to the majority of the nation. But today, civil rights is a dominating issue in every state, crowding the pages of the press and the daily conversation of white Americans. In this decade of change, the Negro stood up and confronted his oppressor. He faced the bullies and the guns, the dogs and the tear gas. He put himself squarely before the vicious mobs and moved *with strength and dignity* toward them and decisively defeated them. And the courage with which he confronted enraged mobs dissolved the stereotype of the grinning, submissive Uncle Tom. He came out of his struggle integrated only slightly in

32. Martin Luther King Jr., "Discerning the Signs of History," unpublished version of a sermon, Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia (November 15, 1964), Library and Archives of the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change (KCLA), Atlanta, Georgia, 4–5 as cited in Diana Hayes, "A Great Cloud of Witnesses: Martin Luther King Jr.'s Roots in the African American Religious and Spiritual Traditions," in Baldwin and Anderson, *Revives My Soul Again*, 39–59 at 39.
33. King, "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," 53.
34. King, "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence (1960)," 40. See also Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 113.
35. See Gene Sharp, *Gandhi as a Political Strategist: With Essays on Ethics and Politics* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979). See also Ramin Jahanbegloo, *The Gandhian Moment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). Similarly, Lonergan identifies cooperation as the source of power. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Dialectic of Authority," in *A Third Collection*, Collected Works 16, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 3. See also Clayborne Carson, *The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (New York: Grand Central, 2002), 353.

> the external society, but powerfully integrated within. This was a victory that had to precede all other gains.[36]

Internal integration sets the conditions for external victories because it is the visible demonstration of activists' dignity, which subpoenas a nation's conscience to moral examination and accountability.[37] This internal integration is also the condition of possibility for responsible enemy-love. Even if other victories are slow to come, internal integration is worthwhile and liberating.

King's enduring commitment to the dignity of the oppressed is also at work in the clear distinctions he made between passivism and nonviolence/pacifism:

> The phrase "passive resistance" often gives the false impression that this is a sort of "do-nothing method" in which the resister quietly and passively accepts evil. But nothing is further from the truth. For while the nonviolent resister is passive in the sense that he is not physically aggressive toward the opponent, his mind and emotions are always active, constantly seeking to persuade his opponent that he is wrong. The method is passive physically, but strongly active spiritually. It is not passive nonresistance to evil. It is active nonviolent resistance to evil.[38]

Far from counseling passivity and inaction, King encourages resistance to evil, insisting that resisting evil is as much of a moral obligation as doing good—and this

36. King, "Where Do We Go from Here?," in West, *The Radical King*, 161–80 at 162 (emphasis added).
37. King, "Where Do We Go from Here?," 162–63.
38. King, "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," 49. King sometimes calls nonviolence "true pacifism" (and false pacifism is passivism). Where passivism/false pacifism is passive nonresistance to evil, true pacifism is active nonviolent resistance to evil, as evident from its roots, which mean "peacemaking" (from the Latin "pax" and "facere"). The only way in which nonviolence is passive is that it does not use physical force. However, both Gandhi and King preferred the terms *satyagraha* and nonviolence (or nonviolent direct action), respectively, over pacifism because pacifism had, in the early twentieth century, become associated primarily with the refusal to render military service (a merely passive act), whereas Gandhi and King meant something much more expansive and active by their terms. Gandhi even debated with pacifists during his lifetime because he saw their movement as tolerant of British rule of India and shortsightedly insufficient: "It is a far cry from pacifism to Gandhi's idea of nonviolence. While pacifism hopes to get rid of war chiefly by refusing to fight and by carrying propaganda against war, Gandhi goes much deeper and sees that war cannot be avoided so long as the seeds of it remain in man's breast and grow in his social, political and economic life. Gandhi's cure is therefore very radical and far reaching. It demands nothing less than rooting out violence in oneself and from one's environment." B. Kumarappa, "Editor's Note," in *Gandhi: For Pacifists* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1949), v–vi, cited in Gene Sharp, "The Meanings of Nonviolence: A Typology," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3, no. 1 (1959): 41–66 at 43, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200275900300104. See also Terrence J. Rynne, *Gandhi and Jesus: The Saving Power of Nonviolence* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2008), 75–77.

spiritual, nonviolent form of resistance is dignifying. Gandhi called his campaigns *satyagraha* to emphasize this inherent difference between passivism and nonviolence. *Satyagraha* means "soul force" or "truth force," wherein the force exercised is spiritual and moral and in which people choose to be the recipients of suffering rather than inflict it for the sake of letting the truth rise to the surface. Further, *satyagraha* is more than civil disobedience because it is not merely a tactic for creating change; it is a way of life.[39] *Satyagraha* "includes the commitment to nonviolence, the belief in the power of truth and self-suffering, and the desire to win over the opponent and transform the situation."[40] These commitments, beliefs, and desires nurture the activist's growing felt-sense of her own dignity.

This developing sense of one's own dignity also sets the conditions for a felt-sense of the dignity of the enemy, and so develops activists' feelings about the command to love their enemies:

> He learns in the midst of his determined efforts to destroy the system that has shackled him so long, that a commitment to nonviolence demands that he respect the personhood of his opponent. Thus, nonviolence exalts the personality of the *segregator* as well as the *segregated*. . . . [There] is the growing awareness on the part of the respective opponents that *mutually* they confront the eternality of the basic worth of every member of the human family.[41]

King's Christian theology of the image of God and of human solidarity is an expression of his radical love—real assent to the dignity of each human person demands affirming the dignity even of our enemies. Thus, overcoming our feelings of anger and resentment toward our enemies is an essential element of interior self-purification because "hate is just as injurious to the person who hates"[42] and nonviolence "avoids not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. The nonviolent resister not only refuses to shoot his opponent but he also refuses to hate him."[43] Still, as Cornel West reminds us, King's "genuine commitment to the dignity of whites . . . never overshadowed or downplayed his deep commitment to black people."[44]

Unearned Suffering as Redemptive

Yet, even if the command to love one's enemies begins with a felt-sense of one's dignity and a refusal to cooperate with evil, what about suffering in the context of living out this command? What about the suffering that Gandhi and King claim is capable of

39. See King, "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," 49.
40. Rynne, *Gandhi and Jesus*, 42.
41. Martin Luther King Jr., "The Ethical Demands for Integration (1963)," in Washington, *A Testament of Hope*, 117–25 at 125 (emphasis added).
42. King, "Loving Your Enemies," 59.
43. King, "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," 51.
44. Cornel West, "Introduction: The Radical King We Don't Know," in *The Radical King*, ix–xvi at xiii.

changing hearts? King's Christian faith imparted the belief that "unearned suffering" can be redemptive.[45] Yet it was Gandhi who taught him that creative unearned suffering could transform even social situations and not only individual interactions.[46] As Gandhi observed, and as King was fond of quoting, "If you want something really important to be done you must not merely satisfy the reason, you must move the heart also. The appeal of reason is more to the head, but the penetration of the heart comes from suffering."[47] Unearned suffering (what Gandhi calls "self-suffering"—*tapasya*) and conversion are linked, for the nonviolent activist chooses to endure suffering not only because he understands the cyclical nature of violence, but also because he believes he can reach the opponent's heart through voluntarily suffering for the sake of truth.[48] Like King, Gandhi believed that nonviolence could melt even the stoniest hearts.[49] Rather than compulsion, nonviolence relies on its ability to reach the heart, bear suffering, and win opponents over not by threatening them but by stirring their sense of justice.[50] Winning in this way respects the dignity of the other and sets the conditions for lasting change. This is a long process, but over time, activists can wear the opponent down.[51] While the activist never knows which act of unearned suffering might at last reach her opponent's stony heart, she does know that the way to the head is through the heart, and the way to the heart is through a suffering that awakens the conscience because of the truth the suffering expresses about the situation. It is the difference between telling someone that a situation is unjust and inherently violent and showing him—indeed, showing him in one's very body. Like St. Paul, King recognized, "there are some who still find the cross a stumbling block, and others who consider it foolishness, but I am more convinced than ever before that it is the power of God unto social and individual salvation. So like the Apostle Paul I can now humbly yet proudly say, 'I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus.'"[52]

King made important distinctions between types of suffering. These distinctions are not systematically explained in his writing. However, I proceed to develop meaningful distinctions from his work. Like enemy-love, suffering should be understood according to the orderly unfolding of interpersonal and social transformation. First, earned and unearned suffering are mutually distinct. When suffering is earned, the recipient is

45. Martin Luther King Jr., "Suffering and Faith," in Washington, *A Testament of Hope*, 41–42.
46. See King, "Love, Law, and Civil Disobedience (1961)," 47; "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," 45, 50–51.
47. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *All Men Are Brothers* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 145.
48. Rynne, *Gandhi and Jesus*, 65–66. See also Ligita Ryliškytė, "Conversion: Falling into Friendship Like No Other," *Theological Studies* 81, no. 2 (2020): 370–93 at 377, https://doi.org/10.1177/0040563920931757. Ryliškytė argues that religious conversion hinges on one's antecedent willingness to suffer for the sake of transforming evil into good.
49. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 100 vols. (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958–1994), 68:64 (hereafter cited *CWMG*), cited in Rynne, *Gandhi and Jesus*, 66.
50. *CWMG* 67:195; 14:356, cited in Rynne, *Gandhi and Jesus*, 66.
51. See King, "Loving Your Enemies," 63.
52. King, "Suffering and Faith," 42.

morally responsible for the injustice, and so subject to punishment—that is, to the deprivation of some good intended to restore order. Unearned suffering occurs when someone who is not morally responsible for the evil act suffers because of it—it is, as King says, "unmerited."[53] King alludes to this kind of suffering when he clarifies that nonviolent activists are "*not* the creators of tension"[54]—they are innocent and not morally responsible for the violence and suffering that erupts in reaction to their dramatic actions. Second, voluntary and involuntary suffering are distinct from one another. For example, involuntary suffering is the kind of suffering Black Americans faced due to segregation, whereas voluntary suffering is the suffering activists chose to risk for the cause of justice:

> One must remember that the cause of the demonstration is some exploitation or form of oppression that has made it necessary for men of courage and good will to demonstrate against the evil. For example, a demonstration against the evil of *de facto* school segregation is based on the awareness that a child's mind is crippled daily by inadequate educational opportunity. The demonstrator agrees that it is better for him to suffer publicly for a short time to end the crippling evil of school segregation than to have generation after generation of children suffer in ignorance. . . . Of course, no one wants to suffer and be hurt. But it is more important to get at the cause than to be safe. It is better to shed a little blood from a blow on the head or a rock thrown by an angry mob than to have children by the thousands grow up reading at a fifth- or sixth-grade level. . . . [The demonstrator] sees the misery of his people so clearly that he volunteers to suffer in their behalf and put an end to their plight.[55]

The nonviolent demonstrator understands that his voluntary suffering can overcome the involuntary suffering innocent people are enduring insofar as his voluntary suffering exposes the unjust situation.

Four Types of Suffering, Two Contexts

These distinctions can be combined, yielding four possibilities, which fall within either of two distinct contexts in which justice is achieved—the context of retributive, vindictive justice and the context of satisfaction, reconciliation, and forgiveness.[56] The four possibilities are suffering that is (1) earned and involuntary, (2) unearned and involuntary, (3) unearned and voluntary, and (4) earned and voluntary. First, when suffering is earned but involuntary, the person morally responsible for the offense unwillingly suffers punishment for his actions—this belongs to the context of retributive injustice. Second, when suffering is involuntary and unearned, a situation

53. King, "Suffering and Faith," 41.
54. King, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," 135.
55. King, "Nonviolence: The Only Road to Freedom (1966)," in Washington, *A Testament of Hope*, 54–61 at 57.
56. See Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 85–87.

of oppression exists, which can be responded to according to either context.[57] For example, King realized he could react to his "unmerited suffering" with bitterness (retributive context) or seek to transform the suffering into a creative force (reconciliation/satisfaction context).[58] Third, unearned voluntary suffering is the kind of suffering nonviolent activists undertake—for example, the vicarious suffering of Christ on the cross and the decision King made to transform his suffering into a creative force. Fourth, earned and voluntary suffering is the kind of suffering a penitent undergoes because she willingly accepts the punishment due to her, and she does so for the sake of the reconciliation of friendship. These last two belong to the context of satisfaction.

These four forms of suffering are related to one another in nonviolent activism and in the justice of the cross, and their relation hinges on unearned voluntary suffering. Appealing to the numbered categories above, we can observe that, in the first place, (3) unearned voluntary suffering and (2) unearned involuntary suffering are related: activists voluntarily suffer in solidarity with the involuntarily oppressed and seek to overcome the oppression through their suffering. Second, in this attempt to overcome oppression, (3) unearned voluntary suffering and (4) earned voluntary suffering become related to one another: nonviolent activism seeks to bring about a conversion in the opponent/offender wherein the opponent/offender is converted from impenitent to penitent, which makes reconciliation possible. According to this conversion, the offender now willingly accepts the suffering he has earned for the sake of transforming evil into good, and this willingness is the condition of the possibility of reconciliation. At this point, King's nonviolence and Lonergan's analogies of the sacrament of penance and of friendship become mutually illuminating, as we will see in the comparison below between nonviolent activism and the crucifixion.

To understand why and how unearned voluntary suffering can transform and heal unjust situations, the two contexts (retributive justice and the reconciliation of friendship) need further elaboration. Lonergan sometimes calls the former the "justice of the judge" and the latter the "justice of the cross."[59] Jeremy Wilkins explains the difference and highlights the higher aim the justice of the cross seeks and makes possible because of its higher horizon—that is, its more expansive area of concern:[60]

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57. A further distinction can be made within unearned, involuntary suffering between preventable and non-preventable suffering. This distinction raises further questions about moral responsibility (with respect to preventable suffering) and possible differences between how the victim experiences preventable versus non-preventable suffering. I owe this further distinction to Ligita Ryliškytė.
58. See King, "Suffering and Faith," 41.
59. Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 527, 541. See also Aquinas, *ST* I.21.3–4 wherein Aquinas relates God's justice and mercy and explains that mercy does not destroy justice but fulfills it. The justice of the cross involves the fulfilment of justice through mercy, and the principle and goal of this justice is charity (the love of friendship).
60. Lonergan uses horizon metaphorically to mean the limit of one's knowledge and interests. In the case of the two justices, the justice of the judge occurs within a more limited horizon that excludes knowledge or concern about the personal context of justice and the possibilities for reconciliation. See Lonergan, *Method*, 221–23.

> Justice is a rightness of order but also a righting of disorder. In the righting of disorder our Christian aim is not merely to restore equity but to promote understanding, repentance, conversion, and reconciliation. The justice of a judge is impartial but also impersonal. . . . The justice of the cross is a higher justice, a personal and reconciling justice, a justice that seeks not punishment but understanding, conversion, and willing restoration. . . . The justice of the cross is not a prescription for ignoring injustice but an invitation to the conversations . . . that can go some way to restore not only objective equity but also the tranquility of order.[61]

Aquinas makes the same distinction between two types of justice when discussing the sacrament of penance: vindicative justice, which is not appropriate to the sacrament, and the reconciliation of friendship, which is appropriate. When explaining why contrition, confession, and satisfaction are fittingly assigned as the parts of penance, Aquinas responds by articulating the good that penance seeks and the conditions of achieving this good:

> In vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge's decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of the person offended; whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship, which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended.[62]

Punishment can occur in both contexts, and the key distinction is in the willingness of the one punished. In the context of retributive justice, punishment is not willingly accepted—it is compelled (earned but involuntary suffering). In the context of the reconciliation of friendship, it is willingly taken on (earned and voluntary suffering), and it is done so because the penitent is sorrowful and detests his offense and in order that pardon may fittingly be granted.[63]

As the two contexts can be distinguished according to the willingness of the person to accept punishment, so too can they be distinguished according to the dimension of the good they seek and the dimension of the good of which they are capable. Again, both contexts are just and both restore the good of order. However, the context of satisfaction (reconciliation of friendship) adds a further element because it specifically seeks to restore the *interpersonal* dimension of the good of order through pardon

61. Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Political Responsibility in a Time of Civil War," *Lonergan Review* 11 (2020): 13–35 at 31, https://doi.org/10.5840/lonerganreview2020112. The justice of the cross seeks what King calls "positive peace," which is not merely the absence of tension nor "tokenism" but the presence of both justice *and* brotherhood, the presence of true integration. See King, "Love, Law, and Disobedience," 50–51.
62. Aquinas, *ST*, III.90.2, co. See also 85.3, ad. 3.
63. See Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 63.

fittingly granted.[64] This interpersonal dimension includes a focus upon what can be done about evil, rather than about what can be retributively done to evildoers—and when we do ask about evildoers, it regards what can be done to transform them into friends.

In this context of the reconciliation of friendship, it is not punishment per se that makes it fitting to grant pardon, but rather punishment willingly accepted and accepted as a way of outwardly expressing one's interior sorrow over and detestation of the offense.[65] Interior sorrow and detestation (contrition) motivate the person's willing acceptance of punishment, and it is the offending person's interior sorrow and detestation that must be made known to the offended in order for reconciliation to become a possibility. The person's willingness to accept punishment expresses his changed stance toward and feelings about the offense—the offense is detestable and he is sorrowful over the offense and the harm it has wrought. This interior state is essential and foundational. Unless the offender and offended become of one mind and heart with respect to the offense, the offense will continue to be a barrier to relationship. If the offender aligns his mind and heart with the offended with respect to the offense, reconciliation becomes possible not only because the two parties now share values but also because this shared set of values indicates that the offender is a different person than the one who committed the offense in the first place, which in turn makes it possible for the offended to responsibly enter into a relationship with this "new" person. The offender's conversion with respect to the offense makes reconciliation reasonable and responsible.[66] A sign of conversion is his willingness to accept punishment—his willingness to accept the pain that comes with encountering the consequences of his past behavior. Conversion from impenitent offender to penitent is a participation in the more fundamental conversion according to which one is antecedently willing "to undertake suffering for the sake of the transformation of evil into good."[67]

64. See Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 65. See also Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross?*, 205.
65. In fact, Aquinas explains that a penitent's need for punishment itself (which is medicinal and is distinct from the role the penitent's willingness to undergo punishment plays in interpersonal reconciliation) can become unnecessary depending on the depth of the penitent's interior transformation, according to which she turns from sin in detestation and toward God in love. Insofar as punishment is formative, if the person is already firmly transformed, punishment becomes increasingly unnecessary. See Aquinas, *SCG*, 3.158.
66. Forgiveness and reconciliation are two distinct acts. The offended can forgive the offender, even if the offender does not repent—forgiveness is not dependent on or restricted to the offender repenting. A reasonable and responsible reconciling of the relationship, however, depends on repentance because a shared value judgment about the offense serves as part of the new interpersonal foundation. Repentance does not cause forgiveness. Rather, it is the other way around. Forgiveness freely given can move people to repent; it can be the horizon in which repentance becomes a more likely possibility: "Forgiveness is a catalyst creating the atmosphere necessary for a fresh start." King, "Loving Your Enemies," 57.
67. Ryliškytė, "Conversion," 370.

Given that it is the willingness of the person to undergo punishment that sets the context of satisfaction apart from that of retribution, the person making satisfaction (the person willingly punished) and the person who committed the offense can be either identical or distinct.[68] If they are identical, the punishment is both incurred and willingly accepted—it is earned and voluntary. If they are distinct, the punishment willingly accepted is not incurred—it is unearned yet voluntary. When the two persons are distinct, the satisfaction made is vicarious—one person is making satisfaction on behalf of another.[69] Vicarious satisfaction is rooted in and possible because of friendship, according to which two people become one and can thereby act on one another's behalf.

While willingness to undergo punishment is essential to reconciliation, it depends on a subjective transformation of the offender from impenitent to penitent (a change in his value judgment about and feelings toward the offense such that he is now willing to undergo punishment). It is perhaps obvious that even well-intended coercion is severely limited in its ability to change the subjectivity of the offender.[70] Yet, apart from such a personal change, reconciliation is impossible, as are its fruits of shared meanings and values. Instead, social transformation is built upon the unstable foundations of coercion and fear, wherein "initiative becomes the privilege of violence."[71] Thus, a practical question remains: Given the limitations of coercion, how can the conditions be set for such a transformation of values and feelings in the offender? And what roles (if any) do punishment and suffering have in this transformation? What is the way of the Cross for transforming hearts? It is at this point that *vicarious* satisfaction enters, which is only intelligible and just within an interpersonal horizon, and which is only possible because of friendship (according to which two people become one) within this horizon. This is the kind of satisfaction proper to the Cross and nonviolence. Before articulating how unearned suffering can be redemptive, it remains to clarify Christ's vicarious satisfaction.

Unearned Suffering as Redemptive: The Sacramental Analogy for Christ's Satisfaction

Lonergan retrieves an analogy with the sacrament of penance/reconciliation for Christ's satisfaction because it emphasizes Christ's interiority:[72] his vicarious passion

68. See Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 66.
69. See Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 66.
70. See Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 65.
71. Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 8. Lonergan understood that the lack of friendship among human beings (and between God and humanity) affected not only interpersonal relationships but history, too, and so he considered "the historical causality of Christ." See Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 609–21; Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross?*, 252.
72. I thank Ligita Ryliškytė for her help on this section, and her clarification that metaphysically speaking, charity (not sin) is what moved Christ to accept his passion.

and death *qua* satisfaction is "an expression of the utmost detestation of all sins and of the greatest sorrow of all offense against God."[73] This analogy between the penitent and Christ emphasizes the similarity between how the penitent judges and feels about his sins (contrite, that is, he detests his sins and is sorrowful for them) and how Christ judged and felt about our sins (vicariously contrite). This sacramental analogy for Christ's satisfaction also emphasizes the interior suffering he endured on account of his judgments and feelings about sin and proposes that his physical suffering cannot be understood apart from his interior life and interior suffering.[74]

There are two relevant likenesses between the penitent and Christ in the sacramental analogy. First, as a penitent considers, in heart and mind, his sins, so Christ did consider sins that were in no way his own.[75] The difference between the penitent and Christ is that Christ was absolutely innocent and so had no sins of his own to detest and be sorrowful for. Thus, the satisfaction Christ made was vicarious and rooted in his friendship for sinners (Rom 5:8). Second, "Like the penitent, Christ expressed these inward acts in and through an outward act."[76] This outward act included both the physical, bodily events (flogging, crown of thorns, jeering, crucifixion) and an act of communication or expression, which, like all of Christ's expressions in and through his humanity, is an expression of God to humanity.[77]

The similarity between the penitent and Christ helps us understand what the Cross expresses. As the penitent's satisfaction (penance) proceeds from contrition as an outward expression of her inward attitude, so too does Christ's vicarious satisfaction outwardly express his vicarious contrition (his interior judgments and feelings about sins).[78] Formally speaking, satisfaction "is what is as opposed to an offense against God as can be conceived"; it is "compensation for an offense," wherein compensation is understood interpersonally. Christ's interpersonal offer is that he is "indignant at the offense, denounce[s] the injustice of it, and in every way show[s] that he is on the side of the offended party, not that of the offender."[79] Thus, while Christ loves God and us, his love of us cannot be separated from or lessen his detestation of sin. In fact, this combination and juxtaposition of love and detestation causes in Christ tremendous

73. Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 79. See also Aquinas, *ST*, III.46.6.
74. In the context of satisfaction, Christ's physical suffering is significant, but its significance is as an expression of his interiority that can communicate to us sinners the reality of sin and inspire conversion and that can communicate to victims of sin that he is in solidarity with them with respect to the evils they have endured—like them, Christ detests these evils (though unlike them, he is not in need of refining his feelings to, for example, overcome resentment).
75. See Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 70.
76. Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 70.
77. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Redemption," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958–1964*, ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 3–28 at 5 and 22; Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 70.
78. See Ryliškytė, "Conversion," 386.
79. Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 89.

sorrow over the fact that we have sinned,[80] which is precisely what his cross expresses: "Love of God combines with detestation of sins, and with the judgment that in fact sins are offenses against God, to produce sorrow. *That* is what the cross expresses."[81]

Unearned Suffering as Redemptive: Presenting One's Very Body

In the civil rights movement, unearned suffering was, like the Passion, a way of standing with the offended and expressing detestation of and sorrow over sin, in particular, the sin of segregation. Reflecting on the movement, King writes, "we would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case before the conscience of the local and national community."[82] Elaborating on this point and defending the innocence of activists, he writes:

> Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community that has consistently refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored . . . we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with . . . injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured.[83]

Like Christ, nonviolent activists choose to carry a cross that is not rightly theirs (it rightly belongs to their opponents, who are morally responsible for segregation),[84] and they do so in order to prompt their opponents to confront the issue, examine their conscience, and take up their crosses—this is suffering as a creative force for social transformation.[85]

When civil rights activists were beaten, humiliated, and arrested, a triple, negative exposure occurred: the exposure of violence enforcing segregation laws, the exposure of the devaluation of human persons these laws enacted, and deliberate, creative disruption of "segregation's spatial boundaries" in acts of civil disobedience like lunch-counter sit-ins, which "exposed [segregation's] deficiency as a regulative principle of community."[86] In presenting their very bodies, they demonstrated that segregation is

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80. Lonergan, "The Redemption," 22. See also Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 545; Aquinas, *ST* III.46.6.
81. Hefling, "Lonergan on Christ's Satisfaction," 71–72.
82. King, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," 129.
83. King, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," 130 and 135.
84. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," in Crokern, Crowe, and Doran, *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1958–1964*, 160–82 at 181. See also Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross?*, 300–301.
85. See King, "Suffering and Faith," 41; "Love, Law, and Disobedience," 47.
86. For the first two exposures, see Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace," 147 and 149. For the third exposure, see Copeland, "'All Flesh Shall See It Together,'" 57.

detestable and sorrowful by making the suffering it causes and the violence underlying it visible.

Activists' actions also conveyed positive dramatic meanings.[87] A double, positive revelation arises: First, activists reveal themselves *as human* in their dedication to something more valuable than self-protection. That is, their actions reveal their personal value insofar as they freely incarnate and originate values of justice and redemption.[88] In their revelation of their humanity, activists both resisted the disvalue assigned to them *and* offered the offender the gift of recognizing them as human. This revelation helps inaugurate the "radical revolution of values" King called for—namely, "the shift from a 'thing-oriented' society to a 'person-oriented' society."[89] Further, as M. Shawn Copeland observes, "This *praxis* [of presenting their very bodies] envisioned a new social imaginary that discredited the humiliating bodily *habitus* that segregation demanded of blacks and offered to whites a new image of intersubjective regard and respect."[90] Until now, segregationists have been holding their feelings about segregation in place by thinking of Black people as nonhuman. The value-revealing actions of nonviolent activists and their violence-exposing suffering make it increasingly unlikely that the segregationists can continue holding their feelings in place without added effort and a growing and uncomfortable felt-sense of disequilibrium in their feeling horizon in which "some feelings are at odds with one another."[91] (For example, a segregationist's felt-sense of superiority conflicts with the emerging feelings of humility or compassion, and this conflict is interiorly uncomfortable and disruptive to one's current narrative.) Additionally, activists' actions reveal them *as friends* in their willingness to suffer with and for the offended and for their cause and in their unwillingness to harm the opponent. That is, they reveal themselves as friends of both the offended and the offender—they make a visible demonstration of love (charity, *agape*). This offer of friendship is essential because without the security love provides, self-examination can feel too risky and threatening.

Nonviolence, Vicarious Satisfaction, and the Reconciliation of Friendship

Three important points arise in connection to friendship: First, in the interpersonal context of friendship, we can suffer and satisfy vicariously because of the union between friends. Second (and here I follow Aquinas), when one witnesses her friend suffer, especially on her behalf, she suffers along with her suffering friend and so is not without punishment.[92] In other words, even if my friend suffers and satisfies vicariously for me, I cannot completely escape suffering because we are one in friendship, and so I suffer through her. We are united in charity and therefore her vicarious action

87. See Byrne, "Outer, Peace, Inner Peace," 147–48.
88. See Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace," 148.
89. Martin Luther King Jr., "Vietnam: A Time to Break the Silence," in West, *The Radical King*, 201–17 at 214.
90. Copeland, "'All Flesh Shall See It Together,'" 56.
91. Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace," 171.
92. Aquinas, *SCG*, 3.158.

is not a substitution (as can occur in a juridical context).[93] Third, in the supernatural order, preexisting friendship between the one satisfying vicariously and the offender is not only *not* required, but charity in the one who satisfies vicariously brings about a similar love in the offender.[94] This is the reality underlying Gandhi's insight about the ability of suffering to reach and even convert hearts, and the truth at the heart of Christ's loving decision to lay down his life for his friends who as yet were still sinners (Jn 15:13; Rom 5:8). Thus, while vicarious satisfaction means that the person undergoing punishment and the person responsible for the offense are distinct, and while vicarious satisfaction is always grounded in friendship, the two people need not have mutual friendship from the start. According to supernatural friendship (charity), I can have antecedent friendship for those who currently hate me—my friends-in-the-making. At first, the friendship is one-way. However, supernatural friendship expressed in self-sacrifice is creative of friendship in the other for me, and so it is creative of mutual friendship, which is the goal.[95] That is, charity not only first changes the enemy into a friend in my eyes, but it also can change me from an enemy to a friend in his eyes.[96]

Though Lonergan emphasizes that Christ's satisfaction demonstrates his friendship with the offended, it also demonstrates his friendship for the offender. Again, Lonergan argues God became human to communicate friendship to God's enemies in an orderly fashion. Christ's demonstration of friendship for his enemies creates friendship in them for both him and for the offended (God and all victims of sin). This newly created friendship in turn causes the offender to suffer insofar as he is witnessing a newfound friend suffer, and so he is not without his own punishment. This suffering is amplified insofar as the offender realizes his newfound friend is suffering both because of him and for him: because of the harm he has caused and for him so that he may receive the forgiveness already extended and seek reconciliation and all the healing work it involves. It is in recognizing the innocence, the friendship, and the self-sacrifice of Christ that the sinner suffers the consequences of sin previously ignored or denied. He suffers because he sees his new friend, Christ, suffer. This recognition at last sets the conditions for the sinner's willingness to undergo punishment in order to express the interior detestation and sorrow he now has for his sin, which communicates his change of heart. Again, reconciliation depends upon the sinner's becoming of one mind and heart with the offended by changing his own judgments and feelings about the offense to align with those of the offended. As the offender undergoes conversion through charity/friendship, he can at last turn toward his sin in repentance rather than away from it in ignorance or denial and turn toward the ones he has harmed with a contrite

93. See Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross?*, 231–32.

94. Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 131.

95. See Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of John 9–21*, trans. Fabian Larcher (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute, 2013), ch. 15, lect. 2, no. 2009. See also Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross?*, 229–30.

96. Again, we are never God's enemies because God loves us unconditionally (and so God does not need to change God's mind and heart with respect to us). However, we sinners do see God and treat God as an enemy, and so our minds and hearts do need to be changed with respect to God.

heart rather than away from them in indifference or contempt. What the Cross discloses is that God has chosen to change minds and hearts by Christ's vicarious satisfaction grounded in his supernatural friendship for us while we were yet sinners. The Incarnation and Christ's Passion decisively set the conditions for reconciliation through transforming minds and hearts by simultaneously communicating friendship and exposing sin for what it is.

Nonviolent activists participate in this supernatural friendship, and their unearned suffering expresses, for example, their detestation of and sorrow over segregation and demonstrates that, in every way, they are on the side of the offended—even as they offer the offender a way out through repentance and reconciliation. Nonviolent activists seek to mediate to the opponent their own judgments and feelings about segregation by exposing the violence latent within segregation, as Jesus sought to mediate to us his judgments and feelings about sin by exposing the violence latent within sin. Similarly, just as when nonviolent activists "present their very bodies," they expose the violence latent in the social situation, so too when Christ presents his body, he exposes the violence at the heart of human sin. The crucifixion exposes sin for what it is: violence against God and humanity, for in killing Christ we killed the one who was both God and man.[97] Like Christ, the activists become sin (1 Cor 5:21)—not because they take responsibility for the offender's action, but because sin becomes visible in the wounds it leaves on the bodies of the innocent. In this way, Christ's blood purifies our consciences (Heb 9:14); in this way, his wounds heal us (1 Pt 2:24)—not because he is wounded instead of us, but because his wounds make our sins visible. The visibility of our sins can awaken our conscience, which we can then begin purifying. Purifying our conscience can precipitate healing. King's approach to suffering and justice echoes and helps to make sense of Scripture's praising of suffering for justice's sake:

> For one is approved if, mindful of God, he endures pain while suffering unjustly. . . . For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in his steps. He committed no sin; no guile was found on his lips. When he was reviled, he did not revile in return; when he suffered, he did not threaten; but he trusted to him who judges justly. He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree, that we might die to sin and live to righteousness. By his wounds you have been healed. (1 Pt 2:19–25 RSV)

Unjust suffering is praiseworthy, in part, not as passive acceptance of evil but as an act of nonviolent resistance to evil that communicates the combination of love and deepest regret, which together have the power to cleanse the conscience and heal the interpersonal situation.

97. Technically, God is killed in Christ's humanity and not as God (even though *communicatio idiomatum* allows us to truly say God [the Son] was killed).

Lastly, like the crucifixion, nonviolent activism involves one event but two moral orders. In the same event, there is a grave injustice (crucifying Christ, attacking activists) and a genuine work of *agapic* self-sacrifice.[98] In the same event, the violence opponents inflict is dialectically opposed to the activists' love, and their dialectical opposition becomes visible in interruptive events like the crucifixion or lunch-counter sit-ins. This dialectical situation (what King calls the "tension" between good and evil, justice and injustice)[99] presents witnesses and perpetrators with a foundational decision—that is, with an opportunity for conversion.[100] Thus, these difficult "cross-encounters" (dialectical encounters between good and evil precipitated by unearned voluntary suffering) set the conditions for people to gradually withdraw from inauthenticity as they begin, for example, to have new insights into themselves and respond to memories of inauthentic actions with new feelings of shame and sorrow.[101] Moreover, witnessing activists' unearned voluntary suffering can provoke much-needed and long-repressed questions to emerge—questions about society and questions of self-examination. Nonviolent activism and the Cross are gadflies in society and human history that invite us to care more for justice than societal comforts.[102]

The Significance of Lonergan's Sacramental Analogy for Understanding Nonviolence and the Cross

That Christ's passion expresses both love *and* detestation of and sorrow for sin is of the utmost of importance—and it was why, most likely, Lonergan pinned part of the emergence of substitutionary penal atonement theory on the loss of the sacramental analogy.[103] Further, just as the fundamental error of penal substitution theory is to interpret Christ's vicarious satisfaction in the wrong context (the context of impersonal retributive justice rather than the interpersonal context of satisfaction), so too, we fundamentally misunderstand nonviolence if we interpret the unearned suffering of the activists in the context of retributive justice—as if the activists are being punished instead of the oppressor, as if the activists are taking punishment upon themselves in order to save the oppressor from suffering. This misinterpretation would indeed make

98. See Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 19.
99. See King, "Pilgrimage to Nonviolence," 50.
100. See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 123–26 and 250–74.
101. See Patrick H. Byrne, "Discernment and Self-Appropriation: Ignatius of Loyola and Bernard Lonergan, S.J.," *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 76, no. 4 (2020): 1399–1424 at 1419, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26986579.
102. Plato, *The Apology* in *The Trial and Death of Socrates*, trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2020), 31b and 41e; King "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," 130. King draws upon Socrates' reference to himself as Athens's gadfly sent to awaken it from its neglect of virtue and proposes that America needs nonviolent gadflies to awaken its conscience to the injustice of segregation.
103. See Lonergan, *The Redemption*, 95–99.

"the victims the servants of the evildoer's salvation,"[104] wherein their suffering, like Christ's in penal substitution, is considered a matter of retributive justice.

We also fundamentally misunderstand nonviolence if we think it is a subtle form of spiritual revenge of the weak against the strong.[105] Nonviolence seeks to win over the opponent and create not merely desegregation but also integration, that is, friendship.[106] Nonviolence is an offer of solidarity to the oppressors, who ought to suffer the consequences of their actions and do so willingly not in a retributive way but for the sake of reconciliation. The Philippine's People Power Movement expresses this sentiment in the Tagalog term for nonviolence, "*alay dangal*," which means "to offer dignity." The dignity offered is that of becoming human again and working toward authentic community through the willingness to suffer the difficult work of reconciliation and transforming evil into good.

Both in Lonergan's soteriology and in King's nonviolence, the sacramental analogy for Christ's satisfaction returns. Though King does not speak in these terms, nonviolence as he practiced it is one of the most powerful witnesses to the value of this analogy for understanding unearned voluntary suffering as redemptive. Nonviolence takes up the ministry of reconciliation God has called us to wherein we participate in God's laboring in creation to reconcile all persons to himself and to one another (2 Cor 5:18) through vicarious satisfaction—that is, expressing one's love *and* detestation.

Conclusion: Refining Feelings about the Command "Love Your Enemies"

I conclude with a reflection on refining our feelings about the command to love our enemies. Our feelings are what make us conscious of values, and authentic moral responsibility depends profoundly on an authentic horizon of feelings.[107] A feeling horizon is the totality of feelings individuals experience.[108] Responsibly living out the command to love our enemies and the suffering this command involves depends profoundly on how we feel about it. Some may feel a mixture of awe and dread as they feel the greatness and difficulty of the command. Others may feel its abusive and manipulative possibilities in their aversion to it. Many may feel nothing because the command is too commonplace and seems idealistic.

The only way to responsibly live this divine command is to attune our feelings to God's unrestricted love, which alone is capable of reconciling and ordering all our conflicting feelings and the judgments of value to which they are connected. Lonergan

104. See above, n. 24.
105. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *On Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 16.
106. See King, "The Ethical Demands of Integration," 118.
107. See Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace," 169. See also See Patrick H. Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment: Foundations for Lonergan's Ethics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 160–67 and 238–40.
108. See Byrne, "Outer Peace, Inner Peace," 161.

writes eloquently of how Christ's unrestricted love reconciled his feelings about the complex situation of good and evil in which he lived: "We were turned away from God. We were not friends but enemies of God, and Christ loved both his Father and his Father's enemies. His love of us did not in the least, and could not, lessen his detestation of sin. On the contrary, his detestation of sin, combined with his love of us, caused in him the greatest sorrow that we have sinned. . . . It is the combination of love and deepest regret involved in a single situation about the same persons."[109] Christ, whose feeling horizon was unrestricted, incarnated this combination and was thus eminently capable of responsibly loving both one's friends *and* enemies and transforming evil into good through the suffering creative of mutual friendship. This is the feeling horizon nonviolent activists seek to cultivate in their practices of self-purification, and which they seek to mediate in their alternative, dramatic actions in which they present their very bodies as an act of solidarity with the oppressed and an offer of solidarity to the oppressor; and through such acts, they take the initiating step in building the Beloved Community.[110]

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109. Lonergan, "The Redemption," 22–23.

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